NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 12 APRIL 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700020015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 12, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO04700020015-2
VOL
NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION
OFFICE OF RESORTS AND ESTIIVATES
CENTRAL INTF LIGLNCE AGENCY
APR 121950
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, not
an official CIA issuance. It has been co-ordina-
ted within ORE, but not with the IAC Agencies.
It represents current thinking by specialists
in CIA, and is designed for use by others engaged
in similar or overlapping studies. The opinions
expressed herein may be revised before final
and official publication. It is intended solely
for the information of tho addressee and not for
further dissemination.
do-
LVVyyw.?_ _
NO CHANGE in Class. ^
( DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHAI1GZD T0: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Autb: DDA R'G. 77 1763 0
Date'
57
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO04700020015-2
 NEAR FAST/AFRICA DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE SUNNNARY
For Week Ending
12 April 1950
TABLE OF CONTEPPPS
Tito remains cool . . . . . . . . . 1
Yugoslavia against closer ties with present Greek Government
Where the parties stand . . . . . . . . I
Opposition does not call for drastic changes in policy
If Bayor wins . . . . . . 2
Top Democratic leadership experienced and apparently capable
The Mansur Cabinet . . . . . . . . . .3
How much it will accomplish is problematical
Noted in Brief
Turkey, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran, India-Pakistan . . . . . . .8
aew--AM T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700020015-2
 Tito remains cool: The chances for an early improvement of
Yugoslav-Greek relations, specifically with regard to re-
opening the Salonika-Belgrade rail line, have been sharply
reduced by post-election developments in Greece.. Tito's
recent statement that he was prepared to cooperate with a
Plastiras Government under certain conditions obviously does
not apply to the present Venizelos Cabinet, which the
Yugoslav press has severely attacked for its dependence on
rightist support. Although Tito would be cautious in any
event about developing closer relations with Greece, he
undoubtedly feels it politically unwise to modify his pre-
sent cool, critical attitude toward Greece unless some govern-
ment free of "monarcho-fascist" influence emerges. With the
formation of such a government, Tito would probably feel
justified in resuming at least limited economic ties with
Greece.
Where the Parties stand: An examination of the platform of
Turkey's major parties indicates fairly clearly that the
country's domestic and foreign policies will continue without
startling changes even if the opposition Democratic Party
(which has recently suffered from internal dissension) does
unexpectedly succeed in upsetting the ruling People's Republi-
can Party at the national elections four weeks- hence. Turkey's
presoat foreign policies have not only the wholehearted sup-
port of the Democrats but also the backing of the Nation
Party, the only other party which has even an outside chance
of winning many seats, if any at all.. In the domestic field,
opposition denunciation of the government for allegedly un-
constitutional and high-handed actions in violation of civil
liberties has recently become noticeably more moderate in
tone, doubtless because the government has taken such criticism
to heart and put into effect a number of the reforms demanded
by Turkey's newly-formed opposition parties. While both
the major parties claim to champion the cause of individual
enterprise in economic affairs, it is manifest that state
capitalism will be retained in Turkey whichever wins. Probably
the Democrats would go somewhat farther and faster than the
PRP in giving Turkish private capital a limited chance to
become productive and nationally beneficial. Ti? leader Bayar
has suggested that an atmosphere be created which will prove
helpful to private enterprise, check allegedly extravagant
governmental operation of the etatist system, and correct
 .:ORbT
2.
the abuses of what he regards as an irresponsible and inef-
ficient bureaucracy. In rebuttal, government spokesmen point
to the great promise of national economic rehabilitation now
discernible under ECA-supported programs, for which the PRP
understandably claims all the credit it can, and counter-charge
that the DP speaks in generalities and has nothing specific
to offer. Insofar as one issue is concerned--labor--the
accusation is unjust: the DP firmly demands that labor be
given the right to strike, as against the equally positive
government view that, under beneficent PRP leadership and in
view of Turkey's proximity to a large and menacing neighbor,
to grant labor the right to strike now would be both unnec-
essary and dangerous.
Both parties appear to feel some legitimate apprehension
lest tbslem religious sentiment be used by the somewhat
inchoate and immoderate Nation Party as bait to catch votes.
Nation Party spokesmen might well accuse the PEP of nou going
far enough in its recent relaxation of rigid state control
over religion in a laicized nation and thus pick up votes
among the faithful, notably in provinces near the southern
border. Such appeals to the electorate trill have to be care-
fully worded, however, if HP speakers wish to avoid the long
arms of stern Turkish law.
Controversy concerning the use or suppression of vio-
lence has not died down, particularly since President InSn{l
is making it a major theme of his election speeches. InBnf's
warnings against violence have evoked promises by Bayar, at
least, that the Democrats will be law-abiding. In the last
analysis, however, much will depend upon how carefully local
officials--particularly those who favor the government party--,
resist any temptation they any have to tamper with the ballots.
Although the Turk has been accustomed to being pushed around
(provided it is done by duly constituted authorities in what
he accepts as a proper and customary manner) he has now been
told by both the government and opposition that mishandling
of his electoral privileges this time would be most improper.
If it happens, he will object most strenuously.
If Bavar wins: Since there is a possibility that the opposi-
tion Democratic Party may win the forthcoming national elections--
although all US observers so far have reported that the govern-
ment party will almost certainly stay in power--the question
arises as to how well the Democrats could conduct the nation's
affairs. The answer, based largely upon the record of the
OP-W-0 s~ET
 Sk? ?,rT
3.
party's top leaders, is that they are probably capable of
doing a good job, although doubtless they would make mistakes
and would have considerable difficulty at first in finding
efficient men for all the major and minor posts that would
have to be filled. Celal Boyar, the Democratic leader, is
a former Prime Sinister, one of Turkey's outstanding adminis-
trators, and, incidentally, one of the very few former pro-
minent politicos in Turkey who was once a member of parlia-
ment under the defunct imperial Ottoman regime still active
in political affairs. As a cabinet minister in the early
days of the Republic, and as the first head of one of the
most powerful state-owned "banks," Boyar played an outstanding
role in the creation of the Turkish system of state capitalism--
which some observers very mistakenly appear to believe he now
intends to destroy. Fuat BBprall, a potential Democratic
foreign minister (or even prime minister if Boyar should prefer
the presidency), is one of Turkey's leading figures in the
fields of literature and history and a member of the Ottoman
Empire's most farovs family of statesmen. Adnan benderes,
who would probably got the principal economic post in the
government, is a wealthy landovnet from Western Anatolia who
has been his party's chief spokccrosai on financial and economic
matters in the National Assembly for the past four years.
Another prospective cabinet member is Rofik Woraltan, the
fourth of the quadrumvirate of deputies who founded the
Democratic Party, chile the veteran Refik Ince, who has
become prominent in the party although not at present a member
of the Assembly, might possibly be given the post of Yknister
of Justice, one he held during the nationalist struggle for
independence before the proclamation in 1923 of the Turkish
Republic. What would happen if the D.mocrats won and if Bayer
chose to be prime minister rather than president is more
difficult to predict. One possibility is that the presidency
might be offered to Ali Fuat Cebesoy, who was one of the
founders of the republic, has held cabinet rank, and has
presided over the National Assembly. Cebesoy, although not
a member of the Democratic Party, recently resigned from the
government party and, if a high enough position were offered
him, might presumably be coaxed into accepting it. Cebesoy's
occupancy of the top-renkin- position would be in keeping
with Turkey's military tradition,inasmuch as he is a retired
army general with a brilliant record of military leadership
in World War I and in the War of Independence.
The Mansur Cabinet: Just what the Ahnsur Government trill
accomplish is problematical. The recently formed cabinet
consists mostly of seasoned veterans of Iran's political
 marry-go-round chosen primarily for proved political ability,
althouh they are, with few exceptions, men of good reputation.
A balance to Prima Minister Nansur's opportunism nay well be
provided by Foreign Minister Hosein Ala, especially in Irano-
Soviet relations. Ala is the ou,,standing member of the new
cabinet. As ambassador in Washington, he worked diligently
to strengthen Iran's relations with the West, and he may be
expected to demand full authority in the conduct of Iran's
foreign relations. The Prime Minister himself has executive
ability, but he has a reputation for corruptness and is not
likely to institute reforms necessary for permanent economic
and social betterment. Unless the Shah, who is apparently
entirely responsible for M3nsur's appointment, presses Mansur
to act, the government my fall into a state of political
inertia, as previous governments have done. Moreover, since
Xensur is a "Shah's nan," the Shah's own prestige, which has
been declining as economic deterioration continues, will
suffer further if he permits the bhnsur Government to flounder.
The death of Z rshal Fevzi Cakmk is particularly unfortunate
from the viewpoint of the Ration Party, which has thus been
deprived in the middle of the election campaign of the great
prestige of having Turkey Is respected and only Nhrshal as its
nominal leader. Unless some other national figure can be
persuaded to accept the post, Hikmet Bayur (founder and real
leader of the party) is likely to take over the party's
titular leadership himself.
The end of the strW_ at the Tripoli r~-fine of the Iraq
Petroleum Company IPC was accomplished on 3 April. The
strike was touched off by a report that 1,000 of the 4,000
workers were to be discharged. Moreover, the IPC union
members objected strongly to the employment of Palestinian
Arab refugees and British personnel formerly connected with
the Haifa refinery. The Lebanese and Palestinian workers
have apparently resolved their difficulties, but Arab employees
remain aligned against the 400 British workers. Although the
IPC union is non-Communist and the strikers do not appear
to have been influenced by Communist labor groups, agitation
against the British, particularly in the oil industry, is in
keeping with the local Com mist line,. Lebanese Communists
nay be expected to exploit this xenophobic tendency and in-
croasing uneuzployment.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO04700020015-2
 The transfer of the administration of So is (formerly Italian
Somaliland from the UK to Italy took place without incident
on 1 April. Little friction is expected to develop between
the new administration and the native population; the Italians
will probably make every effort to conduct a model administra-
tion and to improve the lot of the Somalis, and even the
explosive Somali Youth League has adopted a "wait and see"
policy toward the administration. Nevertheless, the unsettled
border between Ethiopia and Somalia is a potential source of
danger in view of conflicting Italian, s hiopian, and Somli
interests in the area.
Former Iranian Prime Minister Qavam, despite his age and ill
health, appears determined to re-enter the Iranian political
arena. For some months Qavam has allegedly been conniving
with Tudeh Party members in Paris, and he recently sent a
letter to the Shah strongly challenging any attempt on the
part of the latter to obtain veto power over parliament.
Should Qavam, who still has a considerable following in Iran,
be permitted to return to Tehran, he my well attempt to regain
political control of the country by opportunistically solicit-
ing the support of Tudeh as he did in 1946. His return to
Tshran, which the Shah will probably endeavor to prevent,
might produce a serious political crisis in Iran.
The successful outcome of the Nehru-Liaguat All than talks
gives rise to the hope of a general improvement in Indo-
Pakistan relations. The accord reached apparently applies
only to the minority problem in East and West Bengal, Assam,
and Tripura, and not to the whole of both countries as the
Pakistanis would undoubtedly have preferred because of the
steady flow of refugees into western Pakistan from Uttar.
Pradesh and other nearby areas. It is in the states mentioned
by the accord, however, that the communal situation had be-
come most critical, and honest implementation by both govern-
ments will greatly reduce the likelihood of developments which
could result in warfare. The success of tha two leaders in
reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement on so tense a
subject can in itself be expected to encourage negotiations
on other matters of serious dispute.
 An agreement between I dinn d P s an s_ has
been reported which would make 00,000 bales of Pakistani
jute available to India, with Pakistan receiving juLe goods
and other items in return. These reports would seem to
indicate that commercial interests in the two countries,
rather than the governments, are taking the initiative in
an effort to break the trade stalemate existing between India
and Pakistan since devaluation of the Indian rupee. Any
agreement of this kind must have the sanction of the respec-
tive governments, and it is possible that the recent talks
between the Prime Ministers may have laid the groundwork for
favorable official consideration of the proposals initiated
by the jute trade. If a jute agreement is reached, it could
be the forerunner of agreements among other trade associa-
tions and the means of ending the trade impasse which has had
such serious effects on the econony of both countries.
el- ~-V ET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO04700020015-2