TASS: ITS ROLE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000100330004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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TASS: ITS ROLE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
June 1959
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TASS: ITS ROLE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
Contents
I. TASS in the Soviet Monolith page 1
A. History 1
B. Role 1
C. Relationship to Other Organizations 3
D. Distortion of News 4
II. Structure 9
A. Administrative Organization 9
1. Editorial Departments 9
2. Specialized Departments 11
3. Technical Departments 13
4. Auxiliary Departments 13
B. Personnel 14
III. Operations 16
A. Internal Operations 16
1. Collection Network 16
2. Republic Telegraph Agencies 16
3. Dissemination Services 17
4. Press Uniformity 18
5. Finances 19
B. Foreign Operations 19
1. Journalistic Activities 19
2. Subversive Activities 24
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TASS: ITS ROLE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
I. TASS in the Soviet Monolith
.A. History
Since the inception of the Soviet state the Communists
have demonstrated a keen awareness of the value of properly
handled propaganda and the need to control the press and all
sources of information. A major element of the vast propa-
ganda and control mechanism is the Telegraphic Agency of
the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoie Agenstvo Sovetskavo Soyuza -
TASS)o
As early as 1 December 1917 a decree signed by Lenin
desi nated the already existing Petrograd Telegraph Agency
(PTA) as an official news agency attached to the Council
of People's Commissars (now the Council of Ministers).
Four months later, on 7 April 1918, another decree merged
the Press Bureau of the All-Russian Central Executive Com-
mittee with the PTA to form the Russian Telegraph Agency
(Rossiykoye Telegrafnoie Agenburo - ROSTA).
The present TASS organization was established on
10 July 1925 by a joint decree of the Central Executive
Committee and the Council of Peoplets Commissars. A
subsequent joint decree of 15 January 1935 superseded both
the basic decree of July 1925 and. later modifying amend-
ments and constitutes the charter under which TASS, insofar
as is known, still operates.
Upon the establishment of TASS, ROSTA continued to
exist as the national telegraph agency for the RSFSR.
However, following the 1935 decree, ROSTA was liquidated
and TASS has continued to function not only as the All-
Union agency but also as the national agency of the RSFSR.
B. Role
The 1935 decree describes TASS as the "central informa-
tion organ of the USSR"; while the Large Soviet Encyclopedia
terms it the "basic source of information of the Soviet press
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on the political, economic and cultural life of the USSR and
abroad." TASS thus has the dual function of operating both
domestically and abroad. TASS is specifically charged with
the gathering and dissemination at home and abroad of all
types of news relating both to the Sov:Let Union and its
constituent republics and to foreign countries.
Although the 1935 charter gives: TASS a monopoly in
these fields, this monopoly is somewhat qualified in
practice. Abroad it shares news collection with a limited
number of correspondents representing major Moscow news-
papers (Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Komsomol'ska a Pravda),
and news dissemination with several Sov'inform ~Soviet
Information Bureau) offices as well as reports sent abroad
by foreign correspondents stationed in the Soviet Union.
Within the Soviet Union the TASS monopoly is infringed by
activities of the Administration for'Radio News in the
Ministry of Culture and the Soviet Information Bureau.
Juridically TASS is a state-owned enterprise, attached
directly to the Council of Ministers. Its status as an
official arm of the Soviet Government is manifested by
the fact that whenever TASS correspondents abroad have
gotten into trouble, the local Soviet diplomatic mission
has appeared to claim diplomatic immunity for TASS and its
employees, Although foreign states have not always accepted
this claim, the British Court: of Appeals, in its June 19+9
decision in the Grajina libel case brought against TASS,
ruled in favor of the defendant on the grounds that TASS
is indeed an agency of. the Soviet Government.. and, as such,
entitled to immunity. The Court indicated that its de-
cision was based primarily upon the certification of the
Soviet Ambassador that
"The Telegraph Agency of the USSR, commonly known
as TASS, or the TASS Agency, constitutes a depart-
ment of the Soviet State, i.e., the Union of Soviet
Socialist. Republics, exercising the rights of a
legal entity."
Although TASS claims to be a news agency similar to
UP, AP, Reuters, etc., it is not a bona fide news agency
in the accepted Western sense. For While it performs
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conventional news-gathering and distributing functions, it
also acts to further the political objectives of the Soviet.
state. In effect, it is an official spokesman of the Soviet
Government--official in the sense of being an authentic
voice of the government, but unofficial in the sense of
having only limited responsibility for the truth and con-
sequences of its statements.
It may also be noted that within the Soviet Union,
TASS is, as its name suggests, essentially a telegraphic
rather than a news agency. It has very limited editorial
functions and, to a large extent, is concerned merely with
transmitting material selected by other organizations.
Hence the.phrase "TASS Report" in no way means that the
agency itself has necessarily prepared the material trans-
mitted. The actual originator may be anyone. of a number
of off ice s--Glavlit, Press Department of the Central
Committee, Foreign Ministry Press Office, etc.
C. Relationship to Other Organizations
Although the 1935 decree provides that TASS is directly
subordinated to the Council of Ministers, the nature of the
Soviet state makes it inevitable that there should be a
close Party supervision over its operations. It is be-
lieved likely that the Council of Ministers concerns it-
self principally with the managerial aspects of TABS
(financial solvency, communication problems, etc.), while
actual policy control rests in the Agitation and Propa-
ganda Section Agitprop -7 of the Party Control Committee.
As a Party rather than a government organ, Agitprop
for the most part does not engage itself in propaganda
operations but functions as a planner, guide, supervisor
and policeman over all appropriate government agencies,
including TASS. With responsibility for propaganda policies
and decisions and for disseminating Party policy throughout
the USSR, Agitprop is believed to have the task of determin-
ing how TASS reports should be edited to make them ideologi-
cally correct.
Another agency which appears to exercise some measure
of control over TASS is the Soviet Foreign Ministry. One
unconfirmed report by a former member of the Foreign Ministry
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has stated that news gathered abroad by TASS is subject to
censorship control by the Ministry, presumably in its
Press Office, before publication. The Foreign Ministry
is also required to approve, formally at least, TASS corres-
pondents for assignment abroad, although actual control
probably lies elsewhere, The interchangeability of jobs
between the Foreign Ministry and TASS also suggests a
close relationship, with the Ministr using TASS as a
training institute (see Section II B~.
Glavlit (Main Administration for Affairs of Literature
and Puhlishing) is another agency which probably shares in
the control of TASS. As the main government censorship
agency with the right of "political,: ideological, military
and economic control" over all published material as well
as the right to prohibit publication, Glavlit is authorized
to station its representatives at all ;places of publication;
the law makes specific reference to "telegraph agencies."
It is not known whether, in the case of TASS, Glavlit avails
itself of this right or of its right to app.oinT,responsible
editors of publications to. act as its agents. At the very
least, it seems probable that TASS materials, like those
of the party press, are subject to Glavlit pre-publication
censorship to prevent disclosure of military secrets.
D. Distortion of News
Since the Soviet dictatorship requires that all infor-
mation contained in the press must conform to, and promote,
the Party's ideology and political line, TASS also functions
as a propaganda agency. This task is performed both by
the selection of the news disseminated and by outright
distortion.
In his article on TASS, Palgunov, the agency's present
director, admitted that TASS's job was "not to disseminate
information which by its content andnature is like a mere
photographic process .... but information, based upon Marxist-
Leninist theory, which provides an analysis of events...."
He continued:
"The force of our Press lies in the fact that it
is directed by the Communist Party always and in
everything.... Information must not simply illuminate
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this or that fact or event, though there might be
reason for such illumination; it must also pursue
a?definite ?end. Information must serve and help
the solution of the fundamental tasks which face
our Soviet society and our Soviet communism. In-
formation must be didactic and instructive.
(Author's italics)
In other words, information disseminated by TASS to the
Soviet press must above all serve as Party propaganda.
The extent to which TASS complies with this requirement
has, on occasion, led to criticism. In 1946, for example,
Kultura e zhizn, organ of the Central Committee's Propa-
ganda Administration, severely attacked TASS for what was
described as "unsatisfactory domestic and foreign news
reports," The journal complained that not only were TASS
reports stereotyped and too greatly based on materials
already published in the Moscow press but that they did
not give a rounded picture of events abroad. As an
example, it noted in regard to the 1945 Paris Peace Con-
ference that "from TASS reviews it was hard to understand
what really took place."
Below are some examples of the way TASS treats Soviet
internal news.
1. Rapa va-Rukhadze Trial
The trial and execution in Georgia of eight
senior officials as counter-revolutionary asso-
ciates of Beria in November 1955 was never re-
ported outside Georgia though the trial was
conducted by the USSR Supreme Court and, more
significantly, it gave the first hint that
Stalin's pre-war purges were under review, three
months before Khrushchev delivered his secret
speech.
20 Khrushchev's Secret Speech
The Party censorship would not allow TASS to
release Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech
at the 20th Party
Congress
in February,
1956,
and it has never
appeared
in the Soviet
Press.
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3. Bagirov Trial
The trial and execution in May 1956, of the former
First Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan Communist
Party as a traitor and accomplice of Beria was
never reported by TASS for the Soviet central or
republican Press. The only mention of what in
any other country would have been a sensational
event was made in the local Party paper of
Azerbaidzhan, where the trial took place.
4. Poznan Riots and the Hungarian Uprising:
The Soviet people have not :been permitted to
learn the true causes and nature of these two
uprisings in the Soviet orbit. TASS said the
Polish Riots on 28 June 1956 were "a hostile
provocation committed by imperialist agents in
Poznan.tt All subsequent reports continued this
line.
The Hungarian revolt which began on 23 October
1956 had been in progress two days before TASS
made any mention of it. While fighting against
Soviet troops was at its height, TASS. said the
ttanti-democratic adventure in Budapest had
failed" and went on:
"Underground reactionary organizations
attempted to start in Budapest a counter-
revolutionary revolt against the people's
regime. This enemy adventure had obviously
been prepared for some time. The forces of
foreign reaction had been systematically
meeting anti-democratic' elements for action
against the lawful authority....'.
Subsequently, the Soviet press always referred to
the "Imperialist Fascist putsch in Hungary."
5,, Speeches by Leading Figures:
TASS texts of speeches by important figures--
Soviet and foreign--have also been "doctored" on
several occasions. On 6 November 1955 when
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Kaganovich made the key-note speech on the 38th
Anniversary of the October Revolution, there were
discrepancies between the live version and the
TASS report. In the part of the speech dealing
with foreign affairs two passages, containing
bellicose statements about the West, were inserted
in the TASS version, while two passages on internal
affairs uttered by Kaganovich were suppressed by
TASS and Pravda. Referring to the growing require-
ments of the Soviet Union, Kaganovich's phrase
"and we do not satisfy them fully" was replaced by
"and economically we are still lagging behind the
principal capitalist countries." Discussing the
increase in cultivation of the virgin lands,
Kaganovich said "and no matter how much talk
there is about the difficulty of this work, the
Party is successfully reclaiming these lands."
This remark was cut out by TASS and Pravda, pre-
sumably because it showed Party policy on the
virgin lands was meeting with opposition.
In September 1956 President Sukarno of Indonesia,
during his visit to the USSR, made a speech at
Tashkent which ended with these words: "I know
that there are among you many Moslems for whom
it is necessary to go to pray and for this reason
I will detain you here no longer." This passage,
though printed in Pravda (September 6) was omitted
in the UZTAG Telegraph Agency of Uzbekistan - a
local branch of TAS version which appeared in
Pravda Vostoka, the organ.of the Communist Party
of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is a republic in which
the Soviet regime has persistently sought to
destroy the Moslem faith. Sukarno's statement
that belief in God was one of the five principles
on which the Indonesian State was based was also
omitted from the Uzbek paper,
Another example is the TASS treatment of a
speech made by Khrushchev on 2 December 1955
during his visit to Burma. In the course of the
speech, Khrushchev remarked, "The English did
not exist as a country until William the Conqueror;
your temples are twice as old as theirs ...yet
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they call you savages and barbarians." The TASS
report of the speech, as printed in Pravda,
attributed this remark to an anonymous "Burmese
diplomat". Referring to the fact that Reuters
had re orted Khrushchev had said it (as indeed
he had), Pravda declared that "bourgeois corres-
pondents"" hadTascribed to Comrade Khrushchev
what he did not say and flagrantly distorted what
was actually said." The flagrant TASS-Pravda
falsification was made quite clear by the fact
that other Communist papers, notably the Czech
Rude Pravo on 4 December and the British Daily
Worker on 3 December,.had already published
accounts of Khrushchev"s speech identical with
the Reuters report.
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II. Structure
A. Administrative Organization
The central TASS office, employing approximately 1,800
people, is divided functionally into editorial, specialized,
technical and auxiliary departments,
1. Editorial Departments
a. Foreign News Department (Redaktsiya Inostrannoy
Informatsii TASS - INOTASS) processes all news re-
ceived from TAB foreign correspondents and from
foreign news agencies. News received in foreign
languages is translated into Russian by the depart-
ment's own staff of translators. The department
is divided into a number of geographical sections,
each of which handles news on a particular country
or group of countries. There is also a foreign
press reading section.
Personnel assigned to the department must have
an adequate area knowledge and a working knowledge
of the language of the country from which they are
editing the news. They are divided on the basis
of qualifications and experience into four grades:
junior editors, editors, senior editors, and sec-
tion heads and their deputies.
b. News For Abroad De artment (Redaktsiya Informatsii
dlya Zagranitsy I Z , which has formed a part of
INOTASS since November 1954, has the mission of
transmitting Soviet domestic and foreign news
reports to the foreign press, The personnel are
chiefly translators since TASS news is transmitted
abroad in English, French, German and Spanish as
well as in Russian.
RIDZ has no domestic or foreign correspondents
but obtains its foreign news from the INOTASS news
report and its domestic news from. correspondents
attached to the Domestic News Department. RIDZ
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does, however, have a local: reportorial staff to
cover central government offices and other Moscow
news.
RIDZ transmits its news'abroad by means of tele-
type, Morse code and Hellschreiber. Morse and
Hellschreiber daily transmissions totalled 120
hours in 1954, 190 hours in 1955, and 240 hours in
1956. In June 1953 the following was the daily
schedule of transmissions:
Time
Region
Code
Hours
Minutes
North America
English Morse
Russian
3
40
(Romanized) Morse
2
Latin America
Spanish Morse
3
English Morse
English
15
Europe
Hellschreiber
French or German
22'
45
Hellschreiber
Russian
20
30
Hellschreiber
22
10
Near East
French Morse
French
8
15
Hellschreiber
7
15
Far East
English Morse
English
14
15
Hellschreiber
2
45
In addition to the above, an irregular TASS
service of 5 hours 30 minutes in Russian or English
Morse was broadcast to Shanghai or Peiping. Also,
the daily 18 hours 30 minutes in Russian Morse to
the Soviet Far East was believed to include propa-
ganda directives and other forms of instructions
to Soviet and Chinese officials in Peiping.
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c. Domestic News Department (Redaktsiya Soyuznoy
Informatsii - R I gathers and edits domestic news,
transmits it to the press, and supervises the domes-
tic TASS correspondents within the RSFSR as well as
the work of the various republic agencies. RSI is
also charged with the training and professional
improvement of correspondents and with the conven-
ing of conferences and conventions of correspondents.
The department is divided into a, number of
specialized news sections: party and government,
industrial and transportation, farm, cultural,
military, sports and youth. It also has a local
reportorial staff (numbering 25 in 1955) in Moscow
and a network of part-time correspondents in large
industrial. plants
RSI distributes its news by radio and other com-
munications media and by a daily informational
bulletin, Vestnik, which contains 100 to 120 pages--
about 20,000 to 24,000 words--and 130 to 200 news
items from all over the USSR,
d.. Local Press Department (.Redaktsiya Informatsii
dlya Mestnoy Pechati -- RI P) edits for republic,
kray, city and rayon newspapers news selected
from the foreign and domestic news reports issued
by INOTASS and RSI. RIMP is also charged with
circulating the important lead items and editori-
als from Pravda and other central organs to the
lower press. As.of 1955, RIMP was servicing about
-i-00 republic, kray and oblast newspapers and
4,100 rayon and city newspapers.
2. Specialized Departments
a. Photo Service (Fotokhronika TASS) is the largest
of the specialized.departments, with a network of
photographers in Moscow and in the major indus-
trial, cultural and administrative centers of the
USSR. According to Paigunov, the Service issues
about 25,000 pictures a year and has a file of
negatives covering 80,000 domestic subjects.
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The Service operates abroad on an extensive
basis, maintaining contacts with foreign picture
agencies and sometimes sending its own photographers
abroad to supply the Soviet press with pictures of
life abroad. In the United States an organization
known as Sovfoto (or the Am-Rus Literary and Music
Agency) appears to act for Fotokhronika as a
central distribution service for pictures on the
Soviet Union for the entire Western Hemisphere.
In Japanphotos are distributed through the Japan-
Soviet News Agency, established in 1954.
Fotokhronika was originally set up in the
early 1930's as an independent organization called
Soyuzfoto. In 1937 it was made a department of the
International Book Trust (Mezhdunarodnaya _Knigaa, or.
Mezhknig). It received its present name in 194l
when it was placed under the jurisdiction of TASS.
b. Press Cliche Department, which was made a part
of the Photo Service in 1954, supplies the non-Moscow
press with finished plastic mats for pictures,
articles, cartoons, etc. The service makes possible
great economies since the mats are supplied at low
cost (i.80 rubles each for a rayon newspaper) and
since the client papers are thus relieved of the
need of maintaining individual staffs of draftsmen,
artists, cartoonists, engravers, etc. However, the
service is also responsible for much. of the monoto-
nous similarity which is so striking in the non-
Moscow Soviet press (see Section III A)0
co Press Bureau supplies the peripheral press with
feature articles of an ideological nature or on
economic, political, cultural and foreign affairs.
The 800 to 1,000 articles supplied each year are
written not only by Bureau personnel but also by
outstanding leaders and experts in every field of
Soviet life and society.
d. Radio Information is the fourth specialized
department; no information is available as to its
functions.
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3. Technical Departments
According to Palgunov, the Communications Department
includes 35 percent of the total central office person-
nel. Incoming and outgoing domestic and foreign news
is handled by radiotelegraph, radio, telephone, radio-
teletype, cable telephone, etc, TASS has its own private
teleprinter facilities within the Soviet Union and its
own radio "center with at least 24 shortwave transmitters,
of which 17 are devoted to broadcasts abroad and 7 to
news summaries for the domestic press.
At least five days a week TASS broadcasts a total
of 7 hours 40 minutes of news to the provincial, republic
and regional press and between 2 hours and 3 hours 45
minutes to the city and district press (the longer
service occurs only two or three times a week). In
addition,. there is an irregular 2-hour transmission from
.Khabarovsk to publications in Palana, Siberia. As of
191, it was reported that only 270 out of some 3,000
papers received their news by telegraph.
On a daily basis, TASS transmits to its client news-
papers by all media a total of 217,000 to 225,000 words.
The department, however, actually daily transmits 996,000
words and receives 677,000 words in all directions and
by all means.
By special agreement between the Ministry of Commu-
nications and TASS, government communications have
priority over information sent by TASS and the republic
agencies regardle"ss of how transmitted. TASS trans-
missions containing decrees and governmental edicts,
however, .have equal priority with governmental
communications.
There are two other technical services: Large
and Small Circulation Departments; no information is
available on their functions.
4. Auxiliary Departments
In his article on TASS, Palgunov refers, without
detailing their specific functions, to seven auxil-
iary departments, of which he names five: planning
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and finance, administration, foreign reference, domes-
tic reference, and auditing. No other information is
available on any of the auxiliary departments.
B. Personnel
According to the 1935 decree TASS is headed by a
director (now N. G. Palgunov), who is responsible for all
activity, and two assistant directors (believed now to be
K. Shiryakev and V. Seliverstov), appointed officially by
the Council of Ministers but probably actually selected
by Agitprop. Heads of the various republic telegraph
agencies are appointed by their respective governments in
consultation with the TASS director.
TASS has responsibility for training the cadres of
"nomenclatured workers" for the entire system of tele-
graphic agencies and also assists the republic agencies
in training their correspondents. The Soviet Union has,
in general, placed great stress on attracting competent
writers and ideologists into journalism and has encouraged
each :Level of the press to give on-the-job training; TASS
is expected to do its share in this process. As in most
lines of government work, TASS employees are believed to be
subjected early in their careers to pressure to join the
Party?
TASS correspondents and employees sent abroad are
nominated by a 5-man sub-committee attached to the Party
Presidium, which, in fact, must approve the appointment
abroad of any Soviet citizen. The committee is headed by
a Presidium member, with other members representing the
Intelligence Center and the Ministries of State Security
(MVD),, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Trade, According to
the International Press Institute, the MVD and Intelligence
Center invariably have the deciding voice in the choice
of candidates.
Because of this appointment procedure, TASS corres-
pondents sent abroad appear to be chosen chiefly on the
basis of political reliability (and, at times, intelli-
gence usefulness), with Journalistic qualifications being
quite secondary, In many cases, in fact, they have had
.no journalistic experience whatever. The first TASS
correspondent sent to Egypt, for example, was Dr. Mikhail
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Korostovtsev, a renowned Egyptologist, who boasted of the
fact that he had never before had anything to do with the
press. Only two of the Russians appointed to the TASS.
London office between 1942 and 1950 had any previous ex-
perience; of four assigned there in 1945 one had formerly
been a village schoolteacher, another a railway engineer,
a third a barely literate demobilized ex-farm laborer,
and the fourth an.official of the Ministry of State
Security.
Foreign nationals employed by TASS offices abroad are
expected to be members of the Communist Parties of their
respective countries, although not always open members,
and well-qualified journalists. In the United States, for
example, Americans employed by TASS have, since 1941,
been required technically to resign from the Party.
Foreign national employees are not expected to know
.Russian.and.reportedly are actively discouraged from
learning it
TASS personnel both in Moscow and abroad include a
strong diplomatic element. TASS's wartime director, for
example, was Constantine Oumansky, who had just previously
served as. Ambassador to the US. His successor, Palgunov,
had been head of the Foreign Ministry's Press Office;
and one of his assistants there later became Ambassador
to China. Yakov Lomakin, once in the American Division
of TASS in Moscow and later head of the TASS New York
office, subsequently (1946) became Soviet Consul
General in'-the US.
Other examples can also be cited. F. Orekhov, an
.assistant to Palgunov.in TASS, was made Counselor of
the Soviet Embassy in Washington. T. S. Chernyshev,
after a tour as Ambassador to Sweden, served as assist-
ant director of TASS and then as UN Undersecretary.
Moreover, many of the persons working in the UN Secre-
tariat under the Soviet quota were originally listed as
TASS correspondents.
This interchangeability of jobs suggests that a TASS.
job is regarded as an important assignment in the foreign
.field, providing useful training for a diplomatic career.
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III. Operations
Internal Operations
1. Collection Network
According to the Palgunov article, TASS was receiv-
ing at the time the article was wr:itten.a daily news
file of from 677,000 to 700,000 words from its combined
domestic and foreign services. A UNESCO study published
in 1953 .estimated that the TASS central off ice received
only about 260,000 words a week from all of its Soviet
centers, which suggests that the overwhelming proportion
of incoming TASS reports comes from abroad.
To collect its domestic news TASS relies on a staff
of more than 800 correspondents within the Soviet Union.
As of 1955, these included 66 correspondents stationed
in every oblast center and autonomous republic in the
RSFSR, correspondents of the TASS bureaus maintained
in Leningrad, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Irkutsk,
Novosibirsk and Tashkent, and correspondents of the
15 republic telegraph agencies. ;TASS also receives
reports from the special correspondents which the
major Moscow newspapers have in large factories, col-
lective fauns and other enterprises.
Within the RSFSR the network of: bureaus and corres-
pondents is directly subordinate'; to the central TASS
office. In the other union republics, the networks of
correspondents are integrated administratively into
the respective republic agencies. TASS appoints these
correspondents from lists of applicants submitted by
the respective agencies. In case of necessity TASS
can and does send special correspondents to posts any-
where in the USSR.
2. Republic Telegraph Agencies
The 15 republic telegraph agencies, which were
created as a gesture towards -th:e th:eoreticailSr
federal structure of the USSR, are in practice no
more than branch offices of TASS Their directors
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are appointed by the respective republic governments on
the recommendation of the TASS director. Since TASS.
.doubles as the national agency for the RSFSR, it has
a plenipotentiary attached to the RSFSR Government,
appointed by the TASS director subject to the approval
of the RSFSR Government.
TASS is, by law, directly responsible for the oper
ations".of these agencies and gives them specific assign-
mentssfor the gathering and dissemination of news, all
of which must be implemented. Each of them receives
its news on the outside world exclusively from TASS and
cannot alter TASS reports in any way. Financial rela-
tionships are regulated by contract.
The following are the 15 separate national agencies:
Ratan Ukraine). Belta (Belorussia)
Uztag (Uzbekistan) Kaztag (Kazakhstan)
Gruztag (Georgia) Aztag (AzerbaijanEl'ta (Lithuania) Moldtag (Moldavia))
Leta (Latvia) Kirtag (Kirgizia)
Tadzhikta (Tadzhikistan) Armentag (Armenia)
Karel-Finta (Karelia) Eta (Estonia)
Turkmentag (Turkmenistan)
3. Dissemination Services
A large percentage of TASS disseminations are
drawn from the Moscow press, from which TASS daily
sends out selections. The leading article of the
Party organ Pravda is disseminated by all media to the
entire peripheral press. The leading editorial in
Komsomoltskaya Pravda is sent to all youth organs and
that in Krasnaya vesda to all military journals. In
addition, a daily press review containing summaries of
the contents of these three papers as well as of
Izvestia and Trud are sent to the press of the entire
USSR, except that papers in Siberia and the Far East
get only abbreviated versions of the most important
articles.
In. addition to the central press material, TASS
disseminates a daily bulletin on internal and foreign
affairs and a weekly survey of international affairs,
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which local papers are obliged to use. At intervals
it also issues summaries of the' contents of some of the
major periodicals, for example,' New Times. (Other
materials provided by the Photo'_Tervice, Press Cliche,
Press Bureau, etc., have been discussed in Section II A
of this report.)
TASS is believed to divide its clients into five
classes based on periodicity and circulation, with
each class getting a different type of service suited
to its requirements. Thus, weeklies, for example, get
a news summary of 125 to 150 lines.
TASS is believed to issue for high Party officials
only a daily secret news summary, Red TASS, consisting
of digests of foreign press comment, diplomatic cables,
and .selected telegrams from TASS correspondents abroad.
Its name derives from the color. of the paper on which
it is printed. A second secret. summary printed on green
paper for less important officials has also been reported.
4+. Press Uniformity
Because all of the Soviet Union's approximately
7,163 newspapers and magazines Must use TASS reports
and because of the widespread use of the services pro-
vided by the Press Cliche Department, the non-Moscow
press evidences a striking similarity, both in content
and appearance. The Party journal. Kommunist (No. 6,
1955, P. 101), in a survey of local papers published
on the same day, complained that "if it were not for
the headings and names of different rayons, enterprises
and collective farms, any of these papers could be
changed over one for the other and neither the readers
nor the editorial staffs would notice it."
During a call on TASS director Palgunov in Moscow
in 1955, William Benton, former US Senator and publisher
of Encyclopedia Britannica, called the director's atten-
tion to copies of the previous day's papers from all
over the country, each of which bore the identical head-
line in the identical type, size and page position.and
the same picture of the same event in the same size and
position. The embarrassed Palgunov could only venture
the lame excuse that it must have been a coincidence.
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While the uniformity of the peripheral press reflects
in part a lack of initiative by individual editors and
a fear of violating the Party line, it also reflects
the extent of TASSts influence on the content and form
of the entire Soviet peripheral press.
5. Finances
TASS, and the republic agencies are required by the
1935 decree to operate on a self-sustaining basis.
Revenue comes from fees paid for their news and services
by client newspapers. Rates are set by special decree
of the Council of Ministers; some are as low.as 4 rubles
60 kopeks weekly ($1.00 at official rate, 25$ actually)
for papers coming.out only once or twice a week. How-
ever, since much of TASS's activity includes intelli-
gence collection and propaganda dissemination, it would
seem likely that it receives an.unreported subsidy from
the government.
Although TASS does not report any details of its
budget, a guess as to its size can be made. Palgunov
told Benton that the AP budget was bigger than his
while that of the Agence France-Presse (AFP) was
2.5 times less. In 1951 AP expenditures totalled
$24,693,645; while in 1952 the APP budget was
approximately $7,400,000. Palgunov's remarks,
coupled with these figures, would suggest that the
TASS budget is probably in the vicinity of $18,000,000.
By virtue of the 1935 decree, information tele-
grams of TASS, the republic agencies and their corres-
pondents are sent at identical preferential rates
established by the Council of Ministers.
B. Foreign Operations
1. Journalistic Activities
The TASS network of foreign.correspondents func-.
tions to a large extent as an adjunct of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry. This is reflected not only in the
interchangeability of personnel (see Section II B
above), but also in the fact that-'PASS correspondents
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abroad live and operate in.close contact with Soviet
diplomatic personnel. TASS men and Soviet diplomats
are often billeted in the same building, while TASS
offices are usually located on mission premises or
adjacent to them. In many instances TASS makes use
of available diplomatic facilities such asthe pouch
and telecommunications. As a rule TASS correspondents
carry Soviet "service" passports and, on occasion,
diplomatic passports.
Unlike the average Western Journalist, the TASS
correspondent does not as a rule get out and "dig"
for a story. For the most part, TASS. relies on a
careful scrutiny of local press. and publications,
coupled with attendance at press conferences, polit-
ical and parliamentary meetings, etc. Where report-
ing to Moscow is expected to be published, it
apparently is heavily edited to make it palatable.
In contrast, considerable factual material--parlia-
mentary debates, technical stories, trade statistics,
etc.--is sent verbatim, suggestng that it is probably
for information rather than publication.
In addition to the news sources mentioned above,
TASS appears also to rely quite heavily on Western
news agencies, to which it subscribes. The TASS
charter specifically gives it the right to sign
contracts with foreign news agencies for the exchange
of news, and it has used this right extensively. Ex-
change agreements are believed to exist (or to have
existed) with the following agencies:
Country
4:f ghani s t an
Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
News A?;ency
Bakhtar.
Agence Telegraphique
Albah.aise
Austria Presse Agentur
Bulgarski Telegrafitscheka
Agentzia
Hsin Hua, (New China) News
Agency
Ceska Tiskova Kancelar
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Country News Agency
.East Germany Aligemeine Deutsche
Nachrichtendienst
Egypt Middle East News Agency
Finland Suomen Tietotoimisto-Finska
Notisbyran
France Agence France-Presse
Hungary Magyar Tavirati Iroda
Indonesia Kantorberita Antara
Iran Pars
Italy Agenzia Nazionale Stampa
Associata
Japan Kyodo News Service
Netherlands Algemeen Nederlandsch
Persbureau
North.Korea Chung-Yang Tongshin
Norway Norsk Telegrambyra
Poland Polska Agencja Prasowa
Rumania Agentie de Informatii
Telegraf ice
United Kingdom Reuters
Un.ited.States Associated Press
United Press
TASS apears to use the Free World agencies for informa-
tion purposes only and very rarely reproduces extracts
,in its own service.
The TASS office in Moscow receives an average of
1,677,000 words daily from its foreign correspondents,
according to a statement by William Benton. The US
offices, according to testimony by a TABS employee
before a Senate committee in 1955, has an estimated
daily quota of 5,000 to 6,000 words, with a total
monthly transmission of about 175,000 words, through
normal commercial channels.
To provide this daily flow of words from abroad,
TASS maintains approximately 200 correspondents in
various cities throughout the world, In 1955, accord-
ing to Paigunov, TASS offices or individual corres-
pondents were located in the following cities (an
asterisk indicates a known full-fledged bureau) :
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Are a Cities
Western Hemisphere New York,* Washington,* (subor-
dinate to New York), Ottawa,
Buenos Aires, Montevideo
Free Europe London, * Paris,* Vienna,* Berne,
Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Copen-
hagen, Stockholm, Oslo, Helsinki,
Athens, Belgrade
Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Tel
Aviv, Cairo, Karachi, New Delhi,
Teheran
Southeast Asia Djakarta, Bangkok
Communist Bloc Peiping,* `'>hanghai, East Berlin,*
Tirana, Sofia, Prague, Budapest,
Warsaw, Bucharest, Ulan-Bator,
Pyongyang
Since the Palgunov article was written, TASS also
has established offices in Pretor-i-a Damascus (September
1956), Addis Ababa (1957) and Phnom Penh (1957). TASS
offices, either as recognized establishments or as part
of the local embassy, are believed to exist also in
Mexico, West Germany, Libya, Neyv_Zealand, Burma, Japan,
Ceylon, Iceland and Ghana.
Despite the large amount of 'wordage regularly trans-
mitted abroad by RIDZ, TASS foreign operations are pri-
marily concerned with collection. Most of the wordage
would appear to be for the edification of the TASS staff
abroad and the local Soviet diplomatic missions. Al-
though the overseas offices in many cases do circulate
daily bulletins based on these'RIDZ transmissions, actual
distribution activity varies widely.
In the United States, the TASS.offices distribute
very little. The same is true of the Latin American
offices, although these do service a few Communist and
left-wing.newspapers. The situation in Europe is much
the same. In Paris and Helsinki, someTASS reports are
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circulated, although by the local Sovinform offices
rather than by TASS itself. In Rome, ANSA, by agree-
ment with.TASS; picks up Russian Hellschreiber broad-
casts and delivers the tapes to the TASS office, which
then forwards them to the Communist organ Unita.
In contrast, TASS engages in considerable distribu-
tion activity in the Middle East. The TASS offices in
Beirut and Cairo, for example, distribute free to a
large number of newspapers and individuals a Soviet
News Bulletin in.French and Arabic, which also reaches
recipients in Syria. In India TASS's News and Views
from the Soviet Union is published daily in English,
twice weekly in. in i, Urdu, Bengali, Telegu, Marathi-
and Gujerati, and once weekly in Punjabi. TASS also
issues. Soviet Land in English, Hindi, Telegu and
Bengali, on occasion also distributes special
pamphlets,
In Japan (as of 1956) TASS news was received through
'Shanghai-by the Soviet News Agency, an indigenous front
organization, which distributed it. The agency also
distributes photographs and other features which are
sent to Japan once a month by airmail. The present
situation is uncertain, since.TASS is reported to
have re-established a Tokyo office following the re--
sumption.of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations.
A special situation obtains in the Soviet Union's
European satellites. In each a national agency exists
to diffuse Party directives and government decrees to
the provincial press and to relay provincial news to
the capital. For the transmission of this information
to Moscow. and the diffusion of Soviet material in the
satellites, TASS is the channel.
As far as is known, actual control of the satel-
lite national agencies is exercised through the local
Communist Party and Soviet mission, with TASS serving
merely as a transmission channel. However, in 1950
TASS reportedly took the lead in organizing the
national agencies of Albania, Bulgaria, Communist
China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North
Korea, Poland and Rumania into a coordinating group,
which has linked them very closely together.
C
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The influence of TASS in the satellites is best
reflected in the foreign news columns of the satel-
lite papers. In 1952, for example, TASS reports
constituted 46 percent in Czech; papers, 75 percent in
Rumanian papers, and 64.5 percent in Bulgarian papers.
2. Subversive Activities
In its 1954 report on TASS, the International
Press Institute noted that only .a fraction of the
information sent to Moscow by TASS foreign corres-
pondents is ever printed in the Soviet press and con-
cluded that "the greater part Zo-f this information
can be regarded as military, political and economic
intelligence intended for functional use by the appro-
priate Soviet ministries and other governmental
departments ."?
Not only are TASS reports of an intelligence
character but TASS correspondents are frequently
active members of one or another Soviet intelligence
agency rather than bona fide journalists. In fact
one postwar survey of TABS correspondents, conducted
on a world-wide basis, revealed that at least 25
percent of such correspondents had a background of
active intelligence training.
The true figure is probably. much higher. Lt. Col.
Yuri Rastvorov, who defected while serving in Tokyo
as a Soviet military intelligence officer under the
guise of an Embassy Second Secretary, has stated that
at; least 85 to 90 percent of all TASS personnel abroad
are agents either of Soviet military intelligence (GRU),
or political intelligence (MVD). Ismail Ege (Ismail
Gusseynovich Akhmedov), another:former GRU officer who
defected, estimated the percentage from 80 to 85.
Vladimir Petrov, who defected while serving as a
Soviet Embassy Secretary in Australia, told a Royal
Commission that all TASS correspondents abroad act
as MVD agents.
While the exact percentage may be unknown, there
is reason to believe It is high. Many examples can
be cited where TASS employment has served to mark
the real activity of a Soviet agent. In one country,
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at the opening of World War II, for example, GRU is
known to have had a spy network of five persons, of
whom two operated as TASS representatives. At the
same time and the same place the MVD had a 6-man
network, of whom one was the director of the TASS
office and another a TASS correspondent.
According to revelations made by him in later
years,. Ege (Akhmedov), then Chief of the GRU's Fourth
Section, was sent to Germany in May 1941 under the
name of Georgi Nikolayev in the guise of a TASS corres-
pondent. Ege also identified a number of TASS corres-
pondents who had served in Berlin, Istanbul, Ankara
and Vichy before 3 June 1943 (the date of his defection),
whom he had known personally to be intelligence agents.
The use of'TASS cover during the war years was
widespread. In the postwar years, TASS cover has
continued to be used, although probably less exten-
sively than during the war. In most non-Communist
countries there is a close liaison between TASS
personnel and indigenous Communist elements; and in
some countries, TASS is believed to play the role of
intermediary and paymaster in its relations with
local Communists.
Rastvorov, for example, has revealed that the TASS
office in postwar Japan was heavily staffed with
intelligence agents. An early TASS representative
there, Konstantin Samolivov, was identified by
Rastvorov as a GRU staff colonel whose real name was
Sonini. Samolivov's successor, Yakov.Kisilev, was
also an intelligence agent, as was Evgeniy Egorov,
who succeeded.Kisilev in March 1949. According to
Rastvorov, Egorov was actually a captain in the GRU.
The Report of the Royal Commission.on Espionage,
issued on.22 August 1955 and based-on disclosures by
Vladimir Petrov, indicated that during the period
.1949-1952 three successive TABS representatives in
.Australia--Nosov, Pakhomov and Antonov--were all
MVD personnel.
Since the end of World War II, there have been
three notorious cases concerning TASS representatives
involved in espionage:
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a. The Gouzenko Case
This case arose from disclosures made to
Canadian authorities by Igor Gouzenko, a
cipher clerk employed in the Soviet Military
Attache's office in Ottawa, about espionage
activities organized by the Soviet Embassy
staff. Gouzenko named, among others, Nikolai
Zheveinov, who served as a TASS correspondent
in Canada from 19+2 to 19145. According to
Gouzenko, Zheveinov was a member of the sppy
ring and, under the code name of "Martin,
had been charged with the direction and super-
vision of undercover agents.
Another member of the spy ring identified by
Gouzenko was Sergei Kudryavtsev, the Embassy
First Secretary. Testifying before a US
Senate committee in February 1956, Ismail
.Ege identified Kudryavtsev as a former TASS
representative in Berlin and Turkey where,
according to Ege, he had actually served as
an MVD agent.
b. The Anisimov Case
In 1951 and 1952, Viktoi Anisimov, head of
the TASS office in Stockholm was involved in
two espionage cases in which a number of Swedes
were convicted of espionage on behalf of the
USSR.
The first of these cases concerned Ernst
Hilding Andersson, a Swedish Navy petty offi-
cer, who was convicted of espionage on 14
November 1951. It was publicly disclosed that
Andersson, a Communist since 1929, had been
contacted in 19+6 first by Soviet diplomats
and later by Anisimov, to supply information
on the Swedish-=Navy, coast defense installa-
tions, secret water lanes, etc.
Anisimov had left Sweden before Andersson's
arrest, and the Swedish Government took no
action against TASS. On. 21 September 1951,
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however, it did demand the recall of Anisimov's
successor as contact man, Nikolai Orlov, a
Soviet Embassy clerk.
Anisimov and Orlov were also involved in the
second affair, namely, the case of Fritiof
Enbom, a Communist journalist arrested and
convicted, along with six others, in 1952.
The Swedish democratic press was outspoken
in its denunciation of Anisimov and of TASS
in general. As an example can be cited the
semi-official Social Democratic organ, Nor on-
Tidningen, which declared in its issue of 31
October 1951:
"We know, from the Russian Press and Radio,
that 'news' about Sweden dispatched by TASS
is highly distorted and false. 'News' not
intended for publication, i.e. spy reports,
however, is both correct and detailed,
judging from Andersson's confessions.
TASS correspondents' real task thus does
not appear to be the operation of a news
service in the accepted sense, but to conduct
propaganda against the countries where they
are stationed to spy. There are no guaran-
tees that Anisimov's successors will differ
from their predecessors in that respect."
c. The Pissarev Case
On 23.December 1952, L, K. Pissarev, chief TASS
representative at The Hague, was arrested by
Dutch police while he was meeting a Dutch con-
tact, a minor ministry official, whom Pissarev
had requested to procure secret information for
him. Unfortunately for Pissarev, his Dutch con-
tact, being a loyal citizen and not a Communist
traitor, had reported Pissarev's activity to the
police. In February 1953, Pissarev was deported
without being brought to trial, the Dutch.author-
ities having decided to be lenient inasmuch as
the police had ended his illegal activities at
the outset.
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It must be kept in.mind that these three cases are only
those which have become public. In view of the widespread
use of-'TASS cover by the Soviet intelligence organizations,
other illegal activity by TASS representatives probably
exists but has gone undetected. As Petrov told the Royal
Commission in Australia, even if TASS representatives are
not permanently employed by the MVD, `they are invariably
required to assist in its work.
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-.SOURCES
,
1. N.G. Pal unov. O $2g# informatsii v Irazete TASS i eo roll
g
Tie Basis for Newspaper Int'orma ion - TABS ands. is Dole
Moscow, 1955.
State, IR-6320.2 "Survey of Operations of the Soviet Agency 'TASS'",
17 December-1953, Unclassified.
UNESCO, News Agencies: Their ',tructure and Operations. Paris, 1953,
2 . 0 d1 A? D .g na l i Z $f~ o P A~ ` ZBasic Decrees and
Legislation on the Press, Moscow, 1937, p. 153-55.
)!P )fl ', Moscow, 1946, Vol. 53, p. 615.
4. Palgunov, op. cit.
5. International Press Institute, "Tass Monopoly on News Raises
Questions for East-West Understanding.' Cited hereafter as
IPI Report
6. Ibid.
IR--6320.2, op. cit.
7. IPI Report
A. GAEV, "Soviet Press Control,"'Bulletin of the Institute for
the History and Culture of the USSR, Vol II, No 5 May 55).
8. Great Britain, Foreign Office. Forty Years of Tass, Nov 57, Unclassified
(Not for Attribution)
"The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political Science
Review, Mar 50.
Alan Little, "The Soviet Propa;randa Machine," Department of State
Bulletin, 3 Sep 51.
Ladislas Farago, "Soviet Propa;;anda," United Nations World, Sep 48.
9. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
10. Ibid.
11. Palgunov, op. cit.
12. Quoted in New York Times, 22 Nov 46, p. 20. See Louis Nemzer,
Strut ure of Soviet Foreie;n Propa anda Organization (University
of Chicago thesis, 19771 p. 217-lb, 232-33.
13. Forty Years of Tass, op. cit.
14. Ibid.
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15. Palgunov, op. cit.
16. Evron Kirkpatrick (ed.), Tam: the World (New York, 1956), p. 79-80.
, Year of Crisis New York, 1951, p. 346.
17. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
18. Ibid.
19. Palgunov, op, cit.
20. Ibid.
21. Nemzer, op. cit., p. 223
See also IR-7320.2, ?p. cit.
22. Target: the World, op. cit., p. 113
23. Nemzer, op. cit. p. 222-23
24. Palgunov, op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. IR-6320.2 op. cit.
27. Palgunov, op. cit.
28. IPI Report
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. U.S. Congress. Senate. Internal Security Annual Report for 1956.
Report #131, 85th Congress, lst Session. Washington, 1957.
Cited hereafter as "Senate Report."
33. IR:I Report
34. Nemzer, op, cit., p. 216.
35. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
36. UNESCO Report, p. 57
37. Palgunov, op. cit.
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38. Nemzer, op. cit., p. 216
39. Palgunov, off. cit.
IR-6320.2, 9. cit.
40. Palgunov, OP. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. IR-6320.2 of. cit.
44. UNESCO. Report, p. 57
45. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
46. Leo Gruliow, "The Soviet Press: Propagandist, Agitator, Organizer,"
Journal of International Affairs Vol X, No 2 (1956)
47. IR-6320.2, of. cit.
Palgunov, of. cT ..
48. IR-6320.2, of. cit.
49. IPI Report
50. UNESCO Report, p. 58
Palgunov, of. cit.
Year of Crisis, op. cit., p. 136
51. UNESCO Report, loc. cit.
52. Editor and Publisher, 17 Dec 55, p. 65
53. Senate Report, p. 122
54. Palgunov, op. cit.
55. IPI Report
Year of Crisis, op. cit., p. 136 and 165
USIA, Communist Propaganda : A Fact Book, 1957-58 (Washington, 1958),
Official Use Only
56. UNESCO Report, p. 57.
Nemzer, op. cit., p. 226
57. UNESCO Report, loc. cit.
Target: the World, op. cit., p. 222
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58. USIA, New Delhi despatch TOUSI 32, 15 January 54, Unclassified
Target: the World, op. cit., p. 1`'8
59. Target: the World, op. cit., p. 1'3
60. IPI Report
61. UNESCO Report, p. 58
62. IPI Report
63. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
64+. Senate Report, p. 22 and 120
65. Time, 2 Aug 54, p. 55
66. Senate Report, p. 119-20
67. IR-6320.2, op.. cit.
68. Ibid.
69. Senate Report, p. 120
70. Quoted in IR-6320.2, op. cit.
71. IR-6320.2, op. cit.
72. Time, 2 Aug 54, p. 55
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771 R000100330004-8