INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 23 FOR WEEK ENDING 7 JUNE 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010040-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: June 7, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
g JuN 1949
WORKING PAPER
(22
NOTICE: This document is a working papers NOT an
official CIA issuances and has not necessarily been
coordinated with other ORE producing components. It
represents current thinking by one group of specialists
in Ms and is designed for use by others engaged in
similar or overlapping studies. The opinions expressed
herein may be revised before final and official publi-
cation. It is intended solely for the information of
the addressee and not for further dissemination.
Copy for:
Document No.
NO CK&NGE in Class. rl
DECLASSIFIED
Macs. MANGE,' TO: T$ S C
rDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA 77/1783
Date: Eilliaza By: o
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
71nKLY SUMMARY NO. 23
For week ending 7 O'une 1949
The International Week
Volume II
The Council of Foreign Ministers, deadlocked over Berlin,
is about to discuss the German peace treaty, a possible spring-
board for a new Soviet?propaganda demarche. In the Kashmir case,
both India and Pakistan have rejected UN truce presiosals. Mean-
while, the Palestine peace talks at Lausanne are at a virtual
standstills with both sides unwilling to yield an Amch.
A Euro ean concern over MAP. There are increasing signs of
oonceTFiViirope over the fate of the US Military Ain Program
(MAP). Leaders in Belgium, France and Norway have already ex-
pressed fears that failure of the Congress to enact MA? during
this session would dishearten anti-Communist elements )y creating
confusion and uncertainty concerning the firmness of 15-; policies.
Both Prime Minister queuille and Foreign Minister Schueen have
Indicated strong French concern over US legislative delays with
respect to the Atlantic Pact and MAP. Moreover, the BrIlssels
Pact powers believe that it would be useless to carry o et planned
increases in their armament programs without the essential pre-
requisite of '141.P. According to Prime Minister Speaks tSese
powers have been gearing their preparedness plans to forthcoming
US military aid and in the absence of MAP, Belgium, for exanrple,
could not be expected to vote increased military ereditd since
their value, without US supnort, would be so small as te be
militarily insignificant.
The current procrastination of some signatories in ratifying
the Atlantic Pact in part reflects the suspicion which ntill
lingers in European minds about the complete sincerity of US
determination to defend Europe with more than words. Since Con-
gressional failure to approve MAP legislation would be ilidely
interpreted abroad as a clear indication of US unwillireeaess to
put teeth in the Atlantic Pacts such action would seriorsly under-
mine the increased sense of security presently prevailing in
?estern Europe as a result of ERP and the signing of ti' Atlantic
Pact.
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2_P'jLp.2.caLbl.lttits_. As the CFM discussions shifted to the
Berlin problem, there was still no evidence of any more concili-
atory Soviet attitude toward the West. However, while the USSR
has so far insisted on an ironclad rule of unanimity with respect
to quadripartite control of Berlin just as in the case of Germany
as a whole, it is more likely to agree to some relaxation of the
rule in the comparatively small problem of city government.
Settlement of the Berlin question is more closely connected with
an effective lifting of the counter-blockade and the trade problem
than with political unification of Germany. Inasmuch as the USSR
is primarily interested in restoring the flow of manufactured
products from Western Germany to its zone and Eastern Europe,
there will be substantial practical pressures to offer concessions
which could' lead to the unification of Berlin.
A further Berlin difficulty to be bridged is the matter of
popular elections. The West favors representation by political
parties only. The USSR favors concurrent representation of all
types of Communist front organizations such as labor unions,
youth groups and cultural grogps to compensate for the weakness
of its political appeal to the Germans. If by any chance there
should be ultileate success in agreeing on arrangements for Berlin,
the city might become a test tube where four power cooperation
might be experimented with on a smaller scale than in Germany as
an entirety.
As the CFM turns to the German peace treaty, its third
agenda item, this may provide the platform for the long-bruited
Soviet proposals for an early peace settlement and the withdrawal
of occupation troops, foreshadowed in the Warsaw Communique.
Yr. Vishinsky could argue that the complete failure to reach four-
power agreement on German occupation, including Berlin, indicates
the irreconcilabilityof East-West views and that as a result it
might be better to liquidate the occupation and terminate the
division of Germany by an early peace settlement and the with-
drawal of occupation troops. Although the USSR might have no
intention of seeking-any agreement, which could be easily avoided
by making proposals unacceptable to the 'lest, it might, highly
conscious of its failure to capture the propaganda initiative at
the CFM to date, seek to capitalize on the propaganda impact of
such a stand. The Soviet Union might thus hope to: (1) emerge
from the Conference as the apostle of a re-united free Germany;
(2) avoid the onus for a breakdown of the CFM; and (3) perhaps
divide the Western Powers, since such proposals would be highly
unacceptable to France.
S ET
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Palestine arbitration doubtful. Any suggestion of arbitra-
tion to accelerate conclusion of the Palestinian armistices is
unlikely to be acceptable to Israel. The State Department is
weighing a proposal that the Security Council recommend that
Syria and Israel accept Mediator Bunch@ as an arbitrator with
power to fix the controversial armistice lines. Israel is aware
that, despite any reservation to the contrary, armistice lines
are likely to be permanent. It is therefore unlikely that the
Israelis are in the mood to arbitrate what they feel is a valid
claim. Moreover, current dissension among the Arab states tends
to encourage continued Israeli truculence here as elsewhere.
The Department is also pondering a suggestion that the
Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) call on both Jordan and
Israel to accept a PCC appointee as Chairman of their Special
Committee with power of arbitration to settle the various open
questions in the Jordan-Israel armistice. Again Israel, which
looks none too kindly on the PCC, would probably prefer to deal
directly with Jordan. The latter, on the other hand, would doubt-
less welcome such assistance (under proper conditions) from an
outside source to counterbalance its unequal bargaining position
vis-a-vis Israel.
British "Peace Congress" to be limited to Anglo-Soviet re-
lations. una?as predecessors n ewYork and Paris, the
Communist-front London Peace Congress of 12 June will have a
predominantly national character and will be attended by only a
few international visitors. This conference, nominally sponsored
by Dean Hewlett Johnson's British-Soviet Society, was actually
initiated by the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress,
which includes the prominent leftwing British physicist, Professor
J. D. Bernals. The relatively innocuous aims which the Congress
will endorse -- the promotion of "peaceful Anglo-Soviet relations"
and "improvement of Anglo-Soviet trade" -- probably reflect the
desire of its sponsors to avoid any out-of-line utterances which
might interfere with Soviet objectives at the CFM. This platform
may also represent an effort to modulate the blatantly anti
Western propaganda which alienated US public opinion during the
New York Peace Conference. Such considerations, however, are
unlikely to have more than a temporary effect and may be quickly
discarded once the outcome of the CFM is determined.
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Satellites attack West German artici ation in ILO conference.
The ira17-arv,est German "observers" to attend the International
Labor Organization conference opening this week at Geneva is being
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vigorously contested by Poland and Czechoslovakia. The
Satellites contend that the German question is still under
consideration by the CFM and that the ILO should keep out of
political problems. The Polish delegate, in opposing a seat
for the West Germans, flatly refused an offer to extend a sepa-
rate invitation to East German labor. This opposition, which
will probably be extended to the J'apanese delegation, reflects
not only Satellite hostility to recognition of the former enemy
states but also realization that such German and Zapanese repre-
sentation will: (1) strengthen non-Communist labor in these
areas; (2) prevent representation of all German labor by a Com-
munist-dominated group; and (3) effectively counter the claim
of the World Federation of Trade Unions to speak for labor in
both countries.
o
ovement for Libmillitz_ahdlisata. The projected trip to
Cyrentra-711-77FITElitanian delegation including the l'ufti, now
the chief local leader, and Mahamoud runtasser, the only Tripoli-
tanian acceptable to the Emir al Senussi, is further evidence of
the trend toward a united independent Libya. The delegation re-
portedly plans to ask the Emir to assume responsibility for
Tripolitania on the same basis as Cyrenaica with a federal union
of the two. The Emir is likely to favor acceding in some form
to their demand, which the British administration in Cyrenaica
reportedly'believes is the only possible solution. Unification
will hinge, however, not only on a bargain acceptable to both
the Emir and the Tripolitanians but on whether the UK, which has
opposed British trusteeship for all Libya because of the economic
burden involved, anoroves. The UK is concerned over the Italian
and French reaction to what will be interpreted by them as a
further British move to bring Tripolitania, as well as Cyrenaica,
permanently under the UK wing. The British may selk to fore-
stall the unification movement by concessions to the Tripolitanians,
particularly some expansion of the present "care and maintenance"
policy in order to avoid further antagolizing their French and
Italian allies. Another complicating factor will be the role of
Beshir Saadawi, previously the most prominent Tripolitanian leader
but now ill in Cairo, who is completely unacceptable to the Emir.
Should Saadawi return, perhaps at British instance, and resume his
former role,, unity may be further delayed.
IOG NOTES
Atlantic Pact ratifications. Of the twelve signatories of
the AtlariETPact, three ? Belgium, Canada and the UK) have already
ratified and five (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark
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and Portugal) are in the process with ratification expected
shortly. France has held back in order to avoid acrimonious
debate during the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
Italy,will probably ratify during the next few weeks and Iceland's
ratification awaits only that of the US.
Bunlh9_22221es anap_s_hipments to Arabs. Un Mediator
Bunche; rePIY-Ing to British and French inouiries, has taken the
position that he cannot acquiesce in the sale of arms to the Arab
states so long as the truce resolution stands. However, in the
cage of Arab states which have already concluded armistices, Bunche
believes that the matter of arms shipments is up to the Sc rather
than himself. Bunche favors the SC lifting the arab
P Syriall_seticli-Tte-coTtekklan.
soviet brands Olympics as " ropapanda." The Olympic games
have Been tunmaske ' as bourgeIs propaganda money-making stunt
by the Moscow weekly, SOVITP S"ORT. The recent Olympic Committee
award of the 1956 games to Melbourne, despite bids by Buenos Aires
and five American cities, is interpreted as evidence of "growing
dissatisfaction with American dictation."
The US is also accused of heavy-handed efforts to eliminate
from the Olympics such events as rowing, gymnastics and football
in which it is not proficient. 0/I0 predicts that it will be
only a short time before the USSR, having already claimed the
invention of the airplane, light bulb and mechanical toilet, will
reveal that an obscure Ukrainian invented baseball ten years be-
fore Abner Doubleday was born.
"Tea for Two." Drew Pearson has recently attributed the
lifting of the Berlin blockade largely to the fact that Mrs.
Gromyko and Mts. Austin met cordially for tea. Mr. Pearson
evidently feels that the tea caddy may now take its place with
the Friendship Train as an instrument of international good will.
In asse on new Intra-Eurouipt La./Lents Agreement. The key
negot at ons etween the OEEC countries over the piEciples govern-
ing division of conditional ECA aid for 1949-50 and the revision
of the 1948 Payments Agreement remain stalemated. The US wishes
to provide for partial transferability of indirect aid drawing
rights, thus allowing ERP debtor countries to choose their own
markets, and some convertibility of drawing rights into dollars,
both of which measures are designed to lower export prices and to
stimulate competitive intra-European trade. Convertibility would
be accomplished by creation of a dollar pool from which nations
could secure conversion of drawing rights into dollars for purchase
in the US if European prices ore too high. These proposals are
opposed chiefly by the British who fear a diminution in their
dollar aid.
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This problem is the most critical one now facing the rarshall
Plan countries since, with nroduction generally back to prewar
levels and the first phase of recovery virtually complete, the
key problem is now revival of European trade. Continuation of
the present rigidly bilateral trade pattern is har-pering the
restoration of European trade essential to further recovery and
the shaking down of the European price structure essential to
increased dollar exports to reduce the deficit with the US. 'abile
recognizing the desirability of freer multilateral trade, however,
many ERP countries, particularly Britain, contend it is too early
for the US proposals and favor instead some lifting of quantitative
trade restrictions as a first step. Nevertheless, US pressure is
likely to force at least some measure of greater trade flexibility
and competition this year.
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1 ?
. RESETTLErENT ONLY .SOLUTIOrT TO ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM ?
The attitude of both Israel and the Arab states offers little
hope for any short-term solution to the problem of nearly a mil-
lion Palestine Arab refugees, a major obstacle to political and
economic stability in the Near East. Israel, conscious of the
necessity of providing for Jewish immigrants, is unlikely, in the
absence of the strongest outside pressure, to repatriate more
then 50,000-100,000 or to provide any substantial compensation
for the remainder. in view of the Israeli attitude, resettlement
is the only feasible solution for the vast bulk of the refugees.
Resettlement, however, is beyond the present individual or col-
lective capacity of the Arab states, while some of them, like
Lebanon and Egypt, are in any case loath to assume such a burden.
Consequently any resettlement program will be dependent upon
substantial outside aid. Under these cIrcumstancess a compre-
hensive, permanent solution is a long-term problem -- at leest a
decade off -- and will require major assistance from UN members,
particularly the US. Meanwhile, during the interim period before
long-range resettlement and development programs can be completed,
the refugee question will be a perennial source of friction between
Israel and the Arab states.
In May, 1948 there were roughly 1,200,000 Arabs in Palestine,
the great majority of whom are now refugees with the remainder
almost as badly off. Syria has 85,000 refugees; Transjordan,
99,000; Lebanon, 131,000; Iraq, 5,000; and about 630,000 are in
those portions of Palestine assigned to the Arabs by the UN
Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947. 7ost are women, children
or aged and infirm -- in other words, not pioneer material. Most
claim they want to return to their former homes in Palestine, even
under Jewish rule. Only one-third or one-fourth are sheltered
even in tents. Their presence imnoses an unbearable strain upon
the already ailing economy of the Arab states, which can contribute
to their resettlement little but space.
The refugee problem has two aspects: (1) the short-term
Problem of temporary relief until the refugees can be either
repatriated or resettled (the money provided for this purpose will
be exhausted before the end of 1949); and (2) long-range projects
for permanent repatriation or resettlement. For any reasonably
early solution to be reached, Israel would have to accept several
hundred thousand refugees immediately. This is highly unlikely,
however. Apart from Israeli relue;ance on security grounds to
repatriate any substantial number of Arabs, the current influx of
Jewish immigrants (over 15,000 a month) has already overtaxed the
Israeli economy and is likely to preempt much of the land and
houses which could otherwise be assigned to Arab refugees. 7Vhile
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Israel recognizes its obligation to provide compensation for
Property actually confiscated from Arab refugees, the measure
of such compensation is likely to be rather grudging. Only
through the strongest US and UN pressure can the Israelis be
prevailed upon to make any significant contribution to the solu-
tion of this problem.
Consequently, the bulk of the refugees will have to be
resettled in the Arab states. Mile Syria and Tordan have offered
to accept at once 250,000 and 150,000 refugees respectively
(provided outside financial aid is given), these figures are
excessively optimistic by at least one-third. The Arab states
as a whole are incapable of absorbing some 900,000 refugees with-
out substantial aid from the US, the UK and various UN agencies.
The Arab lands, without development of their natural resources,
are utterly inadequate to sustain a large number of refugees,
Any substantial resettlement will therefen,e require extensive
financial and technical aid from outside sources by way of lon8-
term projects such as a Jordan Valley "TVA", Point IV schemes to
increase the amount of arable land in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,
further development of oil deposits and various irrigation pro-
posals. A minimum of ten years would be needed to complete such
progr ms and even then only Jordan, Syria and Iraq among the Arab
states would have the capacity to receive any substantial number
of refugees.
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