MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS
 MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS
General Discussion
The Central Committee Resolution dated 30 June and released
on 2 July purports to be aMarxist explanation of how a Stalin
could emerge from the Soviet system and why the current leaders
did not remove him. In fact, the Resolution appears designed
to keep critical discussion regarding Stalin under strict con-
trol both at home and abroad and to prevent such discussion
from becoming an inquiry into characteristics of the Soviet
system and the past actions of Soviet rulers.
Because of Moscow's sensitivity on these points, it pro-
duced a document which is distinguished for its defensive tone,
lack of frankness, distortions, and contradictions. It is
clear that the release on 4 June of Khrushchev's secret speech
has set in motion a chain reaction of questioning and uncertainty
in Western Communist Parties to which the 30 June Resolution is
a response. In spite of the attempt to attribute the confusion
in Communist ranks to "imperialist machinations," it is clear
that doubt has been cast upon two basic elements of the relations
between foreign'Communist Parties and Moscow:
a. Kremlin Infallibility
The former god is cut down to size and is replaced
by men of human stature. The foreign Communists
have derived much strength from the infallibility
myth. The way is now open for continual doubt.
b. Kremlin Credibility
Along with the end of the myth of infallibility,
the Stalin denigration means that no Communist can
ever again be sure that what he is told is the
truth, The emphasis in the Resolution on how the
"imperialists" seek to exploit the current situation
cannot obscure the fact that the things the "im-
perialists" have been saying for years about the
Soviet Union have turned out to be true. The words
of those deemed to be enemies of the Soviet Union
can never be rejected out of hand as before.
 The basically unchanged and unchangeable nature of the
dictatorial system which produced Stalin and developed under
his evil genius has been once more underlined by Khrushchev
at the reception for the East German leaders 16 July. Speaking
sharply, as he said, Khrushchev launched into an unexpected,
bitter attack upon the West and its institutions. Western
democracy, he charged, is a sham. The "monopolies" control
the only effective press, and use this to "exploit the people."
"They shear them like sheep." The "imperialists" who "like to
speak of their election laws," have shown their disregard for
free elections in the cases of Guatemala and Vietnam. The
"free world" means "freedom for the capitalists to plunder the
worker without interference from anyone." The discipline of
the international Communist movement would guarantee its exist-
against the efforts of the enemy to "provoke" disunity in
the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign.
Those non-Soviet Communists who may have thought that the
ideals of Western democracy could somehow be made to fit into
the Soviet Communist mold stand rudely corrected. The Stalinist
formulas still stand.
By pledging to "help our brothers in class struggle"
Khrushchev showed that Moscow would continue to dictate to the
foreign CPs, and also that the line on Soviet "non-interference"
In other countries is strictly sham.
 MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS
In order to facilitate and assist the prompt and effective
exploitation of the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU and many
other important statements, discussions and questions which have
resulted from the deStalinization campaign launched by the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Congress of the
Party in February 1956, the attached material has been prepared.
It organizes an extensive selection of arguments, together
with essential supporting evidence drawn almost entirely from
Soviet sources, under a series of eight topics for ready reference.
The first seven of these topics represent in general the
range of points on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has demonstrated greatest sensitivity. The major Communist
Parties of the Free World have also demonstrated their particular
interest in, or concern over, each of these same points. The
seven main topics are:
I. The Soviet System as the Source of Stalinism
II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the
Soviet System
III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify the
Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy
IV. The Question of Co-Responsibility for Stalin's Tyranny
V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements
VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism-
VII. Moscow Control of Foreign CPs Reasserted
* Only this introduction is classified. The paper itself is
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The eighth topic--'"Omissions"--notes those points where
Soviet Communist statements open up possibilities for discussion
inasmuch as, for one reason or another, the Soviet leaders have
not seen fit to deal with events of major interest to one or
more nations throughout the worlds
An Appendix is included, entitled "Criticisms and Questions
Raised by Foreign Communists in the Course of the De-Stalinization
Campaign." The Appendix is organized in sections generally cor-
responding to the sections in the body of the material, to permit
easy correlation of Western Communist comments and questions with
the relevant Soviet treatment of the same topic.
The material is only intended to serve on a selective basis
as raw material upon which finished output can be based. Under
each topic a general discussion sets forth the major issues in-
volved and presents some background information. There then
follows a listing of the relevant arguments, with supporting
evidence. The use of either declarative, critical, or argumen-
tative language and style in this text is not intended to imply
that the treatment must take the same vein, nor is it intended
to hamper or restrict the type of treatment to be used in output.
It is designed to bring into the sharpest focus the substance
of the argument, as an aid to those responsible for the final
work.
It may be observed that several items of evidence are re-
peated in a number of different contexts. Since it is not
considered likely that any substantial number of points will
be incorporated into a single final product, this should not
prove an obstacle to the use of the material.
While treatment obviously will be determined by each user
on the basis of existing standards and instructions, it is
suggested that in material directed primarily to Communist and
pro-Communist audiences, the "raising of questions" is likely
to be an effective approach. It is also suggested that at
this juncture the treatment of the figure of Lenin in an aggres-
sive and critical vein in material addressed to such audiences
may prove counterproductive. Conversely, any use of the evi-
dence in Section II, paragraph 8, and Section III, paragraphs
6 and 7, showing that Stalin and the present leaders have vio-
lated Leninrs dicta should avoid creating the impression that
Lenin, who was a ruthless autocrat, was actually humane or
democratic.
 MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS
Topical Outline
(An outline of the main points included in
each paragraph. Paragraph numbers are in-
dicated on the left, under each Section heading.)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
I. The Soviet System As The Source Of Stalinism
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
30 June Resolution Designed
Lenin's Warning
Stalin's Manipulation Of Doctrine
Present Leaders Continue To Manipulate
Leaders Interpret History As They See Fit
Lenin Cult Shows CPSU Bound To The Cult Principle
Present Leadership Continues Stalin's Practice Of
Concealment, Evasion, Manipulation Of Truth
a. Concealment of Stalin's Crimes
b. Tampering With The "Bad" Period Of Stalin's
Rule
c. The Lie That The People Or Even The Party As
A Whole Rule In The USSR
d. Attempt To Shift The Blame Onto The West
e, Attempt To Shift The Blame Onto The Soviet
People
f. Deception Concerning Foreign CP Criticism
 II.
Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the
Page 10
Soviet System
1.
Admission Of Serious Basic Evils In Stalin Era 10
a. One-Man Rule For 20 Years 10
b. Twenty Years Of Isolation 10
c. Leninism Lapsed For 15-20 Years 11
d. Bureaucratism, Lies, Deception, Arbitrariness 11
2.
The Inconsistency Of The Soviet Denial 12
3.
Unlimited Power Remains Concentrated, As It Was
Under Stalin 12
a. Stalin's Power Was Absolute 12
b. Action Against Him Was Impossible 12
c. Pravda Reaffirms CPSU's Monopoly Of Power 12
d. This Power Is Concentrated In The Hands Of
The "Collective" 13
e. The "Leninist Core" Suggests Even Greater
Concentration Of Power 13
4.
The 30 June Resolution Sanctions Repression
Prior To 1937 13
5.
Soviet Leadership Continues To Sponsor Mass
Suspiciousness And Mistrust 13
a. Under Stalin, This Weakened The Army 13
b. And Was "Unhealthy" 1.4
c. But It Was Reaffirmed At The 20th Congress 1.4
d. The 30 June Resolution Reaffirmed It 1.4
6.
The 30 June Resolution is Inconsistent In Claiming
Credit For The Party Leaders While Denying
Responsibility For Crimes Under Stalin 14
a. "Restrictions" On Stalin 14
b. Crimes Against Nationalities During The
"
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 8. Stalin Changed The System As Lenin Had
Envisaged It: His Plan For Decentralization
Remains Unimplemented
III.
Refusal Of The Current Leadership To Modify The
Stalinist Concept . Soviet Democrat
16
1.
The 30 June Resolution Reaffirms The Peculiar
Stalinist Definition Of Democracy
2.
Khrushchev's Secret Speech Showed That Stalin
Could Not Possibly Reflect The Interests Of
The People
3.
Pravda Reaffirms CPSU Dictatorship
17
4.
Pravda Reaffirms Individual Rule
17
5,
No Freedom Of The Press In The USSR: The Argu-
ment Employed Contradicts The One Used To Deny
Need For More Than One Party
18
6.
The Definition Of Democracy Contradicts Even
Lenin's Version
18
7.
Soviet Leaders Also Violate Lenin's Dictum That
The People Have The Right To Know What Is Going
On And To Check The Decisions Of The Regime
18
a. Lenin's Dictum Continues To Be Given Lip-Service
b, The Secrecy Of The Khrushchev Speech And Other
18
Events Show That The Dictum Is Violated
c. The 30 June Resolution Shows That The Regime
Has Never Considered It Necessary To Tell
The People The Truth
The 30 June Resolution Reveals The Real Contempt
19
Of The Soviet Leaders Toward The People
19
IV,
The Question Of Co-Responsibility For Stalin's Tyranny
20
1.
Khrushchev Admitted That The Leadership Supported
Stalin
20
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 a. Support In The Early Period Page 20
b. This Support Was Given Despite Lenin's
Warning 20
2. The Soviet Leaders Fail To Explain How Stalin
Gained Mastery Over The Party By 1934 20
3. Khrushchev Explained Only That Stalin Employed
Police Power To Terrorize The Party 21
The Other Leaders Submitted To Stalin's Will
And Became His Acolytes.. 21
The Central Committee Accepted Stalin's Wrong
The 30 June Resolution Claims That The "Leninist
Core" Opposed Stalin 21
a. But Fails To Show Why This Opposition Was
Restricted 21
b. And Why The "Leninist Core" Missed The
Opportunity To Curb Stalin's Rule In 1941 21.
c. The Resolution Fails To Explain Why Some
Politburo Members Re-Activated Stalin Early
During The War 22
The Leadership's Denial That It Knew What Stalin
Was Doing Cannot Be Supported 22
a. Khrushchev Admitted That He And Others Knew
That Beria Was Bad In 1931 22
b. The Leaders Knew That Party Statutes Were
Being Violated 22
c. The Leaders Knew That Stalin Had Called
For The Use Of Torture 22
e. Other Leaders Had Access To The Facts
Through The "Committee Of Information"
The 30 June Resolution's Claim That The "Leninist
Core" Immediately Began To Destroy The Stalin
Myth After His Death Is False
 V.
The Question Of Credit For Soviet Achievements
24
1.
Khrushchev Gave Credit For Victory To Soviet
Generals
24
2.
Khrushchev Admitted That The Party Itself Made
The Nation Unprepared For. War
25
3.
The 30 June Resolution Contradicts Itself On The
Credit Die The "Leninist Core"
25
4.
The CPSU Claims Credit For All Successes
25
5.
The Party Claims Credit For The Actions Of Its
Members In All Spheres
26
6.
But The Record, As Shown By The Other Admissions,
Proves This Claim False
26
7.
The Claim Of The Leadership That Its Strength Is
Demonstrated By The De-Stalinization Campaign Is
Destroyed By The Evidence That The Party Refused
To Act Against Stalin In Order To Preserve Its
Monopoly Of Power
VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence Qf Stalinism
28
1. There Is No Guarantee That The "Collective" Will
Not Give Birth To Another Stalin Or That It Will
Not Become Despotic r
2. "Collective" Leadership Was No Safeguard Against
Stalin
No Checks And Balances Operate To Prevent
Emergence Of Another Stalin
4. The 30 June Resolution Implies That No Further
Analysis Of The Evils Of Stalinism Is Necessary
29
5. No Guarantee Against Violation Of Law
6, "Decentralization" Measures Leave The Powers
Of The Regime Intact
7. The~F+ Party Continues To Control The Channels Of
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30
 8. The Regime Retains The Power To Manipulate Page 30
Doctrine And Th v
t
ac
s As It Sees Fit
9. Khrushchev Admitted That No Guarantees Could
Be Dependable: Stalin Acted In The Interests
Of The USSR
VII.
Moscow Control Of Foreign CPs Reasserted
2
1.
The Soviet Leaders Themselves Are Responsible
For The Turmoil Produced In The Foreign CPs
a. They Opened Up The Question of "National
Communism"
b. Soviet Actions Opened The Door To Criticism
Of The CPSU
3
32
2.
The 30 June Resolution Seeks To Throttle Foreign
Communist Criticism
3.
Recent Soviet Statements Reinforce The Demand
For An End To C it
r i
i
c
sm
34
4.
Pravda Denounces "National Communi
"
sm
34
5.
Pravda Demands Monopoly Of Power Fo
Th
r
e CP
U
"
"
nder
Socialism
In All Countries
35
6.
The 30 June Resolution Tells The CPs To Cease
Discussing Stalin's Crimes And To Proceed With
Th
e Struggle For Power
35
7.
These Statements Violate The CPSU-Yugoslav' Agree-
ment On Relations Between The Two Parties
36
VIII.
Omissions
37
1, Mass Repressions 37
2. Deportations 37
3. Collectivization 37
4. Anti-Semitism 37
5. Foreign Policy 38
Appendix: Criticisms And Questions Raised By Foreign
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Campaign
 MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS
In an effort to suppress further discussion of charges
that the Soviet system itself naturally facilitates the rise
of a Stalin and provides the means of and the justification
for Stalinist crimes, the Soviet leadership has flatly stated
that this is not the case. The denial is entirely dogmatic,
unsupported by proof, belied by history and in particular, by
the evidence contained in the secret Khrushchev speech, and
does not begin to answer the questions raised outside the
Soviet leadership. These questions have been raised, not only
by non-Communists, but by some foreign Communist leaders and
rank-and-file. The current leaders have given ample evidence
that practices which facilitated the rise of Stalin in the
first place still prevail in the system.
1. The Central Committee Resolution of 30 June is an
autocratic statement designed to suppress discussion. This
practice is identical with the practice employed by Stalin.
The Resolution says only that it is "absolutely wrong" to
"look for the source of this cult in the nature of the Soviet
social order." The Resolution then attempts to evade the
question of why it is "wrong by entering into an irrelevant
discussion of the nature of "Soviet democracy."
2. Lenin himself pointed out that the system, as early
as December 1922, had enabled Stalin, in his role of Secretary
General of the CP, to concentrate "enormous power in his hands."
Lenin warned that such power could be misused. This power and
the possibility of its misuse still exists. (The Lenin "Testa-
ment' was distributed to the delegates to the 20th CPSU Con-
gress.) Khrushchev raised this problem in his secret speech,
referring to the "great harm caused by ... the accumulation of
immense and limitless power in the hands of one person ..,"
3. In his secret speech, Khrushchev acknowledged that
doctrine in the Soviet system was a powerful weapon in the
hands of Stalin in raising himself to absolute power.
"Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people.'
This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that
the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a
1
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 controversy be proven; this term made possible the
usage of the most cruel repression, violating all
norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who
in any way disagreed with Stalin."
"Stalin's report at the February-March Central Com-
mittee Plenum in 1937, 'Deficiencies of Party work
and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites
and other two-facers,' contained an attempt at
theoretical justification of the mass terror policy
under the pretext that as ~we7 march forward toward
socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin
asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this."
4. The present Soviet leaders continue to manipulate doc-
trine, just as Stalin did:
a. In his secret speech, Khrushchev said that
Stalin invented the thesis on the intensifica-
tion of the class struggle as the building of
"Socialism" progresses in order to give his
repressive practices a "theoretical. justifica-
tion." The 30 June Resolution states that this
formula is "only correct for certain stages of
the transition,' and that being "given promin-
ence" in 1937, it became 'the basis for the
grossest violations of Socialist law and mass
repressions." By virtue of its power to make
doctrine, the Soviet leadership has now found
it expedient to denounce a Stalin doctrine as
"erroneous" for a certain period, but to condone
it for other times. Stalin's thesis, the Soviet
leaders say, was quite valid in the forced in-
dustrialization and collectivization period
(Stalin employed it correctly, in other words
against Bukharin and others in 1928 and later),
but was wrong to advance it in 1937. A doctrine
which was manipulated by Stalin for his own
purposes, is again being manipulated in the
interests of the de-Stalinization campaign of
the present leaders.
b. The CPSU manipulates Stalin's "capitalist en-
circlement" theory as it suits momentary pur-
poses. At the 20th Congress, in order to further
Soviet foreign policy aims, it was said that the
theory was no longer valid. In the 30 June Cen-
tral Committee Resolution and subsequent state-
ments, the Soviet leaders seize once more upon
 the essence of the "capitalist encirclement,"
in order to blame Poznan on the West and to re-
affirm the principle of "vigilance" against
"imperialist" machinations.
c. At the 20th CPSU Congress a portion of Stalin's
"Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" was
rejected out of hand as inconvenient to the cur-
rent Soviet foreign policy.
d. The 20th Congress also worked out the "different
roads to Socialism" line to facilitate the united
front drive. Subsequently, the CPSU has seen
fit to put limits on this thesis to prevent the
discussion of "independence" from getting out of
hand.
5. The 30 June Resolution, in Stalinist fashion, falls
back upon an authoritative interpretation of history to ration-
alize Stalin's rise to power, in order to evade the fact that
Stalin arose from the system. In the process it falsifies his-
tory when the truth does not support the argument.
a. "How could the personality cult of Stalin, with
all its negative consequences, arise and acquire
such currency under conditions of the Soviet
socialist regime? When examining this question
one must keep in mind both the objective and con-
crete conditions in which the building of social-
ism in the USSR took place and some subjective
factors connected with the personal qualities
of Stalin."
b. The "objective factors" cited in this analysis
,were "the capitalist encirclement" and "the
merciless struggle against the enemies of Lenin-
ism." The formula of "capitalist encirclement"
involves falsification of history, even in
authoritative Communist terms, at least during
the critical period of 1925 to 1933, when it did
not in fact exist. It is not a valid argument
in any case, according to the Khrushchev speech,
which points out Lenin's refusal to restrict
democracy even in periods of major crisis.
"In the most difficult period for our party and
our country, Lenin found it necessary regularly
to convoke congresses, party conferences, and
plenary sessions ... where all the most important
questions were discussed." (Khrushchev, secret
speech)
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 The "merciless struggle" against the enemies of
Leninism is used by the 30 June Resolution to
justify restrictions of democracy and by infer-
ence the mass repressions of Stalin. In the
secret speech it is used to justify only an
ideological struggle, and its use by Stalin to
justify mass repression is denounced:
"Worth noting is the fact that even in the pro-
gress of the furious ideological fight against
the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinovievites and
others---extreme repressive measures were not
used against them." (Khrushchev secret speech)
6. The CPSU has recently reaffirmed that the principles of
one-party rule and individual leadership, which made Stalin
possible, continue to be fixed for the Soviet system.
"As to our country, the Communist Party was,
is, and will be the one and only ruler of
thoughts, the one to express the ideas and
hopes of the people--their leader and organizer
throughout their entire struggle for Communism."
"Lenin wrote in the very first months of the
organization of the Soviet state: 'It is neces-
sary to learn to merge together the turbulent,
mass-meeting-like democratism of the working
masses,., with iron leadership in work, with un-
demurring submission to the will of the individual--
the Soviet leader--in work.'" (Pravda editorial.
article, 6 July)
"Combating the cult of the individual one should
remember that the petty bourgeois anarchist views
denying the role of the leaders and organizers
of the masses are alien to Marxism-Leninism.
The rich experience of socialist construction
teaches us that the principles of collective
leadership, broad development of socialist demo-
cracy do not at all deny the role and responsi-
bility of the individual leader for the matter
entrusted to him.
"It is also well known that the Communist Party
has always upheld the principle of one-man
management at industrial enterprises and of
one-man leadership in military matters."
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 7. While disposing of the particular cult of Stalin, the
Soviet leadership has further revealed that it is wedded to
the leader cult in practice. Throughout Khrushohev's secret
speech, the 28 March Pravda editorial, the 30 June Central Com-
mittee Resolution, and subsequent statements, Lenin is quoted
as the ultimate authority for all questions. Khrushchev, in
his secret speech, called for the establishment of "Lenin
prizes" and construction of "a Palace of Soviets as a monument
to Vladimir Ilyich ..," The cult of Lenin resumes more ful-
somely than ever:
Lenin Stalin
"The great Lenin, genial teach- "The entire work of transform-
er and leader of the working ing our country took place un-
class and all toilers, founder der the direct leadership of
of the Communist Party, is the Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin
inspirer and organizer of the kept perfecting the Soviet
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- science of planning . devel-
lics. Creatively developing the oped and raised the Marxist-
Marxist teaching, training the Leninist theory to an unrivalled
Party and preparing it for height ... Comrade Stalin is the
leadership of the masses in the mighty continuer of Lenin's
Socialist Revolution and the cause..." (Mikoyan on Stalin's
building of Socialism, Lenin..." 70th birthday, Pravda, 21 Decem-
ber 1949)
8. The Soviet leaders continue toward the Soviet people the
practices of concealment, evasion, and manipulation of the truth
which contributed to the rise of Stalin and rationalized his
crimes. The ability and the readiness of the regime to do this
shows that it is inherent in the Soviet system.
a. Concealment of Stalin's Crimes
Khrushchev secret speech: "We cannot let this
matter get out of the Party, especially not to
the press."
30 June CC Resolution: the CPSU . told
the whole truth, no matter how bitter."~
The facts are that the Khrushchev speech has not
been published in the USSR. Stalin's personal
responsibility for the use of torture, fabrica-
tion of cases, mass repressions, mass deporta-
tions of nationalities; involvement in Kirov's
murder, the Leningrad case, the Doctors' Plot;
mistreatment of Khrushchev, Bulganin, Andreyev,
Molotov, etc.; his "plans to finish off the old
 members of the Political Bureau"; his personal
responsibility for dismissing warnings of
Hitler's attack and for the failure of Soviet
military operations in the early stages of the
war; his despair in the early war period--all
the details of the Khrushchev speech have not
been published for the Soviet people. The
30 June Resolution and subsequent statements
have suppressed, minimized or glossed over the
charges against Stalin made in Khrushchev's
secret speech.
b. Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule
Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin's wilfulness
... became fully evident after the Seventeenth
Party Congress which took place in 1934." By
implication, the bad period even antedates the
Seventeenth Congress-. "... Mass repressions
against activists increased more and more after
the Seventeenth Party Congress."
30 June CC Resolution: The period 1934-1937,
during which great purges occurred, is glossed
over; Stalin's thesis on intensification of the
class struggle, which was "given prominence in
1937 ... was the basis for the grossest violations
of Socialist law and mass repressions." Emphasis
is shifted awa,~ from these earlier purges to the
period "when Ls937 the criminal. band of the
agent of international imperialism, Beria, was
put at the head of the state security organs."
c. The Lie that the Peo le or Even the Party as a
o,e Rule in -7-7e
30 June CC Resolution: " . For nearly 40 years
the authority has been in the hands of the working
class and peasantry."
Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin headed the Party
and the country for thirty years ... Stalin decided.
everything No one could say anything that was
contrary to his opinion ... Stalin separated him-
self from the people and never went anywhere ...
Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great
wilfulness and choked a person morally and physi-
cally. A situation was created where one could
not express one's own will."
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6
 d, Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the West
30 June CC Resolution: "For over a quarter of
a century, the Soviet country was ... a besieged
fortress situated in a capitalist encirclement
' Enemies sent into the USSR a large number
of spies and diversionists... The threat of a
new imperialist aggression against the USSR became
particularly intense after the advent to power of
Fascism in Germany in 1933... In the course of
a fierce struggle against the whole world of
imperialism our country had to submit to certain
restrictions of democracy..."
Khrushchev secret speech; ignores the "capitalist
encirclement" bogeyman in describing the condi-
tions under which Stalin exercised his tyranny and
seeks to justify Stalin's misrule as in the in-
terests of the Soviet pec ,le, Khrushchev makes
a point of the'fa.ct that Stalin . used extreme
methods and mass repressions at a time when the
revolution was already victorious, when the
Soviet state was strengthened ~e`tc2.11
Since these two positions contradict each other,
it is evident that the position of the Resolution
is an attempt to divert attention from internal
tensions to an external enemy.
e. Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the Soviet People
Khrushchev secret speech: Makes it clear that
Stalin ruled by terror exercised through his con-
trol of the secret police. Stalin "was the chief'
prosecutor" in the purges. "Stalin not only agreed
to, but on his own initiative, issued arrest orders."
Stalin issued the order for the use of torture, etc.
30 June CC Resolution: "Any action against him ...
would not have been understood by the people .
would not have received support from the people."
"The people consciously assumed . certain re-
strictions of democracy, justified by the logic of
the struggle of our people for socialism under cir-
cumstances of capitalist encirclement."
f. Deception Concerning Foreign CP Criticisms
The 30 June CC Resolution, while acknowledging that
''certain of our friends abroad are not quite clear
on the question of the personality cult and its
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 consequences," attempts to shift the blame for
"confusions" onto the "tricks and devices" of
"imperialist quarters" and ignores the fact that
many CPs have been thrown into turmoil by the
revelations of the Khrushchev speech itself.
The Resolution and later materials deceive the
Soviet people about the turmoil produced by the
Khrushchev speech, and suppress the foreign CP
criticisms by selectively quoting from foreign
CP statements to show their approval.
The Togliatti Nuovi Argomenti interview with its
searching analysis has not been published in the
USSR. Only a single suggestion--that the Soviet
system might have "degenerated" under Stalin--
has been cited by the Resolution, in order to be
rejected cavalierly. The much more moderate
article by Eugene Dennis was published instead,
but with the deletion of the references to anti-
Semitism under Stalin.
The Soviet leadership has followed the same prac-
tice of selectivity since the publication of the
30 June Resolution in an attempt to deceive the
Soviet people into thinking that the Resolution
has met with unqualified endorsement by the
foreign CFs:
"The majority of representatives of the broad
public in various countries,"notes the French
paper L"Humanite,"Look upon the decision on the
personal.i and its consequences as 'one
of the fundamental documents in the history of
the international workers' movement...""
"The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers'
Party has declared that under the influence of
the historic decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress
inner party democracy has become stabilized in
Hungary; the democracy of state and public life
has strengthened, and socialist law has become
firmer."
"In Italy, the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Italian Communist Party says
that executive bodies of the Italian Communist
Party unconditionally approve the actions which
have and are being taken by the leaders of the
CPSU for the complete overcoming of the personality
cult of Stalin, both in the Soviet Union and in
the International Workers' Movement."
 "The General Secretary of the National Committee
of the United States Communist Party, E. Dennis,
states: 'The decision provides a correct assess-
ment of the malicious aims of those reactionary
circles which would have liked to bury the
colossal achievements of the 20th CPSU Congress
under a mountain of suppositions concerning the
revaluation of Stalin. The assessment of him
is in accord with our views. It is that reaction-
ary circles in. the United States and other coun-
tries are seeking to distort Khrushchev's special
report on Stalin in order to destroy solidarity
of the International Working Class Movement."
(TASS despatch to Soviet provincial press, 10 July)
Concerning the questions of foreign Communists
which are not being satisfactorily answered by the
Soviet leaders, and the criticisms from abroad
which the leaders are concealing from the Soviet
people, see Appendix.
 II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration
of the Soviet System
While not denying that Stalin's actions were harmful to
the Party and the USSR., the CPSU has minimized the harmful. ef-
fects of his acts and denied, without bothering to support the
denial in serious terms, that the nature of the Soviet Communist
system was perverted by Stalin. From the Free World point of
view, this question may seem of dubious importance, since it
is impossible to separate Stalin from the system which gave
him power and which in turn reflects his handiwork-. It is also
questionable whether the "perversion" of a fundamentally bad
system is in fact possible. The question is., however, of criti-
cal concern to those who are firmly identified with or dedicated
to the system. In the Khrushchev speech, the damage done by
Stalin to both Party and state was extensively described in
very specific terms, and was shown to have seriously affected
the essentials of the system. This could and did lead natur-
ally to observations and questions by foreign (i.e., non-Soviet)
Communists concerning the pcssibil.ity of some degeneration or
distortion having occurred In the system. The 30 June Central
Committee Resolution, in denying the charges and in cutting off'
further Communist discussion of the question, uses a limited
and unrealistic definition of what constitutes the essence of
the Socialist order, and a dogmatic "Stalinist" statement that
such thinkinw is un-Marxist, contrary to truth, and heretically
"idealistic. Thus it evades the major issue of the de-
Stalinization process. The Resolution's denial is belied by
Lenin's warning that Stalin could distort the system, a, point
which Khrushchev himself raised in his secret speech:
"Fearing for the future fate of the Party and the
Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct
characterization of Stalin..."
I'. The effects of Stalin's actions on both the party and
state were so fundamental. and serious that they'undoubtedly
have modified the system.
a. "The principle of collective leadership is ele-
mentary for the proletarian party, for the Lenin-
type party . in the course of about 20 years,
we in fact had no collective leadership.
(Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)
b. "Isolation of the Soviet public and state or-
ganizations from the outer world" was acknowl-
edged by Mikoyan as having been an error in
Soviet policy, and he refers to "fear of all
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0
 that can happen from contact between Soviet
people and foreigners," as an alleged source
of this error. Khrushchev states in his speech
that "Stalin demonstrated his suspiciousness
not only in relation to individuals--but in
relation to whole parties and nations." Twenty
years of such isolation must have had a serious
effect upon the system, as the inability and
unwillingness of the present leaders to consider
and understand the criticisms of foreign CP
leaders show.*
C. "During the past 15 or 20 years there has been
very little drawing upon the treasury of Lenin's
ideas for the understanding and explaining of
events." (Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)
Since the scientific analysis of events is an
indispensable aspect of the Soviet system, the
non-Leninist interpretation of events for 20
years is bound to have had a serious effect upon
the system,'particularly since a whole generation
of leaders has developed during this period.
d. "The cult brought about ... sterile administra-
tion, deviations of all sorts, covering up of
shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our
nation gave birth to flatterers and specialists in
false optimism and deceit." (Khrushchev secret
speech)
If Stalin's actions produced and gave authority to liars,
'deceivers, and sterile administrators, the actions of such in-
dividuals must in turn have had a serious effect upon the system,
in which they occupied so many positions. Note the references
in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution to "the mistakes in
leadership in critical segments of the Soviet system which were
countenanced by Stalin." The secret Khrushchev speech is more
precise, and states that these characteristics were the products
of Stalin's actions:
"Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged ...
arbitrariness in others... We should not forget
that due to the numerous arrests ... many workers
began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness,
feared all that was new, feared their own shadows....
This all produced the danger of bureaucratizing the
whole apparatus,"
* See 30 June Resolution comment: "Certain of our friends abroad
have ... tolerated a wrong interpretation of certain of its
/he cult' aspects."
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 If the "whole apparatus" was bureaucratized, how
can it be said that the system was not affected?
2. The Central Committee Resolution, in denying that Stalin's
rule perverted the system, charges that those who believe that
Stalin could have changed the socio-political order "enter into
profound contradiction with the facts, with Marxism .., and give
way to idealism."
In the light of the Resolution, should Khrushchev''s
secret speech and Mikoyan's speech, which clearly show the all-
pervasive influence and limitless power of Stalin, now be con-
demned as un-Marxist and "idealistic"? It was primarily on the
basis of the evidence and arguments in these two speeches, after
all, that Communist Party leaders abroad raised the question of
Stalin's effect upon the system. Are they also now to be con-
demned because they took these speeches seriously?
3. By emphasizing its "collectivity" the current leader-
ship is evading the issue of continued concentration of unlimited
power at the top. The small collective inherited all of Stalin's
powers and is capable of abusing these powers just as despotic-
ally as Stalin. No meaningful changes have occurred.
a. The Khrushchev speech states that Stalin abused
the power given him and thereby increased his
power to a point where he was an absolute ruler-
"Later, Stalin abusing his power more and more,
began to fight eminent party and government leaders
and to use terroristic methods against honest
Soviet people. Attempts to oppose ... resulted
in the opponent falling victim of the repression.
In such a situation, there is no need for any
sanction, for what sort of sanction could there
be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev
secret speech)
b. It further stated that this absolute power made
action against him impossible.
"Possessing unlimited power he ~S_tali2n indulged
in great wilfulness. A situation was created in
which one could not express his own will."
(Khrushchev secret speech)
c. In Pravda of 6 July, the Communist Party's con-
tinued possession of unlimited power is reaffirmed-.
"As to our country the Communist Party was, is,
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M ILP express the ideas and hopes of the people."
 d. And power in the Party remains concentrated in
the hands of the collective leadership.
"Our Communist Party is the overning Party....
The Central Committee ... ~f a collective
leader of our Party.... The Presidium of the
Central Committee ... ZT~ a regularly acting col-
lective body dealing with all"the most important
uestions of the life of the Party and country."
(Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to
the 20th CPSU Congress)
e. But there is even doubt that the "collective"
Presidium decides matters, The introduction of
the idea of the "Leninist core" suggests an even
greater concentration of power:
"The Leninist core of the Central Committee immed-
iately after the death of Stalin set a course of
resolute struggle...," (30 June Central Committee
Resolution)
4. The Khrushchev speech condemns the mass repressions of
the Trotskyites and other oppositionists as unnecessary violence
and abandonment of Lenin's principle of ideological struggle.
The Central Committee Resolution, however, by restricting its
criticism of mass repression to the period after 1937, tacitly
endorses the earlier repressive acts and implicitly, therefore,
the degeneration of the system under Stalin.
"Lenin used severe methods only in the most neces-
sary cases ,.. Stalin on the other hand used extreme
methods and mass repressions at a time when the
Revolution was already victorious, the Soviet state
strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already
liquidated
5. The Khrushchev speech shows that what the 30 June
Resolution later referred to as the "training of the whole people
in a spirit of constant vigilance and readiness in the face of
foreign enemies" actually led to the weakening of the Soviet Army
at a critical time, and that mass repressions created mass sus-
piciousness and mistrust. Such training is still a character-
istic of the system and both a source and a symptom of its
degeneration.
a. "For several years officers of all ranks, sol-
diers in the party and Komsomol cells were
taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden
enemies. It is natural that this caused a
negative influence on the state of military
 discipline in the first war period." (Khrushchev
secret speech)
b. "Mass repressions ... created a situation of un-
certainty, contributed to the spreading of un-
healthy suspicion and sowed distrust among Com-
munists." (Khrushchev secret speech)
c. "The capitalist encirclement has sent into our
country no few spies and saboteurs,... We must
therefore in every way arouse among the Soviet
people the revolutionary vigilance and strengthen
the state security organs." (Khrushchev, Report
of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress)
Here Khrushchev shows that he is the direct heir
of Stalin, who set forth this task to the 18th
CPSU Congress in 1939. "Never to forget that we
are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember
that the foreign espionage services will smuggle
spies, murderers and wreckers into our country;
and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist
intelligence service and systematically help it
to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people."
d. "One must not show a careless attitude toward the
new machinations of the imperialist agents, who
are trying to penetrate into Socialist countries
for the purpose of undermining the achievements
of the workers." (30 June Central Committee Resolu-
tion)
6. It is contradictory to give the system credit for major
successes and at the same time deny its responsibility for fail-
ures and evils of an equally serious nature.
The Resolution states that counteraction against
Stalin was taken during the war years by members of the Central.
Committee of the Party and outstanding Soviet war commanders,
but ignores the major charge in the Khrushchev speech that the
most serious injustices against the national minorities in the
USSR took place during this same period. The most glaring
illustrations of inconsistency follow:
a. "There were definite periods, for instance dur-
ing the war years, when the individual acts of
Stalin were sharply restricted Zaing the nega-
tive consequences of lawlessness and arbitrari-
ness were substantially diminished." (30 June
Central Committee Resolution)
 b. "At the end of 1943 ... a decision was taken and
executed concerning the deportation of all the
Karachai from the lands on which they lived.
The same lot befell the whole population of the
Kalmyk Autonomous Republic ZaTlso Chechen, Ingush,
Balkar8~s_7. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this
fate only because there were too many of them."
(Khrushchev secret speech)
7. From a Marxist point of view, the 30 June Resolution
is unscientific. Marxism contends that the political order of
a country reflects and interacts with the economic system at
the base, and more generally that individuals are the products
of their environment. The Resolution simply says that the nature
of a regime is determined by who owns the means of production
and what class holdspolitical authority. Since allegedly this
has not changed since 1917, the Soviet system has not changed.
The Resolution thus ignores the question of relation between
economic and political institutions and says in effect that it
doesn't really matter what happened since the Revolution. Further,
if the system has not changed since 1917, it cannot prevent the
rise of another Stalin, and also, the system itself must have
generated its own degeneration. As Khrushchev put it,
"... the cult of the person of Stalin ... became at
a certain specific stage the source of a whole
series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions
of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolu-
tionary legality." (Khrushchev secret speech..
Emphasis supplied.)
8. Whereas the 30 June Central Committee Resolution stated
that one-man rule could not possibly "change the nature of the
Socialist state," it is a fact that Lenin prescribed some changes
for the Soviet system, and that in neglect nng to carry them out,
Stalin changed the system, even as Lenin had envisa ed it.
Lenin specifically advocated that e central governmen
"... retain the union of the Socialist Soviet repub-
lics only in the sphere of military affairs and
diplomacy, while in other matters each of the people's
commissariats will be fully independent." (Lenin,
"Concerning the National Question or 'Autonomization'")
This decentralization of key elements of power has never been
carried out.
 III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify
the Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy
The CPSU appears to have been alarmed and embarrassed by
evidence that the discussions of the cult of the individual re-
flected the Soviet people's hope for a relaxation and democrati-
zation of the Soviet state. At the same time, in many Commu-
nist Parties, there was evidence of a critical, scrutinizing
and questioning of the true workings of inner-party democracy
in the light of the revelations concerning the operations of
the CPSU under Stalin. Failing to understand or refusing to
consider significant changes seriously, the CPSU has clearly
indicated that the deceptive and peculiar Stalinist concept of
Soviet democracy remains essentially unchanged.
The 30 June Central Committee Resolution depicts popular
support of Stalin as a factor impeding the taking of action
against him. The Khrushchev secret speech, on the other hand,
paints a picture of the complete helplessness and subjugation of
the entire nation--both people. and Party--under Stalin's rule,
and of personal pride and wilfulness as major motives of
Stalin's actions. Examined against these two situations, the
position of the Soviet people in the state is either that of
slaves or helpless children to be led by the Party.
1. In an attempt to suppress foreign Communist and non-
Communist discussion of the nature of Soviet "democracy" in
Western terms, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution reverts
to Stalinist definitions. Accordingly, Soviet "democracy" is
reduced to such questions as the popularity of the regime?
success of the Soviet state, civil liberties determined by
those in power at their own discretion, and material. benefits.
The system of Soviets is described as a system of "genuine
popular authority".
The essence of democracy is not in formal indica-
tions, but in whether political authority serves
and reflects in action the will and interests of
the majority of the people, the interests of the
workers. The entire internal and foreign policy
of the Soviet state proclaims the fact that our
regime is truly democratic, a truly popular regime.
The highest aim of the Soviet state's daily concern
is the raising in every respect of the people's
living standards, the securing of a peaceful exist-
ence for its people." (30 June Central Committee
Resolution)
 2. The Khrushchev secret speech denies the possibility that
the Soviet system under Stalin's absolute rule could reflect the
desires and best interests of the people, since Stalin isolated
himself from the people and was not aware of the real. state of
affairs.
"Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities
and the fact that he was not aware of the real state
of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated..."
"Stalin never traveled anwhere,, did not meet city
and collective workers..."
"Stalin was very far from an understanding of the
real situation at the front. This was natural. be-
cause during the whole patriotic war he never
visited any section of the front..."
And "Stalin decided everything." (Khrushchev secret
speech)
3. The Soviet leadership has recently reaffirmed that the
Soviet people are irrevocably subordinated to authoritarian
one-party dictatorship, "iron discipline," individual. leader-
ship, and unrelenting control. of the press. Alternative voices
are still denied them, in spite of the now proven fact that
the Party could not protect the people, the Soviet state, or
itself against a Stalin.
"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is,
and will. be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the
one to express the ideas and hopes of the people-
their leader and organizer throughout their entire
struggle for Communism."
"A new homogeneous society has been created in the
Soviet Union. It Is void of any hostile classes,
of any social groups whose interests fail to coin-
cide. Therefore, there is no social ground In the
Soviet society for the origination and existence
of other than the Communist Party." (Pravda,
editorial article, 6 July)
k. Even the necessity of "undemurring submission to the
will of the :individual" is being propagated currently. (;Pravda,
quoting Lenin, 8 July)
"The rich experience of socialist construction
teaches us that the principles of collective leader-
ship . do not at all deny the role of the indi-
vidual. leader for the matter entrusted to him."
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 5. Lenin is cited as the authority against freedom of
the press- "Freedom of the press ... in a world in which
there exist capitalists, is freedom to buy the press, to buy
those who write in it, to bribe and to fabricate public opinion
in favor of the bourgeoisie'. . In our Soviet country there
is and there can be no freedom to buy or to bribe the press."
(Pravda editorial article, 8 July) The argument that freedom
wouT:make it possible for hostile class interests to make use
of a Soviet publication is contradictory to the argument em-
ployed to explain why there is no need for more than one party
in the USSR-
"At the present time, as a result of the victory
of Socialism, a new homogeneous society has been
created in the Soviet Union. It is void of any
hostile classes of any hostile rou s whose
interests fail to coincide. here is no social
ground in the Soviet society for the origination
and existence of other than the Communist Party."
(Pravda editorial article, 6 July. Emphasis supplied.)
6. While the present leadership cites Lenin as authority
for its restriction of democratic freedoms, the current
definition of Soviet democracy fails to meet even Lenin's
definition of democracy in at least one major respect. Even
the Communist Party itself fails to meet this test.
"Everyone will, probably agree that 'broad demo-
cratic principles' presupposes two following
conditions: first, full publicity, and second,
election to all functions. It would be absurd
to speak of democracy without publicity; that is,
publicity which extends beyond the circle of member-
ship of the organization,.... No one would ever
call an organization that is hidden from every-
one but its members by a veil of secrecy, a demo-
cratic organization." (Lenin,"What is to be Done?"
"We cannot let this matter get beyond the party,
especially not to the press. It is for this rea-
son we are considering It here at a closed Congress
session." (Khrushchev secret speech)
7. The Soviet leaders today also continue to violate
Lenin's dictum that even in the peculiarly Soviet type of
"democracy" the people "must have the right to know and check
even the smallest step in ... h2e work ... ff7 their respon.-
sible leaders."
a. This statement was quoted in the Pravda edi-
torial article of 28 March, "Why is the cult
 DDPL
cP&1Es
/9 4- ~2?
 of the individual alien to the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism?"
b. The Khrushchev' speech of 25 February, being
secret and enjoining secrecy, violates this
principle, as do many other events. (For ex-
ample, the facts and pleadings of the cases of
Beria, Bagirov, et al.,have never been published.)
c. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution that opposition to Stalin would "not
have been understood by the people" shows that the
regime has never considered it necessary to let
the people know the truth. The Soviet people are
considered incapable of comprehending the truth
(since their ideas are the creations of official,
propaganda) and are only told those things that
suit the particular needs of those in power (Stalin
or the "collective").
8. The thesis concerning Stalin's popularity, as stated in
the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, shows that the current
Soviet leadership believes the people to have been either fools
or dupes: fools, If in the light of what was happening In the
Soviet Union, they still loved Stalin; dupes, if what was happen-
ing was kept from them by a controlled propaganda machine.
 In the course of the de-Stalinization campaign the CPSU
leadership--or at least a major element of it--has sought to
avoid discussion of the question of Its co-responsibility for
Stalin's errors and crimes. The secret speech, however,
intentionally or unintentionally, raised this question when
it clearly implicated many of the leaders in the authenti-
cation and execution of Stalin's policies, showed that they
knew about his illegal methods of action, and described how
they sympathized with some who did oppose Stalin. The secret
speech also shows that in many instances Stalin had the active
support of the leaders, and that even as late as the World
War II period, they urged him to resume active leadership after
he had largely withdrawn as a consequence of the initial.
Soviet defeats. In an effort to conceal their culpability,
the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and later material
refrain generally from mentioning these facts. They seek to
shift responsibility to the Soviet people, and "objective"
circumstances, and also to shut off foreign Communist discus-
sion of the issue.
1. Khrushchev, in seeking to explain why the members of
the Politburo did "not assert themselves" against Stalin, ad-
mits co-responsibility- "The members of the Political Bureau
viewed these matters in a different way at different times."
a. "Initially, many of them backed Stalin because
he was one of the strongest Marxists and his
logic, his strength and his will greatly influ-
enced the cadres and party work." (Khrushchev
secret speech)
b, This was In spite of the fact that Lenin had
warned the Party against Stalin and urged his
removal from the post of Secretary General.
(Lenin's "Testament") In other words, the Party
leaders disregarded Lenin's advice and put
themselves into Stalin's hands, "hoping that
he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir.
Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects
which caused Lenin serious anxiety." (Khrush-
chev secret speech)
2. By 1934, according to Khrushchev, Stalin "had so ele-
vated himself above the Party and above the nation that he
ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party."
The CPSU has completely failed to explain how this arrogation
of one-man power by Stalin occurred, at the time when the
Party was still capable of restricting his powers.
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 of the individual alien to the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism?"
b, The Khrushchev speech of 25 February, being
secret and enjoining secrecy, violates this
principle, as do many other events, (For ex-
ample, the facts and pleadings of the cases of
Beria, Bagirov, et ale,have never been published.)
c. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution that opposition to Stalin would "not
have been understood by the people" shows that the
regime has never considered it necessary to let
the people know the truth. The Soviet people are
considered incapable of comprehending the truth
(since their ideas are the creations of official,
propaganda) and are only told those things that
suit the particular needs of those in power (Stalin
or the "collective")
8. The thesis concerning Stalin's popularity, as stated in
the 30 June Central. Committee Resolution, shows that the current
Soviet leadership believes the people to have been either fools
or dupes: fools, if in the light of what was happening In the
Soviet Union, they still loved Stalin; dupes, if what was happen-
ing was kept from them by a controlled propaganda machine.
 In the course of the de-Stalinization campaign the CPSU
leadership--or at least a major element of it--has sought to
avoid discussion of the question of its co-responsibility for
Stalin's errors and crimes. The secret speech, however,
intentionally or unintentionally, raised this question when
it clearly implicated many of the leaders in the authenti-
cation and execution of Stalin's policies, showed that they
knew about his illegal methods of action, and described how
they sympathized with some who did oppose Stalin. The secret
speech also shows that in many instances Stalin had the active
support of the leaders, and that even as late as the World
War II period, they urged him to resume active leadership after
he had largely withdrawn as a consequence of the initial
Soviet defeats. In an effort to conceal their culpability,
the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and later material,
refrain generally from mentioning these facts. They seek to
shift responsibility to the Soviet people, and "objective"
circumstances, and also to shut off foreign Communist discus-
sion of the issue,
1. Khrushchev, in seeking to explain why the members of
the Politburo did "not assert themselves" against Stalin, ad-
mits co-responsibility. "The members of the Political Bureau
viewed these matters in a different way at different times."
a. "Initially, many of them backed Stalin because
he was one of the strongest Marxists and his
logic, his strength and his will greatly influ-
enced the cadres and party work." (Khrushchev
secret speech)
b. This was In spite of the fact that Lenin had
warned the Party against Stalin and urged his
removal from the post of Secretary General.
(Lenin's "Testament") In other words, the Party
leaders disregarded Lenin's advice and put
themselves into Stalin's hands, "hoping that
he would heed the critical. remarks of Vladimir
Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects
which caused Lenin serious anxiety." (Khrush-
chev secret speech)
2. By 1934, according to Khrushchev, Stalin "had so ele-
vated himself above the Party and above the nation that he
ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party."
The CPSU has completely failed to explain how this arrogation
of one-man power by Stalin occurred, at the time when the
Party was still capable of restricting his powers.
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 3. Thereafter, Stalin made use of police power to terror-
ize the Party and the people.
"Stalin acted ... by imposing his concepts and de-
manding absolute submission to his opinion. Who-
ever opposed this concept or tried to prove his
viewpoint, and the correctness of his position,
was doomed to removal from the leading collective
and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation."
(Khrushchev secret speech)
4. It is evident that the other leaders, in order to re-
main in power, submitted to Stalin's will and in this respect,
bear responsibility with him for the crimes. The statement in
the 30 June Central Committee Resolution--that it was not "a
question of personal courage"--is amply demonstrated in the
Khrushchev, speech to have been false. The other leaders, in
order to gain and protect their positions, became the "many
flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit," which
Khrushchev said had been produced under Stalin.
5. The Soviet statements have neglected to account for
the fact that Stalin's thesis on the intensification of the class
struggle--which both Khrushchev and the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution said was a major weapon in Stalin's terror policy--
was accepted by the Central Committee in 1937 despite Khrushchev's
claim that many opposed it.
6. The 30 June Central. Committee Resolution produces, for
the first time, an allegation that there was "counter-action
against the negative manifestations which were connected with
the personality cult..." The "counter-action" was credited to
a "Leninist core of leaders," The Resolution states that "there
were certain periods, for instance during the war years, when
the individual. acts of Stalin were sharply restricted."
a. There is no explanation of why the "core" was
able to act at "certain" times, but not at
others; nor of how it was able to survive
against the certain "vengeance" which Khrushchev
said awaited anyone who opposed Stalin,
b. It is not explained why the "core" failed to
act at what would appear, from Khrushchev's
secret speech, to have been a golden opportunity
to take power away from Stalin, namely, when
the Central Committee Plenum was called in Octo-
ber 1941, Stalin refused to meet with the Cen-
tral Committee members, but if the "core" had
been resolute, the Plenum could have been con-
vened without Stalin.
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 C. The existence of a "Leninist core" brings into
question the role of those "members of the
Political Bureau" who recalled Stalin to active
leadership from the state of inactivity into which
Khrushchev stated he had withdrawn. Were they
members of the "core"? If so, what has the "core"
done to punish them for bringing Stalin back?
7. Khrushchev has claimed that the other leaders were ig-
norant of many of the facts of Stalin's crimes until after the
removal of Beria. Even if the impossibility of the other
leaders having worn blinders throughout the entire Stalin
period is not taken into account, the claim is not valid.
a. In his speech, Khrushchev admits that he, Mikoyan,
and Kaganovich knew in 1931 that Beria's reputa-
tion was bad (i.e., long before Beria got power),
b. The leaders knew that many top functionaries were
being purged; they also knew what measures the
Party statutes prescribed and that these statutes
were being violated.
C. Khrushchev, along with many others, knew of Stalin's
coded telegram of 20 January 1939 (to Secretaries
of Oblast and Krai Committees, etc.) endorsing the
use of torture.
d. Ignatiev must have had access to MVD records in
1952, before Beria's ouster. (Ignatiev, incident-
ally, attended the 20th Congress and is now Party
Secretary in Bashkir.)
e. The "Committee of Information," established in
1947 under the Council of Ministers, had access
to all data on the activities of the Soviet
intelligence organs, which Stalin personally
exploited to liquidate his opponents. Molotov
was chairman of the committee in the beginning.
The committee existed until 1951. .V. A. Zorin,
Andrei Vyshinsky, and. Yakub Malik were also con-
cerned with the committee.
8. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that
"immediately after the death of Stalin, the Leninist core of
the Central Committee set a course of resolute struggle against
the personality cult and its grave consequences."
a. Khrushchev was hailing Stalin as "the great
continuer of Lenin's cause" in April 1954.
(Speech to the Supreme Soviet)
 b. Even as late as December 1955, Stalin's birth-
day was the occasion for adulatory statements
about his merits.
9. The co-responsibility of the entire CPSU leadership
during the period of Stalin's rule is clear in the 30 June Cen-
tral Committee Resolution, which states:
"All these difficulties on the path of building
socialism were overcome by the Soviet people under
the leadership of the Communist Party and its Cen-
tral Committee which consistently carried out
Lenin's general line."
If the Central Committee chooses to claim credit for the achieve-
ments of the USSR, it stamps Khrushchev's statements that Stalin
ruled alone as a lie. Similarly, If "Lenin's general line" was
being carried, out, how account for the Stalinist evil? Was
that a result of "Lenin's general line"?
 V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements
The current regime, while placing the blame upon Stalin
for excesses and evils, denies that he is entitled to exclu-
sive credit for the major successes of the Soviet state during
the past 40 years. As a consequence, the question of who
deserves the credit arises.
While the Khrushchev secret speech was in general non-
partisan in giving credit for successes to the Party, the
government, technical and intellectual leading workers, and
the Soviet people, it was quite explicit in giving credit for
the successful prosecution of the war to the generals, and in
the same context carried implied criticism of the actions of
the Party in connection with preparedness and the efficiency
of the Armed Forces Just prior to World War II. Later material.,
particularly the Pravda editorial of 6 July, is less balanced,
and claims the greatest share of credit for the Party for all
the socialist successes. In the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution a so-called "Leninist core" of the leadership lays
claim to major credit for itself.
Although, according to the secret speech, the restoration
of the Party to its rightful role was an avowed aim of the
de-Stalinization campaign, the speech's revelations of the ex-
tent to which the Party had been ignored and deprived of power
under Stalin evoked from Communists everywhere embarrassing
questions of what essential role the Party played in the Soviet
system. This appears to have inspired the observed shift in
treatment of the Party's claim to credit for the past successes
of the Soviet state.
1. The Khrushchev speech gives major credit for the suc-
cessful conduct of the war to the Soviet generals.
"We paid with great losses until our generals,
upon whose shoulders rested the whole weight of
conducting the war, succeeded in changing the
situation and shifting to flexible maneuver opera-
tions, which immediately brought serious changes
at the Front favorable to us. (Khrushchev secret
speech)
"And where are the military on whose shoulders
rested the burden of the war? ... With Stalin in,
no room was left for them." (Khrushchev secret
speech)
 2. The Khrushchev speech criticizes the role of the Party
in connection with the Soviet Army's preparedness for war.
"For several years officers of all ranks and even
soldiers in the Party and Komsomol cells were
taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden
enemies. It is natural that this caused a nega-
tive influence on the state of military discipline
in the first war period," (Khrushchev secret speech)
"Before the war ... all our political-educational
work was characterized by its bragging tone; when
the enemy violates the holy Soviet soil ... we will
battle the enemy on his soil and we will win with-
out much harm to ourselves. But these positive
statements were not based in all areas on concrete
facts," (Khrushchev secret speech)
3. The Resolution claims credit for the "Leninist core"
of the CPSU leadership which is inconsistent with the statements
in the Khrushchev speech.
a, "During the war years, the individual acts of
Stalin were sharply restricted... It is known
that precisely during this period members of
the Central Committee and also outstanding Soviet
commanders took over certain sectors of activity
made independent decisions, and through
their organizational, political, economic, and
military work . insured the victory of the
Soviet people in the war," (30 June Central
Committee Resolution)
b. "It would be incorrect to forget that after the
first severe disaster , Stalin thought this
was the end.,. After this Stalin . ceased to
do anything whatsoever. He returned to active
leadership only when some members of the Political
Bureau visited him and told him that it was neces-
sary to take certain steps immediately to improve
the situation at the Front," (Khrushchev secret
speech)
4. The CPSU claims that credit for all the successes of
the Soviet state belongs to the Communist Party.
"Our socialist state owes all its successes to
the leadership of the Communist Party." (Pravda,
6 July)
 5, The Party seeks to assume credit for all the actions
of its members in the Soviet government and the Soviet economy.
"Whenever the country was in danger ... the Com-
munists were the first to rush ahead... During
the years of the Great Fatherland War ... the
Party directed its best forces to the military
fronts and to decisive sectors in the rear."
"Our Party is boldly leading us along this path
strengthening Soviet state, upsurge of agricul-
ture, etc.27 for it unites in its ranks the most
progressive, the most conscious ... section of
the Soviet people."
"By its tremendous efforts ... the Party has ac-
cumulated a rich experience of leadership in all
spheres of the state--economic and cultural con-
struction... Nearly four decades have passed ...
and each day ... was filled with the tireless
activity of the Party in directing the country,
in the socialist transformation of its economy and
culture, in defense of what has been achieved ...
and in strengthening and development of the
principles of the international solidarity of the
workers." (Pravda, 6 July)
6. The falseness of the last quotation given above from
Pravda, 6 July, can be abundantly demonstrated by comparison
with the many statements given elsewhere* concerning the Party's
lack of initiative and authority and the helplessness of the
Party leadership during Stalin's years.
7. Although the CPSU claims that its great strength is
shown by its campaign against the cult--
"The fact that we present in all its ramifications
the basic problem of overcoming the cult--is an
evidence of the reat moral and political strength
of our Party." ~Khrushchev, secret, speech)
"The fact that the Party itself openly and boldly
posed the question of liquidating the personality
cult--is the best proof of the force and viability
of the Soviet Socialist regime." (30 June Central,
Committee Resolution)
--it immediately destroys the argument and shows its true
weakness by admitting that action against Stalin was not pos-
sible until his death.
Approved For Relea
* See Sections I, II and IV.
 The 20th Congress and the entire policy of the
Central Committee after the death of Stalin
bear vivid testimony..."
"Why did these people not take a stand against
Stalin and remove him from leadership? This
could not be done in the circumstances ... such a
stand would have been considered a blow against
the unity of the party and the whole state, extremely
dangerous in the presence of capitalist encircle-
ment." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)
"After Stalin's death the Central Committee began
a policy of explaining concisely and consistently
that it is ... foreign to the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism to elevate one person ...?
"Why did they not assert themselves against the cult
of the individual in time? ... Attempts to oppose
resulted in the opponent falling victim to repres-
sion." (Khrushchev secret speech)
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 VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism
Safeguards adequate to ensure that another Stalin cannot
arise do not, in spite of the CPSU Resolution, exist at present
in the Soviet system.
After the Khruschev speech called for study and analysis
to determine what measures beyond those already taken would be
necessary to ensure that another Stalin could not arise, the
30 June Ceptral.Committee Resolution abruptly stated that all
the necessary measureshave already been taken, and that adequate
guarantees against a repetition of Stalin's actions now exist.
A review of the measures and guarantees referred to does not
demonstrate that the critical elements of the Party and state
system which led to Stalin's rise* have, in fact, been brought
under adequate control. In particular there is no provision for
popular checks on the leadership or for freedom of expression
and dissemination of'information.
The fundamental dilemma over this question of guarantees
in the Soviet system is shown clearly by the Khrushchev speech
to lie in the possibility that deeds such as Stalin's can be
committed in the belief that they are done in the interest of
the Communist cause itself.
1. Restoration of collective leadership is claimed as a
guarantee against the rise of another Stalin, but this state-
ment is meaningless since there are no guarantees that collec-
tive leadership itself will continue, or that the collective
itself will not become despotic.
Although Khrushchev said--"Lenin worked out the
principles of party direction ... stressing that the guiding
principle of party leadership is its collegiality. Lenin
never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers."
(Khrushchev secret speech)--there is no guarantee that a
member of the collective leadership, if he so chooses cannot
impose his views upon his co-workers, nor any way in which
an attempt to do so could be observed by the ranks of the
party and the citizens.
2. As a guarantee of collective leadership, Lenin, in
his"Testament;' placed his faith in the selection for the posi-
tion of Secretary General, of an individual who has certain
personal characteristics. But as the case of Stalin demonstrates,
 the collective leadership cannot--even after a warning such
as that given by Lenin--be trusted to select someone who will
not turn into another Stalin.
"The delegates ft-o the 13th Congress7 declared them-
selves in favor of retaining Stalin, hoping that he
would heed the critical remarks of Lenin." (Khrush-
chev secret speech)
3. The power of the Party in the Soviet state is still
unlimited. No system of checks and balances operates within
the Party to restrict the unlimited use of power by the collec-
tive leadership or by any individual acting in its name, as
Stalin did (e.g., division of powers, limits on terms of office,
alternative candidates for leadership, to be chosen democrati-
cally).
"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and
will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one
to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their
leader and organizer." (Pravda, 6 July)
"Lenin called the Central Committee of the Party a
collective of leaders and the guardian and inter-
preter of party principles... Lenin pointed out;
'Our Central Committee constituted itself as a
closely centralized and highly authoritative group...'"
(Khrushchev secret speech)
4. Khrushchev demanded further critical study and the
taking of any additional steps needed to prevent the rise of
another Stalin, and defined such study as a specific task.
Although this is stated as a task in the secret speech, this
work does not appear among the tasks listed in the 30 June
Central Committee Resolution, and there is no indication such
study is in progress.
"We have to consider seriously and ana ze oofle 1"ly
this matter in order that we may preclude the possi-
bility of a repetition, in any form whatever, of
what took place during the life of Stalin." (Khrush-
chev secret speech)
5. Adherence to Socialist law is claimed as a guarantee
against the rise of another Stalin, but no guarantee is given
that the collective leadership or anyone acting in its name as
Stalin did, must and will adhere to the law.
 "In such a situation there was no need for any
sanction, since what sort of sanction could there
be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev
secret speech)
6. The decentralization measures carried out in the
Soviet state are claimed to be guarantees against the rise of
another Stalin. But the amount of decentralization which has
actually resulted from these measures is insignificant. In
any event, the measures do not restrict centralized control of
the three primary instruments of power identified by Lenin as
the organs of authority and repression under the dictatorship
of the proletariat--the Army, the Police and the Communist-Party.
7. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that
it was not possible for the leadership to take action against
Stalin, because the people credited him with the Party's
suco;9ses, and did not know of his errors. But there is no
guarantee that such a situation cannot recur since the practice
through which the people were misled--i.e., Party monopoly
control of all information channels, and of all information
concerning the activities of its leadership which reaches the
pe,opie eoktinue&to, operate.
a. "It should not be forgotten that the Soviet people
knew Stalin as a person who always acted in de-
fense of the USSR, and struggled for the cause of
socialism." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)
b. "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party
especially not to the press. It is for this
reason that we are considering it here at a
closed Congress session. We should know the
limits; we should not give ammunition to the
enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before
their eyes." (Khrushchev secret speech)
"We do not want to commit suicide, and that is
why we will not do it." (Lenin, on granting
freedom of the press, quoted in Pravda, 8 July)
8. Since an authoritative interpretation of "objective
conditions" by the leadership of the Communist Party is all
that is required to sanction as necessary the reestablishment
of Stalinist practices and restrictions, the 30 June Central
Committee Resolution's statements -- "the most difficult period
in the development and establishment of socialism is behind us"
and "on the possibility of preventing wars during the present
era"--are the sole guarantees that'the Stalin experience will
not be repeated. It has already been shown that errors can be
 made in such statements, and that the statements can be manipu-
lated as the requirements of the leadership dictate.
9. The fundamental fact that guarantees cannot be depend-
able in the Soviet system is brought sharply into focus by
Khrushchev in the following statement:
"Stalin was convinced that this /is now condemned
action was necessary for the defense of the interests
of the working class. He saw this from the position
of . the interest of the victory of socialism and Com-
munism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a
iddy despot ... In this lies the whole tragedy!"
Khrushchev secret speech)
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 VII. Moscow Control Of Foreign CPs Reasserted
Moved by CPSU pronouncements, some Communist Parties
apparently miscalculated the extent to which criticism of the
CPSU, the Soviet system, and the taking of independent action
was permissable in the course of the de-Stalinization campaign,
and have been sharply snapped back into line by the 30 June
Central Committee Resolution.
Foreign Communist comment and criticism, based on the
30th Congress speeches and the Congress Resolution on the cult
of the individual and on the "different roads to Socialism,"
initially involved penetrating questions concerning problems
embarrassing to the Soviet leadership.* The release of the
Khrushchev speech(passed by the CPSU itself to top satellite
Party figures, given semi-official authentication by Moscow
correspondents of foreign Communist Parties, and released by
the State Department to the world press) provoked an intensi-
fication of such. questioning, as well as criticism of the cur-
rent attitudes of the CPSU toward other Communist Parties. The
30 June Central Committee Resolution, which was apparently
directed primarily to the foreign Communist parties, and later
CPSU statements imposed narrow limits on discussion, reprimanded
Parties which had violated those limits, and reminded them of
the essentially unchanged dominance of the CPSU. Criticism
still emanates from Communist Parties, destroying the thesis
of the 30 June Resolution that the cause of confusion and dis-
sension in the'bocialist" world is the activity of anti-Com-
munist enemies and of the capitalist proponents of the cold war.
A measure of the perplexities of the foreign Communist Parties
and of their dependence upon Moscow is provided by the rash of
trips by foreign Communist leaders to Moscow and the mission of
Suslov and company to the 14th Congress of CP France,
1. The Soviet leaders"athemselves were responsible for
letting foreign Communists think that they could begin to act
with greater freedom from Moscow--that they could criticize and
question the CPSU, and that they could begin to act with greater
independence from the Moscow line.
a? The CPSU opened up the question of "national.Com--
munism" in connection with the rapprochement with
Tito and the discussion of the "different roads
to Socialism" which the rapprochement entailed:
 "...while maintaining the unity of the main and
most important matters and common path, the tran-
sition to Socialism in various countries will.not
be quite alike and ... each nation will make its
own contribution to one form of democracy or an-
other, to one form of the dictatorship of the
proletariat or another, to one phase of the Social-
ist transformation or another, and to the various
sides of social life." (Suslov, 20th.CPSU Congress)
b. The criticisms of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress
"shocked" the foreign Communists and encouraged
them to join in the criticism. The de-Staliniza-
tion campaign was launched in the open speeches
at the Congress, especially in Mikoyan's state-
ments that "in the course of about 20 years, we
in fact had no collective leadership" and his
criticisms of Stalin's"Short History of the CPSU"
and'Economic Problems of Q22 ialism in the USSR."
These public OtSU statements provoked a mild flurry
in the foreign CPs. Some of the details of the
secret Khrushchev speech got into the Western Press
in mid-March, and provoked a somewhat stronger re-
action within some Western CPs--a reaction which
measurably increased when West European Communist
newsmen in Moscow reported that the secret speech
in fact had been given, and told some of the de-
tails of the speech. Meanwhile, some Satellite
leaders (notably, Ulbricht and Rakosi) were dis-
cussing Stalin in sharp terms. All these develop-
ments, for which the CPSU itself was responsible,
stimulated foreign Communists into further question-
ing and criticism--a process which naturally reached
a climax when the secret:=steedh itself, wat released
to--,the-press.
2. The CPSU has since sought to throttle the foreign Com-
munist criticism touched off by the revelations about Stalin.
The 30 June Central Committee Resolution clearly had this as
its purpose.
a. It misleadingly claims that the foreign CPs have
unqualifiedly endorsed the de-Stalinization cam-
paign: "Condemnation by our Party of the per-
sonality cult of J. V. Stalin and of its conse-
quences, brought approval and wide response in
all brotherly Communist and workers}"parties."
b. It ignores the embarrassing questions raised by
the foreign Communists.
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 c. It belittles the confusions by stating condescend-
ingly "that certain of our friends abroad are not
quite clear on the question of the personality
cult and its consequences and sometimes give in-
correct interpretations of certain points connected
with the personality cult."
d. It condemns such criticisms as "absolutely wrong."
They are "not in accord with reality and contra-
dict the facts."
e. It shuts off debate by stating that the Stalin
issue is "a case of a past stage in the life of
the Soviet country."
f. It claims that only the "enemies of Communism"
are responsible for the confusion in the inter-
national Communist movement: "Launching a slan-
derous campaign, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie
are again attempting to cast a shadow on the
great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, undermine the
trust of the working people . to sow confusion
into the ranks of the international Communist and
workers' movement."
g. It seeks to turn aside embarrassing basic questions
touching upon the Soviet system by "explaining"
Stalin's despotism as a result of "objective fac-
tors" (the machinations of the capitalists) and
the "struggle against the enemies of Leninism,"
3. More recently, the Soviet leaders hav bluntly reminded
the non-Soviet Communist Parties that the discussion period is
ended and that they must resume their role as unquestioning
agents of Moscow.
"If the workers' parties did not maintain unity of
action and opinion on the most important questions,
this would play into the hands of the enemies of Com-
munism and would harm the Party and the cause of
Socialism." (Moscow broadcast to Europe, 12 July)
4. The CPSU has flatly rejected the idea of "national Com-
munism" for individual CPs:
"One should not forget that in certain places there
still are opportunist elements on whom the enemies
of the working people are undoubtedly banking. One
should also remember that among the insufficiently
 politically mature and exceedingly credulous people
there might be those who would fall for the noisy
words about 'national Communism' and for the conten-
tion that international connections of Communist Parties
have allegedly become 'superfluous;! and so on." (Pravda
editorial article, TASS, 15 July)
5. Not only has Moscow spoken against "national Com-
munism," but it has even turned down the thesis put forward by
Togliatti that non-Communist parties can build socialism.* The
CP must be in charge:
"In other countries proceeding along the road to
socialism, other workers parties '
,Lmaf be given the
opportunity of taking part in the administration--on
the condition that the leading role is assured for
the revolutionary Marxist party, which expresses the
interests of the working class in the most consistent
manner g.e., the Cr7." (Pravda, editorial article,
6 July)
6. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution makes it clear
that all the decisions are binding on the non-Soviet CPs, that
the de-Stalinization campaign is designed to further the inte-
rests of international Communism and that they must buckle down
to business without further dallying over the Stalin issue.
a. The 20th Congress decisisons have "opened up new
prospects" for international Communism. The "im-
portant fundamental theses on peaceful coexistence"
and the different "forms of transition of countries
to Socialism" are "promoting" the "further consoli-
dation of the positions of the world system of
Socialism."
b. The CPSU, the Resolution states, "believed that
even if the stand taken against the cult of Stalin
caused some temporary difficulties, then in the
long run, from the point of view of the vital in-
terests and ultimate aims of the working class,
this would have a great positive result."
C. The foreign Communists should realize that the
Stalin era is "a past stage," that the CPSU has
"been with exceptional persistence and determina-
tion liquidating the consequences of the person-
ality cult," and they should not be taken in by
"...There are countries where we wish to start socialism al-
though the Communists are not the leading party." (Togliatti,
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 the "tricks and devices" of the "ideologist of
capitalism ... to distract the attention
of the working people from the advanced and in-
spiring ideas posed before mankind by the Social-
ist world."
7. It is notable that the CPSU, in rudely clamping down
on the foreign CPs, has shown substantially less concern for
their problems and background than it has for the Yugoslav Com-
munists. According to the declaration of the CPSU and the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (released 30 June)--
..proceeding from the fact that either side holds
alien any tendency to force its views with regard to
the ways and forms of.socialist development, both sides
have agreed that the aforesaid cooperation should be
based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly
criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the con-
tentious issues between our parties." (TASS, Moscow,
20 June)
 Both the Khrushchev,secret speech and the 30 June Central
Committee Resolution, in varying degrees, refer to certain
fundamental areas of policy in which Stalin is said to have
committed crimes or been in error. The following list notes
a number of actions in each of these areas which merit con-
sideration they were not given.
1. Mass Repressions (1934-1937)
While there is no charge in either document that the
repressive activities in connection with collectivization merit
condemnation, the Khrushchev speech condemns as "unnecessary"
the repressive measures taken during the great purges against
proven oppositionists (Trotskyites, etc.). This condemnation
is omitted from the 30 June Resolution, which agrees with the
Khrushchev speech only on the crimes involved in the use of
mass repression against loyal Party members during the same
period. Presumably as of 30 June the Central Committee had
decided that the mass repression of the opposition was after
all necessary, as Stalin had said.
2. Deportations
The secret speech condemns a number of cases of mass de-
portations which "were not justified by military necessity,"
but does not include those of the Baltic states, eastern
Poland, or the Volga Germans, The resolution ignores this
matter entirely.
3. Collectivization
Both the secret speech and the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution endorse the program of forced collectivization,
which entailed the greatest single case of the use of violence
and mass repression in the history of the Soviet Union. Al-
though this fact is not discussed, the treatment of the col-
lectivization period justifies continued highlighting of the
inherent inhumanity and brutality of the system.
4. Anti-Semitism
The Soviet documents steer clear of the anti-Semitic im-
plications of the campaign against cosmopolitanism in the early
postwar period and the doctor's plot just before Stalin's death.
They ignore the questions of foreign Communists about the murder
of Jewish cultural leaders and the destruction of Jewish cultural
institutions. Soviet sensitivity on this score was indicated
by the fact that Pravda's reprint of U.S. Communist leader Dennis'
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37
 article deleted a phrase about the "snuffing out ... of more
than a score of Jewish cultural figures" and added a footnote
on the doctor's plot which implied that not only the Jews but
other nationalities were involved.
5. Foreign Policy
In the field of Soviet foreign policy, "peaceful relations
with other nations were often threatened because one-man decisions
could and often did cause great complications."
"The willfulness of Stalin showed itself ... in the inter-
national affairs of the Soviet Union." (Khrushchev secret
speech)
However, the only matter specifically mentioned is the
case of Yugoslavia. By placing the blame on Stalin the present
Soviet leaders could, as they have in other matters, evade
responsibility for many acts which still obstruct the lessening
of international tensions. The question naturally arises
whether by failing to repudiate such acts the Soviet leadership
does not risk being considered as giving tacit approval to them.
What were these wrong decisions? Did they include the postwar
actions in occupied northern Iran, the Berlin blockade, the
refusal to permit the European satellite states to participate
in the Marshall plan, the Korean war, the virulent anti-Amer-
ican propaganda campaign of 1947-1951? Does the Yugoslav case
carry with it the implication that similar wrong policies were
pursued--successfully--in dealing with other European satellites?
What of their actions toward the United Nations during the Korean
War?
In connection with Yugoslavia it should be noted that the
Soviet leaders when they visited Belgrade sought to put the
blame entirely on Beria rather than Stalin.
 CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN
The material herein has been organized to cor-
respond generally with the organization fol-
lowed in the body of the paper, The preponder-
ance of American and Italian materials is ex-
plained by the fact that Communists in these
countries have raised the most penetrating ques-
tions. Extensive use has been made of quota-
tions from Pietro Nenni, the leader of the
Italian Socialist Party, which has been in close
alliance with CP Italy.
 APPENDIX
CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN
1. The Shock Of The Khrushchev Revelations
About Stalin
2. Inadequacy Of Soviet Explanation Until The
Publication Of The 30 June Central Committee
Resolution
3. Reservations Concering The Adequacy Of The
Soviet Explanation Of The 30 June Resolution A-2
I, Foreign Communist Questions And Criticisms Touching
U
on The B
i
p
as
s Of The Soviet System
2. Questioning Soviet. Sincerity In The De-Stalini
zation Campaign
3. Criticisms Of The Soviet Leadership For The
Handling Of The Khrushchev Report ;Onn Stalin
4. Togliatti Raises The Question Of One-Party
Rule In The USSR
5. French And American Communist Questioning Of
Democratic Centralism As A Source Of Stalinism A-7
6. Stalin's Manipulation Of Doctrine A-7
7. Criticisms Of Soviet Evasions And Deceptions A-8
a. Suppression Of The Khrushchev Speech
On Stalin
b. Suppression Of Lenin's "Testament"
C, Refutation Of Khrushchev's Line That Oppo-
sition To Stalin Was Impossible Because Of
A-8
A-8
His Control Of The Organs Of Coercion A-8
 d. Soviet Tampering With The "Bad" Period
Of Stalin's Rule
e. Soviet Evasions And Deceptions Concerning
Stalin's Anti-Semetic Policies
Page A-9
A-9
f. Continued Soviet Evasions And Deceptions
A-3.0
II.
Foreign Communist Reflections On Stalin's Rule As A
Source Degeneration
A-11
III.
Questioning And Criticism Of Soviet "Democracy"
A-11
IV.
Co-Responsibility Of Other Soviet Leaders For
Stalin's Tyranny
A-13
1.
For Permitting Stalin To Seize Total Power
A-13
2.
For Contributing To Stalin's Monopoly of Power
A-14
3.
For Acquiescing To Stalin's Murders
A-14
4.
The Question Of Opposition To Stalin
A-16
5.
Failure Of Soviet Leaders To Admit Their Own
Mistakes
V.
The Question Of Credit For Soviet Achievements
A-17
VI.
The Question Of Guarantees Against Recurrence Of
Stalinism
A-17
VII.
Foreign Communist Subservience To Moscow
A-18
1.
British And American Communists Admit
Uncritical Adherence To Moscow Line
A-18
2.
Togliatti Charges That The CPSU Excluded
Criticism
A-21
3.
Togliatti Proposes "Polycentrism"
A-21
4,
Reaction To The 30 June Central Committee
Resolution
A-24
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 a.
Togliatti
Page A-22
b.
Nenni
A-23
c.
CPUSA
A-24
d.
Canada
A-27
e.
France
A-28
f.
Great Britain
A-28
g.
Austria
A-28
h.
West Germany
A-28
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 CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN
1. The Shock of the Khrushchev Revelations About Stalin
" There is little that one can say to take the deadly
edge off of the secret Khrushchev speech, and I, for
one, have no desire to enter the argument as to the
manner of its presentation. I am puzzled but not
deeply concerned as to why Mr. Khrushchev made the re-
port public in the fashion he did; my concern is not
with the manner of the document, but with its content.
"It is a strange and awful document, perhaps without
parallel in history; and one must face the fact that
it itemizes the record of barbarism and paranoic blood-
lust that will be a lasting and shameful memory to
civilized man." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker,
12 June)
and share the profound grief and shock of the Soviet
people. The crimes and brutalities that sullied the
latter period of Stalin's leadership are unforgivable."
(Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)
"All Communists, in common with all Democratic and pro-
gressive people, are deeply shocked by the injustices
and crimes which during the period under review violated
the essential principles of socialist democracy and
legality and dishonored the noble cause of Communism."
(Statement of the Political Committee of the British
Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)
The text of Khrushchev's speech will both frighten
and shock those who read it." (Norway, Friheten, 8 June)
2. Inadequacy of Soviet Explanation Until the Publication of
the 30 dune Central Commit ee Resolution
"The K. report lacks any kind of Marxist analysis of
Soviet society and historical reconstruction of the moment
in which under the influence of determinate objective or
subjective relations all power was transferred into the
hands of Stalin." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)
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 ".,. As long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to
denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause
of everything we remain within the realm of the 'person-
ality cult.' First, all that was good was attributed
to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man; now
all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional
and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well
as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judg-
ment intrinsic in Marxism." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi
Argomenti, 16 June)
"The explanations given up to now of Stalin's errors,
their origin, and the conditions under which they
developed, are not satisfactory. A thorough Marxist
analysis to determine all the circumstances under which
Stalin was able to exercise his personal power is indis-
pensable." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the
French Communist Party, L'Hum,anite, 19 June)
"We agree with the observations of Comrade Togliatti
and the French CP that it will be necessary to make a
profound Marxist analysis of the causes of the degenera-
tion in the functioning of Soviet democracy and Party
democracy; that it is not enough to attribute these develop-
ments solely to the character of one individual, and that
a more adequate estimate of the role of Stalin, both in
its positive and negative aspects, will be necessary."
(Statement of the Political Committee of the British Com-
munist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)
Reservations Concerning the Adequacy of the Soviet Explana_
'"Many Marxists will feel satisfied with the answers which
the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many will feel
that the final answers still need to be found and that
tl}e discussion must continue." (New York Daily Worker
editorial, 3 July)
"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, perhaps
the best thing to do now is to read carefully what I have
written. In my opinion, and I have said so openly, the
line followed by the Soviet Comrades in the construction
of a Communist society was undoubtedly right; but within
the general framework of this acknowledgement, there may
be differing opinions on the value and importance of
the errors committed under Stalin's leadership, the vio-
lations of legality, the restrictions on democracy, and
so on, over the economic and political development of
the Soviet Union."
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 "I repeat that such differing opinions are possible and
a frank discussion on the matter cannot but prove useful
for the development of our movement..." (Palmiro Togliatti,
Paese Sera, 3 July)
"From the resolution of the Central Committee emerges the
principle of the necessity of 'War Communism' which Stalin
exploited for his dictatorial ends.
"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of pass-
ing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to that of
the Party, and from the latter to that of Stalin, are not
described in the documents; nor is there any treatment of
how and. why Stalin succeeded in carrying out his plans.
...Why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding himself with
relative ease of all his adversaries, in depriving the
directing organs of the Party of authority, in substituting
himself for justice and government from local soviets all
the way up to the Supreme Soviets? Why did the Party, the
Soviets, the proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed,
and why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?
"The document of the Central Committee does not answer all
this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was such that
he could exploit a fundamental error which prevailed in
the Bolshevik Party after the death of Lenin." (Editorial,
Avanti, 3 July)
I. Forei n Communist Questions and Criticisms Touching
Upon e Ba ie Otie' ovie ystem
1. General
"The no longer secret report of Khrushchev, which made
Stalin a sort of modern Ivan the Terrible, goes beyond
an attack on the man and hits the system, the ideological
problems connected with the notion of dictatorship of the
proletariat and its application in the USSR, hits the
Leninist notion of the working party as well as the Stalin-
ist notion, and attacks the structure of the state born
of the October Revolution." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 17 June)
"ZI-n blaming everything on Stali7 the true problems are
evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could and did
reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the
legality which it had set for itself even to the point of
degeneration." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti,
16 June)
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 "Why did these things happen? Were they inevitable? Are
they inherent in socialism, in Communist philosophy?"
(Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)
2. Questioning Soviet Sincerity in theDe-Stalinization Campaign
"'It is stated, that things have changed, but the truth is
that the only thing that has changed is the men in the
Kremlin... The truth of yesterday is not the truth of to-
day. In this way many truths become doubtful and the respon-
sibilities become collective,'" (Umberto Terracini, as re-
ported in New York Times, 30 March)
"If there was so much self-serving intention substituted for
fact all along, not, as far as we know, opposed by the pres-
ent leaders, how do we know that they are telling the truth.
now?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 29 March)
"Why are we asked to take Khrushchev's word for all this?
Where is the proof? They are saying that Lenin left a will
in which he warned against Stalin. Trotsky also said the
same. So Khrushchev and Trotsky agree? Is Trotsky, too,
about to be vindicated? Is the great Andrei Vishinsky who
conducted the trials of the Trotskyites another stinker?
Was it all just a notion of Stalin's? How is the 'cult. of
the individual' built up without the consent of the other
members of the Central Committee? Why has the discussion
of the Stalin question suddenly ceased in the Worker?"
(Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 13 gay)
3. Criticisms of the Soviet Leadership for the Handling of
the Khrushchey Report on Sta in
"We do not hesitate to state that we don't like the way
Khrushchev's speech was made public. The leaders of the
Soviet Union probably had their reasons for letting the
contents come out piece-meal and in round-about way. In
our opinion they made a mistake and should have published
the speech immediately and made it available throughout
the world." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)
"...The Politburo regrets that because of the conditions
under which Comrade Khrushchev's report was presented and
divulged, the bourgeois press was in a position to publish
facts of which the French Communists had been unaware.
Such a situation is not favorable to normal discussion of
these problems within the Party. It facilitates, on the
contrary, speculation and maneuvers on the part of the
enemies of Communism." (Statement of the Political Bureau
of the French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)
 "At the private session of the 24th National Congress of
our Party on April 1, a resolution was passed and conveyed
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, regretting
that a public statement on this question had not been made
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, which could have enabled the members of all
Communist Parties and the staunch friends of the Soviet
Union to have understood fully the seriousness of the issues
and helped them to a better understanding of everything
that is involved. Our Party has not received any official
version of the report of Comrade Khrushchev." (Statement
of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party,
London Daily Worker, 22 June)
. The Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party's Central
Committee sometime ago requested the Central Committee of
the Soviet Communist Party to place this document at the
disposal of our Party. We Austrian Communists voiced the
belief that questions of such big international importance
must be treated in a manner which takes into account the
conditions under which the Communist Parties in the capital-
ist countries are waging their struggles." (Volksstimme,
26 June).
"I do not know whether this re-examination will include the
problem, which has been raised in a number of cell and
section discussions, of the manner in which our Party was
informed of these criticisms, and in particular of the re-
port made by Comrade Khrushchevvo We recognize that the
method was bad, but on the other hand we ask you to recog-
nize that our responsibility is not involved in any way.
For obvious reasons of courtesy towards our Soviet Comrades,
we could not have acted otherwise than as we did. A cer-
tain amount of critical dissatisfaction also has been ex-
pressed in our Party concerning aspects and concerning the
form of the report.' (Palmiro Togliatti, Report to the
Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, 24 June,
L'Unita, 26 June)
Togliatti Raises the Question of One-Party Rule in the USSR
While attempting to defend the Soviet system of one-party
rule, Togliatti definitely advanced the question of the
one-party system as a source of the Stalinist evils.
"We are reminded, first of all, that Lenin, in his
last speeches and writings, stressed the danger of
bureaucracy which threatened the new society. It
seems to us that undoubtedly Stalin's errors were tied
in with an excessive increase in the bureaucratic
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 apparatus in Soviet economic and political life, and
perhaps, above all, in Party life. And here it is ex-
tremely difficult to distinguish between cause and ef-
fect. The one gradually became the expression of the
other ...
'"-Following the early period during which Stalin per-
ormed services for the Soviet statf the sound forces
of the Party rallied and united around him. Now it can
be observed that these forces rallied around Stalin and,
guided by him, accepted such modifications in the function
of the Party and of its directing organisms, i.e., the
new functioning of the apparatus controlled from above,
as the result of which either they could not offer opposi-
tion when the evils began to appear, or else at the out-
set they did not fully understand that they were evils.
"Perhaps we are not in error in asserting that the damag-
ing restrictions placed on the democratic regime, and the
gradual emergence of bureaucratic organizational forms
stemmed from the Party...
"In the exaltation of ... achievements there prevailed,
particularly in the then current propaganda but also in
the general political line, a tendency to exaggerate, to
consider all problems already solved and objective contra-
dictions, difficulties, and differences, which are always
inherent in the development of a society, as having been
overcome... In this period one had the feeling in the
Soviet Union that the leaders, even if they were aware of
the conditions, failed to present correctly these problems
to the Party and the people.
"Stalin was at the same time the expression and the maker
of a situation, because he had shown himself the most expert
organizer and leader of a bureaucratic-type apparatus at
the time when this got the better of the democratic forms
of life, as well as because he provided a doctrinal justi-
fication of what was in reality an erroneous line and on
which later was based his personal power, to the point of
taking on degenerate forms." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti,
16 June)
 5. British and American Communist Question4.ng of Democratic
-
Centralism as a Source
oftalinism
"From what is asserted to have happened in the CPSU it
would seem that democracy has been absent for 20 years or
so. How was it possible for such a state of affairs to
arise in such a Party? Is it that the Party system of
'Democratic Centralism''is at fault? Doe's it carry the
danger of too much centralism? 'Is Democratic Centralism
useful and necessary only for certain stages and, conditions?"
(Letter to the editor, London Daily Wopr, 29 March)
"Was the brutal supprp,ssion of civil liberties in the Soviet
Union, Poland; Bu.lgaria,'.Czechhoslovqki4` e~C., an abuse of
democratic centralism, or was this si}ppre$sion an inevitable
outgrowth of democratic Centralism--a system of party or-
ganization born in the bitter illegality.of'Tsarism and
hardened under the martial law conditions of civil war and
intervention?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker,
28 Ma
)
y
6. Stalin's Manipulation of Doctrine
" Stalin usurped not only the power belonging to
people and the part to be::-played by the Party,but also
the position of final authority in all figlds.a."
(Cyrankiewicz Spedch, Warsaw Broadcast, 27.:Iarch)
" The theory of the char
periing of the class struggle
Zw_a 7 invented by. Stalin ... Stalin's morYid'suspiciousness
and his growing'degpotism, allowing not even th;e'least ob-
jection, found expression in this theory. With the aid of
this theory he wanted to justify: the application of drastic
measures of repregsion not only with regard to enemies and
political adversaries, but also with regard to persona
representing different views." (Jerzy 'Morawski,.Trybuna
Ludu, 27 March)
" The theory of 'class struggle under Socialism'.A
seems to be a major question about which new thought is
needed,
"At the time of the struggle to-'liquidate the Kulaks,'
Stalin laid it down that in the period of working class
power the class struggle would keep on intensifying and,
in particular, that the weaker the capitalist forces
became and the stronger socialism became the more would
the struggle lnterisify:,.
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 "He was evidently right in saying that the class struggle
had to be stepped up in the USSR at that particular time
L .e., 192W. But was what he said true as a universal
principle? Evidently not ..." (Maurice Cornforth,London
Daily Worker, 23 March. Cornforth is a leading British
ommun.st heoretician.)
"Stalin gave a ,pseudo-scientific formulation to this fear-
ful confusion /i.e., connected with the "capitalist encircle-
ment" and the nternal "class enemy) through his erroneous
thesis of the inherent increase in enemies and in the
sharpening of the class struggle with the progress of build-
ing socialism. This made permanent and aggravated the con-
fusion itself and was the origin of unheard-of violations of
Socialist legality which have been denounced publicly today,"
(Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)
Criticisms of Soviet Evasions and Deceptions
a. suppression of the Khrushchev Speech on Stalin*
"I think it is extremely important to the whole world
Socialist movement that the CPSU publish to the world
its detailed report on the cult of the individual and
state specifically what crimes were committad4t It is
not we who interfere by demanding details, but the
Soviet Communist Party Let them give us the whole
dose at once, or else let them give an official and
convincing explanation of why they are holding back."
(Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker 17 May)
b. Suppression of Lenin's "Te ameht"
7 report is devoted
"The first part of the ihrushchey
to the re-evocation of an old polemic--of the antagon-
ism, so to speak, between Lenin and Stalin: an
antagonism well known in all its details outside the
USSR, but which the official historians of the Soviet
Union had passed over for 30 years, as if the testa-
ment of Lenin had not even existed." (Nenni,.Avanti,
24 June)
e, Refutation of Khrushchev's Line that 40 os&tion to
St-alTn as r7possl le Because of His Con rol of the
Organs o Coercion
"..., I rule out the explanation that a change was
impossible solely because of the presence of a military
 police, terror apparatus which controlled the situa-
tion with its means. The same apparatus consisted of,
and was led by, men who in a serious moment of stress,
for example such as Hitler's attack, would have like-
wise been subject to elemental reactions if a crisis
had developed. To me it seems much better to recognize
that Stalin, in spite of the errors which he was com-
mitting, continued to command the solidarity of the over-
whelming majority of the nation, and above all had the
support of his leading cadres and also of the masses."
(Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)
d. Soviet Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule
".,. It is still not clear, tows, if the current
denunciations of the violation of legality and applica-
tion of the illegitimate and morally repugnant prosecut-
ing methods extend to the entire period of the trials,
or only to a given period ZT-rom 1935 o7..." (Togliatti,
Nuovi Argomenti,' 16 June)
e. Soviet Evasions and Deceptions Concerning Stalin's
Anti-Semitic Policies
"We are deeply disturbed by facts revealed in informa-
tion coming from Poland that organs and media of Jewish
culture were summarily dissolved and a number of their
leaders executed, This is contrary to the Soviet Unions
historic contributions to the Jewish question.
Khrushchev's failures to deal with these outrages, and
the continuing silence of Soviet leaders, requires an
explanation" (Statement of CFUSA, New York Daily
Worker, 25 June)
"We also express our concern that in the long list of
crimes mentioned in the LKhrushchev7 speech, there was
silence on those committed against Jewish culture and
Jewish cultural leaders. We do not consider the speech
to be the last word on just how Stalin's terror control
came into existence and maintained itself for 20 years
and of the role of the other Communist leaders." (Edi-
torial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)
"If, as she says Mrs. Furtseva, alternate member of
the Presidium/CPSW, Jewish culture has been develop-
ing freely, where are the Yiddish books, the Yiddish
theatre, the Yiddish schools?" (Letter to the editor,
New York Daily Worker, 27 June)
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 "When Pravda reprinted the Dennis article it left out
the attack on snuffing out the lives of more than a
score of Jewish cultural figures.' If the charge was
untrue, all Pravda had to do was to deny it. Moreover,
an explanation is long overdue from the Soviet leaders
about the physical annihilation of the top Soviet Jewish
writers and poets in the late 40s." (Joseph Clark
column, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)
f, Continued Soviet Evasions and Deceptions
"There is a ready tendency to slide over the many and
varied problems presented by the current revaluations
by burying thought with fresh armfuls of cliches and
hackneyed phrases. Alongside such stalwarts as 'develop-
ing crisis' and 'Wall Street imperialists' we now have:
'cult of the individual' and 'feria gang,' all of which
gets as meaningful as soap commercials when used as a
substitute for thought." (Letter to the editor, New
York Daily Worker, 24 April)
'i.>. Mr. Khrushchev led men of good will to understand
that the document itself would be a warning of the
monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial
government. I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly
at the end of the document for a pledge that the last
execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked
for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of
habeas corpus, of public appeal to higher courts, of
final m t by one's peers rather than by professional
judges.
"Instead, I learned that three more executions had
been announced from the Soviet Union, and my stomach
turned over with the blood-letting, with the madness of
venegeance and countervengeance, of suspicion and
countersuspicion.. I don't think I am alone in this
feeling. I think millions of human beings share my
disgust at this idiotic behavior--wicked, uncivilized,
but above all, idiotic." (Howard Fast, New York
Daily Worker, 12 June)
 II. Foreign Communist Reflections on Stalin's Rule
aS a Source of Degeneration
"The least arbitrary of the generalizations is the one which
sees in Stalin's errors a progressive encroachment by per-
sonal power on the collective entities of a democratic origin
and nature and, as a result of this, the pile-up of pheno-
mena of bureaucracy, of violation of legality, of stagnation
and, also, partially, of degeneration of different points
of the social organism." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti,
16 June)
"It was evident from that time on Z.e., from the time of
the purges of 1936-193 that Soviet public life had under-
gone in the previous ten years a double process of degenera-
tion: on the one hand, of the Party and state machine toward
forms of bureaucratization and terrorism, and on the. other
hand, of the internal opposition toward forms of conspiracy
and palace revolution." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)
"The distortions arising from the cult of the individual,
from the infringement of the Leninist norms of Party life,
went deep into life. They went deep into the life of our
country as well. Stubborn, petrified bureaucracy,, suppres-
sion of criticism, disregard for the needs and views of the
people--these are only some of the evils which could become
rampant in the atmosphere of the cult of the individual
and of the infringement of the principles of Party democracy.
It is only too often that we can still meet the harmful con-
sequences of this atmosphere--commandeering, intimidation,
disregard for collective will. In this atmosphere servility
and obsequiousness developed, as well as an automatic atti-
tude of obedience to all 'orders from above,' an attitude
of concealing truth, lack of independent thinking and
initiative," (Jerzy Morawski, Trybuna Ludu, 27 March)
III, questioning and Criticism of Soviet "Democracy"
It seems irrefutable to us, at any rate, that the
bureaucratization of the Party, of the state organisms, of
the labor unions, and, above all, of the peripheral organ-
isms which are the most important, must have checked and
compressed the democratic functioning of the state and the
creative drive of the entire society with real, evident
damage resulting therefrom.
 " .. What must be studied thoroughly and clarified are
the problems pertaining to the interrelation of political
democracy and economic democracy, of internal democracy
and the leadership function of the party with the demo-
cratic operation of the state, and how a mistake made in
one of these fields may have repercussions on the entire
system." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)
" The collective direction of the Politburo or of the
Central Committee would, certainly be preferable to the
direction of one man, but if in the collective direction
of the Politburo or of the Central Committee there is pro-
gress compared to personal direction, enlightened or
tyrannical as it may be, there is nevertheless no guarantee
of democratic life. Now the whole problem of Soviet society,
the whole problem of the People's Democracies which have
followed in the footsteps of Soviet society., is reduced to
the necessity for internal democratization, for the circula-
tion of ideas; in a word,`for political liberty, a necessity
which has lain beneath the surface of Soviet society for
many years. It is substantially a question of eliminating
in the state, in the laWs,'and above all in customs all the
surviving incrustations of War Communism, of creating means
and instruments for the formation of the free political
initiative of the citizen, without there hanging over his
head the .accusation of being an enemy of the people, a
deviationist, a saboteur every time he tries to give weight,
in dealings with public authority, to his own personal and
independent evaluation of the path to be followed.
"After a century has passed, the concept of dictatorship of
the proletariat must be thought out again and reconsidered
in relation to a society where the influence and weight of
the proletariat and of the workers in general have become
a determinant in public life and where, in countries demo-
cratically and socially more advanced, the state reflects
the continuous evolution of class positions." (Nenni,
Avanti, 24 June)
"In my opinion; the Soviet leadership is wrong in claiming
their government is a full-fleged socialist state; social-
ism without democracy is simply not socialism ... The
Marxist leadership failed completely--never seemed really
interested--in imbuing the country, not to speak of them-
selves, with an understanding of and respect for civil
rights and what is known generally as the Rights of Man."
(Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker} 31 May)
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IV. Co-Responsibility of Other Soviet Leaders
for S alin's Tyranny
1. For Permitting Stalin to Seize Total Power
"If, after the collective leadership left by Lenin, Stalin
acquired so much power in his own hands, then all in the
leadership who acquiesced in such concentration of power
are fully responsible for what followed. If after the con-
centration of power in Stalin's hands those in the lead.er-
ship with him supported his now criticized policies know-
ing they were wrong they are despicable scoundrels who
should not be entrusted with the responsibility of fanning
a breeze in a hot room. .,,The Khrushchev report ... re-
minds me of nothing so much as a man sitting in judgment
on himself." (Letter to the Editor, New York Daily Worker,
14 June)
"These critics /ho asked why the present leaders did not
take action against Stalin during his lifetime7 would have
been on stronger ground had they asked why the Central Com-
mittee chose Stalin as general secretary in spite of Lenin's
warning," (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker,
17 July)
"Who guided the Bolsheviks in view of the fact that their
Congresses, their Central Committee, their Politburo, the
Soviets, little by little, had allowed themselves to be
stripped of their prerogatives of control and their right
of initiative over 20 years? ... We do not even know how
the Soviet ruling group has arrived at its conclusions,
whether it is in agreement or divided, and if so on what,
and why." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)
"Where were the present leaders during the period when they
say that collective leadership was lacking? What about
their own mistakes in that period of capitalist encircle-
ment?" (Alan Max column, New York Daily Worker, 13 March)
"But why did Stalin succeed in getting rid with compara-
tive ease of all his adversaries, in making leading party
organs powerless and in substituting himself for justice,
Government, the Supreme Court and even the local Soviets?
Why did not the party, the Soviets and the proletariat
resist before Stalin triumphed and why were those who did
isolated and defeated?" (Nenni, Avanti, 3 July) (Fol-
lowing the issuance of the 30 June Central Committee
Resolution.)
 2. For Contributing to Stalin's Monopoly of Power
"And the mistake of his, Jtalin's collaborators was in not
seeing this in time, in having allowed him to go on thus
until correction was no longer possible without damage to
all concerned. As can well be imagined, to this can be
joined the question of co-responsibility for these mistakes
of the entire political leadership group, including the
comrades who today have provided the impetus both for the
correction of the. evil which had been done and its after
effects. The present soviet leaders knew Stalin much better
than we and therefore we must believe them today when they
describe him in this manner. We can only think, among
ourselves ? that; since this, was the case,`aside from the
already discussed possibility of a timely change, at least
they could hate been more cautious in their public and
solemn praise of this mans qualities to which we were
conditioned. True,_today,, they offer criticism and this
is to be lauded, but with''such criticism the lose with-
out doubt a'little of their own prestige." (Togliatti,
Nuovi Ar omenti 16 June)
The Communist Party is the guardian of the rights of the
working people. How did it happen that this guardianship
failed tq be ecercised and the crimes stopped long before
the death of Stalin? Clearly,; responsibility for this fail-
ure falls on the shoulders of the leadership of the CPSU
as a whole. They endorsed Stalin's ,wrQng theory that the
class struggle must be intensified after socialism was
built." (Statement adopted by the National Committee of
the Canadian Labor-Progressive Party, i.e., CP Canada,
New York Daily Worker, 3 July)
"Those leaders who today rise like great new giants and
hurl denunciatory rocks at the body of the dead Stalin
must have been very willing to let that same Stalin make
the decisions then, They did not dare assume the re-
sponsibility in those fateful critical days. Otherwise
Stalin could not have attained such frightful,, over-
whelming personal power. But they were the eager and
willing water, 4s it were, that, inevitably, made the
Stalin plant grow." (Letter to the editor, New York
Daily Worker, 29 March)
3. For Acquiescing to Stalin's Murders
"If one considers that the power of "Stalin was not at
that time what It became later, with the war, it is
evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev
involve responsibilities which were not Stalin's alone
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 but those of the whole directing apparatus. Terror, in
conditions of time and place not justified by necessity,
was the price paid for the suppression of all democratic
life inside the party and the state. . .
At last, the final sally, which was intended to be
a justification for K. and the other members of the Polit-
buro: 'Stalin obviously had a plan to eliminate the old
members of the Politburo.' At this point K. answers the
questions that must have been in the air: 'Where were
the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee?
Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of
the individual in time? And why is this being done only
now?' The answer is: 'The members of the Politburo saw
these problems in a different way at different times.'
"This answer may be valid in a strictly personal sense,
but it is not valid for the Politburo. There is no doubt
that the facts cited by Khrushchev, and on which world
opinion now awaits proper documentation, must have placed
the members of the Political Bureau in a very difficult
situation. But they had been placed in posts of re-
sponsibility precisely for this purpose, precisely to
face difficult situations," (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)
"Where was Khrushchev when all those 'crimes' were being
committed?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker,
1 April)
"Is it not obvious that to repeat 'the Beria gang' was
responsible for the executions is merely to circumvent
one of the central points in the discussion. . ,? That
question is: where were the rest of the Soviet leader-
ship? Could they have permitted the execution of such
outstanding Soviet citizens without being involved in
discussion or the decision? It is certainly not possible,
since these executions were part of a major ideological
campaign against cosmopolitanism." (Letter to the editor,
New York Daily Worker, 26 April)
"How fearless were Khrushchev and the others when many
of the best Communists in the Soviet Union were being
murdered? Or were they part of the terror apparatus?
Did they have a secret trial and murder of Beria because
they needed a scapegoat, and because a public trial would
have implicated them as part of the terror? Was Beria
an 'imperialist agent' or was that a phony trial too?
Why,must Dennis gloss over the fact, recognized by millions
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 Bested by others and rejected? What resistance was made
in top official circles to Stalin's trend toward super-
centralization and denial of collective leadership?"
(William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker,
16 March)
"It has also not yet been made clear as to whether or
not or to what degree; the Party and its leaders were
able, at least partially, to ch.eck the undemocratic
course of Stalin and to hold the USSR on the fundamentally
correct political line which it followed over the years."
(William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker, 4 April)
of people, that Khrushchev.. speaking for the present
Soviet leadership; at no time had one word of self-
criticism for himself personally or for the group?"
(Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)
"If Beria and his gang were responsible for the break
with Yugoslavia why was he not brought to open trial?
If the executions in Hungary. were frameups is it correct
to put all the blame on a police chief rather than the
Party leadership?" (Letter to the editor, New York
Daily Worker, 11 April)
The Question.of Opposition to Stalin
What alternative policies to Stalin's were sug-
"In the discussion on the XXth Congress currently being
centered around the special Khrushchev report, questions
frequently arise about the present Soviet leadership.
Did some of them try to bring about changes before the
last three years? Could the past evils have been checked
earlier? How big and serious are the changes now under
way?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)
Failure of Soviet Leaders to Admit their own Mistakes
"It is inconceivable that after such major mistakes were
revealed, that there is not a resolution or a speech at
the Congress, nor even a whiff of self-criticism by the
leadership of its own errors. I think we ought to tell
the Soviet comrades that it was these mistaken and wrong
policies which led to the crimes." (Steve Nelson article
New York Daily Worker, 24 June)
"If a leading Marxist in the Soviet Union could give that,
type of personalized report Le., Khrushchev's secret
report on Stali7 and have it acceptable to the leading
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 Marxists of a Socialist nation, I suggest that they are
not through with their errors and that perhaps others
may have to do the job of explaining and analyzing what
they have left undone." (Letter to the editor, New York
Daily Worker, 14 June)
V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements
as long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to de-
nouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of
everything we remain within the realm of the 'personality
cult.' First, all that was good was attributed to his
equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the
one case., as well as in the other, we are outside the
criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism, (Togliatti,
Nuovi Argomenti, 1.6 June)
"It was wrong, while Stalin was still living, to shower
him with dithyrambic praise and to give him the exclusive
credit for all the successes in the Soviet Union which
were due to a correct general policy in the construction
of Socialism. This attitude contributed to the develop-
ment of the cult of the individual and negatively influenced
the international labor movement. Today, it is wrong to
blame Stalin alone for every negative act of the CPSU."
(Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist
Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)
VI. The, uest ;b1 Of Guarante'.e,s Against
Red r r ee Of t"Alinism
One general problem, common to the entire movement,
has arisen from the criticisms of Stalin--the problem of
the perils of bureaucratic degeneration, of stifling
democratic life, of the confusion between the constructive
revolutionary force and the destruction of revolutionary
legality, of separation of the economic and political
leadership from the life, criticism., and creative activity
of the masses. We shall welcome a contest among the Com-
munist parties in power to find the best way to avoid this
peril once and for all. It will be up to us to work out
our own method and life in order that we, too, may be pro-
tected against the evils of stagnation and bureaucratiza-
tion, in order that we may learn to solve together the
problems of freedom for the working masses and of social
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 justices- and hence gain for ourselves ever increasing
prestige and membership among the masses." (Togliatti,
Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)
With respect to the pledges at the end of the secret
Khrushchev report on Stalin (rooting out the cult, re-
storing Leninist principles;, etc,) Pietro Nonni observes:
"Fine declarations which, when Stalin was alive, were
made a hundred times by Stalin and other Soviet leaders."
(Avanntt. , 24 June):
Mr, Khrushchev led men of good will to understand
that the document itself would be a warning of the
monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial
government; I. for one, looked hopefully but vainly at
the end of the document for a pledge that the last execu-
tion had taken place on Soviet soil: Ilooked for a
pledge of civil rights, for tIhe sacred right of habeas
corpus, of public appeal to higher c'burts, of final jud -
ment by one's peers rather than by professional judges.
(Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker 12 June)
"Was Mr. Khrushchev's secret report meant to be secret?
Was itdglivered in good faith:? Things are changing
tremendo usly for the bestiin the Soviet Union, without
doubt, but why then still employ capital punishment?
Collective leadership exists in the Soviet Union, but
why is so mach being done, written and published in the
name of Khrushchev? Why not permit recently freed leaders
to lead in the new formation of Soviet government and
Party?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker,
28 June)
VII. Foreign Communist Subservience To Moscow
1. British and American Communists Admit Uncritical Adherence
to Moscow Line "Where' I failed miserably and where I swear by all that is
holy that I will not fail again, was in not exercising the
same judgment toward the Soviet Union, This would not have
lessened my belief in socialism; it would have increased it,
and it would have increased and strengthened the belief of
others as well, For I saw only a land that had won socialism,
and I failed to see that to win socialism and to abandon the
holy right of man to his own conscience, his own dignity,
his right to say what he pleases when he pleases, to speak
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 clearly and boldly for the truth as he sees the truth--
and fearing no man, whether right or wrong--is no victory
at all.
"It is some small comfort to say that I did not know the
facts in the Khrushchev report; but I cannot rest on that.
I knew that the death penalty existed in the Soviet Union,
and I knew in my own heart that capital punishment is an
abomination and a disgrace to mankind, I knew there were
prisons, and I believed that civilized society would make
a short shift of prisons, and yet I failed to charge the
Soviet Union with this. I accepted the fact that Jewish
culture had been wiped out in Russia; and I know that this
is a fate no culture should ever meet; yet this too I did
not challenge. I knew that Jews were forbidden to leave
Russia for Israel, and yet I did not raise my voice to
protest this restriction, even though I could make no
sense or reason out of it. I knew that writers and artists
and scientists were intimidated, but I accepted this as a
necessity of socialism, even as I accepted all else that I
have enumerated as a necessity of socialism." (Howard Fast,
New York Daily Worker, 12 June)
"How was it possible for so many Communists in the 'West,'
and so many non-Communist statesmen and political leaders
to accept the idea that treason and treachery had assumed
such fantastic proportions in the Soviet Union as were
claimed in the series of purges and trials that took
place in the 1930's and subsequently?" (Eugene Dennis,
New York Daily Worker, 18 June)
"Making due allowance for the distortions and caricatures
of Soviet policy that appear in the capitalist press, why
did the Daily Worker editors feel called upon to go along
with each successive position ?f the USSW without ever
having the humility to admit that they may have been
wrong in their previous position?" (Letter to the editor,
New York Daily Worker, 22 March)
It" . If Marxists in the U.S. come to disagree over a
particular issue with Marxists in the Soviet Union, it is
we who are in error and must give way. The Soviet posi-
tion, as if by definition, is 'the Marxists position.
What kind of critical thinking is that?. . .L would
rather be right, than Marxist!" (Letter to the editor,
New York Daily Worker, 3 May)
"If the Soviet-Yugoslav friction was occasioned at least
in part by the unwarranted attempt of one Communist Party
to dominate another, on whom did the obligation of objective
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 criticism rest more squarely than on a party detached by
distance and immediate interest from the smoke of that
battle j.e., the CPUSg?" (Letter from Ring Lardner Jr.,
New York Dail Worker, 18 March)
/Relative to the Statement of the Executive Committee of the
CP Great Britain) "The statement pleads 'false information'
and 'good faith' as an excuse for our own uncritical and
inaccurate propaganda about the Soviet Union, extending
over a period of 20 years. Surely 'good faith' is not
sufficient in the leadership of a party of scientific
Socialism? This is not self-criticism, it is self-
justification. The statement emphasizes that all
abuses in the Soviet. Union took place against the background
of 'total human advance. Can one consider a period which
opened with the suicide of Mayakovsky and ended with the
suicide of Fadayev, which saw the murder of Gorky and the
silencing in various ways of many Jewish writers (and
perhaps others)--can this period be considered to be one
of total human advance?" (Letter to the editor, London
Daily Worker, k June)
"Did we really have to wait for Mikoyan to tell us that
for '20 years the cult of personality flourished' before
we were aware of it or before we could admit it? Our at-
titude in the past. has indescribably been one which can
best be described as 'uncritical acceptance.' What the
Soviet Union did., we endorsed, Future prospects are
inspiring but het Is not assume that because the Soviet
Union has done something it must be good." (Letter to
the editor, London Daily Worker,, 6 March)
"But do we learn? For many years people, both Communists
and non-Communists, have had doubts about what is now
termed 'the cult of the individual.' As Marxists should
we accept everything that happens in the Soviet Union
uncritically as the best of all. possible worlds?"
(Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 6 March)
"This sudden rush of criticism amazes me--where was it
all hidden before? All the 'discussions' I've attended
in the last 15 years and never a dissenting voice did I
hear--why?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker,
29 March)
"But support for the general political line of the CPSU
does not mean the abandonment of our own right to
criticize and of our own need to work out policy on the
basis of the need of interests and experiences of the
British people. In the last few years work in various
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 fields of culture has been dominated by Soviet discussions
which were not necessarily relevant to our own needs. . .
I am not concerned with the correcting of Stalin's formula-
tions. I suggest that the Communist Party cultural
work is badly in need of overhauling, on the basis of
freest discussion." (Letter to the editor, London Daily
Worker, 12 March)
2, Togliatti Charges that the CPSU Excluded Criticism.
"Later, our parties spoke 1ess'and less of the questions
which our Soviet comrades faced in the building of a
socialist society because, among other things, our Soviet
comrades did not present them to us any longer as prob-
lems, as they had before,, but almost as stages of a pro-
grass already well underway, the course of which did
not give rise to any new serious themes.'. (Togliatti,
Nuovi Argomenti. 16 June)
3. Togliatti Proposes "Polycentriemt!,
"I do not believe it will be possible' for all this to
lead to a diminution of the mutual trust and solidarity
among the various parties of the Communist movement.
However, undoubtedly, not only the need but also the
desire for increasingly greater autonomy II n judgments will
come out. of this; and thiq.cannot help but benefit our
movement. The internal political structure of the world 11 Communist movement has changed today. What the CPSU has
done remains, as .1 said, as the first great model of
building a socialist society for, which the way was opened
by a deep, decisive revplqtionary breach. Today, the
front of socialist construction in countries. where the
Communists are the leading party has been so broadened
(amounting to a third of the human race) that even for
this part the Soviet model cannot and must not any longer
be obligatory. In every country governed by the Communists,
the objective and Subjective conditions; traditions, the
organizational forms of the'mgvenent can and must assert
their influence in different ways. In the rest of the
world there are countries where we wish to start socialism
although the Communists are not ;the leading party. In
still other countries, the march toward socialism is an
objective for which there is a,ooncentration'of efforts
coming from various movements, which, however,, have not
yet reached either an $reemment or a reciprocal under-
standing. The whole system becomes polycentric, and even
in the Communist movement itself'we'cannot speak of a
single guide but rather of progress which is achieved by
following paths which areoften 'different." (Togliatti,
Nuovi Arromenti, 16 June)
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 view . a polycentric system, corresponding to the new
situation, to the alteration in the world make-up and
in the very structure of the workers' movements. and to
this system correspond also new types of relations among
the Communist parties themselves. The solution which
today probably most nearly corresponds to this new situa-
tion, may. be that of the full autonomy of the individual
Communist parties and of bilateral relations between
them to establish complete,. mutual understanding and
complete,: mutual i;resL cgnditions necessary for col-
laboration and to'give'unity to the 'Commun'ist movement
itself and to the entire progressive movement of the
working class." '(To,gliattj_, Report to the Central Com-
mittee of the Italian Communist Part.*, 24 June, L'Unita,,
26 June)'
4. Reaction to the 30 June Central Committee Resolution
a. Togliatti
"I have not yet read the full text of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee final resolution on the origin and
consequences of the personality cult. Judging by
what I know of the resolution, it seems to me that
that document pirovid'es a contribution of extreme im-
portance for the clarification of the questions
aroused among the international workers and Communist
world by the criticism of Stalin's work made by the
XXth CPSU Congress.
"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, per-
haps the best thing to do now is to read carefully
what I have written. In my opinion, and I have said
so openly, the line followed by the Soviet comrades
in the construction of a Communist society was un-
doubtedly right; but within the general framework
of his acknowledgement, there may be differing
opinions on the value and importance of the errors
committed under Stalin's leadership, the violations
of legality; the restrictions on democracy, and so on,
over the economic and political development of the
Soviet Union.
"I repeat that such differing opinions are possible
and a frank discussion on the matter cannot but
prove useful for the development of our movement,
because it corresponds to a higher degree of maturity
and of mutual understanding and confidence.
 "This is all the more true since such differences of
opinion do not dimish, but, in fact, as far as myself
and the leading organs of the Italian Communist Party
are concerned, perhaps they enhance our unreserved ap-
proval of action taken by the CPSU leaders to overcome
completely the consequences to which the cult of
Stalin's person has led in the USSR and in the inter-
national workers' movement." (Paese $era, 3 July)
b. Nenni
"The document of the Central Committee of the CPSU on
overcoming the cult of the individual and its conse-
quences, explains several things in the famous secret
report of Khrushchev which up to now remained obscure
or unknown. It illustrates with the greatest Marxist
coherence the causes of the formation of the cult and
of the personal dictatorship of Stalin, but it still
does not answer the fundamental questions which the
Khrushchev report has raised so dramatically with its
revelations of the illegalities and the atrocities of
Stalin.
"The summary that we have of the resolution of the
Central Committee confirms, for example, with the
greatest clarity the secret report of how Stalin's
personal dictatorship evolved, how difficult it was
to combat Stalin during the last twenty years, because
his guilt was unknown to almost all of the Soviet peo-
ple while all the successes of the USSR were attributed
to his personal merit.
"We know better why the abnormal situation of the
last twenty years developed. Thus we know that cer-
tain circumstances contributed to the personal dictator-
ship of Stalin, among which, as the document of the
Central Committee states, was the capitalist encircle-
ment of the USSR, which Stalin used to Justify a tem-
porary restriction of democracy which he later rendered
permanent. From the resolution of the Central Committee
emerges the principle of the necessity of "War Com-
munism" which Stalin exploited for his dictatorial ends.
"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of
passing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to
that of the Party, and from the latter to that of
Stalin, are not described in the document; nor is
there any treatment of how and why Stalin succeeded in
carrying out his plans. The practical impossibility
of overthrowing Stalin or seriously resisting him after
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 he had gained control of the Party, his seizure of
absolute power, the substituting of himself for the
Party and for the constitutional organs of the state,
which the Khrushchev report describes, is comprehen-
sible. But why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding
himself with relative ease of all his adversaries,
in depriving the directing organs of the Party of
authority, in substituting himself for justice and
government from local soviets all the way up to the
Supreme Soviet? Why did the Party, the soviets, the
proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed, and
why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?
"The document of the Central Committee does not answer
all this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was
such that he could exploit a fundamental error which
prevailed in the Bolshevik Party after the death of
Lenin. Having suppressed the other parties--and there--
by democracy based on the plurality of parties--demo-
cracy within the party was also suppressed. Having
eliminated the other parties, from the Mensheviks to
the Socialist Revolutionaries, from competition with
the Bolshevik Party, having eliminated the internal
factions of the Bolshevik Party, utilizing the rivalry
of his followers and oftentimes that of his adversaries
whom he succeeded in pitting one against the other,
it was easy for Stalin, who in the course of this opera-
tion had accumulated immense personal power, also to
eliminate democracy from within his own faction, re-
maininK the only legal force in the Party and in the
state. (Unsigned editorial, Avanti, 3 July)
c. CPUSA
"In the latest chapter in this discussion, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has now given its reply to some of these questions.
Many Marxists will feel satisified with the answers
which the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many
will feel that the final answers still need to be
found and that the discussion must continue.
"The Daily Worker will have more to say on the Soviet
Communist Party's statement in the future and we will
keep our readers informed, as the discussion goes on,
of the views of Marxists here and throughout the world.
"A deeper probing of the errors in the Soviet Union
can only result in speeding the profound changes already
getting under way in that country. It can be of
 invaluable help to the Communist movements else-
where, and to the cause of co-existence and world
peace." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)
"The Soviet Communist Party's resolution is a most
welcome development in the friendly interchange of
opinion among Marxists of the world. It correctly
turns attention to the profound significance of its
XXth Congress, with its historic decisions paving the
way for new socialist advances and its far-reaching
conclusions on the non-inevitability of war and the
possibility for peaceful paths of Socialism in demo-
cratic countries.
"The resolution correctly estimates the sinister
aims of those reactionary circles who would bury the
tremendous achievements of the XXth Congress under an
avalanche of speculation about the re-evaluation of
Stalin. It coincides with our estimate that reactionary
circles here and elsewhere are trying to distort and
utilize Khrushchev's'special report on Stalin to dis-
rupt the solidarity of the international working class
movement.
"In my opinion the resolution of the CPSU goes a long
way in explaining--while clearly not justifying--what
has become known as the growth of the cult of the
individual and the unforgivable violations of socialist
legality and principles that took place in the latter
period of Stalin's leadership. The substance of this
matter will be discussed shortly by our National Com-
mittee which will then collectively express its views."
(Statement by Eugene Dennis, New !York Daily Worker,
4 July)
"It is this attempt to exploit the present discussion
in order to attack the fundamentals of socialism and
to glorify monopoly capitalism, which the Soviet resolu-
tion of the Soviet Communist Party warns against? This
warning needs to be heeded by everyone participating
in the discussion. However, in my opinion, it would
be unfortunate if this warning were interpreted as mean-
ing that the only safe way to discuss is to have no dis-
cussion at all. I am afraid that the wording and tone
of the Soviet Communist Party resolution opens it up
to the interpretation. I say this in spite of the fact
that the Central Committee statement, in my opinion,
marks an advance in the discussion in that it presents
a historical background to the 'cult of the individual.'
 "The fact is, however, that the profound questions
raised by Palmiro Togliatti and others with regard
to the limitations of socialist democracy in the USSR,
have no relation to such anti-socialist sentiments
as expressed by the New York Times and it does not
help the discussion to suggest they do. In my judg-
ment the Soviet statement does not fully answer the
questions raised by Togliatti. Nor does it dispose
of the matter by quoting from various Communist sources
as if in opposition to Togliatti." (Alan Max, New York
Daily Worke'r., 9 July)
"The resolution of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union is a most valuable
and important contribution to analyzing the origins,
effects and lessons of the mistakes made by the CPSU
under Stalin's leadership, We welcome it.
"In responding to the discussion and views of other
Marxist parties of the world, including our own, the
resolution reflects the developing relationship of
independent and friendly criticism which today marks
the fraternal solidarity of Communist parties.
"The resolution of the CFSU is a timely and major
contribution to a further strengthening of such inter-
national solidarity, It assists all Marxist and
working class organizations in their struggle to pro-
mote peaceful relations among states, irrespective of
social systems--the common desire of all mankind.
"We believe that the resolution of the CPSU provides
a convincing answer to the Big Business enemies of
Socialism who claim that the gross mistakes made under
Stalin's leadership are inherent in Socialism. Not
only does the socialist character of the system re-
main in the Soviet Union, despite the mistakes and
injustices under Stalin's leadership, but during the
past three years important steps have been taken to
correct the mistakes of the past, to further democratize
Soviet life and institutions, and to establish guar-
antees that such harmful injustices will never occur
again, We greet these steps and are convinced that
the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the CPSU,
is moving ahead to a new period of unprecedented
Socialist progress.
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 "In connection with the questions analyzed in the
CPSU resolution, we believe certain aspects of the
origins and effects of past violations of socialist
law and principle need, and will receive, further
study and discussion. Among these are; the question
of bureaucratic distortions in a Socialist society,
as well as the happenings in the sphere of Jewish
cultural institutions and their leadership. Our own
Party will, in the period ahead, continue to examine
these questions with the aim of deepening its under-
standing of the profound lessons which must be drawn
from the disclosures made by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union." (Statement of National Committee,
19 July, New York Dail Worker, 26 July)
"The Tribune greets this resolution. It adds greatly
to understanding. It puts the whole terrible 'Stalin
affair' in better perspective.
"We believe however, that there remain some still un-
answered questions: such as. the demand for more light
on the excesses against certain nationalities or against
Jewish cultural life and the Jewish writers. These are
not mentioned. All that is said is that Stalin was
'guilty of many lawless deeds.'
"Nor does it answer the criticism of the way in which
the Khrushchev report on Stalin was handled. The
Tribune has declared it should have been made avail-
able to the press as soon as it was delivered and not
allowed to 'leak' out through the U.S. State Department.
"While it offers further clarification, it does not acknowl-
edge that the present leaders of the' Central Committee
oo' the CPSU accepted the erroneous theory originated by
Stalin, from which so many crimes ensued, that the
class struggle must be intensified following the victory
of socialism. The 'theory' is attributed solely to
Stalin and not the Central Committee or the party Con-
gress that also accepted it.
"On balance, however, we find it a forthright declara-
tion which we believe will do much to clear the air,
help to end confusion, restore confidence and bring about
the ideological unity of Marxist parties everywhere so
necessary for the advance of the peoples to peace, to
Approved For Release 1999108124: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000200300001-3
A-27
 national liberation, and each in their own way to
socialism." (Editorial from the Canadian Tribune,
reprinted in New York Daily Worker, 13 JulyT_
e. France
"The Central Committee warmly approves the decision
of the Central.Comm.ittee of the CPSU which shows how
the cult of Stalin's person was overcome in the USSR,"
(Statement of the Central Committee, French Communist
Party,;L'$umanite, 7 July)
f. Great Britain
"We warmly welcome the resolution of June 30 . "
(Statement of the Executive Committee of the British
Communist Party, 14 July, London Daily Worker, 16 July)
g. Austria
"The resolution ... is welcomed with the greatest satis-
faction by the Communist Parties, because it contributes
essentially to the clarification of questions in con-
nection with the personality cult." (Johann Koplenig
speech to CC,/KPOe, Volksstimme, 15 July)
h. West Germa
While adopting a position in accord with that of the
30 June CPSU Resolutions a statement issued by the
Secretariat of the KPD included a reference to "symptoms
of degeneration" under Stalin, a statement that "the
uncovering of the causes which led to the mistakes com-
mitted is a task which still has to be solved," and an
admission that leading Party cadres had been "fully in-
formed on the entire course of the 20th Party Congress
of the CPSTJ." (That is, the KPD leadership had a copy
of the secret Khrushchev speech prior to its publica-
tion in the press.) (Duesseldorf, Freies Volk, 2 July)