NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 22 SEPTEMBER 1948 VOL. III NO. 37

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010021-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 22, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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WAR EAST/AFRICA 13RANCR
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
For Week Ending
22 September 1948
Vol* III Nbc, 37
Document No.
NO CHAUGE in Class. 0
46ECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77 1763
By :
Date: ryartra.
CIA LIBRARY
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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH
INTELLIMNCE SMART
Vol. III U0037
For Week Ending
22 September 1948
GREECE
Although the Creek Army has successfully driven the 12400 guerrilla of
Wo Mira= pocket fsouth of the old &winos area) baek into Albania,
the army has suffered reverses in the Vitsi area (north of Grammos)2
where conntersattaaks by the 42500 guerrillas involved has forced the
army to retreat end wait for reinforcements, During the week over-all
guerrilla strength increased by 300 (for a grand total of approximately
212000)2 and the guerrillas engaged in small-scale but effective activity.
throughout Greece* It appears that supplies are being sent to the guer-
rillas by caique from Albania, and a parachute drop in the Peloponnesus
has also been reported. Fire support and border crossings are reported
alone all the satellite-Greek frontiers, and although a few guerrillas
retrearEig into Albania and PUgoslavia were disarmed, it has been
established that ehortly thereafter they were rearmed and sent back
to Greece. The Greek Army probably will not be able to overcome all
of the large guerrilla concentrations along the northern frontiers
prior to the end of 1948*
TURKEY
The cituation with respect to tobaccos the noxious weed, is at last
=furrowing some kategy-placed Turkish brows. The ECA organization shows
signs of being about to assist in the sale of Turkish tobacco to Germany,
which in prewar years was an important market. Furthermore, it appears
that the fumes of tobacco can penetrate the iron curtain, for the Turks
have eagerly sought to draw up trade agreements not only with Finland and
Austria but also with Czechoslovakia and Poland, for the major purpose
of unloading huge surplus stocks of tobacco. Any other trans-curtain
country which shams interest in the Turkish variety of nicotiana tabacum
can easily overcome any Turkish titubations about being unduly friendly
with a pro-Uuscovite government.
Criticism of Present Inonu by leaders of the new Nation Party has probably
orn?r-trrougtab?eaconin the country which is antipathetic to the new
group. It was expected that the new party mould take a political line
that was based largely upon intense dislike of the chief of stater Although
there are very large numbers of Turks etger enough to join an anti-govern,-
merit group (provided it does not offend nationalist sentiment); going too
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5uatert
far in criticizing Inonu is one way of obstructing such an occurrence.
The "old man of Cankaya"--/nonu-ris highly respected by the Turks, who
are pretty generally Aware of his statesmanlike qualities as well as
his faults. A worse blunder of the new party2s leaders is their assumpe
tion that the general public will accept their demand for abolition of
the "chief system" as justifiable criticism of Immo Clearly such an
attack is absurd in the extreme. Inonuls outstanding action, and one
that has perhaps made him unique in at least his own age, is that he
has been a leader with very great authoritarian powers who continues to
strive mighily to delegate that power to its proper placer-the adult
population of the Turkish Republic. The Nation Partys leaders would
be better advised to seek more controversial bait.
PALESTINE
The formation of an Arab Palestine government has been announced by
ite Arab League nEaithstanding the violent objections of Transjordan,
backed by Iraq, This move apparently represents an attempt by the non-
Hashimite members of the League (primarily Syria and Egypt) to: (1) ,
prevent the incorporation of central Palestine into Transjordan; (2)
placate nationalist opinion, which has long demanded an Arab government
for all Palestine; and (3) shift the main responsibility for developments
in Palestine from their own governments and armed forces to an independent
Palestine government, Despite the fact that the Iraqi and Trans jordan
armies are in effective control of central Palestine, the establishment .
of even a shadow Palestinian government will place those two countries
in an embarrassing position, If Abdullah fails to cooperate with the
new government, he will incur the hostility of Arab nationalists through-
out the Near East. Unless, however, he is prepared to defy that opinion
and to face the threat of civil war, he can not rule those areas Which
his Arab Legion has been largely instrumental in defending from the
Jews, Moreover, the strength of nationalist feeling in Iraq makes it
doubtful whether the Iraqi Government will long be able to support
Abdullah in his defiance of the Arab League2s action, The reported
fusion of the Iraqi and Trans jordan high commands is at best a paper
agreement and will probably not long .stand up under this new strain.
The public rift in the Arab political front, if allowed to continue, may
well result in the creation of two opposing camps, one a
pro-I-Anna Palestinian government and the other favoring control by
Transjordan of Arab Palestine, Such an eventuality would greatly com-
plicate the itkolementation of any UN decision regarding Palestine,
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3?
The tragl.0 assassination of UN Mediator Count Bernadotte on 17 September
in a Jewish sector of Jerusalem produced far-reaching results overnight,
The arrival in Paris of the news of Bernadotte's death along with the
arrival of the Mediator's report from Rhodes underlined to stunned members
of the UN the immediate necessity for decisive UN action both on the
conflicting demands of Arabs and Jews and on the now problem of the
h00?000 refugees,
In Palestine itself tension was as near the breaking point as at
any time since the truce began on 18 July. The Israeli Government faced
its most severe crisis to date, The lowering of Israeli prestige in
the eyes of the world as a result of Bernadotte's death within Israel-
controlled territory forced Israeli officials at last to come to grips
with the terrorists in an effort to ferret out the assassins, reputedly
members of the "Homeland Fronton a splinter group from the Stern Gang,
Israeli officials were prodded into action by the newly appointed Interim
Mediator, Ralph Bunch?, who charged Israel with responsibility for
Bernadotte's murder, pointing out that recent statements and actions
by members of the Provisional Government disparaging the efforts of UN
observers were not Conducive to preventing or discouraging terrorism .
against UN representatives. The immediate curfew imposed on Jerusalem
by the Israeli Government, along with the searching of Jerusalem by
military authorities for members of the Stern Gang, indicates the gravity
with which Israel regards the new crisis. There is some speculation,
however, as to just how far Israel will go in cleaning out terrorist
groups. In the past these groups have been of real value in spearheading
attacks against the British (during the Mandate) and subsequently
against the Arabs. Concerning the Israeli fear of an external Arab
attack,:it seems probable that, in spite of rising tensions on both sides,
the reported massing of troops and military equipment by the Arabs for
the purpose of initiating attacks against Israel resulted more from
Israeli fear than from factual evidence.
ITALIAN COLONIES
New manifestations of Tri.olitanian nationalist sentiment have cropped
up antic pa ion of a UN .-cision on he former Italian colonies.
Fear of a possible return of Italian rule has led to a number of small-
scale riots in the city of Tripoli, wheraanti -Italian feeling has been
especially high; a bomb was placed outside the office of the Italian
airline, and another bomb damaged the home of a pro-Italian Arab, The
announcement of US-UK proposals for separate disposition of Cyrenaic&
and Tripelitania has also irked Tripolitanian nationalists, most of
whom favor a united, independent Libya. Although no rioting ensued,
posters promptly appeared attacking "imperialist British and Zionist
America."
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
India's consolidation of its Hyderabad trium h has taken place with
remarkaba he tdzam, who cap t ated after less than five
days of desultory resistance to the invading Indian troops, quickly
indicated his desire to please India by enjoining his subjects to obey
India's military governor and by abandoning his efforts to obtain the
intervention of the UN Security Council, The fanatical Moslem Razakars,
against whose raids India's action was ostensibly directed, have been
officially disbanded without notable commotion; their leader, Razvi?
and some of his followers have been arrested. Indeed, India's occupa-
tion of Hyderabad has progressed so rapidly-as to suggest some collusion
between the Indian Government and the Nizam, whose previous intransigence
may have been influenced by fear of Razakar reprisals.
Pressure by the US and other nations to have India's resort to
armed force in Hyderabad regularized through some form of UN action will
irritate the Indians but will not change the status quo. The UN Security
Council may drop the Hyderabad ease upon receipt of formal statements
from the Nizam and India indicating that hcstilities have ceased end
that the wishes of the Hyderabad population will not be ignored. Even
if the Security Council calla for a UN-sponsored plebiscite, the situa-
tion will remain basically the same, inasmuch as Hyderabad has a prepon-
derantly pro-Indian Hindu population.
No immediate change in the Kashmir milita situation is expected.
Although India is undoubtedly temp undertake an all-out drive
in Kashmir now that a quick decision has been gained in Hyderabad, the
Government of India will probably be restrained by: (1) approaching
bad weather and the time required to redeploy troops and improve supply-
lines; (2) the fear of prejudicing the Indian case before the Security
Council, which will soon receive the report of the UN Kashmir Commission;
and (3) the imminent departure of Prime Minister Nehru for the Common,
wealth Prime Ministers' conference in London and the UN General Assembly
in Paris.
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