(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060074-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 74
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/25: CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060074-4
~1 ti AAt No. 5 JAN 1948
49
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*ARMY Declass/Release
Ys CIi. ~1 D TO: TS ONF ; TIC
S L Instructions On File*
Apr 4 77lathl DDA I-~,u. 77 1763 GENERAL
or b nference on European aid su ested--US
r. London suggests that the I S cck an :rFes inv. ve the
European recovery program should review ways and means of im-
plementing self-help programs to assist European recovery, in
order to keep the Communists on the defensive during the possibly
protracted Congressional debate on the European recovery. program
and to demonstrate that the European countries are not interested
exclusively in the amount of aid they can obtain from the US. The
Embassy observes that because to Labor Government has been
severely criticized by British moderates for its failure to take the
lead in reconvening the CEEC, Bevin might well take such action.
2. USSR reaffirms position on apanese ce treaty--Ambassador
Smith in Moscow reports Est in ioepiying to t ie -Chinese note of
5 December the Soviet Govermne ht has reaffirmed its position
that the preparation of a Japanese peace treaty must be entrusted
to the CFM and not to the Far Eat Commission as proposed by
the Chinese Government. The Soviet reply admits that other states
which contributed to victory over Japan should be permitted to
assist in the preparatory work of the treaty,
3. YUGCSLA A: Tito's attitude toward Greece--US Ambassador
Cannon reports that in a conversation with Tito 5?egarding Greece,
the Marshal stated that Yugoslavia was "not going to do anything
dramatic or engage in any adventure."' Cannon adds that Tito's re -
marks confirm an earlier impression that the Yugoslav Government
does. not wish to recognize the lAarkes government unless it is
ordered to do so by the Kremlin. Cannon believes that Tito is un-
easy about US plans.
Tito's att?tude toward trade with US--Cannon found Tito
only mildly interested In the developmenL of normal trade with the
US and entirely indifferent to the long-ringe aspects of such trade,
State Dept. review completed
ARMY review completed
At
wYr !..
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According to Cannon, Tito rant machinery and electrical eg .p -
ment from the US
now an d rea.ltzes that the success of the Yu ows
eastern bloc cannot fur Yish). Tito as ked that the US unbl
k
oc
x o.
Slav gold in the US and reirove the ban on US tourist travel in irug$-
slavia as a means of paying for, this equipment. Tito's attitudl r=od
firmed C '
a
i
'
'
nnons
mpressial that
Y
ugoslav economic develop s=nt
USSR: (a) will only give sus ficient minimum
id t
a
o Yuaslavia to
keep It "in respectful depatdent*"; (b) will encour
e i
d
ag
n
usta ss
in Yugoslavia of direct military importance; but (c) co#isiders rtI9
slavia strategically as a forward area and intends to concentr4te
important Industries wKhla the flolriet Union.
4. GREECE: UNSCOB f ffi ult --According to A bassat or
Kirk (US delegate to the Uti Specialtommittee on th.~ Balkans)
several UNSCOB delegates feel that the General Asse- bly's o Igir l
terms of reference for UNSCOB are now obsolete in view of tb :? a 1-
lites' refusal to recognize the Committee. Kirk reports that th _,
Chinese delegate has suggested that the UN "Little Assembly44 mIgt t
be asked to redraft the terns of reference, or that the "Little i tsse nt 1y'
might even be transformed into the General Assemnb for a sp+t ^ial
session to deal solely with U NSC OB.
Comments on Konits h ht#rr -Colonel Miller ,,I JS milij 1'r y
adviser to UNSCO] repo s e fo lorvir~g information and irnp )asit.rj
after a recent visit to the I,onits , area: (a) the Greek infantry h :d
no will to advance without full artillery and air support and laced
aggressiveness; (b) there are no indications of guerrilla aircraft; (c)
Greek Army successes appear to have been largely the to favour .hie'
weather, which permitted effective close air support; (d) the un
f M.>ec
ability of several National Guard battalions has resulted in i11-tel ;
and jealousy between Army and National Guard officers; (e) unit,rm ~
worn by some of the capturri guerrillas are believed to have
supplied by the Rumanian Red Cross; btr..n
(f) the bulk of the ti present j;ue>i ~-
rilla forces in the area are not believed to have crossed the Al tntae
frontier; (g) the continuity of guerrilla open; tions the skillful rnewre ...
lug, and the evidence of frequent liaison across the frontier ind$ ate
IAL
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TO S ~P-
CONFIDENTIAL
master direction and coordination of activities on both sides 0 f
the frontier; and (h) there .s no indication yet of the rre senci~
non-Greeks among the guerrill .s.
USE-Ta ropose " .i overnment_-4TS Chargek
Ra akin transmits a re por'e, st texment by Greek hoc Mist lea
Sofianopoulos in Paris calling for a special Four P ver confe a act
to seek "an inter-Allied soba.tioi" of the Greek problem. 'het . xutt
ment claims that the Four 1 -lowers are responsible for the Gr! ..-
situation and shoua.d resur n~ their ro.`.es as joint proteMors of (roes :ez
Soflanopoulos is a r)o alleged to have stated that the formation )f a
Greek Government on a w, dur b; st3, including all non-Ponmu ist
parties, would greatly strong the::a Greece, both intertaaLly and
nationally. (The p`.a ition of the Greek Socialists vis the) ", o
munist Party has never been. clarified; so far none of the Soci '1st
leaders has condermed the I\, Tarkos government, )
Rankin believes that 3ofinnopoulos' statement z4ay be s,ar
cant in the light: (a) of Yugv.3l.avia's caution concern-*.-zg recogn `,.firm,;
of the Markos government; and (a) of the possibility that Yuios.?tia.
or the USSR may piaustbly propose a "fusion" goverxu rent in t reee t,~,.,
(CIA Comment: CIA considers that the USSR has no rea ;on
at present to abandon its current policy of violence in Greece i
favor of a compromise solcition.)
NEAP EAST-AFRICA
5. TURKEY: Turks believe strong ITS declaration needed to save gree.
US Ambassador Wilson reports that Turkish lea ers recd the - arree c
situation as desperately serious and feel that only an "mistalq ble
declaration" of US interest in the preservation of Greek ' indeper lenc~l
and integrity can possibly induce the USSR to withhold Satellite a-tco ai
tion of the T arkos government. The Turkish leaders reportedlyy feel
that, in the absence of such a declaration, Satellite recognition o the
Markos regime will eventually force the US to choose between at tuned
intervention and Soviet domination of Greece.
Co"""ffAL
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the statements of the Soviet represent t ve.
'?ENTIAL
6. SYRIA: USSR asserts it is "real " rgz&W--According to US
Legation Damascus, a Soviet L gat on officer has informed a Syrian
Foreign Ministry official that he USSR "really would hell)" the
Arabs and that the Soviet pro partition vote in the UN w`as merely!
an "anti-imperialist" measure., The Syrian official does riot bell vo
US Embassy London reports the opinion of Foreign Offtco and oil,
7. SAUDI ARABIA: Drit.io-l wziv ..,r led about oil fields for the prose
ing US forces.
position in Palestine by supplying the Zionists with arms eor by l#i
company officials in Lrmdon that the Dhahran Bahrein oilfield
will probably remain relatively quiet unless the US takes ea str
following summary of the current political situation in K rent
the UN Commission will face overt opposition by the extreme 4t
and sabotage by the extreme Right; (b) Rhee Syngrnan is now in .
control of the Right and will oppose any solution in Korea. which floss
not promise him unchallenged dictatorial control; (c) Comunis
activity and popularity are ;t i it elate; (d) there little i-dic Icn
of an early unilateral Soviet withdrawal but such a movef rexna a
possibility i n view o f apparent Soviet preparations t o accord re4 gnt-
tion to the North Korean regime; and (e) troop strength-of the U1
command is "dangerously low" and is inadequate to maintain 1* 7
and order and US prestige.
8. KOREA: Current political sibs n--General Hodge trasraits
FAR EAST
ence for SU=h Korea.
Hodge predicts "explosive results and a tremendous 1
of US prestige," if the UN Commission fails to achieve 'ome tceft l
solution of the Korean problem, including "at least apparent in a a2pen i-
-4-
c L
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T
JTIAL
'I "., AMERICAS
9. PANAMA: Reason, far rejection of defense-sites reenztent- ?t S
Ambassador Hine: 4reE4 f -prier ghat :he Pa la a 1)4i
Assembly's unanimous reje=cticna of the defense-site: agreem it
may be explained by: ca) tt "loss of- control of the. s uadon'i to.
"communistically-led' s`u: eni groups, with whom t'ic po:tice, ifte
one contact, had been instructed not to interfere; (b) t a urge
opposition of Alf art) and Earmo iio Ariat3; and (c) polit. Weal coo icie;3 a-
tions connected with the coming eloctionsd
(CIA Comment: CTh believes that while the Hananimity >f t
vote may have becri caused by u.nco-mrolled student t earionstraxions
the Assembly would have rejected the- a!reea ent ey n if Cher . had
been no student damon.^tratioaas
US Emba.asy Pavaraa previously reported t t instru
to the police to discontinue !nte ferenee with the stn. lent elem
tions originated with th 3 Assembly ",L11, which approved such i .ns4;~-w -
tions by unanimous vote on 13 December.)
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