SURVEY OF SOME COMMUNIST TACTICS AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300030013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Relea ,2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP78-02771 EW00300030013-9
A. Tactics Preceeding lntertiational Conferences
B. Tactics ??Titl;in the Conference Halls
C. Tactics Outiside the Conference Halls
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SURVEY OF SOME CCI fl lST TACTICS I;'1T INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
A. Tactics Preceeding Internatioml Conferences.
0
The Qommznists arrive at international conferences with their objectives
clearlay defined. T4eir preparation of a pr o ;r i_m does as far as arranging a set
sequence of speeches to be used at a tactLcal moment.
Eaxam e. At the Geneva Conference, particularly during the Korean sessions,
the various Communist del,=gations apparently participated itnt a
planned sequence of cpeec;hes. ,KU- "'`OJL
1r Gtr -. c#'~ c ~ =pct . + 004'1.
The Communist-controlled front groups and press are supplied in advance kith
the approved propaganda line. Thezz Communist -;;heiaes are continually emphasized during
the pre-conference publicity.
The Communists also contact various dip.orrtic nersonnel of other countries
scheduled to participate in the conferences, and attempt to influence their attitude.
Examaple. Prior to the I3er'!.in Conf=rents, Soviet diplomats talked with
British and other Western di 3.omats, emphasizing the line to the
effect that the U.S. was the only obstacle to European settlemnt
and that Russia had no aggressive intentions. They also stressed
that the Conference would be doomed to failure if the West were
to insist that a'_1?-German elections must preceede Germah unification
and peace treaty .
le JIt is widely claimed th`_t, prior to the Geneva Conference,
the Communists used the leftist French press as a fifth columns
and that the influence of that press had produced in France a dis-
couragement which doomed the Conference from the start.
tLbt t cn,e-this of th entire delegation _co .~
'German; a lesser number could speak French. I
&n4k u ,t
adequate for conferemce purposes.
Example At the Geneva Conference
The Communist delegates and cM te.ff are very well seleted and are fully
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B. Tactics Within the `lonfe:renoe Halls.
Once the Communist ri= conference plan is ? set, any change in the negotiations
has to be reffered back to headquartres, unless the highest-ranking Communists are present
at the conference.When new directions arrive, they have to be obeyed to the letter.
The 1944 negotiations in London for the establishment of an
x Exannpleg
.
emergensy European Inland Transport Organization, which inlvolved
nothing detrimental to Soviet interests, dfagged along until the
Potsdam Conference in 1945, when Stalin personally approved the
Soviet participation.
Communist line is likely to begin as a ha~?d, rigid position and gradually soften
The The
is conceded.
insignificant it may be, must be thrashes? out in detail, apparently to provide the Communist
delegate with proof that he has really "1E.at his head against a stone wall", before it
up as it develops a more conciliatory tone:. Ei.ch point, however, regardless of how
At the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers
in September 1945, the phrase "in the main" was contained in
brief instructions. Weeks of daily ar argument i I 14 x
on this phrase took place in successive conferences concerning
the Yugoslav-Italf_an bov.ndary. Eventually, the negotiators were
forced to suspeivl their neetings without agreement on the terms
of reference. Only thee, did the Soviet Government permit its
delegation to approve the inclusion of the controversial phrase.
In the absence of eh new instructioni., Communist delegates reiterate their
original positions even when confronted pith new pointse of view on the part er of
other members of the conferencee. At ~;irnes, reiteration constitutes a a .
refuge for the Communsist delegate when he is unable to answer the opposition or MMXt
desires to stall for time.
Example: At the Berlin Conference, after the Western delegates had agreed
to the almost :Lv-oossi ble> terms which the Soviets demanded for an
Austrian peace treaty, Eolotov, taken by surprise, could only fall
back on reiter.-ting z . i faa'.iliar Communist arguments, since he
had no expectation or intention of coming to an agreement over the
treaty.
The various Communist delegation, ptrtici.pating ac in a conference
operate jointly in accordance with a prearranged and well understood plan.
Examples: At Geneva, the variou+, delegations made a series of speeches
evid-:ntly planned ihed as to exact sequence. They likewise
exhibited z fairly ostentatious respect for each other in matters
of decorum and. protocol.
At various ECAFE conferer=ces, it has been the practice for various
Communist delegates to propound their presumably separate views,
to be followed at the erg by "generous support" from the Soviet Big
Brother.
From the Communist point of vilw, international conferences constitute
sounding boards for propaganda themes to be played throughout the world. They exploi
such opportunities to the fullest.
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Approved For Ri O(~01o5P'`3' y 9 = 1a R U~ eneve Conferen
were rowne el p nne reps ono ommunist themes
by the So-rimts, the Chicoms, the North Koreans, and the Viet
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Communsit delegates delay Ed infinitum agreement on procedural matters
in order to avoids including in (or excluding from) the agenda matters of
strong importance to the Communist cause. Also, they attempt to gain acceptance
of an agenda which is, in effect, a st.te?aent of their solutions to the various
items.
Examples. An indication tf soviet depondance on the technique of
delaying an agreement on the agenda was the surprise that
was engendered at tie Berlin Conference, when Secretary Dulles
immediately accepted the Soviet agenda and thus eliminated the
necessity for a pre_:ee:iural debate which had characterized all
previous conference3.
During the Korean 3eace talks, The Communists submitted
the following ;tern.--or inclusion in the agenda;,which item ,
if accepted,would have obviated the need for substantive
otslss discussicn: 'To establish the 35th parallel as a military
demarcation line, t'-ie trmed forces of both sides to withdraw
10 kilometers `ram the 31th parallel and simultaneously complete
the withdrawal from Xai:-ea within a definitUe time limit, leaving
NUM 'gssiyutlc x the evaluated areas demilitarized, and
the civil authority -ould be restored by 25 June 1950".
The opposition frequently atteupts to introduce irrelevant material in the
conference. It insists on attemptin?- to include matters extraneous to what the b
other delegations consider to be the agenda. This is done usuTally for political reason
or for the effect on the world opini_cn.
Examples: The Soviets repeatedly attempted to have the Chinese Communists
included in the Berlin Conference, the agenda of which dealt
with German and Austr an problems only. The Soviets
argued that Chinese Communist participation would help world
peace. Actually, a dozen Chicoms were present at the Conference
as observers.
At the Geneva Conferwice, there was a considtent Communist attempt
to :force the consideration of political matters prior to the
military matters on the agenda. Rlumw=s iami to The
Communists also insisted t3=t on discussing Laos and
Cambodia, rtli:hough Vietnam was the only subject of discussion.
Communist delegates frequently accsttse other conference members of crimes
with which they themselves are about to be: cunfronted. They make a special attempt to
bring up their own grievances, real or imt.girary, before any other delegation
~..~ awl
Example:
ordei to gain the edge on publicity.
At the Potsdam ,on'erience, the Soviets made bitter and prolonged
attacks on the ore:senc;e of British troops in Greece, the Itaftmom
Dodecanese, Syeia c.nd Lebanon. After the Westerners had been
worn down by thsse wrangles, the Soviets eduld more easily face
the Western protests against brutal Soviet tactics in the Sa-
tellites. The 3ovi?ts thus encouraged their supporters in Greece,
upheld their reoutF.tic-,n for hostility to colonialism in the
Middle East,X lad vrea3:ened any coordinated Western effort to
loosen the 3ovi--t =rip on the Satellites.
The Communists frequently itte npt, to influence negotiations by conducting
military activities concurrently with the conference.
Example: The assault on Dienb_ieziphu was engineered on the eve of
the Geneva Conference. \ iet Minh delegates arrived it Geneva in
li]l triumph and '3=-)me delegates who had prieviously been thought
Approved For r glee ~ ~ `~ - i ry t,ter, the
,. c c a n qi , ac ics a every ime when
Bidault was attempting to arrange a battlefield truce for the Bienbie-
Ar? ,.,n-tinia.r
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Communists delegates can be ?ypec-,ed, particularly when an impasse at the
conference is reached, to make sate a.pnneaals to various conference delegations ,
playing upn their special interests, hopes, or fears. One aim of this tactic is to
divide the opposition.
Examples:jnuring..the Geneva-. Cconference, as the position of the French
hard pressed by e'rea ch opinion.
in Indochina. rev progressively worse, the Viet Minh delegates
made a separate approach to Mendes France knowing that he was
gaining agreaent: for the proposed Geneva Conference.
for an easy indoehina settlement to the French, for the purpose;
At the Berlin Conference,, the Soviets and the Chicoms held
out attractiv3 trade possibilities to the British and prospects
Soviet Bloc delegates also plan tpon personality traits of other con-
ference members when they have sufriei3nt J-h knowledge to slant their approach.
They exploit their knowledge of oppolitioit pers6nnalities to the fullest.
Examples: At the I:ondoi conferences of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in 19/5, Molotov tried with great pertinacity
to trip up 3)