NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 24 APRIL 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010050-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: April 27, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIA LIBRARY
WORKING PAPER
NOTICE: This document is a working pater, NOT
Oicial CIA ismiance? and. has not necessarily
been coordinated with other ORE producing compo-
nents. It represents current thinking by one
group of specialists in CIA, and is designed for
use by others engaged on similar or overlapping
studies. The ?pialliODS expressed herein may be
revised before final and official publication.
It is intended solely for the information at the
addressee and not for further dissemination.
swor e Arc
Document No. it
Os
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
XDECLASSIFIED
ass. CHANGED TO: TS $
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 6 MAR 1978By: ?if
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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
For Week Ending
27 April 1949
GREECE
Vol, IV No. 16
Intensified military activity: The recent increase in the frequency of
clashes between guerrillas and national forces throughout central and
nortrn Greece, resulting partly from aggressive probing on both
fore.1.,odes a considerable period of intensified military activity. .Although
the guerrillas are not leading from any new strength of their own (actually
their recruiting and supply potential within Greece has suffered a decline),
they have not lost the active friendship of any al their northern neighbors.
Even Tito is maintaining (at least publicly) his correct Communist attitude
toward the guerrilla movement, and a spokesman of his has again lauded
the guerrillas while Waning Americans for most of Greece's ills. Albania,
however, has been providing the guerrillas with their most valuable
support. From Albania the guerrillas have been bringing still more of
their reserves into the Vitsi-Grammos sector to counteract the fairly
heavy casualties suffered in the Grammes battle. There also appears to
have been a slight build-up of guerrilla strength near the Bulgarian frontier
of eastern Macedonia, along with indications that the Cozninform is seek-
ing to create the impression that the guerrillas are receiving increasing
aid from Bulgaria while Yugoslav support is decreasing. In view of the
intensification of military activity in Greece, the guerrillas may in fact
stand to gain an increase in logistical support from Albania and Bulgaria
as an earnest of Cominferm intentions. In such an event, Greek anger
recently directed against Albania will be extended to incline Bulgaria, and
the Greek press and public may be expected to become more clamorous
than heretofore for a larger army. The Greeks have already expressed
hearty approval for a recent British suggestion that Greek armed strength
be increased. They may become convinced that only with such an increase
can the struggle be ended with a minimum of bloodshed.
TURKEY
Bipartisan foreign policy threatened: For the first time in many years
differences ci opinion over the conduct of Turkey's foreign policy are
beginning to appear. The first indication was when it became evident
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S etyroseCal
2.
that Turkey would be excluded from the North Atlantic Treaiy group, al n.
that no correlated security agreement with Turkey as a member was
likely in the near future. A writer in the government party journal ULUS
was allowed to suggest rather bitterly that Turkey (unless itself attacked)
might best adopt a policy of neutrality toward both East and West. Although
this suggestion, based on the notion that Turkey had been abandoned, was
vehemently repudiated by both government and opposition spokesmen,
similar views have been expressed by at least one responsible official--
the Director-General al National. Security. This gentleman. (Parke')
recently expressed to a US representative in Ankara his opinion that
Turkey should not enter into a formal pact, because in the event of an
East-West war the Turks would be obliged to fight; it would be better,
in Peekel's view, for Turkey not to fight (unless attacked), bat rather
to remain neutral and keep large Soviet forces immobilized. It is note-
worthy that Perkel, whose expressed view is altogether opposed to the
official line, is in almost daily personal communication with the President, -
the Prime Minister, and the principal officers of the Turkish General
Staff. It may be suggested that the Perkel attitude was a deliberate
plant, as part of an effort to impress the US with the idea that the Turks
might really revert to neutrality. It seems inconceivable, however, that
Perkel should make such a clumsy attempt: and at the same time advocate
Turkey's exclusion from formal pacts, jest as the Foreign Minister was
going to Washington to learn how formal a commitment to safeguard
Turkey's security was obtainable from the US. Foreign Minister Sadak
has now visited Washington, where he. received many signs of US recogni-
tion of Turkey's plight, and reassurances that the security of Turkey has
not been abandoned in favor of that of Western Europe_ He has no
formal commitment, however, and. no promise al any in the present
circumstances. He may therefore find it difficult to persuade the great
majority. of the Assembly and the public that the many concrete signs
of US interest in Turkish security must be regarded as sufficient assur-
ance of continuing US support and even cd aid shall/el Turkey be attacked.
There are many people in Turkey who will not consider this sufficient.
The first manifestation of this cleavage--which would princieally be over
the government's inability to obtain what almost everybody viants--will
be in the National Assembly and in the press, after Sadak has reported
upon his visit to the US.
PALESTINE
Peace conference: The Palestine peace conference now being held at
Lausanne between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria
is not expected to produce an early solution of outstanding problems.
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3.
The main issues are: (1)Iksrael's frontiers; (2) the Arab refugees; and
(3) the future status of Jerusalem. On the first issue, Israel will try to
persuade the Arabs to accept approximately the present armistice lines
as legal frontiers. The Arabs, on the other hand, will attempt to cut
Israel back to the original partition boundaries or at least to frontiers
enclosing an equivalent amount of territory. Transjordan will demand a
port on the Mediterranean and a corridor leading to it. Syria will
demand Western Galilee, and quite possibly Eastern Galilee as well.
Thus unless very great pressure is exerted on one side or the other,
agreement on this issue will, be difficult to obtain. With respect to the
Arab refugees, it is unlikely that even the Arab governments themselves
expect the refugees to be repatriated in any significant numbers. Israel
will probably agree to permit the return of a token nuraber and then
devise some sort of formula for awarding compensation to the remainder.
The formula will be so designed as to provide a face-saving device for
the Arab governments (which have been demanding repatriation or com-
pensation for the refugees) without placing any undue financial burden on
Israel. On the matter of Jerusalem, the major remaining difficulty will
be for the contracting parties to persuade the UN to accept the division
of the city into Israeli and Traztsjordan sectors in disregard of the UN's
recommendation for internationalization. Even if agreement is reached
on these main issues, Israel and its Arab neighbors probably will not
exchange diplomatic representatives or establish commercial relations
for a long time to come.
IRAN
Constituent Assembly: The Shah's program for constitutional reform
moved one steliThniiir to accomplishment with the convening of the newly
elected Constituent Assembly?the second. in Iran's history-eon 21 April.
It is. not clear yet, however, how readily the Assembly will carry out the
tasks assigned to it: (1) revision of the rather vague Constitutional pro-
visions regarding dissolution of the Majlis; (2) establishment of a regular
procedure for amendment of the Constitution; and (3) determination of
how the Senate called for in the Constitution should be brought into being.
Elections held early in April for the 270 Assembly seats brought in most
of the Majlis members plus local notables known to support the program
of the government. However, the strong Majlis support for constitutional
reform which was evinced soon after the attempted assassination of the
Shah has now lessened, and the Majlis is becoming more aware that the
SlreerET
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Sietnerr
4.
Constitutional reform program strikes directly at its prerogatives. The
Assembly may therefore be expected to proceed cautiously, although
eventually its respected elder statesman president, Muhammed Sadeq
Tabatabais will probably be able to get the program enacted substantially
as it was presented by the Shah.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
The tribal issue: Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to
have lessened within the last fortnight. The subjects of the controversy
between the two states, the Pathan tribesmen of the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border areas do not seem to have been particularly aroused by the
agitation which has taken place over their status, and the somewhat
calmer tone which Afghanistan's anti-Pakistan press and radio propaganda
has now taken suggests that the Afghans, realizing that their campaign
is less successful than was expected, may be preparing for a peaceful
retreat. They can hardly make such a retreat gracefully, however, unless
Pakistan issues some sort of statement indicating that it does not intend
to force the integration of the tribal areas into Pakistan. Thus far such
a face-saving assurance has not been forthcoming, although Pakistan
has made the conciliatory overture of formally stating, on 19 April, that
it would be quite willing to negotiate the question of the tribal areas if
Afghanistan would halt its anti-Pakistan campaign. Meanwhile, two other
powers, the UK and Iran, have also taken an active interest in ending
the controversy. The British Foreign Office is considering the possibility
of calming the Afghans by helping them sell their goods in sterling areas
and by holding out the hope of a loan and of arms shipments. Iran, which
has already urged patience and conciliation on Pakistan, has intlinated
that it may offer its good offices in settling the dispute. Neither of these
proposed steps, however, offers an easy solution. The British can hardly
make arms shipments to Afghanistan except with Pakistan's assent, which
is not likely to be forthcoming under present circumstances. Iran's
projected offer is unlikely to be accepted by Afghanistan because of the
latter's suspicions of Iran and their present difficulties over the Helmand
River.
India and the Commonwealth: The British Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
Conference, which convened in London 21 April, has still to make an
official statement regarding the future status of India. It is probable,
however, that same legal formula will be obtained whereby India can remain
a member of the Commonwealth after proceeding with its announced plans
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Lot becoming a republic. Most of the other members of the Commonwealth,
despite the strong attachment of many of them to the Crown as the symbol.
of unity, desire India to remain one of them. The Indians, for their part,
appear to realize the benefits of continued membership in the Common-
werith and the difficulties they would face if they severed their ties with
it.
UNCIP woes: The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (IINCIP) has
once again failed to get India and Pakistan to agree on truce terms for
Kashmir. UNCIP's truce proposals of 15 April elicited a moderately
favorable response from Pakistan, which "accepteethem with reserva-
tions. Indies reply to UNCIP; however, completely ignored the question
of acceptance or rejection, instead reiterating displeasure at the absence
of reference to the disarming and disbanding of the Azad forces and to
India's responsibility for the security of Kashmir. The Indian press con-
tinues to play up alleged cease-fire violations, and it appears that the
period of peace and quiet which set in after the cease-fire is definitely
over. Faced with increasing criticism from both sides for its alleged
weakness and vacillation, the Commission plans to present revised truce
proposals by the end of April, this time urgently requesting that both
sides accept the terms immediately and unconditionally, without further
discussions.
NOTED IN BRIEF
The propaganda intent of the latest Greek guerrilla "peace offer,"
couched in vague but familiar terms, isrbvn irtni fact that it was
timed to coincide with the opening of a Communist and fellow-traveling
"peace" congress in Paris 20 April. Only a week previously the guerrillas
had heard new praise and strong exhortations from Greek Communist
chief Zacha.riades to "make 1949 a decisive year for victory."
Defeatism among non-Communists in Cyprus at the approach of the May
municipal elections is scored by The Cypriot, an English-language
daily published with Cypriot Greek nationalist backing. The paper calls
upon anti-Communists to realize without further delay that tiny must
somehow adopt a real policy with "human breath and appeal" if they ?
_seater
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SE ..;Crofer?i
expect to prevent a Communist sweep. The US Consul in Cyrus has
already reported the probability that the Communists would carry the
elections in at least three, and possibly four, of the six main towns un-
less the Nationalists unite. Although the Nationalists hold a potential
majority, it is unlikely that they will be able to overcome their tradi-
tional divisiveness before the elections.
Membership in the Council of Europe appears to be likely for both
Turkey and Greece, unless last-minute objections are raised by smaller
Western European states.
Recent negotiations between Socony-Vacutun Oil representatives in
Ankara and the Turkish Cabinet werepresiunably about the development of
Iturkey's new and, at present, only oilfield at Ramandag.
Despite faithful Soviet support of the Jewish cause in the UN and connivance
In the Czechoslovak arms running to the Israeli Army, the USSR has
never relaxed its hostility to 'bourgeois nationalist Zionism" nor hes
it permitted Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel. Lately the
satellite countries, where large numbers ofpenaigrants await transporta-
tion to Israel, have tightened their restrietiens. Israeli Foreign Minister
Shareft has remarked on Israel's great distress at this hostility toward
Zionism and Zionist activities in Eastern Europe and the USSR, but denied
that this meant a diplomatic estrangement between Israel and the USSR.
Meanwhile, the Soviet press campaign against Zionism continues with a
new anti-Semitic slant in a series of vehement attacks on the evils of
cosmopolitanism as personified in the "rootless intellectual" and
48passportless wanderer" of Jewish name.
4:
Israeli authorities reportedly "take a grave view" of the recent ambush-
ing of Israeli convoys by Arabs dressed as beduin and feel that these
Incidents may presage continuous hit-and-run border raids into Israel
ape
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70
for some time to come. As a result of this week's ambushes (in which
15 Israeli soldiers were killed) west of Hebron and south of the Dead
Sea, the Israeli Army is concentrating on tightening its control of the
dangerous border areas. Israel may possibly find that defending its
terristory from this kind of raid is a sufficient and credible excuse for
further encroachments into Arab territory.
The Israeli-Transjorclan "Special Committees," which was established
without UN supervision during the recent armistice, made no substantial
progress in the two meetings held last week. In the Jerusalem area, the
Transjordenians gained control of nineteen square miles in return for
yielding a village to the Israelis. On other conflicting points in the
Jerusalem region and particularly in the Arab-held Latrun sectors, the
Israelis appeared more concilatory then heretofore. The Transjordanians,
however, are apparently hesitant to make any major concessions for fear
of damaging their bargaining position at Lausanne.
Israeli strategy for opposing the internationalization of the entire
Jerusalem area was indicated This week by President WeizmannPs speech
in New York. Referring to Pope Pius XIrs recent message on this
point, Weizrnann stated that the Israelis would readily agree to international
control of the sacred places (which are mainly located in the Arab-held
Old City) but that Israeli administration of the Jewish-controlled New
City could not be yielded. Just last week Prime Minister en-Gurion
conceded to Ethridge that, while Jerusalem could not be the capital "for
several years," it could quickly become the chief Israeli city were
Israelps border to be advanced to the Jordan River,
Syria has finally evacuated Hill 223 (in the Mishmar hay Yarden Arab-
held salient just south of Lake Hula) as a result of UN pressure and the
threat of retaliatory military action by the Israelis, Since Israel pre-
viously pulled back its forces from a recent Jewish thrust into Syrian
territory, the outlook now seems greatly improved for concluding a
final armistice agreement between Israel and Syria.
irEFET
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8,
Several Iranian political andmr.itary figures, including General lira,
the former n-
KiTana repoltialrPrince MI Reza, the Shah's
hali brother, are endeavoring to oust General Razinara? ambitious (Thiel
Siaff of the Iranian Army. The attack against Raman has principally
taiTen the form of an interpellation el the Seed Government in. the Majlis,
charging Razmara with embezzlement, malfeasance, ansl laxity toward the
Tudeh Party. Although the attack on Razmara has taken op much of the
time of the IttiajUs recently, it is not likely to be succesacaL There is
no indication that the Shah, who. has been Razmara's strongist supporter,
has lost confidence in him. Razmara believes that the Ma:sister at
WitO is suspected of having supplied data to support the charges, will
eyed:lathy feel constrained to (Wend him in the debate. Prime Minister
Seed has dismissed the matter as unimportant and apparently plans to do
nothing positive which might upset the loosely Aunt affiance sit lis
faptors which has provided him with moil: strong suppmt to Cate.
Some Iranian leaders are exhibiting unrest over the fact that the US is
to Irantie amount?crbaeltili against Soviet aggression
which it has given to. Turkey. Recent statements of the Shah in particular,
have implied that the disparity in US aid will build up TnrIey as a threat
to Iran, as well as providing the Soviets with an invitation to invade Iran.
Although additional appeals and arguments, sound and utssound, may be
expected to emenate frozn Tehran, Iran will continue to res,ast Soviet
pressure so long as the present type of US support is maintained..
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