NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 9 FEBRUARY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: February 9, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

grafiwax-e
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
"xt
? ceterlITT?
ts T.:rev:sac Eni:ai
rstr-vr-
iturixcrciz.; tcor
twar3 Pa.=
EOTICM: This document is a *corking paper, MIT
an otTictnl CIA iseuance, and has not necessarily
been coordinated pith other ORE producing compo?
nents. It represents currant thinking by one
group of cpecialists in CIA, and is designed for
use by others en:caged on sinister or overlapping
studio?, The opinions expressed heroin may be
revised before final and official publication.
It is intended solely for the information of the
addressee and not for further dissmeination.
Copy for:
ar
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
)ECLASSIFTED
lass. CHOGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 9 MAR 1978By: 0/f
Azitmi
itrtE-1-1'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
S
Si
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
41,
NE AR EAST/AFRICA URANUS
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
For Week Eluding
C February 1949
GREECE
Vol. IV No.5
Markosi dismissal; The dismissal of General Markos by the Polite
bilircitu of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) should have the principe:
eft.ect of assisting the internationalist, or pro-Comiralorm win r of the
party under Zachariades in completing its domination over fele guer-
rilla cause. Markos has been virtually the only impoetant leader
of the nationalist clique in KKE since the spring of 1947, when his
most prominent fellow-natienalists; Siante)s and Zevgos, died
mysteriously; particularly in his role of military spokesman for the
guerrillas, Markos may have resisted the growing pressure to
steer clear of commitments to Tito which the Conainform has
apparently exerted on KKE. Markos' relief from command will
probably have little immediate effect on guerrilla tactics or
capabilities in the field. Mattes has reportedly never had much
more than a symbolic role as a military leader and, in any event,
there are indications that he has been in virtual retirement since
last summer's Grammes campaign. Moreover, Yugoslavian
support for the guerrillas, particularly by Tito's South Macedonian
irregulars, has already lessened. The fact that Markos was dropped
on grounds of illness, rather than for failure or deviationism,
suggests that Zachariades hopes to effect a reduction in anti-
Cominforin influence Among tin guerrillas quietly, without antagoniz-
ing Tito into ceasing all co-deflation with the Greek rebels. The.
possibility remains, however, that the Markos dismissal, while
Immediately effecting a closing of ranks within KKE, may in the
end react against. it by giving Tito cause for cutting off support
of the guerrillas and sealing the Yugoslav border agaiast them.
TURKEY
The mantle of Atattirk: 'The clock stopped when Atattirk died'
is a remark which has frequently been heard in Turkey during the
past decade. The general conviction it represents?that President
literati\ lacks the ability to carry on the dynamic program of regeneration
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
2.
and reform begun by. his predecessor?is less than just to
who has exercised skillful direction over foreign affairs, has pro-
moted a more democratic government, and, after all, is president
rather than premier. Nevertheless, economic development has
lagged during his tenure of office, and cabinet after cabinet has
failed to redeem its stout promises to do something about the cost
of living, the costliness and inefficiency of government, the high
price of government-manufactured goods, the diminution of Turkey's
export trade, the hunger and poverty in the eastern provinces, and
an assortment of other economic ills. Recently, public discontent
has been growing over continued governmental :failure to deal with
economic difficulties; the people appear to be getting rather tired
og hearing it all blamed upon the war (hot or cold). Many Turks--in
the coffeeshops, in editorials, in the Assembly?are voicing their
skepticism czef endlessly repeated government promises which are
never CuWilled; during a recent National Assembly debate, one
government party deputy went so far as to step up to the rostrum,
deliver a violent tirade against government inaction, announce his
resignation from both the party and the Assembly, and then
stride out of the Chamber with the cheers of the opposition ringing
In his ears. Now even those who believe that the clock did not
entirely stop when the great Atatitt died are becoming convinced/
that, however responsible his successor in the presidency may be, the
old timepiece certainly seems to have slowed down.
? PALESTINE
Israeli aspirations in Jerusalem: While the Sews have always wanted
the Jewish sections of Jerusalem as part of their state, Israeli tactics
in working toward this goal have undergone a change.
In the early period of the new state when jerusalem was isolated
by Arab forces from the rest o2 Israel, the majority of Jerusalem's
Jews reportedly favored the UN proposal to internationalize Jerusalem.
Only the independent Irgun and Stern Gang fighters insisted that the
city must become the capital, and hence an integral part, of Israel.
As Israel's strength increased, however, following the first UN truce,
the incorporation of Jerusalem within Israel bane increasingly
popular among Jews generally. During this period a Jewish Military
Governorship was established and improvements were made in the
communications between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, including the building
?
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
SEC
3.
of the 'Burma Road' to bypass Arab-held Latrun. Subsequently the
Jews were reported to have begun the construction oi? new settlements
in the connecting corridor, and Jewish DP's from Europe have been
housed in areas (like Ramie and Lydda) previously inhabited by Arabs.
With the improved military situation many Israelis looked ;forward to a
Jewish attack on the Old City, which would have brought all Jerusalem
under Israeli control. This offensive was prevented primarily by the
costliness in time and effort that clearing the Old City would impose on
the embryonic Jewish State, and the fact that the UN has consistently
favored internationalizing the entire Jerusalem area.
Now the Israelis are strengthening their claims in Jerusalem by
the simple expedient of building up their vested interests in the area.
Recently the PGI announced that the Israeli civil administration would
replace the Military Governorship of Jerusalem. Moreover, government
offices are gradually being transfered from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and
the forthcoming Constituent Assembly will be held there. These tactics
seem designed to prepare the ground for the eventual annexation cf.7
Jewish-held Jerusalem and thus to present the UN with a fait accompli.
Arab-Jewish deadlock continues: The Egyptian and Israeli representa-
tives at Rhodes, unable to agree on any general armistice principles,
appear to be concentrating on technical details, presumably in the hope
that agreement on details will add up to a comprehensive armistice.
It is unlikely that this inverted procedure will lead to a satiseactory
solution. Moreover, the other Arab states have reached no decision
on how to deal with Israel in the present uncertain situation. Trans-
Jordan appears eager to negotiate but is waiting to see how the Egyptians
make out at Rhodes. Lebanon is reluctant to institute negotiations so long
as Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon. Syria seems unwilling
to negotiate under any conditions. Iraq has asked Transjordan to represent
It in whatever negotiations take place, but it probably will not
feel bound by commitments made on its behalf. Saudi Arabia and
Yemen are silent on the question, and Israel declares that it has n&
differences with either of them. Meanwhile, Israel's extension of its
civil administration to Jewish Jerusalem and its announced intention
of holding the Constituent Assembly there are regarded as preliminary
to incorporation of certain sections of the city into the Jewish state, not-
withstanding the UN's resolution that Jerusalem be internationalized.
Thus the old picture of Israeli determination and Arab vacillation has
not changed.
?SCT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
4.
?Zen-ft
ISRAEL
4.
The Israeli political situation: The Israeli Constituent Assembly, delegates
to which were chosen nomerically in the 25 January election with each
delegate representing 3,;390 votes, will open 14 February in Jerusalem.
IVIAPAI, the winning party in the election, will control 49 oil the 120 seats
in the Assembly . MAPAM, the second party, has 19 seats, the United
Religious Bloc 16, and Menachem Beigin's entremely natiorealist Freedom
Party 14. If it so desires, MAPAI can bypass these three major parties
and still obtain the additional 11 votes necessary for a majority in the
Assembly from the center parties, which have 12 seats, and the Sephardic
Jews, who have 5.
The first task of the Assembly will be to elect a president;
Dr. Weizmann, now President of the PGI Council of State, will almost
certainly be 'chosen. The President will then call upon MAPAI's Ben-
Gurion, as lender of the most powerful political party, tc lorm a govern-
ment. As the chic.' task of the government and the Assembly will be to
draw up a constitution for Israel, MAPAI will probably attempt to form
as broad a coalition as possible. Except for the Communists, it may
invite all the parties, possibly including even Beigin's Freedom Party,
to join for the framing of the constitution. The center parties will
almost certainly be asked into the coalition because of the enormous
political and financial power they command among Zionists abroad,
and they will undoubtedly accept. MAPAM, the leftist labor party
which is closest to M.APAI in views and second to it in strength, will
probably also be included in the coalition. Although relativeky weak
in the country as a whole, its in;luence M the coalition and the Consti-
tuent Assembly may be much greater because of its strong position
In Ilistadrath, the powerfulabor organization to which more than 40%
of the popnlation belongs, in the last Eistatiruth elections in 1944
MAPAM obtained 43% of the vote to MARA:l'e 53%. Should this ratio
be maintained in the 13 February aistadruth elections, MAPAM will
be in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis MAPAI and can be extracted
to demand greater influence in the coalition government and the Constituent
Assembly than its 15% vote in the general election world warrant. By
including the third strongest party, the united Religious Bloc, in the
government, MAPAI could obtain a strong majority without MAPAM
and still have a relatively -ree hand in economic and foreign affairs
in exchange for certain religious concessions within Israel.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
irterrErr
5.
IRAN
Aftermath of the shooting: The attempt to assassinate the Shah has
provided his supporters with an opportunity to clamp down on trouble-
some elements, both le?tist and rightist, which have been ill-disposed
toward the court and the government. The army, with the approval
of the Cabinet and under martial law, has not only outlawed the pro-
Soviet Tut Party, to which oNicials claim the assassin belonged,
but has also arrested the politically ambitious religious leader,
Mullah Kashani, and some of his henchmen. (While Kashani had
often used rabble-rousing tactics against the government, he has
not been implicated in the attack, and even the Tudeh Party had still
to be clearly linked, as an organization, with the shooting. although
it staged two large student demonstrations just beforehand.) Altogether
some 500 persons have been reportedly arrested and 60 newspapers
suppressed, and it may be expected that the army will further ttrghten
u p security controls through Iran. The attempted assassination will
also affect the Shah's relations with the Majlis. He has probably gained
in popularity and it is almost certain he will now renew his attempts to
effect constitutional reforms granting him greater powers.
NOTED IN BRIEF
The Turkish GovernmeinLasproves the sentiments expressed in
Patriarch Athenagoras' recent appeal for Christian-Moslem unity
against Communism but is doubttul about their propriety. Turkish
officialdom feels that the new patriarch should check the tendency
he has displayed to make pronouncements on political affairs and
should confine his public efforts to curtail Soviet influence to his
proper sphere, the Greek Orthodox Church.
The go2.2pina_s sg...12Lashstan incensed by the recently
enacted Israeli property law, which vests in an ofiticial administrator
the property af: 'absentees.' They view this act as tantamount to
confiscation ei the property of the Arabs who "led from Israel and
threaten to retaliate by confiscating property of Sews who are Syrian
and Iraqi nationals. This retaliatory plan, allegedly designed to help
the Arab refugees, would affect a comparatively few wealthy dews of
Baghdad and Damascus but would do lithe toward maintaining the
hundreds of thousands of Arabs who fled Jewish rule following the
outbreak of hostilities.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
6.
The British Forel Office iylanning to set up a new section to
handle 1.76-iirat airs. The British Military Admthistiifiuihas been
under fire for some time from the Trixiitanians for its 'care and
maintenace' policy, which is keeping the country at an economic
standstill. This British move may presage an effort by the UK to
discard this highly unpopular policy for one of economic assistance.
If such were the case, the US-UK proposals for postponement of the
disposition of Tripolitania for another year- might not be as un-
palatWe to the Tripolitanians as heretofore.
Mrs. Golda Ivlyerson, for many years a leader in the Zionist move-
ment and a member of the MAPA! Party, is reported to be disillusioned
with her position as Minister to the USSR and prepared to take over a
cabinet post in the new Israeli Government.
The Iranian Maj/is accorded Prime Minister Seed an 89-0 vote
of confidence, with 4 deputies abstaining the day aZter the attempt
on the Shah's life. The vote, which followed an interpellation on
the government's oil policy, indicates that Seed has not only retained
?Aegis confidence, but also that the Majlis has met the assassination
attempt with equanimity.
The British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran faces a precarious
future, as a result of a recent cabinet decree prohibiting the Bank
from dealing in foreign exchange after 19 February.. The Bank had
expected less favorable operating conditions following the expiration
of its concession on 30 January but was unprepared for a measure
virtually tantamount to forcing it out of business, and the British
Embassy is seriously concerned over the reduction in British influence
and prestige in Iran which veoud follow the closing of the Bank. While
the cabinet's action, which was precipitate, may be moderated later,
it reflects the strength of the nationalist feeling in Iran.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7
-- ? nECRET
7.
Evacuation of tribesmen from Kashmir to their tribal areas
continues v?recit incident andno violation of the truce agreement
has been reported from either Pakistan or India. Over half of the
tribesmen already have been removed, and if sufficient transportation
had been available the evacuation would have been more rapid. General
Delvoie, 1TNCIP Military Attache and ten US observers have left New
Delhi for the Pakistan Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi, preparatory
to forming teams and moving them to the field on the Pakistan side. The
remaining six US observers, to serve on the Indian side, will be joined
later by Canadian, Norwegian, and Belgian observers. The preliminary
truce arrangements agreed on by the two Commanders-in-Chief on
15 3anuary have still to be approved by the two governments, with the
major point of difference being India's refusal to permit local forces
to be trained by Pakistan for police duty in Itashmir areas already
evacuated by the Pakistan Army.
The Indian Constituent Assembly convened 1 February. The main
business of the session is to consider and approve railway and general
budgets.
sseererr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010039-7