INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 12 FOR WEEK ENDING 22 MARCH 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010030-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 22, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
OFFICS OF REPORTS AND EpTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE=
WOOING PAPER
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, NOT an
official CIA issuanee9 and has not neceesarily been
000rdinated with other ORS produeing components. It
represents eurrent thinking by one group of specialists
lu cm, and is designed for use by otheria'engaged om
similar or oVerlapping studies. The opiniont expreased
herein may be mama before final and official publi-,
Oation. It is intended solely for the information of
the addressee and not for flarther dieseMination.
Copy for:
Document No. 00g9
IOJPHANGE in C1454.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CANOED TO: TS
, DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
C-7 /7 . pc:4 4 Auth: DDA TEC. 77J1763
fie / Dates2 7 FEB j978 By: 04
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IMPRNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
WKLY t3UNTA1tY NO. 12
For week ending 22 Uarch 1949 Volume II
The International Week
Lebanon and Israel have agreed to an armistice, while Syria consented
to open negotiations with the ?GI. ECOSOC closed its eighth session after
numerous meetings fraught with "elst-West differences, The Security Council's
"neutral" committee admAted failure in the Berlin currency negotiations.
The Wheat Conference ended after drafting an international wheat agreement.
Fleet Adriral Niritz accepted appointment as Kashmir Plebiscite Administrator.
Publieatioe of the Atlantic Pact text has elicited an initially favorable
reaction from the non-Soviet world, hut the Soviet bloc and its Communist
party stooges have sharply attacked it as undermining the UN and as an aggres-
sive rove toward war
- 0 ters.
Initial lis2401gi to "Point Four"
The broad concept of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries,
set forth in the President's inaugural address, was uelcomed with enthusiasm
throughout the non-Scviet wcrld, Initial reacticns, although necessarily
general in content because of uncertainty about the exact scope of the prorram,
indicate that the most common approach to "Point Four" will he an attempt to,
turn the emphasis of the program from technical to financial assistance on the
order of ERP,
Latin America: Chile has taken a prominent part in UN rcononic and
Social Council (rosoc) discussions of technical assistance and econonic de-
velopment and has been quick to inform the US of its interest in these prob-
lems. The Chilean president has assured just, non-discriminatory treatment
of private foreign ckital? but has stressed the point that the basic type of
development projects required could be undertaken only through government-to-
government financial aid, He also warned that continued pro-US, anti-Communist
orientation in Chile might depend on the imrroverent of living standards (pre-
aumably with US dollars). Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Paiti have also
expressed interest in "Point Four," while Brazil has stressed the importance
of financial, in addition to technical, assistance,
jar _East: The most positive attitude of any Asiatic nation
has been that of Lebanon, whose ECOSOC representative raised the problems
of promoting the international flow of capital and assuring freedom from
political strings, while emphasizing the need for action rather than mere
planning and for financial contributions "on the governmental level and
AFT
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inspired by the principles of the European Recovery Program," rgypt !sks
also indicated the necessity of applying the 'Marshall" approach to the
riddle East,
In India there is widespread interest in "Point Four"; however, because
of the feeling prevalent among many Indians that it is the "duty" of the
United States to grant India financial, technical and material aid, the
Indian ECOSOC representative expressed considerable disappointment in what
he considered the vague nature of the US-sponsored ECOSOC resolution.
Turkey, Iraq and Syria have voiced varying decrees of interest in the Pres-
ident's plan and in Ceylon there has 'been a reversal of the Government's
policy of opposition to outside financial assistance. In the Far East, Siam
has evinced serious interest in "Point Four" while senior civil servants and
educators in Burma are anxious for outside help from the US or other sources.
USSR and Satellites: Although the Slav states voted against both
ECOSOC resolutions on technical assiFtance and econoric development, the
USSR has so far taken a cautious position toward the "Point Four" program,
limiting its official comments to general approval of economic assistance
if it promotes national development toward independence and the development
of domestic resources and is not rade contingent on political, economic or
military demands. This initially rild and reasonable approach probably re-
flects a wait-and-see attitude pending final formulation of the Kremlin line
and in no way impairs Soviet capabilities of attacking the final form of the
'IS program as merely another facet of US "capitalistic imperialism." The
Polish ECOSOC representative has indicated the most probablefuttre Soviet
line by his bitter denunciations of the program as a US tcherne designed to
shape the "American Century" through political maneuvering, profiteering and
espionage.
-
PaleEtlm_domlamgatg. With Lebanon and Israel about to sign an
armistice while Syria has at last agreed to negotiate, the trend toward
stabilization of the Palestine conflict is apparently continuing. The most
serious of the remaining difficulties concerns the Israeli demand for a
rectification of the frontier in Samaria. There the partition boundaries
leave Israel with a narrow coastal strip, in SCCP places only eight miles
wide. The Israelis have recently been conducting a war of nerves in this
area -- playing up Arab raida in the press and concentrating troops -- in
what is evidently an attempt to frighten Abdullah into granting ccncessions.
Israel wishes he tracks of the north-south railroad line to run entirely
through its territory and to incorporate Tulkam It appears that if Israeli
demands are reasonable, Transjordan may be prepared to male some accomodation.
Another pont at issue is Jerusalem where the Israelis wam_ an arrange-
ment assuring them of ultimate title to the new city, thus forestalling an
internationalization plan. Meanwhile, the UK and possibly France are taking
concrete steps to suprort the Arabs as a means of making clear to the Is-
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tV.1
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raelii that some limit rust he imposed on their adventures. Israel will
probably continue its characteristic bargaining technique of stepping up
the pressure behind its demands to the critical point of negotiation and
only receding somewhat at the last minute. Following such a tortuous course,
an armistice should eventually be achieved in Palestine.
The Mindszenty cases Bolivia's decision to put the Mindszenty case on
the agenda of the April General Assembly rakes it unlikely that UN debate on
this question can be avoided. The US feels that, in accordance with Article
33 of the UN Charter, it must exhaust the remedies under the Satellite peace
treaties before it can take any UN action (see IOG Weekly Noe 7). The Latin
American UN delegations, however, have decided to take some UN action inde-
pendently of the Satellite peace treaties to which they are not parties.
Australia, too, has asl'ed for GA consideration. An opportunity can arise
under the pending Hungarian application for UN membership. Nevertheless, it
is doubtful if material is available to meet the inevitable soviet counter-
charges and no result other than propaganda can be expected.
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IOG Notes
'CAFE may seek prorinent_part in 'Point Four." 10: its forthcoming
Bangkok meeting the rconoric Cormision for Asia and the Far cast may attempt
to terve out for itself a prominent role in the implerentaVon of President
Truman's proposal for assistance to underdeveloped areas. The Department of
State is attempting to forestall such action, which it censiders to be pre-
mature pending full consideration of this problem at the July session of
TCOSOC.
Ea_2921119EALgs Conference improves. The US has strengthened its
position at the Mexico City High Frequency Broadcast Conference by calling
the Soviet bluff on threatened withdrawal. Previously apprehensive delega-
tions are now less concerned over a possible Soviet walkout and will be
encouraged to back the US in opposing exorbitant Soviet demands,
Netherlands and WFTU. The Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (NVV),
which recently approved withdrawal from the WFTU, has urged the establishment
of a new, independent labor international in the shortest possible time.
This move reflects the urgent desire of the Benelux trade unions to see the
non-Communist labor organizations of Western valrope and the US present a
united front against the expanding WFTU drive for control of world labor
forces, particularly in colonial and dependent areas.
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Scteleies remrn doubtful. UN Secretary General Lie reportedly doubts
that Soviet national Arkady Sobolev, Assistant Syg in charge of Security
Council affairs and reputed chief Kremlin agent with the UK, will return to
his post. Sobolev's failure to return and Soviet failure to replace him
(as recently occurred in the case of five other Soviet UN employees) would
leage the USSR with few nationals en the Secretariat and force it to rely
more and more on the activities of Satellite, fellow traveling and Communist
Staff members for espionage and sabotage of UN activities.
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