ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 146
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA
State Dept. decl 4R'citibW'&W di,%Lt*is9! i ?11 ??370001-3
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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Contents
I. The Moslem Peoples of China page 1
II. Communist Policies 4
A. Minority Policy
B. Benefits to Moslems
6
C. Disadvantages to Moslems
7
III.
Moslem Resistance
9
IV.
Regional Autonomy
12
V.
Moslem Participation in Government
13
VI.
Cultural Organizations
14
VII.
Notes
18
VIII.
Appendices
21
A. China Islamic Association-Officers
and Members
China Hui Cultural Association Officers
and Members
IX. Sources
26
29
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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA
I. The Moslem Peoples of China
Although the contrary view may be widely held, China is
not a nation inhabited by a single people speaking a single
language,. While 90 to 95 per cent of the total population
are Han Chinese (i.e., Chinese proper), the remainder com-
prise an intricate mosaic of races, languages, cultures and
religions. The Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek
fostered the theory-that China was inhabited by a single
Chunghua (Chinese) nation; but the Communists, led by Chen
15o-ta, a leading Communist theoretician, have realistically
admitted China's character as a multinational state. Various
Chinese Communist sources have noted the existence of over
60 minority nationalities, ranging from 1,000 Olunchuns to
more than six million Chuangs, while the Academica Sinica
has recorded 34 languages for research purposes.
The present regime recognizes ten Moslem nationalities:
Hui, 1~ Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Tatar, Uzbek, Tunghsiang,
Paoan, ./ and Sala (or Salar), each with its own culture, his-
tory, traditions, and language. / Official Communist sources
indicate that they number approximately ten million, distributed
as follows:
Hui
3,559,350
Tunghsiang
140, 00.0
Uighur
3,64o,125
Salar
30,000
Kazakh
470,000
Uzbek
13,000
Kirghiz
80,000
Tatar
6,000
Tajik
15,000
Paoan
k,ooo
It is impossible to say how accurate these figures are since
no reliable census of Moslems has ever been taken. Almost
every writer on the subject has his own idea as to China's
Moslem population and very seldom do their figures agree, vary-
ing from less than 10 million to as high as 50 million. The
latter figure is that generally cited by Moslem writers.2/ and
by Moslem Chinese themselves, although Chinese Moslem spokes-
men today dutifully echo the 10 million figure officially
recognized by the regime. In between are such estimates as.
3
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15 million by Forman, 9 18 million by Bodde, and 23 mil-
lion by Lindbeck.
Roughly half of China's Moslems are located in the five
northwestern provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia
and Shensi, where they comprise about half of the total popu-
lation. The greatest concentration is in Sinkiang where al-
most 94 per cent of the people are Moslem, with the Uighurs
alone accounting for 74 per cent of the whole. The remainder
are scattered throughout the land, with every province with-
out exception having its Moslem colony, either small or
large. In Yunnan Province, in southwest China, is the second
largest concentration, where they account for about 25 per
cent of the total population of the province. / Peking, the
capital, counts more than 70,000, served by 49 mosques; Mukden,
in Manchuria, with 40,000 Moslems and eight large mosques, is
virtually a Moslem city; in Shanghai are to be found 120,000
believers with 14 cathedral mosques. Similarly, every other
large city has its own colony. That in Canton, numbering
2,500, is said to be the oldest in China, dating back to Arab
contacts with Tang China In the seventh century.
As was mentioned above, the Uighurs are concentrated in
Sinkiang, where they form a majority. The Kazakhs and Tatars
are found chiefly in the Ashan, Ili, Tacheng, Urumchi and Hami
areas of that province, with other Kazakh groups being located
in Minho hsien of Chinghai. The Kirghiz and Uzbeks inhabit
various hsien in Sinkiang, while the Tajiks are chiefly in the
Puli, Soche,Wand Pucheh hsien of the Pamir plateau in Sinkiang.
The Tunghsiangs and Salars are chiefly to be found in the
K:ansu-Chinghai border area, while the Paoans live in areas
near Tibet. The Hui comprise the greater majority of Moslems
elsewhere in China.
The 10 nationalities mentioned above represent several
racial strains. The Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and
'Tatars are of Turkish stock akin to the people=s of Soviet Cen-
tral Asia, and speak related Turkic dialects, The Tajiks are
Iranian and are related to the people of Sovie't Tadzhikistan.
The Salars are descendants of lnunigrants from :Samarkand, while
the Paoans are Tibetans. The Hui are essentially Chinese by
race but, in many cases, with a considerable admixture of
other racial strains: Turkish, Arab and Mongolian. In north-
vest China, it might be noted, Moslems who are Chinese by
language and culture, as well as by race, are-known as Tunganoj
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and between them and other Moslems as well as Han Chinese
there is a latent antipathy which has, in the past, fre-
quently flared into open conflict.
Aside from their common faith, Chinats Moslems are solidi-
fied by occupational factors, for they have monopolized jade
work and the fur trade, animal husbandry, horse-dealing and
butchering. They provide most carters, muleteers, and
cameleers, and are said to be the best restauranteurs and
inn-keepers in China. In matters of dress, lO- manners and
customs, Moslems--especially the Hui--are frequently indis-
tinguishable from other Chinese; often the avoidance of pork--
a favorite food with Han Chinese--is the only major difference
between them and the Han peoples.
Isolated from the main body of Islam for many centuries
the Chinese Moslems have developed along their own lines, quite
untouched by influences affecting the rest of Islam, and have
become quite lax in matters of religious observances. The
Five Pillars of the Faith are still recognized and.observed
but not always in a manner that would be regarded as orthodox
by other Moslems. This isolation has also served to make
them immune to any attraction by the Pan-Islam concept, which
for them has no meaning. As elsewhere in the Moslem World
there is no cleric hierarchy. Each mosque is independent,
and the Moslems are in reality only a collection of separate
congregations bound together by a common creed. The idea of
a caliph is meaningless to the Chinese Moslem; to him the
highest earthly spiritual authority is his own ahung. 2,11
In matters of faith, Chinese Moslems are all Sunnites,
with some Sufi influences, who follow the Hanafi school of
law. But while all are Sunnites, they are divided into a num-
ber of sects which differ as to how prescribed Sunni rituals
should be practiced. The "Old Sect" is the most conservative
and, at the same time, most lax in dietary and moral habits.
The "New Sect," already several hundred years old, tends to
be more mystical and more ritualistic, opposing such things
as opium smoking and wine drinking which the Old Sect is in-
clined to overlook. Other differences can be adduced. In
general, the New Sect insists on a return to traditional
Islamic ways, while the Old Sect prefers the modified customs
and forms which have developed in China during the centuries
of isolation. Thus, the New Sect insists that a chapter of
the Koran be recited only once instead of three times as held
by the Old Sect; that at prayer clasped hands should be raised
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once instead of twice; that after meals there is no need to
raise clasped hands in greeting; and that in singing the
praises of Allah the voice should be low instead of high.
The New Sect does not allow any substitutefor an shun in
preaching while the Old Sect does. Finally, the two groups
disagree on the proper basis for calculating the ritual fast-
ing period, the New Sect adhering strictly to-the Arab method,
the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar calendar.
A third main group, known as the Modern Sect, was founded
about 80 years ago by a reformer who declat'ed himself to be
Christ returned to earth to prepare for the return of Mohammed.
It is the most liberal of the three. In education it stresses
religious ethics rather than the traditional memorizing of
the Koran, and in the interpretation of the Koran maintains
that the spirit rather than the letter should be observed.
In personal habits it advocates modernism,' such as the wearing
of European clothes.
In the northwest area there also are many small sects, for
example, the "Brand New Sect" and a number of Sufi orders such
as the Che-ho-yeh (Jariyah). 12
II. Communist Policies
A. Minority Policy
Under the Kuomintang regime the Moslems as well as other
non-Han peoples were frequently oppressed End persecuted as
a result of the KMT policy of Sinofication. The Communist
regime has been less harsh in this respect, for it has pursued
a deliberate policy of recognizing the existence and seeking
the support of the many minority groups. The Moslems have
profited thereby since the Reds treat them, not only as a
religious minority but also as minority nationalities.. Thus
they have escaped the harsh treatment accorded to Christians,
whom the regime is apparently determined to reduce to impotence
if not eradicate completely. Even the Buddhists, except in
Tibet and adjacent areas, have been subjected to pressures
which the Moslems have thus far escaped.
The Communist Chinese policy toward minorities is based
on the early Russian nationalities policy (before it was cor-
rupted and perverted by Great Russian chauvinism) and on
Stalints two sets of theses on the nationality problem as
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accepted by the X and XII Congresses of the CPSU in 1921 and
1923. The Common Program of the Chinese Peoplets Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which guided the policies
of the CCP until the promulgation of a constitution in 1954,
explicitly declares that all minorities are to be free to
develop their own national languages, customs, religions
and traditions, and states in Article 51 that:
Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where
national minorities are concentrated and various kinds
of autonomy organizations shall be set up according to
the size of the respective populations and regions.
In places where different nationalities live together
and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities,
the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate
number of representatives in the local organs of poli-
tical power.
During the period in which the Communists were winning
China from the Nationalist regime, they were careful to respect
the rights of minorities. Upon entering areas inhabited by
Moslems, Communist soldiers received special instructions to
respect Moslem beliefs and customs, to avoid molestation of
mosques and priests, and to avoid disturbing religious beliefs.
Care also was taken to avoid feeding pork to Moslem units,
while arrangements were made for Moslem soldiers to observe
their religious obligations without hindrance.
The new Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, ap-
proved for promulgation on 14 June 1954, repeats the essential
features of the Common Program. Sections 2 and 3 of Article
3 guarantee equal treatment to all nationalities, prohibit
race discrimination, racial oppression, and activities that
would destroy the friendly unity among them, and assure them
the right to develop their own language and to preserve or
reform their own customs and religion. Section 4 of the same
article provides that national minorities are to have regional
autonomy in areas where they are predominant. It is made clear,
however, that these areas are inseparable parts of China and
that the first loyalty of every citizen is to the People's
Republic.
The minorities policy is carried out by the Nationalities
Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress, 14 which
works closely with the CCP and the People's Revolutionary Military
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Council. The Commission holds periodic conferences of repre-
sentatives from various national areas to consider their
problems, but its most important task is to train Red cadres
from minority groups, whose duty it is to insure party con-
trol in their areas. 25 Within the State Council, or cabi-
net, there is also a Religious Affairs Bureau headed by Ho
Cheng-hsiang. No information as to its mission is available,
but it presumably handles. government policy toward religious
groups, which would include Islamic as well as Christian,
!Buddhist and others.
The policy directed by the above groups have fostered, as
in the Soviet Union, the creation of individual alphabets (for
those languages previously without one), the publication of
!books in national languages, and the organization of dance
and art groups and other cultural activities. Medical care
and communications in minority areas have been improved, and
schools--primary, secondary, and advanced--established. In
!Peking there is now a Central Institute for Nationalities,
while eight subordinate Institutes for Nationalities have been
establ.ished throughout the country.
!B. Benefits to Moslems
In the wooing of minority groups, the Moslems apparently
have been. especially favored. Mosques have been exempted from
real estate taxes, while those of historical importance have
been repaired at government expense. On 6 ,December 1950, the
government issued a special order remitting the slaughter tax
on cows and sheep killed by Moslems in connection with the
celebration of the birthday of the Prophet and'?'the festivals
of Shakar Bairam.(Id al-Fitr) and Qorban Bairam (Id al-Adha).
,During these same festivals state-owned stores and cooperative
!trading agencies gave special discounts to Moslems on such
items as beef, mutton, rice, flour, tea, sugar and cloth. This
favoritism apparently was not confined to festivals since
Moslems in Peking reportedly were given adequate supplies of
beef and mutton in the winter of 1953 even thotLgh there was a
general meat shortage.
By government order, no Moslem student, worker or state
employee is forced to work on a, Moslem religious holiday.
!During the 1955 Bairams, Moslems were given a three-day holi
!day. At every state banquet and representative assembly there
,are special tables with Moslem food. The same convenience is
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also provided at many railway stations.
In the cultural field the Moslems have also made gains.
In Peking an Institute of Islamic Theology has been established
and also an Institute for Hui People which has more than one
thousand students. The students at the Central Institute for
Nationalities as well as at the subordinate regional insti-
tutes are largely Moslem. Moslems are also free to enter
any other school. Mosques reportedly have been allowed to
retain their religious schools. The Nationalities Publishing
House is issuing a steady stream of publications in Moslem
minority languages, although most of them are translations
of Communist texts. Sinkiang has eight newspapers and three
periodicals in Uighur and five newspapers in Kazakh. Both
languages are now being used for radio broadcasts, and Uighur
for the Sinkiang telegraphic service as well as on currency.
C. Disadvantages to Moslems
All this is not to say that the Moslems are free or that
their customs and beliefs have not been affected by the Com-
munist regime. Take marriage for example. The new marriage
law of 1 May 1950 provides for marriage "based on free choice
of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes" and
prohibits "polygamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference
with the remarriage of widows, and the exaction of money or
gifts in connection with marriage." These provisions strike
at many facets of Moslem marriage practices. Moslems in China
as elsewhere practiced polygamy. Parents also arranged mar-
riages, now forbidden, and betrothed their children, which is
now forbidden. 16 The institution of bride-price or of
dowery was likewise observed. The Koran also lays down certain
restrictions as regards remarriage, which presumably can no
longer be enforced among Moslem societies.
A more fundamental tenet of Islamic society everywhere--
that no Moslem, particularly no Moslem girl, should marry out-
side the faith--is also apparently under attack. The govern-
ment reportedly was encouraging Red cadres, in early 1954, to
marry Moslems and, if such marriages were opposed by parents,
to. cite the provisions of the marriage law. Between January
and July 1954, 40 such marriages are said to have occurred in
the Harbin area alone. This would appear to be part of the
Communist policy to disrupt the traditional family relation-
ship and might well, were it pushed far and long enough, result
in the absorption of the Moslem minorities.
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Although, as already noted, Moslem dietary laws appear
to be tolerated and even abetted, the following incident
reportedly occurred. The Peking regime deoreed that animals
should be electrocuted before being slaughtered. This pro-
cedure makes the meat unclean according to-the rules pre-
scribed by the Koran, and in February 195+. Moslems in Peking,
Mukden and Harbin protested against the ruling in vain. It
is probable that the decree had little effect in the heavily
Moslem areas of northwest China, where many of the Moslems
are animal raisers and therefore probably slaughter their
own meat. However, as those areas become industrialized and
modernized, more and more Moslems may be forced to eat meat
which according to their religions precepts is unclean.
Refugees who have escaped from Sinkiang and various under-
ground reports from China indicate that the Communists have
closed down many mosques and seized them for use as museums,
stores or barracks. Religious courts also:are reported to
have been abolished. It is difficult jo eQtaluate these reports
on the state of Islam in China, for Moslem;''.. spokesmen such as
Burhan and Mohammed Makien continually are' stressing the free,
dom with which Moslems practice their faith, and in this they
are supported by many Moslems from other countries who have
visited Red China in recent years.
The explanation may well lie in the existence of different
sets of circumstances in Sinkiang and in the rest of China
were foreigners are allowed to travel. Very few Westerners
have seen Sinkiang since the Communist take-over, but reports
have filtered out that the province today is controlled by
the Soviets rather than the Chinese Communists and that the
garrison troops, for example, belong to tho Red Army rather
than to the Chinese Communist Army. If this is true, it may
well be that the Soviets are applying in Sinkiang the same
type of campaign they applied in the Moslem areas of the
Soviet Union, where the Moslem clergy has been largely elimin
ated and the majority of mosques closed.
Although the Chinese Communists deprecate religion, they
have not announced an avowed campaign against religion as
such or launched any organized drive to persuade Moslems to
abandon their faith. IV There is, however, evidence that the
Peking regime is attempting to control the-content of mosque
sermons. In 1953 the regime assigned a Moslem (presumably a
reliable Communist) secretary to each mosgiie in Peking to
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observe and report on all activities. Each week, before the
Friday sermon, the secretary gave the chief priest a copy
of the weekts important news, received from his superiors,
which the priest was expected to incorporate into his sermon.
The sermon itself had to be prepared in advance and submitted
to the secretary for approval who was frequently asked by the
chief priest to prepare it. Available information does not
indicate whether this system is still in effect or whether
it is peculiar to the Peking area.
The Communists also are making plans to control future
Moslem clerics. Those graduated by the new Institute of Is-
lamic Theology will be well indoctrinated. In early 1953 the
regime ordered each mosque in Peking to select and send one
student to a course of study at the Peking Moslem College,
who, after graduation, would return to the original mosque
to preach. Two principal qualifications for selection were
listed: clear-mindedness and progressiveness; but nothing
was said about proficiency in Arabic, which any qualified
Moslem cleric must have.. From early 1953 to July 1954, the
government reportedly sent 60 Moslems, in groups of 20, to
the USSR for training.
III. Moslem Resistance
From the Yenan days the CCP has made strenuous efforts
to attract the support of Chinats Moslems. 18 Success con-
sistently eluded the Communists. Since ach eving power in
1949, the Reds have made considerable concessions to that
same end, and there are indications that complete success has
still not been attained. Their parallel attempts to impose
control and Communist discipline on people whose faith and
discipline is already strong has created difficulties not
encountered elsewhere.
Islamic exclusiveness based on claims of absolute religious
truth and social values, buttressed by prohibition against
marriage outside the faith, aloofness from religious and social
activities of others, a self-segregated pattern of social life,
and a well-developed solidarity and communal self-sufficiency
makes friendly cooperation between Moslems and Chinese possible
only on Moslem terms. Yet such aloofness is detrimental to
China's national unity and modernization. In order to carry
through national programs of reform, education and reconstruction
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and to meet external ideological and military threats, the
activities of all groups in China need to be and are being
collectivized and brought under national control.
Although the Communists may have won political and mili-
tary control over Chinats Moslem areas,, they have still to
solve the problem of defining the status of Chinats Moslems
and reconciling their aspirations and interests with their
own demands. The Communists refuse torecognize the unique
role of religion, which serves China's-Moslems not only as
a basis for communal life, but also as the critical differ-
entiating factor between the Chinese-speaking Moslems and
other Chinese and as the primary unifying force among the
culturally and racially diverse peoples in China who are ad-
herents to Islam. For ideological reasons the Communists
are unable to offer the Moslems real religious freedom. They
are willing to respect certain forms of religious beliefs
and habits of individuals and groups, but they cannot accept
a religiously ordered society without forgetting the establish-
ment of their own political and economic system. This. they
are unwilling to do. It is cultural diversity, not Islam, which
the Communists are willing to champion.
The Communists have not been able to solve the problem of
the status of China's Moslems because the primary aim of
their policies has been to promote their own power. Communist
policies. to win the voluntary support of the Moslems are inade-
quate because they are designed not to advance the interests
of the Moslems but to use the Moslems. Only if Communists
were willing to frame a, broader program to safeguard religious
unity and the racial diversity of the Moslems, could they suc-
ceed in reconciling Moslem interests arid those of the CCP.
Minority autonomy provides no solution for such autonomy,
if it is to be real and meaningful, is"only possible after
the Moslems have become loyal and participating members of
the national state.
Although committed to respecting the autonomy of Moslem
groups (as national minorities rather than as Moslems as such),
the Communists still consider them as integral parts of Chi-
nese society and therefore subject to the laws of the .new
regime. While there is no available d4ta relative to this.
particular point, the elimination of so-called people's enemies
probably has proceeded apace in Moslem Mareas as in other parts
of China. Among the more than 20 million Chinese said to have
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been subjected to hsiao mieh, i.e., liquidation, there have
undoubtedly been a proportionate number of Moslems. Forced
delivery of crops and livestock, execution of landlords and
rich peasants, and other aspects of Communist terror have
been applied to them as to Han Chinese. Sinkiang and other
areas of northwest China have witnessed mass public trials
and executions just as have the large cities and areas of
Eastern China.
There are indications that. the blood-letting has perhaps
been even greater among Moslems. The land reform class
struggle has lagged behind in Moslem areas. The Communists
made some provision for Moslem sentiments in this regard,
but the concession made was not sufficient to prevent Moslem
peasants from opposing other aspects of the program and from
refusing to join in the persecution and condemnation of fel-
low Moslems who fell into the Communist classification of
"rich" peasants. The Moslem areas also have been involved
in reports of revolt and.resistance. The largest open rebel-
lion yet admitted by the Reds since they seized power was
staged by more than 20,000 Moslems in Kansu Province between
April and July 1952, where the rebels killed over 3,000 party
cadres, civilians and military officers before being put
down. 20
The same area was also the scene of a serious revolt in
1950. On 28 March of'that year, a congress of 1,000 Kazakh
leaders at Barkol proclaimed an autonomous Kazakh government
with Janim Khan as governor and Osman Batur as military com-
mander. In mid-April, Communist forces swept down on Barkol
and more than 12,600 of the 15,000 assembled Kazakhs were
killed, captured, or dispersed. Janim Khan was captured
shortly thereafter and taken to Urumchi where he was publicly
executed in February 1951. Osman Batur met the same fate two
months later. 21
As a result of these incidents and of general dislike of
the Communist regime, thousands of Kazakhs, as well as other
Moslem tribesmen, have attempted to escape from Sinkiang to
India, over the fearsome mountain barriers. Of one group of
22,000, only 3,000 reached safety in Kashmir. Those who
have reached the outside world tell of thousands of others
who have died in the attempt from cold and hunger or at the
hands of Communist soldiers. They also tell of other thousands
who would make the attempt if opportunity presented itself.
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Reports of these refugees and of their leaders such as
Mohammed Amin Bughra, former Deputy Governor of Sinkiang,
and Yusuf Isa Aliptakin, although perhaps-somewhat colored
and exaggerated, make it quite clear that the Red reign of
terror has not bypassed the Moslem areas. 22 The specific
oppressive measures are probably neither more stringent nor
more lenient than for the rest of China; it is only that
Moslem resistance is greater and more tenacious.
IV. Regional Autonomy
The Chinese Communists have resolutely pushed the autonomy
program outlined in the Common Program and in the Constitution,
so that today the administrative boundaries of the country
present a complex array of autonomous regions (ch'u), districts
p(chou) and counties (hsien) mingled with regular a nistra-
tTve-units.- As of 19 5~,hina had 22 provinces, three autono-
mous regions (Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet), and the
centrally administered.cities of Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai.
The provinces and autonomous regions, in turn, were divided
into 25 autonomous chou, 2,100 hsien or equivalent units,
about 50 autonomous hsien, and about 170 cities under provin-
cial jurisdiction.
Among the autonomous areas are many inhabited by Moslem
peoples; for example, Tunghsiang and Paoan'areas.in Kansu;
Hui areas in Kansu, Chinghai and Suiyan; Kazakh and Kirghiz
areas in Sinkiang; as well as a number of others in addition
to those with mixed populations. The autonomy 'accorded, how-
ever, would seem to be more apparent than real, for most
minority group officials have empty title s' and no power.
The official Communist organ People's Daily admitted on 9 Sep-
tember 1953 that it was common.pce for minorities not to
be consulted by governmental organs dealing with their affairs
and that often governors at a higher level ignored the autono-
mous areas under them.
Toward the end of 1949 the Peking regime inaugurated a
system of regional governments, apparently designed to bind
provincial governments closer to Peking and to aid in over-
coming the handicaps which China's vast size, imperfect com-
munications and general backwardness placed in the way of
centralized administration, Five regional areas were created
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including that of Northwest China which embraced the five
provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia and Shensi.
Under the previous system of regular provincial governments
Moslems could rightfully expect to exercise control in
Sinkiang, perhaps also in Kansu and/or Chinghai. But within
the area encompassed in the new regional government they
represented something less than half the total population
and were therefore condemned to function within that area
and its centralized government as a permanent minority.
The situation improved in June 1954 when the regional
administrative areas were abolished. On 1 O-ctobe.r 1954, the
province of Sinkiang was proclaimed the Sinkiang Uighur Autono-
mous Region, with Uighurs serving as chairman and a majority
of the members of the Region's People's Council. As an autono-
mous region, it has the same status as a province but with
additional powers. It can, for example, with the approval of
the State Council in Peking, set up governmental bodies through
which local autonomy can be exercised including the administra-
tion of its own finances and public security forces. Autonomy
for non-Uighur peoples is assured by five autonomous chou and
six autonomous hsien within the Region's borders.
It is extremely doubtful that the province's new status
has materially helped its inhabitants. The political,leaders
are still subject to Communist orders--Saifudin, chairman of
the Peoplets Council is a CCP member--and if Peking is not
exercising firm control there, it appears that the Soviets
are,
V. Moslem Participation in Government
Moslems have not been conspicuous by their presence at the
highest levels of government in Communist China. The most
influential Moslem is perhaps Saifudin, formerly vice-chairman
of the Sinkiang provincial government, who today is chairman
of the People's Council of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress, and one of the two Moslem members of
the State Council. Sharing honors with Saifudin is Burhan,
who today is chairman of the China Islamic Association and
who in the past has served as chairman of the Sinkiang pro-
vincial government and as vice-chairman of the Nationalities
Affairs Commission of the CPPCC.
13
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The second Moslem member of the State Council is Liu
Ke-ping, who also holds the posts of chairman of the Nation-
alities Affairs Commission of the National-People's Congress
and of chairman of the China Hui Cultural 4ssociation. Other
prominent Moslems are Sheikh Nur Mohammed Ta Pu-sheng), a
vice-chairman of the China Islamic Association, who previously
was a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and served
as a member of the Chinese delegation attending the Bandung
Conference in April 1954; and Mohammed Maiden (Ma Chien), a
professor of Arabic at Peking University and a graduate of
Cairo's al-Azhar University. He is a leading committee member
of the China Islamic Association and also served as a member
of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC.
At the inception of the Communist regime, Moslems were
represented in the CPPCC both in the "democratic religious
circles" category (one delegate) and in the "minority nation-
alities" group (four delegates). The CPPCC's Nationalities
Affairs Commission had three vice-chairmen of whom two were
Moslem (a Hui and a Ui hur), and 22 ordinary members of whom
18 were non-Chinese Available information does not indicate
the number of Moslems among those 18.) When the First National
People's Congress met in 1954, its membersincluded 41 Mos-
lems. Of the 85 members of its Nationalities Affairs Com-
'mission, 16 were Moslems.
On the local level in predominantly Moslem areas, the
Islamic contingents are much greater; and in autonomous Mos-
lem regions Moslems presumably constitute the greater majority
of government officials. Nevertheless, in~Communist China,
as in the Soviet Union, there are few Moslems with national
reputations or national responsibilities.
VI. Cultural Organizations
Communist China is a country of organizations--numerous,
large and varied. The Communist leaders have found it exped-
ient to accomplish their ends and to change the face and so-
cial structure of China by working through an endless variety
of "mass organizations." Such groups as the New Democratic
Youth, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, All-China
Students' Federation, Sino-Soviet Friendshi' Association,
All-China Democratic Women's Federation, Al-China Federation
of Trade Unions, and countless others number their members
in the millions. The cooperative and peasants= associations
reportedly have over 150 million members.
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These mass organizations today command much of the leisure
time of the Chinese citizen. While there are no available
figures on the breakdown of their memberships, these organi-
zations probably include many Moslems. Branches in an area
like Sinkiang, for example, where virtually the entire popu-
lation is Moslem, would have primarily Moslem members.
The major purely Moslem organization is the China Islamic
Association, 23 formally inaugurated on 9 May 1953. The
groundwork for the organization was laid at a Preparatory
Conference in Peking on 27-31 July 1952, which had been called
at the initiative of eight prominent Moslems, including
Saifudin and Mohammed Makien. This conference was attended
by 53 delegates from all parts of the country and represented
the various Moslem nationalities.. A k0-man preparatory com-
mittee was elected, headed by Burhan, with the task of getting
the new organization into operation.
The China Islamic Association'is a lay organization designed
"to help the people's government to implement the policy of
religious belief as laid down in the Common Program," and
"to develop love for the Motherland ... and participate in
the movement for the defense of world peace.' In practice
the association serves as an agency for handling the racial,
religious, cultural and political relations of Moslems with
the Communist regime, and as a convenient propaganda instru-
ment for improving Chinese relations with countries of the
Moslem world.
A second national Moslem organization is the China Hui
Cultural Association, 24F established on 14 May 1953, with
the task of promoting the culture of the Hui people. The May
1953 conference which inaugurated the association, in a mes-
sage addressed to Mao Tse-tung, expressed its mission in
these words: "The China Hui Cultural Association will assist
the People's Government in the study and development of the
culture and education of the Hui people through strengthening
patriotic education and mobilizing the Hui people to acquire
scientific knowledge, production know-how, and advanced pro-
duction experiences so as more effectively to contribute
themselves in the large-scale economic construction of the
Fatherland, which has already begun."
Both associations seem largely to serve political rather
than cultural purposes, especially as regards China's rela-
tions with countries of the Moslem World. In its first two
15
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
years of existence, the China Islamic Association was host
to. leaders from the Near and Middle East and Africa on 15
different occasions. When foreign Moslem dignitaries are
invited to China these guests, whether religious leaders,
journalists, government leaders, labor leaders or business-
men, are feted and guided by leaders of the two groups.
Chinese cultural missions to Moslem countries are led by,
or include as members, leaders of these groups; for example,
the current Chinese delegation in the Middle East is headed
by Burhan.
Among China's numerous organizations are a number of
"friendship associations." Here, too, Moelem leaders are
used when a Moslem country is concerned. Burhan was a founder
and currently serves as chairman of the China-Indonesia
Friendship Association, while its. vice-chairmen include Ma
Yu-huai, one of Burhants colleagues in the China Islamic As-
sociation. Liu Ke-ping and Ma Sung-ting,"chairman and vice-
chairman respectively of the China Hui Cultural Association,
fill the same posts in the China-Pakistan Friendship Associ-
ation.
.Another example of the propaganda use of these organiza-
tions to curry favor among Moslems abroad'is the action of
the second plenary committee meeting of the China Islamic
Association in November 1955, attended byryl8k imams, mullahs
and other leaders of the 10 Moslem nationalities, in adopting
a resolution supporting independence for the Moslem peoples
of North Africa.
The leaders of the two associations a'e used to inform
the Moslem World how free China is and hoif much religious
, eking frequently
freedom is accorded Moslems there. Radio P
broadcasts statements to this effect attrbuted to Chinese
Moslem leaders, and the good relations which China enjoys
with Moslem countries. The diplomatic recognition recently
extended by Egypt suggests that these propaganda efforts have
not been entirely unsuccessful.
Along strictly religious and cultural lines the two asso-
ciations also have been active to a degree. The China Islamic
Association, for example, is charged with organizing the
annual hajj to Mecca which in 1955 was led by Sheikh Nur
Mohammed. he association also was instr4mental in the estab-
lishment in Peking of the Institute of Islamic Theology, and
has. also arranged for the printing of a Chinese translation
16
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of the Koran. In its first two years, the association held
22 meetings of ?imams and other Moslems to discuss religious
questions and to celebrate, with due publicity abroad, Mos-
lem festivals. Other activities include the translation of
the new constitution into Arabic, the making of a documentary
film on Moslem life in Peking, and the publication of a book
depicting Moslem life in China.
There is no available information regarding the specific
activities of the China Hui Cultural Association.
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1. Moslems who are Chinese by race. The term is not to be
confused with Hui Hui or Hui Chiao Jon which are used to
denote China's oslem.s collectively.
2. Tibetan-speaking Moslems.
3. The common language for all of Chinats Moslems is a-la-bi
(Arabic), which is taught in all Moslem schools. Like
Moslems everywhere China's Moslems refuse to recognize
the validity of the Koran or of Moslem prayers in any
language but Arabic.
4. Figures are taken from Theodore Shaba-d., China's Changing
Map (New York, 1956). See also People's China, 6 June
T9_55-
50
6. Harrison Forman, "China's Moslemia," Canadian Geographical
8. John M. H. Lindbeck, "Communism, Islam, and Nationalism,"
Review of Politics XII (October, 1950).
10. The en min chuang (peoplets uniform) is today common to
all citizens of China.
11. Derived from the Persian word akhund,=a scholar learned
in Islamic law and theology. Tie ah s show their status
by a white turban or skull cap.
12. The best available account of China's;; Moslem sects is
found in Chan Wing-tsit, Religious Trends in Modern China
(New York, 1953).
13.
For example, Ahmed All, Muslim China (Karachi, 1949)..
Journal XXXVII (S.eptember, 1948).
Dirk Bodde, "China's Moslem Minority,::::" Far Eastern Survey
XV (11 September 19+6).
The Moslems of Yunnan Province are sometimes referred to
as Panthays.
See China Islamic Association, Mosleme in China (Peking,
1953). The text of other pertinence rticlea is also given.
18
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14. Headed by Liu Ke-ping, a Hui Moslem. The former Nation-
alities Affairs Commission of the CPPCC was headed by
Li Wei-han, also known as Lo Mai, who served at the same
time as vice-chairman of the government's Committee of
Financial and Economic Affairs and as head of the CCP's
United Front Work Department.
15. Walker states that to date more than 100,000 such cadres
have been trained, most of them youths. See Richard L.
Walker, China Under Communism: The First Five Years
(New Haven Bonn., 19 5 , p. 185?
16. The law fixes the legal age for marriage at 20 for men
and 18 for women.
17. There have been reports of a Chinese Society for the Pro-
pagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge, apparently
patterned after the Soviet atheistic organization of the
same name.
18. For an account of Communist attempts to win over China's
Moslems in the years before seizure of power in 1949,
see Lindbeck, op. cit.
19. Moslem resistance to the land reform program was foreseen,
and the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950 provided, in
Article 3, that "Some or all land owned by Moslems may
be retained by them subject to the consent of the Moslems
residing in the area."
20.. See Walker, op. cit., p. 187. A Spanish missionary who
reached the Free World from Kansu Province in late 1952
reported that the Moslem rebellion in Northwest China
still continued, that anti-Communists had controlled a
mountainous area in Eastern Kansu for about 18 months,
and that for political reasons the Chinese Communist
leaders had not yet launched an all-out attack to crush
it. However, the New York Times on 8 April 1953 carried
a report that the Communists had made peace with the
Kazakhs by promising them a tract of land to call their
own and that Kazakh leaders had been among the chiefs of
seven minority tribes in Northwest China to send their
respects to Mao.
21. For an account of the Barkol rebellion, see Milton J.
Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," National Geo-
graphic Magazine C (November, 1954).
19
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
22. Bughra has written an account of present conditions in
Sinkiang, giving many details of Communist oppression
and terroristic measures. See Mohammed Amin Bughra
D__ogu Turkistan: Tarihi, cografi ve simdiki durumu astern
Tur istan: is History eorgrapiy, a and Present on-
ditio7 (Istanbul, 1952.
23. Not to be confused with the China Moslem Association, a
pro-Chiang organization with headquarters in Taipei,
Formosa, which was founded in Changchow in 1938 as the
Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation and which
adopted its present name in 1942, after having absorbed
all other existing Chinese Moslem organizations. See
Appendix A for a list of the officers and committee mem-
bers of the China Islamic Association..
24. The names China Islamic Cultural Association, or China
Moslem Cultural Association, or Chinese Association for
the Promotion of the Hui People's Culture are also used.
See Appendix B for a list of officers and membe.ra.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
CHINA ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS
Name g/
Numeral Code
Nationality
Chairman
Pao Erh-han 3/4
Uighr
Vice-Chairmen
Yang Ching-jen*
2799/7234/0088
Hui
Ma Yu-huai Y*
7456/3768/2849
Hui
Ta Pu-sheng
6671/3184/3932
Hui
Ma Chen-wu*
7456/7201/2976
Hui
I-ming-ma-ho-su-mu 6/*
0181/2494/7456/0678/
Uighur
5684/2606
Secretary General
Chang Yu-tseng i/
Deputy Secretary General
Ma Ming-chi* 7456/2494/1015
1. FBID Daily.Report, 20 May 1953.
2. An asterisk denotes membership also on the Preparatory Com-
mittee. See FBID Daily Report, 6 August 1952.
3. Usually known as Burhan. Chairman of the Preparatory Com-
mittee.
4. Also known as Yusf. Was Secretary General of Preparatory
Committee.
5. Also known as Sheikh Nur Mohammed.
6. The 6 August FBID report gives his name as I-ming-ma-ho-lumu.
7. Also known as Mohammed All.
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
Numeral Code
Nationality
Members
Chang Yu-chen ?/*
1728/3768/3791
Hui
Ma Chien 9-/*
7456/1017
Pang Shih-chien
7894/1102/6179
Hui
Ma Yeng-....
7456/7685/5294
Hui
Ma Ping-fu*
7456/1627/3940
Hui
Tzu Tzu Chien
0459/1311/5329
Hui
Ma Chung-yung*
7456/6850/0932
Hui
Ma Pei-ching*
7456/1414/7230
Salar
Fa Chen
3127/4176
Hui
Shan Hsia-hsi
3088/6667/3556
Hui
Mu-ha-te-li
2606/07.1/1779/6849
Kazakh
Ma Yu-tsai
7456/6735/7872
Hui
Chou Kuan-shun
071.9/0385/6511
Hui
Ma Chi-shan*
745,)6/1477/1472
Tunghsiang
Han Cheng-kang
7181/2973/4857
Paoan
Ho-chic-ni-yu-tzu-a-chi*
A-jai-sa
A-pu-yu-jo-hai-ti*
0149/0502/1441/36.60/ Uighur
1326/7093/.679
7093/5337/3097 Uighur
7093/0008/6757/3583/ Uighur
6000/....
Served as Deputy Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.
9. Or Mohammed Makien. Served as Deputy Secretary General of
Preparatory Coamaittee
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Numeral Code
Nationality
A-tai-erh-ti-pai
0761/1769/3643/6849/
Uighur
2157
A-pu-li-tzu-ni-ya-tzu
7093,0008/0500/1320/
Uighur
14.1/3660/1320
Mu A-shih
2606/0761/0087
Kazakh
. . . . / . . . . / . .. .
Kazakh
Ma Liang-chun
7456/5328/7486
Hui
Chao Yun-lung*
6392/7189/7893
Hui
Yu-nu-wu
3768/0505/3527
Uzbek
Haia Ko-erh*
1115/0344/3643
Tatar
- -to-kua-ha-tzu-
0124/..../ 660/0960/
Uzbek
ko-erh
1139/0761320/2688
Han I-shan
3063/0122/0819
Tajik
Na Ssu-erh
6719/1835/3643
Uighur
Yen-mu-li-ha
6056/2606/0500/0761
Kazakh
Ya-sheng-ho-to-pai-
erh-ti
2657%36~3%410~/1129/
Uighur
Hsi-i-to-a-fu
3097/0131/1795/7093/
Uighur
6059
Ma Fang-chi
7456/2455/1015
Tunghsiang
Ma Pa-lo
7456/.572/3157
Hui
Han-ssu-shih-san
???./093./0577/0005.
Salar.
Mai Cheng-chang
6314/2052/4545
Hui
Ma Wen-kuei
7456/2429/76o8
Hui
Ma Chen-tung*
7456/2182/2639
Hui
23
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
Chin Feng-shan
Wang Hung-kuei
Hu Hsieh-lan
Shou Chien-chih
Lin Ting-hsiang
Na Cheng-chai
Chin Chuan-te
Yang Te-ming
Ma Yuan-wu*
Chang Chu-chien
Li Chia-yung
Wang Kun-chou
Ma Pai-saner
Keng Chen-chun
Ma Jen-feng
.Li Chen-min
Tsung Tai-tung
Taung Tai-tang*
Wang Shou-Jen
Yang Shih-chieh
Li Ching-yu
Yang Te-chum'
Chen Yu-chi
Numeral Code
6855/7658/1472
3769/3163/1ik5
579-/1331/3482
7446/0256/....
26 51/2019/x382
4780/2502/7872
6855/0356/1795
2700/1795/....
7456/6663/0063
1738/.999/0578
2621/13.1/2837
3769/1507/0719
7802/0160/1115
5105/1957/0689
..../oo88/1k96
2621/2182/30+6
1350/2760/2768
1350/2769/2769
3769/1108/0088
2799/0013/0267
***a/2417/3342
2799/1795/2504
711.5/3768/3823
24
Nationality
Hui
Hui
Hui
ffui
Hui
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Name
Liu Shao-lung
Mei Ching-chai
Ma Hung-yu
Chu Yueh-po
Wang Ching-i
Ma Shih-fen*
Cheng Lung-hui
Yang Ming-yuan*
Yu I
Wang Hsiao-hsi*
Liu Yuan-i
His Neng-i
Wang Shun-liao
Tao Tieh-shan
Ma Cheng*
Li Wen-hsuan
Wang Ko
Han Tao-san
Chin Hsiao-tsun
Numeral Code
0491/4801/7893
2734/2417/7872
7456/7703/3731
2612/2588/3134
3769/417./0001
7456/0013/5358
6774/7127/1979
2799/2494/6678
1626/....
3769/4607/3305
..../0756/0001
3097/1125/1732
3769/2504/.055
1497/6993/1472
7456/2052
*009/2429/0660
3769/0344
7281/6670/0088
6855/2556/2625
?.??/.?.?/. ?.e
7456/..../...?
Nationality
Hui
Hui
Hui
Hui
Hui
25
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
APPENDIX B
CHINA HUI CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS /_
Chairman
Liu Ke-ping
0491/2706/1627
Vice-Chairmen
Wang Hsing-jang
2760/5281/6245
Wu Hung-pin
0702/7703/6333
Ma Teng-ai
7k56/7506/722k
Chang Po-chuan
1728/0514/1557
Chao Chung-chi
6392/6945/1142
Pai Shou-i
k1ol/11Q8/17k4
Ma Sung-ting /
7456/2646/0080
Members
Ting Chen-te
0002/2182/1795
Yu_Te-hai
0060/1795/3189
Yu I
1626/0001
Wang Tzu-chiang
2769/5261/1730
Wang Ping-chieh.
3769/0393/0204
Wang Lien-fang
2769/6647/5364
Wang Ko
3769/0344
Fang Chu-ju
2455/4554/1172
Pa Yu-tzu
1572/3768/1964
Ku Hsiu-ying*
0657/4423/5391
Pai Chun-chang
4101/0193/4545
Pal Yen-ting
4141/1693/1694
Pai Feng-kang
4101/7685/1511
Tien Ching-Ching 3944/1777/7230
---lei
..s{/7191
Shih Yu-hsia* 4258/3768/7209
Mi Chang-mou
4717/7022/5399
Wu Te-kung
0124/3676/0361
1. FBID Daily Report, 25 May 1953. (An asterisk after a name
denotes a woman.)
2. Also known as.Hachih Abudurakhem.
26
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Li Hsiao-ying
2621/1331/4134
Yu Tsun-yung
0151/1317/3057
Tu Hu-wu
2629/0395/2976
Li Wei-tung
2621/2417/3342
Li Shu
2621/1859
Li Chang-meng
2621/7022/3718
Shen Hsia-hsi
3088/6667/3556
Wu ...-yeh
0702/7703/2814
Wu Yu-tai
0702/1547/3141
Wu Wen-yu
0702/2429/0147
Che Ching-hsiang
5074/2973/4382
Yu Chan-Ii
4416/0594/2651
Hu Kao-shan
5706/1520/1472
Chin.Mou-yao
6855/5399/1471
Chin Mo-sheng
6855/7817/3932
Pai Jang-hua
2157/5980/5478
Wei Chih-tang
1201/4949/1016
Ma Ching-nien
7456/7230/1628
Ma Ssu-i
7456/1835/5030.
Malushihsan
7456/0362/0577/
0005
Ma .Feng-tu
7456/7685/0956
Ma Ju-lin
7456/3067/6775
Ma Chen-hua
7456/2182/5478
Ma Chih-ang
7456/1807/7122
Ma Pei-lieh
7456/0012/3525
Ma Chu-hsien*
7456/4554/6513
Ma Hsiao
7456/1321
Ma Lu-wen
7456/6922/2429
.Ma Yung-chen
7456/3057/4394
Ma Tzu-shih
7456/1311/1395
Ma Ching-tien
7456/1777/3944
Ma Lo-ting
7456/2867/0800
Ma Yu-huai
7456/3768/2849
Ma Cho-thou
7456/0587/3166
Ma Wu-pen
7456/0523/2609
Ma Shu-hsiu*
7456/2579/4423
Ma Yun-wu
7456/6663/0063
Ma Kung-chin
7456/0361/3866
Ma Chung-ying*
7456/1813/5391
Ma Chai-ju
7456/3419/....
Ma Teng-chiu
7456/7506/0046
Ma Shih-fen
7456/0013/5358
Ma Feng-wen
7456/6785/5254
Ma Chieh-jen
7456/0267/0086
Ma Chun-i
7456/7486
Shan I-chang*
7026/2034/2490
Sung Shih-chieh
1327/0013/3954
Na.Chang-chi
4780/7022/7784
27
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Hsia Wen-hsuan
1115/2429/6693
Chang Yu-chang
1455/3768/4545
Tsao Meng-lin
2580/1125/7192
Chang Yu-chen
1728/3768/3791
Chang Hua-tung
1728/0553/2639
Cheng Yao*
4453/3852
Chang Yung-ching
1728/3057/3237
Wen Shao-hao
3306/1421/7729
Yang Chih
2799/1492
Yang Chia- shah
2799/4471/1472
Yang Tsou-tung*
2799/4371/1749
Yang Ko-y .ng
2799/2654/5391
Yang Hsin
2799/6580
Yang Chao-chun
2799/0340/6874
Yang Nien-chin*
2799/1819/6000
Chao Chun-lu
6392/1317/4389
I Chih-chiang*
7392/1807/1730
Chao Lung-chang
6392/7893/4545
Liu Huan-chang
0491/3562/4545
Liu Hsiu-feng
0491/4423/7364
Liu Shu-ying*
..../3219/6391
Mu Jui-mou
4476/3843/5399
Lu Hsueh-chung
4151/1331/1813
Han Tao-Jen
7281/6670/0088
Su Pao-chiao
5685/2128/2884
Su Peing*
5685/0393
.Lan Ta-keng
5695/1129/6972
Lan Pei-kang
5695/1014/2704
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VIII. Sources
Ahmed All. Muslim China. Karachi, 1949.
American Consulate General, Hong Kong. Current Background.
Nos. 103 (1 August 1950), 139 (22 November 1951), and
195 (25 July 1952).
Bodde, Dirk. "China's Moslem Minority," Far Eastern Survey
XV (11 September 1946), pp. 281-84.
Brid es, Flora. "Dynamite in Sinkiang," Current History IX
July, 1945), pp. 40-5.
Bughra, Mohammed Amin. Dogu Turkistan: Tarihi, cografi ve
simdiki durumu j~aste~rn__Tur es an: History, Geography,
and Present C.onditio7. Istanbul, 1952.
Chan, Wing-tsit. Religious Trends in Modern China. New York,
1953.
China Islamic Association. Moslems in China. Peking, 1953.
Clark, Milton J. "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," National
Geographic Magazine C (November, 1954), pp. 621-44.
De Francis, John. "National and Minority Problems," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences
L' I eptem erg--,--1951j, Pp. -5-5-7
FBID Daily Reports. 1952-1956.
Forman, Harrison. "China.ts Moslemia," Canadian Geographical
Journal XXXVII (September, 1948), pp. - .
"High Tide of Terror," Time LXVII (5 March 1956), pp. 27-33.
Iwamura, Shinobu. "The Structure of Moslem Society in Inner
Mongolia " Far Eastern Quarterly VIII (November, 1948),
PP. 34-44.
Jalees, Ibrahim. "I Met Muslims in New China," Peoplets China,,
No. 4, 1953, pp. 11-13. V
"Kazakh Rebellion in Sinkiang," Amer rasia VIII (29 December 19kk),
p. 371.
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COMMUNIST DOCTRINE ON RELIG10N
Summary:
Recent events in Eastern Europe demonstrate clearly
that the existence of a Communist state is incompatible
with anything approaching religious freedom. Commu-
nists cannot and will not tolerate an unsubmissive reli-
gious sect. Communism may preach that religion is a
"private affair" for non-Communists, a matter for the
Individual alone to decide, but the fact remains that
Communism is, virtually by definition, pledged to the
propagation of atheism andto the&destruction first, of
organized religion, and, ultimately, of religion itself.i
Atheism is propagated actively wherever Communists
are In power. Communists conceal or deny the funda-
mental irreconciliability between religion and Commu-
nism only when such a denial is essential for tactical
purposes -- when, for example, it would otherwise be
impossible to gain mass support for Communist aims
in a predominantly Catholic country. For the Commu-
nist there is no real contradictioh between Marxist ad-
vocacy of atheism and the Party policy of catering at a
particular moment to religious believers in some states.
The first is the goal, the second merely a means to that
end. Communists have only one goal as far as religion
is concerned and that is its complete eradication.
I. Communist Doctrine on Religion.
The working philosophy of Communism Is the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of
.materialism. Marxism not only incorporates the hostility of materialism toward religion --
in line with its search for a purely material explanation of all natural phenomena -- but ex-
tends that hostility to the point of active combat with religious beliefs. Marxism's avowed
intention is the eradication of all religions.
Communists do not attempt to conceal this intention from the Inner circles of the
Party. In fact, the official program of the Soviet Communist Party specifically outliner the
methods by which the eradication of religion is to be achieved. Communist literature is
replete with attacks on religion and with support of atheism. The following are typical e> -
amples of this anti-religious position.
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Regardless of the date of origin, these quotations are still cited in contemporary
Soviet sources to justify and explain the Party's stand on the religious question. Their
contemporary usage also shows once again that there has been no fundamental change in
the Communist viewpoint on religion since the days of Lenin.
"Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and
the theoretical foundation of the Communist Party, is Incompatible with re-
ligion.....The world outlook of the Party Is based on scientific data, whereas
religion contradicts science. As the Party bases its activity on scientific
foundations, it is bound to oppose religion. (Molodol Bolshevik - Young Bol-
shevik - No. 5-6, 1946, p. 58.) For the conception of the world from a reli-
gious point of view Is incorrect..... It Is a mutilated understanding of the world
and of the mutual relationships of men. (Yaroslavsky, Chief of League of Mili-
tant Atheists, Religion in USSR, Moscow. 1939.) The world outlook (of commu-
nism) Is irreconcilable to any d of superstition, religion or idealism. (On
Soviet Socialist Society - Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1948, p. 400.)
"But while (Marxism as materialism Is absolutely atheistic and resolutely
,postile to all religion...it goes farther than earlier materialist schools] by
applying the materialist philosophy to the field of history, to the field of-social
sciences. 1 We must combat religion;-{ that is the rudiment of all materialism,
and consequently of Marxism... .But Marxism goes further. It says: We must
know how to combat religion, and in order to do so we must explain the source
of faith and religion among the masses materialistically. The fight against-n
religion must not be confi ned to abstract ideological preaching or reduced to
such preaching. The fight must be linked up with the concrete practical work -
of the class movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion.
(Lenin, "Attitude of Workers Party Toward Religion", 1909. Selected Works,
Int'l Publishers, New York, 1943, vol. XI, p. 666.)
"(For) religion?is the opium of the people. Religion is a kind of spiritual
gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to
any decent human life. (Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 1905, Selected Works,
vol. XI, p. 658.) Religion is a bandage over the eyes of men, preventing them
from seeing the world as it actually is. (Yaroslavsky, op.cit) There is no
-place or job for God in the universe. (Radio Moscow, June 11, 1948) `Every re-
ligious idea, every idea of god, even flirting with the Idea of god is unutterable
} vileness... .of the most dangerous kind, "contagion" of the most abominable
kind.' Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence and physical contagions....
are far less dangerous than the subtle , spiritual ideas of a gad decked out in
the smartest "ideological" costumes. (Lenin, "Letter to Go~ky," 1913, Selected
Works, vol. XI, p. 675-6761) It is not religion that creates man, but man who
creates religion.... religion Is the groan of the down-trodden creature... .It is the
opium of the people. The abolition of religion, as an illusory' happiness of the
people, is a requisite of their real happiness. (Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's
philoso h of Law . Religion is.the opium of the people - this dictum of Marx's
a e corners one of the whole Marxist view on religion. Marxism has always
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Party ranks and the Communists preach the compatibility of religion and Karl Marx. Efforts 6
regarded all modern religions and churches and all religious organizations
as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to
drug the working class. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Reli-
gion", 1909, Selected Works vol. )I, p. 684.) The explanation of our program
therefore necessarily cues an explanation of the true historical and eco-
nomic roots of religious obscurantism. Our propaganda necessarily includes
the propaganda of atheism ...(Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 1905, Selected
Works, vol. XI, p. 860.) "
II. Communists on Religion Before the Seizure of Power.
While there Is no question as to Communism's ultimate aim in regard to religion, the
means by which that aim is to be secured differ. They vary depending on whether or not
the Communist Party Is the Party in power, and if so, how firmly it is in control. Where
the Party wields only minor political influence, where its control of the state is not com-
plete, and where religion plays an important part in national life, the Party organization
carefully avoids any public avowal of Its antireligious program. Instead the religious ques-
tion is sidetracked as completely as possible, church members are welcomed into the
may be made to limit the temporal power of a church hierarchy, but even so, the rank and
file are continually assured of the inviolability of their religious convictions. (Communist
spokesmen are unanimous In their conviction that open war on religion Is the best way of
strengthening religious convictions and so must be avoided at all costs.) At the same tine,
Communist authorities may foster minor religious denominations as a means of dividing and
weakening the dominant religious faction.
is covered in the authoritative Soviet definition of morality -- " 'moral' Is dnything which aids
The temporary adherence to these tactics in no way lessens the basic Communist inten-
tion of eradicating religious beliefs; rather, it is another example of the use of any means to
obtain an end. The moral aspects of this and other deliberate deceptions for tactical purposes
the cause of the Revolution" (Kratldi Pilosofichesid Slovar - Short Philosophical Dictionary -
Gospolitzdat, Moscow, 1941, p. 177).
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"Why do we not declare in our programme that we are atheists? Why
do we not refuse Christians and those who believe In God admission to our
Party ?.... (Because) unity in the revolutionary struggle of the-oppressed class
for the creation of paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of
opinion among the proletarians about a paradise in heaven. That is why we do
not and must not proclaim our atheism In our programme; that is why we do
not and must not forbid proletarians who still cherish certain relics of the old
superstitions to approach our Party. (Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 190b,
Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 660-661.)
"Engels frequently condemned the efforts of people who desired to....
introduce an explicit avowal of atheism, in the sense of declaring war on re-
ligion, into the programme of the worker's party.... he stated that sdch a
declaration of war was the best means of reviving Interest in,religion.... Engels
demanded that the worker's party should know how to work patiently at the task
of organizing and educating the proletariat, and not venture into a political war
on religion. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion", 1900, Selected
Works, vol. )I, p. 864-665.)
"The Communist Party is guided by the conviction that only the realization
of conscious and systematic social and economic activity of the masses will lead
to the disappearance of religious prejudices. The aim of the party Is finally to
destroy the ties between the exploiting classes and the organi4ation of religious
propaganda, at the same time helping the toiling masses actually to liberate their
minds from religious superstitions and organizing on a wide scale scientific-
educational and anti-religious propaganda. It is however necgssary carefully to
avoid offending thereligious susceptibilities of believers which leads only to the
strengthening of religious fanaticism. (Program of Communist Party of the Soviet
Union - First adopted at the VIII Congress of the Party, March 18-23, 1919 - still
in force.) (For) religion is like a nail; the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes
into the wood. (Lunacharski - Minister of Education of the'P FSR)
"Let us take an example. The proletariat in a given district and in a given
branch of industry is dividid, let us assume, into an advancedsection of fairly
class-conscious Communists, who are, of course, atheists, and rather backward
workers' who are still connected with the count ryside.4nd the peasantry, still be-
lieve In God, go to church, and are even under the influence of the local priest who,
let us suppose, has organized a Christian labor union., Let usassume furthermore
that the economic struggle in this locality has resulted In a strike. It is the duty
of a Marxist to place the success of the strike movement above everything else,
to combat vigorously such a division, Under such circumstances, atheistic propa-
ganda may be both unnecessary and harmful - not from fear of scaring away the
backward sections, of losing a seat in the elections, and so on but from consid-
eration for the real progress of the class struggle, which in the conditions of
modern capitalist society is a hundred times better adapted to convert Christian
workers to Communism and to atheism than Is bald atheistic preaching. He who
preached atheism at such a moment and in such circumstancep would only be play-
ing into the hands of the priest and priests, who desire nothing better than that the
divis on qI f -Fe workers according to their participation in the strike movement be
replaced by their division according to their beliefs in God....A Marxist must be
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a materialist, i.e., an enemy of religion but he must be a dialectical material-
ist, i.e., one who puts the fight against religion not abstractly, not on the basis
of abstract, purely theoretical, unvarying propaganda, but concretely, on the
basis of the class struggle which is going on ipractice....
"It is from this standpoint that all particular questions concerning theme
attitude of Communism to religion must be determined.... We must not only
admit workers who preserve the belief in God into the Communist Party, but
must deliberately set out to recruit them .... in order to educate them in the
spirit of our programme, and we will not permit an active struggle against
our programme. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion",
1909, Selected Works, vol. )I, p. 669-670.)
"Communism will protest against persecution of Catholicism and
Protestantism, It will defend the right of nations to profess whatever religion
they choose, but at the same time, proceeding from a thorough understanding
of the interests of the proletariat it will agitate both against Catholicism and
against Protestantism and against Orthodoxy so as to bring the triumph of the
socialist world outlook. (Stalin - Marxism and the National and Colonial
Question p. 59., Int'l Publishers, New York,
III. Communists on Religion after Seizure of Power.
A. The Party
Once the Communist organization seizes political power and control of the state, i
religious manifestations on the part of Party members are no longer tolerated as before.
The campaign to eliminate believers from the Party ranks becomes more open and more in-
tense. Intra-Party propaganda increasingly stresses the atheistic aspects of Marxist phi-
losophy; at the same time both direct and indirect pressure are exerted on those Party
members who cling to old dogmas or rituals. Communists who continue their observance
of religious rites despite these measures are eventually purged from the Party ranks and
only convinced atheists accepted as candidates for membership.
B. The Public
For the general public, the fiction of Marxist compatibility with religion is dropped I
only after the Party has consolidated its hold on the political apparatus and can safely with-
stand widespread opposition to its policies. Religious organizations are thus deprived of
their properties, the clergy are often put on the state payroll (in spite of Communist
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championing of the separation of church and state) and are prohibited all educational ac-
tivity. The nation's school system is completely secularized and religious instruction to
the young curtailed. Eventually, propagation of religion among school children becomes a
criminal offense, as in the USSR. At the same time, the state gears~its entire educational
I
and informational apparatus to the dissemination of a materialist philosophy and the athe-
ism expressive of that philosophy.
Wherever possible, the Communist regime avoids open assaults on the clergy of
any church, preferring to undermine clerical influence gradually through atheistic educa-
tion of the young. If the clergy accept a Communist-dictated modus'vivendi between church
and state, the authorities permit It relative freedom of ritual, but atrogation of the right to
give religious instruction is generally the price of that limited freedom. The eventual dis-
integration of the rite is assured by its inability to propagate itself.
The refusal of strongly organized religious sect to capitulate to state demands spot-
lights the doctrinal issue and focuses attention on religion, a situation the Communist state
prefers to avoid. If church opposition assumes a definitive enough character, the general
public Is forced to recognize the basic irreconcilability between Marxist dogma and religious
tenets, and to choose between the two. Communist authorities must"then resort to active
repression to eliminate the power of the church hierarchy and to divorce the public from its
religious inclinations.
In the long run, the avowed goal of Communism is the eradication of religion. Any
temporary modus vivendi concluded between church and state in a Communist controlled
state only works to the advantage of the Communists by allowing them time to undermine.
11
slowly but surely, the popular support of any particular sect and the foundations of religion
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A. The Party
"It is not to be tolerated that even the smallest manifestation of
religiousness should be observed among Communists. (Zarya Vostoka -
Dawn of the East - January 27-28, 1949.)
"There is no room in the ranks of the Party for 'Communists'....
who hinder the thorough development of anti-religious propaganda... .A
young man cannot be a member of the Young Communist League unless
he is free of religious convictions. (Komsomolska Pravda - Young Com-
munist Truth - October 18, 1947.) For us Communists, and Young Commu-
nists, religion never was and never will be a 'private matter'. The high
status of Communist and Young Communist can be applied only to one who Is
not only completely free from religious prejudice, but who also considers it
as his most important duty to educate Soviet people and Soviet youth in the
real spirit of scientific Marxist-Leninist views. (Molodoi Bolshevik - Young
Bolshevik - May 1948.)
"For a Komsomol It is impossible and inadmissible to believe in God
and to observe religious rituals. (Komsomolskaya Pravda - Young Commu-
nist Truth - October 18, 1947.)
"Religion should be declared a private affair... .But the meaning of
these words must be precisely defined so as to leave no room for misunder-
standing. We demand that religion should be a private affair as far as the
state is concerned, but under no circumstances can we regard religion as a
private affair as far as our own Party is concerned. (Lenin, "Socialism and
Religion", Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 659-660.)
"In the course of 1948, forty-nine persons were excluded from the
Party (Communist Party of Georgia) for the observance of religious rites.
Characteristically, among them are persons with middle and even higher
education. Thus, for example, a teacher of the Aspindza Raion seven-year
school.., .and her husband, an inspector of the Statistical Administration of
Georgia,....both with a higher education, baptised four of their children.
Both were expelled from the Party. Also excluded from the Party was a
kolkhoz member of the Engels' Kolkhoz in Sachkere Raion who had a middle
education.... who in September of last year arranged a funeral to which he
invited a priest and at the same time, on that very day, baptised two of his
children. The facts again and again remind us of the necessity of strengthen-
ing the anti-religious propaganda among the population. (Zarya Vostoka -
Dawn of the East - January 28, 1949.)
"A person cannot act correctly, cannot act in an organized manner as
a Communist, as a Leninist, if his brain is poisoned by religion. (Yaroslav-
sky, o cit.) Although the Party demands religion be considered a private
matter as as the state is concerned, it does not regard the fight against
the opium of the people, the fight against religious superstition, etc., as a
private matter. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party toward Religion," 1909,
Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 671.)
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"Anti-religious propaganda forms an integral part of Communist
education. We educate the youth in a materialistic world outlook, a sci-
entific understanding of the phenomena of nature and of social life. Re-
ligious superstitions and prejudices are unscientific. That is.why Young
Communist League members must be not only convinced atheists and
opponents of all superstition, but must actively combat the spread of super-
stitions and prejudices among youth. (Komsomolski Rabotnik~- Young Com-
munist Worker - Moscow, 1934, No. 11, June 1947, p.
B. The Public
"The basic work In communist education and the overcoming of the
survivals of religiousness must be carried out by the school teachers in
the process of teaching the foundations of the. sciences.... the basic task of
communist education and,overcoming the survivals of religiousness in our
present condition is to prove to the pupils.the complete contrast and com-
plete irreconcilability between science -- the real and corredt reflection of
the objectively existing world in the consciousness of the people -- and reli-
gion as a fantastic, distorted and, consequently, harmful reflection of the
world In the consciousness of the people.... the school must pose the question
before parents who are believers as to the extreme harmfuln`ss....and inad-
missibility of imposing religious influence on children .... Par6nts who are
religious believers in the great majority of cases realize that they have no
right and that it is not in their Interest to maim their childrer- morally and
to place them in a dual situation by bringing them up at home on religious
prejudices which are in radical contradiction with the true scientific instruc-
tion and education of the school. (Naro oye Obrazovaniye - Popular Educa-
tion - "Some Aspects of Education,Apr 1949.1
"The propaganda of atheism and the popularizationof tie scientific
viewpoint has been a vital part of the activities of educational and cultural
organizations in Soviet Russia from the first days of the Soviet regime.
(Novy Mir - New World - No. 1-2, 1946, p. 183.)
"But the Communist Party never put the struggle against religious
superstitions in the foreground. The Party believed that work in overcoming
religious superstition should be subordinated to the principle', task, the or-
ganization and consolidation of the working people in the strugle for the
victory of Communism, (Molodoi Bolshevik - Young Bolshevik - No. 5-6,
1946, p. 58-59.) To declare war on religion.... is the best means of reviving
interest in religion. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party toward Religion"
1909, elected Works, vol. XI, p. 664.) A persistent and patient propaganda
of the scientific materialistic world outlook represents In present conditions
the most reliable means of fighting religion. (Molodol Bolshevik - Young
Bolshevik - No. 5-6, 1946, p. 59-69.)
"The Party cannot be neutral toward religion and it does conduct anti-
religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice.... It will con-
tinue to carry on propaganda against religious prejudices because that is the
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best way undermining the influence of the reactionary clergy who support
the exploiting class and who preach submission to these classes... .Anti-
religious propaganda is the means by which the complete liquidation of
the reactionary clergy must be brought about. (Stalin, "Interview with
American Labor Delegation", 1927, Leninism Cooperative Publishing
Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934; v 1. I, p, 386.) "
C. Soviet Laws on Religion Now in Effect.
1. "Instruction of the under-aged or minors in religious doctrines in
state or private educational institutions and schools or the violation of the
rules established for this is punishable by corrective labor for a period
of one year." (Article 122 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, enacted 1926)
2. "Religious Organizations are forbidden:
(a) to create mutual assistance funds, cooperatives, or unions
of producer.;;
(b) to extend mutual support to their members;
(c) tq organize special prayer or other gatherings for children,
youths, or women or to organize gatherings, groups, circles,
or offices, either bible, literary, handiwork or labor for in-
struction of religion, etc.
The instruction of any religious faith whatsoever is not allowed in
state, social or private educational institutions. Theological courses may
be opened with the permission of the NKVD, or in Autonomous Republics,
of the appropriate Central Executive Committee." (Law of April 1929
RSFSR Code)
3. "Instruction of any type of religious doctrines given in schools to
minors and the under-aged is one of, the forms of infringement on the
freedom of conscience guaranteed by the USSR constitution. For the com-
mission of criminal action,.. .the type and character of the religious doc-
trine taught are of no importance'.' (Trainin, A., Menshagin, V., and Vy-
shinskaya, Z., Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, 2nd
edition, Moscow, 1946, p. 168.)
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Soviet Definition of Religion
social system.
"Religion--Distorted, fantastic reflection in people's minds of the
natural and social forces ruling over them; 'one type of spiritual
oppression inflicted everywhere on the popular mases who are
oppressed by eternal work for others, by want and loneliness" (Lenin,
Vol. 10, p.65). The basic characteristics of all'religion are a
be1Pf in supernatural powers, which supposedly rule the world, and
sub.aission to them. Religion has elements in comzion with philosophical
rea:.ism and contains gnosiologicel roots: theories and hypotheees
separated from nature, personification and sublimdtion of the forces of
nature. Philosophical idealism is the form and mdthod of the defense
of religion.
"Religious beliefs and the rites and inatituirions (church and others)
corresponding to them are not eternal. They arise and exist only
under certain historical conditions. Over a very'long period of
human history; people did not know any religion. The appearance of
religious beliefs in primitive society became pos4ible with the
dev' pment cf :,:nought and articulate sp.cech. Religion arose as a
ref. x of the i-.ipotence of primitive man before natural phenomena
,-which threatened him and which he did not understand. This impotence
gave rise in the heads of primitive men to the thought of the
existence in the surrounding world of special, evpernatural beings
capable of bestowing blessings or of delivering misfortune on people.
Having personified objects of nature and giving t.em supernatural powers,
the savage tried to influence them with incantations, magic, and
cer:monial rites. Elements of magic are containea in all modern
re?.:gions. In a class society the roots of religious beliefs are
pri:Berily class roots./ The helplessness of people before the
el--*re.ltal processes--of the development of an exploiting society in-
evitably breeds belief in miracles, in a better life beyond the grave.
'The social oppression of the toiling masses, their seemingly complete
be1').esaness before the blind forces cf capitalism, which inflicts daily
and hourly a thousand times more horrible Sufi' .~rizigs, a thousand times
more savage tortures on the rank and file of the yrorking people than any
kind of unusual event like ' r,. earth cake, etc.-'this is the most
basic present-day root of re:Ligion.t (Lenin, Vol 15, pp. 374-375). In
the absurd, ridiculous fairy tales of char.chgoers'and believers con-
cerning God, Paradise, and the kingdom of heaven people look for
salvation from the misfortunes end sufferings caused by the exploiting
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VIII. APPENDICES
A. China Islamic Association Officers
and Members
B. China Hui Cultural Association
Officers and Members
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"As one of the elements of the superstructure, religion plays
an active role in strengthening the economic base which gave rise
to it, in strengthening the system founded on the enslavement and
exploitation of man by man. Religion has always played a reactionary
role, has fortified people's impotence before nature, has served
as a weapon for oppressing the toilers, and in the present day
in all 'bourgeois countries religion is the weapon of the imperialist
bourgeoisie in the struggle against the camp of democracy and
socialism., Propagating submissiveness, humility, rejection of
the struggle to remake the world., to struggle for docialism, all
in the name of being rewarded after death, 'in the other world t')
religion helps to strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie.y'Eeligion
is the opium of the people,--such is Marx' definition. Insisting
that everything in nature and society occurs according to the
wi,Ul. of the gods, rejecting the objective lava of phenomena, denying
maw s ability to get to know the surrounding world, religion prevents
people from knowing the laws of nature and society and from using
them in the interest of society. Religion has been and is the
~irreaoncilable enemy of progress and science.
"Socialism destroys the material roots which nourish religious
beliefs. Together with the disappearance of the social system which
is based on the exploitation of man by men, the conditions which
breed religion disappear also. However, one oannot overcome religious
prejudices in the consciousness of people at one stroke. In its
development consciousness lags behind the development of the
material conditions of the life of people. Therefore, in the con-
sciousness of backward people, religious prejudices remain as
survivals of the eafitalist past even after the destruction of
er;pitalism. They can be and are actually overcome gradually, in the
proce esof the active participation of the broad masses in the practical
construction of a communist society, in the. process of communist
education. In the USSR and countries of people's democracies there
is genuine freedom of conscience. In the USSR the church was
rseparated from the state, and the school from the church, as far back
. That is
That
as 1918. Each citizen can be a believer or a non-belie8er the isd
as
a matter of his own conscience. The Communist Party,
of the toilers which is fighting for their liberation from all
oppression, cannot be neutral towards religion, because religion
is a form of spiritual oppression. l'u all its activity the
: Communist Party helps the toilers to free themselves from rex.ig cus
tsuperatitions and to master the scientific world-outlook. Of great
importance in overcoming religious superstitions are the propagation
of the Marxist-Leninist world-outlook, cultural-educational work,
and extensive propaganda of natural-scientific and social-political
knowledge. A profound illumination of questions of religion and
of the attitude of the proletarian party to it is given in such
articles by Lenin as Socialism and Religion. The Attitude of the
Workers' Party to Relig on, and otters.
M. R.zental' and P. Yudin, ed., Kratki Filosoficheski.
th ed., State
al 74ietionaty
hi
,
c
' (Short Philosop
Slover pib ishing Rouse of Political Literature, 1951+, pp. 510-5129
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"Religious Survivals" Im edim ,tbe ShViet Transition-t Commuj*am
Extracts from the entry oh "Survivals of Capitalism in the Con-
sciousness of *eople," in M. Rozental' & P. Yudin, ed., Kratkiy
Filosoficheski Slover' (Short Philosophical Dictonary)Kr, 4th
ed., State Publishing Hnuse of Political Literature) 1954, pp 448-450.
"Survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of a certain number
of the toilers are manifested primarily in a non-socialist attitude
towards work ... A non-socialist attitude towards social property,
the squandering of social wealth, a negligent, unbusinesslike attitude
towards it, the nonfulfillment of the instructions of organs of the
Soviet government for safeguarding social property and socialist
law and order--all these things are also serious survivals of
capits~ism in the ccnsciouanesI, of people. Survivals of capitalism
in the consciovgness of people also includes deceiving th C'. c.,mmunint
Par--.y and the ,F r?-iet state, concealing and. distorting the truth,
vio:?.atingr discipline, perse.c:uting criticism) nationalism,
fawpriing bcfcre ':oreign achievements, individuals em, lack of discipline
in private life., bureaucratism, et al. One of t :le survivals of the
past are'religious prejudices, which obscure the consciousness of the
baci?rard section of the toilers. .,.
"Nov, when the Soviet ,.eople are successfu]Jy carrying out the
bui:;.rling of comm:uism, the task of atrugg) ng eg,:tnst surviva.'o
of c:epitaliom in the consciousness of people is of the first importance.
Urilcses survivals of capiL?aliom in people's consciousness are completely
ova ;'coo , the tran.gttion Eros: socialism to communism is impossible."
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CPSU. CENTRAL CONA4ITTEE DECREE ON ATHEIST PRO
Coimtinist Party Ceihtral Committee Decree, "On Errors in Conducting
Scientific-Atheist Propaganda Among The Public."
"In conformity with its program, the Communist Party is con-
ducting scientific-educational propaganda of the materialist world
outlook, directed toward constant raising of the consciousness of
the toiling masses and toward their gradual liberation from religious
convictions. In this the Party has always considered it necessary to
avoid offending the feelings of believers in any way.
"The Party Central Committee is in possession of facts which
testify that of late gross errors have been committed in scientific-
atheist propaganda among the public in many localities.
"Instead of the development of systematic and painstaking work
to -prsad knowledge of natural sciences and an ideological struggle
against some central and local newspapers and also the
st3temey_4-s o= some lecturers and speakers have contained insulting
at?t=:cks 'zpon_ the clergy and believers who perform religious rites.
Cases oc=r when, in the press or in statements by propagandists,
some ministers of religious cults and believers are depicted without
justification as people unworthy of political trust. In a number of
arias th-re have been cases of administrative interference by local
organizations and individuals in the activity of religious associations
and groups, and also of a rude attitude toward the clergy.
"Such errors in antireligious propaganda are fundamentally at
variance with the program and policy of the Communist Party toward
religion and believers, and they are a violation of the Party's
repeated instructions on the impermissibility of offending the feelings
of believers.
'he Party Central Committee considers it wrong that many Party
or;ariza-c_ons have held aloof from deily guidance of scientific-
at'.'.leist propaganda and c'o not chow concern for the careful selection
of psopags,nda cadres. Articles in the press, lectures and reports
are frequently allowed to be made by people who are ignorant in
science and in questions of atheist propaganda, and sometimes even
by hack workers who mainly know only anecdotes and tales about clergy-
men. Such an irresponsible approach to the selection of authors of
articles, lecturers and speakers and the absence of proper control
by arty Orga,nizat fta over t3 c'n act. direct io* of - agionti 'tc-
&thW gropagar4m do, acrio4,v he.rm *o the educational, cultural-
onlightoning work being conductcd among the public.
'he Party Central Committee decreess
'that province and territory Party committees, Party Central
Committees of the Union republics and all Party organizations be re-
quired resolutely to eliminate errors in atheist propaganda and in
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no event to permit future offending Of the feelings of believers or
clergymen or administrative interference in the activity of the
church. It must be born in mind that actions insulting the church,
clergy and citizens who are believers are incompatible with the
policy of the Party and state in the conducting o t scientific-atheist
propaganda and are contrary to the U.S.S.R. constitution, which grants
freedom of conscience to Soviet citizens.
"As a result of profound changes in the social-economic conditions
of life, the liquidation of exploiter classes and the victory of
socialism in the U.S.S.R., as a result of the sucgessful development
of science and the general rise in the level of culture in the country,
the majority of the population of the Soviet Union has long been freed
of religious survivals; the consciousness of the '.for}ring people has
grown immeasurably. At the same time, one cannot! but take into account
the fact that there are also many citizens who, while actively parti-
ci.pating in the life of the country and honorably fulfilling their
ci.-duty to the motherland. are still under the :influence of various
ki:..Is of religious beliefs. The Party has always demanded and will
c:'aLInue to demand a considerate, mindful attitude toward these
bellievers. All the more is it stupid and harmful to cast political
do,.ot on Soviet citizens because of their religious convictions. Pro-
fcraad, patient, skillfully arranged scientific-atheist propaganda
among believers will help them in the long run tofreo themselves
fro:a religious delusions. On the other hand, administrative
measures of any hind and insulting attacks on
b-lie:vers and clergy can only do harm, can only lead to strengthening
an! oven intensifying their religious convictions.;;
"In conducting scientific-atheist propaganda, account should be
ta'ten of the fact that it is impossible to identify the position of
the church in the land of socialism with the position of the church
in an exploiter society. In bourgeois society the church is a support
and instrument of the ruling classes, who use it for the purpose of
enslaving the working people. This does not preclude the possibility
that individual clergymen even in a capitalist society may and do go
over to the point of view of the working people on a number of im-
portant questions of politics. However, for behavior contrary to the
interests of the exploiter classes those clergymen are generally
subjected to persecutions of all kinds from the church and government
circles of capitalist countries.
"In Tsarist Russia the church faithfully served the autocracy,
the land-lords and capitalists, justified the cruel e:cploitation of
the mass:.s and supported the exploiters in the struggle against the
working people. It is also known that immediately after the victory
of the October socialist revolution, during the years of the Civil
War and later, many religious organizations and groups of the clergy
remained hostile to the Soviet regime. Because ofthis, individual
ministers of cults were prosecuted by the state not for their religious
but for to eir antigoc?ornment activity, directed against the interests
of the Soviet people and for the benefit of internal counterrevolution
and international imperialism. It is natural, therefore, that the
Soviet people's struggle against the enemies of the socialist state
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should have included a struggle against those reactionary representa-
tives of the church who were engaged in activity hostile to the
Soviet people. At the present time, as a result of the triumph of
Socialism and liquidation of the exploiter classes in the U.S.S.R.,
the social roots of religion have been undermined and the base on
which the church relied has been destroyed. The majority of clergy-
men, as the facts testify, now take a loyal stand with respect to
the Soviet regime. Therefore, the struggle agaihst.religitsne beliefs
should be regarded now as an ideological struggle of the scientific,
materialist world outlook against an antiscientific, religious world
outlook.
"Rectification of mistakes committed in antireligious propaganda
must not load to a relaxation of scientific.-atheist propaganda, which
is an integral part of the communist education of the working people
and has as its aim the dissemination of scientific, materialist knowl-
edge among the masses and the liberation of believers from the influ-
ence of religious beliefs.
"W'"ri:ae, in relation to the state, religion is a private matter,
an.f the:: or' the church is separated from the state, the Communist
Par,;y, vhich bases itself on the only correct, scientific world out-
look--M..:,:?xis.?n,-Leninism--and its theoretical foundation, dialectical
materialism, cannot adopt an apathetic neutral attitude toward
religion, an ideology which has nothing in common with science.
"Ou.' party has always considered and considers it its indispens-
able duty to promote the development of natural, technical and social
sciences by all opportunities and means. Only on the basis of modern,
progressive science is it possible to make thorough and full use of
the riche of nature in the interests of all mankind. Only on the
basis of science is it possible to achieve a fresh and considerable
advance in development of industry and agriculture, to ensure higher
lab .r pfi~oductivity and thereby substantially promote the Prosperity
cultu.i?al level of the people. Proceeding from this, the Com-
m; ': st Fizty ed:acates Soviet people in a scientific world outlook
an,.,.', wago3 a s r' ggle of ideas against religious ideology as an anti-
sc. entifio ideology. The fundamental opposition of science and
religion is obvious, '-rhereas science relies on facts, scientific
experiment and conclusions strictly checl.ed and confirmed by life,
any religion bases it3elf only on Biblical and other traditions, on
fantastic fabrications. Modern scientific discoveries in the natural
and social sciences convincingly refute religious dogmas. Science
cannot be reconciled with fabricated religious concepts about the
life of nature and man, hence it is incompatible with religion.
Science helps mankind to delve more and more deeply into the objective
laws of the development of nature and society, helps to place the
forces of nature at the service of man; science helps to increase
man's awareness and raise his culture; but religion clouds man's
consciousness, condemning him to passivity in the face of the forces
of nature and. fettering his creative activeness and initiative.
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"Taking all this inte+ account, the Party considers profound,
systematic scientific-atheist propaganda essential, without, however,
permitting the religious feelings of believers and also of Clergymen
to be offended.
"The Central Committee reminds us that-the basis of scientific-
atheist propaganda should be elucidation in popular form of the more
important phenomena in the life of nature and society, of such
questions as the formation of the universe and the origin of life eMd
man on earth, of discoveries in astronomy, biology, physiology, physics,
chemistry and other sciences which confirm the correctness of material-
ist views on the development of nature and society.
`The Party Central Committee emphasizes that s:cientific-atheist
propaganda requires the greatest care and thought in the selection of
lectr?ers, speakers and authors of articles and pamphlets on anti-
relir-ious subjects. In this work cadres should be enlisted which are
part-:e,ularly qualified in a scientific regard: school teachers, teachers
of t.:o:hnical schools and higher educational establishments, doctors,
agr'..ultural specialists, workers in various scientific research insti-
tutiars, literature and arts workers and others capable of explaining
convincingly the antiscientific nature of religion':from the standpoint
of a materialist world outlook.
"The Party Central Committee considers that positive results in
educ-,,_:',nal work directed toward overcoming religious survivals can be
achie?.-::l only on condition of further development of all our cultural-
enli;r..tening work among the working people, of considerable impgcvement
in tae activity of culture centers, libraries, reading rooms, lecture
hal.in, parks of culture and rest and other cultural-enlightenment
institutions. Therefore the task of. Party, state and public organi-
zatioi:s consists in fundamentally improving cultural-enlightening work
among the public and thereby achieving a further rise in the cultural
level of the working people.--N. KHBUSHCHEV, Secretary of the Central
Committee of the communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nov. 10, 1954. "
(Pr y a Nov. 11, 1954)
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The Soviet View on Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam
"BVDDHISM--one of the three most widespread religions (together with
Christianity and Islam)
"Origin and Doctrines. Buddhist religious literature attributes
the creation of Buddhism to the Bu4dha Sakya-Muni, who supposedly
appeared in the 6-5th centuries B.C. in the figure of the Indian prince
Gautama. Reactionary bourgeois science repeats this version. An
analysis of Buddhist literature and aroheological materials of the 2nd-
lot centuries B.C. bears irrefutable evidence to the fact that the
myth of the buddha Sakya-Muni was created by the Buddhist church
comparatively late in order to propagate Buddhism more .successfully.
The earliest biography of Sakya-Muni was written in the lot century
A.D., and the most popular narrative about him, the 'Lalita-vistare,'
was written in the 2nd-4th centuries A.D.
"Buddhism, like all other religions, was not created by any
special person, but originated in the conditions of social life. In the
6.h-51;h centuries B.C* in India, especially in its northern part, the
p."oc.eas of the development of slaveholding relations and the
formation of large slaveholding states was intensified. This
period is characterized by the appearance of various religious
teachings on the equality of all people. The appearance of these
teachings was a reflection of the dissatisfaction of the downtrodden
and persecuted freeholders and lower classes of the slaveholding cities.
Early Buddhism, equalizing all people in 'suffering" and,in the right
to "salvation", was one of these teachings. As a result of its
characteristic propagation of passivity and reconciliation with
reality, the ruling class did not look upon Buddhism as a dangerous
doctrine and not only did not subject it to persecution but,
on the contrary, supported it. Moreover, the slaveholding
aristocracy soon adopted Buddhism for its own ides.:-:,gical weapon,
i.nasmc.ch as Brahmanism--a religion which half arisen in the epoch
of the disintegration of the primitive-communal system and which
sanctified tribal divisions--could not serve as a satisfactory
ideological basis for the large slaveholding states which had
been formed. In addition, the slaveholding aristocracy perceived
in Buddhism an anti-priest tendency which was.useful to it,
inasmuch as Brahmanism propounded the privileged status of priests
within the slaveholding aristocracy. With the growth of slaveholding
and the formation of large states, the slaveholding aristocracy as
a whole came out against special privileges for one of its component
groups. In the 3rd century B.C., Asoka, the king of Magadha of the
Mourys dynasty which had united the larger part of India, adopted
Buddhism and zealously forwarded its propagation in India and
beyond its borders. The teachings of humility and submissiveness
became the main elements'in Buddhism. In those parts of India
where the process of the development of slaveholding relations
proceeded with less intensity, the basic mass of the population
continued to adhere to the old, communal religious views.
"L der the patronage of the Maurys kings 'tie first Buddhist
councils were called at which representatives of various small sects
and tendencies tried to establish agreement on problems of dogma and
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organization. Buddhist monasteries began appearing from the 2nd
to the 1st centuries B.C. The :Buddhist cult was further developed;
Buddhist temples were built, etc. ...
"Early Buddhism was called Hinayana (,small chariot' or 'narrow
path' of salvation). In the lst century A. D. in the northwestern
part of India a new form of Buddhism arose--the Mahayana ('large
chariot') 'wide path' of salvation), in the dogma and cult of
which a large place is occupied by Boddhisatvas--deities which
render help in 'sllvation.' Buddhist worship included ancient
popular invocations of numerous gods and spirits; in order to
intensify emotional influences Buddhist ritual makes extensive
use of the graphic arts, music, luxuriant trappings, ritual
dances, etc.
"The ideologists of the exploiting classes tried to touch up
Buddhism and declared it to be an 'atheistic' religion or a
'purely philosophical' system. In the epoch of imperialism bourgeois
obscurontists, trying to place Buddhism at the service of a refined
f:.deism, not only supported the positions of Buddhism in the
c~;'.ontal and dependent countries of the Orient, but propagated it
J--: Europe and America. Only Soviet science was able correctly
to expose the roots, the historical path, and the reactionary
essence of Buddhism, to show its real role in exploiting the
toiling masses. 'All rr.:.igion is contradictory to science' .
(I.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 10, pp 132-133). Thet,:Oealietic world-
view of Buddhism is the darkest kind of mysticism. Materialist
teachings in ancient India developed in the struggle against the
idealistic mysticism of Buddhism. The idealistic mysticism of
Buddhism teo^hes that the visible world is the manifestation of
a st,?eam of non-material, rystical 'particles'--of Unknowable
'dharmaa,' Certain 'combinations' of 'dharmas' generate indivirloal
consciousness. The outer world is declaredlD be merely an illusion
of this consciousness. On the basis of the ancient Indian animistic
ideas of the transmigration of souls, Buddhism propounded the
doctrine of the reincarnation of living beings, affizming that
the death of a living being is a manifestation of the disintegration
of a certain 'combination of 'dharmas,' after which a new
'combination' of 'dharmas' is formed. New 'combinations' of
'dharmas' are predetermined by 'karma'--the sum of Aall 'sins'
and 'virtues' in the previous cycle of inv:arnotionb. A preponderance
of 'virtues' over 'sins' guarantees a better reincarnation. The
ideal,, according to the teaching of Buddhism, is'the attainment
of 'nirvana' (literally, 'extinction')--the complete cessation
of the process of reincarnation and liberation, therefore, from
suffering, which, according to Buddhism, makes up the essence of life.
Moreover, proponents of Buddhism are no different from proponents
of Christianity, who '...proclaim all the villainies of the oppressors
against the oppressed either as just punishment for:-the original and
other sins or as trials which God in his great wisdom grants his
atoning people.' (K.Marx) see K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol.5, p 173),
Buddhism declared that the enslavement of the toilers was the result
of their sins and 'errors' in former incarnations,and in this way,
like all religions in a class society, trying to reconcile the
toilers and oypressad to pofieitty And to their lack of tights., to
instill in them the slave psychology of patience and submissiveness
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in the name of a future illusory nirvanp. Buddhist dogma on re-
incarnation, which maintains that today's mighty ruler can be a
slave or an animal in his next incarnation, and that a slave can
be a rajah in his next incarnation, is designed to turn the
oppressed away from the struggle against the exploiters, to defend
the interests of the ruling classes, to suppress the class protest
of the toilers.
"Hypocritically propagating non-resic1,an?_te to va.oJ.ence, Buddhism',
as the ideological weapon of the oppressors, became G e defender of
the violence of the exploiters to..ar.ds the oppressed, The Buddhist
pantheon consists of a tremendous collection of gods--'huddhos and
boddhisatvas. According to Buddhist concepts,, the principle gods--
buddhas--are surrounded by an assemblage of less important gods-
assistants, among whom are terrible, furious guards who exterminate
heretics and atheists.' Some Buddhist orders and sects place in
the center of their worship the buddho Sakya-Muni; others give
preference to the future buddho Moit_eyo, gigantic depictions
of which ore erected in temples. Still others =de the buddha
1 aita'Da, the leader of paradise, the main god. The complete
t~nkr?iptcy of the thesis of bourgeois scholars of the tottheismc
o." Buddhism is beyond question.
"Diffusion of Buddhism Outside India. The coex?stence of Buddhism
and Brahmanism in India gradually brought the-na closer and closer
together and promoted the formulation of a new ideo.i ~,gical system--
the religion of Hinduism, which was more applic'9ble to the feudal-
ism which was developing in India with its pecLi arities (the
presence of survivals of primitive-communal relation.--., the
stabil.i .,y of the rural community, the presence o_ slu very, the
caste system, the differences in the level of to.7) soc.ial-econorilc
development of the t;&rious nationalities, et In the period
of the disintegration of slaveholding despotisi and the decline
of cities in the early middle ages. iudd'cism, r,:~ .ch 'dos not
supported by the central au..horities, gradra) y fell. into decline
and Buddhist monasteries. which had amassed tren~nd r,.s wealth
over the centuries, became an easy prey for to .eudr:_1, lords
during the frequent civil wars. Alread-y by Vi,, beginAing of the
10th century, Buddhism lost its importance in At the present
time,, the number of Buddhists in India is insi.gmi.ficcnt.
"Having lost its importance in India, Bu6.dhtsm become widespread
beyond its borders and for centuries played a large role in the
feudal enslavement of the toilers of Central ani Eastern Asia?
in the island of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, China, Mongolia, Japan,
and other countries. Adapting itself to local conditions, the
Buddhist church and monasteries, with their class-sharpened and
flexible doctrines, with their organizational experience and
emotional rites, became diffused in countries w'aere the old
religions lost their importance or where -;he oi.:ss struggle
demanded an intensification of the spiritual enslavement of
the toiling masses. Engels wrote: 'Great historical turning
points in history were accompaled by cLo nges in religion only
to the extent that one speaks of three world religions existing
up to the present time: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam. The old
spontaneously arising tribal or national religions did not have
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"HINDUISM--the name of a religious system embracing a complex of the
most varied beliefs of the majority of the population of present-day
India, beginning with religions with complex theological doctrines
and ending with primitive beliefs inherited from aA'primitive-
communal system (animism, totemism, fetishism, etc.).
"The religious system of India was developed in the period of the
early Indian middle ages as a most important element of the feudal
ideological superstructure, designed to protect and strengthen the
feudal base. A characteristic of the feudal society in India was
the presence of significant remnants of slavery and of a primitive-
communal system, andal.c.o of the historically developed caste
divisions. Because of this, various and num erous religious beliefs
continued to exist in India in the early middle ages. The priests--
BrahrAns--tried to reduce this great variety of beliefs to a
unified system. They made as the basis of this system the most
important doctrines of the ancient religion6--Brahmanismu and Buddhism--
of the slaveholding society, which had served the exploiting classes
as a weapon for the spiritual oppression of the toiling masses. These
most :important dogmas were dharma, karma, and ahimse.
"Dharma (literally, 'law') is the rule of life ' and? conduct of every
Indian, i.e.., of the followers of the religion of Hinduism.
According to t1 b-,aching of Hinduism., each caste has its own special
dharma. For toilers, the main element in the dogma of dharma
is the instruction to be content with their actual lot, the
improvement of which during their lifetime was decl4 red to be
impossible in principle. Another basic doctrine of',Hinduism
was the dogma of karma, formulated, as was the case- with dhar:aa,
in Brahmanism and Buddhism. This doctrine rests up:n the anii.stie
conception, which goes back into for antiquity, of the animation
of the entire world surrounding man and of the transmigration of
souls. According to the teaching of karma aft er a man dies his
soul is reborn in a lower or hi,;her social status depending upon
the degree to which he si.tbmitted to the demands of his prescribed
dharma, i.e., on the unquestioning falfillmont of the obligations
of his caste.
"Hinduism also included the doctrine of ahimea ('rejection
of evils) which had been worked out in the religions of Buddhism
and Jainism. The exploiting classes tried to instil this dogma
.into the consciousness of the exploited in order to-convince them
,of the sin of all forms of struggle for their emancipation,,
"All these doctrines of Hinduism were utilized by the feudal
lords to hold the popular masses in a state of obedience and
submissiveness to the exploiters to reconcile them to want and to
the deprivation of their rights. Social inequality was explained
as 'eteranl lave' established by the gods and according to t.hich
each man, from the point of view of the dogma of dhsrma, merely
reaps the fruits in his present life of the ''sine' or 'virtues'
of his former existences.
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"Heading the pantheon tf the gods of Hinduism was the trinity
of the gods t Brahmanism (trimurti). Bfabma is the god-creator;
Vishnu, the god-preserver (the personification of eternally alive
nature, his cult is-closely linked with the, ancient sun cult);
and Shiva,, the god-destroyer and builder (the personification
of the alteration-of life and death, his cult goes back to the
most ancient cults of the gods of fertility). The image of
Brahma did not have any roots in popular beliefs and was always
only an artifical creation of Brahman theology, and he was never,
therefore, widely revered. In its attempt to embrace the entire
variety of religious beliefs existing in India in the period
of the formation of feudal society, Hinduism recognized these
beliefs as forms of the worship of Vishnu or Shiva; the deities
of these religious beliefs were recognized as embodiments of
Vishnu or Shiva or as their symbols....
"As a result, Hinduism absorbed the various tribal religions
as well as the earlier religious ideologies of ancient clavebolding
Indian society. In India Buddhism was compeltely dissolved in
Hinduism, and Buddha merged with the image of Vishnu as one of
the letter's incarnations.
"The vedas and other holy books of Brahmanism remained as
such in H:izi1ism; the language of the ^ult remained Sanscrit,
and the Brahmans remained as the sole guardians and interpreters
of religious laws. This guaranteed for the Brahmans the highest
place in the caste structure of Hindu feudal society.
"Inspite of the complexity of Hindu theology, Hinduism
is in essence extremely primitive. Inherent in it is idol-
worship--worship of certain animals (especial-1y the cow), de'fication
of certain rivers (especially the Ganges), plants (the lotus,
for example), mountains, etc. Hinduism is characteristic for
its 'vulgar cult of nature, the degrading nature of which is
particularly striking in the fact that man, this master of
nature, reverentially falls on his knees before the monkey
Hanuman and the cow Sabala.' (K, Marx, see the collection of
K. Marx and F. Engels, On England, 1952, p 341). The basis
of the cult of all the religions of Hinduism are sacrifices to the
gods, ancestor worship, and pilgrimages to holy places. Much
attention is given to the formal aspects of the ritual, which
strengthens the influence of the professional priesthood all
the more.
"The anti-feudal movement in the Indian middle ages often
adopted variova forms of religious sectarianism. The best known
of the sects which came out against the class-caste system was
the sect of the Sikhs, which developed in the beginning of the
16th century and which led the peasant were in the Punjab in
the second half of the 37th and the first half of lthe 18th
centuries. Sikhism later lost its anti-feudal direction and
become one of the religions of India. In the middle ages in
certain sections of India there took place the conversion of
Indians to Islam, as a result of measures of force and persuasion
carried out by the Moslem rulers and feudal aristocrats who
had some out from countries of Central Asia and the Near East.
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Incidents of religious conflict between Hindus and Moslems took
place in the middle ages, mainly anong the feudal aristocracy.
But the feudal lords--Hindu and Moslem alike--quickly forgot
their religious differences when it became necessary to unite
to suppress the resistance of the peasants and artisans professing
various religions.
"The English colonizers, conquering India in the 18th and 19th
centuries, tried to utilize the Hindu priesthood as one of the
supports of their rule in the country. Hindu priests had various
privileges. The English colonizers supported the caste oppression,
sanctified by Hinduism, which doomed millions of Hindu Indians
of the so-called untouchable castes to a semi-slave existence.
With the growth of the national-liberation movement and class
warfare in India, English imperialism utilized to a greater and
greater extent the religious and caste divisions of the population
of India to keep the popular masses disunited, playing off Indian
Hindus against Indian Moslems through all kinds of provocations.
In 19C9 the English colonial rulers introduced a system of
elections to so-called legislative organs of British India,
built on the foundations of religious curiae. The_ extreme sharpening
of class contradictions in the last quarter of the 19th century
intensified the attempts of Indian landowners and bourgeoisie
to utilize Hinduism to defend their class positions. In this
period a multiftae of religious-political organizations grew up.
Regardless of whether they advocated a position ofcfficial
Hinduism or whether they came out as reformist organizations,
their aim was one and the same--to subordinate the Indian toilers,
who had been awakened to active political struggle, to the
influence of bourgeois national-reformism; to divide the popular
masses and prevent the growth of their class self-''consciousn ss;
and to guide the popular movement into a channel which would
not endanger the exploiting classes. The English authorities
gave special protection to the most reactionary of these organizations
('Hindu Mahasabha', and others). Individual attempts (e.g., Tilak)
to use Hinduism in the .,1ruggle againot the English failed and
only prevented the creation of a unified anti-imperialist front
in the country.
"The leadership of the party of the liberal landowners and big
capitalists--the National Ccc ress Party, which, form the very moment
of its creation (1885) declared that it represented the interests of
all Indians regardless of their rel;g;iouo affiliations--was made up,
in ren lity, mostly of Hindus and set itself off from the Moslems.
At the some time, the official ideology of the party, Gandhism, borrowed
the religious-mysticial aspects of its teaching from Hinduism. All
this enabled the English imperialists to inflame religious conflicts
all the more and to divide India in 1947. After the division of
India, Indian reactionaries have continued to utilize Hinduism and
religions-chauvinistic slogans to draw the toilers' away from the class
struggle. With the growth of Us political activity of the masses
and the ever-widening spread in India of the advanced, progressive
ideas of the scientific world-view, the role of Hinduism is gradually
diminishing."
Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Enteikl.opediya, 2nd ed., vol 18, 1953, pp 128-130-
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a propagandistic character and had no power of resistance when
the independence of the tribes or peoples was destroyed.'
(F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1949, p 28). Spreading beyond
India, Buddhism strr;c.l,a bargain with the local religions,
accepting the local gods into its own pantheon and augmenting its
own rites with the local ceremonies. All this endowed Buddhism
with great variety in the various countries. In China, Buddhism
begs;n to eepreod iu the let century A. D. (in Tibet., later).
A network of num erous and increasingly vealtLy mono3i;erics, which
seized. much laz:cl, sprang -ap throughout ti-?.e c,) n?;;ry., In tbA
4th-7th centuries, the BudChist church in Ch:'..v, becrna a great
economic and political force add played. Tn i~:r ?.:;'.ant :!-ole in the
early feudal states. Latex , Budd_-'sm gu-ie vcy ~..o ';he ruling
religion, Conf~nianinm, alihough ic, st-iicont.:a'?xed to be rather
widespread. Buddhism enjoyed the pat, cnage of the Vann dynasty
in China (1280-1368). The Manchus; enslaving China and Mongolia
in the 17th-18th centuries, also attributed great inp?)rtcnce
to Buddhism, along with Confucianism, and util;.sed Buddhism as a
weapon for the ideological enslavement of the peop:'.es of China
and Mongolia. Buddhism entered Japan from C:-?-I.nn an Korea in
the 6th century in the some role--as an ideo:-og`..a1 *ecapon
of the exploiting classes. With the consol cca'_..;n of feudal-
Ism in Japan, the Buddhist chruch began serving as a support
of the feudal system, playing a very important role in its
development. Buddhist monasteries became larr,,' .?.e1?c:.al holdings.
After the so-called revolution of the Maiji Sh'ntoism
became the principal religion of Japan, but :L;o..u61ii.ra preserved
important positions in the country. Buddsi.sm r?=met. abed Tibet
in the 7th century and acquired there the c.10araeteristics
of lamaism. In Tibet the monasteries become t'~:. m+?.. r~ centers of
the feudal exploitation of the toilers,. ud(Lti sm the form
of Lamaism spread in Mongolia in the l)-a'7th and in.
Buryat-Mongolia in the. 17-18th centuries. Thy :pp .? 3tra ;,a
of the Buddhist priesthood became on ir.flucn'?:; -i. - sr -tor of the
feudal class, and the monasteries become the Y?:'. Sal holdings
of the Buddhist hierarchs.
"The Political Role of Present-Day Pu.dditism. ?1 pia :'L.d.dhist priesthood
has always been close ,y allied with the e1:p10-"^'.ng :-:cling apex
of society and itself comprised a noel uf:ntor of the
exploiting classes. Buddhism plryo a. i?ioat n .-F x; ior.- ry role in. the
epoch of imperialism. During the Great +`cto:,t.: Socialist Revolution
and civil war the lama priesthood in Russia ?fvu a gl.Aziter-
revolutionary force end supported the Wh.i e Sands and
also the Japanese and Anglo-Anerican in~cA ve~~.',i.xe a ?e, Drying
the successful. building of socialism, as c the liquidation
of the oppression of man by man, the ov?= :hnF:~m'_::.g ?,:v ority of
adherents of Buddhism in the Soviet tTn:.ca. ?;+ras L.beza'?;ad from
religious prejudices.
In the Mongols. u Peopl: e' a R-?pub1 { c, the 11. ~ he? . 'lamas converted
the monasteries into !uppn:-.1 hasps of the fe',? I'I ax1nterrevolution
and the i raper .e,1-ist : i te3.1 1!,tYnce services and -i1-:)re .lquida ted
by the pe ople s c govea. n;ient or the NPR, The suo pe s 6r ;l development
of the i,.cxagol:, People s llo yzblie y wi.tt t:Ze help of , the So :?.Let
Union,. a' Ong the -pa:kh tp su^3.alisi, by-passing copi`olism, led to
the radi. al undo' 'mining of the influence of Buddhism- _Iumoisn among
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the Mongolian people. In countries of East Asia, the Buddhist
priesthood emerged,. for the most part, as agents ofJapanese
imperialism. The Buddhist church actively aided the aggression
of Japanese imperialism against the USSR. Japanese Buddhist
missionaries went to China, Thailand, Burma and other countries
of East Asia in large numbers, entrusted with the task of uniting
all Buddhists under the domination of imperialist Japan. The
slogan of Pan-Buddhism served as a cover for the aggression of
Japanese imperialism. Japanese :imperialism tried to weaken
the resistance of the peoples of Asia against theirraggressioa
through the Buddhist doctrine of passivity.
Since the end of the second world war the A4erican-
English imperialists have been making extensive use of the
reactionary leading elements of the Buddhist ::hurcb in their
aggressive pr+liey in East Asia. The mystical iacn i.sm of Buddhism
is being utilized by Anglo-American philosophical servants of
imperialism for the struggle against materialism, in order to
'buttress' and provide a 'basis' for idealism and ideolcgical
obscurantism of all kinds. In Japan, Buddhism, like Shintoisra,
is a support of reaction and Japanese militarism, which is being
revived with the help of1he United States of America. In China,
Buddhism, along with Confucianism, served as an ideological support
of the now-shattered reactionary Kuomintang clique. The reactionary
leadership of the Buddhist church in Lhasa is being used for
aggressive ends by the English and American imperialists-, who
are trying to tear Tibet away from China and convert it into
their own colon'-, into an arsenal for the struggle against the
Chinese People's Republic. The Tibetan people, including broad
strata of the lamahood and the patriotic sector of the higher
priesthood, are ocming out against the forces of imperialism
and reaction which are trying to separate Tibet from China.
Considerable strata of the Buddhist priesthood in ,countries of Asia,
inspite of the plots of the reactionary leadership, are taking
an ever-increasing role in the struggle for peace, supporting
the world movement of peace partisans.
"In the course of the national-liberation struggle of the
peoples of the East for peace, freedom and democracy, Buddhism is
more and more losing its influence among the 'toiling people. The
advanced, progressive ideas which-em being increasingly assimilated
by the toiling mosses are counteracting the reactionary ideas of
Buddhism, as well as of other religions."
Bol'sha Sovetskaya Entsiklo edi a (Largo Soviet Encyclopedia),
2nd ed., vol 6, 1951, pp 2128-230-
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Islam--A religion which arose in the beginning of the 7th century in
Arabia and later spread in the Year and Middle East, North Africa,
and Southwest Europe as a result of Arab conquests, At the present
time, Islam is widespread in countries of the Near and Middle East,
in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and, to some extent, in countries
of the Far East. Islam, like the other religions, has always played
a reactionary role, being a weapon in the hands of the exploiting
classes for the spiritual oppression of the toilers, and it has been
utilized by the foreign imperialists to enslave the peoples of the
East.
Origin of Islam
The rise of Islam was called forth by formation of a class society
among the Arabs. In the 6th century Arabia, whose popalation consisted
of nomad-herdsmen (Bedouins), settled farmers, merchants, and craftsmen,
experienced a process of decay of its tribal-communal system. The
economic and social contradictions characteristic of the stage of the
decay of tribal-communal relations reached its highest development in
t.:.^ c; ty of Mecca....The development of the inequality of wealth among
the people of Mecca led to the strengthening of the power and influence
of the local native aristocracy. This aristocracy engaged in a large-
scale caravan trade (especially, slave trade) with neighboring countries,
kept the people of Mecca and the neighboring Bedouin tribes in a state
of continuous financial indebtedness, owned slaves, and-possessed
livestock and land in the oases. In addition, the Meccan native aris-
tocracy usurped the priestly functions in the Meccan temple of Kabah.
The tribes of Western Arabia, which were economically dependent on
Mecca made an annual pilgrimage--hajj--to the temple of Kabah F_ --A
tradrd with the Mecdans during the hajj. Soviet scholars are r...,t united
in taeir views on the question of the nature of the production relations
which developed in Western Arabia. Some investigators think that in
Mecca, Medina and other areas the sixth century saw the development of
a slaves-owning system in the decayed tribal-commmunal system, a;,hers
believe that the process of the formation of a feudal society already
took place in this period,
In connection with the formation of a class society in Arabia,
there developed among the local tribes an economic and social crisis,
a reflection of which was the rise of Islam, which was called upon to
justify social and economic inequality and the system of exploitation
which was taking form. The tribal aristocracy was attempting to solve
the crisis by seizing new territories, and in order to do this it was
necessary to unite all the Arab tribes. Islam, with its strict mono-
theism, expressed this attempt at unification. The process of
fashioning a new ideology in the form of Islam was accelerated by the
decline of the Meccan transit trade as a result of the establishment
of the rule of the Ethiopians and Persians in South Arabia, This
decline, in K. Marx's words, gave the impetus to the rise of Islam
(V.K. Marx and F. Engels, Wes, Vol. 21, page 488). As a result of
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the decline of the Meccan transit trade, the pressure rf the Meccan
merchants and money-lenders on the Bedouin tribes was intensified.
The development of Islam was greatly influenced by the primitive
religious concepts of the Arab tribes, and also by Christianity, Judaism,
and Zoroastrianism. The basic monument of early I3la.-n is the Kcran,
which expounds the bases of the dogma, worship, and law of early Islam.
The history of early Islam is usually divided into the Mecca and Medina
periods, in conformity with the same division of the suras (chapters)
of the Koran. In the Mecca: chapters Allah (the Moslem god) foretells
the early approach of the "end of the world", "of the day of judgement",
and threatens with the tortures of hell the obstinate ones who do not
recognize his all-powerful authority. He promises 1 those who are sub-
missive and patient sensual pleas'zres in a paradise after death. In
the Meccan chapters slavery and material inequality are presented as
phenomena established by the same all-powerful Allah, and which, there-
fore, are not subject to any change. The point of view advanced by
certain apologists of Islam concerning the "crmmunism" of early Islam
and alleging that Mohammed, who is considered the fgander of Islam, was
a revolutionary and a great social reformer, is anattempt to conceal
the real essence of Islam. The Koran, which dilig;ntly and consi-,tently
Ct:~fe-,m:s and justifies slavery (it is considered to have been established
'...-y .llah), exploitation, the material and social inequality of people,
id the best refutation of this kind of falsification.
In Mecca the spread of Islam was very limited, The Kureishite
aristocracy was hostile to the new religion, fearing that its success
would lead to the liquidation of the cult of Kabha to which the trade
between the Meccans and the Aran tribes was tied. According to Arab
tradition, in 622 Mohammed and his small group of followers resettled
in Medina. In this agricultural oasis Islam quickly spread am-gig two
Arqb tribes. Three so-called Jewish tribes (probably Arabs wh pro-
.fs :,,e3 Judaism) were driven out of Medina and partially ex;,:= '.=atcd,
while their lands and dwellings were transferred to the Moslems. The
Medina Moslems, headed by Mohammed, conducted an nmcd struggle against
the I4ecans. This struggle ended in a compromise in 630. An agreement
was concluded whereby the Meccans adapted Islam and occupied a
Ajjent place in the Moslem crinnnuzity, while the followers of Moha:ri cd
recognized Mecca as a holy city and the temple of xabha as the prin-
cipal sanctuary, to which pilgrimages were ordered.' The followers of
Mohammed also retained the cult of the ancient fetish of the "black
rock", which was in the Kabha. The Moslem community was decisively
formed in the Median period and was the nucleus of the Arab state.
This community, uniting people on the basis of their adherence to the
new religion, was radically different from earlier, existing tribal
organizations, in which people were united mainly by signs of blood
relationship. The Medina suras regulated property and social relations
in the conditions of the already established class society. In these
suras special attention is devoted to the maintenance of private prop-
erty and the defense of the rights of property-holders. "Islam", wrote
F. Engels, "is a religion adapted for the inhabitEtnts of the East,
especially for the Arabs, that is, for the townspeople engaged in trade
and commerce, on the one hand, and for the nomad-Bedouins, on the other."
(K. Marx and F. Engels, Work g, Vol. 16, part 2, page 410).
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Each Moslem, the Koran teaches, must profess his belief in the
one god-Allah and recognize Mohammed as "Allah''s envoy". The Koran
depicts people as weak-willed "slaves of Allah", required to be sub-
missive and patient, to submit to Allah, to his "envoy", and to all
those in power. The rites which each Mussulman is required to per-
form are directed mainly towards inculcating the believers wi;.h a
feeling of helplessness before Allah and with dependence on him.
According ti the Koran's instructions, every Moslem must pray, observe
the fast during the entire ninth month of the Moslem lunar year--the
Ramadan, perform a pilgrimage to Mecca, and pay a state tax-nn the
harve,~t, on an increase in livestock, and on;;commercial profit. In
every way possible the Koran recommends and approves of a jehad, a
"holy war", against "infidels"--non-moslems,,the aim of which is to
spread Islam.
Islam in the Period of Feudalism. In the 7th - Cth centuries the
Arabs conquered Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia. Transcaucasia,
the Middle East, Egypt, North Africa, The Ibr. ian Feninstla, and
Northern India. Under the banner of a "holyllwar" the Arab usurpers
spr~,a.rl Islam among the enslaved peoples in several conquered coo:-.tries
'Dy fire and sword. In the conquered lands a''vast state was formed--
the Caliphate, in which Islam became the predominant religion. .Zn
this state all those who did not adopt Islam were required to pay a
heavy sr-called head tax. In the Caliphate,',.tho Arab-conquerors were
strongly influenced by the subjugated peoples, who lived under a feudal
system. Thus, in the feudal Caliphate Islam became one of the "world
religions". "The great historical turning-points," wrote F. Erecls,
"were accompanied by changes in religion only to the extent that one
speaks of three world religions existing up to the present day--
Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam." (F. Engels, Ludwig Feue_?hach and
rind of Classical German Phioso h 1951, p.-27 In the (a Lipha e
under t~ a conditions of developed feudal relations, Islam in i.ts
initial form, as expressed in the Koran, no longer satisfied the
social-political interests of the ruling classes. Therefore, to
augment the Koran there arose the Moslem "holy tradition," tr,e Sunna
which was composed of a great number of hadiths, i.e. stories, `,he
subject of which were actions and judgments :attributed to MohL,Lied.
The Sunna, which, like the Koran too, justified the class systc.i and
exploitation, sanctioned all the innovations which appeared in the
doctrines, cult, and ceremonies of Islam as a result of its development
under the conditions of an early feuds: society, including everything
the Moslems borroied from the religious beliefs, laws and customs of
the subjugated peoples. On the basis of the Koran and the Sunna the
Shariah was formulated also--a collection of feudal Moslem laws which
regulated all aspects of the life of a Moslem through a variety of
minute instructions. In the first century and a half in the existence
of Islam, the Moslem spiritual lfaders considered only the Koran and
the Sunna as the source of faith and behavior in life. Accepted as
an absolute tenet was the doctrine of predestination, according to
which all acts of all men arc predetermined by Allah.
A characteristic feature of the history of Islam is the struggle
among various tendencies and sects. Already in the first century of
its existence Islam broke down into two main trends--Sunnism and
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Shi'ism. They arose through the internicine struggle among the
successors and followers of Mohammed. Sunnism is the main, "orthodox"
current of Islam, the adherents of which build their teaching on the
Koran and Sunna and recognize as their spiritual leader the Caliph,
who at first was considered Mohammed's deputy, and later as Allah's
deputy on earth. Shi'ism developed mainly in Persia. The Sta'ites
gave a special interpretation to the Koran, had their own holy tradi-
tion in lieu of the Sunna, did not recognize the Sunnite Caliphs, to
whom they opposed their own dynasty of the 12 Imams, whom they con-
sidered the direct descendants of Mohammed. The last representative
of this dynasty, "the hidden Imam", is considered the unseen leader
of the Shiites, who await his second advent.
There arose both in Sunnism and Shi'ism a variety of sects which
were an expression of the feeble protest of the toiling masses against
class oppression and feudal exploitation. They were sometimes the
expression of the struggle of various groupings of the ruling class.
The earliest large sect of the Sunnite faith were the YJlawarijites,
who led the anti-feudal. movement of the peasant and plebian masses in
the Caliphate in the ?th and 8th centuries. The Ismailis, a Shiite
sect w':iich arose in the 8th century, derived support from the peasant
a::t1 -fsudal movement, but the feudal lords seized the leadership of
t.rie sect. Anti-feudal strivings were expressed with particular
emphasis in the movement of the Carmathians, which began in the 9th
century.
Towards the beginning of the 9th century, when, as a result of
the deepening of class contradictions in the Caliphate, more refined
methods of influencing the toiling masses were required, a rationalist
tendency appeared in Islam. Its first representatives were the
Mutazil_tes. The 9th--10th centuries saw the beginnings of an u.-.,thodox
Mosa,_:m -theology, the Kalat, the founder of which is considered -) be
AUhari (874-935). This theologian and his students, trying to rG.on-
cile the doctrine of predestination and free will, attempted to per-
suade the believers that all of man's actions are predetermined by
Allah, but since man is able to "acquire" his actions, he is respon-
sible for them before Allah.
In the 10th - 11th centuries, in the process of the further
develcpment of Islam, there arose and received universal recognition
the cult of the "holy ones", monasticism, mysticism. The cult of the
"holy ones" was expressed in visits to their graves, in prayers and
religious ceremonies at their graves, and in bringing gifts, which in
actuality profited the spiritual leaders. As in the days before the
advent of Islam, stones, trees, springs and wells associated with the
names of the "holy ones" became objects of worship.
The intensification of feudal exploitation in this period, the
suppression of anti-feudal uprisings, and inter-feudal l?aars, the.onus
of which fell on the shoulders of the popular masses, created favorable
conditions for the diffusion of mysticism in Islam and of the asceti-
cism associated with it. The spokesmen of the mystical-ascetic trend
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in Islam -Sufiism--were the dervishes (Moslem monks), who united into
frattrnities in the 11th century, later organizing Sufist orders. At
first Sufiism was characterized by opposition to "orthodox" Islam.
The spiritual leaders accused the Sufis of infidelity and declared
them heretics. The authorities persecuted them. Therefore, Sufi
teachings became very popular among the popular masses, and the Sufis
were respected and considered authorities. But Sufiism with its
doctrine of renunciation of the world, of abstention and non-resistance,
could easily be utilized as a means of stifling the class struggle.
Therefore, the medieval Moslem theologian Ghazali used his authority
to legalize the mystical and ascetic concepts of Sufiism and intro-
duced them into the system of "orthodox" Islam.
With the strengthening of the Osman empire, which in the 16th
cnntury included thb Arab lands, the leading position among the Moslems
passed from the Arabs to the Turks. The Turkish sultans, who later
took on the title of caliph, and also the Persian shahs used Islam
to justify their predatory policy and to sanctify the exploitation of
the oppresscd peoples. "With particular cruelty the Persian and Turkish
copressors used Islam in their wars against the peoples of the Cat asus,
e-ainic- the Slavic peoples, against Russia. The seizure of Trans-
c_:uc,- +a, of Georgian and Armenian lands, the mass destruction of
h torical monuments and cultural treasures, the extermination and
enslavement of thousands of women, old people, and children--all these
bestialities the Turkish and Persian invaders covered with the flag
of the struggle for religion." (M.D. Bagirov, On the Questicn cf the
Movement of Muridism and Shamil, 1950, p.6) .
Islam in the Period of Capitalism. As a result of the penetration
of European capital into Islamic lands, of the colonial enslazar.-.1t of
these countries and the beginnings there of capitalist relatior.?-., there
ero;:;, various Islamic Currents and trends, the adherents of :.,hi :h tried
to adapt Islam to the new social-economics conditions in order to keep
it as a weapon of class oppression. The founders and adherents of
these tendencies were the bourgeoisie, the liberal landowners, and the
bourgeois-landowner intelligentsia.,
The struggle. of the popular masses in the countries of the Past
against the European colonizers, which was conducted under the slogan
of Islam and led by the feudal lords and Moslem spiritual leaders,
ended in the defeat of the popular masses and the victory of the fcudal-
clerical leaders, who came to terms with the co3.unizers.
Islam was utilized by the foreign colonizers, first of all by the
English, for the enslavement of the peoples of the East and for the
struggle against the national-liberation movement of these peoples.
The English colonizers used Islam not only to organize mass fratricidal
wars among the oppressed colonial peoples, but also the struggle against
their competitors, especially Russia. England, together with sultan
Turkey, made especially extensive use of Muridism,--the most reaction-
ary and militant tendency in Islam, which carried religious intolerance,
expressed in the idea of "jihad", a "holy war" against "infidels", to
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extreme limits. Under the slogan of jihad predatary wars of the
Anglo-Turkish agent Shamil were undertaken agains Russia in the
19th century.
From the second half of the 19th century "Panislamism" became
widespread in the countries of the East. Panislam'ism is a reactionary,
religious-political teaching, propounding the unification of peoples
who profess Islam for the struggle against "the attack of the Christian
West". Panislamism, as Lenin characterized it, att-inpted "to unite
the liberation movement against European and Amer can.impc.rialism
with.the vested interests of the Khans, landlords,, Mullahs, ital."
(Wor o .th ed., vol. 31, p. 127.)
The main goal of Panislamism was to replace class contradictions
with a religious community and to preserve feudalrelations.
Islam in Modern Times. After the victory of the Great October Socialist
Revolution in Russia, in the period of foreign intervention and civil
war, Islam utilized the internal counter-revolution and fo:,oif:n impe-
.alists to struggle against the Soviet state. Thu;:, for example, in
11.9 =.n the North Caucasus on the initiative of the English imperialists
a. o l:irate" was established, at the head of which was placed a Sheikh
w~io announced his intention to rule according to the directives of
the Shariah. In Turkestan the Moslem spiritual leaders, who were
foreign agents, demanded that the country be ruled according to the
Sha:iat, and under the guise of defending Islam and the Sharia they
organized attacks against Soviet rule. During the period of the
building of socialism in the USSR, the remnants of the exploiting
classes tried to use Islam for the struggle against socialism. The
Moslem spiritual leaders, as agents of these classes, ^onductec a
struggle against the Soviet laws on the family and manr..age, ag=:ast
the, 7iberation of women, for retaining the yashnal and the rai ah.
They committed terrorist acts. The Kcran and Sha~iah were used with
special vigor in the Islamic areas of the USSR for the struggle against
industrialization and collectivization. In the U4SR, as a result. of
the victory of socialism and the liquidation of the exploiting cl,,.sses,
the social roots of Islam, as of all other religidns, have been d.?~-a-
troyed. In USSR Islam exists only as a remnant of one of the fo:,ns of
.he ideology of exploiting society. Moslems (as well as adherents of
other religions) in the USSR are granted freedom to perform religious
worship and religious ceremonies.
In countries of the East (in Turkey, the Arab countries, Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistani Indonesia), where Islam is a.state religion, it
continues to be one of the weapons in the hands'o# local reaction and
foreign imperialism. American-English impcrialists utilize Islam to
struggle against the revolutionary and national-liberation movement
and against the movement of the peace partisans i? countries where
Islam is widespread (for example the British increment of Hindu-Moslem
enmity in India; Anglo-American plans for the creation of "Islamiatan",
i.e., a bloc or federation of states, the majority of whose population
practice Islam, etc.) Bo Faha a.Sovetslcaya EntsiT diva, 2nd ed.,
1953, Vol. 18, pgs. 516 519.
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Soviet Institutions and Communications Media in the Service
6f the Communist Campaign Against Religion
"Freedom of conscience, unrestricted in any way, exists in the
Soviet land, Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution states: 'In
order to ensure t citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the
U.S.S.R. iu separated from the state, and the school from the church.
Freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda
is recognized for all citizens.' This article in our Constitution
is cons!stently and strictly enforced.
"However, many of our organizations which have the duty of
working among the masses, including. the trade unions, have drawn
incorrect conclusions from this article of our Constitution. They
have taken freedom of conscience to mean merely the freedom to worship
and have forgotten their own direct duty to spread scienti..ic atheist
propaganda. ...
"The heads of many trade union organizations have began to turn
a : lisJ eye to the fact that trade union members are prac*.:I.-Ing
religious ceremonies--marrying in church, christening the i'^ ;;hildren
and celebrating feast days. No one explains the harm of religion to
the workers and employees, particularly the young ones; no one explains
that religious beliefs demean man and spiritually cripple him. Yet
it is well known that as soon as the struggle against bourgeois
ideology slackens or, worse, is utterly neglected, the representatives
of hostile ideology extend their activity.
"The trade union; and ti sir cultural insti',!.tion- have tr-r,,-:.dous
fact"..itie^, for conducting m '_itant scientific a`Lheis?t propa-It
is their duty to help the Communist Party constCX?.bly aid ac--.:.vely to
build up a scientific, atheistic outlook in Soviet peoule. For this
purpose all means of mass enlightenment-lectures, ta''.ks, e.g ba i on
with visual demonstrat.ons, films, and libraries--mu,t be used. .,."
"Develop Extensive Scientific Atheist Propaganda", Trud, 4 Aujust
1954.
"4-. 'Fear created gods', Vladimir I1ayich Lenin said, quoting an
old philosopher, in one of his articles. The Soviet system freed the
workers from blind helplessness before the menacing forces of nature.
With the abolition of exploiter classes, the roots which nourish
religion disappeared in our country. But religious beliefs, though
shattered and undermined by life, still make themselves felt. To this
day these beliefs still poison the minds of part of the youth and
hinder its active participation in building communism,
"Yet among many Young Communist League ilxtiv members there are
incorrect, un-Marxist views that religion is a personal matter, that
one cannot fight against religious beliefs; in the course of building
communism religious ideology, they say, will fade and vanish of itself.
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"The Communist Party has never viewed religion as a ''personal
matter" of no concern. .1.
"What does it mean to fight against religious beliefs? Above all,
to bring the light of authentic knowledge to the masses of young
people and to conduct extensive and.skillful natural science propaganda.
Lectures, reports, discussions, books and popular science films, telling
how the world was built, how life came into existence on earth, where
religious beliefs came from and to whose advantage they are, must
occupy a constant and prominent place in Y.C.L. work. It is the
honorable duty of the young intelligentsia to be tireless propagandists
of science and active fighters against ignorance and. darkness. ...
"The practicing of religious rites and the celebration of
religious holidays are accompanied by many days o' drunkenness, absen-
teeism and mishaps. Great harm is caused to the interesis of the state
and the collective farms, and the personal interests of the workers
also suffer greatly from this. This the Y.C.L., agitator3 and propa-
gandists must explain to the workers, explain intbllig;eni:.y, concretely
and with statistical computations in their hands.
"It is necessary to fight against religio?is be1:.tfs :':;ughtfally
and tactfully, and in no case insult the feclin :? s' of bu7. i,F. r .rs, but
influence them by persuasion, by spreading scioi t1?'!c tai v1 edge....
"All aspects of Soviet life open great ifore the
Komsomol. The Party and Government spare noth:.-7g fo-r the t.-aining
and education of the .;rowing generation. Every;,h3.r.g is given to us
in order comp].st.ly to overcome in the minds o ybut:, the remnants of
capital .a j!'?'tg th-m religious beliefs and s~~ e ?st'.' ion:,, arc' in order
to tral;.,,, a --h ;r 'YL g person o;: the Soviet count V? '., an r..ti-~.,
conic _mr, buildr r of communism,."
":'he Young Communist League: F'.ghta : A in;'t Ra.'..,.giouo
Beliefs'', 'n0_,;,rna1-zk 2z Pravda, 14 Augus i; 195,; .
"A course of logic, if we include in it q'zost~ ~~ ~:. of atheiccrn,
can b-3 of great help in training students for high:.y qualified
atheistic work.
"There are great opportunities for anti-religious propaganda in
the very essence of a course in elementary logic.' ..,
We consider that the tasks involved in the development of
atheistic propaganda should also be expressed toka certain extent in
the programs on logic. Unfortunately, in the program approved by the
Social Sciences Teaching Administration last year questions of atheistic
propaganda in the course of logic were not dealt with. Strange as it
may seem, the new programme even takes a certain-step backwards in this
respect compared with the draft program for 1953. In the latter, there
was a particular point on the topic 'Basic stages of the development
of Logic', entitled: 'Conversion of the logic of Aristotle into the
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servant of theology in the Middle Ages'. This point does not appear
in the new programme. That is wrong."
I.V. Novik, Candidate of Philosophical Services, Moscow State
University, "Questions of Atheism in Logic courses", Vestik
Vyss'M.ey Shkoly (Hightr-,School Herald), #8, passed for publication
11 August 1955.
"The Central Committee of the CPSU in its resolutions has poihted
out that scientific-atheistic propaganda must be carried out system-
atically and not in outbursts. Fulfilling these instructions of the
Party Central-Committee, the ccmmanders and political officials of
the Navy have achieved certain successes in disseminating a knowledge
of natural sciences among the personnel of ships and units. However,
of late scientific-atheistic propaganda in the Navy has visibly weakened.
In particular, unforgivably few lectures on natural-science themes are
being read by the propaganda lecturers of the Political Administration
of the Black Sea Fleet. For a prolonged period they have been
delivering only a single lecture on the subject 'Religion The Enemy
cf Science and Progress'. Only now, after a great lapse of time, has
a lecture been prepared on the harmfulness of religious prejudices and
superstitions. This is clearly inadequate. ...
"In the Communist upbringing of sailors great importance attaches
to the cultural-education institutions of the -Navy. They must be
centers of militant scientifio-atheistic propaganda. This cannot,
unfortunately, be said of the Officers' House, where the head is Comrade
Afanasyev. Here scientific-atheistic propaganda is neglected. Things
are no better either in certain other Officers' Houses and sailors'
clubs. Such a situation cannot be tolerated. Cultural-educati.c,nal
institutions have an obligation to help commanders, political c ficials,
har?~;y and Komsomol organisations to bring up the personnel of ;aaips
and units in the spirit of militant atheism."
"Daily Attention to Scientific-Atheistic Propaganda", (Lead
article), SovetskiyFlot (Soviet Fleet), 9 September 1955.
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Summary of 19 October 14~j " `'' ''' 15 u .. 4.ryij*, 10c-tuner of
aJure8ll of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, (in the
the C
F I% effects of religious survivals in the USSR:
The Communist Party teaches us that the position of the church in the
USSR should not be compared with the position of the church in an
exploiters' society.
In a bourgeois society, the church is the bulwark-and the tool of
ruling classes who use its services to enslave the working people. In
our country, as a result of the liquidation of the exploiting classes,
the old basis on which the church stood was destroyed,.
The majority of the clergy in our country are loyal to the Soviet regime,
This does not mean, however, that religious beliefs have ceased to be
reactionary and that atheistic propaganda is not necessary. The
Communist Party, which stands upon the only correct world outlook--?
MM.rxism-Leninism--cannot remain neutral in its attitude toward religion,
a:. ideology which has nothing in common with science.
Persistent study of the laws of the development of society and nature
convinces Soviet people that the fate of human race is decided by real
conditions of the real development of society and nature and not by the
will of supernatural, nonexistent forces. The complete liquidation of
the exploiting classes, the cultural revolution, And the systcmatic
propagation of the scientific world outlook have resulted in the fact
that the great majority of 0oviet people have become corscious buu.=.lders
of communism and have broken away from religion.
Socialist ideology predominates in the USSR and the new sccialist
economy has created in our country conditions which do not support reli-
gious beliefs, but, on the contrary, lead to the gradual dying o;.~t of
these beliefs in the consciouoness of the working people.
However, a certain number of our people are still' attracted by the
religious beliefs. As far as their nature is concerned, the religious
beliefs and organizations, remnants of the old world and of the
exploiters' superstructure, are the most (conservative?) elements of
this superstructure which are still able to survive the conditions
which brought them into being.
While it was possible,, during the progress of the Revolution, to destroy
the existing state administration, to prohibit propaganda of reactionary
views, and to close down reactionary press organs, it was impossible to
use the same means to destroy religious beliefs amcng the people, to
close religious establishments and to prohibit religious services.
It would be naive to think that religious beliefs will die a natural
death. Such views are anti-Marxist and anti-Party; religious beliefs
are long-lived, an enormous force, and can become even stronger.
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The great war conducted by the Soviet Union against the aggressors, the
difficulties connected with this war, anxiety about fate of members of
families, and other factors contributed to the strengthening of reli-
gious beliefs among the most backward part of the Soviet people. The
weakness of scientific-atheistic propaganda during and after the war
also contributed to the strengthening of religious beliefs. Simulta-
neously, churchmen and members of varicus sects intensified their
propaganda.
There are other rcasons for the survival of religious beliefs in our
country. Such survivals result from the action of the general sociolo-
gical law manifested in the fact that the development of human con-
scioushess lags behind social development and economic conditions of
life.
The vitality of the remnants of religious beliefs also can be explained
by the existence of the imperialist camp which is interested in the
survival of these beliefs and which is striving to revive and support
them.
The unsatisfactory general standard of cultural development of a certain
::,.cover of our people must also be blamed. A certain number of older
believers are contaminating the younger generation with their religious
prejudices. The force of a bad tradition, of a bad habit, is a terrifib
force,
The main rcason, however,, for the survival of religious beliefs is the
weakening of scientific antireligious propaganda and intensification of
religious propaganda by churchmen and members of religious sects.
In recent years church propagandists have devoted special atter.I.Lon to
attracting young men and women to the church.
What is the harm of religious prejudices under the conditions of the
construction of communism?
These prejudices are harmful because religion teaches humility and
submission to a powerful god, poisons the consciousness of the Soviet
people with lack of confidence in their own abilities, and kills their
energy and joy in life. By promising a better future in another world,
religion distracts the attention of Soviet people from the construction
of communism.
All religions, without exception, reject science and replace it with
blind faith, Religion kills the best human qualities, such as
inquisitiveness, boldness, and courage, qualities particularly needed
by the Soviet people who are marching toward communism.
The religious and national intolerance preached by religion is
particularly harmful because-it undermines the order established in
our multinational state.
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The unmasking of religious ethics which inflict much harm on Soviet
society today is a most urgent necessity in the interest of dommunist
construction and in the interests of friendship among people of all
countries. Work, which plays the decisive role ihthe progressive
development of the human society, is proclaimed by-'religion as the
curso of mankind.
Religion appeals to believerst Love your enemies And bless those who
curso you. It is enough to remind you of the sufferings of our people
during the war against the fascist invaders to prove the harmfulness
of this teaching. Not love for fascist cannibals 'out hatred of them
helped us to defeat our enemies and defend our freedom and country.
Religion teaches that a wife should fear her husband. It develops a
feeling of weakness among.women. Communist ethics reject such a con-
temptible attitude toward women, On the contrary,nthe Soviet regime
has freed women, granted them full rights in political, social, and
economic life.
Facts prove that religious people arc also superstitious. The most
h?Lghly developed superstition is manifested in fortune-telling, which
i- nothing but deceit and trickery.
Observance of religious rites and holidays is one of the most harmful
remnants of the past. Let us consider baptism of children and church
marriage. The baptism ceremony is based on old beliefs of protecting
a child against evil spirits by submerging it in water. Church marriage
is also based on various marriage ceremonies of the pro--Christian era.
Both ceremonies reflect the beliefs of primitive people who, by various
magic gestures, tried to protect a child or a youn couple. The porr-
formanco of these rites of savages in our time is the fruit of i,:c;k-
wardness and lack of culture among certain people.
The origin of the majority of Christian holidays is the same.
Christians believe that Easter is a holiday marking the resurrec;tion
of Christ. Science, however, has proved that Christ never existed and
that the origin of this holiday can be clearly traced to the pre-
Christian era.
Religious holidays often inflict harm on our national economy and on
believers. Very often, as a result of these holidays, established
periods for various types of farm work are violated and this results
in losses of yield.
Many church-goers in our country do not go to church because they are
believers but because they are following an old tradition. Despite
this, Soviet society must conduct the struggle against religious super-
stitions which distract people from the struggle for the flourishing
of our country and for higher cultural standards for our peoplo.
It should be remembered that our constitution not pnly guarantees
freedom of conscience, but also freedom of antireligious propaganda.
The fact that religious organizations in our country are not acting
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as a politically hostile force and that they are taking part in the
struggle for peace should not result in the conclusion that we should
abandon the struggle against religious ideology. Everyone who is of
a different opinion forgets that despite the changed position of the
church toward the socialist state, religious ideology has not lost
its reactionary character and continues to be an obstacle on the road
to the construction of communism.
The Nov. 10, 1954 decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on tho
conducting of scientific-atheistic propaganda among the population
stresses the need for this propaganda. This propaganda, however, should
not offend religious beliefs and members of the clergy. It should
always be remembered that offending actions against the clergy or direct
interference by administrative organs in the work of religious
organizations only lead to the strengthening of religious prejudices.
The best means of struggle against religion is scientific ideological
propaganda.
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1. Central Government Minority Policies
The Chinese Communist regime has taken determined steps to deal with
discontent among the minority nationalities. The Moslems were finally
permitted to set up their Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region under rigid
Chinese controls. An attempt is being made to bring Tibet, Sinkiang, Tsin-
ghai, and Inner Mongolia under control by resettling Chinese peasants in
these areas and strengthening local Chinese garrison forces.
Minority nationality cadres are encouraged to work for the regime.
They are strongly urged to study Chinese in addition to socialism. Cadres
among Chuang people, who have just been given a written language, are de-
voting their time to studying Chinese. Government and party organs, es-
pecially the latter, continue to claim industrial and agricultural achieve-
ments in the minority areas as a result of the "correct party policy on
minorities."
In the course of attacking rightist Ma Chen-vu., it was revealed that
there had been repeated outbreaks among the Moslems during the past few
years. Evidently, the Chinese Communists had inherited the Moslem troubles
which had plagued the Manchu and Kuomingtang regimes for the past centuries.
Little news comes out of Tibet, but it reflects a tense situation there.
The Hu-ho-hao-t'e Nei-men -ku Jih-pao reported on 17 June 1958 that
the first session of the second people's congress of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region had recently been concluded. In addition to receiving
a lengthy political report delivered by Ulanfu, chairman of the region,
the session passed resolutions accepting the report, the financial report
for 1957, the budget for 1958, the 60-article Five Year Plan for socialist
construction, the judicial report, the 1956-1957 agricultural and livestock
development program, and report of the bills committee.
Commenting on the political report, the session noted the achievements
of the rectification and antirightist campaigns and the early fulfillment
of the nation's First Five-Year Plan. It then called on the masses to over-
come their superstition and conservatism in order to promote the big leap
forward in production. The session also noted that the 1957 financial re-
port showed a surplus and expressed the hope that it will do so again in
1958.
Editorially commenting on the work of the session, the newspaper of
the same date pointed out that, although outstanding results have been
achieved by the region in economic, social, and cultural progress, still
many cadres are conservative while the broad masses are backward and
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superstitious. It urged both cadres and broad masses to study and improve
their ideology in order to comprehend the main line fully and to utilize
it in the struggle for a big leap forward for the red flag in 1959.
Reporting on industrial progress, the Hsin-hue News Agency said on
31 October that some 1,640 factories have been organized in the Daghur,
Evenki, and Orunchun banners (ch'i) to produce fertilizer, milk products,
woolens, and hydroelectric power. It said the Orunchun people have been
able to change from their nomadic life to socialism without having to
undergo the tortuous development of the intermediate stages.
Industrial progress in other minority areas was reported in an item
appearing in the 24 September issue of the Lhasa Tibet Jih-pao. It is re-
ported that to promote the construction of Tibet tl'e Tibet Military Region
has formally organized an army construction coi and headquarters with Fu
T'ing-hsiu as commander and Ch'iao Chia-ch'ien as political cotmissar.
This organization is now surveying the construction of a hydroelectric power
plant at Na-chin, in the eastern. suburbs of Lhasa. Ch'iao Chia-ch'ien
called on the members of the staff to overcome superstition, improve their
techniques, introduce innovations, and promote racial solidarity to assure
the success of the project.
The 28 July 1958 issue of the Urumchi SinkiangJih- ao carried a di-
rective of the Sinkiang party committee on the big leap forward in agti-
cultural and livestock production in 1959. Point 1 of the directive called
for the following targets: new land to be developed, 8 million mou; land
to be placed under cultivation, 88.9 million mou; and land to be seeded,
35.9 million mou. Grain production is fixed at a total of 12-13.2 billion
chin, with a per unit production of 500-550 chin aid a per-capita produc-
tion of 2,000-2,200 chin. Cotton production is fixed at 3.6-4.5 billion
chin, with a per unit production of 120-150 chin and a per-capita produc-
tion of 30-40 chin. The target for afforestation is 50 million mou. The
target for livestock production is an over-all increase to 28,610,000 head,
with a net increase of 15-17 percent in large animals and a 150 percent
increase in hogs.
Point 2 of the directive called for the realisation of these targets by
expanding irrigation works, increased application of fertilizer, deep-
plowing, innovations in farm implements, purebred seed selection, proper
planting of winter wheat, development of virgin land, a greater effort for
a big leap forward in livestock production, a vast afforestation program,
and the intensive training of technical cadres.
Point 3 called on cadres to utilize their experiences in summer grow-
ing and those of Ye An-ying in the course of the third and fourth stages
of the rectification movement to promote production. The directive urged
cadres to take positive steps in leading the peasants by bold action.
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Concluding, it pointed out that, as an over-all condition to achieving
success in the implementation of the directive, all cadres must initiate
a socialist education movement at the time of the autumn harvest in all
agriculture and livestock areas in order to promote the main line of the
party.
Revealing some of the problems arising from the implementation of
this directive, another item in the same issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao
reported that cadres have completed the first stage of the studies on the
main line and have taken final examinations in preparation for initiating
studies on the second stage. However, the item pointed out, the examina-
tions revealed serious shortcomings among the cadres. It urged the party
to strengthen its leadership in order to overcome these weaknesses.
The 2 July issue of this paper carried an agitprop item entitled
"Strengthen and Develop the People's Collective Ownership System of Social-
ism and the Dictatorship endthe International Solidarity of the Proletariat,"
which warned against the "machinations" of US "imperialists" and Chiang
Kai-shek, and called for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat.,
It also called for the solidarity of the proletariat and the expansion of
international Communism. It said that the socialist camp under the leader-
ship of the Soviet Union is growing stronger daily while the imperialist
camp is growing weaker as the result of unemployment and falling production.
Concluding, the item called on the masses to oppose imperialism, war, and
the enslavement of people by struggling for world peace, national libera-
tion, democracy, freedom, and socialism.
The 31 August issue of the Tibet Jih-pao reported that fast progress
is being made in the cultural development of minority nationality areas.
In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, it said, a vast movement is under
way to expand the school network in order to fulfill the historic task of
wiping out illiteracy. In the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, 54+6 in-
termediate agricultural schools were established during the previous 2
months in 60 cities and hsiens. In 17 hsiens, everyone has an elementary
school education. In the Liu-chou, Nan-ning, and Pai-se areas of the
Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region, over 390,000 children are enrolled in
school for the first time. Many minority schools are expanding their
Chinese-language courses. All classes in the Yen-pien Korean Autonomous
Chou have Chinese classes, and Chinese is used for instruction in some of
the junior and senior middle school courses. Over 130,000 children of the
Chuang, Yao, Mao, and T'ung nationalities are now studying Chinese in
elementary schools, the paper reported.
On 17 May, the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that in Szechwan Province
there are 295 schools in the Yi and Tibetan areas. Some of the Yi school
children belong to slaves who gained their freedom with the liberation.
Nomads in Szechwan now have mobile schools.
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The agency report added that the Miao-Tung autonomous area in south-
eastern Kweichow Province organized 82 middle schools and 651 primary
schools in April and May 1958. These schools include courses in agricul-
ture, animal husbandry, industry, sanitation, and sericulture. The area's
cooperatives have allotted 2,600 hectares of farm land 1,800 oxen, and
some farm implements to the schools for field operations; 93 percent of
the school-age children are now in school.
In Inner Mongolia, the report said, 90 percent of the school-age
children are getting a primary school education in half the region's hsiens
and cities. The total enrollment in primary schools has reached32 million.
Issue No 34 of the Min-tzu HHuaa- ao (Nationalities Pictorial) Minzu
Huabao), published in October 1958 in Peiping, reported that there is now
one national and ten local national minority publishing houses. In 1957,
over 1,763 minority nationality publications in various languages were
published; this is 283.9 percent above the figure for 1952. The total run
was 1,461 copies, or 221 percent above 1952. Between 1952 and 1957, over
61.2 million copies of 6,700 kinds of publications in over 10 languages
were published. In addition to those on Marxism-IJeninism and the works
of Mao Tse-tung, there were numerous scientific, sociological, and cul-
tural publications. These publications are promoting the big leap forward
and the cultural revolution by overcoming superstitious beliefs among the
minorities, the source said.
A 12 October news release of the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that
while addressing a meeting to mark the second anniversary of the founding
of the Tibet branch of the Chinese Buddhist Association, Gen Chang
Ching-vu said, "The question of religious beliefs and social reform are
two different things and cannot be mixed up. Still more impermissible is
for religious circles to use religion as a pretext for opposing social re-
form. The existence of a system of exploitation is the main reason for
Tibet's poverty and backwardness. The people's livelihood can be improved
only through reforms, developing production, and building socialism by
joint efforts." Present at this meeting was the Dalai lama.
The 8 August issue of the Sinkia Jih-pao reported that a group of
Moslems from Sinkiang had returned after a pilgrimage to Mecca. In their
travels, they visited Mongolia, the Soviet Union,: Czechoslovakia, Switzer-
land, and Greece. The Urumchi ;party committee held a reception for the
returning pilgrims.
Outwardly, the Chinese Coma nist regime continues to display a liberal
attitude toward religion and the minorities. How@ver, in the implementation
of party policies and lines which conflict with this attitude, the regime
will not hesitate to take stern measures to satisfy its demands.
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2. Minority Reaction to Central Government Policies
While the Chinese Communist regime is attempting to wean the minori-
ties away from their traditional mores, the established leadership of each
nationality group is resisting the change, since it will endanger their
paramountcy. The party therefore is attempting to drive a wedge between
the leadership and the masses in the minority areas. The leadership is
accused of stressing the "peculiarities" of the area in order to secure
special privileges or exemptions.
However, the party is now finding itself in an awkward position.
While denying that "peculiarities" exist, it "acceded" to the wish of the
upper strata in Tibet and delayed social reforms there for 6 years because
the people there were "not ready.." Yet the party attacked Chiang Kai-shek
for saying, "Everyone in China is Chinese," when it decided that autonomous
minority areas were necessary because of the special needs of the people
living there.
Such illogical reasoning makes it difficult to enforce party direc-
tives. When minority leaders are refused special privileges, they can
claim racial discrimination. Therefore, the minority reaction of central
government policies is far from satisfactory.
The Hsin-hua News Agency reported on 30 April that in the course of
the rectification campaign national minority cadres thoroughly criticized
local nationalism and took positive steps to strengthen racial solidarity.
In the Yen-pien Korean Autonomous Chou, Chinese and Korean cadres are
learning each other's language in order to improve their relations. Over
2,000 of these cadres are learning the proletarian viewpoint of working
alongside the peasants in cooperatives in actual production or administra-
tive activities. The working style of the national minority cadres has
greatly improved after developing closer relationships with local masses
as a result of the rectification movement.
After thoroughly studying Chairman I+ao Tse-tung's speech "On Dealing
With Contradictions Within the Ranks of the People," 160 Tibetan cadres
of the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee took concrete steps
to improve their work by holding public criticisms of their erroneous ide-
ology, the news agency said.
The 14 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that commercial
and industrial circles in Urumehi had met recently to discuss the struggle
against local nationalism. Addressing the gatherings, Hsin Ian-t'ing
pointed out that China has surpassed the US in grain production, and, in
this. atomic age, he said, it is best for businessmen to "ride the east
wind" and reform themselves. He added that there is no doubting the suc-
cess of socialism and therefore businessmen should not get involved in
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capitalistic plots. Nast businessmen are neither supporting the leftist
Marxist interpretation of nationalism nor the bourgeois rightist interpre-
tation. This is erroneous, he said; all businessmen mast immediately swing
to the left; otherwise, they will be drifting to the right. It is impossi-
ble to remain neutral. People who attempt to rationalize or become emo-
tional on the subject of local nationalism are 1jound to make mistakes.
They must be firm in the struggle against local nationalism.
The 9 August issue of the Sinkiang Jih-.ao reported that party commit-
tees in Karasu, Aksu, and Khotan had recently held meetings to combat local
nationalism. Minority leaders who are demanding a national independent re-
public were attacked for promoting separatism. They were charged with op-
posing Chinese cadres and Sinkiang production and` construction army units.
Wu-mai-erh A-pu-te-la Yu-fu, commissioner of the `Aksu special district,
utilized his position to employ counterrevolutionary elements and conduct
local nationalist activities.
Another news item in the same issue featured.:the theme "strengthen
national solidarity with the Chinese at the core" by Qiting achievements
of the minority nationalities in Sinkiang under the guidance of the Chi-
nese. In the previous 4 months, the item said, the minority nationals
made brilliant achievements in industry, agriculture, and livestock graz-
ing.
Lumping attacks against local nationalism ijth parochialism, the
K'un-ming Yunnan Jih-pao editorially commented on 31 July 1958 "Yunnan
Province has the characteristics-of a border province where many minority
people live and production techniques are deficient. However, the pur-
pose of acknowledging these characteristics is to implement the policies
and directives of the party Central Committee more fully in order to reach
the fundamental common goal -- socialism and Communism. Some good cadres
may believe the biased and blind theory of 'local:peculiarities' but they
can be corrected by persuasion and criticism. Pa~ochialists, however, use
the'local peculiarity theory'to oppose the party Central Committee. On
the argument that certain areas of nationalities are different from others,
certain individuals oppose the party line in hopes of creating an indepen-
dent kingdom."
Continuing, the editorial pointed out that parochialists utilize this
theory to evade the party's organizational procedure by appointing local
cadres to key positions in the party and government. This is a serious
intraparty contradiction, since the major party line is not the localiza-
tion, but the communization of cadres. Only cadres with a complete under-
standing of Communism can implement the party line and struggle for the
masses. Striking at the heart of the question of.' parochialism, the edi-
torial said, "One point must be emphatically pointed out. Local cadres
generally mean members of the party who were underground at the time of
the liberation. Most of these cadres were intellectuals who have not been
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completely reformed. On the other hand, nonlocal cadres are worker and
peasant as well as veteran intellectual cadres with sound indoctrination.
Therefore, the question of local and outside nonlocal cadres is metamor-
phosed.into intellectual versus worker-peasant cadres.... Parochialists
try to place local intellectual cadres who are still not properly reformed
on the same level with nonlocal cadres. This plot is easily exposed."
Continuing its chastizing, the editorial said, "In fact, intellectual
cadres, whose only claim is that they speak the local dialect, are really
not, 'localo at all.... Cadres without Communist ideology and having no
feeling in common with the workers and peasants are not Communist cadres,
even if they are 100 percent local people."
To further implement the party policy of national solidarity, a Hsin-
hue News Agency dispatch dated 13 May said that Headquarters of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army in Ch?eng-tug Szechwan Province, had recently
called a meeting of ranking members of minority nationalities in the armed
forces. Over 204 ielegates from the Tibetan, Yi, Chiang, Miao, and Li-hsu
nationalities attended the meeting. Pledging to improve their work in self-
defense and agricultural production, the delegates will take important
roles in protecting the democratic transformation program, maintaining pub-
lic peace, and safeguarding production. Of these delegates, 1+0 percent
were slaves before the liberation, the dispatch said.
The 5 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih- ao reported that, despite the good
record of many cadres who were transferred to Fou-k'ang Hsien, Sinkiang,
to engage in production, some have never ceased complaining. A cadre who
was transferred to a cooperative did nothing all day but harp on self-pity.
He packed up his belongings twice and left for his old office. Another
wanted to give up the revolution and go to Urumchi to sell milk. A young
cadre complained that there was no future in the rural areas and said that
he was wasting the best years of his life there. A large number of cadres
mistakenly devoted all their attention to manual labor and ignored politi-
cal training. They reasoned that since they were transferred for manual
training, they had better stick to it and earn more work points. Thereere
even some whothi*they are above everybody else and fail to follow orders,
obey regulations, or work regularly. Finally, some failed to adjust to
rural living conditions. Chinese cadres refused to live with minority na-
tionals. In view of this situation, the party committee took firm action.
It ordered transferred cadres to observe discipline, hold regular politi-
cal meetings, make confessions, and sign a pledge, the paper said.
The 10 September 1958, No 9, issue of the Peiping periodical Chun -
kuo Mu-szu-lin (Chinese Moslem) carried several letters from its readers
on the question of intermarriage of Moslems and Chinese. These letters
commented on an article in an earlier issue of the periodical and generally
approved this type of marriage. In most cases1it was a matter of a Moslem
woman marrying a Chinese man. The more forceful Moslems called for "edu-
cating" the Moslem community to favor .su?wh marriages, since the Moslem
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community should not consider itself apart from the masses of China.
Praising the leadership of the party, younger Moslems point out that pres-
ent conditions are different from the old days. Now contract marriages
are no longer the custom. The letters state that;, although Moslem prac-
tices should be respected in mixed marriages, still the Moslems involved
should not rigidly insist on their observance by hon-Moslems. They pointed
out that, with the socialist construction of new China, new opportunities
are being opened for everyone and Moslems should take advantage of them.
An article in the same issue carried a critique of an earlier article
in the periodical on Moslem history. The critique took exception to the
statement, "Moslems the world over are one family*" It said that this ide-
ology is a remnant from the feudalistic exploiting class and that such
thinking is in direct contradiction to the solida'ity of the proletariat.
The 12 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that a minority
work conference had been held in Peiping recentlyyto review the work of
teams engaged in a compilation of the histories o' various minority nation-
alities. The meeting brought out serious local nationalism among the work-
ers engaged in writing the history of peoples in Sinkiang. Insteadar work-
ing closely with local party committees, the investigators repeated
reactionary statements on nationalities by such bourgeois specialists as
Fei Hsiao-t'ung, Wu Tse-lin, Huang Hsien-fan, Tsem Chia-vu, Li Yu-i, Yang
K'un, and Yang Ch'eng-chih. Instead of adopting the principles of Marxism-
Leninism in their investigation work, they used tle subjective minority
nationality point of view. In this respect the Sinkiang team committed
the serious error of acting diametrically opposite to the instructions of the
central government and the Sinkiang party committee. The conference de-
cided to complete a brief history of the minorities in 3 years and compre-
hensive history in 4-7 years. In the course of tYe conference, the dele-
gates heard reports by Wang Feng, deputy chief of the united front
department and of the nationalities committee. of the party Central Commit-
tee, and Hsieh Fu-min, deputy chairman of the nationalities committee of
the All-China People's Congress.
3. The Moslem Movem?,nt;in the Northwest
Moslem separatist movements in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang provinces
reached their height in 186+ when Yakub Beg and others were virtual masters
of Kashgar and the Tarim Basin. It was not until the star of Tso Tsung-
t'ang rose over the northwest that the Moslems in'Shensi were pacified in
1870 and in Khotan, in Sinkiang Province, in 1878. General Tso Tsung-t'ang's
military feats were equaled only by the Chinese generals of the Han and
T'ang dynasties who brought these Moslem territories under Chinese rule.
Although the Chinese Communists met with little resistance in their
occupation of the northwest and the far .Nest, Moslem resistance to Communism
is still strong in these.areas. This resistance even extends across the
western Chinese border into Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union. With the as-
cendency of the Middle East, the homeland of Islam, Moslem unrest noses a
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Despite their gains with the more backward minorities, the Chinese
Communists are apparently unable to find a solution for the Moslem question.
The Ho-fei Anhwei Jih-pao of 29 June denounced Moslem rightists for charg-
ing that the party nationality policy was designed to deceive the people
of the nation and that a people's democratic dictatorship was a dictator-
ship over good people.
The newspaper said that the ideology of the Moslems was, "all Moslems
belong to one family," "Moslems must fight for their religion, not their
country," and "Moslems should unite and organize their own government."
The Moslem movement was very much in the public eye in 1958. Prepara-
tions for the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region have been under way for
years. The region was finally organized in October 1958 under circumstances
far from pleasant. During the year, unmitigated attacks were leveled at
Moslem rightists. The China Association for the Promotion of Moslem Culture
was disbanded. Ma Chen-vu,, a powerful Moslem leader, was openly accused of
misdeeds when he attended the Kansu People's Congress. He was charged with
organizing Moslem uprisings in the northwest since 1952.
Issue No 34+ of the Min-tzu Hua-pao, published in October 1958, carried
an article by Han Tao-jen, deputy secretary-general of the Ningsia party
work committee, on the establishment of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Re-
gion. Praising the solidarity of the Moslems with the other nationalities
in China, he said that the Moslems will make great economic and cultural
progress with the establishment of a region especially for Moslems. He said
that in this 17,800-square-kilometer area there are 2 million people, of
whom 33 percent are Moslem. Arable land in this area amounts to 7 mou and
7 fen per person. The area is rich in shale and petroleum. A large field
is now being worked &t Wu-chuang. In contrast to the old Kuomingtang days,
the areais being rapidly developed through the united efforts of the Moslem
and Chinese people so that its inhabitants will enjoy a bright future, the
article said.
On 16 October, the Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao reported that the first
plenary session of the party committee of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Re-
gion was held in Yin-ch'tsn on 12 October. Speakers at this session said
that they were eager to study the works cf Chairman Mao and the General Line
and policy of the party. They pledged to participate enthusiastically in
the manual labor program and to strengthen their ideology by remolding it.
The 25 October issue reported that the first people's congress of the
Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region met on 24 October to select a slate of of-
ficers for the regional government. Among the delegates was Lin. Pao-chu, a
member of the party politburo, who represented the party Central Committee
and Chairman Mao. The main address was given by Liu K' o-p' ing, chairman of the
preparatory committee for the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region. His address
traced the progress of the Moslems in the area under party leadership and
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urged both cadres and the broad. masses to study Marxism-t ninism and the
works of Mao Tse-tung in order to liberate their minds. Pointing out that
95 percent of the peasant households now belong to people'? communes,
he urged early fulfillment of 1959 grain production targets. Concluding,
he praised the party's religious policy which permits no interference with
each person's beliefs.
The 24 October issue of the newspaper reported that in welcoming Lin
Po-ch'u, Liu K'o-p'ing, chairman of the preparatory committee of the Ningsia
Moslem Autonomous Region, said, "From the beginning of preparations for the
establishment of the region, the central authorities have given due consid-
eration to all Moslems. The neighboring provinces and autonomous regions
have also given warm support. China is making agiant and all-round big
leap forward in socialist construction. Our various nationalities are con-
tinuously developing their friendship and solidarity along the victories
scored in the socialist cause. This meeting, is another vivid expression
of the close unity among the various nationalities of China."
On 27 October the newspaper reported that while addressing the second
session of the congress Lin Po-ch'u reviewed the historical exploitation of
the Moslems by their rulers and Chinese,officials. Expressing the desire
of the party to give full recognition to all Moslems, he said, "After the
liberation, the Communist Party abolished the system of racial oppression
by introducing racial equality. The party guarantees equality to Moslems
who live in small numbers among other nationalities throughout the country.
It has established four Moslem chous, nine autonomous hsiens, and several
mixed Moslem minority hsiens. The party has led the Moslems in implementing
the democratic and socialist revolutions, improving living standards, and
developing the economy, in addition to training &large number of Moslem
cadres. There has been a basic change in the Moslem society."
Continuing,- he said, "In the spring of 1956, the party Central Commit-
tee proposed the establishment of an aultonomcus Moslem region at the provin-
cial level to meet the long-standing desire of the Moslems. The establish-
ment of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region supplies this need and is a
triumph of the party's nationalities policy. The party's basic policy for
the settlement of the nationality question is to provide regional autonomy
for the various nationalities. The work of the past few years has resulted
in regional autonomy for 35 nationalities totaling 25 million people. This
is about 90 percent of the minority population living in compact areas."
Concluding, he reviewed the tasks of the newly organized region. He
called on all nationalities in the region to unite in the struggle to im-
plement the party's General Line for socialist construction, to carry out
the socialist revolution thoroughly, and to strengthen the people's communes.
The region was called on to take positive steps to promote the cultural and
technological revolutions and to accelerate the development of an over-all
big leap forward in socialist construction in order to bring about a basic
change in the appearance of the region in the shoitest possible time.
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He closed his address with the following words: "Many people's com-
manes have been established in the region. They are the basic unit of a
socialist society and will also be the basic unit for the Conmiunist society
in China. Many people's communes in the region have both Moslem and Chi-
nese members. Such multinational communes are the basis for unity and co-
operation among the minorities."
On 28 October the newspaper reported that Wang Feng had recently told
the people's congress of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region that the in-
terests of socialism and Communism should be taken into consideration in
everything, that factors unfavorable for national unity should be overcome,
and that vigilance should be.sharpened against undermining of national unity
by imperialists and counterrevolutionaries. "The mass line is the funda-
mental political and organizational line of the party," he continued.
"The construction targets set for 1959 would be still higher, and to fulfill
them, the masses should be widely mobilized."
On 24+ October the newspaper gave the following data on the region.
The Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region is located in the northeastern sector
of Kansu Province. It includes 12 hsiens and shihs and covers a total of
77,800 square kilometers. It has a population of 2 million people of sev-
eral nationalities, but the Moslems predominate; they constitute two thirds
of the people. This former arid grazing area is rapidly being transformed
into a highly productive agricultural area as well as an industrial center.
An editorial in the 10 September 1958 issue of the Peiping periodical
Chung-kuo Mu-szu-lin make strong attacks against Ma Chen-wu. It said that
his crimes were laiT bare by the fifth session of the first Kansu people's
congress in May 1958 when he was accused of oppressing Chinese and Moslems
in Hsi-chi, Ku-yuan, Hai-yuan, Chin-chih, Chang-chia-ch'uan, and Wu-chung.
He not only utilized his religious position to inflame the populace against
the regime, but also sold so-called religious medical cures to poison and
kill the people. Despite numerous warnings, he continued his crimes. He
even presented himself as the earthly representative of Allah.
Reports appearing in the 7-17 May 1958 issues of the Ian-chou Kansu
Jih-pao on the fifth session of the first Kansu Provincial People's Con-
gress which opened on 6 May cited numerous speeches of the deputies attack-
ing local nationalism among the Moslems in the area. In her attacks, deputy
Li Iei said, "In the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region, many people are not
conscious of national solidarity. Instead, they emphasize the differences
between minorities in order to demand more privileges and to evade respon-
sibility. In their relations with other nationalities, they insist on
special rights. They drive out Chinese and other outside cadres, thus
obstructing cooperation among the various nationalities. They negate the
achievements of the party in minority areas, slander the party leadership,
and attempt to sabotage relations between the minorities and the party.
They oppose socialist transformation and do not care for self-improvement."
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Deputy Wang Ting-chieh said, "Isolated cases still occur where the re-
actionaries do their utmost to retain feudal privileges and exploit the
people. This obstructs and sabotages the production of the friasses and di-
rectly affects production expansion as well as the livelihood -and improve-
ment of the minorities. We must resolutely and mercilessly struggle
against reactionaries. As for those reactionaries with ulterior motives,
they must be severely punished."
Ma Chu-hsuan, a Moslem woman deputy, pointed out that adventures in
religious circles, taking advantage of their feudal privileges and com-
pletely disregarding the law of the land, have prevented women from par-
ticipating in socialist construction and interferd with their freedom of
marriage, thus inhibiting their active participation in socialist construc-
tion. The broad masses of women demand that this situation be corrected
immediately. The Moslem areas must implement the marriage law. This is
the desire of the Moslem masses, especially the young men and women, she
said.
During the people's congress meeting on 9 May, the deputies concen-
trated their attack on Ma Chen vu, a Moslem political "opportunist." He
was accused of openly supporting land reforms, but secretly sabotaging the
movement. He was said to have opposed the agriculture cooperativization
movement although he owns 2,000 mou of land and thousands of heads of live-
stock. It was charged that he hired 110 workers yhom he cruelly exploited.
Deputy Na Chang-chi said accusingly, "To Ma Chen-vu, killing is second na-
ture.. He told people that those who have killed will go to heaven. A man
tried to argue with him, and he sent people to cut off one of his ears.
When Ma Chen-wu visited the villages, he would come back loaded with money.
He fattened himself at. the expense of the working masses. He lives on hu-
man flesh and blood."
Adding to the accusations Wang Tzu-hou said,"On the eve -of the 8 May
rioting, Ma Chen-wu called a meeting at Ping-liaug. No one knows what he
said to the Imams. When I was at Ch'ang-hua Ch'uin Ku-yuan Hsien, Imam
Ma Hsi-tsu told me that there was rioting and advised me not to leave."
Ma Peng-chieh said, "On the eve of the 2 Apxl rioting in 1951, Ma
Chen'wu sent his henchmen to Tung-shih, Hsi-chi-t'an, anu x[u-yuan to direct
activities. He touched off the rioting by slaughtering four animals to
celebrate the Molib Nabawi festival."
The paper said that Ma Chen-wu spoke in his c'efense before the deputies
by telling lies and stressing minor matters. He evaded all responsibility
as well as the major issues involved in his rightist activities. However,
as the deputies exposed the crimes committed by 1 Chen-vu and others, who
had cruelly oppressed and exploited the masses through the exercise of their
feudal privileges, there were indications that the, struggle between the two
roads of capitalism and socialism was still going on. This aroused the
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vigilance of the deputies, who expressed a strong determination to wipe out
the ideological influence of all remnant feudal forces by forcefully criti-
cizing capitalist ideology, the paper said.
In the closing address before the congress, Chiang Tzu-hsin, secretary
of the Kansu party committee, said, "As a result of the rectification cam-
paign and:'the adtirjghttst struggle., the socialist revolution on the political
and ideological fronts has basically succeeded, and changes more favorable
to socialism have occurred in the relation between classes. The
struggle between the two roads, however, is still not completed. But fol-
lowing the expansion of the socialist revolution and the development of
socialist construction, the class struggle in China will gradually diminish
until finally it vanishes altogether. As for the ideological struggle to
establish the proletariat and destroy the bourgeoisie, that will take longer.
Failure to recognize this fact is dangerous."
The same newspaper reported that rightist activities among the Moslems
dominated sessions of the Kansu Islamic Association since its first meeting
on 11 August 1958. During subsequent sessions which lasted well into
September, such leading Moslems as Ma Shun-t'ein, Ian Hsiu-chai, Chin Tzu-
ch'ang, Ma Ju-lin, Fu Lien-sheng, Ma Ju-i, Chang Teng-t'ing,Ku Jui-t'ing,
?4a tling-te, and Ma Chi-wing were accused of attacking the party and social-
ism under the guise of promoting religion and safeguarding the interests of
the minority nationalities.
The 23 August issue of the Kansu Jih-pao reported that rightists such
as Ma Shun-t'ien slandered Imams who cooperated with the regime and abused
minority cadres. Ma Ju-lin utilized "worship days" to stir up the masses
and, in addition to threatening to kill party cadres, had managed to stop
agricultural production for a month. Ma Shun-t'ien sheltered counterrevo-
lutionaries in Moslem mosques. Ma Ju-i said, "The Communist party is sup-
pressing innocent people and is treating them unjustly." When a landlord
was executed during the land reforms, Ian Hsiu-chai said, "The Communists
behave like bandits. They take people's property and injure them." La
Shih-ming said, "If the Communist Party succeeds, the first person it will
kill is the Imam." In an attempt to place religion above the state, he
proposed the establishment of a "Ningsia Islamic Autonomous Chou."
On 26 August, the newspaper reported that Ma Shun-t'ien and Lan Hsiu-
chai were accused of swindling the public by levying money for the repair
of mosques and tombs, but actually dissipating the funds by lewd living.
They even tried to restore Chiang Kai-shek and Ma Pu-fang to power. When
Ma Bang openly revolted, Ma Shun-t'ien supported him by spreading rumors
that Ma Liang had occupied Tibet, aircraft had arrived from Taiwan, new
weapons had'arrived,and the Communists would soon be finished. However, Ma
Shun-t'ien still denied these accusations and threatened to arouse the
masses if he were accused of being a rightist.
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The newspaper reported on 27 August that Lan Hsiu-chai supported the
revolt in Ping-liang on 8 May 1952 and defended rightists by saying, "Ma
Chen-wu is a religious man. He has nothing to do with politics."
The newspaper reported on 31 August that Ma Chen-vu was accused of
plotting to set up a "Moslem Kingdom." During the Japanese occupation of
China, he tried to organize an armed force and found a "Moslem Kingdom"
with Japanese support. The "kingdom" covered Hsi-hai-ku, Ning-hsia, Ching-
yuan, and Ching-ning. Ma Chen-wu cooperated with, Ma Liang, the puppet
governor of Shantung Province during the Japanese occupation, and worked
through Baron Ogazawara in Tokyo. The plot fell through when the Japanese
were defeated, it was said.
On 4 September, the newspaper said that Kuo Nan-p'u wrote a confession
which indicated Ma Chen-wen to be the instigator of the outbreak on 2 April.
A Hsin-hua News Agency report of 17 October said tat Ma Chen-vu was for-
merly high in the councils of the party. He was formerly a member of the
nationalities affairs committee of the former Nortawest Military and Po-
litical Administrative Committee, chairman of the Ku-yuan Moslem Autonomous
Chou, a member of the national committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative council, and deputy chairman of the Gina Islamic Association.
Calling for a purge of "black sheep" from Islamic circles, the news-
paper editorially commented on 17 October, "Protection of freedom in reli-
gious belief is one of the basic policies of the party and government. We
Communists are out-and-out atheists who believe it no religion. But real-
izing that religion is a product of the human society at a certain stage of
development and that there is a law governing its origin, development, and
elimination, we consistently stand for freedom of religious belief. This
is expressly laid down in the constitution of our country. Over the past
9 years since the liberation, we have repeatedly declared that each citizen
make his own decision as to whether he believes or does not believe in
religion...the government will not only refrain from interfering in the
freedom of religion, but will protect it....
"Simultaneous with this, we have repeatedly made it clear that reli-
gious believers must observe state laws and that no person may exploit re-
ligion for illegal activities. Freedom in religion and the utilization of
religion for counterrevolutionary activities are two different things....
Any person who exploits religious beliefs for counterrevolutionary activi-
ties will be resolutely and ruthlessly suppressed by the government. Ma
Chen-vu is a heinous reactionary who works under the cloak of religion."
On 9 November, the pro-Nationalist Yin-tu Jih Tpao (Chinese Journal of
India) of Calcutta, India, carried extracts from t-e Yin-ch'uan Jih-pao,
published in Yin-ch'uan, Kansu Province, on the Mslem situation in that
area. The extracts stated that the Peiping State Council had issued orders
to Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu provinces which instructed each province
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to raise a people's armed division of 10,000-15,000 Chinese to form a "land
development army." This force will be settled among the Moslem communities
in Yin-ch'uan, Wu-chung, Chung-ning, and Ching-t'ai in the Ningsia Moslem
Autonomous Region of Kansu Province. Li Ching-lin, a party secretary, has
been designated the political commissar of this army.
)4. Unrest Among Local Minorities
Reports of unrest continue to be carried in the press. The Moslems in
the northwest and the lamas in Inner Mongolia are continuing their resist-
ance to Chinese political and economic infiltration.
Ulanfu, the leader of the Mongolians continues to prate the party line,
but as early as 26 February 1958 Jen-min Jih-pao carried this quotation by
him: "The most basic slogan of the local nationalists is,'Oppose assimi-
lation-1 They point out that the ratio between the Mongolian and Chinese
population in Inner Mongolia is now one to seven."
On 28 February, the Hsin-hua News Agency released an official report
submitted to the Nationalities Committee of the All-China People's Congress
which contained the following comment:
"The question of accepting or rejecting Chinese cadres and immigrants
is equated with the question of accepting of rejecting socialism.... The
chief reason given for rejecting the Chinese revolves around the so-called
question of 4assimilation.... Natural assimilation among the nationalities
will never be rejected because it represents a progressive trend in histori-
cal development."
The 30 July issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported that Ulanfu,
chairman and first party secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
had recently addressed a meeting of lamas of Silingol League (Mang). He
called on them to rally around the party and government by promoting sol-
idarity and following the path to socialism. Calling on the lamas to be-
come progressive, Ulanfu pointed out that professional religious workers
heretofore were handmaidens of the bourgeoisie. The lamas assisted the
ruling clique to exploit the masses of Inner Mongolia. "Now" said Ulanfu,
"the bourgeoisie and feudal classes are wiped out, but the lamas still re-
main. The lamas must now follow the road to socialism. Some of them have
already joined agricultural and livestock cooperatives. This is best be-
cause socialism and capitalism cannot coexist. In his talk on dealing with
contradictions within the ranks of the people, Chairman Mao stated six
points to guide the lamas in their socialist reforms. The government's
policy on the freedom of religion has not changed."
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Ulanfu.continued by explaining that the lamas must not sabotage social-
ism because such action constitutes contradictions which are not within the
ranks of the people, but which are between the "enemy and ourselves." He
continued by criticizing lamas who follow the third road.
"Since China's 600 million people are follo'ing the road to socialism,
there is no alternative road," he pointed out. "!The third road does not
exist. All lamas must realize that the Mongolians suffered under the
bourgeois feudalistic regime. Since the liberation, the masses have greatly
improved their economic condition and they will appose lamas who seek to
return to the old ways. At present 100 percent cif the lamas in the Lu-t'u,
96 percent in Wang-kai, and 85 percent in Ao-pao't'u temple have joined
agricultural cooperatives."
Ulanfu pointed out, "Lamas belonging to the'Hung-hsing agricultural
cooperative are supposed to work 260 days a year. They should actually
work at least 220-240 days. They may gradually develop the manual labor
program, but lamas must engage in agriculture. Otherwise, Inner Mongolia
will lapse into economic chaos and even the lamas will not be able to
continue to exist. To engage in manual labor does not necessarily mean
working in the livestock industry. A doctor performing his duties or a
craftsman engaged in handicraft production is in~luded,in the field of
manual labor. Old lamas should receive financial relief from the govern-
ment and may undertake light duties."
Concluding, Ulanfu told the lamas that participation in cooperatives
would not interfere with their ordinary life. They could still recite
their scriptures without any restrictions, and property handed over to the
cooperative would still yield an income at a fixed rate of interest."
In response to Ulanfu's speech, several leading monks pledged the
support of all. lamas for the party's leadership.' They said that the party
is their savior and they will undergo reform in ?irder to embark on the road.
to socialism.
An item in the 29 May issue of the Peiping Kuang-ming Jih-pao reported
that during the past years local nationalism. has' developed among the
400,000 Moslems in Honan Province. They have shown hostility to outsiders,
failed to cooperate with other nationalities, and rejected Chinese cadres
and peasants. They attempted to create an all-9pslem area by driving out
other nationalities. Moslems refused to join cooperatives with other
nationalities. They exaggerated national differences and made unreasonable
demands for special foods and holidays. They hoarded goods and illegally
slaughtered draft animals. They even tried to undermine the solidarity
of the party by, creating nationality differences', so that members would be
divided along nationality lines. They refuse to learn from the Chinese
and are constantly involved in quarrels with other nationalities. They
refuse to give food to Chinese cadres ^:1d even beat them up. In Yeh-hsien
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Hsien of Ts'ao-chuang Moslem Ch'u, Moslems were so busy illegally slaughter-
ing cattle and dealing in the black market that work attendance was only 60
percent. These shortcomings are being corrected through socialist education.
On 31 October, the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that delegates to the
second plenary conference of the China Association for the Promotion of
Moslem Culture, held from 26 to 29 October 1953 in Yin-ch'uan, had approved
the dissolution of the association. In his closing address, Li K'o-p'ing,
chairman of the association, reviewed the development of the Moslems in
China and the organization of the association with the comment, "Although
the China Association for the Promotion of Moslem Culture has now wound
up its work and organizational functions, all Moslems must further their
solidarity and devote greater efforts to socialist construction in addition
to striving for the transition from socialism to Communism."
In his report to the Tsinghai Provincial People's Congress, which was
carried in the 4 July issue of the Hsi-ning Tsinghai Jih.-pao, Yuan Jen-yuan
attacked the dissension created by former governor Sun Tso-pin among the
various nationalities in Tsinghai. Sun Tso-pin failed to implement party
policies and even dropped the party membership designation in publishing lists
of appointments. He and his henchmen opposed the rectification movement and
said that, although the party knows nothing about law, it still tries to rule
over everything.
Pointing out that the party observes its policy of freedom in religion,
Yuan Jen-yuan attacked those who use religion as a cover to carry on
counterrevolutionary activities. He praised the arrest of Hsia-jih-chuang,
To.-erh-chi, Cha-hsia, and others. Utilizing religion as their cloak, these
culprits worked with "imperialist spies," converted mosques and temples into
centers for counterrevolutionary activities, circulated all kinds of rumors,
organized armed rebellion, promoted counterrevolutionary outbreaks, opposed
socialism, attempted to overthrow the people's regime, violated the con-
stitution, and endangered national security. He closed with a warning to
the minority nationalities in the grazing areas against participation in
counterrevolutionary activities.
In the 10 September issue of the Chum-kuo Mu-zsu-lin, Yang Cheng-ying
wrote an article attacking Ma Chen-vu and other Moslem "turncoats" aho
instigated riots against the regime. Ma Chen-vu was accused of hiding Ma
Chen-hua and other leaders of the 2 April 1956 uprising in a Moslem temple
in Wu-chung Autonomous Chou. Ma Chen-wu pointed out that, since the out-
breaks on 8 May., 2 April, and ~- April have failed, it will be necessary to
have another outbreak on 1 June [no year givenj. He printed 1,000 paper
charms and distributed them to Moslems with the admonition that they must
wear them while fighting so that they can go to heaven after death. He
designated a word as the signal for the uprising and ordered 200,000 chin
of grain stored in January 1958.' He used the cover word "charcoal" for
grain. On 8 May, he inspected his prey irations and planned to stage an
uprising at the first opportunity.
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to strengthen their leadership.
The 16 July-issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that on 22 June the
Kasghar intermediate and municipal courts held a joint session to try a
group of criminals. Several Uighurs were sentenced to death for murder which
had taken place during robberies and family quarrels. The son of a landlord
was sentenced to prison for evading taxes, violating grain. control regulations,
and leading an immoral life.
The 26 July issue carried a report of the recent rectification movement
conference of the Sinkiang panty committee. While praising the achievements
of the movement, the conference pointed out that it lacked depth and breadth.
It ordered the third stage of the movement ended about the end of July 1958,
when a review of the first three stages would be'made. The conference
called for a determined struggle against rightists exposed in the course of
the movement. It urged cadres to study and improve their ideology in order
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Part 2. POLITICAL
A. Central Government Minority Policies
Through the centuries, unrest among the minority nationalities
inhabiting China's frontiers has always been of great concern to Chi-
nese authorities. Remembering that the Chin Tartars, Mongols, and
Manchus once ruled China, the authorities adhered to a policy of sup-
pression to keep the minority nationalities in line. The Communist
regime has not succeeded in improving the situation,. The Tibetans
traditionally remained aloof. The Outer Mongolians succeeded in
achieving full independence from China with the upsurge of Soviet in-
fluence. The Uighurs in Sinkiang recently openly declared for in-
dependence.
The whole question of discontent among the minorities was serious
enough to receive the attention of Mao Tse-tung. In his speech, "on
Dealing With Contradictions Within the Ranks of the People," he suc-
cinctly pointed out that the people in Tibet were not ready for social-
ist transformation; therefore, such changes should be delayed for 6
years or longer. In July 1957, top government leaders, including Mao
Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Ulaiifu, held a conference in Tsingtao,
Shantung Province, to discuss minority problems and work out a long-
range policy for dealing with local nationalism.
An editorial entitled "Why Is It Necessary to Combat Local Nation-
alism?" appearing in the 27 June 1958 Peiping Jen-min Jih` was re-
printed in full in the 29 June Hu-ho-hao-t'e Nei-meng-ku Jihh- ao_to
lay down the party line for cadres. The editorial reviewed achieve-
ments of the party and government in Sinkiang and lashed out at local
nationalists who are sowing seeds of discord among the nationalities
as well as between them and the Chinese. Admitting the existence of
vestiges of Chinese chauvinism, the editorial had the following to say
about the activities of local nationalists.
"The policy of local autonomy for minority nationalities adopted
by China is based on historical conditions and the current situation
within the nation. This policy is fully compatible with the principles
of Marxism and Leninism and is for the common welfare of all nation-
alities in the building of socialism"
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The editorial adds, "Local nationalist activities against this policy
are being carried out by landlord and bourgeois elements. Pretending
to uphold the interests of minorities, they have actually done these groups
great harm. They call themselves Marxist-Leninists, but they are peddling
revisionism. They not only oppose the policies of centralized party
leadership and national autonomy, but, also the General Line of the party
during the transitional period in hopes of remaking minority areas in the
image of the bourgeoisie.
"Bourgeois rightists, who disguise themselves as nationalists, are
agents of the landlords and bourgeoisie. They have the ideology of a
fast disappearing class. Some have connections with imperialist ele-
ments which direct their sectarian activities."
Concluding, the editorial pointed out that "local nationalism is
a vestige of the old society. To overcome this ideological influence,
it is necessary to initiate a long-term struggle. Although some people
engage in sectarian activities, most people in the minority areas are
willing to follow the leadership of the party to socialism on the basis
of national solidarity. Local nationalists must be educated patiently
on the principle of unity-criticism-unity. Their--mistakes must be pointed
out clearly to them. They can then realize that only national unification
and racial solidarity can develop the nation's socialist economy and
culture so that the people of all nationalities can enjoy a bright and
prosperous future."
To strengthen the illusion that China is a big., happy, multinational
family, the government sent a large delegation tothe Afro-Asian writers
conference in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR. The Jen-min Jih-pao reported on
13 October 1958 that members of the delegation included Mao Tun, the
chief; Tzunung Hadir, a Uighur; ICurban Lai, a Kazakh; and Malchinfu and
Saiichaoteku, two Mongolians. In his opening speech to the conference,
Mao Tun talked about a visit by Chang Chien to Tashkent sometime be-
tween 100 and 200 B. C., the introduction of Buddkism to China from
Samarkand, and the travels of Ta Heien and Hsuan ''sang to India. He
also said, "We hope that the conference will make more contributions to
upholding national independence, opposing colonialism, and protecting
and developing national culture...."
An important phase of the central government"s minority policy is
the creation of written languages for the various minorities. A written
language would presumably increase the efficiency of the minority cadres.
Projects for creating written languages were subjected to long discussions
at all levels.
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The 22 January 1958 Nan-ning Kwangsi Jih-pao reported that the
63d plenary session of the State Council on 29 November 1957 approved
the final plan for the written language of the Chuang nationality in
Kwangsi Province. The popularization of the written Chuang language
began in May 1957. After about half a year of study, over 350,000
students mastered this writing. A written knowledge will help to
strengthen the management of cooperatives and thus improve production.
Completely illiterate Chuang cadres can now record wage points, audit ac-
counts, read newspapers, and write letters. This is a case of the
realization of the nationality policy of the party and a concrete ex-
ample of the party's solicitude for the cultural improvement of minority
nationalities, the paper said.
The 19 April editorial of the Jen-min Jih-pao commented on the
28 March to 16 April 1958 second conference on Scientific Discussions
of Linguistic Work Among Minority Nationalities by pointing out that,
since the first conference in December 1955, the linguistic program for
minorities had been basically realized. A. "political principle" the
editorial said, was resolved with the adoption of a Latin alphabet for
the romanization of Chinese.
In his "Current Task of Language Refoxi' Premier Chou En-lai said,
"While creating or reforming languages for the various nationalities,
the writing must hereafter be based on the Latin alphabet and must con-
form to the phonetic system adopted for the Chinese language in the
pronunciation and use of the Latin alphabet."
With this ideological point settled, linguistic personnel were
urged to increase their efforts. They must plunge into a "3-year
bitter struggle" to complete written language for multilingual minor-
ity nationals and to initiate programs for the reform of minority
languages where necessary.
Pointing out that personnel engaged in linguistic work must promote
harmony and not stress racial differences, the editorial attacked the
"purists" 'who exclude expressions which were introduced from Chinese or
other languages and are now in common use as a part of the minority
language.
"Borrowed expressions do not negate, but enrich, national culture
and are a development of the national language," the editorial pointed
out, with an added comment that any attempt to exclude such borrowed
expressions would be promoting racial differences.
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Laying down the correct line for linguistic work, the editorial
severely criticized subjectivism among the cadres who keep data to
themselves by stamping them "scientific-secret" or who stake out a
"field" and beat off any trespassers. "Errors in ideology and work,"
the editorial concluded, "were exposed during the second conference on
the Scientific Discussions of Linguistic Work Among Minority Nation-
alities and were corrected in time."
A Hsin-hau (New China) News Agency dispatch dated 21 June 1958
said that the Sinkiang committee on minority languages has drafted
Latin alphabets for the Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Khakha, and Hsi-po
languages of minorities living in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
The Arabic written script now in use prevents these languages from
meeting the needs of the development of socialist construction in the
region. The adoption of a Latin alphabet will strengthen the nation as
well as the solidarity of the nationalities. In the compilation of
technical terms, due weight will be given to these terms borrowed from
the Chinese language which are now in common use' among the local nation-
alities.
The central government's policy of creating a written language
was only one of the innovations planned for the national minorities.
Economic, sociological, and cultural changes are being introduced
relentlessly. The cadres were naturally confused when faced with the
resistance of the minority nationals. Since they are inclined to fol-
low the hard line, central authorities felt obligated to lay down the
correct line for them.
The,3 April 1958 issue of the Peiping Kuan -min Jih-pao carried
an article by Wang K'e and Tsui Chien on the correct treatment of
minority customs which presented an exhaustive analysis of practices
among the minorities and their impact on socialism.
The writers warned cadres against such hasty conclusions as all
minority practices are "good" or "bad," or that certain customs are
generally observed throughout any one minority area. Such hasty de-
cisions, they pointed out, play into the hands Of local nationalists
who create dissension within the minority group 'under the pretext of
making concessions to common customs and practices and thus endanger
the course of socialism adopted by the national-minorities.
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Continuing, the writers attacked such practices as offering oxen
for sacrifices, not watering fields, accumulating fertilizer, not
working on *taboo" days, and arranging marriages through matchmakers.
Citing the case of Kawa nationals who now use monkey instead of human
heads for sacrifices, they point out that abominable customs can be
changed.
Concluding, they said, "If we think the customs and practices of
the national minorities utterly bad, or even try to compel the minorities
to change them, we will be guilty of reactionary Chinese chauvinism.
This is trying to assimilate other nationalities forcibly. On the other
hand, 'it is equally erroneous to think that respect for national customs
and practices means that harmful practices must never be changed. Cadres
must assist the minorities in making reforms. All party members and
cadres belonging to national minorities must positively take the lead
and reform bad customs in order to promote the development of socialism
in monrity areas."
A Hsin-hua News Agency dispatch dated 30 April 1958 said that since
the adjournment of the nationality work conference in Tsingtao in July
1957, meetings have been held in minority areas in Kweichow, Yunnan,
Tsinghai, Kansu, Honan, Hopeh, and Kirin provinces to study the reports
of Premier Chou En-lai, Deputy Premier Ulanfu, and others. The facts
reveal that local nationalists are ambitious elements who oppose the
interests of the nationalities to launch criminal activities against
the party and socialism in order to undermine the solidarity of the
nationalities in China, the dispatch said..
Rectification and socialist education campaigns are being conducted
in minority areas in the light of local conditions, according to the
dispatch. In areas where the socialist transformation of the ownership
of the tools of production is already completed, the masses and cadres
should hold frank discussions on the two roads of socialism and capital-
ism, and antirightist struggle, and criticism of local nationalism.
The dispatch added that in minority areas which have basically
completed democratic reforms and have begun programs of socialist
transformation, patriotic education, tailored to local conditions, is
being initiated. In minority areas where democratic reforms are still
not implemented, cadres have initiated socialist propaganda for the
masses. Patriotic socialist education began in Tibet in January 1958.
Exhibitions contrasting past and present living conditions of the
minorities have clearly demonstrated to the people in minority areas the
bright prospects of socialism, according to the dispatch.
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On 24 May 1958, the Jen-min Jih-pao reported that, in a speech
marking the seventh anniversary of the peaceful-liberation of Tibet,
General Chang Ching-vu pointed out that the central government had
sent large numbers of Chinese to assist the Tibetans in carrying out
economic, cultural, and other programs; that both civil and military
Chinese personnel have energetically carried out the agreement for the
peaceful liberation of Tibet and that the Chinese have respected the
religious traditions of the Tibetans.
Pointing out that Chinese authorities were able to provide a
working formula for Tibetan officials in Lhasa, Gyangtse, and Chamdo,
General Chang Ching-vu according to the paper, said that Tibet's return
to the homeland had wiped out the vestiges of imperialism in Tibet.
Now, under the peaceful policy of the central government, cordial
relations are maintained with India, Nepal, and other neighboring states,
he said.
Commenting on the armed forces, General Chang Ching-wu said that
although ranks of the regular army have been conferred on officers of
the local Tibetan army, it is still necessary to'
.improve the patriotic
education of the local Tibetan, troops before they can be reorganized
as part of the national defense force.
Concluding, General Chang stressed the necessity for the establish-
ment of a socialist society in Tibet and the formal organization of the
Tibet Autonomous Region and warned against local as well as Chinese
chauvinism and the schismatic plots of imperialists and counterrevo-
lutionaries.
An item in the 30 June 1958 issue of the Nevi men -ku Jih- ao said
that on 27 June 1958,the Inner Mongolia party committee called a meeting
to map plans for the fourth stage of the rectification movement. Ad-
dressing the meeting, Wang Feng, secretary of the party committee, an-
nounced that the "theory and practice" stage of the movement had come
to a close. He urged cadres to study carefully the speeches given before
the second session of the Eighth Party Congress by Chairman Mao in order
to overcome subjectivism, dogmatism, and empiricism. He called on edu-
cational circles to discuss emphasis on the old and new, on legal circles
to discuss rightism and the class struggle, and on advanced institutions
of learning to discuss the need to be "red and skilled."
As to the fourth stage of the rectification movement, Wang Feng de-
Glared that this was the last stage of the movement and it should not be
allowed to slither out like a snake since the movement began with the
roar of a lion. Listing the four points for this.: stage of the movement..
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he said that cadres must study documents an rectification in order to
strengthen their political stand, promulgate the party's main line, and
correctly understand Marxism-Leninism. He also called on the cadres to
promote frank discussions in order to arrive at a mutual understanding.
They must write a summation of their self-criticism and submit it for
review. Finally, they must work out a plan to be "red and skilled."
In Inner Mongolia, the Chinese authorities continued to promote
their policies by.criticizing the errors of local nationalism and of-
fering rewards of "autonomy."
On 3 August 1958, the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported that the 0-wen-
k'o Autonomous Banner was formally established at the first people's
congress held in Nan-t'un on 30 July 1958. The congress elected a
people's council of 19 members, with T'u-meng-pa-ya-erh, an 0-wen-k'o,
as chairman; and Yu-li-chi and Meng-k'o, Mongolians, and Pi-li-k'o-t'u,
a Daghur, as deputy chiarmen.
In addition to passing resolutions attacking Anglo-American
"aggression" in the Middle East, the congress sent greetings to Chairman
Mao to report the formal establishment of the banner and to pledge
national solidarity and full support of socialist construction.
"Under the guidance of the party and Chairman Mao," the message
said, "and the brilliant light of the party's General Line, the banner
will complete the assignments of the revised draft program of the
development of agriculture and livestock growing in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region ahead of schedule."
A similar greeting to Ulanfu, chairman of the Inner Mongolia
party committee, pointed out that the establishment of the 0-wen-k'o
Autonomous Banner was "another signal victory of the policies of the
party and government."
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The 0-wen-k'o nationality includes peoples formerly included in the
So-lun, Ya-k'u-te, and T'ung-ku-shih groups. Although a majority are
concentrated in the six somons of the I-min Ho watershed, these nomads
are scattered from Sinkiang to Heilungkiang. The newly organized banner,
with its capital at Nan-t'un, has 2,457 people of the 0-wen-k'o; 3,697 of
the Mongolian; 1,869 of the Daghur; 1,265 of the Chinese; and 48 of the
Moslem, Manchu, Tibetan, and Korean nationalities.
Editorially commenting on the establishment of the banner, the
Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao pointed out that during the feudal Manchu days no-
mads in the Hulunbuir plain were designated "Soluns" although the people
called themselves "0-wen-k'o." These people are linlmd to the Ya-k'u-te
and T'ung-ku-shih people by cultural ties. During the Manchu, warlord,
and Japanese imperialist regimes, the nomads were ruthlessly exploited
the editorial said. Concluding, the editorial laid down tasks for the
reform and development of the livestock industry.
on. 15 August 1958, the Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner was
formerly inaugurated at Ni-erh-chi, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported 19 August 1958. After hearing work
reports and future plans, the meeting elected Pa-t'u-pa-ya-erh, a
Daghur, to be chairman; Tsui Hsi-hsien, a Chinese; and T'u-jung, an
O-wen-k'o, to be deputy chairman; and Po-yen, and 0-wen-k'o, to be
chief of justice of the people's court of the Mo'li-ta-wa Daghur Auto-
nomous Banner. The meeting sent greetings to Chairman Mao which said,
"Since the revolution and under the correct leadership of the party,
the banner has successfully completed the democratic and socialist
revolutions, and has achieved outstanding results in the socialist re-
volution. Oppression, bias, and distrust have given way to equality,
solidarity, and mutual cooperation...."
The Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner is located in the northern
part of Inner Mongolia. The word "mo-li-ta-wa" in Daghur means "a
mountain range which looks like a horse." The banner was formerly known
as the Mo-li-ta-wa banner. Of the 63,944 people in the area, 14,929 are
Daghurs; 46,024, Chinese; and 3,041, 0-wen-k'o Mongolian, Moslem, Korean,
or Orunchun.
Speaking at the founding ceremonies, Pa-t'u-pa-ya-erh, chief of the
Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous :Banner, said that in the past 9 years
oppression and bias against the minorities have changed to mutual trust
and unity under the brilliant light of the party's nationality policy. He
added that the multinational homeland has been able to improve its racial
solidarity. However, he said, schismatic bourgeois local nationalist
have demanded a Daghur chou despite the fact the Daghurs are few in number
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and scattered. They complain that without an autonomous chou, the Daghurs
cannot make economic, political, and cultural progress. They say that
the economy of the mountain area is getting worse daily. They are wreck-
ing national solidarity and party leadership under the guise of promoting
the rights of nationalities. This erroneous thinking must be corrected by
a thorough study of party documents and a rectification drive, he con-
cluded.
Echoing these sentiments, Su Ch'ang-te, first party secretary of the
Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner, pointed out that the founding of
the autonomous banner was a signal victory of the party's nationality pol-
icy in the struggle against local nationalism. He noted that, in the
struggle against the two paths in nationality affairs, attacks against
Chinese chauvinism were strong while local nationalism was treated lightly.
Su said that during.the review of nationality affairs in 1952 and 1955,
only Chinese chauvinism was criticized, with the result that in 1956
serious errors of local nationalism were committed during promotion of the
Daghur autonomous banner. To correct this error, he added, the national-
ities must treat their problems from the viewpoint dialectical materialism.
The nationalities must learn from the experiences gained in the struggle
against rightists and the rectification movement. To complete the tasks
assigned to the banner under the nation's agricultural program, cadres and
broad masses of the banner must study party policies and the experiences
gained from various campaigns. They must overcome conservatism.and hold
frank discussions to deal with contradictions within the ranks of the
people, Su concluded.
Editorially commenting on the founding of the banner, the Nei-meng-
ku Jih-ppao praised the high quality of the Daghur people and their struggle
against feudalistic oppression. It pointed out that the founding of the
banner settled the question of the Daghur nationality which the party
decided in 1956 should be a separate group. Although concentrations of
Daghurs are scattered over wide areas, the government decided to locate
the banner in the Mo-li-ta-wa plain. Now that these people have their own
territory, they should guard against the errors of local nationalism as
well as Chinese chauvinism by forever following the leadership of the party,
the paper said.
B. Minority Reaction to Central Government Policies
Chinese Communist propaganda stresses "achievements" of the govern-
ment's minority policy and gives the illusion to people at home and abroad
not only that is "all well' with the minorities, but also that they are
thriving and making spectacular socialist progress.
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The Jen-min Jih-pao said on 19 May 1958 that people of the various
minority nationalities throughout the country have raised their political
ideological level through the rectification and socialist education cam-
paigns. By-learning to work together with the Chinese as well as with
each other, the minority nationalities have overcome local nationalism
and with heightened enthusiasm are actively promoting the big leap for-
ward in production, the paper said.
Farmers from the minority areas in Yunnan Province went to Chinese
areas to learn advanced techniques in fertilizer accumulation, irrigation
development, and use of modern farm implements, the paper noted.
The improved level of political ideology of the minority nation-
alities is leading them on the economic road to Communist prosperity,
according to this account. In 1958, agricultural cooperatives in areas
occupied by various nationalities signed mutual assistance pacts. Minority
nationality peasants in the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region said that
the party is their mother; the cooperative, their home; and the Chinese,
their elder brother. The slogan of these peasants is "learn from the
Chinese; imitate the Chinese."
During 1958, according to the 8 May JenminJih-nao, the Chinese
will make an all-out effort to promote the big leap forward in industry
among, the minority people of Yunnan Province. Chinese technicians re-
cently left K'un-ming for the T'ai, I, Hani-I, and Te-hung T'ai - - Ching-
po minority areas to build 655. small plants. The, government appropriated
5 million yuan for conservation projects throughout the minority areas.
Experts from engineering institutes in K'un-wing Will assist the minority
nationalities in developing mines for nonferrous metal smelters. Al-
though minority areas are economically backward, they are rich in minerals.
An editorial in the 19 October issue entitled "The National Minorities
Are Advancing at Great Speed" pointed out that "in fact, backwardness will
not hamper the national minorities in their pursuit of a forward leap in
construction. On the contrary, it demands that they carry out their con-
struction at a greater pace."
An item in the 29 April issue said that, with the exception of the
Kawa nationality, the T'ai, Ching-po, Li-su, Han-1, La-hu, and other
minority peoples live in compact communities along a 2,000-kilometer
stretch of China's southern border. There are 20 nationalities in Yunnan
totaling 5.6 million. Of this number, 3.8 million live in 8 autonomous
chous and 11 autonomous hsiens. In the Hsi-shuang Pan-na T'ai-ching-po
and Hung-ho Han-i Autonomous Chous, 40 percent of-the households have
Joined cooperatives.
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"The Yuan-en area of Yuan Chiang in Yunnan Province is occupied by
the Pai, Ba-ni, Yao, and others totaling 13 nationalities, the 17 July
1958 K'un-wing Yunnan Jih-pao said. Although their feudalistic practices
have not changed over the centuries, they have completed land reforms
since the liberation and introduced cooperativization. They have im-
proved production relations and are promoting the big leap forward in
agriculture. They have learned to accumulate and use fertilizer. They
have overcome taboos for women. Women formerly did not thin plants
because this might kill off the family. They did not work the soil be-
cause it might offend the dragon. They could not use the plow because
it would harm the menfolk. Women could not carry fertilizer because it
smelled offensive to the men, the paper said.
Other common taboos noted by the paper were against working on one's
birthday or on the day of birth or death of one's parents and against
being the first to plant grain, since this meant that person would be
the first to die.
But with the promotion of the big leap forward in agricultural pro-
duction, the people are not only working on former taboo days, but even
at night, the paper reported. Women vying with the men are working in
the fields to increase production. Small industries and handicrafts now
dot the villages. Minority peasants can now produce artificial cotton
fibers, turpentine, and No 200.cement, as well as mine asbestos, coal,
and gold. Transport has been mechanized, and this is a great improvement
over the back breaking porter method.
As a result of the great big leap forward movement, according to the
paper, the minorities have overcome their conservatism and superstitions.
Under the guidance of the party committee, they held criticism and self-
criticism meetings to convince people of the benefits of using fertilizer
and modern farming equipment. Through such propaganda as blackboard
newspapers, cartoons, "field schools," and group song-fests, the peasants
are gaily sweeping white flags from the hills and replacing them with red
ones, the account noted.
The 22' August 1958 Hsi-ning Tsinghai Jih-pao said that, as a result
of the big leap forward and the socialist education movement, minority
nationalities have wiped away a great many of their taboos which had
been inhibiting production. For example, the Miao people in Lei-shan
Brien, Kweichow Province, formerly refused to build irrigation works
because they might "interfere with the dragon." They fought plagues with
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offerings to the spirits. They had 100 taboo days a year. In the
struggle for accumulating fertilizer, the Chuang ]people in Kwangsi
Province invaded bats' caves, which they had believed haunted by spirits,
to collect guano. Youth groups among the minorities are taking the lead
in smashing age-old superstitions.
In the Hsi-shuang Pan-na T'ai minority area of Yunnan Province, the
paper said, Yu-ai-yang, a young woman, took the lead in breaking the
national tradition that women must not handle plows. She succeeded in
the face of ridicule and was awarded a red flag by the party committee.
Now the T'ai women are emulating her technique.
In the Tung, Yao, Miao, and T'u-chia nationality areas in Hunan
Province, the minorities have changed work-taboo days to high-production
days, according to the paper. Instead of offering; cattle as sacrifices
in cases of sickness, the Miao and Li minorities of Hainan Island now
organize health centers. The people of Liang-shan in Szechwan Province
formerly did not use fertilizer; now they realize the importance of
spreading fertilizer and are building latrines to accumulate it.
The November 1958 issue of the Peiping Min-tau T'uan-chieh (Minzu
Tuanjie, Solidarity of the Nationalities) carried,,a letter written by
Tien Hsing-ch'eng calling on minority cadres engaged in government work
to reform themselves. He said that despite the brilliant achievements
of the party and government there are still minority cadres who con-
sider themselves people apart from the masses of the homeland and refuse
to understand the policies of the party. In opposing the party, they
exposed themselves as exploiters. Citing his native place, Hui-li Hsien
in Yunnan Province, he said that cadres there did not have the proper
outlook because they were not reformed.
Continuing, he pointed out that, although leading minority cadres
had supported the struggle against Kuomintang reactionaries, worked for
national solidarity and autonomy, and wiped out local bandits and special
agents, many cadres from the upper social strata of the minority national-
ities have retained vestiges of exploitation. They have failed to im-
prove their relations with the masses. This danger to socialism must
be corrected, he said. They must undergo positive self-reform. To
achieve reform, they must positively participate in manual labor and
understand its dignity. They must strengthen their ideology and relate
theory to practice. They must criticize themselves and confess every-
thing to the party. They must work out a plan fort self-reform and actively
participate in political movements, he said.
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.Commenting on this letter, the paper's editor pointed out that a
united front among the upper strata of the minority nationalities is one
of the long-range policies of the party. He said that the party had
striven over the years to unite upper strata of all minority nationalities
which could be united. The party will continue this policy of uniting
minorities who love the party and government and work for socialism.
However, he continued, with the upsurge of socialism, the need for reform
among the upper strata of minority nationalities becomes more urgent.
The upper strata must divest themselves of remnant thoughts of the exploi-
tation class in order to keep up with socialist development of the home-
land and the progress of the party.
Despite its rosy propaganda about the minority areas, the regime
often finds it necessary to stage "show trials" to make minority leaders
hew to the party line. Important personages, some high in the party and
government, have been publicly humiliated. Possibly because Sinkiang is
under the control of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the attack
against "local nationalists" there has been the strongest.
Pu-i-na-sheng wrote that under the brilliant leadership of the
party, the Mongolians in Sinkiang have made rapid progress in cultural
development, according to the Urumchi Sinkiang Jih-pao of 4 May. Con-
tinuing, he said that in the old days a m n had to ride for miles to find
a person who could write a letter for him. Now Mongols are enrolled in
Sinkiang College, Sinkiang Medical College, and institutions of learning
in China.
He attacked local nationalists who advocate the organization of
Uighuristan and Pledged a struggle to the end against local nationalists
who are creating dissension in the ranks of the people.
Without the Chinese brothers, he concluded, the minorities of China
would not be able to develop modern industry and culture. The Mongolians,
he said, would welcome more Chinese cadres to Sinkiang for the construc-
tion of socialism.
A similar reaction was expressed in the 17 May issue of the Sin
Jih-pao. In an article attacking the local nationalist attitude toward
the reform of intellectuals, Lin Po-min pointed out that such statements
as "there are no rightists in Sinkiang' and "since Sinkiang is near the
Soviet Union, its intelligentsia have not been exposed to the influences
of bourgeois nations" are erroneous. He said that, opposing the party's
policy of reform for the intelligentsia, local nationalists claim that
such reform is in reality labor reform and would injure minority cadres.
They insist that the intelligentsia in Sinkiang do not need reform.
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Admitting that exposure to the Soviet Union was helpful, Lin Po-
min pointed out that this was not a decisive factor in revolutionizing
the intelligentsia of Sinkiang. Continuing, he said that cases have
come to light of Chinese who had studied in the soviet Union, yet they
opposed the Soviet Union and Communism because of remnant bourgeois
thinking and a lack of a firm political ideology. Concluding, he called
on the intelligentsia in Sinkiang, especially the students, to overcome
remnant bourgeois ideology and to oppose local nationalism by isolating
elements advocating a "Great Sinkiang" independent of the homeland.
In support of this stand, an item in the 2 June issue of the Nei-
meng-ku Jih-pao said that, attacking Te-pu-hein's:criticism of minority
language work, Tsao-tu-pi-li-k"o denied that Mongolian was being treated
in such a way that it would soon become archaic because "many people are
forgetting Mongolian," so that although it has made progress along certain
lines, it has receded in the over-all picture. To the contrary, Tsao
tu-pi-li-k'o said, old works in Mongolian have been dug out of storage
and popularized because more people can read Mongolian now. With the
organization of four universities in Inner Mongolia, more Mongolians now
can get a higher education. Concluding, he warned against rightists who
claim to "defend the rights of minorities" but are actually utilizing
their love of the nationalities to serve the bourfeoisie.
The 22 August issue of the Lhasa Tibet Jih_pao reported that party,
government, and ecclesiastical officials had met recently in Lhasa to
express their support of the Mao-Khrushchev statement and to attack
Anglo-American "aggression" in the Middle East. Bringing the discussion
closer to home, Ngapho Shape, secretary-general of the Tibet Autonomous
Region Preparatory Committee', pointed out that "the important spirit of
the communique of the Mao-Khrushchev talks. is to prevent the Anglo-
Americans from playing with fire in the Middle Eat and to protect the
people all over the world who love peace. The 806 million people of
China and the Soviet Union love peace, support national independence
movements in all countries, and firmly oppose the criminal aggressive
acts of the imperialists. At present, counterrevolutionary cliques in
Tibet are stirring up rebellion under the direction of imperialists.
In consultation. with each other, the Tibet party work committee, the
Tibet Military Region, and the `abet local government have worked out
peaceful methods for the solution of this problem.;', If these methods fail,
then we are determined to suppress and wipe out all rebels."
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Echoing these sentiments, the newspaper reported on the 23d that
women's circles in Zhikatse no longer look askance at politics as some-
thing beyond their ken. After hearing reports on the Mao-Khrushchev
communique and Anglo-American "aggression" in the Middle East, they have
increased their political alertness against the rumormongering and sabo-
tage activities of counterrevolutionaries, the paper said.
Similar sentiments were expressed in an item in the 21+ May issue
of the Jen-min Jih-pao. Marking the seventh anniversary of the "peaceful
liberation of Tibet, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdini sent felicita-
tions to Chairman Mao. Pledging, loyalty to the party and government,
their messages expressed determination to combat local chauvinism, to
strengthen Sino-Tibetan relations, and to fully implement the 17-point
agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.
Ngapho Shape, secretary-general of the Tibet Autonomous Region
Preparatory Committee; and Thupten Tendar, director of the civil affairs
department of the preparatory committee and concurrently secretary-
general of the local Tibet government, pointed to improvements in the
status of Tibetans by saying that most of the personnel of the government
offices are now Tibetans. Over 5,000 Tibetan cadres were trained in the
past yearn.
C. Unrest Among Local Minorities
Reports of growing unrest among the local nationalities in the
Chinese press continue to increase. Slight mention of dissatisfaction
among the minorities had appeared along with other criticisms during the
"Hundred Flowers" period. Although positive steps were taken subsequently
to quell any open criticism, the "speaking up" which began as a trickle
apparently gushed forth with the pent-up fury of a downtrodden people.
Social reforms had to be "delayed" in Tibet. Local nationalists in Sink-
iang wanted to organize a completely independent "Uighur Republic." Mos-
lems throughout northern and northwestern China raised their arms as well
as their voices.
The 29 March issue of the Tsinan 7h-chung Jih-pao reported that at
the 21i March 1958 fourth Shantung nationality work conference, cadres
found growing local nationalism among the minorities in Shantung since
the socialist transformation in production. The manifestations of this
feeling are found in the refusal of the minorities to acknowledge the
advanced status of the Chinese, the refusal to offer help, and open hos-
tility to Chinese cadres working in the area, the paper said. They re-
fused to belong to the same cooperative as the Chinese who eat pork. As
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a result, rightists are isolating the minorities by creating dissension
under the guise of protecting the interests of minorities and their
religion. Such actions not only endanger the solidarity of the nation,
but also the peaceful development of the national minorities, according
to this account.
The newspaper added that the conference decied that the solidarity
of the nationalities must be strengthened by giving every minority nation-
ality family a thorough socialist education and by organizing them to learn
advancedexperiences from the Chinese so that the great unity of all. na-
tionalities will be consolidated around the Chinese.
The 16 May issue of the Jen-min Jih-pao reported that during the
previous 5 months Moslem circles in Honan Province staged a vigorous
struggle against rightists. During the "contendig" period in 1957,
Hsieh Hsi-san, Mai Ming-tao, Pai Ch'ing-chang, anc Wan Chin-Jung posed
hypocritically as defenders of the Moslems in ordgr to attack the party
and government, the paper noted. They said that the Moslems of the
world are one great family and that "religion comes before country." They
called Moslem cadres traitors and said that the growing farm cooperative
system was leaving no future for the Moslems.
The 29 March issue of the Cheng-chou Honan J,h-pao reported that
local nationalism problems dominated the recent nationalities work con-
ference of the United Front Department of the Honan party committee.
Painting a dreary picture of disunity, Chinese de'egates accused the Mos-
lems of emphasizing the gap between nationalities, black-marketing, ille-
gal slaughtering, and violations of the law. A nqw growth of local na-
tionalism was reported stemming from the selfishness of petty producers,
remnants of age-old differences among the nationalities, unsolved problems
among the minorities, and activities of the rightists in 1957. Over 30
Moslem households which were resettled in Tainghai Province came back to
Honan; then they left again for Tsinghai.
The conference called on the cadres to urge the minorities to
strengthen the unity of nationalities, to distinguish right from wrong,
to solve the problems of resettlement, to find new methods of production,
to stop black-marketing, to return to the farms, and to accept the leader-
ship of the party, the paper reported.
The situation in Tibet is not showing any improvement despite stern
measures by the Chinese authorities to pacify the local populace. Ac-
cording to a dispatch of the Hsin-hua News Agency dated 25 March 1958,
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when the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee held a routine
meeting on 24+ March to discuss current tasks, officials were called on
to guard against schismatic elements and to improve their political
consciousness by studying government policies and current events. The
meeting also called for intensification of ideological and socialist
education for the masses. It pointed out that, since the abolition of
the corvee, the recruitment and training of Tibet cadres are greatly
facilitated.
Reflecting the current situation in Tibet, the 12 November issue
of Jen-min Jih-pao carried a terse item reporting the initial organi-
zation of a people's armed unit in Lhasa. Although the unit includes
both Tibetans and Chinese, the item reported, most of the men were mem-
bers of the Tibet Expeditionary Force which entered Tibet 8 years ago.
The situation in Sinkiang reached such serious, proportions that
the Sinkiang party committee had to call a plenary session to discuss
it and to expel members from its "inner circle" for advocating local
nationalism. The 14 May issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that
on 28 April 1958 the Sinkiang-party committee met in Urumchi to re-
view the 1+.5 month struggle against local nationalism. During the
period, local nationalists in the Urumchi area were exposed and purged
from the government. They had not only obstructed the building of
socialism in Sinkiang, but also gave aid and comfort to the imperialists.
Calling for a determined struggle against imperialism, the meeting urged
cadres to first overcome sectionalism and subjectivism among their ranks,
the paper said.
The newspaper reported on 4 May 1958 that the editorial staff of
the monthly Shu-kuang,(Light of Dawn) recently wrote in praise of the
party's nationality policy. The journalists said that the party must
be protected "like one's eyes" and that all nationalities must support
racial solidarity and the unity of the country. They also praised. the
action of the Sinkiang party committee in exposing the rightists in the
course of the struggle against local nationalism.
In closing, the writers pledged to carry out the spirit of the
Sinkiang party conference by initiating a broad struggle against local
nationalism and dealing powerful blows against its leaders.
Another item in the same issue said that A Said, mayor of Urumchi,
was accused of antiparty rightist activities. He was a loyal servitor
of the Kuomintang and a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek's statement that
"there is only one nationality on China," the paper said. After he
joined the party, he continued his attacks by calling for an independent
Uighur Republic. While mayor of Urumchi, he threatened to move the
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several tens of thousands of Chinese in the city Out of town and bring
in Uighurs in order to make it a Uighur city. HeLLfilled government
positions with minority nationalities in complete disregard of their
qualifications. He even used nationality cadres who were rich land-
lords or counterrevolutionaries. He-continually plotted to separate
Sinkiang from the homeland, the item added.
The item said he accused the Chinese of occupying the best parts
of Urumchi. Praising the Kuomintang, he attacked Marxism and the Soviet
Union. He said, "There is no truth in the SovietUnion," and "the Soviet
Union is red imperialism," and called the attackers of the Kuomintang
"red running dogs." His record shows that he was''Sheng Shih-tsai's run-
ning dog in 1938 and graduated from the Kuomintang party school in 1942.
He acted as a special agent under several aliases, according to the item.
The item continued: Abdul-Rizak Kari, deputy director of the Sink-
iang department of commerce, an enemy of the Chinese, gained admission to
the party to attack it. He promoted movements to divide the homeland
by advocating the organization of a Uighur Republic. Saying that he
was holding a position without authority, he delayed the work of his of-
fice. Working with Aisa (another rightist) and Said, he plotted to seek
greater power for the Uighurs by demanding that Uighur be placed above
the Chinese language. He plotted to prevent A-t'u Shih from being in-
cluded in the K'o-tzu-le-su-k'o-erh-k'o-tzu Autonomous Chou and I-1i in
the Ha-sa-k'o Autonomous Chou. At a party conference in May 1957, he
opposed a proposal to transfer Chinese workers and cadres to Sinkiang
with the statement that no Chinese were needed an4 that the Uighurs in
Sinkiang could take care of everything. He said that he would be very
happy to see the Chinese leave, since, he said, they treated the Uighurs
like the way the Americans treated Negroes. He looked on the department
of commerce as his little "kingdom' and took every opportunity to drive
Chinese cadres out. Under the pretext of improving living conditions
of the local nationalities, he demanded more minority cadres. He refused
to give the Chinese credit for the swift progress-of Sinkiang. He not
only diverted public goods to his private use, but also padded his ac-
counts. His morals were so bad that he was arrested in Peiping while
attending a conference there.
The 28 June issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao carried an item on the
plenary session of the Sinkiang party committee held in April 1958 to
combat local nationalism. After hearing comprehensive reports by Wang
En-mou and Saifudin, the meeting passed a resolution to expel the follow-
ing ranking party members: Zainuddin, director of the Sinkiang depart-
ment of culture and noted writer; Abrahim Turdi, director of the Sinkiang
department of civil affairs; Abdurahim Aisa, deputy chairman, of the I-li
Kazakh Autonomous Chou; A Said, mayor of Urumchi; and Abdul-Rizak Kari,
deputy director of the Sinkiang department of commerce.
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In his report to the committee, Wang En-mou, first secretary of
the party committee in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, delivered
a severe indictment of local nationalism in Sinkiang, the Jen-min Jih-pao
reported on 27 June 1958. Citing attacks against local units of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army as a glaring example of alienating the
Chinese who are assisting in the construction of Sinkiang, Wang En-mou
said, "The appointment of minority cadres is a nationality policy of the
party. However, it is not the only principle. The prime principle of
the party's nationality policy is the communization of cadres. Some
local cadres are alienating Chinese cadres by emphasizing the national-
ization instead of the communization of cadres. This is erroneous."
A 4 May 1958 dispatch of the Hsin-hua News Agency from Urumchi said
that, while addressing a recent Sinkiang party conference, T'seng T'iao
pointed out that a member of the Communist Party must not promote local
nationalism. He summed up the weaknesses of local nationalism as follows.
"Poorly organized party members are strong in local nationalism.
They fail to observe party directives and consider local nationalism above
party and class. They may even oppose the party.
"Some members are subjective and are willing to sacrifice the good
of the party for selfish interests.
"Some have no confidence in the party, but trust only in themselves
or blindly in certain personalities.
"In matters of party policy, some members are taking an independent
attitude and violating party discipline by failing to carry out directives.
"Some place individual leadership above collective leadership in
party affairs. They freely disobey party directives and pit personal
responsibility against collective leadership.
"Some party officials use only cadres of their own nationality. In
their efforts to promote local nationalism, they appoint cadres without
considering their ideological qualifications.
"Some cadres are proud and sensitive to criticism. They seek re-
venge and suppress democracy. .
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As some 80 per cent of the coal deposits
of the whole Soviet Union are in Eastern
Siberia, and most of these coals are coke-
able, the fuel necessary for these huge
new works is also near the ore deposits.
On the basis of all these factors it is
planned to increase the production of pig
iron to 15-20 million tons in this area,
within the next fifteen years. The pro-
duction of coal and electric power is
planned in proportion.
According to the present plans the
Ta}set Combine will be the first important
steel works here. The quantities of iron
ore will be mainly supplied by the
Angara mines but partly also from the
Irkutsk district, and the fuel from the
Kuznieck coal mines. The production
of this new plant together with the steel
works in Kuznieck (which is partly in
operation already), Karaganda (in
construction) and Barnaul (planned) is
estimated to exceed 20 million tons in
1972.
These, however, are not the only plans
to develop the Eastern Siberian area.
Final details of other plans have not yet
been disclosed but it is announced that
detailed planning is in progress regarding
new steel works near Krasnoyarsk and
beyond the Lake Baykal.
The latter would be partly built in the
Yakout Republic (upper right-hand
corner on the map), partly in the Csita
district, based on the Aldan and Southern
Yakout ore deposits.
These heavy investments are supposed
to transform this part of Siberia into an
important industrial centre within the
next twenty-five years.
2. Political Status of the
Asians in the U.S.S.R.*
By Geoffrey Wheeler
NO country has been louder in its
condemnation of western, and
particularly of British, colonialism than
the Soviet Union. And no country has
been more insistent on its own
unblemished record as the selfless cham-
pion of the rights of oppressed and
exploited peoples. These charges and
claims have gained a considerable
measure of approval in eastern
countries, and at least part of the
Soviet contentiorf appears to be supported
in somewhat unexpected quarters in the
West. The object of the present article
is to consider how far Russia's claim to
freedom from the taint of colonialism can
be substantiated.
There is no Russian word for colonial-
ism, nor does it figure in the 20,000-word
Dictionary of Foreign Words used in
Russian, which contains most of the
other isms in international use. It may,
however, be assumed that the Russians
now regard colonialism as synonymous
with "kolonizatsiya" which they define
as "the seizure of a country or region by
imperialists accompanied by the sub-
jection, brutal exploitation, and some-
times by the annihilation of the local
population."
These are in fact the charges which
the Soviet Union persistently brings
against the West and has in the past
brought against Tsarist Russia. The
? This article first appeared in Political
Quarterly, London, July, 1Q58.
English definition of colonialism is in
principle the same although expressed in
much milder terms-"the treatment of
settlements abroad as proprietary domains
exploited for the benefit of the mother
country." In order to decide how far
these charges are applicable to the Soviet
Union, it is first necessary to consider
the nature of the territory and peoples
involved and the circumstances in which
they came under first Russian and then
Soviet control.
The broad facts and chronology of
Russia's acquisition of her Asian empire
are not, generally speaking, in dispute.
Soviet maps showing the dates and
extent of successive Russian advances to
the west of the Urals and across the
Caucasus differ hardly at all from similar
maps published in the West during the
past 60 years. Very briefly, what hap-
pened was that the Russians, after having
been confined for 250 years to their
European homeland by the Mongol
domination, threw off this domination at
the end of the fifteenth century.
At the end of the sixteenth century
they began to spread across Asia. Their
first expansion was due east along the
line of least resistance, and the Pacific
was reached by the end of the
seventeenth century. Later, in the first
half of the eighteenth century, Russian
trading operations began to extend from
Siberia towards the south. They now
began to encounter less primitive. and
107
Until China emerged as a Communist
Power, no Communist frontier had been
felt as abutting aggressively on an Asian
State.... Nor, and this is often over-
looked, have the Russians spread across
Asia in the past as traders and adminis-
trators.
-The Times, February 5, 1955
(leading article).
Exploitation here (in Russia) took the
most cruel and reactionary form. In
almost all the colonial areas of Tsarist
Russia there was practised the direct
exprypriation of the basic means of pro-
duction at the disposal of the indigenous
population, namely, land.
-Soviet Encyclopaedia 1938,
Vol. XXXIII, p. 446
more warlike peoples, who interfered
with Russian trade and had to be sub-
dued or absorbed.
This process, a familiar one in the
history of all expanding empires, went
on until 1881, by which time the Asian
empire of the Tsars stretched from the
Urals-to the Pacific, and from the Arctic
to the frontiers of China, Afghanistan,
and Persia.
All this vast area, comprising more
than half the total area of Asia, was
under direct Russian administration,
with the exception of the Central Asian
Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, which
retained a semi-independent status
analogous to that of the Indian States of
British India. The Russians had, in fact,
pace The Times, spread over Asia as
traders and administrators.
In some respects the Russian empire
resembled other empires: it had its origin
in trading operations which eventually
involved conquest and annexation; and it
included peoples who were materially
under-developed, and whose culture was
widely different from, although in some
cases older than, that of the newcomers.
There were, however, certain important
differences.
In the first place it was not an over-
seas empire but geographically contiguous
to the Russian homeland. This meant
that -the Russians, and particularly the
millions who were permanently settled in
.the empire, came to regard it as an
integral part of Russian territory.
Secondly, to the Russians the Turkic
peoples who made up the bulk of the
population of their new lands were
"Tatars," the descendants of those same
Tartars or Mongols under whose domina-
tion they had themselves lived for 250',
years.
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This meant that feelings of superiority
and inferiority were never so prevalent as
in other empires. Finally, the native
population which came under Russian
domination was far smaller, less hetero-
geneous and less exposed to cosmopolitan
influences than the dominated peoples of
the empires of western countries.
In all, the native population of the
Caucasus and the whole of Asiatic Russia
has never amounted to more than thirty
million, or rather less than the present
population of Nigeria; but more than
half of it is concentrated in Transcaucasia
and Central Asia.
A feature of the Russian empire which
was by no means unique but still deserves
mention was that, so far as is known, no
hopes or promises of self-government or
independence were ever held out to the
Tsar's subject peoples.
There do not even appear to have been
any plans for the eventual "nativisation"
of the administration. On the other
hand, there was very little interference
with religious and other established
practices, and until 1916 the peoples of
Central Asia were not subject to any kind
of compulsory military service.
It is still not possible to express a
completely informed and unprejudiced
opinion of Tsarist administration in
Asia. Relatively impartial accounts like
that of the American Schuyler were
written before the Russian conquests were
completed, and full official reports, such
as those of the Palen Commission pub-
lished just before the first world war
in nineteen volumes, are now unob-
tainable.
Soviet reports must be regarded as
heavily biased as well as inconsistent in a
number of important respects. There is,
for instance, a remarkable difference
between the long articles on Colonies in
the first and second editions of the Soviet
Encyclopaedia: the first castigates Tsarist
Russia at considerable length for cruelly
exploiting her colonial possessions; but
the second makes no mention even of
Russia having or having had any colonial
possessions.
In fact, there is no doubt that colonial-
ism in the sense of the definitions given
above was practised in the Asian empire
of the Tsars, although there is no record
of the annihilation of local populations.
The liquidation of the Russian empire
and the grant of self-determination and
independence to the various nationalities
formed an important part of the pre-
and early post-Revolutionary programmes
of the Communist Party, and the sudden
inheritance of a large Asian empire
sparsely inhabited by relatively backward,
peoples confronted the Soviet regime with'
a serious embarrassment.
At first there was some idea of creating
a kind of loose Muslim federation which
would eventually, it was hoped, embrace
the neighbouring Muslim peoples of.
Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey.-
Among the considerations which caused
this plan to be abandoned was the wide-
spread conviction already referred to that
the vast area stretching from the Urals to;
the Pacific was not so much an empire
as an integral part of Russia, to which,
the Russian people had a prescriptive-
right.
Another reason was the development.
among the Asian peoples of nationalist-
and separatist tendencies; they soon came
to think of the Revolution, which they-
welcomed in principle, not so much in
terms of a class war as of a "colonial''
revolution" directed against metropolitan-.
governments everywhere. Finally, the
chaos caused by the civil war in the
Caucasus and Central Asia confronted'
the Soviet Government with the purely
administrative problem of how to restore
law and order.
The "Nationalities" Policy
Once the decision had been taken to.
keep the Russian empire in being, the
Soviet Government had to devise a way :
of administering it and securing its?
frontiers while continuing lip-service to
the requirements of Communist ideology.
A solution was found in the "nationali-
ties" policy, which consisted in labelling
the' principal races and in demarcating
republican frontiers on what was osten.
sibly the broad basis of language.
This operation was carried out in 1924,
and the inter-republican frontiers then
aligned have been subjected since only to
very slight modification. Today the
confines of the Asian part of the Soviet
Union are precisely the same as those of
Imperial Russia.
As an administrative expedient the
Soviet plan had something to recommend
it on ethical as well as on practical and
material grounds: in a brief space of
three years from the Revolution until the
end of the civil war paramount power
over the whole of Russia had passed
from the Tsarist to the Soviet regime.
The sudden abdication of that power
would have resulted not only in the loss
to Russia of such vital resources as the
Baku oil and the Central Asian cotton,
but in a state of complete anarchy which
could hardly have profited the peoples
concerned.
The premature termination of colonial
rule may, in fact, prove to be a worse
evil than its institution. The basis of the
Soviet claim, however, is not that their
action in retaining the status quo was
justified, but that they have broken away
from the old colonial system and set up a
new and enlightened one according to
which the hitherto subject peoples enjoy
complete freedom and sovereignty.
So steady has Soviet insistence on this
claim been that they have been able to
persuade other Asian peoples of its
validity. In the West, reaction has
varied from violent rejection to fulsome
approval; a dispassionate appraisal of the
facts is rarely attempted.
The first matter to be considered is
that of colonisation, or settlement, as the
Russians prefer to call it. There are at
present at least forty million non-Asians
from the western part of the Soviet Union
settled in Asia. The great majority of
these are in Siberia where the native
population has always been extremely
small. But there has also been extensive
colonisation in the more populous parts
of Soviet Asia.
For instance, in Kazakhstan and Soviet
Central Asia the total of the non-Asian
population now amounts to between six
and seven million-that is to say, about
half the total native population of thirteen
million. The non-Asian element has very
greatly increased since -the Revolution;
according to the Soviet census figures, the
native population increased by about 5
per cent between 1926 and 1939 whereas
the non-Asian settler population increased
by over 70 per cent.
The extent of the Russian colonisation
of Asia does not necessarily call for con-
demnation, but it is essential. to remember
it when considering Soviet claims, and
particularly those relating to industrial
and agricultural output, literacy, and the
standard of living. All these, it is
asserted, are tar higher in the eastern
republics of the U.S.S.R. than in most of
the independent or colonial countries of
Asia and Africa, and those unaware of
the facts are encouraged to believe that
the undoubted material progress achieved
in Soviet Asia is the work of the Asian
peoples themselves with some assistance
from Russian technicians.
The proportion of non-Asians to
Asians naturally varies: it is over 50 per
cent in Kazakhstan and less than 15 per
cent in Uzbekistan; but in the Tashkent
108
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oblast (province) of the latter republic,
probably the most highly industrialised
area in the whole of Soviet Asia, the
non-Asian settler population amounts to
over 30 per cent.
Once these little known facts about
population are grasped the essentially
colonial character of the eastern republics
becomes a foregone conclusion. The
system of administration is on the
standard Soviet model, bearing no trace
of local tradition. The real rulers of each
republic are the Communist Party, which
is geared to Moscow by the fact of either
the First or Second Secretary of each
republican Party being a non-native,
usually a Russian. The same goes for
the vital office of Chairman of the Com-
mittee of State Security and many other
key posts.
The peoples of the republics have
played no part in shaping their own
economies: they had no say in, and
indeed opposed, Moscow's decision to
give over-riding importance to the
cultivation of Central Asian cotton to the
detriment of food crops; nor had they
any control over the development of such
industries of Union-wide importance as
oil and coal or over vast irrigation
projects, some of which, like the Main
Turkmen Canal, have been dropped
without explanation after billions of
roubles had been invested in them.
In spite of the fact that all the republics
adjoin foreign countries, they have no
direct diplomatic, commercial, or cultural
relations with any of them. They have
no national armies, all national military
formations having been abolished after
the last serious outbreak of nationalism in
the 1930s. Finally, and perhaps most
important, there is the systematic
campaign against established tradition in
religion, language, and the arts.
The regimentation exercised in the
matter of language has been particularly
marked: national languages have had
the Russian script, a large Russian loan
vocabulary and various Russian gram-
matical features grafted on to them; and
higher education and professional
advancement is impossible without a
thorough knowledge of Russian.
It is significant that whereas in the
early years of the Revolution great
emphasis was laid on the need for settlers
and others working in the eastern
republics to learn the national languages,
it has recently been clearly stated by the
Secretary of the Central Committee of
under no obligation to learn ]Sazakh and
that complaints by the Kazakh intelli-
gentsia of their failure to do so have no
justification.*
The Soviet definition of colonisation
mentions annihilation of populations but
not mass deportation, which may, how-
ever, amount to much the same thing.
Towards the end of the last war the
entire populations of the Crimean Tatar,
Kalmyk, and Chechen "Autonomous"
Soviet Socialist Republics, amounting
with some smaller communities to nearly
a million people, were uprooted from
their homes and deported to other parts
of the U.S.S.R. For over ten years there
was no mention of their fate-they were
simply liquidated as peoples.
The first edition of the Great Soviet
Encyclopaedia had contained glowing
descriptions of their achievements, but in
the second post-war edition they were
not even mentioned as existing or as
having ever existed. In 1956, this act,
reports of which had previously been
dismissed as imperialist fabrications, was
for the first time admitted as one of the
many mistakes of Stalin. It was des-
cribed as a crime against humanity and
rehabilitation was promised.
"Not from Overseas"
In spite, or perhaps because, of this
exposure, the Soviet Government has
continued with unabated violence its
charges against the West of "colonialist"
crimes which pale into insignificance by
comparison with the Soviet deportations.
The Russians have good reason to be
satisfied with their success in convincing
at least part of the outside world that
they are not and never have been guilty
of colonialism. One reason for this is
that in Middle Eastern eyes, for instance,
imperialists and colonialists come from
overseas, whereas the Russians do not.
The Muslim peoples of Soviet Asia, on
the other hand, are unfamiliar with the
phenomenon of overseas imperialism; the
only imperialists of whom they have any
first-hand experience are the Russians.
The attitude of the Asian peoples of
the U.S.S.R towards the Soviet regime is
a matter of which it is impossible to
speak with precision. The impression
which the Soviet authorities wish to
make on the outside world is that these
peoples are perfectly satisfied with their
present lot, that they regard themselves
as fully independent but at the same time
the Communist Party of Kazakhstan that
Russians working in the republics are
109
look up and defer to the Russian people
as to an "elder brother."
Soviet writers are, indeed, at particular
pains to emphasise the great love which
the people of Asia have felt for the
Russians ever since they were first
brought into contact with them by the
Russian conquests of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. It is true that there
are few outward signs of discontent in
the eastern republics and it is probable
that many of the material achievements
of the Soviet regime are respected and
even appreciated.
Since they have no first hand experi-
ence of independence and are segregated
from the outside world, it is more than
likely that the people of the eastern
republics believe they are better off both
materially and politically than the people
in neighbouring Muslim countries.
Passive acquiescence and expressions of
satisfaction and loyalty, even if sincerely
felt, do not necessarily indicate a state of
freedom'a.nd independence.
In fact, however, there are certain
circumstances which suggest that the
absence of open opposition to the present
regime springs more from resignation
and fear than from real contentment.
In the early days of the Revolution, one
of the most important planks in the
platform of Asian nationalist leaders was
the removal of Russian settlers whose
number has in fact been more than
doubled.
Again, all the early nationalist leaders
such as Sultan Galiyev, Baytursunov,
Zeki Velidi Toghan, Fayzulla Khodz-
hayev, and Akmal Ikramov were either
executed or are living in exile. There
are no Gandhis, Nehrus, or Nkrumahs
who, after long struggles against their
colonialist masters, lived, not only to tell
the tale, but to lead their peoples after
independence had been won.
Finally, during the second world war,
over 200,000 Soviet Muslims who had
deserted or had been taken prisoner by
the Germans were organised to fight the
Russians, thousands of them losing their
lives at Stalingrad. The fate of the
remainder after they were handed back
under the Yalta Agreement has never
become known.
Even at the present time, when all the
nationalist leaders have disappeared, there
are constant complaints by the Soviet
authorities of stubborn adherence to
traditional customs, of slowness in adopt-
ing the reforms of national languages,
and of failure to learn Russian.
The impartial student of Soviet affairs
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must reach a conclusion something on the following lines.
Territorially the Asian empire of the Tsars is still in being
and it retains such established features of colonialism as
extensive and increasing colonisation, economic exploitation,
the arbitrary treatment of populations, including their segre-
gation from the outside world, regimentation of traditional
culture and the suppression of genuine and spontaneous
nationalism.
Soviet Asia is now the only colonial territory in which
all these features of colonialism are present at the same time.
Moreover, Soviet Asia is almost the only colonial territory
from which foreign conquerors and colonisers have not yet
receded nor shown any signs of receding. On the other hand,
if Russian colonialism is considered as a whole, and without
the high-sounding nomenclature by which its existence is now
partially obscured, its purely material record is seen to be
ahead of that achieved in many other colonial territories.
The presence of large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian
settlers, who are hard-working and to a large extent free
from colour prejudice, has contributed considerably to the
development of industry and agriculture and thus to the
material well-being of the native population. Indeed, it
would be not unfair to say that the Soviet experiment in
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000400370001-3
Central Asia and Transcaucasia is a good
example of what a deliberate and deter-
mined policy of colonialism can achieve.
But it is none the less colonialism and,
which is worse, it seems to be chronic
colonialism, for there is no glimmer of
those hopes of real independence which
in other parts of Asia and in Africa have
either come to fruition or have long been
stirring.
Sooner or later both the independent
and the still dependent peoples of Asia
and Africa will have to face the fact that
just as their newly won independence is
emerging or about to emerge from the
ebbing tide of western colonialism, it will
be threatened by the rising tide of
Russian colonialism. That they are far
from realising this and even imagine
that the Soviet Union is an ardent and
disinterested champion of their freedom
and independence can he seen from many
of the public utterances of eastern states-
men.
Even the statement of Mr. Nkrumah,
at the Conference of Independent African
States held in Accra in April, that Africa
is "the last remaining stronghold of
colonialism" shows the extent to which
the truth about Soviet colonialism has
escaped the Africans. Earlier, he rightly
spoke of the impact which independent
African countries were already having on
international affairs.
How many of the countries of Africa
and the Middle East realise that the six
Muslim republics of the Soviet Union,
which are described as "fully sovereign
states," have never had and show no
prospect of ever having any impact on
international affairs whatever?
It had already been shown that one of
the reasons why eastern and African
countries ignore the facts of Russian im-
perialism is that the Russians have always
been regarded as different from.western
imperialists because they do not come
from overseas. Other reasons are to be
found in the undeniable skill and scope of
Soviet propaganda and in the dividends
which the policy of playing off Russia
against the West seem to offer to eastern
governments.
An important contributory cause of the
rapid spread of Russian influence is the
West's persistent failure to appreciate the
potentialities of the Soviet appeal for the
peoples of under-developed countries.
Even since 1955 when it first became
apparent that the Soviet Union intended
to intervene actively in Middle Eastern
and African affairs, there has been little
or no attempt in the West to analyse and
determine the nature of this Soviet appeal
as it is reflected in the vast mass of Soviet
literature on every conceivable aspect of
eastern politics, economics, and culture.
It is not simply a question of charge
and counter-charge, of propaganda and
counter-propaganda; the prime need is
for understanding, not only of the facts
of Russian colonialism, but of the
methods which Soviet policy adopts to
attract the attention and confidence of
Asian and African peoples. In eastern
Europe the Soviet pose as the champion
of freedom and. independence has been
exposed because the people have remain-
ed convinced of the spiritual-if not the
physical-superiority of western demo-
cracy over the Soviet system.
It is largely because of the setback she
has encountered in eastern Europe that
Russia is now intensifying her efforts in
Asia and Africa where most of the
peoples have no first-hand knowledge of
Soviet methods. Yet the West is still far
from appreciating the danger of the
Soviet appeal, let alone from matching
it.
Reforms in Laos
By a Correspondent
R ELATIVELY small, land-locked
Laos has recently shown to the
World that she is no mere pawn in the
historic chess-game now being played in
S.E. Asia., but intends to maintain the
independence she fought for and achieved
in October, 1953.
Alarmed by the unexpected successes
of the left-wing Party, the Neo Lao Hak
Sat, at the supplementary elections held
in May of last year, the Nationalist and
Independent Parties formed a united,
anti-Communist front-the Rally of the
Laotian People (RLP).
With the support of the RLP and
CDIN (another strong new group com-
prising a more youthful element) a
Government was formed which has
already illustrated that the grave diffi-
culties facing Laos are not being
ignored and that the country is trying,
by its own efforts, to find a solution to
its most pressing problems.
Declaring its objective to be "to pre-
serve our newly-won independence and
unification" and to fight against the
spread of Communist ideology, the
Government has dedicated itself to.clean-
ing up the internal situation, which was
rapidly deteriorating as a result of the
vicious procedures and practices accom-
panying the distribution of U.S. aid that
has been pouring in since the establish-
ment of the sovereign state in 1955.
In October, the new Government,
despite concentrated left-wing opposition,
successfully introduced devaluation-a
proverbially difficult task for any govern-
ment but one essential to the present
state of the Laotian economy.
The artificial dollar exchange rate of
35 kips to the dollar-a third of the
unofficial exchange rate and for long a
source of speculation and corruption-
was raised to 80 kips to the dollar. Free
convertibility at this rate was introduced
and. import licences, for long the basis
of profitable illicit trading, consequently
abolished. At the same time, the kip
was made freely convertible into certain
other currencies at the free market rates
determined by demand and supply in the
main financial centres, these rates being
reflected in Vientiane through the opera-
tions of the local exchange banks.
The rate for sterling is now in line
with the official sterling/dollar rate, and
the franc'kip rate equivalent to recent
official market rates for the franc. Thus.
although the acquisition of currencies
other than dollars depends on free
market arrangements, ordinary trade
with Laos can be financed in any
currency.
Far from being in effect part of the
dollar area, Laos remains, at least as far-
as the United Kingdom is concerned, in
the transferable sterling area.
Although some of the usual adverse
short-term effects of extensive monetary
reform are to be expected, these have
already been overcome to a large extent
and will in any case be more than
compensated for in the long-run. That
nowadays ever-present bugbear, inflation,
has largely been avoided by the Lao
Government's management of public
finances and the note issue in such a way
as to maintain balance between monetary
demand and the supply of goods, and by
the fact that prices in Laos had for long
reflected the unofficial exchange rate
before devaluation was introduced.
The former large-scale diversion of
imported goods, financed by dollars at a
cheap rate, to profitable markets outside
Laos (principally Bangkok) has been
substantially reduced, although, with the
111
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money supply necessarily under strict
control to prevent inflation, some goods
bought with dollars can still secure better
prices elsewhere.
The flight of capital that was feared in
view of the absence of restrictions on
kip/dollar exchange transactions has also
been successfully checked by the con-
tinuing need for kips to meet current
expenditure, the difficulty of finding an
acceptable market for capital assets, and
the growth of confidence that foreign
exchange will continue to be available as
required.
More Counterpart Funds
In the long run, with a more realistic
dollar exchange rate, U.S. aid to Laos
will generate more counter-part funds,
which can therefore be directed towards
the development of the country's economy
rather than solely to defence expenditure.
The importation of goods essential to
the local economy (e.g. petrol and oil,
building materials, chemicals, aircraft
engines and transport equipment) is now
being given every encouragement by both
the Lao and U.S. Governments, the
latter having simplified the necessary
import procedures, and lowered the
deposits required from importers.
The acquisition of these essential pro-
ductive goods plus U.S. "project aid"
will enable Laos to look at last to the
exploitation of her natural resources. The
development of mineral resources, light
industries and handicrafts, irrigation
systems, and better farming techniques
will mean an increase in the country's
productive capacity, whilst the introduc-
tiQn of wider communications, and
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better primary education facilities and
public 'health services will improve the
'lot of the villagers, who have been long
discontented with the failure to redistri-
bute the benefits of U.S. aid dollars to
the rural areas.
Self-Imposed Honesty is Essential
The problems, both economic and
political, that face any young, undeveloped
",country today are many and the fact that
the Laotian Government, further faced
with unrelenting Communist subversion,
found strength to put through a vital but
1controversial reform is commendable.
It realised, however, that if Laos is to
uphold her independence, the self-
imposed honesty that monetary reform
has placed on vested interests is essential
to the survival of the country.
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Office of Research and Intelligence
P-12-59
9037229
February 25, 1959
This Report is not a statement of USIA policy.
O F F I C I A L USE ONLY
UNITED STATES
OR
RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
This study of an important aspect of religion
in Communist China was prepared for the Agency by
Dr. Harold C. Hinton a well-known soholar in Chinese
Communist Affairs.
With the removal of this page and tie
cover sheet this material may be treated
as Unclassified.
OFFICIAL U 0
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RE IGION IN CONMUNIST CHI A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Summary
I. Religion in Chinese Life ............................ Z
II. The Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Religion ...... 1
III. Chinese Communist Religious Policy
A. General
B. Popular Religion
C. Taoism
D. Buddhism
E. Islam
F. Christianity
IV. The Current Anti-religious Campaign
A. General
B. Popular Religion
0. Taoism
D. Buddhism
E. Islam
F. Christianity
3
6
7
7
8
9
11
13
14
14
15
16
V. Conclusions ..........?....r ......................... 17
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RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Harold C. Hinton
SUMMARY
Like other Marxist-Leninist parties, the Communist Party of
China (CPC) is committed to the eventual destrudtion of religion.
The nature of the CPC's anti-religious policy receives an added
importance from the fact that the CPC regards its own institutions
as a model for the rest of the underdeveloped world.
Between 1949 and 1956 the CPC established a very considerable
degree of control over the organized religions of,China, with the
partial exception of Catholicism, by means of manipulation, propa-
ganda, and terror. Popular religion suffered somewhat less. Since
the middle of 1957, when Communist China's "socialist forward leap"
began, both organized and popular religion have been subjected to
intensified and extreme pressure, including a head.ong assault on
popular religion and "ancestor worshiptl and the creation of a
"national" Catholic Church partially in schism wi h Rome.
The Chinese Communists have proclaimed their.regime to be the
principal example and model for the nonindustriali gd countries of the
world (the "colonial and semi-colonial countries") It is very likely,
therefore, that in any such country which came under Communist control
the policies and institutions of the Chinese Communists would be
introduced sooner or later, at least in their esseptials; this has
happened already in North Vietnam. Few, if any ofthese policies would
have more effect on the people of such a country than would religious
policy. The present paper examines Chinese Communist religious policy
with this possibility in mind.
1. Lu Ting yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution,"
People's China, July 1, 1951; Chen Yun, "In Memory of J. V. Stalin,"
Peo e's China, March 16, 1954.
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I. Religion in Chinese Life
Religion, in the broadest sense of the term, has tradition-
ally occupied a very important position in Chinese life, although it
has been strongly tinged with scepticism among the educated and with
superstition among the uneducated. At the base of Chinese religion
lay popular religion, which contained many superstitious elements but
also others, such as the ceremonies of respect misleadingly known as
"ancestor worship," which cannot be dismissed as mere superstition.
The principal organized religions were the Mahayana School of Buddhism
(including lamaism in Tibet and Mongolia), Theravada (Hinayana)
Buddhism among the Chuang (Thai) of South China, Taoism (an indigenous
mystical cult), Islam, and Christianity. Confucianism, although not
strictly a religion, had points of contact with popular religion and
even with Taoism and Buddhism. The Chinese tended toward a tolerant,
pragmatic, and synthetic approach to religion, and many a Chinese held
and practised -- alternately or simultaneously -- tenets of Confucianism,
Taoism, Buddhism, and popular religion.
Although the influence of religion on educated Chinese has tended
to decrease in recent times, the history of religion in modern China
have
has by no means been one of total decline. On the contrary,
been movements of intellectual and spiritual renewal among the various
religions, including popular religion.2 It therefore cannot be assumed
that religion in China, if left to itself, would have died a natural
death.
II. The Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Religion
The Chinese Communists, like other Marxist-Leninists, hold the view
that all religion is objectively false and constitutes the "opium of the
masses," or in other words the means by which the ruling class lulls
the exploited classes into accepting their lot. From this assumption
it follows that the disappearance of class exploitation -- which Communists
claim will occur under "socialism" and "communism" (as Communists define
those terms) -- will lead sooner or later to the disappearance of
religion.
2. Wing-tsit Chan, Reli_ gius Trends in Modern China, Columbia University
Press, 1953, passim.
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The early leaders of the Chinese Communist movement were frank
in proclaiming their hostility to religion. The constitution of
the "Chinese Soviet Republic" (November 7, 1931), for example, in-
cluded Buddhist monks among the "exploiting and counter-revolutionary
elements" who were to be denied the right to vote. A land law passed
at the same time provided for the confiscation of all land belonging
to religious institutions.3
Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, who rose to power within
the party at the end of 1934, the Communist Party of China (CPC)
adopted for a time a somewhat more moderate tone and policy toward
religion without modifying its basic attitude. The latter can be
discerned, for example, in Mao's scornful allusion of 1927 to Buddhism
and popular religion:
The gods and goddesses are indeed pitiful; worshipped
for hundreds of years, they have not knocked down for
you i.e., for the peasants of Hunag7 a single local
bully or one of the bad gentry."4
Despite the Chinese Communist claim that all religions were
tolerated in the areas under the CPC's control,5 Mao and the CPC have
associated -- in their own minds before 1949 and in public since 1949 --
Christianity with "imperialism" (i.e., Western influence in China), and
the other religions of China with "feudalism" ei.., features of the Chinese scene, such as rural landlordism).c Ones of
the principal characteristics of "Maoism" as a revolutionary strategy
is that it identifies foreign "imperialism" and domestic "feudalism,"
rather than Chinese capitalism as the main enemies and targets of the
Communist revolution in China. Religion has therefore appeared to
the CPC as both the prop and the instrument of its principal enemies.
3., C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, Documentary Hist rv of
Wiese Co ~nism, Harvard University Press, 19'52, 52 "` ~ ~ 9 .+ pp. 220, 225-226.
.
4. Selected Works of Mao Tse- un , 4 volts. to date, New York:
International Publishers, 1954 --, vol. 1, p. 48.
5. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 309.
6. "....religion has been utilized by imperialism the landlord class
and the bureaucratic class...." (Chang Chih-yi, "Atheists and Theists
Can Cooperate Politically and Travel the Road of Socialism," Che-hsueh
en-chin (Philosophical Research), Feb. 15, 1958).
7. "....the C ine a revolution at the present stage .... Zh-as as] its
central task tha 7 of combating foreign imperialism and domestic
feudalism...." (Selected Works of Mao Tag tunQ, vol. 3, P? 152).
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As Mao Tse-tung pointed out in 1940, any toleration of or collabora-
tion with religion by CoFnmunists could only be temporary and a matter
of expediency, and be practised only toward those "religious followers"
who satisfied the Communists that they were opposed to "imperialism"
and "feudalism," or in other words that they were prepared to accept a
degree of Communist leadership.8 In short, "religious followers" were
asked, and since 1949 have been expected, to collaborate with the CPC
on its terms, with a view to promoting among other things the eventual
elimination of religion.
III. Chinese Communist Relisious__Polic7
A. General
It is not an easy task to summarize Chinese Communist religious
policy from 1949 until the beginning of the current anti-religious
campaign, which will be discussed separately. The policy has been
essentially one of combining manipulation through organizational
techniques, hostile propaganda, and outright terror, andgnot one of
put it,
relying exclusively on any one of
We cannot abolish religion by administrative Qrders;
nor can we force people not to believe in it.
The CPC's organizational approach to religion has been greatly
simplified by the fact that none of the major religious bodies, except
for the Catholics, had a tightly knit organization and that none of them
(except for the Catholic Church's Central Bureau in Shanghai) had an
effective directing headquarters at the national, or all-China, level.
This has left the way clear for the CPC to set up such national organi-
zations, ostensibly in the name of patriotism and national unity.
Confucianism did not have to be organized in this way, since it had been
moribund for some time and in any case was not truly a religion.
Popular religion was too amorphous to be capable of organization.
8. "Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united
front for political action with certain idealists and even with
religious followers, but we can never approve of their idealism or
155).
religious doctrines." (Select o Works ofMao e=, vol. 3, p.
9. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,"
New China News Agency despatch (hereafter NCNA), Peking, June 18, 1957;
the speech was actually delivered on February 27, 1957.
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The Protestant churches were organized in 1954 under a National
Committee of Protestant Churches in China for Self-Administration.
The China Islamic Association was set up in 1953 under the chairman-
ship of Burhan, a Uighur, so as to embrace Moslems. of all ethnic stocks
and of all three major schools or sects of Islam ill China (Tradition-
alists, Reformists, and Modernists). The China Buddhist Association
was established in 1953 under the chairmanship of Hsi-jao-Chia-ts-u, a
Tibetan, over the Chinese Mahayana Buddhists, the lamaists of Tibet
and Inner Mongolia, and the Theravada Buddhists of South China. A
China Taoist Association made its appearance at the end of 1956. The
supervision of these organizations, and of religion in general, was
(and is) a function of the CPC Central Committee'sUnited Front Work
Department, under Li Wei-han, and of the Religious Affairs Bureau of
the State Council (cabinet), established in 1954 under the chairmanship
of Ho Ch'eng-hsiang, also a Communist.
Chinese Communist anti-religious propaganda is accompanied by a
virtual prohibition against propaganda or proselytization by the
various religious bodies, under the guise of a guarantee of freedom of
religion. In the Chinese Soviet constitution of 1931, which was
modeled on the Russian constitution of 1924, a guarantee of "true"
religious freedom was balanced by an insistence that "All Soviet citizens
shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda.n10 In
the relatively moderate Common Program of 1949 (Article 5), the latter
provision was dropped, and a guarantee of religious; freedom was accom-
panied by one of "freedom of holding processions and demonstrations."
In the constitution of September 1954 (Articles 87 and 88), these
guarantees are retained.
In practice, however, propaganda and proselytization by religious
bodies are severely restricted. The CPC's strong objections to such
activity are the main explanation of its repressive treatment of the
Legion of Mary, an organization of Catholic laymen devoted to spiritual
work of this sort, including the recovery of lapsedCatholics. They
also explain in part the nearly total control which the CPC has imposed
on religious schools. Given the virtual prohibition on proselytization
(recently described as "religious propaganda in public resorts or areas
plagued with complications of class relations") and the severe restric-
tions on religious education, the CPC's guarantee of freedom of worship
and its prohibition of "anti-religious propaganda in-'churches or
temples"11 means little. Presumably the CPC expects organized religion
to die out gradually for lack of recruits.
10. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbanks, M. cit., p. 223.
11. Chang Chih-yi, cit.
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The CPC's anti-religious propaganda has on the whole been fairly
subtle and indirect. It has taken the general line that "religious
followers," like other Chinese, must give up all ties with and affection
for "imperialism" and "feudalism" and must espouse "socialism." In
that case, and only in that case, coexistence between Communists and
"religious followers" will be possible and the religious freedom of
the latter respected. The difficulty with this seemingly reasonable
position is that for a "religious follower" to accept it means giving
at least passive support to a program many of whose features -- such
as atheism, materialism, and police terrorism -- are incompatible with
the principles of any religion, and with many ethical systems other than
the Communist.
The CPC has.not confined itself to organizational manipulation
and anti-religious propaganda in its efforts to promote the eventual
elimination of religion. It has also employed persecution, presumably
because the other methods seemed inadequate or too slow. This perse-
cution has always been masked, with varying degrees of skill, so as to
make it appear as something else. Thus adherents of the various religions
of China have been persecuted from time to time on the ostensible grounds
that they were "reactionaries" or "counterrevolutionaries," or that they
were Nationalist or "imperialist" (i.e., American) agents. Chinese
"religious followers" and foreign missionaries whom the CPC considered
dangerous have been accused of upholding "feudalism" (particularly
the former rural landlord system), of maintaining organizational or
financial relations with foreign "imperialist" organizations, of espousing
"local nationalism" (in the case of the national minorities), of opposing
the "leadership" of the CPC, and similar alleged offenses. The perse-
cution has taken various forms, ranging from house arrest followed by
expulsion from the country (for some foreign missionaries) through
exclusion from public office to forced labor and execution.
X In many cases, Chinese "religious followers" and foreign missionaries
have been made to "confess" to the charges against them. These "con-
fessions," like other similar ones extracted by Communist police from
their prisoners, have no necessary validity as evidence against the
accused. This is because the techniques used axe capable of extracting
a "confession" to nearly anything from nearly any one, and in some cases
of producing semipermanent obedience and psychological conformity as well.
These techniques rely mainly on extreme fatigue, psychological pressure,
and imprisonment under extremely unpleasant conditions. In most cases
these deprive the prisoner of the will to resist, and the threat of their
repetition is usually enough to prevent the prisoner from repudiating
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his "confession" later.12
The application of these three forms of pressure -- organiza-
tional manipulation, propaganda, and persecution -- by the CPC began
in some Communist-controlled areas (especially North China and Inner
Mongolia) before 1949, has been extended to China as a whole since
1949, and seems likely to be a continuing feature-of Chinese Communist
religious policy in the future. The exact nature and degree of the
pressure have of course varied with the time and place, and as exped-
iency seemed to indicate. Probably the most interesting variation
has been a marked ayyarent improvement in the treatment of Buddhism
and Islam since 1955. The main reason is that the CPC learned from
the Bandung Conference how much damage its religious policy, as well
as some of its other policies, was doing to its standing in non-
Communist Asia, where it was and is trying to pose as a champion of
peaceful coexistence. Since that time the CPC has allowed visits by
handpicked delegations of Chinese Buddhists and Moslems to other
Asian and Middle Eastern countries and by foreign Buddhists and
Moslems to carefully selected and often restored religious showplaces
in China, and has cited these contacts as fresh evidence for its
allegedly friendly policy toward religion. Not only has there been
no real change in Chinese Communist religious policy and religious
controls, however, but the CPC has actually intensified its anti-
religious pressures since about the middle of 1957 (see Section 4,
below).
B. Popular R io
Until 1958, popular religion was much more nearly exempt from
Communist pressures than were the organized religions. The CPC made no
serious or systematic atte;apt to interfere with traditional beliefs or
customs such as "ancestor worship." Presumably this was because
popular religion was both too amorphous to constitute a serious obstacle
to CPC's short run objectives and too deeply rooted in the minds of the
people to be attacked without careful preparation. To some extent the
CPC prepared the way for an eventual assault on popular religion by
drastically overhauling certain features of traditional Chinese society,
notably the concept of male supremacy within the family.
12. The most factual and scientific study of this "brainwashing"
process yet published is Drs. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., and Harold G.
Wolff, "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination_of.'Enemies of the
State'," American Medical Association, Archives of Neurology and
Psychiary, Aug. 1956, pp. 115-174.
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C. Taoism
Taoism has suffered severely under the CPC for two reasons.
Although moribund as a religion, it was closely associated with a
number of secret societies, which the CPC was determined to stamp
out because they constituted centers of political and social power
independent of and indeed opposed to the CPC. Secondly, Taoism has
no offshoots or connections in other Asian countries which might
have tended to deter the CPC from repressing it. Consequently,
Taoist sects and secret societies have been subjected not only to
organizational controls and hoitile propaganda but to outright
persecution. This persecution was especially severe during the
terrible campaign against "counter-revolutionaries" of 1951-52 and
during the similar but less intense campaign of 1954-55.
D. Buddhism
As a religion, Buddhism has been somewhat more vigorous in
modern China than has Taoism; furthermore, it has numerous co-religion-
ists elsewhere in Asia. Mainly for these reasons, Buddhism has suffered
less severely under the CPC than has Taoism. Nevertheless, it has by
no means escaped pressure. Buddhist monks have occasionally been
executed as "counter-revolutionaries," and a much larger number have
been forcibly returned to secular life and compelled to take up
"productive labor." Land and buildings belonging to Buddhist monasteries,
except to some extent in Tibet, have been confiscated on a large scale
in the course of "agrarian reform." Buddhist monks and laymen, in
addition to receiving the usual political indoctrination given to
virtually. every one in Communist China, have been asked to accept the
idea that Buddhism and Communism are compatible, and indeed that
Buddhism can find its true expression in Chinese secular life only in
an environment controlled by the CPC.13
In Tibet, the expropriation of some monastery lands and efforts
by the CPC to monopolize the instruction of the youth were among the
causes of widespread thoughuncoordinated popular revolts which broke
out in eastern Tibet in 1956 and are still (December 1958) in progress.14
13. Yang I-fan, Buddhism ii China, Hong Kong: Union Press, 1956.
14. The Sino-Tibet agreement on the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet
(May 23, 1951) had provided for complete religious freedom and non-
interference with the lamaseries (text in supplement to People's China
June 16, 1951).
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These revolts have produced some temporary modifications in the CPC's
timetable for "reforms" (pointing toward the establishment of
"socialism") in Tibet, but no fundamental changes in policy.15
F. Islam
The CPC gives the total number of Moslems in Communist China as
10 million and recognizes ten national minorities among them, the
most numerous being the 6 million Hui (Chinesespeaking Moslems) and
3.5 million Uighurs. These minorities generally live under "autonomous"
governments which serve as elaborate disguises, and transmission belts
for a centralized control which is not only Communist but Chinese in
character. One indication of this is the fact that in "autonomous"
areas of importance the First Secretary of the-local CPC apparatus is
generally a Han (i.e., racial) Chinese rather than a member of the
local minority. The division of the various national minorities, in-
cluding Moslems, among numerous "autonomous" areas helps to prevent
united action on their part.
The fact that Moslems are treated as a gro.p of racial minorities,
as well as a single religious minority, has nevertheless given them a
status which, at least until recently, has been:, somewhat better than that
of other religious groups which have no comparable political standing.
The CPC has discouraged the building of ney mosques, confiscated
a great deal of land owned by mosques, and severely restricted the
Islamic education of Moslem youth. These policies provoked armed revolts
by Kazakhs in Sinkiang and by Hui in Kansu in 152, which were forcibly
suppressed. In 1955 the CPC established an Institute of Islamic Theology
to monopolize the training of ahuna (ak unh , or Islamic teachers) and
see to it that they were given political instruction, including indoc-
trination in Marxism-Leninism. Another blow to,Islamic culture was
the replacement of the Arabic by the Cyrillic alphabet in Sinkiang, in
1956.
15. For example, a Tibetan Branch of the China Buddhist Association
was formed in October 1956.
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F. Christianity
Christianity has occupied a special place in Chinese Communist
religious policy, because the Christian churches in China have in
the past been supported, if not controlled, by countries and insti-
tutions now labelled "imperialist" by the mainland regime. Further-
more, the Catholic Church in China formerly had considerable land-
holdings, so that like the Buddhist monasteries and Moslem mosques it
could be accused of "feudal" tendencies. These characteristics con-
tributed to making Christianity probably the most dangerous, the most
hostile, and yet the most vulnerable of the major religions from the
Chinese Communist standpoint.
The essence of Chinese Communist policy toward the Christian
churches during the first year or two after 1949 was to offer them
toleration (as understood by the CPC) on the same basis as other
religions, provided Chinese Christians proved their "patriotism" by
cutting their ties with ".feudalism" and above all with "imperialism,"
and by accepting the "leadership" of the CPC in all but purely religious
matters. The CPC insisted that the Christian churches implement what
it called the "Three Autonomies." These were "Self-Administration" (an
end to any degree of control by foreigners, whether within or outside
China), "Self-Support" (the repudiation of foreign financial aid), and
"Self Propagation" (the eventual expulsion of foreign missionaries).
These demands sounded superficially reasonable, and in fact the various
churches had been moving in these directions for about a generation.
The difficulty of course was that the "Three Autonomies" were regarded
by the CPC as merely a first step toward the total elimination of
Christianity from China.
The Protestant churches, from a variety of motives, went far toward
accepting and implementing the "Three Autonomies;" foreign missionaries,
in particular, began to be progressively withdrawn. With the launching
of the "Mate America" campaign after the outbreak of the Korean war,
however, Communist pressure on the Protestant churches, most of which
had American connections, sharply increased. Their schools, colleges,
and hospitals were seized and converted into state institutions and the
foreign missionaries expelled or jailed. The churches themselves were
brought effectively under Communist control.16
16. Helen Ferris, The Christian Church in Communist China 192,
Human Resources Research Institute, 1956.
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The Catholics refused to accept the "Three Autonomies," except to
a very limited degree and mainly in the matter of finances, primarily
because they implied a repudiation of the spiritual authority of Rome.
This refusal brought down on their heads a wave df persecution.
Catholics, including Chinese clergy and laymen as well as foreign
missionaries, were arrested in large numbers during the campaign
against "counterrevolutionaries" of 1951-52. Some were executed, and
a much larger number were sent to forced labor or placed under house
arrest. The CPC tried in particular not only to deprive Chinese
Catholics of leadership by foreign missionaries, but to discredit the
latter in the eyes of Chinese Catholic and the Chinese people as a
whole. Thus the CPC extracted "confessions" to "counterrevolutionary"
activity from a number of missionaries, by means already described, and
lodged fantastic propaganda charges, involving the alleged maltreatment
and even killi~g of Chinese children, against orphanages conducted by
Catholic nuns. This persecution slackened somewhat after 1952, but
the activitf9s of the Catholic Church in China continued to be severely
restricted, and the issue between it and the CP? remained unresolved.
In 1955 Bishop Kung Pin-mei (Ignatius Kung) of Shanghai was
arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary activity; he has been held
in prison ever since without having been formally sentenced. The CPC
then manipulated the election of Francis Xavier Chang (Chang Shih-lang),
a priest of the Shanghai diocese, as acting bishop (vicarius regiminis).
The Holy See refused to recognize this election and threatened with
excommunication any Chinese Catholic who collaborated with the CPC to
the uetriment of his church. Early in 1956 the CPC intensified its
pressure on Chinese Catholics to form a "national" Catholic Church, or
in other words ont with few or no ties with Rome. The result was the
formation of a Preparatory Committee for the China Catholic Patriotic
Association, which committee held a conference in 'eking in July 1956.19
17. Thomas J. Bauer, TIM Systematic Destruc, tin 91 the Catholic
Church in China, New York, 1954.
18. See.Robert Guillian, 00 Million Chinese, New York, 1957.
19. Statement by Li Wei-kuang and Hu Wen-yao to National People's
Congress, People's Daily, July 20, 1957.
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IV. The Current Anti-religious Campaign
A. General
By about 1956 the severity of the CPC's dictatorship (including
of course its oppressive religious policy) and the feverish speed of
socialization in 1955 had generated a number of serious tensions.
The CPC's conclusion, as set forth in Mao Tse-tung's speech of
February 27, 1957, on "contradictions," was that while these tensions
were serious enough to require remedial action, they were for the
most part "contradictions within the ranks of the people" rather than
"antagonisms." They could therefore be alleviated by permitting
greater freedom of expression, including even some public criticism
of the CPC itself. As it turned out, the CPC had underestimated the
severity of the tensions, for the criticisms which it finally elicited
from some non-Communists (in May 1958) were much more forceful than it
had expected. Among other things, the CPC's religious policy came in
for its share of criticism. A Moslem speaker, for example, complained
that the State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau "was not interested
in supporting the Islamic religion nor was it giving sufficient financial
assistance for the upkeep of mosques."20
In June of 1957 the CPC struck back at its critics in an "anti-
rightist struggle" which effectively silenced them. It then launched
a massive "socialist forward leap" designed to accelerate the "transition
to socialism" and bring China abreast of Great Britain in total indus-
trial output by about 1972. This "forward leap" had several inter-
related aspects. On the economic side, it involved an effort to increase
production by transferring hundreds of thousands of people from the
cities to the countryside, the establishment of large numbers of small-
scale local industries, and (since the spring of 1958) the formation of
agricultural "people's communes." On the ideological side, there was
a reversion to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, symbolized by such things as
an attack on Yugoslav "revisionism" and the termination of the official
birth control campaign (both in May 1958). Furthermore, the intellec-
tuals and remaining private businessmen, who had shown themselves in
May 1957 to be ideologically unreliable, were subjected to intensified
"ideological remoulding," at the same time that the CPC was trying to
render itself less dependent on them by establishing small, simple
industrial installations which would not require many highly skilled
20. Kwangmina Daily., May 25, 1957.
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personnel. Finally, the ideological aspect of the "forward leap"
also included an intensification of the CPC's pressure on religion.
Nevertheless, the CPC has continued to take the line that true
religious freedom is possible only under Communist rule. The CPC
remains committed, of course, to the ultimate extinction of religion,
but it now maintains that the disappearance of class distinctions
from the Chinese scene will not be enough to bring about the dis-
appearance of religion. Religion, it says, has ideological
("cognitive") as well as social causes, and the former cannot be elim-
inated without positive anti-religious propaganda and pressures.21
The CPC's current anti-religious campaign has been marked by an
intensification of organizational controls over the various religions,
especially Protestantism (in which they had previously been slight at
the provincial level)22 and Catholicism (in which they had been almost
nonexistent at either the central or provincial levels). The volume
of anti-religious propaganda has swelled to even greater proportions
than usual and has been directed in particular against Catholicism
and popular religion. Persecutions and other types of pressure, in-
cluding denunciations of alleged "rightists" among the various religious
groups and abolition of some popular religious festivals, have been
freely employed.
Two interesting recent features of the anti-religious campaign
are a visit to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary by a delegation representing the Religious Affairs Bureau of
the State Council and led by Ho Ch'eng-hsiang himself in July 1958,
presumably to seek advice on how to conduct the_campaign;23 and a ten-
dency to hold meetings of "religious followers" at which all the organ-
ized religions are jointly represented.24
21. Chang Chih-yi, loc. cit.
22. NCNA, Foochow, March 22, 1958, for example, refers to a Preparatory
Committee of the Protestant Self-Administration Movement in Fukien.
23. NCNA, Peking, July 25, 1958.
2,4. Kwangmina Daily, August 8, 1958.
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B. Popular Religion
Of all aspects of the current anti-religious campaign, the drive
against popular religion is probably the most complex, the most import-
ant, and the most novel. On the whole, the CPC had not previously
launched a frontal assault.on popular religion to the same extent as
against the organized religions. This comparative toleration could
not last, however, both because of the CPC's hostile attitude toward
all religion and because of the fact that many attitudes and practices
associated with popular religion are incompatible with the CPC's
"socialist forward leap," and in particular with the "people's communes."
The campaign, which began in earnest in. the spring of 1958, alleged-
ly at the demand of the masses and under the guise of a campaign against
superstition, has been. directed mainly at two sets of targets, the
popular deities and the dead.
On the ground that they are superstitious and extravagant, many local
cults and festivals have been abolished. This has been true not only
among the Han (Chinese) but among the minority peoples, whose undoubted
backwardness as compared with the Chinese the CPC chooses to attribute
mainly to superstition.25 Religious holidays have been converted into
workdays, and religious images have been converted to economic purposes.
As in dealing with the organized religions, the CPC has made extensive
use of carefully organized meetings and "debates," at which its own view-
point is explained and other viewpoints are refuted.26
Still more important is the CPC's campaign against the dead, or in
other words against traditional Chinese burial customs and "ancestor
worship." Elaborate funerals and mourning have been discouraged; simple,
non-wooden coffins, and in some casee cremation, have been encouraged; old
tombs have been obl iter ated, newer ones have been moved to economize
space; many coffins have been converted into latrines or manure carriers;
in some cases decomposed bodies have actually been used as fertilizer; and
"ancestor worship" is being gradually eliminated.27
25. "Emancipation from Superstition," People's Daily, August 22, 1958.
26. E.g., Kwanaming Daily, Sept. 18, 1958.
27. Chao Chien-min, "Reform Funeral Customs, Encourage Thrifty Burials
Without Coffins and Graves Without Sepulchral Mounds," People's Daily,
June 17, 1958.
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These measures, which would be extreme in any country but are
doubly so in China, are clearly intended to eliminate not only the
economic but also the ideological importance of popular religion.
As the People'ss Daily (September 4, 1958) has put it, "Spiritual
fetters which have bound the people for the past several thousand
years will become a thing of the past."
C. Taoism
Relatively little information is available onthe fate of
Taoism during the current anti-religious campaign, but the indications
are that its status has been essentially no differqnt from that of
the other religions. Taoists like other "religious followers' have
been compelled to hold "socialist study sessions" at which they are
exhorted to uphold the "leadership" of the CPC and the cause of
"socialism."28 At the end of 1957 the Shanghai Public Security
Bureau claimed to have smashed an attempt by remnants of a "reaction-.
ary Taoist sect" to "revive the sect and resume counter-revolutionary
activities."29
D. Buddhism
The "anti-rightist struggle" of 1957-58 claimed to have uncovered
a number of "rightists" among China's Buddhists, the most prominent
being Liu Ya-hsiu and Chen Ming.-shu, two well known laymen,30 and Pen
Huan, a Ch'an (Zen) abbot.31 They were accused, in essence, of using
Buddhism as a cloak for "counter-revolutionary" anti-Communist propa,
ganda. Pen Huan acquired the doubtful distinction of being the most
prominent Buddhist yet arrested by the CPC. As in most such cases,
some of the charges against these men dated back several years, so
that their denunciation at that time rather than earlier was clearly
done for propaganda effect. The CPC press has acknowledged the arrest
of a few other Buddhist monks and the execution of rat least one of
28. E.g., Kwai Daily, August 8, 1958.
29. Shanghai ez Hui P o, Dec. 28, 1957.
30. Hsien i Lo-hsueh (Contemporary Buddhism), Dee. 1957.
31. Hong Kong Wen Huai Pao, June 13, 1958.
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them.32 Persecution has, of course, been accompanied by intensive
propaganda; during 1958 the CPC press reported numerous conferences
and "socialist study meetings" among Buddhists of all schools and
in various parts of China, for the purpose of upholding the CPC and
"socialism."33
In the lamaist areas, including Tibet, the current campaign has
brought intensified pressure against "superstition" and for support
of the CPC and the "forward leap." Lamas are expected to work like
anyone else, under penalty of not eating.34 In Tibet, the CPC,
without repudiating its promise of 1956 not to introduce "democratic
reforms" until after 1962, has made it clear that propaganda in
favor of the CPC and "socialism" will be carried on continuously
during the interval.35 Revolts are still in progress among the Gologs
of Tsinghai and the Khams of Sikang, both of whom are predominantly
Buddhist.
E. Islam
It has already been pointed out that the CPC's policy toward
Islam has a very important political aspect in the sense that Moslems
are treated as distinct racial and political minorities, as well as a
single religious minority. Similarly, the CPC's difficulties with its
Moslems and its current anti-Islamic campaign have strong political
overtones. The CPC has repeatedly admitted that Moslems, especially
those of Sinkiang, are. infected with "local nationalism," or in other
words that they resent Communism, Chinese control, Chinese immigration,
and collectivization, and in many cases would like to secede.36 Five
(nominal) Moslems were expelled from the CPC apparatus in Sinkiang in
May 1958, on the charge of "local nationalism."37 The establishment
by the CPC of a Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region in 1957-58 evoked a
number of Hui revolts in the spring of 1958. Their alleged leader,
32. Changchun Kirin Jih Pao, June 20, 1958.
33. E.g., Esien-tai Fo-hsueh, July 1958.
34. E-.g., Ulanfu's talk on the situation in Inner Mongolia in
Kwanamins Daily., August 14, 1958..
35. E.g., Chang Kuo-hua's speech in Lhasa Hsi Tan Jih ,
October 19, 1957.
36. E.g., speech by Saifudin, NCNA, Peking, December 25, 1957.
37. Speech by Wang En-mao, People's Daily, June 27, 1958.
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Ma Chen-wu, was branded a "rightist" and presumably dealt with
accordingly.- Shortly after the announcement of this affair, the
China Association for the Promotion of Islamic Culture (not to be
confused with the China Islamic Association) met in Yinchuan (Ningsia)
and dissolved itself.-
While political considerations bulk largest in the CPC's Moslem
problem, as reported in the CPC press, there can be no doubt that
strictly religious grievances are also very important. Since Moslems,
virtually alone among the religious groups of China, have a political
and territorial base, religious discontent tends to assume a political
appearance.
F. Christianity
Like other public bodies in Communist China, the Protestant
churches were compelled during the second half of 1957 to uncover
"rightists" in their midst. This process began at as meeting of the
Standing Committee of the National Committee of Protestant Churches
in China for Self-Administration, held in Peking on November 28-
December 4, 1957. A number of "rightists" who had spoken out during
the preceding spring were criticized, and "In the course of heated
debate, the rightists were silenced by reasoning, finding themselves
completely isolated."40 Numerous similar meetings mere held at the
provincial and local levels during the following spring. Among the
"rightists" denounced at these meetings, and in some cases imprisoned
afterwards, were many of the leaders of Protestantism in China.41
In the summer of 1958, the CPC prevented the attendance of some Chinese
Anglican bishops at the Lambeth Conference in Londo.42 Protestantism
in China seems to be well on the way to total subjugation at the hands
of party and state.
The same trend also applies to the Catholic Church. One of the
earliest manifestations of the CPC's "anti-rightiststruggle" was a
renewal of pressure for the formation of a "national" Catholic Church.
38. People's Daily, October 17, 1958.
39. Chinese Home Service Despatch, Peking, October 31, 1958.
40. NCNA, Peking, December 5, 1957.
41. China Bulletin, National Council of Churches of Christ, New York,
August, 1958.
42. Ecumenical Press Service, World Council of Churches, Geneva,
August 8, 1958.
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On June 17 - July 13, 1957, the CPC convened a "preparatory meeting"
attended by 241 bishops, priests, and laymen, at which the Vatican
was denounced vehemently as usual.43 Then the CPC, ignoring a stern
warning to Chinese Catholics from the Vatican against collaboration
with Communism, convened a National Catholic Conference in the second
half of July from which emerged a Chinese Catholic Patriotic Associa-
tion pledged to maintain with the Vatican nothing but "purely religious
ties that do not violate the interests and independence of China."44
Numerous similar conferences were held at the provincial level
during the next several months at which provincial Catholic Patriotic
Associations were established and various Catholic "rightists"
denounced. More important still, the CPC undertook in earnest the
creation of a Chinese Catholic Church formally in schism with Rome.
This it did, beginning in the second half of 1957, by manipulating the
election of a total (as of December 1958) of fifteen bishops by the
clergy of their respective dioceses and their consecration by other
bishops, without reference to Rome. In at least one case a bishop
agreed to perform a consecration only after he had spent a week in
the hands of the secret police.45 The CPC realizes that these elections
are valid under Catholic canon law, even though the Vatican has refused
to recognize the elections and consecrations and has excommunicated
those bishops who have consecrated or been consecrated without its
approval. In other words, the CPC has successfully begun the creation
of a Chinese Catholic hierarchy whose orders are valid but which is in
schism with Rome. These are lengths to which no other Communist regime
has yet gone in dealing with its Catholic population, with the single
exception of the forcible russifieation of Uniate Catholics by the
Soviet government after the Second World War.
V. Conclusions
From this survey of Chinese Communist policy toward popular religion
and both indigenous and foreign organized religions, it is clear that
the CPC has used manipulation, propaganda, and terror to achieve an al-
most total degree of control. The CPC exercises this control under the
guise of ensuring "true" religious freedom, but with the actual purpose
of eliminating religion by destroying both its social and its ideologi-
cal bases. Such is the religious aspect of the model which the CPC holds
up for imitation to the peoples of the "colonial and semi-colonial"
countries.
43. NCNA, Peking, July 30, 1957.
44. NCNA, Peking, August 2, 1957.
45. The source for this information is the Most Reverend Patronius
Laechio, O.F.M., formerly archbishop of Changsha, as reported in The
Washington Star, November 29, 1958.
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U.S. INFORMATION AGENDY
No. 59-74
BagWMo~gy pCo uni~m_
April, 1959
IPS/SM/NS
PEIPING ATTNIPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS
By A. J. Roy
(Observor of East Asian Diplomacy and Politics)
SUNM RY: Since early 1958 the Chinese Communists have been
organizing mass "struggle meetings" where Buddhist and Muslim
religious leaders are accused of fraud, crimes, and counter-
revolution. This article is principally concerned with the
campaign against Chinese Muslim imams and Tibetan Buddhist
lamas in Tsinghai province. Popular opposition to Communist
control and Peiping's collectivization policy has caused a
number of armed revolts. The Communists hope to discredit the
leaders of the minority peoples, many of whom are religious
figures.
NOTE: Please remove this cover sheet before distribution.
Use of the byline is optional. The article may be abridged.
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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS
By A. J. Roy
(Observer of East Asian Diplomacy and Politics)
In an attempt to consolidate control over China's restive national
minorities, Peiping is now attacking their religions leaders and undermining
their beliefs. Communist officials organize mass "struggle meetings" at
which Muslim imams and Buddhist monks belonging to the Tibetan, Thai or
other minority groups are accused of "oppression and exploitation."
This campaign has two purposes. The Comaunhsts wish to reduce the
influence of the minority peoples' leaders, many of whom are religious fig-
ures. Peiping also wants to destroy the religious beliefs of the minorities
and persuade them to accept Communist ideology.
This long-run objective was discussed in,an article in the January
12, 1959 issue of the Peiping Xt n~g MingDaily, which said that "The most
basic obstacle which prevents the people of the national minorities from
mentally accepting Communist thought is idealism - theism."
During the early years of the regime this problem was approached
with caution. The Kuang Mine Dai?y pointed out that "In some places we
also had many misgivings. We dared not publicize materialism and atheism
out of fear that this would come in conflict with religious policy and a-
rouse the apprehensions of the masses."
In early 1958, however, the Communists decided to ignore such
approhon,sion . Chinese Muslim imams and Mongolian lamas first came under
attack. Religious leaders of Thai and other Buddhist tribes were also put
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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS
under pressure, and since August 1958 an intensive campaign against Tibetan
Buddhist lamas has been in progress in Tsinghai province. Tsinghai, a broad
arid plateau north. of Tibot proper, has a largo Tibetan population.
These attacks follow a distinct pattern. Party officials organize
large public meetings, often attended by thousands of persons. Leaders of
several different religious groups are often attacked at the same meeting.
Lamas and imams are charged with charlatanism, robbing the people,
torture, rape, incest, and fraud. Buddhists and Muslims are told that gods
and supernatural forces do not exist. They are urged to "eliminate super-
stition."
Religious leaders are.put on platforms and the people are directed
to hurl accusations at them face to face. The procedure is similar to that
used in the mass meetings called during "land reform," when landlords and
village leaders were also required to face popular accusations staged by
party workers.
led and Expert, a Tsinghai party journal, said in its October 1,
1958 issue that "cempa of struggle and prosecution were carried out
with much fanfare. According to incomplete returns, by oarly September over
5,770 such meetings were held with over 600,000 people attending."
There is an immediate political reason for this campaign as well
as a long-term ideological one. Tibetans and Chinese Muslims in Tsinghai
have long been restive under Communist control, but during the past several
years they have had two specific grievances: they oppose Peiping's attempts
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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS
to organize them into eollootiv? farms, herdsmen's collectives, and communes;
and they resent the massive immigration of ethnic Chinese organized by the
Communists.
According to Red }d Expert, 50.28 per cent of herdsmen in Tsinghai
had been enrolled in collectives by the end of August 1958. These were trans-
fonaed into communes almost immediately.
Tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese have been transferred to
Tsinghai and other border provinces during the past few years. Most have
come from Shanghai and other coastal cities where unemployment is a major
problem. The official Peiping Pggnle's Daily periodically asks young people
to emigrate to frontier areas. There they are establishing state farms and
communes which encroach on land used by Tibetans and Chinese Muslims for
grazing and farming. They are considered outsiders who threaten the way of
life and the economic well-being-of the minority peoples.
Opposition to Peiping's policy has for the most part been passive,
but there have been a number.of armed revolts. In 1956 the Communists at-
tempted to form collective fps in the Kantzu district of Szechuan province.
There, as in Tsinghai, Tibetans constitute a large part of the population.
The Tibetans, encouraged by their lamas, refused to accept collectivization.
When the Communists applied force the Tibetans took to the mountains and
began an uprising which has since spread to Tibet proper.
The People's Daily reported on October 18 1958 that "several hun-
dred counter-revolutionaries" led by a Chinese Muslim imam in Nighsia named
Ma Chen-wu had taken part in two revolts on April 4 and June 1.
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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIN L ADERS
Ma was charged with planning to form an "Islamic Democratic Party"
and a "Chinese Muslim Republic." He opposed collectivization of the herds
and was said to have used a mosque as a base for his activities. His slogan
was "glory for Islam."
The Ts.JnghaiDaly of Sining for November 14, 1958 reported the
mass trial of another imam named Mai Ch'eng-ohtang. He was termed a "counter-
revolutionary working under the cloak of religion." He reportedly said that
"If a Hungarian-type uprising takes place in China, I will certainly join it.,,
Tibetan opposition to the Communist regime in the Kannan district
was revealed by the Peiping magazine Nationalities Unit: for January 6, 1959.
It said that lamas there "publicly sell arms and ammunition, harbor counter-
revolutionaries and wicked elements and try to overthrow the people's regime.
From 1955 to February 1958, no less than 40 counter-revolutionaries and
criminals were found and arrested in the Lapulen monastery alone. At the
same time, large numbers of military weapons and counter-revolutionary docu-
ments including seals and documents of the so-called "Allied Anti-Communist
Nationalities Army' and the 'Kuomintang Branch for the Lapulen Regions were
seized from the monastery."
The lamas were also accused of telling the people that "the Coin
munist Party will abolish religion," "pastoral tax is robbery under a beauti-
ful name," and "the policy of the Communist Party is sweet first but bitter
later."
Red anlEExpert explicitly linked the Tsinghai uprisings with the
drive to collectivize herdsmen. It said that "When the great socialist
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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TODISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MtIM LEADERS
revolution in the pastoral areas of our province was still in its primary
stage, the die-hards among livestock-owners and counter-revolutionaries in
religious circles staged an armed revolt against socialism, the people, and
the Communist Party."
(It can be presumed that the Communists were also alarmed by the
possibility that the revolt in Tibet, which began in 1956 and became more
extensive in 1958 and 1959, would spread to Tsinghai. The attacks on lamas
in Tibet has, however, involved the Communists in a contradiction. In Tsinghai
they say that "reactionary lamas" should no longer retain their "feudal priv-
ileges." In Tibet proper, however, the official Communist policy is to per-
mit lamas to preserve their high position in Tibetan life until 1963.)
Although the campaign against religious leaders of national minor-
ities has been most intensive in Tsinghai, it has also bemm carried on in
other areas where non-Chinese nationalities predominate. The Peiping uan
Ming Daily for February 12, 1959 described the activities of a "government
work team" in Chinghung county, Yunnan province.
The party functionaries carried on propaganda activities among the
Hani, Ake, and Pulang minorities. According to the newspapers, "law-wdefying
headmen, landlords and other bad characters manufactured rumors design to
undermine the work of the team." Mass meetings were organized at which the
Communists attempted to discredit the headmen and.ridicule the religious
beliefs of the people. The newspaper noted succinctly that "There is now
less feudal superstition among the masses, and production activities are no
longer suspended during Buddhist festivals."
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HEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS
These mass meetings +ftaa conclude with a summing-up by a Commu-
nist official. The TTsinRha Daily for October 23, 1958 quoted from the
summing-up delivered at one meeting by the chief of the Communist Party's
propaganda department for the province.
He said that "There are no such things as spirits and gods. All
this religious nonsense was designed to deceive the people. The reactionary
lamas and imams speak good but do evil."
He concluded by saying that "Elimination of religious superstition,
bad customs, and taboos from the thoughts of the people is a long-term, dif-
ficult task."
It would appear, however, that the Communists expect to substitute
their own type of superstition. The TAnin Aim declared that "As a re-
sult of the great debate, the people are spiritually revitalized, and a high
tide is steadily rising in which feudal and superstitious beliefs are being
completely destroyed and materialistic, Communist ideas are being established.
"Ka-ya, a poor herdsman, said: tWe are now thoroughly liberated.
Feudal superstitions, through which we have been oppressed and exploited
for several'thousands years, are now being demolished. We shall never be-
lieve in gods again.' He then hung pictures of Marx, Lenin, and Chairman
Mao in his tent."
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