THE IMPACT OF COMMUNES IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300120008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 29, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICIAL U,
UNITED STATES
FOR MATION
AGENCY
Office of Research and Intelligence
THE IMPACT OF COWUNES IN CHINA
0 P-24-58 September 29, 1958
This report is not a statement of USIA policy.
0
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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USIA declassification & release instructions on file
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Statement of Purpose
This analysis of Communist Chinese propaganda on the
nationwide formation of agro-industrial communes is intended
to point up the vastly increased political and economic as
well as the cultural and ideological controls which the
Communist authorities will acquire over the huge peasant
population of the mainland, and to provide pertinent back-
ground or the development of the communes. The communal
process is intended to speed up the reduction of the Chinese
peasant into a completely "socialist man," a.cog in the vast
apparatus designed to extend Communist power and further
Communist goals on the mainland of China. The commune is
intended to subordinate further the interests and welfare of
the Chinese masses to the requirements of the Communist state,
With the removal of this page and the cover sheet, the
material in this report may be treated as Unclassified,
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THE IMPACT OF GOMMUNES IN CHINA
I. Summary
II. Communes to Replace Cooperatives as China's Basic Unit
Mao Calls for Communes
Hasty Organization
Publicity Stresses Production Potential9 Conceals Repression
Communes Necessary to Meet Accelerated Production Goals
Propaganda Claims Greater Discipline and Efficiency
Private Property Eliminated
Propaganda Lists Strengthened Political Controls
Wage Coercion Outlined
Financial Problems
Similar Changes in Handicraft Cooperatives to Meet
Accelerated Goals
Ill. Chinese Use of Soviet Experience
Khrushchev's Farm Plans
Chinese Praise for Khrushchev Policies
Chinese Follow Soviet MTS Decentralization
IV.. Communes Provide First Step Toward Communism
Liu Shao-chi Implied New Ideological Status
Communist Stage No Longer Remote
Similarity to Yugoslav Statements on Communes
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Summary
Vastly,-?nereased control over the mainland population is Axplicit
in the current Chinese Communist formation of agromindustrial communes
and state-owned handicraft factories. This first step toward forced
communization is directed toward total state control, organization and
ownership of mainland assets with workers and peasants alike to receive
fixed wages rather than shares in the unit's productivity. The larger
agro-industrial units will permit easier central direction and indoc-
trination and will provide for firmer control of the activities, work
assignments and thoughts of China's masses. The move, begun this
spring at Mao Tse-tung,'s behest, appears designed to facilitate Communist
China's intense drive for status in the socialist camp e? Peking is
the only other nation in the camp beside the USSR to make the claim
to be building Communism ?? and to make possible an increased economic
product supporting Peking's claim to "great nation" status. Achievement
of these objectives, as in the past, will require further-inroads into
the masses' freedom and welfare.
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II. Communes to Replace Cooperatives as Chinaas Basic Unit
Mao Calls for Communeso The new "basic social unit" in Chinaus
countryside is to be the agro-industrial "peopleOs commune "encompassing
"industry., agriculture, commerce, culture and education and the military,"
according to recent Peking announcements. The concept is attributed to
Mao Tse-tung, in keeping with the current cult publicity surrounding the
Chinese leader. According to CCP propagandist Chen Pe ta., writing in
the mid-duly issue of the PartyQs new ideological journal Red Flag, Mao
recently directed that the CPR's general course should be to "organize
industry, agriculture, commerce and trade, culture and education and
the militia mo that is., the armed strength of all the people om into a
large commune which should form the basic unit of our society." The
development was formalized on 29 August 1950 in a resolution of the
Chinese Communist Central Committee.
Hasty Organizations. According to current publicity from mainland.
China, the first communes were organized in April this year in Henan
with the merging of small cooperatives into big ones - the average ratio
is about 10 m 1. By midsummer the campaign had spread quickly to all
of China and in early September reports claimed virtual completion of
the communization in six provincial areas., Henan., the first to begin.,
was the first to announce completion of the task in early September,
Virtually all other provinces and minority regions, after hasty establish-
ment of experimental communes, were also well advanced in the transfoia-
tion of their farm cooperatives and collectives and Peking reported that
the communes would be established throughout the nation by harvest time
this fall.*
* The possibility that the plan.for agro-industrial communes oo like
that for cooperatives in 1955 ?? has been controversial is suggested by
the fact that it was not reported on in the Party resolution on agricul-
ture adopted at the second session of the VIII CCP Congress held this May,
The Party resolution approved the controversial 12 year agricultural
plan only "in principle" and recommended that the Central Committee be
assigned the task of "making revisions that may be necessary" in the
light of future developments. The 12-year agricultural plan, orginally
approved by the CCP Politbureau in January, 1956, has been revised at
least eight times since then and has been the subject of some public
controversy. No direct criticism of the commune system has been
publicized however,
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Publicity Stresses Production Potential, Conceals Repressions. Esta-
blishment of the communes on the mainland have been accorded rather more
than normal publicity for a domestic topic and broadcasts from Peking
have beamed the news to all audiences at home and abroad. Additionally
the official Chinese Communist news agency, NCNA,, has transmitted reports
of the development of communes to its. domestic and foreign consumers.
Peking stresses the increased production potential of the communes;
.repressive features of the system are revealed only implicitly. The
announcements of the completion of communal organizations in several pro-
vinces in early September occasioned a peak in broadcast attention with
some 80 separate broadcast commentaries on the subject in the week I m 7
September. This accounted for over ten percent of all broadcast commentaries over Radio Peking for the period. The resolution of communes
approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 29
August was released and publicized heavily on 10 September - 28 separate
broadcasts carried the information to all audiences. In addition to the
regular stress in home and regional broadcasts, news of the communes is
broadcast most widely to Southeast Asia and to Overseas Chinese audiences.,
without apparent. tailoring. As is customary, comment to date has made
no attempt to portray the development of communes in China as one deserving
of emulation-by other nations.
Communes Necessary to Meet Accelerated Production Goals, The rationale
advanced for the large-scale organization of communes throughout China is
first and foremost an economic ones Peking on 20 August declared that
"the superiority of the commune system has made it possible for the difficult
and huge production assignments to be completed successfully." Just two
days before Peking reported a Peoples Daily comment that the peasants had
begun to realize that "small cooperatives could not meet the requirements
of the 'big leap forward? in various fields, but had become an obstacle
to the development ofthe productive forces.'" The paper added that it had
become "urgent., under these circumstances, that the people?s communes"
be established, An account of. Honan?s experience stated,
* Controver. y over China?s ability to meet the rash goals for increased
agricultural production was exposed publicly by both Liu Shao-chi and Tan
Chen?lin, the Party?s agricultural expert, at the May Congress sessions.
Both referred to ranking Party cadres who opposed "reckless advance" and
who were "waiting for the autumn harvests to settle accounts." Formation
of the communes and amalgamation of small cooperatives seems part of the
leaders' attempts to reach the high targets set. There is no indication
that the disagreement over "reckless advance" included disapproval of the
organization of the-communes, although this may have been the case.
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In view of the increasing demands of industrial construction
and the need for improving the people's livelihood further,
the masses of cadres and people recognized the urgent need
of merging the small. cooperative3 into large ones in order
to solve the shortcomings involving manpower and materials
which were being concounzered by the small farm c.,,,rganizations
and to provide conditions for "building more, faster, better
and more economically,"
Propaganda Claims Greater Disci lpine and Efficiency' Peking lists
the following major advantages that communes will have ever the smaller
and less ordered cooperatives and collectives,
1, "The working efficiency of the peasants in the communes is,
in general, 20 percent higher than in the agricultural
cooperatives," according to a discussion of the question on
1 September. Comment stresses the more organized use of the
available labor in specialized work brigades and notes es-
pecially the release of women for work both in the fields d
in other communal activities. The final break-up of the tra-
ditional Chinese family system is predicated on the widespread
development in the communes of public kitchens, nurseries,
tailoring establishments and the like,.. One province alone
claims that already seven million women have been released in
this fashion from their household duties for more productive
work. Even the aged and infirm are to be encouraged to under-
take limited production assignments geared to their infirmities.
2.. Establishment of the more disciplined communes will facilitate
the "accumulation of common funis1t, according to Peking's plans.
The. ability of the regime, in short, to withdraw surplus funds
and savings for state purposes and, at the same time, to supply
less goods to the commune which instead will be expected to
produce'its own necessities of life, will be considerably
enhanced.
The Peking regime expects a more rational and efficient use of
the land in the large communes to bring about large crop increases
which will in the foreseeable few years eliminate the food pro-
blem and provide first an average of 1,000 and later 1,500 cattier
of food per capita. At the same time, the planned introduction
of primitive industry in the communes will add to the total
industrial prdduct and is expected in many. things to make the
commune self sufficient in necessary industrial and consumer goods.,
The State will thus be freed to pursue the goal of modernized
heavy industry for defense needs, a goal which is currently
(September) being reactivated on a priority basis.
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40
The introduction of industry into the basic farm communities.,
it is hoped by the Chinese Communist authorities., will also'
facilitate the "elimination of differences between town and
country., industry and agriculture and mental and manual labor."
The establishment of factory brigades within the communes is
expected to gradually provide the worker nucleus for more
widespread expansion of industrialization in China in the
future.
Existing communes., which average from 10,000 m 409000 in member-
ship according to local conditions., will have the advantage., the Chinese
Communists declare., of "centralized control and unified management" and
will develop and engage in all spheres of activity,, including industry.,
agriculture, forestry,, animal husbandry, subsidiary occupations., market-
ing and supply, credit., culture and education,, public health, and
communications. The existing hsiang or administrative village is to be
replaced by the commune and hsiang officials will staff the commune.
Emphasizing the advantages of centralized direction and unified
management,, the commune is set up on the basis of work brigades which
can be assigned and utilized as deemed necessary. Current reports state
that centralized deployment of work brigades has resulted in the sudden
growth of communal industrial units and in the advance of such other
projects as afforestation.,.flood control., irrigation., electrification,
and primitive farm mechanization.
Private Proeerty Eliminated: A major characteristic of the new
commune is the system of "common ownership" which will universally deprive
the peasants of the ownership of the few,things left to him in the
collectives - private garden plots and tools. The new commune member
will be permitted to retain only It a small number of-domestic animals and
fowl as private property.P? The private garden plots., it is directed,,
"will be taken over by the operational units Lommunal kitchen of the
people?s communes for cultivating grain or vegetables for the joint con-
sumption of the commune members."
Propaganda Lists Strengthened P01it cal Control: The political
motivation for the change to communal organization clearly includes the
increased degree of control which the Party can exercise over larger units.
Control which. is presumat necessary to meet China?s ambitious economic
goals. In keeping with this., Chinese Communist propagandists call for
strengthening Party leadership and perfecting the Party organizations
within the communes The Party., Peking adds
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must not only consolidate all rank-and-file Party cadres,
but must also.improve the methods of Party leadership,
fully developing:the roles of the Party, youth league, and
women's organizations. It must also strengthen the Part s
ideological-political program for the members within the
commune and develop the "red and expert" Party activists.
Concomittantly, Chinese Communist propaganda lists labor discipline
as one of the major characteristics of the new communes. Frequent
reference is made to imposing "stern control over the fulfillment of the
labor quota" assigned each commune member. Perhaps the greatest lever
to be used in controlling the commune members is the newly adopted
wage system whereby members who fail to work "enthusiastically" or are
"lax" fail to receive a-bonus - deducted from their wages in advance
or even to demotion in wage grade. Another important lever of day to
day control ever the commune members exists in the para-military
organization established in the communes. According to an editorial in
Red Fes, one of the Party's theoretical organs, commune members are to be
"organized along military lines, do things the way battle duties are
carried out." 'Red Flag adds that the swift expansion of agriculture
demands that the peasants "quickly strengthen their organization, act more
quickly and with greater discipline and efficiency."
Wage Coercion Outlined. A basic difference between the new communes
and the former collectives is the adoption of a wage system for peasants
in the communes, The new organizations will operate a "basic wage plus
reward system" to replace the former "work-point,system" of remuneration
under the socialist collectives. Under the new wage system, Peking explains,
the amotant of fixed wages will be paid to members according
to the individual labor performances and work attitude, plus
monthly and seasonal rewards. The commune has also set aside
funds for rewarding those whose performances have been adjudged
outstanding.
It is in the use of bonuses and rewards that the commune leadership
can exert the greatest control. Eighty percent of the basic wage of each
member will be paid him directly, but 20 percent will be withheld, to be
returned only 'in the form of a bonus or reward for outstanding performance.
A worker who fails to display the proper "enthusiasm" or is lax or fails
to work the requisite number of days not only loses the 20 percent of his
basic wage already withheld, but runs the risk of being demoted to a lower
wage grade or of having further wages deducted. On the other hand, to
qualify for a bonus, Peking requires that he be "obedient, enthusiastic,
overfulfill production quotas, struggle against evil personalities and
practices, think progressively and work at least 28 days per month." The
pressure for conformity and production are thus increased manifold.
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According to the draft regulations of one commune,, "the distribution
of income shall be based on the principle of ensuring high speed in
expanded production." While the regulations call for increased wages as
the rate of production goes up, the regulations prescribe not only that
the rate of wage increase must be slower than the rate of increase in prom
duction,, but also that when living standards reach the level of "well-to-
do middle peasants," the rate of wage increase should be reduced to make
possible greater accumulation for industry.
Financial Problems Some problems are foreseen in the wage-income
pattern of the communes.. One involves the expected reaction of members
of comparatively well-to-do cooperatives which are forced to merge and
hence share their wealth with poorer cooperatives. The Party Secretary
of Shansi Province, Tae Luuchia, writing in the 16 May Peo~ ple's Da.ili,
warned that "the existence of markedly well-to-do and markedly poor
cooperatives side by side might well lead to a fierce class struggle."
And a Honan conference declared that communes should strive to maintain a
!'reasonable ratio between the pay for labor contributed to agricultural.,
industrial and subsidiary production in order to avoid discord between
members engaged in different types of work,, thereby adversely affecting
the practice of paying according to the contribution of labor."
Similar Changes in Handicraft Coop2ratives to Meet Accelerated Goals
The handicraft cooperatives too are in the process of transformation into
amalgamated units known as cooperative factories or state-owned factories
operating under the "system of ownership by all the people." A report of
a national handicraft conference held in Peking in September explained that
workers in cooperative and local state-owned factories
are given back their shares in the cooperative and become
wage workers. The local state-owned factory comes entire-
ly within the system of ownership by all the people. The
cooperative factory also comes within that system in essense,
since the members no longer own shares and rely entirely
on wages.
The report notes, however., that the cooperative factory "retains some
elements of collective ownership," inasmuch as profits of the factory.
after taxes,, are returned to the management of the local handicraft coop-
erative.
Like the agricultural cooperative transformation, the changeover of
the handicraft cooperatives is based on an admitted necessity for re-
organizing to meet the accelerated economic goals. Acknowledging the dif-
ficulty of meeting the "heavy orders" for their products,` Peking claims that
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it is only by turning themselves into factories., changing
the system of ownership, further emancipating the forces
of production and coordinating more closely with the nation-
al economic plans that the handicraft cooperatives can a-
chieve mechanized production speedily and better serve the
country's socialist construction.
The handicraft conference is said to have agreed "in general" that
I'all handicraft cooperatives should be turned gradually into cooperative
or state factories," and the change-over is reported to be underway all
over the country. Approximately a tenth of the 5,000,000 handicraft
members have been effected to date. The reorganization., it is reported.,
is proceeding under the leadership of the local CCP committee and with
the guidance and help of "experienced workers provided by the Party
organizations."
III. Chinese Use of Soviet Exx"erience
Khrushchev's Farm Plans-, Peking's venturesome program to amalgamate
its agricultural collectives into large agro-industrial communes bears some
similarity to the program for the rapid merger of Soviet farm collectives
begun in 1950 at the initiative of Khrushchev., then Politbureau spokesman
on agricultural policy. The 252,000 farm collectives in the Soviet Union
at the beginning of 1950 were rapidly reduced to 97,000 by October of 19526
Khrushchev advocated an even greater transformation in the countryside,
and he recommended in 1950 and again in 1951 the formation of agrogorods
or agro-cities around which the new and larger collective farms would be
organized.* Presumably these agro-cities were to include industrial
facilities, as now provided in the new Chinese communes. The Khrushchev
plan of eight years ago was undoubtedly more ambitious than the current
Chinese communal program, but it seems at least worth considering that the
Chinese have borrowed from this original Khrushchev plan and adapted it to
Chinese needs and circumstances., a technique which has become a hallmark
of most Chinese comment on the usefulness of Soviet experience.
Although Khrushchev9s 1950-51 espousal of agrogorods was immediately
disavowed by the Soviet regime, it was seemingly returned to favor in
.August this year when IzvestiaOs 17 August editorial quoted from Khrushchev's
1951 speech and advocated the.reconstruction of farm villages along the
lines advanced by Khrushchev in 1950-51. Khrushchev's specific reference
to agrogorods however was not repeated in Izvestia.
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Chinese Praise for Khrushchev PoliciesA Pertinent to possible in-
fluence on the Chinese of Khrushchevus original farm program is the ob-
servation that Chinese leaders have been unusually open in their approval
of Khrushchev's policies, particularly his domestic policies. Chinese
endorsement of current policies identified with Khrushchev is often far
more direct than the customary endorsements from the rest of the socialist
camp.
Outstanding in this regard was the speech of the CPR chairman, Mao
Tse-tung, at the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution last
November. Mao, alone among the foreign Communist leaders in Moscow for
the anniversary, approved the domestic policies identified with Khrushchev,
including opposition to the "anti-Party group," improvement of Party and
political work in the armed forces and the decentralization of industry.
He called the policies `'wise measures" of the CPSU Central Committee.
Praising the successes which the CPSU4s creative application of
Marxism-Leninism to "practical tasks" had brought about in the Soviet
Union, Mao declared:
The wise measures taken by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the questions of
overcoming the cult of the individual, developing agri-
culture, reorganizing the administration of industry and
construction, extending the power of the federal republics
and local organizationsz, opposing the anti-Party group,
consolidating unity within the Party and improving the
Party and political work in the Soviet Army and Navy., will
undoubtedly promote still further the consolidation and
development of all undertakings in the Soviet'Union.
And Mao added a reference, unusually laudatory even for the Chinese, to
the usefulness and universality of Soviet experience.
The Chinese people are fortunate in having the experience
of the October Revolution and of the socialist construe-
tion in the Soviet Union,, which enabled them to make fewer
mistakes., to avoid many others, and to pursue their cause
fairly smoothly, although they still face many difficulties.
It is clear that, after the October Revolution, if a pro-
letarian revolutionary of any country should overlook or
not seriously study the experience of the Russian revolution,
of the proletarian dictatorship, and of socialist construc-
tion of the Soviet Union, and should fail to use these
experiences analytically and in a creative way in the light
of the specific conditions in his own country, he would not
be able to master Leninism... and he would not
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be able to solve the problems of revolution and construc-
tion in his own country correctly.
Chinese Follow Soviet MTSS ecentralizationo The most immediate
example of that devotion to Soviet experience cited by Mao as of such
importance to the future of China, as of other socialist states., oc-
curred less than three months later. On 1 March 1958 the Communist China
news service NCNA, and the principal Peking papers, carried extensive
passages from Khrushchev?s report on the reorganization of the Machine
Tractor Stations (MTS) before the February plenum of the CPSU Central
Committee. It was reported at the time that the Chinese papers "pointed
out the great opportunities offered by the new measures." Just two weeks
earlier, Peking had publicized an experimental program paralleling the
Soviet plan to turn over farm machinery to the individual farm coopera-
tives.
But Peking, aware that implications of slavish copying of the USSR
would adversely affect the Chinese population, advanced a claim to have
adopted the program independently of the Soviet Union, stating
(1) that the Chinese experimental program was worked out during
the first five year plan and
(2) that the program for the decentralization of heavy farm
machinery "had emerged from'l.economic and social conditions
in China.
Peking had suppressed publication in China of Khrushchevas first announce-
ment (22 January 1958 in Minsk) of the Soviet reorganization of the MTS
and had publicized Khrushchev?s second announcement in late February only
after NCNA had released a report on China#s'own program based on Chinese
conditions and needs.
While these observations are only suggestive., they all point strongly
to the keen interest the Chinese have evinced in Soviet internal develop-
ments, and to the strong support they have advanced for Khrushchev?s prag-
matic approach to economic-political organizations. There seems little
reason to doubt that Mao V5 unusually strong endorsement of Soviet experience
and particularly of the internal policies advocated by Khrushchev evidenced
an interest in utilizing Soviet planning in China U8 own economic course., with
suitable revisions to fit the Chinese situation. Planning on the decentrali-
zation of the MTS must have been well underway in both the Soviet Union and
China during this period. Furthermore., it is likely, but not at this time
provable., that the Chinese leaders also developed an interest in Khrushchev?s
more advanced plans for agricultural development. The initial formation
of China ? s first commune in April suggests that comrhunal plans were being
developed at about the same time as were those for reorganization of China's
machine tractor stations,. first discussed in February.
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IVs Communes Provide First Step Toward Communism
Liu Shao-chi Implied New Ideological Status-. Peking's claim to be
engaged in "a social transformation leading from socialism to Communism,"
a claim advanced for the first tines with the advent of the commune system,
appears on the surface at least to be somewhat at odds with its customarily
acknowledged status of "transition to socialism." This latter more modest
stage, shared with other members of the socialist ea p, was endorsed
officially at the CCP"s May sessions of the VIII Party Congress. The
political resolutions of that Congress concluded that the purpose of the
newly-adopted general line was "to build socialism," But closer perusal of
the chief Congress documents, particularly the keynote speech delivered. on
behalf of the Central Committee by Party theoretician Liu Shao-chi, reveals
some vacillation on the question of China's ideological status,with some
broad hints.of a more advanced stage in the offing.
On at least four occasions in his speech, Liu raised the issue of
Communism as a stage to which China was currently aspiring. Taken together,
Liu"s argument appeared to be that
(1) China has already completed, in the main, its socialist revolution
on the economic front (in 1956) and on the ideological and
political fronts (in 1957);*
(2) The CCP"s new call for technological and cultural revolutions re-
quires that China"s "constantly developing revolution must now
advance to a new stage";
(3) This includes the duty to "consolidate and, develop socialist
ownership",
(4) In order to achieve these ends, the Chinese are currently engaged
in a"Communist ideological emancipation movement" in which a
"mighty torrent of Communist ideas has swept away many stumbling
blocks", and
(5) In Lenin?s words, this is "the actual beginning at Communism."
China's farms were fully cooperativized in 1956, according to. Peking
reports, and were transformed into "fully socialist cooperatives" or
collectives by the following year. This claim excludes certain minority
areas which have been allowed to proceed at a slower pace in socialist
reorganization. This far-exceeded the pace originally recommended by Mao
Tee-tung on 31 July 1955 when he called for a reversal of China's oonser-
native agricultural policy. Mao had scheduled the completion of coopera-
tivization for 1960 and collectivization within three five-year plans.
The current drive for the formation of communes, by Peking's own admission,
is being conducted at an even faster pace was the drive during 1955-570
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Expanding on what Liu Shao-chi termed Mao's belief in the Marxiat-
Leninist theory of "uninterrupted revolution",,* Liu. argued that
on the eve of the victory of the democratic revolution
in 19499 the Party's Central Committee had outlined the future task of
transforming the "new democratic state into a socialist state." By
projection, Liu seemed to argue that with the virtual victory of social-
ism in China today, the transition to Communism need not wait for the
loose ends to be tied up.
The CCP leadership at the Congress was obviously reluctant to spell
out Liu's implications,, as Party doctrine, and the Congress resolution
stopped at the stage of "building socialist." But just two and a half
months later, propagandists began their reference to China's transition
to Communism within the specialized context of the formation of agro-
industrial communes. Apparently the concept of the "uninterrupted revo-
lution" is interpreted as authority for China both to complete the social-
ist transformation and'at the same time, to proceed with the transition
to Communism, at least in specified sectors of the nation.
Communist Stage No Longer Remvteo Elite Peking propaganda has boldly
underscored the fact that with the establishment of communes,, China is
actively experimenting with the form of Communism. The Central Committee
resolution (29 August 1958) approving the communes states clearly.
It seems that. the attainment of Communism in China is no
longer a remote future event. We should actively use the.
form of people's communes to explore the practical road
of transition to Communism,
The Central Committee admits that, the introductory wage, system is
based on the system of "to each according to his work" rattier than on the
Communist principle of "to each according to his need,"' and that the
transition to "common ownership" may take six years or even longer for
the entire country. But following this, the Central Committee declares.,
only a. "number of years" will pass before
* Although some writers have suggested a similarity between Mao's theory
of "uninterrupted revolution" and Trotsky's theory of "continuous revolu-
tion", in fact there is a basic difference inasmuch as Trotsky's theory
applied only to international events,, while Mao's theory has bden applied
so far only domestically.
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP78-02771 R000300120008-5
Chinese society will enter the era of Communism where
the principle of from each according to his ability.
and to each according to his needs will be practiced.
At that foreseeable time,, according to the Party, 'the function of
the state is. limited to protecting the country from external aggression but
plays no role.internallye" The Chinese Communists therefore hold out the
possibility, in the "no longer remote future",, of the gradual withering away
of the states
Inasmuch as China has hitherto claimed only to be building socialism, or
to`be in the transition to socialism, this appears to be a calculated move
to mount the ideological ladder quickly and attain the rung which the Soviets
themselves only reached in February 1956 when they claimed finally to be
building Communist at the U CPSU Congress, However., even the Soviets have
not teen so forward in their anticipation of reaching the nirvana of
Communism.
Similarity to TuSoslav.Statements on Communes., In fact, Chinese Communist
propaganda on both the Communes and the ultimate attainment of Communism and
the withering away of the' state seems matched only by the Yugoslavs. There is
a striking parallel between current Peking proclamations and the pronouncements
of the draft program of the Yugoslav Party this spring4* The Yugoslavs., who
first established communes in 1955 and reorganized them in 1951, appear to re-
gard the communes as an essential step in preparation for Communism and the
gradual withering away of the state. Arguing -- like the Chinese.-.- that the
state can wither away only as its functions are replaced by other forms of
socialist organization,, the 1958 Yugoslav Party program explains:
As a political mechanism of management aso the commune represents
a leading institution of direct socialist democracy which realizes
the government of the working people through the working people
themselves and for theme Taking over the management of social
activities and having at its disposal the resources necessary to
carry out these activities,, the commune is not only and solely a
school of democracy, but it is that democracy itself; it is the
basic cell of self-management, by citizens and their control of
their joint activities..
Soviet pronouncements have generally avoided reference to the commune even
on the theoretical plane.
Criticism of Yugoslav revisionism has not apparently hindered Chinese aware-
ness of Yugoslav experimentation, Both China and Poland adapted the'Yugoslav
system of-workers' councils in 1956, but Although Poland repudiated the system
this year,, China incorporated it in.the now constitution of the All=Chin
Federation of Trade Unions in late 1957, and apparently continues to utilize
the f ormo
Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP78-02771 R000300120008-5