A SOURCE PAPER ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES COLLECTIVES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300180002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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A SOURCE PAPER ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES-
COLLECTIVES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
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October 1957
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A SOURCE PAPER ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES-
COLLECTIVES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Contents
FOREWORD
I. Agrarian Program
II. Problems Resulting from the A ;i arian Program
A. Failure of Government to Carry Out Promises and
Regulations
1. MAO Promises Private Ownership
2. Vice Chairman LIU's Views
3. Organizational Regulations Stress Voluntary Principle
B. Coercion Used to Implement. Agrarian Program
1. Foreign Observers Report Force Used
2. Chinese Communist Offi.cta s Admit Use of Force
3. Chinese Communist Newspapers and Radio Admit
Coercion
C; Effects of Forced Collectivization on Peasants
1, Peasant Morale Low and Di ,=content Widespread
2. Living Standards Low
3. Elimination of Work Incentive
k. Education Denied to Children of Peasants
5. Peasant Grievances A1;ainst Cooperatives
6. Large Scale Desertions tram Cooperatives and
Migration to Cities
D. Economic Progress Threatened
1. Inept Planning and Mism.magement Producing
Economic Chaos
a. Dislocated Agricultural Program
b. Unrealistic Producton Norms
c, Promised Farm Machinery and Fertilizers
Unavailable
d. Failures in Cooperatives
(1) Abuses
(2) Conflicts and Contradictions
2. Dangers of Inflation
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A SOURCE PAPER ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES-
COLLECTIVES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The Chinese Communist regime maintains that the development
of China into an industrialized state can best be achieved through
implementation of its agrarian program. This, it claims, can
only be done if agriculture prospers because the raw materials
on which industry depends must be :'urnished by the peasants.
The regime promised the peasants that they would be landowners
in their own name, and that the products sold on the markets would
benefit them by raising their standard of living. It also claimed
that wages paid to workers would enable them to live comfortably,
and that industrial goods produced would be within the reach of
all. China thus would be self-sufficient and ultimately produce
all commodities necessary for the well being and comfort of its
citizens.
The attached documentation shows, however, that forced collectivi-
,zation of the agrarian population of Red China has not produced the
utopia promised to the nation. The agrarian program has resulted
in discontent and growing restlessness on the part of the popula-
tion. The regime has blatantly disregarded its promises to the
people whose needs it has proven unable to anticipate.
Farmers are not interested in cultivating their crops for a
regime which is bleeding them white. Available evidence indicates
that they are malingering in their tasks, deserting their harvests
and view the future without hope. Prices are rising, food is
becoming scarce, industrialization is hampered and unemployment
is wide-spread. Crime is increasing, desertions from the agricul-
tural producers' cooperatives (APC's are numerous and armed re-
volts are prevalent. Consequently this program, unworkable in a
country predominantly agrarian, cannot serve as a model for other
nations anxious to increase their agricultural potential.
Chairman MAO Tse-tung, in side-stepping the Red hierarchy by
forcing acceleration of collectivization, may have made a monu-
mental mistake which might trigger a movement that could ultimately
sweep him from control and possibly restore China to the Free
World. The agrarian situation in China, as revealed in the at-
tached documentation, bears careful scrutiny during the coming
months.
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A SOURCE PAPER ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES-
COLLECTIVES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
I. Agrarian Program
Totalitarian countries have long recognized the necessity of
rigid control over their peasants, e-specially when they constitute
the majority of the nation. Communist China is no exception.
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued
on 15 December 1951, the first draft decision on mutual-aid and
cooperation in agricultural production. This measure was designed
not only to control peasants politically but also to enforce govern-
ment regulations concerning the collection of taxes, the percentage
of farm products to be sold by the government at stipulated rates,
the share to be retained by the peasant, the kinds and quantities
of crops to be grown, and the sum to be paid for labor performed.
When this draft decision was issued, there were already approxi-
mately 300 agricultural producers' cooperatives (APL's) in Communist
China. On 16 December 1953, when the number of APC's had grown to
14,000, the Party Central Committee issued its decision regulations
which stated that, between the winter of 1953 and the autumn of
1954, the cooperatives should be increased to 35,800. Statistically,
the number reached 100,000.
The Central Committee, at its October 1954 meeting, decided
to increase the cooperatives to 600,000, Of the 670,000 actually
formed, 20,000 were eliminated iLn June 1955 because they were not
functioning properly. These ccoooperat.ives, mainly in the northern
provinces, were composed of 16,900,000 households.
In the spring of 1955 the Central Committee urged the forma-
tion of one million cooperatives. However, MAO Tse-tung, in a
speech on 31 July 1955, not only complained about the slow forma-
tion of these cooperatives, but ordered that they should be
speeded up rapidly, with a 1960 deadline for the collectivization
of all peasants, and a 1962 deadline for transforming all agri-
cultural enterprises into state--operated farms.
Consequently, by December :1955 the membership in the APL's
reached 1,900,000. In January .1.950, this time-table was changed
in a draft program of agricultural development submitted by the
Politburo of the Central Committee for 1956-1957, ordering the
completion of socialization of Chinese farming by the end of 1958.
The regime claimed in December :i95E0 that 96 per cent of all farm
households had been enrolled in cooperatives, and that fully
four-fifths of the cooperative farmers were in the collectives.
Six stages were announced by the government in the regimenta-
tion of the rural population. Five stages have more or less
been completed while the sixth stage is to be developed slowly,
because it depends on mechanization.
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The first stage was the confiscation of the land of large land-
owners and wealthy farmers and its distribution to land-poor
peasants.
The second stage was the formation of mutual-aid teams. In
this stage, neighboring families pooled their labor, animals and
implements for particular tasks during certain seasons, but the
peasant remained an individual agent.
The third stage was the formation of an APC. Land and farm prop-
erty were pooled and the individual peasant was paid a share of the
produce based on labor performed and the value of the capital contri-
bution invested.
In the fourth stage, also an
were collectively owned and each
in accordance with the amount of
The fifth stage is collectivization,
number of APC's. Land and equipment are
and the members are paid wages according
expended.
APC formation, the land and property
member was paid wages exclusively
work performed.
or the combination of a
owned entirely by the state
to the amount of labor
In the sixth stage, which necessarily will be delayed for a
number of years, the government is to undertake certain technical
reforms in the collectives.
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II. Problems Resulting from the Agrarian Program
A. Failure of Government to Carry Out Promises and Regulations
The Chinese Communist Goverr.:ment, in the development of its
agrarian program, assured the farmer that he is free to join or
reject the state-sponsored organizations. If he joins voluntarily,
his right of private ownership of land and equipment will not be
abrogated. These principles are clearly stated in the following
promises, decisions and regulations made by the leaders of Red China.
1. MAO Promises Private Owrership
MAO Tse-tung, in his work On Cooperatives published in 1943,
said: With a transformation of the individual form of pro-
duction to a collective form of production, it would
still be impossible to increase labor productivity.
Thus it is imperative that we develop cooperative
labor organizations on the basis of private economy,
that is, the private ovirership of property by individual
producers will not be destrroyed. Only by so doing we
greatly increase labor productivity in agriculture....
This kind of transformation .. is a revolution in
method of production.
2. Vice Chairman LIU's Views
Addressing the First National Conference of Representatives
of Cooperative Workers, Vice-Chairman LIU Shao-ch'i said:
It would be a leftist deviation if we operate the
cooperatives like state-owned stores. On the other
hand, it would be a rightist deviation if we manage
cooperatives like private stores. We should deviate
neither to the left nor to the right; we should oper-
ate the cooperatives in the strictly correct way.
This is a basic principle governing the operation
of all cooperatives. We must not deviate from this
principle. If we do, our cooperatives would not look
like real cooperatives.
3. Organizational Regulations Stress Voluntary Principle
The People's Practical Economic, Dictionary- Cooperatives in
China (published in Shanghai, 1953), defines the
principles
governing the organization of cooperatives as follows:
p [qtass line must be followed in the admission
of new members into cooperatives. Only working people
(i.e., workers, peasant::., and individual producers)
should be admitted into cooperatives....
The voluntary principle should be followed in the
organization of cooperatives.... Compulsory member-
ship and commandism are strongly rejected in the
organization of any cooperative.
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CPYRGHT
The mass line must be followed. A cooperative must
be organized according to democratic procedures....
The policy that cooperatives should serve the interests
of their members must be followed faithfully at all
times. The profit-seeking motive of the capitalists
must be rejected by all cooperative members. Those
who try to make profits in the name of the cooperative
must be expelled.
Agricultural producers' cooperatives are an advanced
phase of collective production. They can be organized
only when there is machinery. When small peasant
holdings still prevail in the countryside, it is really
impossible to urge farmers to organize into agricultural
producers' cooperatives. In the first place, the
peasant masses would not respond to such a call. In
the second place, state industry is still not in a posi-
tion to provide the peasants with sufficient modern
agricultural implements. Without large-scale invest-
ment by the state, agricultural producers' cooperatives
cannot be organized, and will not operate successfully
even if they are organized. Thus at the present time,
China's agricultural production problem is not how to
organize agricultural producers' cooperatives, but how
to use the supply and marketing cooperatives as a means
to stimulating production. Mutual aid-teams also
operate with the help of supply and marketing cooper-
atives.... No compulsion should be used to promoting
such mutual-aid teams; farmers must be allowed to parti-
cipate in such teams voluntarily.
These promises, however, were quickly forgotten and completely
abandoned in the head-long rush of forcing the farmer into the
collectives and stripping from him not. only the ownership of
his farm, but also of his implements, his livestock, grain, seeds
and fruit trees
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B. Coercion Used to Implement Agrarian Program
The following documentation indicts the Red leaders for
deliberately violating their promises and forcing collectivization
on the peasants.
1. Foreign Observers Report Force Used
Five independent accounts from different sources charge the
People's Republic of China with using force to compel its farmers
to join the APC?s.
a. Chaudhry Rahmatullah, a prominent Pakistani labor
leader who headed a Pakistani Trade Union Delegation to Com-
myp,($na, wrote in The Comment (Karachi, 21 July 1956)
Throughout my trip, i did riot see any concre e ex-
amples of development, progress or advancement to
benefit the peasants who make up 85 percent of
China's 500,000,000 population.... During my long
Journeys in China I did not. witness any proof of
modernization nor did I see the tractors, tubewells
and other modern agricultural implements. The situa-
tion in villages is much less pleasant than in the
cities. There is no doubt that some land reform of
a drastic nature has taken place; the Communists
have uprooted all the landlords, who, according to
them, were strangling the poor peasants. However,
the size of holdings in the villages is so small
that it is very difficult for a family to make ends
meet. Besides they have to pay the taxes and their
quotaswto the Government and thus the Communist
Government has replaced the exacting landlord. Peas-
ant discontent in different parts of China is increas-
ing.... The peasants who once were promised land
with all sorts of rights and-who were the backbone
of the revolution on the basis of these promises are
now being deprived of these lands which are distributed
to them. The Communist Party workers are ordered to
lead the peasants towards collectivization. The
slogan of "land to tillers'' has vanished and is never
mentioned, and according to the orders of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, the land has come
back to the State again. While industry flourishes
in the great developmental schemes, the farmer is
left to feed the hungry nation with little help from
his Government, with no effects at modernization and
the constant yellings of the Communist Party bureau-
crats in his ear.
b. The Hindustan Time}_ (4 January 1957) commented on a
r b1-FRC mittedo the Indian Co-operative Union as follows:
On China, the report states that on "official Com-
munist evidence" only "pro for'na results" have been
obtained. Peasants have been and are being made to
Join co-operatives through force, the threat of
force or irresistible administrative pressure exer-
cised through discriminatory taxes and other measures.
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CPYRPHTThe Asian ,Analyst
February 1957) cites the following.
It is now fairly clear that in spite of the official
call for "voluntary" formation of agricultural pro-
ducers' cooperatives and collectives, direct and in-
direct coercion has usually played a major part in
the movement and provoked fierce and prolonged popu-
lar resistance. Thus a Party Congress report about
Changchih special district in Shansi province---one
of the "early-liberated" areas where "land reform"
was complete by 1947--reveals that for two years
afterwards a bitter internal struggle raged, reviving
again during the Korean war: Taoist secret organiza-
tions were feverishly active. In 1953 "some excesses"
of the Party in organizing "mutual aid teams" aroused
the peasants and "one county almost erupted in revolu-
tion." In the spring of 1955 "counter-revolutionaries"
again stirred up resistance to the monopolized purchase
of foodstuffs by the State and to collectivization
(Peoples Daily, 26 September). Out of 610,000 house-
holds In the district, 2,759 "elements" have been
"handed over to the collectives for labor under surveil-
lance," and 2,387 are "either serving prison sentences
or laboring outside" the district (probably in "reform
through labor camps"). And this took place in one of
the most "reliable" old Communist areas in the country.
ul aln, w o was in Shanghai six months before
and after the Communist take-over of the mainland and who
revisited the new regime in 1955, made the following accusa-
tion against the Chinese Communist government in The New
RI I-1113 May 1957):
The Communist regime is busily engaged in taking
away from the Chinese peasant the "Good Earth" which
it had given to him. The change is now virtually
accomplished, and the collective system has already
almost replaced the private ownership concept which
was an article of faith in early revolutionary plan-
ning
I was in Peking in October 1955, when
President MAO announced his collectivization plan in
a report to the party, intimating that the first
stage of land socialization was to be completed within
six months, and attacking with an unaccustomed vio-
lence those who might be inclined to resist or slow
down his design.... Voluntary adherence by the peas-
ants to the agricultural production cooperatives
which preceded collectivization... existed more in
fancy than in fact. No sooner had MAO made his
declaration, however, than the regime unleashed a
violent campaign of propaganda and persuasion (a
word which seems to have a special meaning in China).
Collective pressure on individuals was intensified,
and within eight days .., even millions of peasants,
had "spontaneously" given their support to the coopera-
tives.,,, I have visited several agricultural coopera-
tives, mainly in Hopei, an established agricultural
region, Manchuria, the pilot province and Kansu, the
Far West of the New China... it was clear from visits
to the villages that a virtually irresistible pres-
RlIrP TAMP nanAecorilj being @.4@124@4 on onco for-mipt
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CPYRGHT
The state determines what each farmer shall plant,
fixes land taxes in advance, and decides, often in a
quite arbitrary manner, what purchases to make in each
village after the harvest. Sooner or later the
individualist peasant, having lost all liberty, will
have no alternative but to take the "road to socialism"...
e. C. M. Chang in his article, "Communist China, Fact
and Myth 14 published in The New Leade.r (24+ September 1956) had
th YR concerning the c,ol7.ectives<
The collectivization deLve has been both expensive
and bloody. But no obstacle, however formidable,
can stop the Communist planners. Indeed, the very
magnitude of the obstacles means that the pace must
be accelerated, and har,;her and still harsher methods
will be employed. The Soviet experience is considered
relevant to the Chinese situation. Collectivization
is, in Communist thinking, the prerequisite for social-
ist transformation,. And, in the present world situa-
tion, China must complete the process of socialist
transformation in a hurry.
2. Chinese Communist Official. Admit Use of Force
The Minister of Agriculture, LIAO Lu-yen, in an address on
25 July 1955 to the National Congress on agricultural policies,
disclosed the following-
Of course, in the victorious advance of the coopera-
tive farming campaign, ;rho-tcomings still exist.
In some localities, mi;take'es of compulsion and vio-
lation of the policy of voluntariness and mutual bene-
fit have occurred. Such shortcomings as poor opera-
tion and administratioii and poor production organization
also still prevail.... Some people have been heard
to say that the peasant.' enthusiasm in production is
Jeopardized because of poor results in the cooperativi.-
zation of agriculture and =door food work....
The following year, he admitted in a report to the Third
Session of the First People's ("ong re ss held in Peking on 15 June
1956 that:
... there are still man shortcomings and faults
in agricultural cooperation and agricultural pro-
duction. In the work of c,oo-reration, there have
been rather serious extravagance and waste and abuse
of manpower and materiaL resources in a number of
agricultural producers, cooperatives. Prices fixed
for draft animals taken into the cooperatives have
not been fair enough and the work of tending and
managing public livestock has been poor, leading
to the weakening and death of draft animals....
In the work of agriculture, a number of cooperatives
in some places have set their targets for increased
production higher than the technical abilities could
encompass....
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The Chairman of the State Planning Commission, LI Fu-ch'un,
in presenting the Five Year Plan to the First National People's
Congress in July 1955, acknowledged that there were instances of
d
l
un
u
y hasty and coercive practices and warned that-
If these mistakes are not corrected production not
only will not increase but may even decline.
Chinese Communist Newspapers and Radio Admit Coercion
In late 1956 a copy of the Shensi Daily News which reached
Hong Kong reported the arrest of 100 "counter-revolutionists"
after they had sacked a People's Council building, burned the
records and killed the secretary in June. The Peso le's Daily
(Peking), commenting on the event on 23 August 195b, stated that:
The Provincial Party Committee held between August 8
and 16 criticised itself in familiar terms for
"commandism" which had "aroused dissatisfaction
among the masses and suppressed the enthusiasm of
the peasants."
An excerpt from the People's Daily (27 June 1956) disclosed
the following:
Now that the great majority of the peasants have
joined cooperatives, local party organizers can
terrorize them through both political and economic
means. They say: "Now that the cooperatives own
the land, we have the peasants' throat and they
dance to our tune."
The Kwangming Daily (Peking, 8 July 1956) admitted that:
Many local organizers are acting illegally, they
are searching houses, arresting and torturing people,
forcing couples into marriage and stealing collective
property.
The Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party re-
ported on 8 May 1957 that-
Since last winter 117,916 households have withdrawn
their membership in agricultural cooperatives; of
these, however, 10,214 have rejoined. In the course
of consolidating the agricultural cooperatives,
harsh measures to restrict the withdrawing members
were used in some localities, thereby resulting in
a certain degree of tension which should not have
arisen.... In areas where there have been great
economic changes and in the calamity-stricken areas,
little has been done to improve the livelihood of
the people.
By the admission of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves,
by their press and radio broadcasts, and by the testimony of
foreign travelers who have visited Red China, the government has
been guilty of brazenly disregarding its promises to the peasants.
It has eliminated private ownership of farm lands and stock,
established unequal wage standards, arbitrarily distributed
food, and failed to provide equipment. It also has used adminis-
trative pressure, coercion and commandism to herd 96 per cent
of the Chinese farmers into state-controlled cooperatives-
collectives.
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C. Effects of Forced Collectivization on Peasants
The regime has repeatedly proclaimed that its agricultural pro-
gram will benefit the population by raising the standard of living.
Peasants have been promised that the income of APC members will
be increased, food will become plentiful, children of peasants
will receive a good education and that farmers will be provided
with machinery to lessen their drudgery.
The following documentation indicates, however, that all these
promises have been broken by the regime. Peasant morale is low
and discontent widespread among the population, undermining the
sociological structure and threatening the economic stability of the
country. The failure of forced co-'lectivization to raise the standard
ov living has resulted in large scale desertions from the APC?s and
migration to the cities.
1. Peasant Morale Low and Discontent Widespread
The morale of the peasants Is extremely low as a result of the
forced herding of farmers into the state-controlled agrarian
organizata~~ions.
~~u1lliaFnTsays in his article that -
The peasant state of mind in the early winter of
1956 was conclusively revealed in the sabotage of
the preparations for the spring crops of 1957.
The People's Daily comp ?_ained that the cooperatives
were not carrying out their, winter tasks; winter
sowing was being held up and maintenance work was
being neglected. This was claimed to be the case
in Shantung, where the peasants were discouraged;
the accounts had not been feompiled and the workers
still did not know how much they were to be paid
for their work during the past year. The organizers
did not dare to push the peasants, and both workers
and their superiors, said the Daily, made no pretense
at the enthusiasm which wa,3 shown when recruitment
was initiated the previous winter.
The People's Daily stated in November 1956 that there was a
wider use of coercion by the authorities often "directly stimulated
by the plans and arbitrary decisions made by the higher authorities."
To control discontent, local organizers called "accusation meetings"
which gave the peasants an oppo 't.uiity to voice their grievances
and the cadres a chance to imp(-)-,e additional controls.
The new rural bureaucracy LL?Lso was rapidly gaining in number.
In one cooperative in Shansi there were a total of 300 officials
for 400 homes while in another cooperative in the same area 100
officials were being used to control 200 families. The peasants
were required to attend meetings lasting far into the night,
then rise the following morning, at five for work, still tired and
distressed.
Local leaders often furnished false reports to their superiors.
The cooperative accounts were badler kept because the accounting
system was too intricate for the semi-literate peasants to compre-
hend. The most serious complaint by the peasants was that there
were numerous injustices and errors in calculating their wages
for work done.
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2. Living Standards Low
For the last two years, the farmers' income has decreased, as
indicated in the following items:
a. The text of the Grain Distribution Directive, re-
leased by Peking on 25 November 1956, states that 10 per-
cent of the members of agricultural cooperatives suffered
"income decreases," due either to natural calamities or to
improper management, of such severity as to cripple them
from operating unless assisted by the regime.
b. The Christian Science Monitor (3 July 1957) credited
Frank Robertson, Special Correspondent, Hong Kong, with the
following statement:
In spite of claims that agricultural. production
for 1957 will reach a record of 191,000,000 tons,
it is admitted that the revenue from collectives
and the few private peasants :Left has fallen off
considerably....
A study of the Chienchin APC in Yungping County, Yunnan, showed
that while 70.6 per cent of its total income was distributed to
the peasants, the were only paid 0.-i-6 yuan for each working day
which averaged 3.4 yuan per month, proving that the peasants'
living standards are still very low. In this cooperative, a num-
ber of peasants kept no hogs and not even the chicken most of
them had before collectivization.
The New China News Agency stated on 18 August 1956 that in a
certain district in Kwa.ngtung Province 21 out of 87 ACP's had
been dissolved due to living standards having been reduced.
On 20 November Peking Radio informed its listeners that in the
Chunli cooperative in Hupeh seven out of eight production team
leaders were encouraging 100 members to neglect their agricul-
tural production in favor of trade.
Tgq''s Daily (244 August 1956), in an article on the
cooperatives in Changsha Hsien, Hunan, said that
a.. There are altogether 163 such co-operatives,
which constituted 13 percent of the total number
of cooperatives of the hsien. Of these 163 coopera-
tives, 71 will suffer a decrease in production
ranging from 10 percent to 40 percent in comparison
with last year. None of the remaining 92 coopera-
tives can fulfill this year's plan for increased pro-
duction.... Over 7,000 households which are members
of these cooperatives will, without exception, re-
ceive less income this year than last year. Under
such circumstances, many cooperatives have lost
confidence and members have become restless; 4 per-
cent of the members have withdrawn from the coopera-
tives; 7 percent of the members are asking to with-
draw and 19 percent of the members have grown pessi-
mistic and disappointed and have given up production
work....
h 24 October lq5ih, PPki nZ ra rri n _ 1-hrrnicrh the~'hin~ a? Home
bervlce, broadcast the following:
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This year, increased agricultural production assign-
ments of a number of agricultural cooperatives in
the Mienyang Special District, Szechuan Province,
were not fulfilled satisfactorily as a result of
improper business management.
The World Today (Hong Kong, 1 May 1957) quoted a woman who
recently ed rroomlRed China concerning conditions in the farming
districts of Kwangtung Province:
We were working in rural. districts mostly. Farmers
there were living a life e~;-en poorer than beggars.
They were wearing patched clothes, and didn't have
enough food to eat. As far as we know, each of them
was given four ounces of rice a day, and had to buy
potatoes to make up the shortage. Even so, each of
them was allowed to buy only one catty of potatoes
each day. Each got only four ounces of oil and the
same amount of sugar a month. No pork was on sale.
You can imagine how scanty their life was.
John Roderick, in his dispatch from Hong Kong to the Washington
Post (14 July 1957), indicates the reasons for the low standards
of living on mainland China?
For this was a nation beset with economic troubles,
dissatisfied with the bureaucracy of government,
still aching from the effort to convert itself
from near-feudalism to ;,ocLalism. Floods, drought
and a disastrous 1956 typhoon had laid waste to
millions of acres of land and brought suffering to
70 million people. The country had gone into debt
partly because of the }wavy expense of bringing
relief to ravaged area,,. `here were still food
shortages. Officials E-:a.dmi lted graft and corruption
in newly-created agricu_cltu-al. producer cooperatives.
Party members were inc?-easingly arrogant and more
and more concerned with their own comforts. Party
cadres among the union;; were inept ....
The impoverishment of the rural. population resulting from
forced collectivization is des