CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES: SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300120007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 31, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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RADIO
PROPAGANDA REPORT
Research Series
(Intelligence Problem Study)
RS019
31 October 1958
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Radio Propaganda Reports are based on the analy-
sis of propaganda covered by FBIS and are is-
sued without any outside coordination. Inferences
drawn solely from propaganda content should be
tested against other evidence before being accepted.
This material contains informati g the National Defense of
the United States withi ping of the espionage laws, Title 18,
USC, Secs. 7 , the transmission or revelation of which
in er to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Foreword
Part A of this report examines (1) claims advanced by Communist
China to be rapidly approaching communism through the new system
of "people's communes"; (2) the extravagance of those claims, when
read alongside the orthodox Soviet portrayal of "gradual" progress
in the USSR toward communism in a distant future; and (3) possible
groundwork in Peking propaganda for claims to have devised, in the
communes, a model for an Asian "special road" to communism.
Part B presents evidence in the CPStJ's October Revolution anniver-
sary slogans that the USSR may have serious misgivings about the
CPR's new ideological pretensions. Part C brings out further indi-
cations of such misgivings in the manner in which Soviet propaganda
has underplayed the communes, particularly the CPR's claims about
their ideological import.
The conclusion suggested by this report is that the CPR's claims to
be rapidly nearing communism have introd',.ced an element of strain
into Sino-Soviet relations. There are no signs that such an element
of strain is likely to overshadow the basic Sino-Soviet community
of interests. But the depth of the Sino-Soviet ideological diver-
gence is such that open polemics could conceivably come about unless
some compromise line concerning the implications of the commune move-
ment is devised.
A forthcoming Radio Propaganda Report will examine some recent diver-
gences in satellite propaganda treatment of the communes--evidence
that no standard line has yet been set throughout the bloc.
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1958
CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:
SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW
Contents
Peking on the Imminence of Communism in China
Communism in China "Not Far Away"
Few Preconditions for Communism Still To Be Met
Free-Supply System: "To Each According to Need"
Moscow on the Struggle for Communism in the USSR . . . . . . .
6
"Gradual" Transition Toward Final Goal
Industrialization As Base for Achieving Communism
Reforms Unaccompanied by Ideological Claims
Peking As Ideological Proselytizer . . . . . . . . . . .
8
China's PatternL_Could Be Relevant Elsewhere in Asia
USSR Denies Validity of "Special Roads"
B. MISGIVINGS ABOUT CPR CLAIMS REFLECTED IN SOVIET SLOGANS
No Acknowledgement of New Commune System . . . . . o . . . . . ,
12
CPR Reduced to Satellite Level of !'Socialist','vPr_ggress > . . . .
12
China Always Distinguished from Satellites Until Now
Levels of Specialist Building Always a Sensitive Subject
PRAVDA Editorials on Slogans Use Equivocal Formulae
Co CALCULATED SOVIET PROPAGANDA DEEMPIIASIS OF COMMUNES
Paucity of Authoritative Soviet Comment . . . . . . . . . . .
17
Single Full-Length Article on Communes in LITERARY GAZETTE
KOMMUNIST Presents Innocuous. Picture of Communes
Minimal Comment on Communes from Radio Moscow . . o . . . . . .
19
Three Soviet Press Articles by Chinese Spokesmen . . . . . . . .
20
IZVESTIA Tampers with Key Passage in CPR Directive
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1958
CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:
SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW
1ummary
1. Claims that communism is "already not far away" in China have been promi-
nent in PekingTpropaganda since the release of the 29 August Chinese Com-
munist Party directive on establishing "communes." Communalization is
presented by the CPR as a major step toward full communism. According
to NCNA, it has already been extended to more than 90 percent of China's
peasant families. A free-supply system, putting into effect the communist
criterion for distribution "to each according to his need," is said al-
ready to be in force in a number of communes.. A Chinese Politburo member
has claimed that eight of the Communist Manifesto's ten preconditions
for achieving communism have already been met in China and that progress
has made toward meeting the remaining two--combination of manufacturing
with agriculture (in the communes), and elimination of the distinction
between manual and intellectual labor (in the CPR's current education
reform).
2. Peking's new ideological pretensions raise an implicit challenge to So-
viet ideological hegemony in the bloc:
a, Peking's claims could serve as groundwork for the proclamation
of full communism in China before the USSR proclaims it in Me-
USSR, The CPR, after only nine years in existence as a sta e,
pictures itself as taking practical steps toward communism as
a foreseeable goal. It does not include development of heavy
industry in its two recent listings of preconditions for com-
munism, possibly conceiving of communism as something China can
attain through self-sufficient communes before becoming a mua;or
industrial power. The USSR, after 41 years, still portrays it-
self as moving toward communism as a distant goal, and adheres
to the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist line that makes that goal
attainable only on an integrated, highly developed industrial
base.
b. The CPR all but invites invidious comparison of its own progress
toward communism with that of the calling communalization
unparalleled in "world" history<
c. Peking propagandists have no% always been careful to limit the
applicability of the commune: system to China, leaving open t e
possibility that it could be applicable in other countries.
d.
One CPR Party spokesman went so far as to imply that China's
road to communism might serve as a T_,odel for all of Asia: In
the earliest authoritative Peking discussion of communes, an
alternate Chinese Politburo member exhumed a 1919 quotation
from Lenin--never cited by Moscow--to suggest that not only
China but all Asian countries should puoceed toward communism
in a special way distinct from that of Russia and the Euro-
pean countries.
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31 OCTOBER 1958
3. Moscow's propaganda treatment of the communes suggests Soviet misgivings
a out the CPR's new ideological l claims:
a. No Soviet leader has so much as mentioned communes, although
there were ample occasions on CPR National .Day w en mention of
them would have been appropriate,
b. The Soviet press has devoted oni one full-length article to
communes--in LITERARY GAZETTE rather than a top Party eo-
ret ical journal, although KOMMUNIST and PARTY LIFE have both
touched on the subject.
c. Radio Moscow discussed communes only three times, and then very
briefly, in.215 commenta.xies reviewing China's progress on CPR
National Dayo
d. No Soviet-originated comment has endorsed the CPR's linkage of
communes to communism. Moscow has diluted and even misrepre-
sented the Chinese c aims, and has been careful to limit the sig-
nificance of communes to the Chinese scene. It has also con-
tinued to attack the "revisionist" heresy that there can be spe-
cial roads to socialism which depart from the Soviet prototype;
one such attack appeared in a discussion of.,China on CPR National
nay.
4. The most direct evidence that the CPR's claims have introduced an element
of strain into Sino-Soviet relations appears in the CPSU s slogans this
cto era e slogan for China uses a subtle semantic device to move the
CPR down.a notch in the scale of countries "building socialism"--precisely
at a time when the CPR is claiming radical advances not'only in building
socialism but toward communism itself. In'all prior sets of May Day and
October Revolution anniversary slogans since May 1956, by which time the
CPR had announced the basic completion of its collectivization, China had
been pictured-as ahead of all the satellites in the building of socialism.
In three successive sets of slogans, in May and October 1957 and: May 1958,
the CPR had. been called "builder of socialism" (which could be taken to
mean that it had already built socialism), while the satellites were still
"building socialism" (which could only refer to a process in being).* The
distinction in China's: favor seemed an acknowledgement of claims at'the
September 1956 Chinese Party Congress that the CPR had "fundamentally
realized" socialism. Now China is moved back to'the stage of"building
socialism" -back to where it was before May 1957 and'back to the level of
all the satellites.
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1958
CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:
SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW
CPR CHARTS OWN ROAD TO 'COMMUNISM
1. Peking on the Imminence of Communism in China
Since the inauguration of the CPR's concerted publicity for the commune
movement this August, Peking propaganda has begun to make ideological
claims which--when compared with Soviet statements--suggest:,thatthe
CPR may envisage proclamation of a full communist society, the ultimate
goal of all bloc countries, in advance of the Soviet Union.
Communism in China "Not Far Away"
The.29 August Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee directive
on communes, published. belatedly on 10 September, established something
in the nature of a time schedule for the attainment of communism in
China. Although in one paragraph it pictured the communes as a way to
"complete the building of socialism ahead of time and to carry out the
gradual transition to communism" (the familiar Soviet clich4) it con-
cluded With the unambiguousstatement that
the primary purpose of establishing people's communes is to
accelerate the speed of socialist construction, and the pri-
mary purpose of building socialism is to prepare activel
for the transition to communism. It seems that t e rea lza-
tion of communism in our country. is alrea~ty not something far
anc through.it f n the concrete road of transition to com-
munI sm o
Here the directive describes the people's commune as an organizational
unit through which the road to communism will be found.. Elsewhere it
pictures the commune as an organizational form which will remain the
basic social unit in a fully communist society. The reorganization of
rural areas into such units has been completed with extraordinary speed.
Only 8,694 communes, embracing somewhat over 30 percent of all peasant
households, were reported as established by the end of August. But on
30 September, on the eve of China's National I)ay celebrations, NCNA an-
nounced that 750,000 agricultural cooperatives had already "transformed
themselves" into 23,384 communes embracing ,90.4 percent of the country's
peasant households. Although the 29 August directive envisions that the
consolidation of the communal units will require a period of from three
to six years, NCNA's announcement now indicates that all but 10 percent
of China's peasantry has already been absorbed into an organizational
framework in which the further evolution toward a fully communist society
will take place.
As reprinted in the 11 September PRAVDA, the directive's phrase "realiza-
tion of communism" appears as osushchestvleniye kommunizma and "already not
something far away" as uzhe ne avlya~ayyets a ehem to dalekfi The Peking
NCNA's English translation o the directive renders this passage as, "It
seems that the attainment of communism-in China is no longer a remote future
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1958
Few Preconditions for Communism Still To Be Met
Communalization, however far advanced, is not yet communism. The directive
on communes makes it clear that the communes will remain "socialist" rather
than "communist" in character for "a number of years." It is only after
this, unspecified number of years, after several other preconditions have
been met, that communes will become "communist" in character as Chinese
society enters communism:
After a number of years, as the social product greatly increases,
the communist consciousness and morality of the entire people
is enormously raised, universal education is instituted and de-
veloped, the distinctions between mental and manual labor...
gradually vanish, and the function of the state is limited to
protecting the country from external aggression but plays no
role internally--at that time, Chinese society will enter the
era of communism.
Peking propaganda has already laid what could serve as groundwork for
claims to be meeting some of these preconditions. With respect to uni-
versal education, the CCP's 19 September directive on education fixed a
three- to five-year goal for "the task of basically eliminating illit-
eracy, promoting primary education, establishing middle schools in every
agricultural cooperative, and establishing creches and kindergartens for
children before they reach school age."*
Where the directive set forth five preconditions still to be met for the
achievement of communism, an article in the CCP theoretical journal RED
FLAG by Politburo member Lu Ting-i compressed them into only two. Lu's
article, published 1 September, was said to have been "written in accord-
ance with the conclusions of an educational work conference called by the
CCP Central Committee." Lu drew on the 110-year-old Communist Manifesto
as his authority, claiming that of Marx's 10 preconditions for communism
the CPR had already carried out eight "through the adoption of means
suitable to the actual conditions in our country." All that remained,
Lu said, were (1) the combination of agriculture with manufacturing, and
(2) the combination of education with industrial production.
* Fifteen years is set as the target period for "vigorously developing
middle school and higher-level education; and another 15 years for popu-
larizing.higher-level education.,
** Marx's other eight conditions were (1) Abolition of property in
land and application of all rents of land to public purposes; (2) a
heavy progressive or graduated income tax; (3) abolition of all rights
of inheritance; (4) confiscation of the property of all emigrants and
rebels; (5) centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by
means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly;
(6) centralization of the means of communication and transport in the
hands of the state; (7) extension of factories and instruments of pro-
duction owned by the state, the bringing into cultivation of waste
lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with
a common plan, and (8) equal liability of all to labor, establishment
of industrial armies,. especially for agriculture.
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By using Marx's 10 preconditions, Lu excluded what seemed the most formi-
dable of the five advanced in the commune directive--limitation of the
function of the state to protecting the country against external aggres-
sion.
Lu claimed that both of the two remaining preconditions he cited were al-
ready "beginning to be carried out." He said one of the main purposes
of the communes was to combine agriculturelwith manufacturing--the first
of the two preconditions. And he maintained that one of the principal
purposes of the CPR's educational reform was to meet the precondition that
education and industrial production be combined, or, put another way, that
the distinction between mental and manual labor be eliminated. Poking
media have already begun to propagandize the educational reform as a move
toward eliminating this distinction, and hence as a move in the direction
of a communist society, just as they have propagandized communes as a
major step toward communism.. And Peking propagandists have supported Lu's
claim that both the educational reform and co:mmunalization are well ad-
vanced.
Free- SuppllySystem: "To Each According to Need"
One of the basic universal criteria for achieving communism has.always
been the attainment of a system that would'dIstribute the fruits of pro-
duction not according to work performed but according to need. The CPR
claims already to have partially met this basic criterion in a number of
the pioneer communes through the institution of a free-supply system.
The CCP Central Committee directive on communes, released on 10 September,
made no mention of this system. But at the end of September -when Mao
and several other top leaders were returning to Peking after extensive
tours of the provinces--it was announced that "a number of communes," in-
cluding 70 percent of those in the pilot province of Honan, were supplying
their members with free staples and that some communes were providing
clothing, housing, and a number of other services without charge.
Politburo Member Li Hsien-nien, reporting in the 16 October RED FLAG on
his observations during a tour the previous month, confirmed that some
version of this supply system was in use in most of the communes in Hopei
as well as in Honan. Li said that in somelcommunes he had visited, food,
clothing, housing, education, medical carer maternity care, and marriage
and funeral services were all provided by the commune as part of its re-
muneration system. He strongly endorsed this system, and suggested that
it be applied to other necessities as soon as possible. He added:
The portion for distribution according to needs ...will be grad-
ually increased, and the payment portion according to work done
will be gradually reduced. And so the transition to communism
will be realized step by step.
Li's statement implied that communism would be achieved when all remunera-
tion in the communes was based on the principle of "needsa" The question
of who will decide how much each individual "needs" is answered in the
regulations for China's model commune--the "Sputnik" commune in Honan--
* A Bratislava PRAVDA article on 25 October, reviewing CPR domestic pro-
gress, accepts this CPR claim declaring that the distinction between
intellectual and manual labor will "wither away" in China in "the near
future."
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6 -
which were given nationwide publicity by Peking media in September. These
regulations say that when grain production reaches a high level and all
commune members accept the system, "they will be supplied with food free
of charge in accordance with standards laid down b the state." With the
state defining these standards, the problem of satis yang needs" would
seem by no means insurmountable.-*
Moscow on the Struggle for Communism in the USSR
Whether one takes as authoritative Lu Ting-i's optimistic view of the im-
minence of communism in China or the commune directive's more conservative
view, the spirit of both is considerably less cautious than the official
line taken by the Soviet Union.
"Gradual" Transition Toward Final Goal
While the CPR claims in its nine years of existence to have reached a point
where communism is a practical possibility, the USSR after 41 years still
treads cautiously in speaking of the attainment of that ultimate goal.
The official Soviet line is that the USSR is now in a period of "gradual
transition" from socialism to communism.
In one of the most recent discussions of the problem of building communism
in the USSR, the Central Committee Journal KOMMUNIST (No. 12, signed for
the press 9 September 1958) states flatly that communism is still far off:
.there must be a final disappearance of class distinctions, of
substantial distinctions between mental and pkiysical labor, be-
tween the town and the village, while the consciousness of all
the toilers must rise to the level of their communist vanguard,
But this is a matter for the very distant future.
At the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev conveyed no suggestion
that communism was imminent in the Soviet Union, At one point in his
speech he referred to the economic progress made in the four years between
the XIX and XX Congresses as "a new big step forward along the road of
gradual transition from socialism to communism." Elsewhere in the speech
he used a.metaphor which suggested a long road ahead toward communism:
The Soviet Union is now on a steep rise. To speak figuratively,
we have climbed such a hill, we have reached such a height that
we can see the wide horizon on the path toward the final aim: a
communist society.
* Peking has not indicated precisely when the CPR expects to have the
free-supply system in effect in all communes. The Bratislava PRAVDA of
25 October went so far as to suggest that the system would be instituted
in most of the communes within five to six years: "...the basic prin-
ciple of a communist society 'from everybody according to his strength
and capability, and to everybody according to his needs,' is being sub-
stantially implemented here. However, thus far it refers only to a
few communes . and only the first testis are being made... Naturally a
larger commune cannot venture on such experiments at the present time.
However; it is believed that the communes may start to implement this
higher form of a communist society within five to six years."
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31 OCTOBER 1958
Only recently, a Soviet social scientists' discussion of the theoretical
problems involved in building communism portrayed these problems as seri-
ous and considerable. The discussion took place at a conference .of'top-
rankipg social scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The main re-
port, delivered by Deputy Chairman of the Academy and prominent Soviet
economist Ostrovityanov, was published in PRAVDA on 28 June 1958. Although
Ostrovityanov claimed in an opening paragraph that the building of com-
munism in the USSR was an "immediate, practica:L aim," he set no time sched-
ule for attaining it,saying only that Soviet tec meal progress had insured
the creation of a "basis for communism in a short historical period."
Industrialization As Base for Achieving Communism
In the Soviet view, communism will be achieved finally when heavy industry
and the productive forces of the economy are far advanced. The Soviet
Political Dictionary, signed for the press on 4+ April 1958, says:
Under communism the national economy will be based on much
higher techniques than under socialism, both in industry and
in agriculture. On the basis of advanced -technique there
will be achieved the complex mechanization of work, the full
automation of production, the chemisation of all branches of
the economy, the maximum growth of electrification, the uti-
lization of new forms of energy.... The most important condi-
tions for the transition to communism are tie!all-round
grow of heavy Industry, the electrification of all branches
of the national economy, the complete mechanization and auto-
ma it 0n of production.
Reflecting what may be the crux of the difference between the CPR and
Soviet views of communism, Peking does not--despite its current campaign
to double steel production--make heavy industry, electrification and
automation necessary prerequisites for the achievement of communism in
China. In Peking's portrayal, communism based on communalization will
be characterized not by a highly developed modern industrial state such
as the USSR, but by a state comprising a group of decentralized, nearly
self-sufficient communes which attempt to make the best of available re-
sources, utilizing whatever industry falls within the communal area
handicraft, light industry or heavy industry. Peking thus redefines the
orthodox Leninist view of communism, a view based on the premise that
communism could only be built on the economic foundations of a highly in-
dustrialized country.
By going back to the 110-year old Communist Manifesto for its criteria
for communism, Peking has managed to sidestep the implications of the
modern industrial era in which the Leninist 'and Stalinist views on com-
munism were developed. The Soviet Union adheres to the orthodox por-
trayal of communism as still a distant goal in a country that has
considerable distance yet to travel in industrialization.
Reforms Unaccompanied by Ideological Claims
Unlike Peking, Moscow does not present its current educational and
agricultural reforms-as moves to speed up progress toward communism.
Khrushchev's dducational reform program for 'the USSR aims, as Peking's
does for China, at obliterating distinctions between mental and manual
labor. But in the memorandum explaining the' reform Khrushchev presents
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it as a practical matter of improving the educational system; he speaks
once vaguely of the role of the educational reform in building the
"edifice of communism," but nowhere presents it in ideological terms as
a step that is a major advance to-ward communism.
The Soviet and CPR portrayals of their respective agricultural reforms
diverge in the same manner. The CCP's commune directive said agri-
cultural. cooperatives were being converted into communes because co-
operatives were outmoded. Agricultural cooperatives, made up of several
hundred peasant families, could no longer satisfy China's economic needs.
Cooperatives would therefore be amalgamated into larger units combining
agriculture with industry, trade, education, culture and military pro-
tection. These units, the people's communes, would be the fundamental
social units for the future; they would remain the "basic social units
in a communist society." In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev not only did
not present his machine-tractor station reform early this year as a
step toward communism, but was hard pressed to prove that it was not a
step away from communism.
Having ignored the ideological aspects of his MTS proposal in his
22 January speech at Minsk, Khrushchev devoted a considerable effort to
defending the ideological consistency of the proposal in his Theses pub-
lished on 28 February. In what seemed an effort to minimize the extent
to which his proposals departed from the mainstream of Soviet doctrinal
statements on MTS-collective farm relations, he made no direct reference
to Stalin's views on the subject (Stalin had argued in 1952 that any
transfer of basic agricultural machinery from MS'S to collective-farm
ownership--as has now been done in accordance with Khrushchev's proposal
--would go in exactly the opposite direction from communism),*
3~ Peking As Ideological Proselytizer
It may well be that the furious pace of commi1nalization in China stems
from practical economic goals which the reime felt it could not achieve
without resort tc. such a drastic measure.** But whatever the motivating
factors may have been, Peking need not have put forward communalication
in such an elaborate ideological context, with such extravagant claims
about its role in speeding up progress toward communism. It could have
pictured the communes simply as a way of speeding up the building of
socialism.
* The MTS reorganization is discussed in Radio Propaganda Report CD.104
of 18 April 1958, "Indications of Further Changes in Soviet Collective-
Farm System."
** For a discussion of such economic motivating factors, see Richard
Lowenthal's "China, A Fourth World Power?", Radio Free Europe Background
Information, 3 October 1958. See also "Economics and Ideology in Sino-
Soviet Relations," a panel discussion by Soviet-affairs specialists,
Radio Free Europe Background Information, 29 September 1958. Several
of the participating economists view the communes as a response to re-
quirements for greater production in a country extremely short of capi-
tal and with a rapidly increasing population. (A source within the
bloc itself, the Polish Party organ TRYBUNA LUDU on 21 October, makes
a similar point.) RFE's specialist's speculatethat (continued on page 9)
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Peking pronouncements have in fact reflected awareness of the implications
of the CPR's ideological claims about the communes--awareness that the
CPR is in effect suggesting, in its pretensions to be rapidly approaching
communism, that it might overtake and even outdistance the USSR despite
the latter's 32-year head start.
Vice Chairman Chu Te said on 9 September that "the organization of people's
communes... is a major event not only in Chinese history, but in world
history." An article in the CCP's theoretical journal RED FLAG,Troadcast
on ctober, called the innovation of the free-supply system in the com-
munes an event "without parallel in history." These references to world
history seem calculated precisely to invite comparisons with the USSR, the
only country in the world whose history would make it susceptible to such
comparison.
Inherent in Peking's ideological portrayal of communalization is the pos-
sibility that the CPR may be putting itself, in. the position of setting
ideological standards for the entire bloc and thus creating a serious
challenge to Soviet leadership.
While Peking propaganda has not suggested that the commune system might
be applicable in the bloc as a whole, it has not always been careful to
restrict the applicability of the commune system to China. The 29 August
directive itself says, without any qualifying phrase about limitation to
China, that
the people's communes are the best form of organization for
the attainment of socialism and passing gradually to communism.
They will become the basic social unitslin communist society.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 1 October makes a similar claim that the
communes "will be the best organizational. form for...the gradual transi-
tion to communism"--not specifying that this is true only for China, in
China's particular situation.
Other Peking statements have, like Lu Ting-i on 2 September, spelled out
the qualifier that the communes are the best organizational form for
China. That the qualifier is used sometimes, but not rigidly or
(continued from page 8) with the cessation of direct Soviet loans to the
CPR--which they trace to 1956--the Chinese Communists must now rely on
their own resources and that the communes are considered the best means
of mobilizing. these resources.
The terms of the most recent Sino-Soviet technical aid agreement, signed
in Moscow on 8 August and released simultaneously in Moscow and Peking on
1.2 August, does in fact suggest that the CPR is relying to a much greater
extent than before on its own resources. The agreement says Soviet aid
will consist of "surveying, research work, designing of certain industries,
supply of parts of the equipment, instruments and cables, as well as the
dispatching of experts and the training of Chinese personnel.." It goes on
to say, however, that "in view of China's achievements in industrial de-
velopment and in training its own engineering and technical personnel, the
Chinese side will. carry out the designing, surveying and research work on
most plants covered by the agreement, while the engineering industry of
tie People's Republic of China will supply the equipment needed for these
plants."
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31 OCTOBER 1958
consistently, suggests that CPR theoreticians are aware they may be
treading on potentially dangerous ideological ground but are not seri-
ously concerned to mute or suppress this crucial ideological implication
of the communes.
CPR's Pattern Could Be Relevant Elsewhere in Asia
There are already indications that the CPR may hold up the communal sys-
tem as a prototype at least for the Asian communist countries, In the
earliest authoritative Peking pronouncement to mention the communes,
Peking laid the basis for such a claim along with the basis for a claim
that China and Asia should be excepted from European methods of building
communism.
A long RED FLAG article on 16 July, dwelling on Mao's contributions to
communist theory, laid great stress on the vagueness of Marx's and
Engels' very general schemes for implementing communism and exhumed a
long-buried quotation from Lenin, using it out of context to demon-
strate that special conditions for building communism--unknown to
European countries--existed in Asia. The crux of these special con-
ditions was the existence of a huge, backward peasantry.
The article was written by Chen Po-te, alternate Politburo member,
deputy director of the CCP Propaganda Department, and editor of RED
FLAG. Chen's article, replete with laudatory references to Mao's the-
ories,made only a bow in the direction of Marx and Lenin and not even
that in.the direction of the current Soviet leadership, Chen first
stressed the lack of precision in Marx's and Engels' prescriptions for
communism:
Needless to say, Marx and Engels could only show us the general
direction of struggle and give us the general principles for
directing the struggle; they could not write out a prescription
for each nation and each country that will... insure victory of
revolution and the realization of communism. It was impossible
for them to. . .provide each nation and each country with a de-
tailed and ready-made scheme...-Revolution must depend on the
people of each country.
In going on to discuss the difficulties of building communism in back-
ward countries with large populations, he drew on a quotation from
Lenin's 1.919 report to the second congress of the Communist Party organ-
izations of Eastern Russia, a quotation unused in Soviet pronouncements:
You are confronted with a task never before encountered by
the Communists of the world: that is, you must, in the 11 ht
of special conditions unknown to the European countries, apply
the general communist theory and communist measures and realize
that peasants are the principal masses and that it is not capi-
tal but the survivals o the 1e Ages that is to be opposed
..You must find special forms to unite the proletarians of the
world with the working masses of the East,
Chen Po-ta pointed out that the passage was taken from Lenin's report
to the Communist Party organizations of Eastern Russia. He did not
acknowledge that in context it was not intended to sanction "special
forms" for building communism throughout Asia but simply to authorize
the Communists in the Eastern sections of Russia to adapt their tactics
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31 OCTOBER 1958
to the conditions peculiar to the backward areas of the Tsarist empire.
He contended, on the contrary, that Lenin was in effect sanctioning
"special. forms" of building communism throughcut the entire Far East:
The contents of these words actually weft beyond the frontier
of the Soviet Union. The Eastern countries beyond the fron-
tier of the Soviet Union were more or less in the same posi-
tion, that is, the peasants were the principal masses. Thus,
the task presented by Lenin--an "extremely momentous task"
in his words--was in fact likewise placed before the Communists
of Eastern coup ries.
in effect,, Chen was taking a statement no longer incorporated in Soviet
dogma* tojustify a special Chinese and Asian communist road to communism
based not on the working class but on the peasantry. This road, he later
implied, would be based on the commune which would combine agriculture
and industry, the peasant and the worker. He seemed to provide an answer
to the problem long plaguing communist theoreticians of how to proletar-
ianize the peasantry. And his article could clearly serve as groundwork
for future claims that China's road to communism through the communes is
a model for all Asian bloc countries.
USSR Denies Validity of "Special Roads"
Moscow has ignored the claims to Chinese exceptionalism raised provoca-
tively by Chen Po-ta. Soviet propaganda has, continued to stress the
universal applicability of the Soviet road.' On at least one recent oc-
casion, Moscow has pointedly referred to China's "socialist transforma-
tion" not to represent China as in any way exceptional but precisely as
proof that special roads do not exist. RED STAR on 30 September, com-
memorating Chinese National Day, took pains to make the point that the
CPR's experience could in no way justify the "revisionist" idea that
there can be special roads of socialist building:
The entire process of socialist transformation of China is
clear demonstration of the all-victorious :force of Marxism-
Leninism. The example of China makes particularly clear the
absurdity of the fabrications of contemporary revisionists
that fundamental principles of N&arxism-Leninism on the con-
struction of socialism are allegedly outdated, that the ex-
periences of the Soviet people, who were the first to imple-
ment these principales, have no international significance,
and that therefore the Communist and workers parties of other
countries must necessarily work out their own "special" road,
different in principle from the road which was and is.covered
by the Soviet Union.
RED STAR's unusually defensive language suggested Soviet concern that the
Chinese innovation might strengthen revisionist arguments. It could be
read as a reply to the arguments put forward by Chen Po-ta in July--a warn-
ing to the Chinese Communists that claims to exception from the "universal"
laws are "revisionist heresies" no matter where they come from.
The statement does not appear in the most recent postwar edition of Lenin's
collected works issued by the Soviet State Publishing House for Political
Literature.
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B. MISGIVINGS ABOUT CPR CLAIMS REFLECTED IN SOVIET SLOGANS
to No Acknowledgement of New Commune System
The current greeting to Communist China in the CPSU's 1958 October Revo-
lution anniversary slogans makes no reference to the establishment of com-
munes. Issued semiannually, each May Day and October Revolution anniver-
sary, the CPSU's slogans have traditionally been used as vehicles to con-
vey to the Communist world the precise line fixed in Moscow with respect
to foreign and domestic affairs. The slogans not only reflect the state
of the USSR's general relations with other countries and the premises of
Moscow's over-all policies, but the line with respect to actual current
developments: This October's greeting to China, for example, takes due
note of the Taiwan Strait crisis.*
In October 1955, the CPSU's slogan for China took note of the CPR's ac-
celerated drive to cooperativize its countryside, referring to "coopera-
tion in agriculture." A special effort was apparently made to insert
that phrase following Peking's release of a major speech by Mao Tse-tung
raising the CPR's goal for the development of rural cooperatives. The
phrase "cooperation in agriculture" was not contained in the initial re-
leases of the slogans, but appeared in subsequent ones, having evidently
been added at the last minute in acknowledgement of Mao's speech.
Had the CPSU chosen to acknowledge the communes in its current greeting
to China, it would have had a clear precedent in the sloganization of
the CPR's 1955 cooperative movement.
2. CPR Reduced to Satellite Level of "Socialist" Progress
The current slogan for China not only ignores the communes, but withdraws
a subtle semantic distinction between the CPR and the satellites that had
seemed to place the former a notch higher in the scale of countries "build-
ingsocialism."
In the prior three sets of May Day and October Revolution slogans, the
CPR had been called "builder of socialism" (stroitel sotsializma) while
the satellites were said to be "building socialism" (stroyashchiy sot-
sialism). The difference, hair-splitting though it may seem at first
glance, was a real one. "Builder of socialism," in Russian as in Eng-
lish, can be taken to mean that the country either is in the process of
building socialism or has already built it; there is no ambiguity about
"building socialism," which can only refer to a process in being.
The difference could not have been attributed to the mechanics of sen-
tence structure--the slogans for China and the satellites were struc-
turally parallel in this regard. The difference seems hardly attributable
* The October 1958 set of slogans is analyzed in detail in Radio Propaganda
Report CD.117 of 20 October 1958, the latest of the reports issued regu-
larly by FBIS on the GPSU's May Day and October Revolution anniversary slo-
gans.
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31 OCTOBER 1958
to chance, having been present consistently!, since May 1956. Close ex-
amination of the slogans over the years has indicated that they are for-
mulated with extreme care to convey precise,mubtle shades of meaning in
the esoteric language peculiar to Communist communications.
Having three times, in these carefully formulated documents, distin-
guished China from the satellites in a manner: that could only be inter-
preted as favorable to the CPR, Moscow now withdraws the distinction--end
so withdraws any basis for crediting the CPR with faster progress toward
socialism than the satellites.
China Always Distinguished from Satellites Until Now
From October 1954, when references to the building of socialism first
appeared, in slogans for bloc countries, until October 1958 the CPR had al-
ways been distinguished from the other bloc countries with respect to how
far it had gone toward socialism. Before May 1956, the CPR was placed at
a .lower level than the satellites (it was struggling for construction
only of the "foundations" of socialism in October 1955, for exam le, when
the satellites were already struggling to build socialism itself).
By May 1.956, after the CPR had announced completion of its collectiviza-
tion, the slogans credited China with having overtaken and outdistanced
the satellites: China was "successfully realizi a socialist transforma-
tion" while the satellites were l "struggling for...the construction
of socialism.
By October 1956, a month after the VIII Chinese Communist Party Congress
had announced completion of the "fundamental" tasks of socialism in China,
the CPSU elevated China another notch to "successfully building socialism"
while the satellites were still "strugglingfor" its construction.
By May 1957, the satellites were finally graduated to "building socialism"
(stroyashchiy sotsializm),* catching up to the level the CPR had reached
the preceding October. And the CPR--still keeping its distance from the
satellites--was in turn moved up another ideological notch to "builder of
socialism" (stroitel sotsializma). This ambiguous formulation, implying
that the Chinese Communists might already have built socialism, seemed
a bow in. the direction of acknowledging the claim advanced at the Sep-
tember 1956 CCP Party Congress that China had "fundamentally realized the
tasks of the socialist revolution."
The shade of difference between China and the satellites, in the former's
favor, was preserved in October 1957 and May 1958.
The chart on the opposite page shows the consistent progression upward
in socialist building which had until this October been credited to the
Chinese Communists, and the careful distinction which until this October
had been drawn between China and the satellites.
The formula was applied that May Day to all the satellites except the
DRV (which was not yet credited with having reached any stage in social-
ist building) and Hungary (which in this first set of slogans after the
Hungarian rebellion drew"a special--and equivocal-"warm wish for suc-
cesses in the building of socialism").
**In Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-pirg's report to the Congress.
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Slogans for China Slogans for the Satellites
May 1954 (no reference to building of (no reference to building of
socialism) socialism)
Oct. 1954 successfully struggling for..,.
construction of the
foundations of socialism
successfully struggling forooo
construction of a socialist
society
May 1955 successfully struggling for... successfully struggling forooo
construction of the foundations construction of socialism
of socialism
Oct. 1955 successfully struggling for... struggling for the construc-
construction of the foundations tion of socialism
of socialism
May 1956 successfully realizing a so- struggling for-the con-
struction of socialism
Oct. 1956 successfully building struggling for... the construc-
'
socialism
t ion of socialism-"
May 1957 builder of socialism building socialism
Oct. 1957 builder of socialism building socialism
May 1958 builder of socialism building socialism
Oct. 1958 building socialism building socialism
* In October 1956 the CPSU introduced the practice of greeting each bloc
country in a separate slogan. Prior to that time, a single slogan had been
used to greet the people's democracies collectively.
All the satellites have consistently been described in identical language in
their respective slogans, except for (1) the DRV (not promoted from "build-
ing a new. life" to "building socialism" until October 1958) and (2) Hungary
in the May 1957 slogan that came after the Hungarian rebellion.
Since October 1957, all the satellites have been greeted in Russian-alpha-
betical order. Only China has been differentiated as to status: China
comes first, followed by the other Communist countries in alphabetical order.
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The October 1958 slogan for China is thus the first one since October 1954
--when descriptions of socialist building were introduced into Soviet
slogans---that has not either retained China at the level credited to her
in the last previous set of slogans or promoted her to a higher level.
The new formula for the first time breaks the pattern which since May 1956,
in five successive sets of slogans, had portrayed the Chinese Communists
as higher than the satellites in the scale of countries building socialism.
Levels of Socialist Building Always a Sensitive Subject
The extreme sensitivity of Communist leaders to formulations concerning
levels of socialist building was demonstrated in October 1955, when Molo-
tov wrote an open letter to the editors of KOAIMUNIST admitting that he
had expressed "a theoretically mistaken and politically harmful" formula-
tion in his February 1955 Supreme Soviet speech. In that speech, in dis-
cussing the different levels of development of the countries in the bloc,
Molotov had distinguished the level attained by the USSR from that at-
tained by the sat llites;
Side by side with the Soviet Union, where the foundations of
a socialist society have alread been '6Uilt, ere are also
peoples democratic countries which have made only the first--
but extremely important--steps in the direction of socialism.
In his letter of self-criticism, Molotov admitted that his "erroneous
formulation leads to an incorrect deduction, that allegedly a socialist
society has still not been built in the USSR--that only the foundations
of a socialist society have been built...." In the final paragraph of
his letter, Molotov said that the incorrect formulation "brings confu-
sion" into ideological questions. At the XX Party Congress the follow-
ing February, Khrushchev attacked Molotov--though without mentioning him
by name--for the same "incorrect" formulation.
The extreme sensitivity of the subject was evident not simply from the
fact that Molotov was compelled to recant his formulation, but from the
reasons for which he was compelled to disavow it. The formula was imper-
missible not only because it was wrong in and of itself, but because it
could lead someone to draw "an incorrect deduction"--because it carried
with it a possible implication that would be incorrect.
Hence the extreme care--the hair-splitting differentiations--in the lan-
guage of the CPSU's slogans, language contrived not only to convey os-
tensible meanings but to provide those educated in communist parlance with
the basis for deductions as to real. meaning.
PRAVDA Editorials on Slogans Use Equivocal Formulae
In broaching the sensitive subject of progress toward communism in the
bloc, PRAVDA's 20 October editorial on the current slogans used a formula
that seemed designed to beg the question of China's progress relative to
the USSR's. The editorial referred ambiguously to the successes already
achieved in the "construction of socialism and communism in the USSR, the
CPR and all the countries o-f the camp." By lumping. all the bloc coun-
tries together, PRAVDA sidestepped the crucial question of comparative
stages reached in the individual bloc countries' progress toward communism.
Six days later, another PRAVDA editorial similarly sidestepped the prob-
lem. Devoted to "The Great Cooperation of Socialist Countries," that edi-
torial stated that the world socialist system was entering a "new phase
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of development" Where previously the building of socialism had been
completed only in the Soviet Union, "now we are entering the epoch of the
With not,
completion of differentiate the erentiate building among of sothosecialism other countries. in man county It did
Ti respect to the CPR,
it said, the great Chinese people are carrying out the task of the
building of socialism with.great enthusiasmo" At best,.this seemed no
greater an ac 1 evemen an e great v`ic ory in the struggl,e for
socialism scored by the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Al-
bania, Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, Rumania, the DPRK,
the Mongolian People's Republic and the DRV."
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C. CALCULATED SOVIET PROPAGANDA DEEMPHASIS OF COMMUNES
In the indirect manner characteristic of.communist communications, Moscow
has indicated that it does not endorse the radical new Chinese Communist
ideological claims.
No high-ranking Soviet leader has yet mentioned the communes--and there
was ample occasion when mention of them would have seemed called for in
speeches and congratulatory messages on CPR National Day (1 October).
The Soviet press carried articles by CPR spokesmen on National Day which
lauded the communes--but the Soviet Tress''blways publishes articles by
Chinese authors on the CPR's National Day, and the Chinese spokesmen al-
ways review what Peking regards as its major accomplishments. In the
entire period since the inauguration of commutes in Mugust, including the
period surrounding National Day, the Soviet central press'hes:!published
only three discussions of communes by Soviet authors. Only one of the
three was a full-length article devoted to communes--and that appeared
not in the top theoretical organs of the Party, but in LITERARY GAZETTE.
Radio Moscow managed to broadcast 215 CPR National Day commentaries with-
out mentioning.th,p : communes?in,.amore. _than ;:three . *
In one glaring distortion, the official Soviet Government organ IZVESTIA
misquoted a passage from the CCP directive in what seemed a deliberate ef-
fort to suppress the Chinese Communists' claim to be nearing communism.
In an instance of more subtle misrepresentation, the CPSU Central Commit-
tee journal PARTY LIFE prefaced a passage from the directive with a quali-
fier limiting its significance strictly to the Chinese scene--something
the directive itself did not do.
1. Paucity of; -Authoritative' Soviet Commeont
Since the release of the 29 August CCP directive on the establishment of
communes, Soviet authoritative press organs'have given the communes minimal
token publicity and have originated only three discussions of any aspect
of communalization.
No Soviet leader has mentioned communes. Khrushchev's National Day tele
gram to :Mao Tse-tung referred three times to the CPR's efforts in "so-
cialist" construction. His only reference to communism-was an ambiguous
* Although Moscow has not commented extensively in the past on Chinese
internal economic demarches,.Soviet treatment ocf -Peking's accelerated
collectivization drive in the winter of 1955 was markedly less restrained
than current treatment of the communes. Mao Tse-tung's 31 July 1955
report., stepping up the campaign, was released by Peking on 16 October.
Twelve days later a Soviet home service commentary dwelt in detail on
the "grand progress of socialist transformation of Chinese agriculture."
On 3 December PRAVDA published a lengthy account of the agricultural
transformation based on selected quotations from PEOPLE'S DAILY. PRAVDA
also published several TASS dispatches from'e:king in December dealing
with the new collectivization drive, and on20 December it published a
long description of Chinese agricultural developments by its staff cor-
respondent in Peking. The following month, the Soviet Party paper pub-
lished a coll action of articles on the socialist transformation in the
Chinese countryside with a foreword by Mao.
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18
one, putting its attainment for the CPR--as for the USSR--in an unspecified
future: "The friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. is sealed
for all time in. the unity of aims for communism."
A. Andreyev, CPStT Central Committee member and,chairman:of the Sino-Soviet
Friendship Society, similarly ignored the communes altogether in his Mos-
cow Stadium speech on the eve of CPR National Day. The subject was ignored
even by Soviet official spokesmen in Peking, who were responding directly
to remarks in which their Chinese counterparts lauded the communes.
Despite the fact that all major Peking commentaries on National Day hailed
the development of communes as a move of major importance, PRAVDA's
1 October National Day editoria.L said nothing that could even be construed
as an indirect reference to communes. PRAVDA said only that the "social-
ist cooperative system is firmly established in the Chinese countryside."
The Peking PEOTLE'S DAILY that some day repeated the standard CPR ration-
ale for the commune movement--that "the cooperatives are inadequate to
meet the demands of. the developing situation" in China.
Single Full-Length Article on Communes in LITERARY GAZETTE
The.sole full-length discussion of communes by a _ Soviet. author appeared
in the 3O September. LITERARY GAZETTE over the signature of the paper's
Peking correspondent Alexander .Smerdov. The article offered no interpre-
tation of the ideological significance of the communes, nowhere even us-
ing the word "communism." Smerdov's largely descriptive article conveyed
the impression that nothing more was involved in communalization than a
changeover to a more advanced stage of "socialist agriculture." Communes
were
the fast but planned transition.from the now existing coopera-
tive form of Chinese socialist agriculture to a higher social-
ist organization.
Smerdov followed the pattern of an earlier single-paragraph discussion
of communes in the CPSU Cexttral Committee's PARTY LIFE (No. 18, signed
for the press 26 September). Author A. Martynov's short paragraph on com-
munes---buried in a seven-page article on "Victorious Construction of So-
cialism in.;.Chna"--said nothing about communes as related to a transition
to communism:
The. mass movement which has recently developed in the country
for the reorganization of the agricultural production coop-
eratives into large people's communes of a socialist t e is
called on to play a large role in the -m-Mil nation of the crea-
tive.activity of the 500,000,000-strong peasantry. Leadership
of local industry, agriculture, trade, industry, education,
health and the people's militia is being transferred to the
jurisdiction of the people's communes. As is pointed out in
the decision of an expanded session of the Politburo of the Cen-
tral Committee of the CP, the people's communes, under Chinese
conditions, is the best organizational form for the hastening
of socia.ist construction."
In introducing the quotation from the CCP directive with the phrase "under
Chinese conditions," Martynov added a major qualifier that is not expressed
in the directive.
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KOMMUNIST Presents Innocuous Picture of Communes
A historical review in KOMMUNIST of CPR achievements since 1949, geared
to CPR National Day, contains five innocuous paragraphs on communes in
the course of 11 pages, discussing factually the number of communes
organized in certain provinces and the manner in which they are. organized.
This article in the CPSU Central Committee's theoretical journal (No. 13,
signed for the press 2 October) follows the pattern of the LITERARY
GAZETTE and PARTY LIFE articles in conveying no suggestion whatever of
the radical nature of the communes as pictured in Peking propaganda.
Author Sidikhmenov's only evaluative comment is that the communes are
playing "a large role in the further growth of the productive forces of
society and in the organization of a sharp upsurge of agriculture."
To these five paragraphs, Sidikhmenov adds a sixth consisting of a ver-
batim quotation of the passage