SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (M G B)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02546R000100130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No.
SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
Organization and Functions
of the
Ministry of State. Security
(MGB)
z
Interim Report
CONFIDENTLA ,,
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THE MGB
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPT.NT OF THE I.'-GB
III, CEITTRAL TIGB Imo! DQUARTER~q
A. Structure
Be Co-ordination of tho MGB Espionage and
Countorospionago Agencies
PAGE
1
3
1, INU (Foreign Directorate) 21
2. SPU (Secret Political Directorate) 26
3- KRU (Counterintelligence Directorate) 30
4. EKU (Economic Directorate) 34
5. DTU (Rail Transport Directorate) 37
6. Directorate for the Security of
Govurn_aont Leaders 38
7. 00= s/i4KGB 39
8, SUERSH: Diroctorato for CcuntcrintoIligoncc
in the irmod Forces 39
9. Partisan Dircctorate 41
10, Other Hc^.dquarturs Directorates 44
I1. Service Directoratcs and Sections 45
a. Investigation Dircctorate 45
be Operational Dircctorate 4.6
C, Special Sections 46
(1) lst Spacial Section 4o^
(2) 2nd Special Scetion 4-9
(3) 3rd Spacial Section
(4) 4th Spocial Suction 54
(4) 5th Spacial Suction 54
d. 7th Diructorato of GUGB 55
e. INFO: Information Section 55
f. GUK: Central Porsonnol Directorate 56
g. AKhU: Administretivc-Economic Directorate 56
he FO or FU: Finance Office or Finance
Dircctorate 56
is Secretariat 56
V. ORG d`1IZATION OF TIIu T:,IGB -.1ITHI14 THE USSR ON REPUBLIC,
PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS 57
1. II U, ITIO 59
2. SPU, SPO 59
3. KRU, KRO 60
4. EKU, EKO 64
5, Operations 67
VI. ORGMTIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE T.IGB IN SOVIET
ZONES OF OCCUPATION 68
A. Soviet Zone in Gormany 69
B. Hungary and the Soviet Zone in l.ustria 73
CONVIDENTIAZ
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
VII, OR.GWIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF TIC; 1.1GB IN SATELLITE
COUNTRIES
'PAGE
A. Poland
77
B. Bulgaria
78
C. Yugoslavia and Albania
79
1. Secret section or SO
80
2, Foreign Section or INO
80
3. Economic Section
81
4. Information Section
82
5. Oper^.tions Section
82
6. Special Section
82
7. Private Section
82
8. Records and Files
82
VIII.
IX.
FIELD ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF T1
ESTIMATE OF T.1GB EFFECTIVENESS
i,IGB ABROAD
82
INU Agent Dispatch Chr.nncls
CONFIDENT I AIM
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ORGANIZATION AND FITICTIONS OF T HE MGB
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Ministry of State Security (Ministertvo Gosudarstvennoi
Bezopasnosti) is the fulfillment of thirty years? development since the
establishment in 1917 of the Cheka to protect the infant Bolsi-evik party
and to combat counterrevolution, speculation and sabotage. From this
relatively defensive, protective position a growth through years of in-
tricate changes has resulted in the present MGB which not only combats
counterrevolution, foreign esPionage and political deviations inside the
Soviet Union, but also carries on a program of positive espionage, sabotage
and assassinations throughout the world. The primary emphasis or. dis-
covering politically unreliable elements in all spheres of Soviet life
can only be understood in the light of the aims of the Soviet state which
insists on insulating its peoples and institutions from ideas foreign to
Communist principles; fearing a politically opposed and malcontent populace
that might one day aid in the overthrow of the system which Bolshevism
has erected and maintains by force.
In considering the functions and the operations of the MGB,, it should
be remembered that, from their earliest conception, the Soviet organs of
State Security have been primarily Party agencies subject only to formal-
istic control within the extant structure of the Soviet GoveriiY:.ant. Until
the reorganization in July 1934, when the OGPU was incorporated, into the
newly created NKVD, little pretense was made that State Security was other
than a Party function, taking its authority and control from the Central
Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and, of
course, actually from the Politburo. At the present time, in theory, the
MGB is responsible to the Council of Iviinisters, formerly the Council of
Peoples' Commissars of the Soviet Union. In fact, the MGB is responsible
only to Josef Stalin and to the Politburo.
It is impossible to evaluate adequately the scope and components of
the LZGB without considering also the functions and jurisdiction of the MVD,
the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. Both ministries, of course, spring
from the same origins and while they are technically separate today, it
must be remembered that actually in many fields they still operate jointly
and, upon occasion, aliaost as a single agency. Both the MGB and the i?IVD
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"Offiw*~
are subject to the same ultimate control, and the operations of each are
closely integrated with those of the other.
There have been some indications of frequent interchange of personnel
between the two ministries and it is known that,wherever necessary, units
of the MVD are controlled operationally by the MGB. There are also indica-
tions that, at least in occupied territories, certain functions which,
within the Soviet Union, definitely tend to be functions of MGB have been
carried out, probably for purposes of convenience, by 1.?VD units. There
are many signs, too, that MVD installations have been used as cover by MGB
personnel, although such use has been denied by at least one apparently
well-informed defectors
No effort is made in this study to delineate the s tructure, jurisdiction,
and functions of the MVD, as such. Since March 15, 1946, when the use of
the term "Peoples' Commissariat" was dropped and the term "Ministry" sub-
stituted, an extensive reorganization of MVD and MGB has apparently been
under way. Authentic information on this reorganization is too fragmentary
for complete evaluation of its significance. It appears, however, that the
ultimate purpose of this reorganization, which is still continuing, is:
(1) the complete integration within the MGB of all of the intelligence
functions formerly performed by either ministry; and (2) the integration
within the MGB of many, if not all, of the security functions which have
long been considered primarily the province of the Unistry of Internal
Affairs.
Indications of this concentration of intelligence and security within
the MGB appear particularly evident in several reports stating that within
the past year the MGB has assumed the direction of certain uniformed troops
which previously were under the unquestioned control of 1:ND. Apparently
the first of these troops to be absorbed were units of the MVD internal
troops, including transport and communications units. It has been reported
also that there now exists within the MGB a directorate, probably called
the Guards Directorate, responsible for the administration and control of
MGB troops which were formerly MVD units. While we do not yet have
sufficient information upon which to base an accurate determination of the
significance of this trend, it is at least possible that a logical conclusion
might be the centralization of all intelligence and security within the MGB,
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leaving the I ND primarily concerned with administrative control of the
Soviet population and with the utilization of the tremendous labor pool
provided by the millions of individuals confined in the PIND forced-labor
camps. In this regard it is known, of courses that the LND has in recent
years become increasingly active in the administration and direction of
large industrial and construction projects throughout the Soviet Union,
and that through its various industrial combines the ministry has assumed
increasing control over industrial expansion and construction within the
USSR. So tremendous in scope are the functions and the powers of these
two ministries that together they resemble a state superimposed upon a
state.
The complicated process of evolution which has produced the present
I!!GB cannot yet be fully and clearly described, primarily because of the
unavailability of sufficient current, authentic sources. Even factors in
the development which have remained relatively constant,such as the overall
planning of intelligence and counterintelligence functions and the high
degree of collaboration among the MGB organs and between the MGB and other
organizations of the Soviet state, cannot be presented in the proper
perspective and detail. This preliminary study, therefore, is an examina-
tion of the organization and functions of the MGB based on information
obtained from many sources, which information refers frequently to its
predecessor organizations.
It should be noted that recent reports have alleged the existence of
numerous directorates, sections, and subdivisions under various names,
numerals, and letters. As a large number of those reports are in dis-
agreement, only such organizational units of the MGB reliably reported
upon from more than one source, and whose existence can be considered
at least fairly well established, have been included in this study.
He HISTORICAL DEVELOPIlIENT
The Russian people have lived under the despotic power of the Boyars,
the Czars, and the Bolsheviks, State oppression has been a traditional
and constant force only now reaching its fullest and most refined development.
The first steps toward a central agency for the protection of the
state were taken by Ivan the Terrible in his struggle with the Boyars when
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circa 1564 he created the Oprichnina, the first Russian State Police.
The Oprichnina was almost a state apart; it possessed its own special
court, its own army and its own police, Members of the a;onoy, the
Oprichniki, swore to allow neither God nor man to come between themselves
and Ivan's commands.
Despite the efforts of the Oprichniki and of later state security
forces, Russian history has been flecked with plots, assassinations, and
rebellions. Under Peter the Great the system of policing Russiawith
emphasis on state socurity,became firmly established, During the reign
of Nicholas I the 3rd Section of Nicholas' Court Chancery bore the respon-
sibility for state security. Apparently the 3rd Section was unable to
copo successfully with the increase of rovolutionary activity in the 19th
16(,p -F,?.
century, and in the 1880's the notorious 0khrana was founded. Among
Okhrana sections, one had the task of spying on separatist movements among
the various nationalities in Russia, another employed agents to carry out
surveillance of foreign diplomats in Russia, and a third'was responsible
for counterespionage within the country. An 00 (Osoby Otdel) or Special
Section undertook the surveillance of Russian political refugees abrcad,
a duty which has devolved upon the successors to the Okhrana down to the
present time. fem. (.ea.4
~c~ , S
'~ ' CA
CHEKA
When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, KERENSKI was con-
sidering a revival of the Okhrana, which had been permitted to deteriorate
after the March revolt. Shortly after the October revolution, LENIN and
the Council of Peoples' Commissars decided that, without a similar organi-
zation, the now government could not copo successfully with the rise of
counterrevolution soon supported by invading armies and foreign aid.
The first step toward creating such an organization was the issuance
of a decree by LENIN on 11 December 1917, declaring the Cadets or Con-
stitutional Democrats a party of enemies of the people and making the
directing members of the Cadet Party liable to trial by revolutionary
tribunals. LENIN then wrote, on 20 December 1917, a memorandum to Folix
Edmondovieh DZERZHINSKI, an old Bolshevik and trusted Party functionary,
containing the draft of a general decree for combatting counterrevolution
and sabotage. He suggested that the Commissariat of the Interior should,
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with the aid of house committees, assume supervision of all the members
of the bourgeoisie, the landowners and the wealthier classes. Such
persons, and employees of banks, investmont firms and other institutions
as well, were required to submit to the house committees information con-
cerning their incomes and occupations. In January 1918, the Sovnarkom
willingly accepted the recommendation of DZERZHINSKI that the irregular
activities of the inchoate force of secret police, which had sprung up
almost immediately after the seizure of power, should be definitely,
organized under an "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat
Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage" (Vsorossiskaya Chroz-
vyohainaya Komissiya po Borbo s Kontr-Revolutsioi, Sabotazhom i Spokulatsi?i,,
or Cheka, with the primary purpose of protecting the infant Bolshevik
regime. In the first months of its existence Choka headquarters were
moved from Leningrad to Moscow. Its first director, at least in Leningrad,
appears to have boon Moses URITSKI, who was assassinated in August 1918
by a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Leonid KANNENGIESSER.
According to an apparently reliable source, a certain YOSILEVICH was
adjutant to URITSKI in Leningrad; one of the earliest chiefs of the Cheka
in Moscow was LSSING and other important early leaders of the Choka
were VfTNSCHLICHT, IAOGILEVSKI, ARTUSOV, MTSNELSON, ~TRILLISER/KOGAN,1.ESLAU,
/SACHS,/GOLOSEKIN,r1GHUROVSKI,ISAFAROV, KUN,/SEMLIACHIKO,`PANDER, INBERG,
WARTS, FINKELSTEIN,v HLENKRIEG,`/GRUEPISTEIN,'t ISEL andiKEDROV. Another
source lists YAGODA together with L NZBINSKI as deputies to DZERZHINSKI
under the Cheka and the following as chiefs of sections of the Choka:
SOSNOVSKI, LITVIN, MIRONOV, GAI, AGRANOV, KURSKI, TSESARSKI, PETROVSKI,
KAGAN and BERT.AN.
By a decree of 7 November 1918, DZERZHINSKI was made president of the
Choka which by this time had adopted much the same methods of spying, oral
examinations and secret trials as had been used by the Okhrana.
The Choka was even loss subject to control than the Okhrana, which had
boon directly subordinated to the Imperial Ministry of the Interior.
Moreover, the Cheka,, from the first, assumed the power to punish even by
death those counterrevolutionaries whom it discovered, while the Okhrana
had no such le g l power. Gradually DZERZHINSKI built the Cheka into a
firmly es d state security organization.
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OGPU
In 19220 when the civil wars had ended and order was substantially
restored, the Cheka was ostensibly abolished in an attempt to dispel the
public fear and anxiety which it had engendered. Together with the
announcement of the New Economic Policy, a now organization was created,
the "State Political Directorate" ( Gosudarstvonnoyo Politicheskoye
Upravloniye, or GPU) which, in everything but name, absorbed the Cheka.
When, in the following years the Soviet republics wore federated, the
GPU became the OGPU or Union State Political Directorate (Obodinyonnoye
GPU), at the all-union level, with local branches retaining the title
k
GPU. The OGPU, responsible directly to the Central Executive Committee
(TsIK) of the All-Union Communist Party(bolshevik), merged in a single
I federal secret administration the primary duties of "maintaining the
revolution." It took over from the Cheka the following subordinate organs:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Operational (or general)
Foreign (INO - Inostranny Otdel)
Economic (EKU - Ekonomicheskoye Upravloniyo), dealing
with industrial offences, especially sabotage,
bribery, counterfeiting and smuggling
Transport
Counterintelligence in the Red Army
Secret Service (SO-Sokretny Otdol), responsible
for detecting counterrevolutionary tendencies
in the USSR.
DZERZHINSKI personally controlled the OGPU until his death in 1926,
although nominally he was but one member of a collegium of 14 or possibly
15 commissioners sharing the administration of the OGPU. While the first
Constitution of the Soviet Union had failed to mention a state security
organization, the second Constitution proclaimed the structure and the
tasks of the OGPU in a special decree of 15 November 1923, promulgated
by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Party. Provision
was made for the appointment of the director or president of the OGPU and
his deputies by the Central Committee and the tasks of the organization
were defined as follows:
(1)
Direction of the GPU offices of the Soviet Republics and
the special departments of military districts, as well
as principal divisions subordinate to the GPU.
(2) Direction and administration of the special departments
at the front and in the Army.
(3)
Political protection of the Soviet frontiers.
(4) Operational work in the territory of the Soviet Union.
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The functions of the OGPU, according to the same decree, also have been
The suppression of counterrevolutionary acts, including
banditry.
The taking of.measures to prevent espionage.
The guarding of railways and waterways.
The political protection of the Soviet frontiers.
The prevention of smuggling and of illicit frontier
crossings.
The execution of special duties assigned to it by the
Central Executive Committee or by the Sovnarkom.
An unverified report lists the following "departments" of the OGPU
Secret Department under KSENOFANTOV
Information Department under ANTIPOV
General Department under MOROS
Foreign Department under MESCIffSCHERJSKOV
Finance Department under DEITZ
Registration Department under FOMIN
Propaganda Department under KATZ
Supreme authority over the OGPU was actually in the hands of the then
Secretary General of the Communist Party, Josef STALIN, with the executive
authority vested in the chief of the OGPU with full power to handle routine
state security matters. The OGPU chief and his two deputy chiefs formed
the Troika which acted in cases of emergency, discussed summary reports
prepared by the two deputy chiefs of OGPU,, and formulated instructions
and orders for departmental chiefs. The Troika also prepared all agenda
for the sessions of the Collogium of the OGPU and was responsible for the
execution of decisions made by the Collegium, which, in principle, had
both executive and judicial powers. Actually, however, the Collegium was
only an advisory council, final decisions being made either by the Troika
or directly by the chief. All oases whore capital punishment was mandatory
were, however, brought before the Collogium. It apparently consisted of
fourteen members: the chief of the OGPU, two deputy chiefs, ton departmental
chiefs and one administrative chief,
Bolovi the Collegium was the so-called Osoboyo Sovoshohaniyo - Special
Advisory and Arbitration Council or Special Commission as it was called -
with no permanent membership; it was a loosely bound group made up of
departmental chiefs with a deputy chief of OGPU as chairman. This
commission, aside from its administrative duties, also handled minor
political cases where the maximum punishments were prison sentences and
deportation to f oreed-labor camps under the administration of USLON
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(Upravleniye Sovietskikh Lagerei Osobovo Naznacheniya) - Administration
of Soviet Special Assignment (forced-labor) Camps.
Vyacheslav Rudolfovich PENZHINSKI, who succeeded DZERZHINSKI in 1926,
had boon a leader of the Choka and a deputy director of OGPU since 1923.
His ill health allegedly threw the actual power within the OGPU into the
hands of his two deputies, Genrich Grigorevich YAGODA, who had hold his
post since 1924, and Mikhail TRILLISSER, long-time chief of INO, the
Foreign Department. YAGODA is said to have boon devoted to STALIN, to
whom, however, his policy of mass depcr tations and staged trials was to
become an extreme embarrassment. In 1931 STALIN attempted to restrain
YAGODA by reducing him from 1st deputy to 2nd deputy and by superimposing
MENZHINSKI's former chief assistant, Ivan Alexandrovich AKULOV. The
latter reportedly was unable to hold his own against YAGODAts intrigues
and after a year was sent to an inferior post in the Donbas. Upon the
National Socialist ascension to power in Germany in 1933, STALIN saw that
the Soviet Government would for a time increasingly have to ally itself,
at least verbally, with the Western European countries and that the
publicity which the OGPU was receiving under YAGODA's direction constituted
a serious obstacle. He therefore recalled AKULOV, appointed him to the
new office of State Prosecutor and, in December 1933, conferred upon him
special powers "to strengthen the law" which, at least in theory, enabled
him to override the judicial decisions of the OGPU. He seems to have
received the specific duty of "supervision of the legality and regularity
of the actions of the OGPUa"
Dissatisfaction with the work of the OGPU reportedly had been growing
over a period of years and, apparently as a step towrr d its liquidaticns
the Republic Commissariats of the Interior had been abolished in 1931,
To take the OGPU's place STALIN resorted to the reestablishment, on an
all-union basis, of the NKVD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutronnykh Del) or
Pooples4 Commissariat of Internal Affairs which had existed until 1922
in the RSFSR.
The NKVD was established by a special decree of the Central Executive
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) in July 1934 in
which the functions of the new All-Union Commissariat were defined as follows
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(1)
The protection of the revolutionary order and of
state security.
(2)
The protection of socialist property.
(3)
National registration of births,
and divorces.
deaths, marriages
(4)
The protection of the frontiers.
By virtue of this decree, the intelligence and counterintelligence organs
of the OGPU became the Central Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the
NKVD. Other functions of the OGPU were placed under other NKVD director-
ates, as noted below. This decree implied an increasing centralization
of authority and administration, but the new organization appears to have
changed little from its predecessor in personnel, methods or scope; we
can, therefore, judge the extent of the development of the OGPU, for the
NKVD at the time of its organization is known to have been divided into
a number of directorates, among which the following were the most important;
GUPV (Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranichnykh Voisk ) - Central
Directorate of Frontier Troops. Responsible for
frontier control; had espionage and counterespionage
functions.
GURKPM ( Glavnoye Upravloniye Rabocho-Krestyanskoi Militsii) -
Central Directorate of Workers and Peasants Militia
GULAG (Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagorei) - Central Directorate
of Camps.
GTU (Glavnoye Tyuremnoye Upravleniye) - Central Prison
Directorate.
GUGB (Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvonnoi Bezopasnosti) -
Central Directorate of State Security; also referred
to as Gugbez and Gosbez.
From these directorates it is obvious that, as constituted, the new NKVD
represented primarily only the OGPU under a now name. One oxcepticn,
however, is found in the transfer of the judicial organs-of the OGPU to
the normal Soviet judicial agencies rather than to the NKVD.
The first Comfflmar of NKVD was YAGODA, who replaced MENZHINSKI after
J1e Qe;, to MGM b, 4' RM~sk?' S,~e~
his death in 1934, and who controlled all NKVD directorates, the powers
n /
of which wore increased, especially in the case of the GUGB, as a result
of the murder, in December 1934, of STALINts close personal friend Sergei
Mikhailovich KIROV, Secretary of the Leningrad Communist Party.
In 1936 YAGODA was dismissed by STALIN and replaced by Nikolai
Ivanovich YEZHOV, who had been president of the Party Control Commission
since 1935; YEZHOV proceeded to carry out a purge of GUGB in April 1937,
which was followed by other purgos, notably those of the "Anti-Soviot Bloc
of Rights and Trotskyites" of March 1938,, in which YAGODA, RYKOV, and
BUKFIARIN were liquidated, and the purge of the high command of the Red Army,
which included Marshals TUKIii1CHEVSKI and YEGAROV, two months later.
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iil
YEZHOV maintained his position only until 1938, when he disappeared,
according to many reports, having been either shot or poisoned for "polit-
ical reasons" On 8 Decembor 1938 he was replaced by Lavrenti Pavlovich
BERIYA, who had been a Chrkist in 1921 and who, in 1931, had become
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Georgia.
By his strongly pro-Strlinist and historically perverted History of
Bolshevism in Transco.cc~sia, written in 1937, BERIYA may well have
strengthened his fr'.endship with Stalin and helped Dave the road to his
appointment to YE2IIOV's post..
In March 1941 the GUGB/NKVD had grown so important that it was made
an independent Commissariat: the Peoples' Commissariat of State Security
(Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) or NKGB. Its first
commissar was Vsevolod Nikolayevich ?ERKULOV, who had been first Deputy
Commissar of the NK--VD in 1938 and had been associated with BERIYA in the
early Bolshevik days in Tiflis. The new Commissariat had a short life at
this time for on 20 July of the some year it was incorporated into the
NKVD. This reversion was almost certainly due to the German attack on the
USSR which had taken place a few weeks earlier and had raised problems
with which a Commissariat so recently established could scarcely have been
competent to deal, In May 1943, however, with the lessening of German
pressure, the GUGB again was given independent status as the TNKGB, and
MERKULOV was once more appointed its head.
On 15 March 1946, apparently for political and propaganda reasons#
all Peoples' Commissariats were renamed ministries and the NKGB became
the MGB, NERKLUOV remained as its head until replaced as Minister of the
MGB on 15 August 1946 by Viktor Semeonovich ABAKUMOV, wartime chief of
countorintelligonco in the Armed Forces (STIERSH). According to some un-
verified reports 1'ERKULOV was purged, although he also reportedly was
placed in charge of Soviet atomic research under BERIYA. Very recently
it was officially announced in Moscow that MERKULOV had been placed at
the head of a newly created "Chief Directorate for the Administration
of Soviet Property Abroad." The exact functions and purpose of the new
V CC I Tam"
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agony are as yet uniasown, but it is interesting to note that one of
MRKULOV's deputies in the directorate is Vladimir G. DEKANOZOV, former
Deputy Minister of the MID. DEKANOZOV for many years was a high official
of the NKVD and is known to have had at least some authority in intelligence
matters as late as 1945 while assigned to the NKVD.
Since 11 November 1941 BERIYA had been Deputy President of the Sovnarkom
(Soviet Narodnykh Komissarov - the Council of Peoples' Commissars, later
the Council of Ministers). The ton Deputy Presidents of the Sovnarkom,
at the time, each exercised a general supervision over one or more Con is-
sariats in addition to his owne The NKGB was allotted to BERIYI'L and thus
he controlled,botwoen 1941 and 1946, both Commissariats, the NKSTD as its
Peoples' Corunissar and the NKGB through the authority vested in him by
the Sovnarkom. On 10 July 1945 BrRIYA received the rank of Marshal, and
in 1946 he became a member of the Politburo. It appears that at the
present time he has extensive co-ordination and control functions in
respect to the activities of both the MGB and the MVD (Ministry of Internal
Affairs), although he has not officially headed either agony since 15
January 1946 when he was replaced as Peoplest Commissar of NKVD by Colonel
General Sergei Nikiforovich KRUGLOV who had been Deputy Peoples' Commissar
of the NKVD since 1939.
III. CENTRAL ARGB I LDQUART RS
A. Structure
mown reorganizations in occupied territories, as well as other
factors are the basis for the belief that since early 1946 the MGB has
been undergoing extensive reorganization, the exact ultimate purpose of
which is not yet completely clear. Similarly, the exact present struc-
ture of central MGB headquarters is not known with finality, but it is
undoubtedly an outgrowth.of the trials and errors of the Cheka, the OGPU,
the GUGB/NKVD and the NKGB. Some directorates and sections of the MGB
have, in the course of these years, remained relatively unchanged,
especially the 1st Special Section which maintains files and archives,
while others have undergone radical changes in organization and functions;
for example, the EKU which developed from a purely administrative organ-
ization. It is fairly certain that 11GB directorates at USSR level
exercise strict control over their subordinate organizations on republics
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province and district levels, In addition to the directorates on the
USSR levels certain sections and directorates which carry out executive
and administrative functions for the INU, KRU, etco$ are also organized
on USSR level and are independent, as far as their own administration is
concerned, of the directorates to which they are attached. Such service
organizations are also set up on USSR level in a Moscow directorate or
center, and subordinate sections are subject to strict control from USSR
level down through republic and province level, if not necessarily through
district level. Thus a section of the 1st Special Section, with the task
of maintaining card files and indices, services KRU on USSR levels and
sub-sections of the 1st Special Section service KRO's on lower planes.
Administratively these 1st Special Sections and subsections are directly
responsible to the 1st Special Section Center on USSR level in Moscow.
At the present times the central MGB headquarters on USSR level in
Moscow comprises an unknown number of directorates (Upravleniya) and sec-
tions (Otdely). In order to clarify those that are known, OGPU and GUGB
organizations which preceded the MGB are listed below. The statements
explaining the functions of those organizations have been left as reported
by sources, for the reason that not enough material is available on the
background of the OGPU and the GUGB to permit a thorough analysis of them.
Mile some of the subordinate organs of State Security agencies which
preceded the MGB into the present D,MGB structure have not boon traced,
it should be noted that most of these socti m s, with little question,
exist at the present time in one form or another. The bulk of the avail-
able reliable information concerning Soviet State Security organs reflects
that the major functions, purposes and objectives of these organs have
continued, with minor variations., unchanged since 1917.
The following subordinate organizations of the OGPU have been reported
as constituting its central Moscow setup in the first years After its
establishment:
1. Personnel Section
2, Eastern Section
3. TR (Tainaya Razvedka) - Secret Section. Supervised the life
of the Communist officials; maintained liaison with the
various GPU posts in the USSR; kopt files on suspects and
agents; 'controlled such expressions of public life as the
theaters meetings, etc.; and combatted the activity of
the church.
4,, Central Registry. Kept information in dossiers against
all suspectso
5. INO (Inostranny Otdel) - Foreign Affairs Section. In charge
of political, military 9mic intelligence outside
the Soviet borders.
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5, 00 (Osoby Otdol) - Important Affairs Section. Listening post
for dissatisfaction in the Red Army and Navy and in govern-
ment offices; protected and assisted the New Economic
Policy; in charge of economic counterespionage.
6, KRO (KontrV Razvedyvatelny Otdol) - Counterespionage Section.
In charge of overall counterespionage in the USSR, in the
armed forces, and abroad.
7. EKO (Ekonomichoski Otdol) - Economic Section, In charge of
protection and assistance to the Now Economic Policy; of
combatting sabotage and dissatisfaction among the workers
and of economic counterespionage.
Be OPEROD (Oporatsionny Otdel) - Operations Section* Organized
and planned punitive expeditions, made arrests, shadowed
suspects and was in charge of physical security of GPU
property, supervising of prisons; executive arm of the KRO.
9. SPEKO (Spotsialny Otdol) - Technical Matters Section, Super-
vised radio programs, and telegrams leaving the USSR; was
in charge of codes, ciphers, invisible ink, etc?
10. POLITOTDEL (Politichoski Otdol) - Political Section. In control
of newspapers, periodicals and books; monitored the telephone
calls, censored mail leaving the USSR.
1i. TO (Transportny Otdel) - Transport Section. Supervised the em-
ployees of the rail and water transport systems and surveilled
tourists in the USSR,
12. FO (Feldyegerski Otdel) - Courier Service Section. In charge
of the secret mails service, diplomatic correspondence and
transmittal of money.
13. GUPOV (Glavnoye Upravleniyo Fogran-Okhrany Voisk OGPU) - Border
Patrol and OGPU Troops Headquarters Section. In charge of
border control service.
14. INFO (Informatsionny Statisticheski Otdol) - Information and
Statistics Section. Responsible for the collection of
statistics on the work done by all OGPU sections.
An undated report, based on sources whose reliability cannot be esti-
mated, lists the following so-called departments of OGPU with their sub-
ordinated sections. The terminology used is that of the report; no attempt
has been made to comment on the accuracy of the material presented. Only
in the case of the Foreign Department has material received from this
source been used in the body of the present study, and it is incorporated
in the chapter on INU.
1. Special Task Department (Osoby Otdol). Charged with super-
viii. g OGPU staff ac ivitios and conduct; carried on sur-
veillance of Communist Party members, state functionaries,
Foreign Service staff and special assignments made by the
chief of OGPU or the Secretary General of the Party. This 00
was the most influential department, feared by all Soviet
officials and Party members; it was divided into the following
sections (otdoloniya):
a. State and Party Functionaries Section (0 Kadrov) - In charge
of screening all newly appointed officials. Without its
approval, no applicant could be appointed either for a
Party post or a government position*
be Special Duty Section (0 Spotsialnoi Sluzhby) - Handled all
its own agent provocateurs, saboteurs, forgers, divorsents,
actions against enemy agents, and liquidated its own
"unworthy" agents,
as Liaison Section (0 Svyazi) - In charge of all liaison between
provincial or foreign OGPU units and headquarters in
Moscow.
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d. r.Suseum and Laboratory Section (0 Muzeya i Laboratori) -
Collected and preserved samples of various documents,
stamps, seals, codes, chemicals, photographs, forged
and real currency, and maintained a complete library
in many foreign languagese
e. Medical Service Sections (0 Meditsinskoi Sluzhby) -
Handled all medical tasks of the OGPU.
2. Counter-Espionage Department (Kontr-Razvedyvatelny Otdel).
Contained similar sections to those of the General Staff
of the Red Army, the work of which was duplicated by this
parallel system. This sectionts primary task was the
control and evaluation of reports of CE and intelligence
agents of the General Staff.
3. Internal Secret Department (Vnutrenny Otdel). Directly con-
nec ed with e Contro and Inspection Commission of the
USSR (Kontrolnaya i Inspektsionnaya Kommissiya CK CPSU),
and was charged with direct control and inspection and
purging of all Party members and state institutions and
their employees both at home and abroad. In charge also
of headquarters buildings, prisons and special assign-
ment armed OGPU units known as CHON, the best-equipped
armed force in the USSR. Handled all secretarial work
of the OGPU, the Criminal Section of OGPU and the Law
Section of OGPU. The Internal Department was divided into:
a. Kommandatura Section (0 Kommandatury) - Headquarters.
be Secretariat and Political Section ( Sekretariat i
Politicheskoye 0).
c. Operative Section (Operativnoye 0).
d. Out-of-City Section (Inogorodnoyo 0) Controlled the
activities of privineial branches of OGPU.
e. Criminal Section (Ugolovnoye 0) - Charged with re-
cruiting "criminal" elements for work with OGPU,
in addition to regular routine work.
f. Legal Section (Yuridiohoskoye 0) - Accused of framing
many cases of unwanted persons which normally would
not stand before the law*
g. Counterrew?olution Section (0 po Borbe so Spekulatsici:
sic).
he Anl%Speculation Section (0 po Borbe so Spekulatsiei)o
I. Special Task Suction (Osoboye 0) - Authorized to supervise
all activities of this department and handle assignments
which could not be handled by other departmentse
j. Military OGPU Unitst Section (0 Voisk OGPU or 0 CHON).*
4o Special Department (Spetsialny Otdel). Performed all assignments
received from various party and state authorities, dealing
with government industrial and agricultural activities. It
had sections such as:
a. Operative.
be Secretariat.
c. Industrial
d. Agricultural
e. Special Task (Osoby 0).
5. Economic and Financial Department (EkFO). The fiscal agent
of OGPU. handled all OGPU finances which were based on
an unlimited credit from the USSR government and its various
enterprises such as building, highway, railroad, industrial
and other constructions where compulsory labor was supervised.
Financial transactions abroad were handled through various
credit bureaus, etc., and agents called Commersants (brokers)
who conducted business in countries of their residence.
Business included aiding Soviet "returnees" to liquidate their
properties abroad, purchasing strategic materials, acquiring
foreign currencies, distributing counterfeit money and selling
or dumping Soviet products to fight foreign competition or to
provide money needed by the Comintern or other Soviet agencies
for clandestine operations.
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Pron"
6. Information Department (Informatsionny Otdol). Collected
and disseminated information both at home and abroad.
Tass News Agency was under its control.
7. Foreign Department (Vneshny or Inostranny Otdel),
8. Operative Department (Oporativny Otdel). Handled all
routine work of the OGPU not assigned to other depart-
ments. It was also a service department for other
departments, inasmuch as it prepared action later per-
formed by respective sections of a given department.
Also in charge of the so-called Militsiya (militia or
police at home and guards of Soviet foreign missions
abroad).
9. Eastern Department ( Vostochny Otdel). Its assignments were
operations in Eastern countries (Asiatic). Agents of the
Eastern Department collaborated with Far Eastern Comintern
agents who were setting up Comintern-patterned agents'
nets, employing specially trained native personnel. This
department was also very closely associated with the
Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions), Asiatic
section, under Secretary LAZOVSKY0 Almost all Far Eastern
Trade Unions were deeply penetrated, controlled and financed
by agents (Soviet and native) of this department.
10. Border Patrol'and Defence Department (Otdel Pogranichnoi
Okhrany . T is epar men is duties comprised border patrol,
contraband control and defense against White Russian raids.
Border patrol units were called Pogranichnaya Okhrana and
its members were called "Pogranichniki," The Border Patrol
Department collaborated very closely with the Political
Department of the Red Army and its commanders in all border
zones.
11. Administration and Organization Office (AIOU). Having the
status and functions of a department, this office was
charged with the administration matters, preparation of
plans for the improvement of the services, establishment
of liaison facilities, administrative control of temporary
personnel, etc,
By the time the GUGB of the NKVD was set up in 1934 the following
subordinate organs were reportedly administered by it; the majority, it
will be noted, had previously existed under OGPU;
1. Organization and Administration - Handled the organization of
subordinate offices in the republics, provinces and cities.
2. Secretariat - Handled the most important correspondence of the
Administration.
3. INO; Foreign Department - In charge of the activity of the
foreign organs of the Gosbez and also in charge of the
Foreign Operations Center (SOZ) created in 1937,
4. Economic Department - Observation of morale among the workers
and the activity of economic undertakings.
5. Frontier Department - Handled frontier control, customs offices
and transportation of agents into foreign countries,
6. Railroads - Supervised railroads and their highways, as well as
railway workers and their activities.
7. Information Department - In charge of secret agents who were
assigned to collect intelligence concerning the political
and economic situation within the Soviet Unions
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8. Secret Department - In charge of lists of secret agents (Seksoty),
the equivalent of German.V-Men and also correspondence with
Branch offices.
9. Registry - Compiled the black lists of the names of the
enemies of the USSR.
10. Counterespionage.
11. Commandant Office - In charge of prisons; supervised highly
placed personalities and. executed death sentences.
13. Operations Department - In charge of the planning and execution
of various operations, such as the liquidation of revolutionary
bands and the suppression of the counterrevolution.
14. Political Control - In charge of censorship within and at the
borders of the USSR.
15. Religious Department - In charge of lists of ministers and
priests and supervised churcheso
16. Special Department - In charge of the Secret Intelligence
Service within the Army and the Navy.
17. Oriental Division - In charge of secret deputies of the NKVD
in Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and India.
18. Dispatch Corps - In charge of the expedition and transmission
of most secret papers within the USSR, as well as through
diplomatic couriers outside of the country.
According to a source whose reliability cannot be checked, the prin-
cipal sections of GUGB in 1939 are listed, with their respective chiefs,
as follows:
1st Section GUGB - Protection of the Government (Okhrana
pravitolstva) - VLASIK
2nd Section GUGB - Secret Political Section (SPO) - FEDOTOV
3rd Section GUGB - Counterintelligence (KRO) - KORNIENICO
4th Section GUGB - Special Sections (Osobyye Otdely) - BOGKOV
5th Section GUGB - Intelligence (Razvodyvatolny) - Lt. Gen.
FITIN, P.M.
It is of interest to note that GUGB sections were numbered since there
is no reason to doubt that the system of numbering has been adhered to
and the directorates of the MGB today are also numbered. The numbering
of sections and directorates of the predecessor organizations of MGB
has been confirmed by several reliable sources. Between 1939 and 1941,
possibly at the time of the first establishment of the NKGB, the 5th
Section of GUGBmentioned above, became the 1st Directorate of the NKGB,
and probably of GUGB/1XVD, when the NKGB reverted to its former status.
Lt, Gen. FITIN is believed to have remained as chief of this directorate
and FEDOTOV as chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate.
erriUr-r
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It seems to have become customary to refer to the subordinate organs
of the State Security service by numbers instead of by various groupings
of the letters of their Russian names. In the following list of State
Security organs, both the initial and number designations will be given
wherever possible. It should be noted that it is difficult to tell whether
any organizational branch is a department, a directorate, a section, a
branch or a subsection, In this paper the following nomenclature will
be used: Upravloniye for Directorate, Otdel for Section and Otdeleniye
for Subsection. A number of directorates or sections have been reported
which may no longer exist, possibly having been dropped in reorganizations;
however, the present list has been made up from sources of some trust-
worthiness with the aim of including all possible State Security organs
as well as all organs which have possibly served State Security during
the past eight years. It is probable that most of these listed organi-
zations existed under !TKGB, but it is extremely unlikely that they were
carried over in the form outlined in this study when the NKGB was replaced
by the MGB, at which time a thorough reorganization of the State Security
service is believed to have taken plaoee
INU - (Inostrannoye Upravleniye) - Foreign Directorate, Also
referred to as the Intelligence (Razvedyvatelnoye)
Directorate, 1st Directorate and 5th Directorate, In
charge principally of espionage and counterintelligence
abroad,
SPU - (Sekretno-Politicheskoye Upravloniye) - Secret Political
Directorate. Also known as the 2nd Directorate. Its
principal task was counterintelligence against anti-
Soviet elements in the USSR.
KRU - (Kontr-Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) - Counterintelligence
Directorate. Also known as the 3rd Directorate. Principal
task protection of Soviet institutions from foreign
espionage.
EKU - (Ekonomichoskoye Upravleniye or GEU - Glavnoye Ekonomioheskoye
Upravleniye) - Economic or Centrallbonomic Directorate.
Was in charge of counterintelligence and anti-sabotage
work in industry and agriculture; may have been discontinued.
DTU - (Dorozhno-Transportnoye Upravleniye) - Transport Directorate.
Counterintelligence in the transport systems of the USSR.
Directorate for the Security of Government Leaders (Russian name
unknown). At one time referred to as the 1st Directorate.
Protection of all important leaders.
Directorate of the OOts (Osobyye Otdely) or Special Sections of
NKGB. In charge of counterintelligence in the partisan
troops.
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Sf'ERffi
Central Directorate for CI in the Armed Forces (formerly SIERSH,
from "Snort Shpionam -.Death to Spies"). The reincorporation
of STAERSH into MGB in the summer or fall of 1946 is believed
to have been one of the first steps taken in the reorgani-
zation of MGB in order to further centralize intelligence
and security functions within that ministry. It should be
noted, however, that while formal control of SI,RSH had,
since 1943, rested in theory with the a rrned forces, actually
SL RSH was controlled by the NKGB and MG-B, inasmuch as the
directing personnel apparently was completely drawn from
officers of State Security, owing their, primary loyalty and
allegiance not to the Rrd Army but to the organs of State
Security. It will be recalled in this regard, for example,
that the present Minister of State Security, Viktor
Semoonovich ABAKUI,MOV, was the wartime head of SIJIERSH.
Partisan Directorate. Referred to constantly as the 4th Directorate.
Responsible for the organization, in cooperation with the
CP of the Partisan Movement, of espionage, sabotage and
terrorism in the enemy's roar.
Directorate of Intelligence in the Lanistry of Foreign Affairs.
Functions unolarified.
Central Directorate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Functions
unclarified.
Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Ministries
of Internal and Foreign Trade. Functions unelarified?
Central Directorate for the Control of the Maintenance of State
and Military Secrets. Functions unclarifiod,
Central Directorate for the Control of the Purity of the Communist
Party. Functions unclarified.
Central Directorates in Industrial Ministries.and in Industries.
(For example: the Ministry of Heavy Machine Construction
and the Armaments Industry). Functions unelarified.
Operational Directorate. In charge, prior to 1941, of the opera-
tional work of the GUGB directorates.
Investigation Directorate. Responsible for the investigation of
IMGB cases and the interrogation of suspects.
7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD. Believed to have been responsible
for certain code and cipher procedures and still to exist
in MG-B in an unknotim form,
1st Special Section. Maintenance of files and card-indices for all
MGB organizations.
2nd special Section. Responsible for providing technical equipment,
monitoring, etc.
3rd Special Section. Provides agents for surveillance and search.
4th Special Section. Censorship.
5th Special Section. Codes.
Information Section. Responsible for the publication of informa-
tion bulletins,
AKhU (Administrativno-Khozyaistvonnoyo Upravleniye) - Administrative-
Economic Directorate. In charge of administrative work
for all MGB organizationse,
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GUK (Glavnoye Upravleniyo Kadrov) - Central Personnel Directorate,
Responsible for the administration of personnel for all
MGB organizations,
FO (Finotdel or Finantsovy Otdel) - Finance Section or Office.
Controls the financial resources of MGB organizations.
B. Co-ordination of the MGB Espionage and Counterespionage Agencies
Before analyzing the functions and structure of specific MGB head-
quarters directorates, the importance of counterespionage to the Soviet
Union should be emphasized and an.-effort made to clarify as far as possible
the headquarters control, co-ordination and planning of MGB operations.
In a general sense* oountorespionago within the USSR encompasses
the prevention of all counterrevolutionary and anti-state activities on
the part of the entire Soviet population, The principal MGB directorates
charged with this responsibility are the SPU, the EKU, and the DTU. The
duties of KRU, on the other hand, are direct counterespionage, to protect
Soviet citizens inside and outside the USSR and non-military Soviet insti-
tutions from penetration by foreign intelligence services.
The IAN, in
addition to carrying out all of the MGB espionage work abroad, also
appears to have counterespionago functions regarding anti-Soviet organi-
zations, groups and persons abrcad which are similar to those of the SPU
within the Soviet Union.
It appears possible that a planning committee for counterespionage,
with emphasis on counterespionage within the Soviet Union, is established
in the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (bolshevik)
where all reports concerning disturbances and efforts directed against the
interests of the state or against the policies of Party leaders are
collected. Those reports are believed to come from the State Information
Bureau and the Central Office of the Secret Information Service in the
Council of Ministers as well as from the Party organization itself through
the Commission for Party Control within the Central Committee, It is also
possible that this last-mentioned commission determines the points of
emphasis for counterespionage within the USSR and that the Politburo de-
termines the policies of counterespionage against foreign countries. Advice
from these offices is believed to form the basis for the orders given by
BERIYAts oo-ordinating Central Office in the Council of Ministers, where
the basic co-ordination of the work of the military and non-military
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branches of counterespionage is believed to be planned in regard to
defining jurisdiction, objectives, use of personnel, and administrative
expenses. In this office opinions and experience may be exchanged between
the positive intelligence and the counterintolligonce directors. This
possibility, however, has not been verified,
Regarding high policy positive intelligence planning, a single report
indicates that BERIYA heads an intelligence subcommittee of the Central
Committee of the-All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) which has the
authority and responsibility to determine the missions, strength and
organization of all intelligence and counterintelligence agencies; to
control the selection, appointment, rotation and dismissal of all intelli-
gence and counterintelligence personnel; to maintain surveillance over all
personnel; to control the flow of information between intelligence agencies
and from them to other governmental and Party organs; and to operate extra-
governmental intelligence, counterintelligence and sabotage through
Communist Party channels in the USSR and abroade An important,but as yet
not completely clarified,part in these functions is played by Georgi
links imilianovich MALENTKOV, Chief of the Orgburo and member of the Secre-
tariat of the All-1i`zion Communist Party (bolshevik). Since PJLALENKOV is
also Chief of the Administration of Personnel of the Communist Party, it
is presumed that he is primarily concerned with approval of all Soviet
Intelligence personnel, including the staff personnel of the MGB.
25X1 5b
25X1 5b
in addition to his other functions,
Georgi Maksimilianovich MALEISIXOV also occupied, directly under Stalin, a
position as "intelligence co-ordinator," channeling instructions to and
information from the intelligence agencies and settling such conflicts
as jurisdictional disputes and arguments over utilization of particular
agents or concentration on particular objectives.
_i;IiLENKOV was the head of a so-called "political section" of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, which section was responsible for the control of
all CPSU members abroad and for certain policy liaison with foreign Com-
munist Parties; a function which, for many years, was exercised by the
Executive Committee of the Communist International,
sources reported the existence within, or attached to,the Politburo, of an
25X1 C5b
25X1 C5b
25X1X7
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extremely secret control organ known as the TPK (Tainy Partiny Kontrol
or Secret Party Control). These sources described the TPK as a committee,
the members of which are STALIN, MALENKOV and BERIYA, and stated that it
was responsible for, among other things, a complete co-ordination of all
intelligence efforts within and outside the Soviet Union, as well as the
co-ordination of foreign Communist Parties. If this group does exist as
described, it could, of course, logically be composed of the three indi-
viduals named.
Obviously, in order to effectuate the decisions of any such organ,
some bureaucratic apparatus would be necessary and there is a possibility
that at least a portion of such necessary bureaucracy may have been the
political section referred to by
25X1 C5b
IV. MGB DIRECTORATES
Consideration of the principal MGB directorates is naturally hampered
by the high security surrounding them. As a result, it has been extremely
difficult to compile full and detailed information concerning them; es-
pecially the exact headquarters organization of such directorates as the
INU and the KRU. It appears that the directorates and sections of the MGB
at the present time are consistently designated by numbers; and possibly
in some instances by letters. However, the numerical order of the head-
quarters directorates of the MGB has not been completely determined as
available sources disagree. For example, while the INU has been described
most frequently as the 5th directorate, at least two recent sources have
referred to it as the 1st directorate.
1. INU (Inostrannoye Upravleniyo): Foreign Directorate
The INU has extremely broad jurisdiction, both within and outside
of the Soviet Union. It was founded as the INO, or Foreign Section, of
the Cheka in 1921 by one DAVTYAN. It is known that Mikhail TRILLISSER
directed its activities for a number of years, exorcising powerful and
apparently able influence on its growth. Originally, the principal purpose
of the INO was to gain military, naval, political and economic intelligence
concerning foreign countries, By the time the Cheka had become the OGPU,
the main functions of the INO, in addition to "regular routing work," were 25X1A6a
reported to include the following:
F r . (_ cr ?c9 d~ ao fC Ir o 6, 19 2 2 Al o Ciu'cJ
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as Preparation of favorable conditions for the subsequent
work of diplomats. .
b. Co-operation in the Comintern's underground work*
c. Active participation in the elimination, often called
"extermination," of enemies of the USSR, both internal
and external.
According to the same sources, INO under OGPU was subdivided ad-'
ministratively into sections nazch as were other directorates of OGPU. In
addition to a secretariat, a special task section, an operative section
and finance and economic sections, INO also had the following sections
assigned:
a. Special Intelligence Section (Spetsialno-Razvodyvatelny
Otdel),
b. Political and Propaganda Section (Politicheski i Propa-
gatsionny Otdol)e
C. Press Section (Otdol Pressi)e
d? Liaison and Courier Section (Otdol Svyazi)o
e, Deception Section (Diffamatsionny Otdol)*
f. Recruiting Section (Verbovoehny Otdel)o
the INO-OGPU in Manchuria, some
years ago, had the following functions: to carry on all underground work
among Russian emigrants; to propagandize Communism among the Chinese; to
organize plots and strikes; and to form underground units and Chinese
Communist bands. Both this and other sources agree that there was a close
co-ordination between INO and the work of the Comintorn throughout the
world; in fact, the rather sweeping statement is made that "Comintern
activities' network throughout the world was patterned according to the
INO-OGPU setup, especially security, travel and liaison matters." Units
of INO-OGPU sections are claimed to have been attached to every Soviet
foreign representation abroad, and the INO "worked in co-operation with"
the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Finance, and Heavy
Industry. In addition,
underground work of the Comintern and of Red
Army Intelligence was carried on under the direction of INO-OGPU.
The only available information on how the INO was represented
abroad in the early years was received from a source vh ich listed eight
special districts of INO in 1923; these districts, referred to as "resi-
dence places," were located in the following areas: Germany, Sweden,
England, Turkestan, Bulgaria, A.merioa, Finland and China, The districts
had so-called subdivisions under the areas as follows:
25X1 C5b
25X1 C5b
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German : Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland.
Sweden: Denmark and Norway.
France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and apparently
Eng -d
their colonies.
Turkestan: India, Hindustan, Persia and certain British
and Dutch colonies,
Bulgaria: Rumania, Turkey, Greece.
America: Australia.
Find ann Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.
China: Japan
The abolition of the OGPU and the establishment of the NKVD saw
a change in the functions of INO, which became the INU under the GUGB/NKVD,
only in that they were broadened and deepened. The primary INU espionage
functions of gathering political, economic, technical, naval and military
intelligence in foreign countries remained, but the part played by the INU
in the active struggle against non-Soviet organizations of all types was
expanded greatly and the directorate assumed extensive surveillance functions.
In this respect it will be noted that INU and KRU seem to overlap in their
work outside the Soviet Union. No full clarification of the exact rela-
tionship of those two directorates is availablo, nor can it be definitely
stated that all operational intelligence outside the Soviet Union is
controlled by INU, or that KRU, for example, maintains its oven channels and
its own operations. On the basis of the data available, it appears most
probable that KRU operations abroad are conducted either by INU or through
INU channels; it is interesting to note that a number of cases have been
reported where operations, tentatively established as being under the con-
trol of INU, were concerned with counterintelligence objectives. These
would appear to be within the province of KRU, at least if tie are to accept
the various delineations of KRU functions and jurisdictions which are
available.
The INU is reported to have carried out the follatiiing functions
during its history and may well be responsible for them today*
as Attempts to control and keep under surveillance all
Russian emigre organizations and all anti-Soviet
organizations outside of the USSR, including Menshevik
and Trotskyite groups*
b. The surveillance of all Soviet citizens abroad, especially
members of the Soviet diplomatic and trade missions*
c. The dissemination of secret political propaganda throughout
the world in order to create conditions favorable to the
growth of Communism, especially by inciting discontent
and dissatisfaction*
d. The support of Communist parties under persecution
abroad.
irrenrir
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e. The direction of subversive and sabotage activities
outside of the USSR and the organizing of strikes
and revolts*
f. The recruiting of foreign government officials for
agent work, propaganda, etc; instigating through
such recruits changes in government staffs and
agencies for the advantage of the Soviet Uniono
g. Attempts to subordinate the Greek Orthodox churches
abroad to the Patriarch of the Soviet State church
and to penetrate the Roman Catholic church through-
out the world for purposes of positive and counter
intelligence.
h. The execution of reprisals, including assassination,
against members, of Russian emigro.organizations,
against members of anti-Soviet political groups
and against outstanding anti- Soviet personnages.
The INU has been very successful in preserving the security of
its operations, Seldom has it been possible to prove definitely that
a specific Soviet espionage operation abroad was under the direction of
INU; in such instances where it has been possible to establish this,
it has been proved by a defection or penetration. INU operations abroad
are characterized not only by maximum security, but by careful planning,
tenacity, and extreme patience. It is not unusual for high quality INU
operations to be prepared and built up very carefully over a period of
years, with no immediate results for long periods of time. Character-
istic of INU operations also appears to be a policy of using one country
as a base for operations against another; for example, the frequent use
of France and Switzerland during the 1930's as bases for intelligence
operations into Germany and the consistent use of the West Coast of the
United States as a staging base from which to mount intelligence operations
against the Orient. Usually in such INU operations the personnel concerned
are not in any way implicated in operations against the base country.
For the carrying out of the responsibilities outlined above, the
INU, operated
through the following sections:
Operational Section: Planned and directed the work of the INU,
including, in conjunction with the Special
Section described below, all espionage organs,
Special Section: Believed to have worked in collaboratiai with
the Operational Section in directing and con-
trolling espionage networks from headquarters
sot up in all parts of the world; possibly
collaborating with an Agent Section situated
in Iles cow.
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24 -
25X1 C5b
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Communications Responsible for all INU communications, chiefly
NOME: maintaining contact with all espionage organi-
zations and all agents of impor tanceo
Records Section:
Maintained all the records and card-indices of
INU. A card-index of every INU agent network
was kept, including a file for all the permanent
agents of each network. It is believed that a
card-index of potential agents and informants
was maintained also.
Personnel Training Responsible for the training of all UNU officials,
Section: staffs and for most of its agent personnel, The
latter wore trained either individually or in
special study groups, Personnel training section
controlled the INU Study Center and personnel
were trained in special faculties by certain
schools and institutes, such as the Higher Diplo-
matic School of the Soviet Union, the 1st Moscow
Medical Institute,, the Soviet Industrial Academy.
Training in special short courses was also given
when necessary. For example, a silkworm breeding
exhibition was to be hold in Paris in 1937 or
1938. Allegedly INU decided to use the exhibition
as a cover for agents, and personnel therefore
underwent an intensive short course in silkworm
breeding prior to leaving for Paris.
Information Issued intelligence bulletins on the work of the
Section: INU. No information is' available as to the
frequency of these bulletins, their exact con-
tent or the distribution list.
Press Section: Carried out a systematic examination of the press
of all nations.
Radio Section: Studied foreign radio broadcasts.
Collation of In- Roeoivod, chocked, collated and filed by countries
formation Group: and departments all material obtained by the
various espionage networks. Translation, photo-
graphic, drafting, deciphering and other offices
serviced this group.
Consular Section: Made use of Soviet diplomatic channels for the
acquisition of intelligence end either carried
out CE work for KRU or provided cover for M-U
agents. Members of the Consular Section of INU
are said to be active in every Soviet embassy.
It is possible agents of this section supervised
the work of diplomatic representatives quite apart
from any connection with KRU.
Military Attaches Allegedly supervised the work of Soviet Military
Section: Attaches.
Foreign Trade Reportedly checked on the work of all Soviet
Section: Trade Missions abroad, using them also to screen
espionage and propaganda activity.
Finance Section: Reportedly conducted all INU financial matters
and controlled large bank deposits in foreign
countries. Deposits were credited to trustworthy
"dumraies" and built up by the following methods:
In purchasing goods abroad, the USSR would offer
to pay a sum in excess of the price asked, providing
a portion of the excess sum be credited a specified
account in a specified bank; ie, the dummy account.
Operating through the NKID, the INU would direct
the buyer of goods exported from the USSR to pay
a portion of the price to a specified individual.
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Administrative and Responsible for all ordinary INU administrative
Economic Section; functions.
Personnel Section: In charge of personnel administration, the main-
tenance of records and the recruitment of
personnel.
In addition to the above, geographically divided sections referred
to by this source as "sections for various countries" controlled networks
of independent agents operating in various countries, Headquarters were
believed to be established either in the country in which espionage was
carried on or in the Soviet Union near the country concerned. For example,
the section dealing with Turkey was believed to have had one headquarters
in Odessa, another in Batum and still another within Turkey. The section
dealing with the Far East-was believed to have headquarters in Khabarovsk
and Vladivostoko
Available information indicates the existence of two additional
offices charged with procurement: the Special Supplies Office and the
LZatcrial and Technical Supply Office0 Inadequate information on the first
indicates it may have provided material essential for the carrying out of
secret espionage work and served only INU. The second, which appo.rently
provided for both 3GB and MVD material and technical supplies, is believed
to have had depots in all cities whore there were INU headquarters.
We are not able at the present time to delineate authentically and
in detail all of the information objectives of the INU. It is known that
the INU is almost completely omnivorous in its search for information.
Generally, it is interested in all information which by any conceivable
stretch of the imagination affects the security of the Soviet Union or
which concerns the military, economic, sociological, or political potential
/g V(,, l V A tia V
LAA
of any other country* f-., C
2. SPU (Sekretno Politicheskoye Upravleniyo): Secret Political
Directorate
The SPU, believed to be the 2nd Directorate of MGB, has been called
the direct heir of the earliest Bolshevik secret police; of all MGB direct-
orates the SPU comes closest to the original primary purpose of the Choka:
the combatting of counterrevolution and sabotage within the Soviet state.
SPU was originally created to guarantee completely the political solidarity
of the Communist Party, and its purpose was to sock out and eliminate within
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the Party any signs of opposition constituting a throat to the regime. In
cases where these signs were no more than tendencies of schools of thought,
it was the responsibility of SPU to study them closely and to be able to
report on their potential danger; most of SPUts attention was therefore
focused on the Party. In addition, the SPU had the subsidiary task of
keeping a close watch on religious activities in the USSR; this was deemed
necessary because the Communist Party feared and distrusted the development
of any political, social or spiritual body which it could not directly
control.
It may be said that the SPU today is concerned with crushing all
elements within the USSR which are hostile to or presumed likely to become
hostile to the regime. This may be contrasted sharply with the purpose
of KRU, the Counterintelligence Directorate of 1.1GB, which is to protect
Soviet institutions from penetration by foreign powers. In casee where
there were signs of only hostile tendencies in certain groups, it was
the responsibility of SPU to koop close tabs and report on them. In all,
the SPU maintainc a dense not of agents to keep under surveillance and
to combat not only all elements of the population suspected of being anti-
Soviet, but also to watch illegal parties or groups, national minorities,
the clor:gy,, the intelligentsia, all cultural institutions of the USSR, and
the agricultural communities. The SPU represents the Communist P r ty
authority in the government for the supervision of political attitudes;
in other words9 supervision down to the level of the private life of every
Soviet citizens
The structure of the SPU at the USSR level is reported
to have included the following sections:
25X1 C5b
operationalDirectly responsible under GUGB to the chief of
Seion: SPU, or to his deputies. The Operational Section
organized and directed all the activities of the
SPU, working with the political sections described
below, which were in a position to give expert
advice. The Operational Section issued its orders
after studying reports prepared by the operational
sections of lower formations of SPU. There were
five types of such reports:
a? Periodical reports (when the situation demanded)
be Ton-day bulletins*
c. :Monthly reports*
d. Quarterly roportst
o. Yearly reports.
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All reports from provincial operations sections
of the RSFSR were sent directly to the Operational
Section, SPU. Reports fron provincial operational
sections of ordinary republics would first of all
be sent to the Operational Section at Republic
levels and from there,. if of sufficient importance,
would be forvacrdod to the Operational Section,
SPU, Moscow.
Investigation When the Operational Section ordered the arrest
Section: of a person reported as a potential threat to state
security, he would be imprisoned pending investi-
gation of his case by the Investigation Section,
or, at levier levels, by the investigation sections
of republics or provinces. No information on how
this section conducted its investigations was
available to source.
Secret Section: The task of this section was to spy on all the ac-
tivities of the various party organizations, com-
mittees, offices, etc., down to and including
province level. This work was done by secret agents
who maintained surveillance of the members of the
Central Cornittoos for republics, provinces, etc.,
as well as of the members of all organizations and
branches under the Party Central Committees. Agents
reported on individual "recalcitrants" as well as
on the general political tenor within the Party.
When necessary, the Secret Section passed this
information directly to the Operational Section,
which, advised by the Political Section, decided
on necessary action. Although no further infor-
mation is available on this section, a directorate
of the MGB has boon mentioned - the Central Direct-
orate for the Control of the Purity of the Communist
Party -=;-ahioh may conceivably have developed from
the Secret Soction.
Records Section: Maintained all records and files of the various
sections of SPU. The chief card-indices were as
follows: (a) Card-index for all Party members
who at any tine had been members of other parties,
which was divided into two groups: an active group
containing particulars of people under observation
by SPUR and a passive group containing those who
were not actually being watched by SPTJ; (b) A card-
index of all religious officials, both of the
Orthodox Church and of any other religious
organizations.
Communications Responsible for all communications.
Section:
Personnel Section: maintained the files of all SPU employees and dealt
with administrative personnel problems. On questions
relating to important members of the staff and to
training of personnel, the section maintained liaison
with the Personnel Directorate at the Center; it is
possible that the Personnel Section trained SPU
employees in special subjects within the limits
of SPU work.
Political Sections: These sections made an exhaustive and detailed study
of all political movements and schools of thought
within the Party which tended to deviate from the
central policy. Each section carried out research
into a separate movement and estimated in what
measure it constituted a throat to the regime. The
political danger of any movement or of any reac-
tionary group was then discussed with the Operational
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Section and a plan of action mutually evolved.
The plan had to be approved by the Central Com-
mittee, but its elaboration and execution were
the responsibility of the Operational Section.
As specialists in this field, the Political Sec-
tions of SPU had to keep the Politburo and the
Central-Party Co?nittee continually informed as
to the pxaet position and the potential threat
of each.movcmert under study. In addition to the
Political Sections above mentioned, other sections
existcd''wwhich had the task of studying and report-
ing on 'religious movements within the Orthodox
Church and other sects.
Files on surveillance of individuals in the USSR are maintained
in co-operation with the 1st Special Section (Spetsotdel) described below.
A notebook or registry of supervision is kept on every suspect person? If
the suspect moves, his registry book follavvs and is maintained by the lst
Special Sections in the now district. This activity is called "preparation"
of the suspected person and it has boon estimated that between two and
three per cent of all persons in the Soviet Union are at all times under
"preparation." The 1st Special Sections maintain, in general card files,
all data on anti-Soviet and enemy elements brought to light during the
existence of the Soviet organs of State Security; included are full factual
information about the persons, the dispositions made of them and the where-
abouts of the records concerning them.
It is kno-vintha.t several oategcrios of groups have been of parti-
cular interest to the SPU and thus subject to intensive surveillance and
study. These groups have included national, social, and religious groups,
political factions of all types, and cultural organizations. In fact,
the general surveillance of all elements representing a threat or even a
potential threat to the security of or'the policies effectuated by the
regime is one of the primary functions of the SPU. It appears that the
SPU particularly concerned itself with deviation from the Stalinist line
and successively surveilled and prosecuted the members of various dissident.
It appears probable that the purges and the trials
which followed the alleged assassination of Sergei M. KIROV in Leningrad
in 1934 were conducted and staged under the supervision and control of
the' SPU,
SPU has long carried on surveillance of the Russian nationalist
minorities, the Georgians and other peoples of the Caucasus and
An r. lop M I-qp
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particularly the Ukrainians. In the religious category, not only the
Orthodox Church but also all Russian religious sects arc .older the con-
tinuous surveillance of SPU. the SPU
directed the campaign against religion which reached its height in the
late twenties; this campaign died down in the thirties as, perhaps, it
was found to be defeating its purpose. The SPU undoubtedly maintains
surveillance over the activities of all cultural groups and institutions,
including educational, and of the so-called intelligentsia, primarily
artists, writers, actors, otc. It is believed that SPU agent networks
are established in the Kolkhczos and Sovkhozos in order to obtain infor-
mation on the attitude of the peasants. It may be presumed that the
program of liquidation and exile of the kulaks was carried out under the
direction of SPU.
It is difficult to delineate exactly the respective jurisdiction
of SPU and KRU. Both directorates, of course, are primarily concerned
with counterintelligence. It appears that the greatest distinction
between them is that the SPU is mainly concerned with elements, groups,
or categories of persons believed inimical or possibly-inimical to the
regime, whilib KRU is mainly concerned with specific operational counter-
intelligence and counterespionage problems.
25X1 C5b
3e KRU (Kontr Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye): Counterintelligence 11
Directorate fr vu ur a1 0 k,s l? U c o,.t ~r d w~ CC
XT"Ie~l 1,
The KRU, also referred to by several sources as the 3rd Directorate,
is primarily concerned with operational counterintelligence and has had
the following responsibilities:
as Protection of the Soviet population and of all non-
military institutions in the USSR against the
activities of foreign agents0
b. Protection of Soviet diplomatic missions in foreign
countries from the activities of foreign agentso
c. Counterespionage abroad; that is, to combat foreign
intelligence services at their source and to attempt
to identify foreign targets and agents before the
start of actual operations*
d. Surveillance of other Soviet intelligence services'
personnel. Such personnel reportedly are under KRU
surveillance within the USSR and abroad and are
screened by KRU upon their return from abroad.
The KRU and its subordinate offices are set up on all levels of
the PMGB structure. It is believed that the designation "3rd Directorate"
is applied to KRU only at USSR level - that is, at the Center in Moscow -
ON on 10 W& NOW
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as its responsibility is for the entire territory of the USSR. It is
probable that in the various republics, provinces and districts the terms
KRU and KRO are in use. All these KRU offices have the common responsi-
bility of doing CE work within the Soviet Union; CE activities abroad
reportedly are almost exclusively directed by the KRU on USSR level. In
isolated cases, KRU's subordinate sections in republics and provinces have
reportedly sent agents into adjoining countries, but such agents seem to
have been restricted to the border zones. One source states flatly that
no district state security organization ever becomes concerned with
counterespionage work. The same source infers, from the directoratets
main responsibilities, that there are two major divisions within KRU.
One division is believed to be for counterintelligence in the interior of
the USSR, and the other& subdivided by countries,' for counterespionage
abroad. This information is substantiated to some extent by 25X1 C5b
who, while unable to give any information on CE activities outside of the
Soviet Union, explained the KRU of GUGB as consisting of operational,
investigation, records, communications, personnel and administration
sections plus a Special Section for KRU. This Special Section was believed
to maintain close liaison with the Operational Section and to supply it
with whatever operational resources it required. It reportedly was divided
into special equipment sections, operational groups and a reserve or pool
of NRT or external surveillance agents for any KRU section handling field
observation of suspects. In addition to agents supplied by the Special
Section mentioned above, an Agent Section laas responsible for directing
the work of CE resident agents in the USSR down through province level;
information received from the Agent Section's networks being passed to
the operational sections.
ti'Vhethcr KRU operations abroad are separate and distinct from INU;
whether they are conducted through INU channels; whether they are con-
ducted by INU personnel; or whether they are carried out by KRU personnel
assigned.to- serve INIT, installations abroad, we are unable to say, although 25X1X4
efforts have boon made to clarify this question through 25X1X4
M available sources. As noted above in the section on INU, it is con-
sidered most probable that the majority of KRU operations abroad are run
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through INU channels, although there are some indications that in certain
instances State Security personnel engaged in extremely secret counter-
intelligence operations abroad may have had no connection with any other
Soviet intelligence efforts in the same area.
It must be emphasized that KRU enjoys the greatest co-operation
in its work from all other Soviet intelligence agencies and government
offices, whether in CE work within the USSR or CE activity abroad. German
documents state that KRU, in preventilag espionage and counterespionage
within foreign missions in the Soviet Union, used the following means:
a. A broad agent net among the foreigners resident in the
USSR who have any sort of connection with their
country's diplomatic corpse
b, A net of agents among the employees of consulates,
embassies, co_mnercial delegations, etc*
c. Use as informants of persons who have connections
with employees of consulates, etc*
d. Special informers, both foreigners and Soviet citizens,
supplied with "legends", try to penetrate missions.
e. Agents of the 3rd Special Section, co-operating with
KRU, carry on a watch over all foreign agency
buildings and the visitors to these buildings,
f. Agents of the 3rd Special Section, co-operating with
KRU, also keep a ,watch over any persons identified
as or suspected of collaborating with the staffs of
foreign missionse
g. Use of listening devices within the foreign agency's
buildings. This work is carried on by members of
the 2nd Special Section who supply and operate the
necessary technical equipment.
h. Censorship and control over correspondence of foreign
agencies and decoding of coded messages. The cen-
sorship functions were the province of agents of the
4th Special Section. A 5th Special Section has been
mentioned as responsible for code work, although this
function has also been attributed to a 7th Directorate
of GUGB, .-
In carrying out its foreign activities the KRU apparently main-
tains a much broader liaison than even the excellent liaison with special
sections indicated within the USSR. KRU maintains liaison with INU,
SDERSH, MVD, MID (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Soviet organizations
with international connections, such as repatriation comaittees, staffs
of Soviet liaison offices, etc.
- experiences gained before and during World War II indicate
that important KRU objectives abroad are to gather information on foreign
intelligence services, to attempt the subversion of those whose work is
directed against the Soviet Union and to gather information on all foreign
CE servicese with particular emphasis on their methods of preventing
Soviet penetration. The groundwork of the CE missions of the KRU is laid
_WW. 1% a It OW 9
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[A 9;
through systematic evaluation of all facts regarding foreign intelli-
gence and CE services, extracted from the statements of Soviet foreign
agents, from documents and from all other sources. According to one
source the primary Soviet aini in this regard is subversion; i.e., a
greater interest in the personnel of foreign intelligence services
than in their organizations, Special investigation files are made up
on each individual subject and are kept by the lst Special Section,
probably on USSR level. Reports are received not only from principal
agents but also from masses of secondary agents in foreign countries
who try to ascertain the existence and location of intelligence units,
agent schools, etc. For example a method of gaining information which
supposedly has proved effective and which is known to be widely practiced
is for an agent to provoke by intentionally suspicious behavior his arrest
and interrogation by a foreign intelligence service, Thus the agent
contrives to learn which agency interrogates suspected agents, the methods
used and the identity of interrogating personnel. By his subsequent
conduct, which is part of a previously devised plan, the agent can fre-
quently effect his release.
Soviet counterintelligence activity in foreign countries is known
to have been consistently concerned with groups actually or potentially
anti-Soviet, as well as with elements active in the political life of the
countries involved. Considerable information is available reflecting
the use of various minority organizations, as well as the of l 7ation
of all official Soviet representation for caznterintelligencc 7)a poses.
For example, the Society of Friends of the Soviet Union in Munich recently
was reported to have received, through a camouflaged outpost of the MGB
in Weimar, instructions to determine the residences, financial circum-
stances, and contacts of all Soviet citizens in the areas KRU agent nets
reportedly permeate the organization of the CPSU, as well as all official
Soviet missions abroad. Characteristic of KRU working methods, allegedly,
is the planned penetration of all anti-Soviet organizations abroad. For
example, penetration of the Vlassov Army reportedly was a special ob-
jective of the KRU,
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The assumption has been made by one source that at the end of
the recent war, the emphasis in KRU counterespionage activities was
re-directed against the "United States area" and the British Empire.
The chief aim is said to be the elimination of all forces which could
be made useful to the intelligence services of these nations and Which
would strengthen the United States and Great Britain. This, of course,
would be in perfect agreement with other knovm Soviet policy changes
after 1945. fV. Ct,, ,r. 4b 7t?Nr.- Nko.
fr.
4. EKU (Ekoromiclieskoye Upravleniyo): Economic Directorate
The EKU or GEU, as late as 1940 was definitely a directorate of
the ITKVD; at that time it was charged with anti-sabotage work, counter-
intelligence supervision and, possibl , efficiency control of all in-
dustrial and commercial undertakings in the USSR, as well as all such
undertakings by foreign nations on Soviet territory. It is possible that
EKU exists today under the MGB, but it is more probable that, as a
development from the EKU branches for various industries, economic direct-
orates for these industries have been set up under MGB. This development
is probable inasmuch as EKU branches existed to carry out the work of the
directorate in the Armaments Industry, the Heavy Machine Construction
Industry, the Oil Industry, the Food Industry and others, and the head-
quarters of the MGB at the present time appears to contain separate
directorates concerned with major industrial fields. It is also probable
that many of the functions of supervision over industry, v.ich at one time
were exorcised by this directorate, may at the present time be within the
provi._?e of the MVD rather than the MGB.
Our source of information on EKU of the NKVD,
has given the following explanation of the formation of the EKUs a lack
of fully qualified technicians who were also convinced Communists compelled
the Soviets to resort to employing politically unreliable specialists.
Such persons, as well as the general run of managers of factories, indus-
trial projects and agricultural communities, had, from the Soviet point
of view, to be watched closely. It was also necessary to make absolutely
certain that the industrial and agricultural policies of the government
were strictly observed and that there were no deviations. whatever. During
25X1 C5b
25X1 C5b
04 1" lop W&
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the 1930's, at the time of the expansion of the Soviet war industries,
it was considered essential to have an organization capable of safe-
guarding the secrecy of the Soviet. military proparatiais and to check
leakage of information concerning the type, quantity and potential of
armaments and munitions being manufactured.
The same source has provided the following summary of the tasks
of EKU. The Directorate was responsible for loading the struggle against
economic counterrevolution, circumventing economic reactionaries, preventing
sabotage, and surveilling all personnel in industrial plants. It also
safeguarded the security of all military and defensive branches of industry,
controlled the execution of government policy in all branches of industry
and agriculture and directed operationally all troops guarding important
munitions factories.
The central apparatus or headquarters of EKU consisted of a series
of departments and branches, which, under the direction of the operational
department or section, organized all work of EKU and administered its sub-
ordinate bodies. The central headquarters were split into two divisions:
(a) The Operational and Administrative Division which was concerned with
the top-level organization of EKU as a whole, and (b) The branch departments
and sections, each of which was responsible for a separate industry, its
work in each case confined to a single sphere.
The Operational Section was responsible for the planning and
direction of the work of all branches and departments of EKU. It received
all returns and reports from industrial branches, sections of the central
headquarters and operational sections of the lower level organs of EKU
(at republic and province levels - EKO, except in the case of the Ukrainian
SSR, which was an EKU)0
All material thus received was studied by the Operational Section
and suitable action was taken in the form of directives to other organs.
In especially important questions the Operational Section would submit
proposals, for approval, to the Industrial, Department of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party. The Operational Section issued orders for
all sections on republic, province and district levels, and it was,in
addition, responsible for the operational direction of the NKVD (now MVD)
troops guarding factories, although administratively these troops were
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subordinated to GUi.!PVO NKVD (Glavnoye Upravleniye Mostnoi Protivo-
Vozdushnoi Oborony - Local Air Raid Defense).
There were four categories of industrial concerns guarded by
these troops: armament, defense industry, heavy industry and experimental
factories, and workshops and laboratories working on military research.
The chief of the Operations Section was senior to chiefs of all other
sections in EKU0 Investigation, records, communications, personnel and
other service sections wore sec up under EKU in a manner similar to the
organization of other directorates,
Of especial interest in EKU was the Technical Consultation Board
which consisted of highly qualified representatives of different spheres
of industryo This board made rulings on all types of special technical
problems arising from trials of cases under investigation and could be
consulted by all the organs of EKU. A local EKU-EKO office which required
a decision of experts on any matter would refer it to the Technical Con-
sultation Board which hod its headquarters in Moscow. If necessary, an
expert would be sent to deal with the matter on the spotG
Departments or sections of EKU dealing with specific industries
are listed below. Each department dealt solely with its own industry;
for example, the EKU Department for the Aircraft Industry dealt only with
factories and organizations forming parts of the NKAP (Peoples' Commissariat
for the Aircraft Industry). EKU depar bments for 25X1 C5b
the following industries in 1940-1941:
a. Department for Ferrous I:Ietallurgy.
b. Department for Non- Ferrous Metallurgy.
c. Section for the Electrical Industry.
d. Department for Electric Power Stations.
e. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat of gar Supplies.
f. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat for Munitions,
g. Department for the Machine Building Industry (dealt with
the Peoples' Commissariats for Heavy, PJ:edium and Light
Machine Building).
h. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat for the
Building Industry.
i. Section for the Celluloid and Cotton Industry.
j. Department for the Home (Household goods?) Industrys
k. Department for the Food Industry (Food, Fish, Meat
and Dairy Industries).
1. Department for Light Industry (including the Textile
Industry).
m. Section for the Timber Industry.
no Department for Agricultural Economy (Peoples' Commis-
sariats for Agriculture, Grain and Cattle Breading,
State Farms).
o. Section for Shipbuilding Industry.
p. Department for the Oil Industry.
q. Department for the Aircraft Industry.
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Special departments and units of this directorate reportedly
existed in all armament and munitions factories and in a majority of
important industrial concerns. The personnel of these departments and
units allegedly was made up of regular NKVD employees or in smaller con-
cerns from volunteer, trustorthy workers. Although these special depart-
ments Were originally a part of the factory's orgcnization, they report-
edly were operationally controlled by the appropriate industrial department,
section, or representative in the local provincial or territorial EKO.
The task of such special departments :xrere:
a. To ,ensure the political reliability of all Workers and
to determine immediately any signs of anti-Soviet
activity..
b. To direct operationally the guarding of the factory
by NKVD personnel and to take reasonable fire pre-
vention precautions as well as to control entry
into and exit from the factory.
c. To sec that the factory fulfilled its production quota,
d. To see that factories having or operating under a
mobilization plan adhered to the plan and were ready
at any time for mobilization,
e. To maintain security and secrecy in factories of military
importance*
should be emphasized that the above information, which is
believed accurate, concerns the period when EKU was operating as an NKVD
directorate. a7o cannot definitely establish the present existence of an
EKU/PMGB, and it is considered possible that functions previously exercised
by this directorate are presently being exercised by certain specific
directorates of the PMGB concerned with intelligence and, perhaps to an
extent, security in major fields of industrial effort. It is also possible,
as noted aboven that certain supervisory functions may presently be exor-
cised by the MVD*
j r: GG, 1 tic. l'1f UtAYI V
5, DTU (Dorozhno-Transportnoye Upravleniye)! Road Transport
Directorate
The DTU, prior to its absorption by the NKGB in 1943, appears to
have been an organ of the NKVD with, as far as our sources show, no formal
subordination to the GUGB. It is believed now to be a directorate of the
PMGB. Very little information is available to us on DTU at the USSR love;..
It apparently exercises counterintelligence supervision of the sea, river
and railway transport systems of the USSR, DTU's responsibilities probably
include security measures to safeguard all. military and non-military cargoes
in transport, direction of the work of the LVD railway militia branches
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7e 00's/NKGB (Osobyyo Qtdely): Special Sections
The Directorate of OOts/NKGB was established at the beginning of
the Soviet Gorman War as part of the Iv VD; it was transferred in April or
May 1943 to the newly formed NKGB and had the function of maintaining
counterintelligence surveillance among the Partisan troops? It is im-
portant to emphasize the distinction between the 00"s/NKGB and the OOts/NKVD.
The latter developed out of the old OGP[? VOts (Voyonnyye Otdely) or military
sections, which had counterintelligence functions in the Rod Army and Red
Navy, and were officially dissolved in 1943, only to reappear outwardly under
the direction of the NKO or Peoples' Commissariat of Defense inhere they were
known as the Counterespionage Section of NKO, Death to Spiess UKR-NKO Smersh,
concerning which further data are sot out below. Briefly, the 00's/KGB
appear to have borne the same relationship to Partisan units as Smersh
bore to the Red Army and the Rod Fleot.
8. SMERSH: Directorate for Counterintelligence in the Armed
Forces now usually referred to as GUKR
The purpose of the Directorate for Counterintelligence in the
Soviet armed forces is to discover politically unreliable elements in and
to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services of the armed forces.
In carrying out the first objective, the directorate aims at elimination
of all opposition to Bolshevism and of all tradition antedating the estab-
lishment of the Soviet Union.
Counterintelligence functions in the Red Army were first initiated
in 1918 when numerous non-Communists were taken in as specialists and it
was believed necessary to place them under constant surveillance to prevent
them from making contact with the enemy, For this purpose the military
sections of the Cheka were established, `subordinated not to Army but to
Cheka command.
In 1922, when the GPU replaced the Cheka, the military sections'
functions were expanded to include counterintelligence control of all other
branches of the armed forces; the Navy, Air Force, a tce With the formation
of the NKVD in 1934, these military sections were redesignated as special
sections of the NKVD (00ts -? Osoby 0tdel), The term special section became
synonymous to the Soviet soldier with denunciation and spying; partly to
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efface this connotation counterintelligence functions were, in the spring
of 1943, placed under the command of the NKO (Narodny Komissariat Cborony)
or Peoples' Commissariat of Defense, and were renamed OKR (Otdely Kontr-
Razvedki) NKO SMERSH; these OKR (counterintelligence sections) were set
up administratively under the Central Counterintelligence Directorate of
the N40 or GUKR (Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontr-,Razvedki) NKO SL!IERSH. No basic
differences in the work of the organization have been noted during these
transitions. The NKO was replaced by the MrS (i;Iinisterstvo Vooruzhyonnykh
Sil) or Ministry of Armed Forces,; in 1946. For a time, at least, the organ-
ization continued as GUKR MVS but in the summer or fall of 1946 STERSH was
transferred to the MGB as the Directorate for Counterintelligence in the
Armed Forces.
Prior to 1946, SMERSH units were attached to the various unit
headquarters of the Red Army,, and SIAM -i informants operated in all troop
echelons. Close liaison was effected with KRU and lst and 2nd Special
Sections of the NKGB, with the PO's or Political Sections of the Red Army
(responsible for the political education of members of the armed forces),
with police installations of the NKVD,and, during the war, with the 4th or
Partisan Directorate of the NKGB. Of great importance was the transfer of
agent nets between KRU and SL RSH, depending on whether control of terri-
tory during wartime was by a'eivilian.or a military agency. lst Special
Section files were constantly referred to by STERSI and the technical
facilities of the 2nd Special Section wore habitually employed. Contact
was never lost with the OOts NKGB,,which carried out counterintelligence
functions in the Partisan troops; SMERSH agents committed behind the German
front lines found Partisan regions the best bases for the initiation of
missions.
The responsibilities of SI:II3RSH have been reported as- divided into
two groups;, that of surveillance and protection of Soviet troops at home
and abroad, and that of preventing penetration by foreign intelligence
services. SMERSH took the following measures in carrying out the first
function :
a. Attempted to discover counterrevolutionary elements
and tendencies,;
b. Sought to prevent desertion, self-infliction of wounds,
panic and sabotage.
c. Reported on "any laxity in army discipline," such laxity
being considered sabotage,
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do Observed and tried to eliminate defects or poor quarters,
poor messing facilities, inadequate equipment and the
like.
co Sought to discover defects in leadership and any condi-
tions which might adversely affect the outcome of
operations?
fo Protected secret material; protected headquarters of
military units from foreign agents and saboteurs.
Traced, identified and interrogated foreign agents
in the troops and in civilian groups with which troops
came in contact.
go Made security chocks on c.ll Smersh and military intolli -
gonco agents before and after commitment; examined
returning Soviet soldierse
h. Evaluated enemy documents of intelligence value.
In attempting to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services,
S:tERSHts most important aims wore:
a,
Acquisition of information on foreign intelligence
services, primarily those working against the Soviets,
b.
Undermining foreign intelligence
tion of agents,
services by infiltra-
c.
Deception through agent playbacks
and l/T playbacks.
d,
Surveillance of Soviet agents in foreign countries,
especially of those considered not completely
reliable and those with especially important
missions.
The establishment of SP:MRSH agent networks and the operation of
the mechanics of surveillance are the same as in other b1GB networks in the
Soviet Union? Foreign agents discovered by SIiRSH are interrogated at
various echelons on other agents committed in the same mission; personnel,
schools and counterintelligence methods of foreign intelligence services;
personnel possibly susceptible to Soviet influence; and the foreign
political, economic and military situation.
It can be assumed that since World War II0 with Soviet soldiers
exposed to foreign influenco$ outside of the USSRs the importance of
counterintelligence surveillance in the armed forces is greater than ever,
The Counterintelligence Directorate has today,, in addition to the responsi-
bilities listed above, the task of nipping every sign of dissatisfaction
on the part of Soviet armed forces personnel returning to the Soviet Union
and of preparing them for the return in such a manner that they realize
what subjects they may discuss after their return and about what they must
keep silent.
9? Partisan Directorate
The Partisan Directorate, also knovm as the 4th Directorate, was
sot up within GUGB/NKVD either in or before August 19423 probably with the
status of a section until, upon the formation of. NKGB in 1943, it became
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a directorate of that now commissariat. The Partisan Directorate is
inseparably linked with the Partisan Uovement which, it is believed, had
boon officially organized, at least on paper, since the period of the
Civil tars. Under the NKVD, the organization of the Partisan Movement
had been centrally controlled, in close co-operation with the Partisan
Administration in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party (bolshevik),, by the 4th Directorate of GUGB. Although its primary
peacetime mission was to combat Partisan activity within the USSR, even
before the Soviet-German war the 1st Section of the 4th Directorate had
prepared the operations of Partisan groups in the rear of any possible
invading enemy. Locally this was effected in the following manner: Party
members, workers in large factories, farm laborers and others were appointed
by the regional comnitteesof the Communist Party to organize annihilation
squads, special troops of the NKVD, destruction squads and other diversionary
efforts. Lower echelons of the 4th Directorate confirmed the selection of
personnel and assumed responsibility for training, In wartime, these
organizations were composed mainly of men ineligible for military service.
Units were especially trained to conduct active sabotage behind enemy lines
in case of military occupation. Detailed instructions issued by the Direct-
orate for the training of these units stressed transition to Partisan
activity in the rear of the enemy*
During the German offensive in the summer and fall of 1941, there
were at first only small groups which actually retreated into the forests.
They comprised a few members of the FTKVD who had remained behind, Party
functionaries, Rod Army men who had separated from their units, ands quite
frequently, criminal elements who took advantage of the activities of these
groups to further their own ends. The Soviet population, as a whole,dis-
played little sympathy at first for these as yet undisciplined guerrillas;,
However,, in the winter of 1941-1942, the organization of the Partisan Move-
ment was activated at a low level by the Communist Party and the NI{VD~
Paramilitary organizations w era mobilized by the local Communist Party
committees and by the local NKVD branch offices, the latter supplying mainly
elements of the GUPO or Central Directorate of Fire Protection. The Partisans
gained members due to the nonrealization of expectations of liberation from
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Bolshevism? the influence of stories told by escaped Russian F?ies of their
experiences in German prison camps, the increasing success of Bolshevist
penetration of the German Eastern administration and the policies of the
German SS formations which forced thousands of Soviet citizens to flee to
the forests. The clever change in the Soviet propaganda from internation-
alism to the slogan "Defense of the Fatherland," from official atheism to
purported freedom of worship., pictured the Partisans to be fighting for
fatherland and religions
It has been rep crted that when the central Partisan organization
was sot up in 1942, it included the following Partisan intelligence units;
In Soviet territory;
Intelligence llepartment (RU) of the Central Staff of the
Partisan Movement?
Intelligence Sections (ROts) of the various staffs of the
Partisan Movements of the various
republics,
Intelligence Sections (ROts) of the representations of the
Partisan Movement of the Soviet
republics; attached to army group
headquarters.
Intelligence officers of the operative groups of the
Partisan T-lovement of the Soviet
republics; attached to various army
headquarters.
In Enemy Territory:
Intelgonce Sections
Intelligence officers
Intelligence schools
(ROts) of all Partisan headquarters
down to battalion.
of all smaller Partisan units
for sabotages espionage and W/T were
attached to most of the intelligence
sections.
A documentary source indicated that the strength of paramilitary
Partisan units was 75-100 men in a group, organized in platoons of 25 men
each and squads of 8 men eache Their missions, including intelligence
activities, were the combatting of anti-Soviet and enemy elements behind
the front, "vigilance" against enemy agents, air raid protection.. destruc-
tion of Soviet industries in case of enemy occupation, and subsequent
organization of armed bands in the rear of the enemy.
Gorman documentary sources are the basis for the remainder of
this section on the Partisan intelligence, Unfortunately, the Germans
never learned in detail the connections between the Partisan Directorate
and the Partisan Movement it organizoda and we have no information from
the Germans on this relationship during the years 1943-1945. Although
the Germans have stated that the entire Partisan intelligence organization
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was, in respect to purpose, closely linked with the military command, they
ti=sere never able to clarify the exact relationship between the Intelligence
Directorate of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement and the Intelli-
gence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. On the other hand,
enough information was available to the Germans so that they could make
clear the co-ordination between Partisan intelligence and the Communist
Party. For example-the Partisan command staff at the level of army group
headquarters received orders from the Central Committee of the Communist
Party at republic level. Such an order might read as follows: "By order
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine,your groups
are to move farther to the west." However, if the Partisan command wished
to initiate a movement or publish an order involving organizational matters,
it had first to receive the confirmation of one of the Central Committees
of the Communist Party, depending on the level on which the command function
was exercised. The instance quoted is an e~:ample of this co-ordination
between Partisan command staffs at army group headquarters level with the
Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Republics.
According to the Germans, reconnaissance and intelligence orders were
released without prior concurrence by Party organs.
A fairly comple-co picture of the structure and functions of the
Partisan intelligence service on the lower levels was obtained by the
Germans as early as 1943; however, by that time the more or less tenuous
connection with the Partisan Directorate had boon lost and no information
on the activities of this Directorate has boon received since that timer
It is believed possible that organizing offices for the Partisan Directorate
may exist at the present time within the T.1GB and may be prepared to reac-
tivate the Partisan TJbvement in any country and at any time. Thus the
Partisan T.bvement may be considered a latent component of Soviet espionage
and sabotage capable of being activated whenever needed under the necessary
extant conditions.
10. Other Headquarters Directorates
Sot out below are other headquarters directorates which have been
reliably reported as -presently existing within the MGB but concerning which
v,o have insufficient information to discuss their composition, functions,
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or jurisdiction adequately. While, from their titles alone, the purposes
and functions of most of these directorates would appear obvious - the,
maintenance of State security in specific fields and the intelligence
control of specific ministries - we do not have authentic data upon which
to base further comment* In addition to the directorates listed below,
we believe that there are still others. as yet unidentified, MGB head-
quarters organs,
a~ Central Intelligence Dircctoratea
b. Directorate of Intelligence in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
cv Central. Directorate in the i:iinistry of Internal Affairso
de Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in
the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Trade.
e, Central Directorate for the Control and I uintenance of
State and .ilitary Secrets.
f. Central Directorate for the Control of the Purity of
the Communist Party.
go Central Directorate in the Ministries of Heavy Machine
Construction.
h, Central Directorate in the Armaments Industrys
i. Operational Directorate.
11. Service Directorates and Sections
Sections of service directorates or service sections are attached
to all MGB directorates mentioned above in order to carry out the numerous
service functions, such as investigation, technical supply, personnel ad-
ministration, administrative supplies, finances, etc. Most of these
sections, heroin referred to as service organs, are set up on USSR level
and the following discussion of their functions is based on such admittedly
incomplete information as is available at the present timoo
a, Investigation Directorate
The Investigation Directorate, also referred to as the Inves-
tigation Bureau or SB (Slodstvennoyo Byuro), investigates and interro-
gates suspects, prepares the legal dossiers on cases and makes transfer:.
of cases to the State Prosecutors A military tribunal tries cases
received from the Investigation Directorate. In addition, the SB
allegedly collects information about the organization and methods of
foreign intelligence services; clarifying details are not available
concerning this report, During wartimo, the SB interrogated prisoners
of intelligence interest. From USSR level, the Investigation Direct-
orate directs the work of subordinate sections attached to NAB direct-
orates and to their subordinate organs down to province level,,
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bq Operational Directorate
The Operational Directorate at USSR level organized and
directed the work of sections attached to the other GUGB directorates;
those sections were the actual operating organs of the directorates
to which they were attached and controlled the mass of agents and
informants comprising the agent nets within the USSR. Detailed in-
formation on the functions of this directorate on USSR level is not
available; it is doubtful whether the Operational Directorate exists
under MGB_, for operational work in the 1'MGB appears at the present
time to be cavr-,od out by the local offices of the L GB at republics
province and C i s;.ri of ievols.
c. Spoe ,a1 (Spetsotdely or 5Oss)
From 3nfo ma,.t.i-n (it hand there can be no doubt that five
numbered Special Secti.cns had existed .up to .th??,ostablishment of the
PXKGB in 19431, and, with little doubt, have continued to exist,
occupying the sane place today in the 1iGB that they occupied pre-
viously in its predecessor organizations,, They were organized on
USSR level and their subordinate sections were attached to most,
if not a11D NKVD directorates to carry out the functions assigned
to them. The functions of the Spotsotdely are believed to be as
follovrs: 1st SO - filos and card indices; 2nd SO - technical
equipment and services; 3rd SO - surveillance and search; 4th SO -
censorship; and 5th SO - codas.
(1)
Lst Special Section
The 1st Special Section NKVD, also known as the 1st
Special Section Center,, was organized at USSR levcl-to direct
the work of all subordinate 1st Special Sections through con-
stant liaison and official directives. At conforencos,mutual
problems were discussed, The Center also maintained on USSR
level the bulk of the archives and files of all completed
cases investigated by NKVD directorates.
Under the direction of the 1st Special Section its sub-
ordinate organizations maintained a wide variety of files, card-
indices and registers principally in two categories: the suspected
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classes of the population, and the agents and informants
detailed to keep them under surveillance. Persons regis-
tpred in an operative record of anti-Soviet elements by
the 1st Spetsotdol include,. those from among the following
categories: all citizens having in one way or another con-
nections with foreign caz ntrieo; immigrants to the Soviet
Union; foreign deserters; surviving members of the Czarist
regime; kulaka; members of religious denominations; former
participants in all typos of anti-Soviet mutinies; former
men ec of t?~c police forces of the Czarist and Kerensky
govorni_en:,a I.'Ie i.sh, vi1 s, Trotzkyites, Social. Revolutionaries,
Cons ticut:`.e_:ia,7 Dcmm-cr=at:,, monarchists.' etc; participants in
natione? ca garii ?at' ens and uprisings; suspected saboteurs,
spies, to ro,is'?. .~.nd anti-Seviot agitators; smugglers;
repatriated oni ;ran;,s; surviving members of fare lies of
persons sentenced to, death by State Security organs; persons
released after serving sentences for political crimes; former
agents of the State Security se.rvicos dismissed for double-
dealing and giving false information; former Party or Komsomol
members expelled for dissension and other political reasons;
members of the families of traitors; persons expelled from
large cities; persons formerly employed by foreign firms;
persons having contacts with foreign consulates or foreign
political or commercial representatives; all foreigners in
the USSR, except members of the diplomatic bodies; and others.
All those known to fall intheso categories are recorded
in the operational register of the 1st Special Section on a
card in an alphabetical index containing general information
on anti-Soviet elements.. A special record or register is then
prepared on every registered person combining all available in-
formation concerning him: biographyv reports of agents and in-
formants, a general decision in regard to the methods to be
used in the case, information from the archives, official
records of the interrogation of witnesses] the manner in which
the person came to the attention of the State Security organs.
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Usually the special register forms the basis for a more
active form of agent supervision called the acute case or
the agents,) case. The distinction between the two is that
an acute case involves surveillance by one-or more agents of
a single individual, :while in an agents' case surveillance
over a group of individuals is carried on by one or more
agents. Persons figuring in this form of active supervision
by agents are called "figurants" and are registered in an
alphabetical index of "figurants." In these active cases
of surveillance, all kinds of combinations of agents and all
varieties of operations are undertaken. The one stable
factor in this picture is the 1st Special Section, the sub-
ordinate organizations of which collaborate with State,
State Security and other organizations in the preparation
for and the carrying out of all surveillance operations from
their inception to the conclusion, whereupon the accumulated
papers are stored in archives,, Among State Security organi-
zations co-operating with the 1st Special Section are the
Investigation Sections, SPU sections, KRU sections, EKU
sections, the organs of the 2nd and 3rd Special Sections.
As an example of the volume of cases handled by the 1st Special
Section, a defector has advised that in the Leningrad Office
of the NKVD during the first six months of 1940 there were
about 55,000 register cases, 9,000 to 10,000 acute cases and
approximately 900 agents' cases.
The registration of agents is done in the following manner:
After recruitment, informants and agents are all registered
by alias in an alphabetical card file in the 1st Special See-
tion~ This index contains the following information: family
name; christian name; date and place of birth; residence and
place of work; education; race; social position; when and by
whom recruited; whether informant, agent or local resident;
signature of section head and with whom the recruited person
is to keep in contact. Working papers, personal-documents
and special information forms on each agent are t, and
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provide very detailed information on his previous occupations,
places of work, foreign relations., relatives, friends, knowledge
of foreign languages, remuneration, persons mentioned by the
agent in his reports, etc. A photograph of the agent is always
kept ti rith his papers, in order to assist contacting him should
he become lost.
When a person under surveillance has been arrested and im-
prisoned, all the material received from agents about him,
statements of witnesses, recordings of conversations, etc.,
is gathered into an investigation file in the 1st Special
Section and sent to the Investigation Section concerned with
the case. It is the duty of the 1st Special Section to super-
vise the investigation Section's handling of the case, ensuring
that the investigation is completed within a prescribed time.
Upon completion of the investigation and sentence of the
accused, documents concerned with the case are sent to archives
on USSR, republic, province or district level, depending
apparently upon the importance and locale of the case. Archives
of the 1st Special Section keeps all documents connected with
completed or interrupted surveillances by agents, all completed
or discontinued investigation cases, all personal and working
papers of dismissed agents, deceased agents or emigrated agents,
and copies of all kinds of coimaunications and reports. Strict
rules govern the operation of the archives office and the means
of disposing of documents, as well as the kinds of documents
to be destroyed.
(2) 2nd Special Section
The duties of agents of the 2nd Special Section were,
and apparently still are, in the main, to provide the State
Security organs with technical equipment of all types needed
in their work. The staffs of the subordinate organs of this
section are large and include personnel of considerable training
and education. The 2nd Special Section is responsible for
radio, telephone, photographic, and chemical equipment, main-
taining laboratories for the production and improvement of all
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materiel. It also censors mail, telephone and radio messages,
and code correspondence.
Chemical laboratories of the 2nd Special Section manufac-
tured and provided agents with poisons, explosives and sympa-
thetic inks; analyzed documents and papers seized on the state
frontiers-, especially with the purpose of discovering secret
writing; and analyzed chemicals and explosives seized in con-
nection with arrests at the frontiers. In May 1941, the 2nd
Special Section allegedly was ordered to begin research on
infectious diseases suspected of being spread by Germain a gQnts.
Whether'it was, the only Soviet organization concerned with
bacteriological warfare, and the extent of its research, are
not known.
Entirely subordinated to and controlled by the 2nd Special
Section was the so-called PK,or Post Control, sometimes referred
to as Political Control. The work of mail censorship was carried
out by this agency in secret rooms of post offices. Post control
of a person or address was arranged on direction from operational
sections and orders requesting post control were required to
contain the subject*s christian name, family nrarae, father's name,
address of residence and working place, as well as the time
during which PK must be maintained, and the signature of the
head of the section requesting the control? The procedure then
was to send the incoming (in rare cases also the outgoing)
correspondence of the controlled party via Special Section 2,
where it was opened, to the officer handling the investigation.
The investigating officer would fill out a card, recording the
contents of the correspondence and then affix his signature.
If the letter "K" was written on the card, the correspondence
was to be confiscated; if the letter "An, the correspondence
was to be forwarded by the post office to the addressee. If
the correspondence or other confiscated material contained
anything of operational interest, it was sent as evidence to
the investigation section or sections. In addition to control
by direct order, a random control was carried out regularly and
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all material of operational interest thus intercepted bras
sent to the proper operational section for investigation.
Letters mailed by soldiers and sailors reportedly have been
especially subject to this random control as a means of de-
termining morale and political attitudes. Special Section 2
co-operated with the OO's/-NKVD in turning over to them sus-
picious items intercepted through this random control and the
section was also required to make content reports to the City
and District Coriuaittoos of the Colmnmist Party and to an NKVD
office in Moscow.
The larger 2nd Special Sections had at their disposal
wireless laboratories equipped with transmitters of every
construction and capacity, powerful radio stations, sound
equipment, etc. Radio stations of the 2nd Special Section
reportedly have boon used to jam foreign broadcasts. The
Section's laboratories studied all confiscated wireless equip-
ment, supplied Soviet agents working abroad with the necessary
wireless equipment and supplied specialists to install micro-
phones whenever and wherever they were needed.
The 2r_d Special' Section handled monitoring of telephone
lines much as it handled post control. Monitoring was only
undertaken in important cases and only on a written request
from an operational section. At the end of the order requesting
the service, the expression "M" or "Mikhail" was used to signify
that conversations of the person mentioned in the order were to
be monitored. In addition to the above responsibility, the 2nd
Special Section, at least at one time,, organized and maintained
the "VTj" or high-frequency communications network linking every
TNKVD organ of republics district, province and largo city with
the NKVD in Moscow,, and also used by important Party and Govern-
ment officials, Only a few administrative officers were entitled
to use this system; for oxamplo, in the Leningrad NKVD adminis
tration only its chief, his deputies, the head of the 2nd Special
Section and the chief of the 2nd Special Section subsection for
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cipher telegrams, In addition to expediting service, the
advantage of VTj was that by the use of a system of filters
listening-in was almost impossible. Every VTj point was
equipped with special sots for supply of energy in cases of
breakdowns in the regular teiephono nots, All VTj equipment
was kept strictly secret, VTj stations were also used to
control Soviet intornQ,tional-: telephone and telegraphic com-
munications, control being exercised by the use of filters
and by monitoring of i semi g telephone and telegraphic
messages.
Photographic laboatorios?.under the 2nd Special Section
arranged for photograph in ,1: ,_NKVD personnel once or tutee
each year and also of `6d persons? They photographed
documents, and other]tcrlul necessary for investigation or
for use as evidenee1 d velopod film exposed by agents during
their assignments,, and-duplicated pictures of wanted persons.
An additional responsibility of the laboratories was to forgo
passports, identification documents, seals, stamps, etc.
The simple encoding and decoding of ordinary incoming
and outgoing cipher correspondence was done by the 2nd Special
Section. Operational Sections (with the exception of peripheric
sections) did not ordinarily code or decode messages but if
they had to send a message in cipher the text was sent to the
cipher subsection of the 2nd Special Section w ith the signature
of the section head and a note "To be sent as a cipher telo-
gram via VTjo" In the poripheric organs, encoding and decoding
was usually done by the head of the district section,, but
somotimos they were entrusted to secretaries of district and
city sections.
As may be judged from the foregoing, the work of the 2nd
Special Section was many-sided.
cribod, the 2nd Special Section employed expert safecrackers,
locksmiths, and exports in forgery and in all typos of search.
Although this information is''limited to the period of NKVD,
inasmuch as source's active participation was with NKVD units,
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it is believed that fundamentally much of the work ascribed
by him to the 2nd Special Section is still carried out by
the present 2nd Special Sections.
(3) 3rd Special Section
Third Special Section agents carried out surveillance
of suspected persons and house searches. The predecessor of
this organ seems to have been the Operod (Operativny Otdel)
which observed travelers arriving in the Soviet Union by train.
As late as 19409 3rd Special Section agents frequented rail-
road stations, hotels, restaurants and other places where new
arrivals were likely to be encountered; many agents were em-
ployed as janitors, hotel, personnel, railway workers and
porters. They were ordinarily recruited among former NKVD
employees dismissed on account of illness or age. One source,
who has given, or substantiateda much of the information set
out above on the 1st and 2nd Special Sections, states that the
3rd Special Sections handle the "outside supervision" of
foreigners arriving in and resident in the Soviet Unions as
well as of the diplomatic corps, The meaning of this phrase
seems to be that supervision of certain diplomatic represen-
tatives,believed to be engaged in espionage and in contact
with foreign intelligence services,is carried out by 3rd
Special Section agents. However: the same agents are also
used to carry out open surveillance of members of foreign
diplomatic establishments with the purpose of preventing
the shadowed persons from meeting agents or recruiting new
ones. Contacts of such shadowed foreigners are turned over
to KRU sections for thorough examination and control by KRU
agents. Actually "outside supervision" is carried out on
orders of the operational sections, An order from an opera-
tional section will request the 3rd Special Section to place
a person under outside supervision (in Russi an: NN or
Naruzhnoye Nabludeniye)o An agent team from this Spetsotdel
will then take the assignment and report all the moves of
the suspect person, as well as chocking on his contacts, all
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this data being added to the "NN" report. Supervision is
continued for as long a period as the order demands. Upon
receiving the "Nil" report, the operational section concerned
carefully investigates all contacts of the suspect as reflected
therein.
Officers of the 3rd Special Section are supplied with
legitimation cards entitling them to use various means of
transportation, including private conveyances. Otherwise,
officers conducting surveillances must depend on their
initiative and ingenuity, except when a search of persons
or property is necessary, in which case a subsection of the
3rd Special Section is called in. This subsection searches
houses, apartments, etc., and their occupants on warrant.
All employees of this section reportedly are supplied with
special clothes, costumes and disguises, as the need arises,
by a store which was apparently, during the existence of the
IN?KVD, under the jurisdiction of the 1st Special Sectiono
(4)
4th Special Section
This Section, on the basis of scanty information,
is believed to be responsible for civil censorship. It
co-operates with the wlinistry of Communications in spot-
check censorship of mail within the Soviet Union, According
to one source, its relatively minor role as a counterintelli-
gence agency is probably due to the small volume of mail in
the USSR, The 4th Special Section reportedly is responsible
also for "supervising" telephone conversations within the
organization of the Ministry of Communications in the USSR.
(5) 5th Special Section
This Section is apparently the cryptographic section.
Nothing more is known at present concerning its activities,
organization or relationship with the 2nd Special Sections
and the 7th Directorate,
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d. 7th Directorate of GUGB
According to a defector familiar with the GUGB, a 7th
Directorate of the GUGB handled the elaboration and deciphering of
the most complicated ciphers end Of all types of codes, This
statement is corroborated by a German translation of a captured
Soviet document, entitled "Instructions for the Organs of the NKVD
Concerning the Performance of the Code Service." Coding activities
in general were set up for all organs of NKVD/USSR under'the juris-
diction of the 7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD/USSR. Specifically$ the
7th Directorate and its subordinate groups were directly in charge
of code activity, controlling the correct performance of code work,
conducting entrance examinations for code applicants in all organs
of NKVD, and supervising the code communications of the Red Army,
This document describes how personnel were to be selected, the
specifications for code rooms, regulations for encoding and decoding,
the protection of code material, and the regulations for the trans-
mission of codes and of correspondence relating to them. The docu-
ment was signed by the Chief of the 7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD/USSR,
Captain of State Security BALAMATOV.
The 7th Otdel of GUGB/IT{VDD later the 7th Upravleniye of NKGB
and presumably of the T?GB, exercised comploto control and super-
vision over RKKA code and cipher convnunications during World War II,
including violations of code cipher procedures, as well as instances
involving the loss or compromise of code and cipher materials? There
are clear indications that this supervision is continuing.
e. IIFO: Information Section
According to Gorman sources and a defector, an Information
Section (INFO) was established under GUGB/N:L'VD on USSR level and had
sections attached to INU and the Directorate for the Security of
Government Leaders. The Information Section on USSR level dealt with
all problems of information bottiwreen individual GUGB offices and between
individual NKVD offices and published daily top secret bulletins for
STALIN,mombers of the Politburo and certain other members of the
Central Committoo. It also published daily bulletins for the chiefs
of all GUGB departments and offices and the heads of other NKVD
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diroctoratest Besides the daily bulletins, the office also pub-
lished periodically top secret bulletins for Party leaders, for
certain members of the Government and for NKVD offices. Another
source reports the existence of Information Sections with the
responsibility of collating agents? reports on various levels down
to districts and forwarding them to the next highest echelon. Such
reports were made up every five days and distributed to the following:
The Directorate for the Security of Government Leaders, SPU, EKU,
and the Investigation Directorate,
fe GUK (Glavnoye Upravloniye Kadrov): Central Personnel
Directorate
This Directorate,, possibly the 15th Directorate of MGB,
and its sections aro in charge of the personnel administration for
MGB, the maintenance of personnel records, the recruiting of personnel
and probably the administration of MGB schools.' GUK agents also
chock the employees of important government officials and of the
Kremlin, Information is still lacking on how GUK controls the train-
ing of personnel, but it is assumed that such training is the respon-
sibility of GUK at USSR level and of this directorate's sections in
the various other directorates to which they are attached. For
example, the Personnel Section attached to KRU probably trains FUZU
personnel in their special works
g. AKOU (Alministrativno-Khozyaistvennoyo Upravleniye):
Administrative-Economic Directorate
This Directorate, sometimes referred to as AKhFU, exercises
the responsibility for general administrative and supply functionsm.
Its sections are attached to all directorates of M GB to provide
materiel, to maintain administrative records and files, to provide
food, quarters, clothing and transportation and to carry out similar
administrative functions.
h. FO or FU (Finotdel or Finupravloniye ,Fin.ance Office
or Finance.Directora e
The FO?s attached to directorates control the financial
resources of the directorates. It is possible that FO has boon in-
corporated in AKhU to form an AKhFO or AithFU.
is Secretariat
A Secretariat has boon traced in the hTKVD and may exist under
MGB; it is believed to have hhcn supervisory control powers over
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V. ORGANIZATION OF THE MGB WITHIN TF.E USSR ON REPUBLIC, PROVINCE AND
DISTRICT LEVEL
Each of the Soviet Socialist Republics has its own Ministry of State
Security (MGB) which is patterned after the central organization of
MGB/USSR. Technically, all Soviet republics have their ovrn independent
governments and therefore their MGB's arein theory,directly under the
Central Committee of the CPSU and the-Council of Ministers in each
republic. Practically, however, each republic MGB is under, and operates
as a part of, MGB/USSR which issues its controlling directives.
Republic MGBts are organized similarly to those of MGB/USSR. It
should be emphasized that under GUGB operational orders were probably
transmitted through an Operational Directorate; this is not now con-
sidered to be the cases Both operational and administrative control is
believed exorcised through lower level MGB offices. On province, terri-
tory and autonomous province levels the MGB organization is referred to
as UMGB, the U being best translated as "office", Thus U14GB/LO is the
MGB office of Leningrad Provinces In the provinces of the RSFSR, the
UMGB's are directly subordinate to the MGB/USSR in Moscow. In all
Soviet Socialist Republics, however, the UMGB seems to be subordinated
to the MGB of the republic UMGB jurisdiction includes an entire province
with all its towns and cities, the headquarters usually situated in the
largest city. Subordinate to the UMdIGB's are city sections and sub-
sections, district subsections and county subsections. At the lowest
MGB levels officers apparently share the work according to the object
of surveillance and not according to whether it is, for example, KRU,
SPU or EKU activity. Officers attached to district sections have various
agents, informants and subagoncios,doponding largely on local conditions
and with less regard for strict regulations and delineations of formal
jurisdiction than at the higher levels,
In the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics, MGB chiefs are Trlinistors of State Security; in oblasts (provinces),
krais (territories), and autonomous provinces they are chiefs of UMGBis
or offices of MGB. The following list, which is considered substantially
accurate as of late 1946, is made up of such principal MGB officers as are
known and includes the head of TJIGB on USSR level and his known deputies:
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Minister Cole Gen. V.iktor.Se::Wonovich ABAKIJMgOV
Deputy -Minister Gone Lt. S. I. OGOLTSOV, deputy for general
Georgia
questions
Gen. Lt. N. IT. SELIVANOVSKI
Gene Lt. A. Se BLINOV
Gen, Lt. N. K. KOVALCHUK, later transferred to
11GB Soviet Zone in Germany
Gene Majo T.T. G. SVII ELUPOV
Soviet Socialist Republics
Ukraine Minister Gone Lt. S. R. S11VCIM?KO
White Russia I? Gone Lto L. F. TSANAV
Uzbekistan it Gon? Maj. M. I. 11SHAKOV
Deputy-Minitor Col. Gent. A. G. GAVITOV
n
n
Minister
Deputy-Minister
Azerbaijan Minister Gen. Maj. S. F. EMNLYANOV
A, NIYAZOV
K. Be RYZMETOV
Gone Lt, As N RAPAV
Gen, Ltc, Sh, 0. TSERETELI
Gone :Aaj. I. I. NIBLADZE
Gen. Maj. I. M. BARTUSHANAS
Gen. Maj. P. M. KAPRAL OV
Col.A. A, MJIITSKEVICHYUS
Deputy-Minister
it
Minster Gone Maj. A. A. NOVIK
Deputy-T:Inister Col, Ya. Ya4 VEVERS
Kirgizstan Minister Colo A. M. IVANOV
Esthonia it Gen. Maj. Be G. KU121
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics
Adzhar ASSR
Dagostm.n ASSR
Kara-Kolpak ASSR
Komi 1,.SSR
Mari ASSR
Tatar ASSR
Chuvash ASSR
Yai-.ut ASSR
A. S. SOLOMATOV
Gone Maj. I. A. GAGUA
Colo M. I. KUKUTARI
Cole M. I . KALININSKI
H. SHERLLIEV
Cole I. I. FEDYUKOV
Lte.Col. S. I. SOLOVEV
Gen. L.ajo A. F. RUCI-fCIN (since end
of 1947 Ma j. Gen, SIDNEY?)
Cole S. To MITRYASHOV
G. K. ZIM.1IN
Obla.shs (provinces) and Krais (territories)
Moscow
Leningrad
Kr.?asnodarsk Krii
Kursk
Dnepropetrovsk
Molotov
Novosibirsk
Orlov
Khabarovsk Krai
Novgorod
Tuvinsk
Oirotsk
South Osetinsk
Chief of UMGB Gene Maj. I. I. GORGONOV
t
if it
Cone L . P, no AUDI Al"
Gene Lt. LI, I.S. GVISHIANI
Major Me P. DEMIDOV
Col. No V. SYRKOV
Gen. Ma j . I. I . ZACHEPA
Gen. Liaj. P. P. KONDAI(OV
Lt. Col, A, D, DOMAREV
Col. uen. S. A, GOGLIDZE
Colo I. V. RECHKALOV
N. No PETROV
A. P, ILL.ZARIN
I. I. GASSIYEV
We are able to delineate the lower level operational and organizational
structure of only a few MGB directorates. The data appearing below in this
connection frequently are more accurate in theory than in practice.. as dual
and multiple functions are frequently carried out by the same individual
or office.
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1. INU, INO SECRET
Information on the lower echelons of INU comes primarily from
defectors with varying knowledge of IIU/NKGB and INU/MGB. INU in the
NKGB organization is believed to have been represented on republic level
in the form of a section or INO8 which# one source states* was always
the 1st Section in a Republic NKGB. INO=s of Republic NKGB!s are said
to have received their directives from INU/NYGB/USSR. The importance
and the size of an INO depended on the amount of interest shown by both
NKGB/USSR and the Republic NKGB in the affairs of the neighboring country.
I1W was also represented by an INO in the UNKGB1s of provinces bordering
foreign countries and was considered by one source to be a sort of border
office of the INO of the Republic and of INU/USSRe The INO/UNKGB allegedly
had very limited independence of action in the performance of its duties.
Except for the limitation of functions of lower echelons of Ii'
MGB apparently follows the same pattern as TiKGB. One source believes that
INOrs of U1,1GB's may carry on intelligence activities independently although
they are generally utilized as service organizations for intelligence
operations undertaken by a Republic MGB or MGB/USSR. But, according,to one
report,believed reliable$ the mission of a minor MGB a gent,,on assignment
from UMGB/Uzhorod,was held up in June 1947 duo to the necessity of ob-
taining specific approval from MGB/Kiev (Ukrainian SSR), as the existing
directive forbade UMGB/Uzhorod on province level to mount operations
outside the USSR without clearance. In any case, provinces bordering on
a foreign country have an INO and probably ING subsections of UMGB for
each country the province borders, In Uzhorod, which bdrders on four
countries, there are subsections of the UMGB for each border country. In
provinces without foreign frontiers;; the UI.ZGB reportedly has no IN0.
2. SPU, SPO
No information is available on the organization of SPU under MGB.
The SPO's of the UNKGBis and UGB's (under GUGB) were subordinated both ad-
ministratively and operationally to the SPO for the respective republics,
except in the provinces of the RSFSR which w ere under direct SPU control.
The structure of the province SPOes conformed almost exactly to that of the
Republic SPOfs,r their size and importance varying in accordance with the
density and political development of the population, and the number of
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objects of surveillance in the province.. Information on the SPO or 2nd
Section of UGB of the Leningrad povince reflects that the inhabitants of
Leningrad wore, at least in 1941s under surveillance by t`o SPO's: the
SFO of the province and the SPO of the city administration. The lattor
supervised suspected citizens,. institutions of learning, movie houses,
theaters, public parks, museums, sport societies, city and district Soviets,
the Academy of Science, courts of Iva, the public prosecutors and other
government agencies in the city. Agents of the province SPO dealt with
government institutions situated in the city of Leningrad but of importance
also to the province, such as the provincial Public Health Sections, the'
provincial Section of Public Education, provincial law courts and prose-
cution officers, etc.
3. KRU, KRO
The source who provided the above information on the SPO has
also made the following statements in regard to KRO, also known as the
3rd Section o f UGB under GUGB, in the Leningrad Province? The p articular
importance of the Leningrad KR O was due to the proximity of the frontiers
of Finland,, Estonia and Latvia, to the existence of a largo commercial
harbor and to the number of nationalities living in the city and province
of Leningrade The Leningrad KRO played the organizing part in dealing
with espionage and counterespionage in its area, aided by 3rd Special
Section agents. The principal objects of KRO attention w ere persons who
had arrived in the USSR at various times (in particular, persons not
possessing Soviet citizenship),, persons who had relations with citizens
of foreign countries, members of the foreign diplomatic corps, members
of non-Soviet national groups, such as Finns, Germans? otc., inhabitants
of the towns and villages in border districts., prisoners of war,, officials
of harbors of commercial importance, and Soviet citizens sent on official
business abroade The duties of KRO Leningrad included a careful regis-
tration of persons bolongi,1.g to the aforesaid categories which,, in respect
to surveillance by agents, are divided into three typos of cases: regis-
tration, active and agents oases..
KRO Leningrad, according to this source, also prepared individual
agents and groups of agents for missions outside of the USSR and transferred
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them abroad. Such agents were largely persons acquainted with life in
the countries to w hich they were sent. On the basis of reports from
those agents: KRO Leningrad compiled detailed reports on the espionage
activities of foreign countries directed against the Soviet Union, on
the activities of all types of hostile foreign parties and organizations
and on persons trained abroad for espionage work in the USSR. Those
reports were sent to all operational sections of the NKVD so that agents
might become familiar with their contents. This source also stated that
to KRO of the Leningrad province were transferred duties of the Leningrad
INO, or 5th Section UGB Leningrad province.
Reliable information on SPO and KRO operations at republic
level is available only from the example of the NKGB/Lithuanian SSR? which
existed for three months in 1941. Since the two directorates cooperated
very closely, they will be dealt with together in the following pages.
During April, May and Juno of 1941, the NKGB operated in
Lithuania until the advance of the German forces after the outbreak of
the German-Soviet war forced the Soviet., to leave the country. Captured
NKGB documents from this period, believed authentic, throw considerable
light on Soviet State Security work against anti-Soviet elements in the
Lithuanian SSR in 1941, as well as on the collaboration between the various
organs of the NKGB at that time. These documents indicate that one of the
principal purposes of the NKGB in Lithuania was to register all anti-Soviet
elements of the population, to prepare them for exile to the USSR and to
initiate the exile. Captured NKGB orders indicate that SPO and KRO/NKGB/
Lithuanian SSR shared in the responsibility of registering anti-Soviet
elements, each directorate in its own fiol0 The following order, dated
20 May 19419 from the Deputy Peoples! Commissar of State Security,
Lithuanian SSR, was dirs3tod to the Chiefs of SPO and KRO/NKGB/LSSR, all
chiefs of county sections of NKGB/LSSR; the chief oft he City of Vilna
NKGB office and chiefs of rail transport sections of NKGB/LSSR; "Forwarded
herewith a form for daily ropcr t of categories of anti-,Soviet elements
by order of the Peoples? Commissar of State Security USSR, Commissar of
State Security Comrade T RXTJL00 Ccmplc; ted forms must be sent to me by
courier on the enclosed blanks and must arrive before 15:000......."
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A list of categories of counterrevolutionary activities has been
found among those captured documents. Persons falling into any of these
categories were subject to operational registry. The demarcation between
SPO and KRO is made very clearly, sinoo the first section of the list
contains categories to be registered by SPO and the second section cate-
gories to be registered by KRO. A translation of the list follows:
Categories to be registered by SPO:
a. Former officials of the government of the country,
1. Principal branch heads.
2. Directors of departments and above.
3. County chiefs.
4. Military commanders of counties.
5. Police officials9
6. Gendarmeries
7o Prison officials and administrative workers.
8. Public prosecutors.
9. Mombors of military field courts.
10. Members of district, etc., courts and sections
concerned with trial of political cases.
11. Members of other courtso
12. Members of the Supreme Court.
13. Members of appellate courts.
14. Examining magistrates for important cases.
159 Officials of the Lithuanian Intelligence Service.
16. Officials of the criminal police,
17. Officers of the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of
the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army,
18? Trotskyitos.
199 Active members of the PLEKH&VICHUS, BERMONT-AVALOV
and von der GOLTS bands, working in Lithuania
against the USSR.,
20. Social-Revolutionaries.
21. Loading members of the Social-Democrats.
22. Agent provocateurs of State Security
23. Families of "back-sliders."
24. Landowners.
25. Important manufacturers.
26. Important merchants and landlords with property
valued at not loss than 60,000 lits.
be Members of the Lithuanian National Counterrevolution
Co 11 " Polish It 11
do It IT Jewish It tt
o. Lembors of the Russian V,`hits Emigrant Formations.
fo " it Ukrainian National Counterrevolution
5, tr It VWnito Russian National Counterrevolution.
h, Loaders of Catholic Organizations.
Categories to be registered by KRO:
a. Employees of foreign legations, regular representatives
of foreign firms and counter-agents of:
Germany England United States Vatican
Italy France Scandinavian Baltic countries
Japan Spain countries Others
b. Germans forbidden to depart for Germany.
c. Members of "Kultu.rb nd" and "Mannschaft.tt
d. Contrabandi.sts and sml gglors linked with Gerrnany.
o, Persons living on the border and having relatives
in Germany0
fo Families and close relatives of persons being exiled
to the USSR.
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Persons trying to floe from LSSR to Germany under
pretense of repatriations
he Persons arr.ivin5 in LSSR from Germany or repatriated
through Germany, concerning whom exact details are
available on their relations with German or other
foreign intelligence services.
A final example served to clarify the chain of corm end and the
headquarters organization in charge of preparing and conducting "operations
to rid the LSSR of hostile anti.. Soviet elements." Carrying out an order
of V. S. MERKULOV, the Peoplost Commissar of State Security, LSSR, ordered
on 23 May 1941 the following to constitute the operational staff for this
operation, He picked his own deputy as chairman and appointed the deputy
chief of SP03 the chief of a subsection of SPO, the deputy chief of a KRO
subsection and several NKVD section chiefs to work with him. This group
was joined by two INNKVD officers from NKVD headquarters in Moscow to arrange
liaison with the NKVD. Operational "troikas," or throo-man committees..
wore sot up throughout the country to carry out the actual operations at
county level. Of the three members of these troikas two were IKGB officers
and one an NKVD officer, usually the chief of the local county NKVD office.
Of the tw NKGB officials one was, in most counties, but not necessarily,
either an SPO or KRO officer. Among other NKGB sections represented on
these troikas were the Investigation Section, Personnel Sections and the
Administrative and Economic Section. The troikas were responsible for
rendering daily reports on all persons registered and subject to exile
and for maintaining a file on all suspected persons. Those files were to
contain information supplied by agents, full details on the head and members
of the family and a complete inventory of property. The rail transport
sections of NKGB set up their own troikas; three for the whole of Lithuania.
The NKVD militia was specifically ordered to render assistance to the
organs of the NKGB in conducting the operation?
These captured NKGB orders, although old? afford an excellent
example of the field co-ordination on specific operational problems not
only between various State Security directorates but also botwoen those
directorates and the uniformed troop formations of NKVD. There are also,
of course, numerous other instances of such operational co-ordination
indicating State Security control of NKVD troops,
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4? EKU, EKO
Although it is quite possible that EKU has changed radically in
the last seven years and may, indeed, no longer exist, consideration of
its operational ' activities should be made, if only to provide useful back-
ground material and a more complete understanding of MGB bureaucracy.
Available information, based on a reliable knowledgeable source, is
therefore presented in some detail on the operations of the EKU for the
Ukrainian SSR and the EKO for the Azerbaijan SSR on republic level, the
EKO for the province of Arkhangelsk of the RSFSRJ the EKO for the province
of Gorki and the EKO for the Primorsk Territory.
The EKOts on republic level are believed to have been subordinated
administratively to the republic NKGBj but operationally each EKO was sub-
ordinated to EKU/USSR. The reason for the existence of an EKU, rather
than an EKO, for the Ukrainian SSR was that the republic contained a
highly developed industrial plant disproportionately vital to the economy
of the entire USSR, Each of the Ukrainian industries was represented by
a section directed by the EKO=s of the twenty-four provinces of the
Ukrainian SSR. These in turn were operationally subordinate to the republic
EKU. Thus each provincial EKO had a combined operational and investigation
unit which, within the sphere of the province, combined the work of the
operational and investigation sections at higher levels. It was this
combined unit which directed the sections which represented EKO in the
various factories of each province. Control was effected either directly
or through the section representing the industry concerned. The operational
and investigation unit of the provincial EKO was also directly responsible
for the guard arrangements for such local factories requiring special NKVD
troops. Each industry within the province was represented by a branch
section in the provincial EKO; the number of such sections varying in each
province according to the economic and industrial development of the
province,
Since the Azerbaijan SSR contains one of the largest oil-producing
fields in the Soviet Union, the organization of the EKO in Azerbaijan was
varied to control this special situation. The Operational Section planned
and directed the work of the Azerbaijan EKO in accordance with instructions
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received from the Oil Industry Department of EKU/NKVfl/USSR, It compiled
periodical reports and returns for EKU and control] d operationally the
NKVD troops guarding oil wellsl pipelines} factories] and related
facilities. The investigation Unit conducted investigations into cases
dealt with by this department and the Records Unit had functions similar
to those of the corresponding dopartments in the EKU/USSR.
The Oil Industry Department was the chief department of the EKO
of the Azerbaijan SSR? It was divided into two sections:
a. Oil Production Section: Kept a watch on the work of the oil-
producing trusts and organs, and directed the work of
special departments and special units in these organs*
b. Oil Refinery Section: Kept a close surveillance on the
activities in e oil refineries by moans of special
departments in the ref inerioss
The small machine-construction industry of the Azerbaijan SSR
was represented in the EKO organization by a special section controlling
special departments in pertinent factories.
The structure and functions of the Arkhangelsk EKO were determined
primarily by the following factors: The main wealth of the province of
Arkhangelsk lies in the enormous forests which cover its entire territory;
the development of the timber industry constitutes Its main economic ac-
tivity and in Arkhangelsk alone there wore thirty mills, two of the largest
timber combines in the Soviet Union, a large paper factory and a host of
smaller woodworking concerns. In addition to the timber industry, there
wore two large shipbuilding yards (the r,Zolotovsk yard being the largest
in the USSR), and deep-sea fishing, stock raising and agriculture wore
important economic assets.
Under orders received directly from EKU/NKVD/USSR, an operational
and investigation unit directed the work of the Arkhangelsk EKO and in-
vestigated any cases of economic counterintelligence within the province.
Resembling corresponding organs at other levels, it was responsible for
security guard measures for factories and forwardod periodic repro is to
EKU/USSR. The most important department in the Arkhangelsk EKO was the
Timber and Floatage Department which workod under the general direction
of the Timber Industry Section of EKU, dealing with timber and its by-products.
This dopartmont was responsible for economic security in all the timber con-
cerns in Arkhangelsk and control)o d special departments in the Timber
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Collecting Trusts, special units in the sawmills, wood-pulp and by-products
plants and special units in the Timber Floatage Trusts. A Household
Industry Section was responsible for all Arkhangelsk industries other than
those represented in EKO by separate sections or representatives. These
industries included a tannery, a knitted fabrics factory, a rope works
and several brick works.
The Shipbuilding Industry Section of EKO, Arkhangelsk was directed
by the corresponding branch department in EKU/USSR and was mainly concerned
with the activities of the Molotovsk yard already mentioned. The Seeticn
reportedly came into existence in 1935 and was also responsible for the
other ship repairing and building ooncerns, operating through special
departments or units.
Natural geographical advantages in the Province of Gorki facili-
tated the development of many industries, among which were the largest
motor works in the Soviet Union, several war industries, a locomotive
works, a diesel engine plant, an enormous river shipyard and numerous
other mechanical engineering and metallurgical shops. Two of the more
important sections of the Gorki EKO were the Machine Construction Industry
Department, which checked on all the activities of this industry in the
province by means of the usual special departments, and the War Industry
Section, responsible for factories engaged in armaments production.
The Primorsk Territory, one of six territories or krais in the
Soviet Union, comprises the Pacific Soviet seaboard from Vladivostok to the
Bering Strait. Industry developed here rapidly after 1934 and the EKO
of the territory was correspondingly enlarged. A War Industry Section
carried on counterintelligence work among the developing armaments and
munitions plants and, according to one source, there were, under GUGB,
an Operational Section, an Investigation. Unit and the usual sections and
individuals according to the various industries and agricultural enter-
prises. Of those a combined section for the coal and oil industries,
prominent in the industrial life of the territory, was the most important.
It is assumed that some sort of organization of other MGB direct-
orates similar to EKU, KRU, and SPU exists below USSR level, but believedly
authentic information on the organization at lower levels is lacking at
present,except for the following on operations in Leningrad province,
primarily as of 1941.
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5. Operations
At the field operational level, Operations are in the hands
of "Operational Collaborators," roughly case officers, attached to the
MGB directorates, sections and subsections, which are referred to as
"operational sections." An example of the work of such a case officer
is available from a defector, who has described the activities of one
assigned to a subsection of the 1st Section of the Economic Section of
the UNKUD of Leningrad Province. Through an industrial branch of EKO
this officer received a completed questionnaire on an individual under
suspicion of anti-Soviet activity in a Leningrad factory. The case officer
made a record on this individual, bearing the signature of his section
head, and this card was placed in an alphabetical index of the 1st Special
Section.
Since it was an absolute requirement that surveillance by agents
be planned in advance and that concrete operational measures of surveillance
be proposed, the case officer drew up a plan of surveillance calling for
collaboration by agents of the 2nd and 3rd Special Sections, the former
to assist with technical monitoring aids and the latter to provide agents
to surveil the suspect. All data on the case had to be processed by the
1st Special Section, by which means accurate and centralized records were
assured.
The case officer now had to plan a safe and secure method of
mutual co-operation with his agents, supplied in this case by the 3rd
Special Section. He arranged and paid for a conspirative apartment for
meetings and~he met his agents according to a schedule drawn up by himself.
On occasion he may have had to consult with his superiors in the 1st
Section of EKO/UNKVD/LO. He made daily notes on the progress of his
agents and was responsible for a summary each month of the agents, roports.
By means of these summaries his own work was ordinarily controlled by his
superiors. When information proving the guilt of the suspect had been
obtained ,- in this case a monitored mooting with an accomplice and state-
ments by follow workers attesting to anti-Soviet remarks uttered by the
suspect -- a local warrant of arrest was made out by the case officer.
On occasion, however, such a warrant might be made out by the section to
which the case officer was assigned. The case was then turned over to the
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Investigation Section. Had the suspect fled in the meantime, the case
officer would have had one final responsibility, the issuance of a general
warrant of arrest requiring all operational sections throughout the Soviet
Union to initiate local searches for the individual.
The case officer conunonly recruited his ovm agents, Ho was
responsible for determining the education, manners, character, etc., of
a prospective agent by personal interviews, for writing a report requesting
confirmation of the recruitment by the chief of the local NKVD section and.,
on obtaining this permission, for getting a written agreement from the
prospect to work as an agent or informant. The case officer trained his
agents himself and was at all times responsible for their acts. If he
himself was transferred, he first transferred his agents personally to his
successor. 'When he was ill or on vacation, temporary transfer of his
agents was made to the head of his section or subsection.
VI. ORGANIZATION A'tD FUNCTIONS OF THE MGB IN SOVIET ZONES
OF OCCUPATI011
The chief positive intelligence and counterintelligence functions
of the MGB were carried out, it is believed, in the Soviet zones of occu-
pation directly after the close of World War II by, or at least through,
the organs of the T.;VD (formerly the NKVD). State Security officers
apparently were assigned to the MVD units which primarily fulfilled police
functions in the Soviet Zones of Germany, Austria and Korea. Gradual]y,
however, as the areas became stabilized, the work of the MGB assumed greater
importance, and in 1946 a broad reorganization took place, at least in
Germany and Austria. In Austria and Hungary, MGB activities previously
had been masked behind the protection of the Allied Control Commissions.
The MGB now took full authority for positive intelligence and counter-.
intelligence activities.
The reorganization which took place, as noted above, appears ob..
viously to be a field manifestation of the general reorganization and re-
distribution of the functions of MGB and MVD which, it will be recalled,
began in 1946 and apparently is still continuing. However, there is con-
siderable authentic information reflecting that in the Soviet Zone in
Germany certain intelligence and quasi.intolligence functions have boon
carried out by the MVD. eoncerning matters which normally would be considered
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at the present time to be within the jurisdiction of the MGB. It is
passible that this has resulted from the somewhat unusual status of Eastern
Germany as a military occupation zone, It is also entirely pcs sible that
MVD installations in this regard have boon used as cover by MGB, although
this has boon denied by at least one defector,
The Soviets apparently consider the principal intelligence problems
confronting them in the occupation zones to be those of counterintelligence
surveillance of all groups capable of anti-Soviet activitys and of all the
branches and employees of the Soviet and native administrations, the pre-
vention,, penetration and interception of foreign intelligence missions,
and the preparation of Soviet intelligence missions to obtain political,
economic,, military, naval and technical intelligence about foreign powers*
For the purpose of both counterintelligence and positive intelligence,
full Soviet use of their zones of occupation as staging areas from which
to mount operational intelli Bence missions can be accepted as axiomatic.
Dom: cant in this field will be the organs of the MGB.
As Soviet Zone in Germany
When hostilities ceased in Germany in 1945 Soviet intelligence units
on rman soil were on a wartime footing, their activities overlapped
con iderably and there seemed to be no coordination or chain of command.
To orroct this situation, Col. Gen. I. A. SEROV, who had been in command
of he combined Soviet Intelligence services in Poland, was placed in
cha ge of all Soviet Intelligence activities in Germany, Austria and
Western Europe. It is not necessary to take up in detail the organization
of EROV1s headquarters in Potsdam; documentary evidence has proven, it
may be noted, that it was responsible to the NKVD (lIVD) in.Moseow,During the
s or of 1946 all Soviet Intelligence services in Germany were still
nominally under SEROVfs control, but a reorganization was probably under
con ideration at that time and may have been bases' on the failure up to
that time to coordinate missions among the various units of the intelligence
services and on a lack of unity in the results obtained.
The reorganization of Soviet Intelligence in Germany, the first
ph so of which ended about November of 1946, resulted in the setting up
of a uniform system of intelligence and counterintelligence sections pri
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maxilyc under jurisdiction of the MGB. The basic structure of the old
NKVD organization in Germany was retained with the Operational Sector
(Opersektor) at province level, the Oper Okrug at district level and the
Oper Gruppa at "kreis" or county level. A recent source refers to the
Oper Gruppa as "Rayonnoye Otdoleniyo." It is possitle that quite recently
the letters MGB have been superseded by SVA (SMA), representing Soviet
Military Administration; thus one would expect to find today, for example,
Oper Okrug SVA, instead of Oper Okrug MGB. In the present paper the names
Cflcrug and Gruppa have been used throughout.
The above-outlined reorganization coincided with the departure
of SEROV from Germany. His successor is not yet definitely known, but is
believed to be one of the following: Lt. Gone or Maj. Gen. KOBULOV, Maj.
Gon. L. F. TSANAVA, Maj. Gan. Nikolai K. KOVALCHUK. Whoever the successor
may be, the functions of his office are believed to be largely adminis-
trative and directional., Actual operations are carried out by the six
Operational Sectors and their subordinate organizations, the Opor Okrugs
and the Opor Gruppy. Soviet Zone Operational Sectors are:
1. Brandenburg,, commanded by Gon. Maj. FIIA TOV, with headquarters
in Potsdam and Oper Okrugs in the cities of
Potsdam, Eberswalde, Kottbus, Brandenburg and
Be rnau.
2. Thuringia, commanded by Gon. Maj. IGNATOV, with headquarters
in Weimar. Opor Okrugs are located in Weimar,
Gotha, Erfurt and Gera.
3. Saxony, was commanded by Gen. Maj. KLEPOV, with head-
quarters in Dresden and Opor Okrugs in Dresden,
Leipzig, Chemnitz and Zwickau. KLEPOV has boon
relieved of his command; his successor is unknown,
4. Saxony- oommarided by Cal* KUZNETSOV, with headquarters
Anhalt, in Halle. Oper Okrugs are located in Magdeburg,
Morseburg, Dossau, Altmark and Torgau.
5. Mecklenburg, commanded by Gon. Maj. NIKITIN, with headquarters
in Sclnvicrin. Opor Okrugs are located in Schwerin,
Greifswald and Gustrow.
6. The Operational Sector of Berlin, commanded by Gon. 11aj. A. M.
VUL, successor to r!Iaj. Gen. SIDNEY) has always
seemed basically different organizationally from
the other five sectors. There are no Oper Okrugs
in the Sector but a number of district sections
MGB or SVA (Raionny Otdol, abbreviated to Raiotdol
MGB or SVA) are under the Sectorts direct command,
each reportedly covering a postal district of
Berlin in the same way as the original MVD Oper
Gruppy did formerly. It is believed that the organ-
ization of the MOB in Berlin proper was designed
to cope with the special circumstances prevailing
in the city under quadripartite occupation, and that
there are, in Berlin, Soviet Intelligence agencies in
addition to the usual installations of the IvIGB in
an Opor Sectors
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It has boon reported that Opor Sectors are divided into an
administrative branch and an intelligence branch, and that a similar
division exists at lover levels but on a smaller scale. The adminis-
trative branch is stated to consist of a secretariat, a personnel
section, a Party organization section, a finance section, a supply section,
a records and registry section and a prison section. The intelligence
branch reportedly has six operational sections of positive intelligence,
counterintelligence operations into western zones, counterintelligence
in the Soviet Zone, search of wanted persons, counterintelligence among
STMA personnel and investigation and interrogation.
A more detailed analysis has boon provided by a defector who
was familiar with the organization and functions of the Operational Sector
of Brandenburg. While the source does not make the distinction outlined
above between administrative and intelligence branches of an Oper Sector,
his information, especially on the intelligence sections of Opor Sector
Brandenburg, is sufficiently detailed to permit full quotation below. Ho
could provide no explanation for his listing of As I and IV as subsections
and not as sections:
Subsection A - Maintains all files of an operational nature,
all informant card indices and all case files,
which cannot be removed from this section,
Subsection I - Positive Intelligence. A network of informants
is maintained in the American, British and
French Zones and agents are sent on missions
into these zones. Targets are order-of-battle
information on troops in these zones; political,
economic and technical intelligence; public
opinion; the situation in the DP camps; and the
activities of foreign intelligence services.
Section II - Conducts counterintelligence operations. In
MGB Operational Sector Brandenburg there are two
subsections, one dealing with United States
espionage and the other with British and French
espionage. This Section also engages in offen-
sive operations, sending agents into the United
States, British and French Zones on counter-
intelligence missions.
Section III - Counterintelligence section for every branch of
the German administration, political parties,
schools, churches and cultural organizations in
the Soviet Zone. Information is obtained through
networks of informants in these organizations.
Subsection IV- Section for locating persons wanted by the MGB;
it makes use of a number of Gorman "log men"
and of German police facilities.
Section V - Section for counterintelligence within the Soviot
Military Administration in Germany. Informant
networks are established in every local head-
quarters and in other administrative offices.
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Section VI - Section for investigation and interrogation.
This Section investigates all arrested persons
and interrogates on the basis of briefs sub-
mitted by other sections, particularly Sub-
section I and Section He
Finance Section -Maintains payrolls of officers, enlisted men
and civilian interpreters and distributes
confidential funds at the request of section
chiefs.
Personnel - r:Iaintains all personnel files of officors, on-
(kader)'Sootion listed men and civilians.
Source, states that this MGB Operational Sector has, under the
jurisdiction of its five Oper Okrugs, twenty-eight Oper Gruppy. Of those
he was familiar with the names of sixteen: Prenzlau, Angermundo, Templin,
Bad Froienwaldo, Frankfurt an der Oder, Nouruppin, Rathenow, Nauon, Malow,
Wittonborgo, Belzig, Luckenwaldo, Fuorstesnvalde, Spromberg, Guben, Beeskow.
In this same source's opinion, Lt. Gon. KOVALCHUK.is Chief of
TJGB in the Soviet Zone, and has -a oomplete -staff -with sections
corresponding to those of the operational sectors. He is sure that a staff
section corresponding to Section VI of an operational sector exists on
KOVALCHUK's staff, and this section carries out investigations covering
the whole of Soviet-occupiod Gormany. Commanding officer of this section
is Col, CHIZENKOV, and the offices of the section are located in Potsdam.
Under the command of Col. CHESTAKOVICH, another staff section, corres-
ponding to Section III of an MGB operational Sector, is entrusted with
the surveillance of all aspects of German public life.
Command channels between MGB Operational Sectors and Oper Okrugs
are sketched by this source as follows: The Commanding Officer of an
Operational Sector may give orders directly either to the Commanding
Officer of an Opor Okrug or to chiefs of sections in an Oper Okrug. Also,
section chiefs of Operational Sectors are authorized to give orders to
chiefs of corresponding sections in Opor Okrugs. For example, Lt. Col.
PAGENTRIGER, at the time of source's defection, was Chief of Section II
of the Operational Sector Brandenburg. PAGENTRIGER was authorized to
order the chief of Seation.Il in Oper Okrug Eberswalde to undertake oper-
ations. The Eborswalde official followed PAGENTRIGER's orders, knowing
that they had been cleared through PAGENTRIGER's chief, Gon. Maj. FIIATOV,
Chief of Operational Sector Brandenburg.
As a further example of the close integration between sections of
an Operational Sector and its Opor Okrugs, source states that Opor Okrug
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chiefs report once a month to chiefs of corresponding sections on sector
level. Only after completion of these reports do they prepare reports
for their awn Oper Okrug chief. Section chiefs of Oper Okrugs have the
same command functions vis-a-vis Oper Gruppa chiefs under the jurisdiction
of the respective Opor Okrugs.
MGB organs are not only integrated as to command functions but
they also collaborate closely in the conduct of operations and the collecting
of intelligence. Source has given an apparently authentic example of this.
While Section VI is not authorized to engage in agent operations, the chief
of that section is, however, by virtue of his position as section chief, in
a position to initiate such operations. 14 in the course of interrogation
of a suspect by Section *VI, certain facts are learned which warrant a special
follow-up, the Chief of Section VI may go to the officer in charge of his
sector, give him a summary of the case and propose that an agent be briefed
to got the desired confirmation or information. The sector chief will,
depending on the nature of the case, call in the chief of either Subsection
I or Section II, and order him to brief one of his agents on the elements
of the information in which Section VI is interested. In cases of minor
importance, the section chiefs will arrange among themselves to obtain the
information. As a rule the Chief of Section VI will not know the identity
of the agent entrusted with the mission and will merely receive a repot
from the section concerned. Source believes that in an invblved case 44
officer of Section VI might be called in to de-brief the agent.
Be Hungary and the Soviet Zone in Austria
Little detailed authenticated information on the PMGB in these areas
is available. During the existence of the Allied Control Commission from
early 1945 until late in 1947, Soviet counterintelligence activities wore,
according to a report from two apparently reliable defectors, masked under
a section of the ACC known as the "Inspektsiya." From a reading of the
functions of the Inspoktsiya, it seems evident that both military and State
Security counterintelligence were carried out, although this section had
apparently no positive intelligence duties. The Inspoktsiya seems to have
made use of both Hungarian and Soviet agents and to have collaborated with
local Hungarian police and military organizations. Although these defectors
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could-not provide an exact organizational breakdown of the Inspektsiya,
they were able to give the following delineation of its functions:
10 Counterintelligence activities on Hungarian territory;
discovery of spies or of elements suspected of espionage;
investigation of sabotage cases.
2. Detection of "anti-democratic," anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist organizations or activity, carried out with
the help of informants and agents.
3. Co-operation with the Military Political Division of the
Hungarian Ministry of National Dofonso, located at Nader
Street, Budapest, and with the Hungarian National Polit-
ical Police, at 60 Andrassy Roads Budapest. This co-
operation consisted of a constant exchange of information,
of commonly organized operations, of joint recruitment
and exploitation of agents and of an exchange of prisoners
of interest to any particular agency.
4. Security of industrial concerns charged with the delivery
of reparations to the Soviets. Checks on political
attitude of such firmst personnel were conducted, and,
in addition, the Inspektsiya had informants in practically
all Hungarian industries,
5. Security of former German-owned factories and other proper-
ties taken over by the Soviets. Local and Soviet infor-
mants were used extensively for surveillance duties,
6. Security of Soviet military and civilian personnel in
Hungary.
7. Surveillance of Soviet personnel in Hungary. This group
was headed by a Maj. REVIN whose deputy was a Maj.
GORLENKO, and it had the task of observing the behavior
and political reliability of ACC personnel. It also
reported on the attitude and behavior of the members of
the Soviet diplomatic representations, trade missions
and other Soviet representatives in Hungary. The group
studied the background and daily activities of such
Soviet representatives, learned how they spent their
free time and determined their acquaintances, Informers
in the ACC reported to the two majors. All military
personnel were also under close surveillance, in which
work Hungarian informers were used. Special emphasis
was laid on surveillance of Soviet personnel during
official receptions, banquets, etc. Soviet officers
were instructed to speak with foreign representatives
only through interpreters who were always informants
working for KEVIN.
6. Special security precautions concerning the Inspektsiya
itself.
9. Functions of a nature unknown to sources. These involved
frequent meetings in secret places between members of the
Inspektsiya and people unknown to sources, apparently
for the purpose of recruiting, briefing and debriefing
agents employed by the Inspektsiya.
Lt, Gen. Mikhail BELKIN was Chief of the Inspektsiya. The above
sources reported that he was succeeded by Col. VELIKANOV in July 1947,
and left for Baden, Austria to command a SMERSH unit under the Baden Area
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HQ Central Group of Forces. Previously, the Baden group, under Col.
BEVZ, had boon controlled by the Hungarian Inspektsiya, but on the
arrival of Lt. Gen. BELKIN the entourage of Col. BEVZ was assimilated
and the Hungarian headquarters reduced in strength by approximately one-
half.
As yet, the name and structure of the MGB organization in Baden
have not boon established. It has boon reported that the Baden group
includes both MGB and SMERSH, which may be a further oxamplo of the re-
organization of 1946 when SMERSH was again placed formally under State
Security control as the MGB Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence
in the Armed Forces (presumably GUKR-S1ERSH). According to available
information, positive intelligence functions are included in the group's
duties, the Baden headquarters reportedly exercising the following
functions:
1. Counterintelligence against the Western Powers.
2. Positive intelligence against the Western Powers,
3. Counterintelligence against the Hungarians and Austrians.
4. Counterintelligence among Soviet and Soviet-employed.: personnel.
.5. Security of industrial concerns controlled by the Soviets,
especially of those charged with the delivery of repar-
ations to the USSR.
6. Security of intelligence buildings.
7. Co-operation with the Soviet element of the Allied Control
Commission in Austria.
C. The Soviet Zone of North Korea
A definitive delineation of the MGB organization and operations in
North Korea is not possible at present. Much of the information received
concerning Soviet Intelligence in this area appears, with little question,
to refer to SMERSH activities.
VII. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 1MGB IN SATELLITE
COUNTRIES
At the present time the primary MGB objective within satellite
countries appears to be the organized control and utilization of satellite
intelligence, security, and police agencies. This does not, of course,
preclude the operation by the MGB in these countries of its own separate
and distinct agent nets, although the use of such satellite agencies
decreases the necessity for such separate nets.
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The utilization of these satellite agencies is accomplished not only
by direct liaison between them and MGB offices or representatives, but also
by placing MGB personnel in controlling positions in these agencies. In
addition, satellite intelligence agencies, particularly in Poland$ have
been staffed with Soviet-trained satellite personnel. Not only is the
product of these agencies available to the MGB, but there are strong
indications that the MGB consistently assigns them specific objectives
and tasks. In addition, it is known that in the foreign intelligence field
these satellite agencies are used to provide cover, support, and facilita-
tion to Soviet espionage nets. According to a number of reports received
during the past two years, the Soviets are increasingly concentrating their
intelligence through these channels, including particularly the use of
satellite diplomatic establishments for cover and communications purposes.
In a number of instances, satellite official representatives abroad, who,
without question,:have been engaged in operational intelligence work,
reportedly have been responsible directly to Soviet Intelligence and not
to any of their own country intelligence agency. The available information
clearly reflects that the utilization of such satellite services is pri-
marily a responsibility of the MGB. However, we cannot categorically assert
that satellite intelligence, security and police agencies, as well as
satellite diplomatic establishments, are not also utilized by Red Army
Intelligence.
There are certain variations in the accomplishment of such Soviet
control, depending on circumstances. In Rumania,, for example, it is
apparent that key Soviet Intelligence personnel find cover in Soviet
legations, commercial organizations or missions of one type or another.
In Bulgaria, controlling MGB officials were given cover positions in the
Allied Control Commission before the signing of the Peace Treaty, while in
Hungary the entire MGB counterintelligence activities wore carried on under
the cover of the ACC.
In the satellite countries the Soviets have clearly adapted their
methods to the exigencies of the local situation. It appears also that
there is a closer, more direct, operational relationship between the
Communist Parties and the intelligence agencies there than exists within
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the Soviet Union. Ropcrts received point out that the Communist Parties
have a direct interest in intelligence and counterintelligence, and that
there are strong indications of a frequent, direct, operational relation-
ship between satellite Communist Parties and satellite intelligence agencies.
A. Poland
The primary purpose of the Polish security and intelligence agencies
is reported to be the fulfillment of Soviet policy, Three of those agencies
worn organized in or prior to$ 1945: the MBP, or Ministry of Public
Security] which was sot up by the SEROV group, a Soviet joint operational
intelligence command which operated at the close of the war in Poland and
later in Germany; the UB, or Security Police1 which was organized by the
MBP; and the GZI, or Polish Military Intelligence, which grew from a small
Soviet SMERSH detachment forming the intelligence section of the Soviet-
inspired Polish Kosciuszko Division. Founded in 1945 wore the KBW, or
Internal Security Corps, a uniformed security army; the MO, or Citizens,
Militia, an ordinary police force; and the intelligence service of the PPR,
the Polish Workers, Party (the Communist Party of Poland). Of these, all
but the UB were founded, staffed and controlled by Soviet officials or by
their Polish puppets. Sufficient information is available to permit a
limited and generalized analysis of Soviet control of the intelligence
organization of the PPR and of the MBP.
The PPR is the principal instrument of Soviet policy in Poland. With
all important offices held by its members, the PPR dominates Polish life,,
both at home and abroad.. indulging in the usual Soviet tactics of pene-
tration, surveillance, and sabotage. It is said to collaborate closely
with the Soviet MGB and MAD and with the Polish MBP, UB and GZI, all staffed
largely by PPR personnel and Soviet Intelligence officers. This service
relics for agents and facilities on the Communist Party organization and
on such front organizations as the ZVRA (Association for the Struggle of
Youth) and the OM-TUR (Youth Organization of the Association of Workers'
Universities).
Outwardlys the PPR is governed by its large public Central Committee,
but actually a secret Politburo of eleven members decides all important
matters and allegedly has policy liaison with the Soviet Politburo and the
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Central Committee of the CPSU in PMMasoow..
The influence of the Polish Politburo is augmented by its control
over the intelligence service of the PPR which is established under the
cover designation "Section B" of the Central Secretariat of the PPR Central
Committee. "Section B" is a complete intelligence organization dealing
with both positive and counterintelligence at home and abroad. There is
evidence that Soviet officials occupy some key positions in it and that
actual control is exercised by the MGB The service is believed to have
the following sections: a sabotage section1 a foreign intelligence section,
pcs sibly an agent recruitment section, on internal surveillance section
with the purpose of observing and penetrating all legal and illegal oppo-
sition groups in Poland, a technical section and a personnel section.
The MBP is, in some of its functions, similar to the PPR "Section Be"
It is charged with the political and civil security of Poland and its
jurisdiction covers the suppression of all opposition and underground
forces, the surveillance of government employees and the enforcement of
laws relating to State Security, It has the authority to use the thousands
of soldiers of the KBW and the MO. As informers, it uses members of the
PPR and of various youth organizations and it uses not only informers
idoalogically motivated, but also many forced to collaborate through fear,
The Ministry has its own prison and its own guard unit.
The KBW, MO and UB have little intelligence or counterintelligence
importance, but the GZI (Gloomy Zarzad Informacji) or Polish Military
Intelligence is charged with procuring military and political intelligence,
maintaining security in the Polish armed forces and counterintelligence
operations in Poland, all of which are under Soviet direction and operated
for the benefit of the USSR. Direct control of the GZI in 1945 and 1946
is believed to have been in the hands of Lt. Gen. N. N. SELIVANOVSKI, a
Vice Minister of State Securityk
Be Bulgaria
Information on MGB activities in Bulgaria is very moager. The Bulgarian
Communist Party Politburo is reported to control intelligence chains within
the country, which before the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1947, were
said to be directed by Soviet Intelligence through liaison channels in the
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Allied Control Commission and the 9Ske ELbassy. Maj. Gen. A. M. VOLKOV,
one-time Chief of the Security Inspectorate of the ACC in Bulgaria and
reported Chief of the MVD in Bulgaria, was said to be indirect contact with
both Bulgarian militia and army intelligence agencies. Col. L. A. SEREDA,
Chief of the Soviet Military Section of the ACC and head of the intelligence
service of the Soviet occupation forces, maintained contact with the
Bulgarian RO (Military Intelligence). Fyodor FECHIN1 formerly 3rd Secretary
of the Soviet Legation, now said to be in Polvdivi and believed to be Chief
of MGB in Bulgaria, has been maintaining daily contact with the Bulgarian
State Security Section of the militia. It is also of interest that the
source for this information comments that the usual distinction between
MVD and MGB the former the executive arm for the enforcement of State
Security and the latter strictly an intelligence agency +- appears to be
nonexistent in Bulgaria. MVD personnel there have been reported serving
in various intelligence and propaganda activities
We are not in possession at the present time of sufficient additional
authentic data to completely clarify this situation.
C. Yugoslavia and Albania
In Yugoslavia and Albania-Soviet control of local agencies seems to
be exercised through key Soviet officials in Soviet missions. The Yugoslav
Intelligence Services UDB, seems to be controlled by MVD and MGB technicians
and supervisors. Overall head of Soviet agents in such key positions in
the UDB is repcrtedly Maj. Gen. SIDOROVICH, Soviet Attache in Belgrade
since March 1947. In Albania, Soviet liaison officers, supervisors and
technicians are attached not only to every agency of the central government
but also to its local subdivisions. The center of Soviet Intelligence
activities for Albania is said to be Tirana and the Soviet director is
a Col. CHUVAKIN. Apparently the Yugoslav Intelligence Service exercises a
greater degree of independence and autonomy than is true in other satellite
countries. It is known that considerable authority over Albanian Intelli-
gence efforts is exercised by Yugoslav Intelligence personnel.
D. Rumania
Information on the work of the MGB in Rumania is available in detail
from an agent sources much of the material covering the organization of
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the MGB in Rumania during 1946. To an unknown extent, therefore, this
information may have boon affected by a reorganization of the MGB in
Rumania in the fall of 1946. Inasmuch, however, as the MGB in Rumania,
as this source sketches its organization, follows fairly consistently
the pattern of the known LZGB organization in the USSR, it is felt that
the data furnished by this source are still at least relatively accurate.
The MGB in Rumania is charged with the collection of information on
all aspects of Rumanian life and public opinion. It keeps under survoil+-
lance foreigners and foreign missions, the Rumanian Government, the
Rumanian Communist Party and Soviot officials in Rumania,, as well as Soviet
soldiers and citizens residing in the country, Bessarabians and Soviet
emigres. It also conducts operations involving the arrest, abduction and
deportation to the UTSSR or liquidation of elements of the population con-
sidered to be dangerous to the safety of the Soviet Union.
The Director of TAGB in Rumania repo tedly was Ivan Andreyevich BAKIirIN,
who had a cover employment as Director-Goneral of the Sovrombank, the joint
Soviet-Rumanian banking institution of Bucharest. Besides his advisory
staff, BAKHTIN controlled the sections listed belovr:
1. Secret Section (Sekretny Otdol) or SO, directed by Col.
ROSHCIn CIINKO and charged with the following functions:
as Surveillance of the Rumanian Communist Party.
be Surveillance of the Rumanian LTinistry of the Interior*
c. Surveillance of the Royal Palaces
d. Surveillance of members of the Rumanian Government*
e. Preparation of false documents and counterfeit money
for all sections of MGB, .
f. Control of transmitting stations of the Soviet Embassy
and Army.
g. Operation of photostat and photography sections.
Also connected with SO are a group in TASS with unknown duties
and a group in Sovkino, said to be responsible for surveillance of the
Royal Palace, loaders of the Rumanian Communist Party and members of the
Rumanian Government. The effect of the abdication of Mihai on the functions
of certain of these sections is not known. Closely collaborating with the
MGB in the operational functions indicated above is the Rumanian SSI.
2. Foreign Section (Inostrany Otdel) or INO$ directed by D. G.
YAKO V, and divided into the following subsections:
a. Subsection for the control of foreigners. (Pod-otdel
kontroly inostrantsov), headed by A. A. MIKHAILOV.
Maintains copies of files and photographs of all
foreigners resident in Rumania.
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b. Subsection for the control of foreign embassies
(Pod-otdel kontroly inostrannykh posoltsv),
headed by A. V, YARSIN. Controls agent networks
(1) Georghe ALEXANDROVSKIs with the function of
recruiting informers in legations and the
collection of information through them.
(2) Alexander MOJAISKI, with the function of sur-
veillance of foreign legations through the
Rumanian State Security Service and the
Bucharest Police Prefecture. Special interest
is said to be given the Turkish, Swissk French
and Italian Legations
Subsection for the control of Allied Missions (Pod-otdel
kontroly soyuznykh missii), directed by A. A.
SEVASTIANOVA. Controls agent networks of
(1) Constantin DRAGONESCU, with the function of sur-
veillance of the American political and mili-
tary missions,
(2) N. CARJEj investigating and shadowing squad made
up of detectives from the Rumanian Security
Service,
d. Subsection for the control of the Rumanian I.7inietry
of Foreign Affairs (Pod-otdel kontroly ministerstva
inostrannykh del v Ryuminii), directed by Leohxd
KARANDASHOVe
e. Subsection for the control of citizens having relations
with persons abroad (Pod-otdel kontroly zhitelei
kotoryye imeyut svyazi inostrantsami), directed by
Nikolai BARDICIEV. Makes use of the Rumanian post
office for censorship of mail,
3. Economic Section (Ekonomicheski otdel), directed by N. P.
FINOGENOV,'chief representative in Rumania of the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Trade; divided into the following
subsections:
as Industrial subsection, directed by I. G. GRINENKO,
reported as head of Sovromlemn, the joint Soviet-
Rumanian lumber company, and as an official of
Resitza, a large metallurgical corporation. Con-
trols networks of industrial espionage, A sub-
office handles oil information from all parts of
Rumania, including data on American, British and
French oil companies*
b? Financial and economic subsection, directed by K. S.
MALINOVSKI, under Sovrompetrol cover. Studies
Rumanian financial developments and trends; in-
cludes an important research group known as the
section for the destruction of capitalism (Otdel
pogloshcheniya Icapitalisma)# directed by Iosif
KOTLEAR, under cover of the economic section of
the Soviet Embassy.
c. Subsection for co-ordination and economic information,
directed by Igor POLESCHIUK, under cover of
Yuzhvneshtrans, a shipping agency. Collects Rumanian
economic intelligence for a so-called Research and
Co-ordination Bureau in Moscow. (Affiliation of this
bureau with the MGB is considered problematical).
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d. Armistice Subsection, directed by Nikolai RAMZAITEV.
Responsible for field supervision of deliveries to
the USSR under the armistice, and the fulfillment
of economic agreements with Rumania*
e. Subsection for collaboration with Combined Political
Police and Security Services, directed by Capt.
Tanis NIKOLSKI. Probably collaborates with the
economic sections of Rumanian security services
and maintains surveillance over the black market
and other clandestine economic activities of Soviet
citizens.
4. Information Section (Informatsionny Otdel). Reported to be
the largest MGB section in Rumania, rected by M. P.
S11UTOV, a..press.attaehe*:of the Soviet Legation, divided
into the following subsections:
a. Political Information Subsection. Gathers intelligence
on activities of the historical parties and opponents
of the present regime in Rumania*
be Military Information Subsection. Directed by Col.
YERIOMIN; collects intelligence on the Rumanian
Army and Navy and resistance movements in these
services.
o. Subsection on information regarding the USSR, directed
by Yaska ROTTMN ; collects material on the Rumanian
attitude toward the USSR and its Slavic satellites*
d. Political Tendencies Subsection, directed by P. A.
ZOTOV, attache in the Soviet Embassy.
e. Subsection for the supervision of Bessarabians and
White Russians, directed by Col. LEOCHENKO. Carries
out surveillance of Bessarabians, Ukrainians, and
Russian emigres resident in Rumania and maintains
card files on all such individuals.
5. Operations Section (Operatsionny Otdel). Directed by I. A.
BAGRATIN or BAGRATI and es arrests, abductions and
deportations and maintains liaison with Rumanian and
Russian police and intelligence agencies.
6. Special Section (Osoby Otdol). Directed by Col. LISTROV.
Charged with the political surveillances and education
of the Soviet armed forces in Rumania.
7. Private Section (Chastity Otdel). Reportedly directed by
Colo N. REVKA, Charged with maintenance of the
security of the Soviet Embassy, MGB offices and other
Soviet installations; protection of prominent Soviet
officials in Rumania.
8. Records and Files. Divided into three typos of files:
political card files, state security files, and files
of material relating to MGB liaison with Rumanian
organizations.
VIII. FIELD ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE
MGB ABROAD
Insofar as it is possible to do so, there have been discussed above
the field operations of various MGB organs within the USSR. While it is
not within the purview of this study to attempt to discuss or summarize
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in detail specific MGB operations abroad, or to sot out in detail TMGB
operational techniques and methods as they relate to operations abroadb
certain comments are sot out below concerning the field organization
and operations of the ITGB in countries outside the Soviet Union.
The TMGB organization responsible for operational espionage and other
operational intelligence work in countries outside the Soviet Union ob-
viously does not reflect or parallel with any exactness the headquarters
organization of the entire TAGB. It is, of course, well established that
such operations are under the jurisdiction primarily of the INU and its
subordinate INO's, although there are numerous reports available concerning
alleged foreign operations of the KRU and possibly of the SPU.
Although certain relatively constant characteristics of INU organi-
zation abroad have boon noted, it is difficult to draw general conclusi arcs
concerning the form such organization may take in any given area, since
the INU, while rigid in its discipline and controls, has exhibited con-
siderable elasticity in adapting its field organization to varying con-
ditions. Basically, INU operations abroad are conducted through a series
of independent, primarily unconnected espionage nets or parallels. For
purposes of convenience, those nets are generally referred to as being of
one of two types, either a legal or official residency or an illegal or
underground residency, depending upon whether or not the staff official
responsible for their direction is operating under official cover, i.e.,
as a known and admitted official Soviet representative.
While it is known that the 1TGB makes constant efforts to keep not only
its espionage nets separate, but even to separate parts of the same not
for security purposes, there are numerous case examples whore this principle
has been extensively violated. Also typical of INU operations is the use
of a legal residency to support and facilitate the operations of a not or
nets operated by an illegal resident. Thus, in many areas, LIGB agent
parallels directed by an UGB offioial in an illegal status have still con-
sistently boon supplied with funds, instructions, and communications channels
by the TAGB organization within an embassy, consulate, or trade mission.
In some instances, high-ranking officers of State Security have been
dispatched abroad appa rontly with jurisdiction and control over most, if
not all, MGB operations within a single country or oven more than one country,
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For example, it was reliably reporr Eod'in 1943 that a Major General of
State Security, assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., was
in charge of all INU operations for North America. There also have been
instances where MGB/USSR has apparently dispatched agents directly to a
particular country or area to operate independently of any resident or
superior in the country of their assignment, reporting directly to PMGB
headquarters through their own channels. Typical also of INU/MGB
operations abroad is the use of one country as a base of operations against
another. This operational, approach has boon so consistently followed that
it has almost become an established principle, involving security advantages
which are obvious.
At the field level, the organizations and instrumentalities of INU
are, insofar as possible, kept separate and distinct from those of any
other operating Soviet Intelligence agency, and as a matter of standard
practice, for example, it appears that GRU representatives in any given
country know practically nothing of TIGB operations in the same areas
Particularly noticeable in INU operations abroad has boon the complete and
constant stress placed on security measures, an emphasis frequently carried
almost to ridiculous extremes. Obviously, no operational intelligence
agency can run agent nets abroad with absolute and consistently unbreached
security, but the MGB has approached this goal in its foreign operations.
Characteristic of INU operations abroad is a consistent dependence
upon the Communist movements in all countries for support, assistance, and
as a recruiting base for agent and operational personnel. As a result of
this dependence, a large percentage of INU agent and even operational
personnel continues to be recruited from Communists, crypto-Communists,
follow-travelers, parlor bolsheviks, and so-called loft-intellectuals,
Numerous instances have been noted of instructions and advice from personnel
forbidding the identification of INU operations with a local Communist
Party, and even going so far as to enjoin against the use of Communist
Party members as agents. Despite those instances, the use of Communist
personnel in agent operations by INU is both widespread and consistent.
Frequently local Communists have been compelled to sever all connections
with the Party. In-other instances, however, Communist Party members and
Communist Party officials involved in INU operations have continued to
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maintain their Party posts without apparent change in status. Although
there is no definite proof, it is probable that major INU officials
operating abroad are still given carefully selected Party contacts to
facilitate their operations. It is known that in numerous eases during
recent years one or more high officials of local Communist Parties have
been made aware of MGB recruitment of Communists for "secret work"; i.e.,
espionage.
According to one defecting Soviet agent, the organs of State Security
in 1943 began stressing the formation of agent parallels, using the so-
called "pole" system of organization, more frequently referred to as the
"double cutout system." While it is difficult to perfect a consistent
system of this character, considerable effort apparently has been expended
to attain successo This type of organization, of course, contemplates
a.maximum security parallel wherein instructions and information are
passed through a series of cutouts, very few of whom are given any knowledge
of the real identity of their subordinate agents or of their superiors.
According to this same defector, at about the same time INU, at least in
one area of major importance, began to transfer the direct control and
operation of a number of agent nets from. operational personnel originally
recruited from native or international Communists to staff officers of
complete Soviet background. At least one important NKGB agent, who
apparently was recruited originally from international Communist circles,
has been quoted as complaining bitterly in 1944 that the "old timers"
in the business were being replaced by young Russian State Security officers
who knew little of the areas or problems involved,
IX. ESTIMATE OF MGB EFFECTIVENESS
At present any detailed estimate of the effectiveness or of the
strengths and weaknesses of the NGB is not only difficult but perhaps
presumptuous. There is insufficient authentic or documented knowledge of
the extent, character, and identity of all MGB operations upon which to
base a definitive analysis of its effectiveness. However, certain comments
can be made on the basis of available data.
It is not difficult to detect flaws in various MGB operations or to
tabulate a considerable number of maneuvers and techniques which, in
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particular instances, have appeared both incorrect and foolish. There is
also abundant evidence available reflecting extreme competence and effect-
iveness in MGB operations, both inside and outside the Soviet Union.
Obviously, if the MGB is to be compared with a standard of perfection, a
number of valid criticisms might jDe made of its operations. If, on the
other hand, it is to be compared with the standard of performance generally
attained by other intelligence and security agencies? it must be admitted
that, as a whole, the 14GB is competent, efficient, effective, and at times
brilliant in its operations. Among the obvious strengths of the MGB, of
course, are numbered its size, power, facilities, continuity of operations,
continuity of personnel, and the prestige and prerogatives which are known
to be given to the officers of State Security. Within the Soviet Union,
itself, as a State Security and repression agency, there appears little
question that the MGB is, as its predecessors have boon, an extremely
effective force - with little question, the most powerful single agency
within the USSR. The power, jurisdiction, and facilities of the MGB are
so extensive that it is possible, of course, for it to approach the satur-
ation point in both intelligence and security operations. We do not
question, in this regard, that the MGB and such components of the MVD as
are operationally utilized by it, represent by far the largest,most extensive,
and the most all-pervading intelligence agency which is, or has recently
been, in existence. Not the least among the assets of the MGB also is its
unlimited choice of methods, the effectiveness of which was amply demon-
strated in a parallel situation during World War II by the contrast between
the effectiveness in certain instances of the Abwehr and the RSHA in Germany.
Another strength of the MGB is, of course, its strong Party character and
the consequent consistent reliability of most of its personnel. The tremendous
benefit which it derives from the availability of the World Communist Move-
ment for facilitation and support has been covered adequately in other
sections of this study.
Finally, a knowledge of the particular strengths and effectiveness of
the MGB includes a realization that the Soviet State as a whole not only
places great stress and dependence on both the security and intelligence
aspects of MGB work, but is obviously willing to expend almost unlimited
men, money, and resources in the accomplishment of security and intelligence
objectives.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02546R000100130001-3
+w
0, ~ ,NFIA~EN
Such weaknesses of MGB operations, as have been pointed out, primarily
apply to I.3GB operations abroad. That those weoitessos w o far from fatal
is. amply dtmonstrated by the disconcerting lack.Qf..knowledge which other
intelligence agencies possess of MGB operations, Also? such weaknesses
as can be pointed out and such apparent errors in judgment and approach
as have boon noted have not appeared in all known I.,IGB operations, nor have
they boon revealed with sufficient frequency to state definitely that
they are symptomatic of all or even a major portion of MGB operations
abroad. One of the characteristics of MGB operations which can be con-
sidered at least as a weakness is the provincialism and lack of foreign
experience apparent in much of its personnel. Obviously, however, many
of the unfortunate results of this are obviated by the availability of
native Communists and crypto-Communists as agent personnel. In many
cases, the omnivorous thirst for knowledge displayed by the i!IGB has
appeared to prejudice the procurement of good, vital, important information.
In certain cases also, an apparent lack of judgment as to the relative
importance of operations and information has been obvious.
Also noted has boon an extreme range in the competence of various
MGB agents and operations, varying from those involving the most carefully
conceived operational plans to be carried out by extremely able personnel
to numerous "shotgun" operations using poorly trained, unsuited, and
stupid personnel, the results of which could hardly be of any great value
or importance. There has also been noted in certain instances a tendency
to waste time and personnel in the conspiratorial procurement of infor-
mation which could more readily and more quickly be procured through
overt means. A corollary to this has boon a frequent refusal to utilize
or depend on available facilities and to so over-complicate an intelligence
operation that it appeared to involve a deliberate avoidance of simplicity.
The constant stress on security and on the strictly conspiratorial aspects
of intelligence operations seems to have contributed to a larzoring of
efficiency and effoctivenoss in many cases.
Although the procurement by MGB of intelligence information some-
times appears to involve an unjustified expenditure of time, effort
and resources1 the MGB unquestionably does procure a great volume of
extremely valuable and important data from practically every area on earth.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02546R000100130001-3
Our imotwrle dge is too limited to permit us to draw valid conclusions as
to tho comparative effectiveness of 11GB headquarters evaluation, corre-
lation, and utilization of this tremendous mass of reports and documents.
Possessing as it does the automatic cross-chocks of an intelligence
system composed of independent parallels working to attain the same ob.
joctivos, it would appear that such evaluation, correlation, and utili-
zation at the headquarters level should be proficiente However, there
are grounds for belief that the effectivenoss of Soviet evaluation and
utilization of this intelligence information is considerably lessened
by the tremendous bulk of the information, by the provincialism of certain
headquarters personnel, and by the bias and self-serving analyses in-
culcated not only by a too strong belief in the dialectical approach
but also by the pressures necessarily incident to a monolithic, despotic
bureaucracy.
MAW
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IN U Agent Dispatch Channels SECRET
' 11
1 111
-' LENINGRAD
OBLAST
I
WHITE RUSSIAN
SSR j
(Minsk) i
1
1
?~?? Border
Note: See attachment.
SECRET
Operational and Command
Channels.
-88-
Departure of Agents Under
Cover.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02546R000100130001-3
NOTE: In connection with the chart of the dispatch of INU agents=
the bulk of knowm cases reflecting the dispatch of an a gent to a
foreign country by an INO at republic level, shows that, while the
actual dispatching and the authority therefor are centered in the INO
of a republic, the agents were dispatched through the channels and
facilities of an INO/UPMGB at oblast level. However, it is not believed
that this is universally true, and it is felt that in certain instances,
at least, agents may be dispatched by PMGB at republic level independent
of the channels and facilities of the oblast INO. The extent of the
authority possessed by an oblast INO to dispatch agents independently
of the authority or control of either r.GB at republic or USSR level
is not clear. Remembering however the extent of centralization of
MGB structure and organization, it is felt that any independent dispatch
of agents by an oblast INO is subject at least to authority and clearance
from PMGB at republic, or in certain instances, USSR level. It should
also be noted that INO/UTIGB of the Leningrad oblast appears to occupy
a status paralleling in importance that of a republic INO, being similarly
directly subordinated to INU/IMGB, USSR.
..89,
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 4: c c c c c c
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