NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 19 MAY 1948 VOL. III NO. 19

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

e41.
=Me
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
? F,TRFNIFsiCili1,11,P211
NEAR SAST/AFRIGt BPUQU
INTELLIGEN SDIPLAP.Y
Par Ws.* Ending
19 May 1948
Ve10 III NO019
Document No, C1411%
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 2 MAR 1978 By: 6
9cd
Declassified andand Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
MILI I AK T bl I UA I ILJN ? lb MAT IY40 CONFIDENTIAL
PALESTINE
Border of strongly-held Jewish area
Border of tenuously-held Jewish area
, ?
Arab troop concentration
rz> Arab advance
r=;:' Jewish advance
NNW Bombed tat accepted by the UNtsd
Nati Grunt Assam*. Nov. 19471
? IntarnsUortel Boundary
Standard Gauge ItanroM 141aN
Moro. Gaut* RollrOod 01,1
First CAM Rood
Soon, On, Rood
04 Pow Um
? - amanitas/II Strum
larAsh Communal Arm
to
all .4n
19 tO 41???????????
NW
.111ra
GAL IL
Rama
Ram -
AM
Hebron
G R A B i
PC'/ - , _ I
v ?./
? ' .. ? I ?-? ?
\ -..- / // , I ? -- .7;
A.
I \ 1 Me
/
G A t?
\ / ?-.7/
, , ...t
# \ ?.. -c
? -? EGYPt1A74? c ? 1 a
01 \
Ism ? \ ,-, FORCES I %
la \
4?44.*\ 1I 5041. 9S4D4 1.00 .an11 1147,. I1939 2
JEWISH
) ? -
.???.??4 110 1? /laz,\ 411 1M ? , \
I I 1
.$4.-
cam Mao Branch. CIA 4-43
CONFIDENTIAL
U. S. GPO-S
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
?4
' jEC-RETe
NEAR SAST/AFRIGA FfeANCH
IUTELLIGFWGE 3ULJATir
For Week Ending
19 Vey 19148
OEFFIVAL
Vol, In
Arab determination strenzthened: US recogrition of Israel hen 7e-de Lere
cirri:if an Areb-Jewian truce, The Jews will inteeeret-
US recognition as a guarantee of leraolge Independence end the lield-
matic prefece to US support in materiel grid pessibly in troeea, The
Arab goverrwmnts, already committed to the destructioneef Ziontee?
may out of despekation lauech tulle:male otteees before the Jeer ese
reap the benefits of outside military' ald.
The aggressiveness -of the Arele foeces eamaitted to eneaeior lead
to the conclusion that thee plan 'ere thaa an occupatten oe the Areb
areas of Pelestine, The 10,000 Egyptian troops (eewe of whom 'lave
already entered Palestine) near the Palestine-tegyptlan border erg peo-
bably sufficient to veal off the ethole of eouthern PalestiLe, reme
of these troops together with the volunteer Arab Liberation env and
the Arab Legion are probably capcele el' blockading eeruualem. The
814100 ireelp Syrian, and Lebanese troees? supported by addetioeel
voluntserre will attempt to clear Galilee of the Jens. It la
early to predict whether the Arab armies vill attack the deem in teeir
remaining corridor along the coast between Tel Aviv and Haifa,
The outcome of these various canine will vitally aefece all
the Arab etatesp the fortunes of whose governments are intimately
interwoven with the fortunes of their ruspective areles, The !tab
armies aro in Palestine today because there would have beep eesious
civil disturbances if they had not been sent: So leng an eere91
enists? they can never lea withdrawn; and if they are defeatedp the
Arab goverramnts will fall., The political upheavals which will
almost certainly result from Arab military defeats in Paleotine ill
vitally affect U.S interests in the Neer Eeeta Whatever poevr rela-
tionships develop from the ehaosp U.S politicree; educationel? oil?
and transoortation interests rill be seriously Jeopardized,
cupzcs
Apparent euerrilla menperzer shortacer The guerrilla rise:Donee :Ao the
Greek Armyta current ohensive-Va made guerrilla intentiune fel the
near future obscure. Instead of attacking in manner eeseened to
prevent the army from effectively concentrating, the geerrellan eaee
SECRET-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
--
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
met the the army challenge lethargically. Although scattered foragiee
and terrorist'attacks have continued throughout Greece; there hae
been a general withdrawal north and west toward the Orameos arce,
:where strong defensive positions are appaeently in preparation,
These tactics can scarcely be the result of the recently recoleee
disagreement among Communist leaders inasmecleas there has bee,: .i-
sufficient time for the dissension to nleke itself felt on the
operational level, Moreover, the guerrillas heve plenty of erns
and aueunition, The most likely explanation is that for the first
time earkos is faced with a manpower shortage and thus has fouee it
advisable tcewithdraw for the present to more advantageous terYitare
near the norteern borders,
TUAKEY,
Dissatiefeetion over EGA allotment: A certain mistiness in ee;:teloere
Frgtras is becoming Egrernible ove?:. the 'ileestion of ecoreeic
tion Administration (ECA) credits, The EGA credit for Turkey- eurreA).y-
unier consideration amounts to $5 million (or at most $10 rdlleot) in
the first quarter of the program, with ne indication thet adetiMonal
credits will follow. The Turkish Goveeeeent, viewing this arov.-.5 so
wholly inadoquate, finds it hard to uneerrtand the apparently fceon
eistent police of generosity in provideree aid for Turkish miliesrer
needs and an unexpected parsimony in credits for economic Ire:Vote,
Furteermere, the Turks feel that larger credits would enable Teceey
to contribute effectively to European recovery while the arrall ieroposad
sums would not. Relations are not going to be strained, however, hvond
the point of causing a feeling of puzzled and somewhat rescntill eff)a:-
rassmf.nt in Turkeye There will be no change in Turkeyes peramerat
policy of adhering to its friendship with the United States end ef f7
siatir4; Soviet pressure,
MAN
Contleued rytilny_hetween Shah and Searee The political Biter:tee:
Iran ir con:iiiid;-7ITEhough former Prime. el:Aster leaven is copertAlly
planning nn extended rest on his country es .ate and therefore se ret
imeedietely make a definitive bid for power, his strength see: to 6a
inereasine respite public demonstrationt against him and the artegonice
at' army and court circles, He is trying to assemble a coalitice in the
eajlis whice tould 0.ve him a controlling majority and make hie drire
minister without having to depend on the su2port of Seyeid Ufa, e foreee
?rime minister who is widely distrusted in Iran and considered tt, be o.
nEvitish stooee." Opecurrently the Seale is?ettempting to inoreeee IS
control over the legislative branch of the governmeet. A bill
-2-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6
,
recently been introduced in the !aegis to authorize the formation of
a Senate, half of whose 60 members would be appointed by the Shah.,
Although Nvam reportedly declared in a recent talk with the Shah
that, if he were returned to office, he would implement any legicla?
tive program-which the Shah might draw upe lasting cooperation between
the two men can hardly be expected because of strong personal and
political differences. Despite the Shahcs opposition, however, eavem
would probably be swept, into office if a crisis should develop in
Irancs 'domestic or foreign affairs,
INDIA?PAKISTAN
Friction betweenIndia,and Hyderabnd: The increasing tension between
India and Hyderabad suggests the possibility that India may have decided
to let matters slide with regard to Kashmir while it forces Hyderabed
into the Union of India'. Hyderallados refusal to accede to India is
backed by a astandstill" agreement signed by the two governmente, but
India is now reported to have iseted an ultimatum to the Nieen ixpleing
that Indian troops will occupy his territore if he does not halt 'xecder
raids from Hyderabad by 24 Hay. These raids, for the most part, eave
been made either by outraged Moslems, in retaliation for similar caide
instigated by Indiaps ruling Congress Party, or by the Nizamcs police,
in pursuit of Congress?uncouraged Communists fleeing into Madras after
depredations in Hyderabad? It is thus poesible that the Nizam will
be both unwilling and unable to comply with Indians demands and that
India does not expect him to do so,
Owing to the ammunition shortages which confront the Nizames
forces, the Indian Army is believed capable of occupying Hyderabad
without effective opposition, although bloody communal rioting mould
take place. within the state., The great danger is that such rioting
might spread starting a disastrous cyelutogrtaliation throughout
the subcontinent which would eventually :7- 4 the governmente
of both dominions,, A secondary danger is that forcible overthrow
of the Nizence government might enable the Communists to gain control
of that important area of India?
The Kashmir dispute: The Kashmir dispute remains in suspense, eith
the Security Council proposals still rejected by both sides, Decpite
bellicose activities on the part of both domineons,-neither,eovernment
is believed to want war, and a'compromise may yet be possible, The
US is urging that the 5C2s Kashmir Commission proceed to India without
delay,
--Sant%
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010003-6