GENERAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060044-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: February 9, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060044-6 FEB 1950
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GENERAL
1. French to ask US-UK consultation on Indochina--Accord-
ing to US Ambassador Bruce in Paris, a high official of
the French Foreign Office has informally advised the US
Minister in charge of MDAP affairs that France intends
to approach the US and the UK regarding a tripartite con-
sultation on the entire situation in Indochina, Bruce adds
that the French believe: (a) the USSR would not have
recognized Ho Chi Minh (Moscow-trained opponent to the
French-supported Bao Dai Government in Indochina) unless
it had intended to do what it could to support him, probably
through a considerable increase. in military assistance via
the Chinese Communists; (b) in this event the French would
find it very difficult "to continue to hold the fort in Indo-
china alone"; and (c) the time has come to consider the
Indochinese situation in its relation to the entire Asiatic
and world situation in the struggle against Soviet Com-
munism. The French official pointed out that the Govern-
ment was not thinking in terms of some limited military
aid under the MDAP but wished to discuss the larger poli-
tical, economic, and military aspects of the problem. The
Ambassador comments that there is no sign of a change in
French policy since Soviet recognition of Ho, but that the
French margin in Indochina is not great, and an all-out
attack by Chinese Communists or major assistance to Ho
could render the French position in Indochina untenable.
(CIA Comment-. CIA believes the French will press
for speedy US and UK aid to bolster their own and Bao Dai's
position in Indochina. CIA further believes that if the mili-
tary situation in Indochina worsens considerably in the next
six months, the French Government would be compelled to
consider reversing its policies in Indochina, including the
possibility of withdrawing its military forces.)
State Dept. review completed
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2. Effects of possible Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh-
The Department of State has instructed US Ambassador Allen
in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav Government that the US
is seriously concerned over the possibility that Yugoslavia
may recognize the Communist-led Ho Chi Minh regime in
Indochina. The Department points out that such Yugoslav
action would-. (a) strengthen the very forces against which
Yugoslavia is fighting for its independence; (b) raise in-
surmountable difficulties in the US for providing further
support for Yugoslav independence; and (c) lead to an in-
crease in French demands on the US for assistance in
supporting the Bao Dai Government in Indochina. The De-
partment comments that the limited resources of the US
cannot be dissipated in any such fashion.
EUROPE
3. YUGOSLAVIA: Increased aid from, West requested--
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj has presented an urgent
oral request through US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade for
increased US economic assistance, In support of his re-
quest, Kardelj pointed out that Yugoslav economic conditions
are becoming increasingly difficult and that the USSR would
consequently redouble its efforts to unseat Tito in 1950.
The Foreign Minister added that if Yugoslavia had to balance
1950 exports against import needs, the Yugoslav standard of
living would be depressed and the resulting internal difficulties
would provide much ammunition for hostile Cominform propa-
ganda. Allen comments that in. view of both political and eco-
nomic considerations, it would be highly important to ease
the present Yugoslav foreign. trade difficulties
(CIA Comment- CIA believes that Yugoslavia's pres-
ent economic situation, including present and contemplated
Western aid, does not justify the alarm expressed by the Yugo-
slav Foreign Minister.)
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Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A006100060044-6