WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004400030006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 5, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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5 September 1950
SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
USSR
1. Soviet dele ate Malik's month as President of
the Security_Soncil has ended with_n2J,222.122Blar victories,
but the...1Mapz212.ally_considers that its_Losition has been
consiftmtly_LuEr2ved during, the month. In clearing the
hurdle of returning to the UN despite the continued presence
of Chinese Nationalists and in broadening SC agenda to include
Chinese Communist charges of US aggression, the USSR has re-
gained almost complete maneuverability for obstructing further
coalescence of the non-Communist world and for effecting a
solution of the Korean issue favorable to themselves whenever
desirable.
(Page 3)
2. Rumored disagreement between the USSR and
Communist China 2p military_Roligy rmacitn,g_Korea and Taiwan
umaa_to be based on unsubstantiated evidence and conflict-
ing reports. Pending a decisive outcome of the Korean con-
flict, it is increasingly apparent that the USSR, in conjunction
with Communist China, intends to pursue a policy designed to
Intensify Western concern regarding Ipossible use of Chinese
Forces in Korea and against Taiwan.
(Page 5 )
3. Kurdish nationalist a2tjatiy_t_gm2pl_azsl
promotally_the USSR has intensified in the last three months,
according to unconfirmed reports from various sources. The
clandestine Azerbaijan Democratic radio station is urging a
militant Kurdish program, but it seems unlikely that the Kurds
can take extended effective armed action at this time.
(Page 6)
saentr'
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SECRET
EASTERN EUROPE
:GENERAL
4. Cominform absor tion of Rumanian and Pulorlps
goods has resulted in: (1) the almost complete lack of formal
commercial and financial agreanents between these two countries
and those outside the Soviet Orbit; and (2) the use of spot
purchases in the West, many of which are made in avoidance of
Western export controls. Even if formal trade and payments
agreement s were signed with the West, it is doubtful that
Rumania and Bulgaria could fulfill their commitments or obtain
strategic items?,
(Page i)
FINLAND
5. The Finnish Social Denocratsi strike offensive
is an effort to unT57-TE-nrckonen Cabinerarirto
a-friari
Tiirf==i675=t7orriririErFiririnr-G"Freirminento Failure to
reconcile antagonisms between Social Democrats and the.Kekkonen?
led Agrarians can benefit only the Communists.
POLAND
6, Exclusive_iurisdiction
ov_er a_mp.p.j_irtments of biflolp. and clergy
Polish Governmentis indirect refusal to
Bishop of Czestochowa.
SECRET
(Page 8 )
of Roman Catholic Church
has been chaflamajm:
recognize new Coadjutor
(Page 10 )
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EASTERN EUROPE
USSR
USSR re ains maneuvemljlitz
122-lics in SC
1!.A.11
Soviet Delegate Malik's month as President of
the Security Council has ended with no spectacular victories,
but the USSR probably considers that its position has been
considerably improved during the month. In clearing the
hurdle of returning to the UN despite the continued presence
of Chinese Nationalists and in broadening SC agenda to include
Chinese Communist charges of US aggression, the USSR has re-
gained almost complete maneuverability for obstructing further
coalescence of the non-Communist world and for effecting a
solution of the Korean issue favorable to themselves whenever
desirable.
As a result of its return to the Security
Council, the USSR succeeded in Obstructing all constructive
discussion of the Korean issue throughout August, the month
during which the North Koreans were probably scheduled to
complete their conquest of South Korea. The USSR's return
to the Security Council, however, could not undo the important
Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 and further
important Security Council action on the question (whether or
not Malik is present) is =likely until North Korean forces
are no longer able to maintain the offensive.
By broadening the Security Council agenda to
include the Chinese Communist charge of US aggression against
Formosa, the USSR not only succeeded in confusing the issue
of Communist aggression in Korea but probably hoped to have
gained a potential bargaining instrument for a future solution
of the Korean issue favorable to the USSR. While the August
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Soviet attempts to seat the Chinese Gallia/lists in the SC
failed0'the USSR has paved the way for the future hearing of
a Chinese delegation in the Security Council when the Formosan
issue is discussed.
Propagandistically, however, the Soviet actions
In the Security Council were less successful. By repeatedly
making immoderate speeches, patently labeled for an Asian
audience, and by reading into the Security Council record
numerous communications from the North Koreans, Chinese Com-
munists, and European Soviet Satellites charging the US with
aggressive designs and inhuman acts, Soviet Delegate Malik
?
endeavored to substantiate the Soviet campaign of vilification
against the US, His obstructionist tactics and intemperate
speeches, however, not only damaged Soviet prestige among
Asian nations which prefer to keep themselves apart from the
East-Mest conflict, but also revealed even more clearly the
aggressive designs of the USSR. Likewise, Soviet propaganda
attacks on the US, which were initially successful in Asia,
were blunted not only by effective US-UK replies but also by
the willing adherence of the US to the inclusion, on the
Security Council agenda, of the Chinese Communist complaints
of US aggression.
The tactics of the USSR during August, combined
with its decision to remain in the Security Council, suggests
that the past month has been largely one of preparation on the
part of the USSR. Having broadened the Security Council agenda
to include Chinese Communist complaints of US aggression, the
Soviet Union probably hopes to score important propaganda
victories, particularly_in Asia, during the discussion of these
complaints. In addition it may hope to employ these charges
as a bargaining instrument in order to obtain a satisfactory
solution of the Korean issue whenever UN forces are capable of
driving back the North Koreans. (SECRET)
SECRET
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Rumor 4gpment the USSR
andCommunist china on militpla
Rumored disagreement between the USSR and
Communist China on military policy regarding Korea and Taiwan
appears to be based on unsubstantiated evidence and conflict-
? ing reports. It is variously reported that the USSR has: (1)
Urged a Taiwan attack as soon as possible despite,Chinese
Communist opposition; (2) opposed a Taiwan invasion on grounds
that Indochina and Korean ventures would be more harmful to ,
the US; (3) statud that a Taiwan invasion is unnecessary
because objectives can be achieved by political means; (4)
? insisted on Chinese Communist participation in Korea despite
opposition from Peiping.
While the USSR may have emphasized the Chinese
issue in the UN to mollify possible Chinese Communist frustra,.
tion created by the initiation of hostilities in Korea, which
delayed the Taiwan invasion, there is no reliable indication
that the possible disruption of the Taiwan timetable has
created a rift in Sino-Soviet relations.
tiLll
? Pending a decisive outcome of the Korean con-
flict, it is increasingly apparent that the USSR, in con-
junction with Communist China, intends to pursue a policy
based on exploiting Western concern over possible use of
Chinese Ceramist Forces in Korea and against Taiwan. Basic-
ally this policy may be designed to enhance the military
character of Ceumunist movements throughout sla, and specific-
ally, to vaunt the balance of power exerted by Red China. Thus,
widespread Soviet-Satellite support of intensified Chinese
Communist charges of "border violations" and provocative acts
against China suggest that this line is primarily a propaganda
offensive to intensify doubt on the part of .non-Communist
powers regarding Chinese intentions.
Unconfirmed reports of a recent military agree-
ment between the USSR and Communist China, including delineation
of spheres of respective military operations, may also reflect
SECRET
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the Soviet-directed war of nerves. By such means the USSR
probably hopes to gain (1) a settlement in Korea and (2) an
agreement on Communist China representation in the UN. A step
in this direction was evident in the Soviet maneuver to add
the Chinese Communist complaint of US "aggression" against
Taiwan to the Security Council agenda, thereby opening the door
for Chinese Communist participation in UN hearings. (SECRET)
Soviet activity_am2n&Kurds relort9Ily_increasiLlE "B"
' Kurdish nationalist activity, encouraged and
promoted by the. USSR, has been intensified in the last three
months, according to unconfirmed reports from variotis sources.
Soviet agents are again rumored to be stirring up the Kurds
to form an independent state. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the
exiled Iraqi Kurd loader, reportedly went to'Moscow for con-
sultations and then to Beirut where he is said to have
contacted several Kurdish Syrian army officers. Some Iranian
Kurds have likewise boon reported in Beirut, consulting with
Soviet Legation officials. In addition, Damascus Kurds are
said to be recruiting volunteers for partisan forces to fight
for an independent Kurdistan, while Communist Kurds are reliably
reported to be purchasing arms in Iraq.
While these reports are difficult, if not
impossible, to confirm, it is known that the Azerbaijan Demo-
cratic radio station, broadcasting clandestinely from the
USSR, is urging a militant Kurdish program. It has announced
that partisan forces have been formed and are already in
action as part of the "armed revolution of the Kurdish nation,"
but this is not confirmed by Iranian sources. The idea of a
united and independent Kurdistan has been stressed and members
of the "Democratic Party of Kurdistan" have been warned "to be
prepared for a brave campaign against against the imperialists."
The USSR has long encouraged Kurdish nationalibm,
as part of its general policy of promoting unrest in the Near
East. Propaganda has been used extonsively,A but it isnot known
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how effectively. Kurdish agents are being trained at Nbkhichevan,
in the USSR near the Turko-Iranian border0, and apparently they
visit the Kurdish tribes of Iran, Iraq, and Syria without difficulty.
The "presence in the Soviet Union of Mullah Mustafa with about
500-700 Barzani Kurds has periodically given rise to reports that
he was about to descend in force on Iran or Iraq, with Soviet
aid and assistance. While there may be increasing discontent
and danger of disorder in Kurdistan, it seems unlikely that the
Kurds can take extended effective action against the armed forces
of Iran or Iraq without direct Soviet involvement, a continganw
which the USSR probably desires to avoid at this time. A Kurdish
uprising, even though unsuccessful and not supported by the
Soviet Union, would intensify uneasiness in the Near East and
would constitute a drain on the already unstable Iranian, and
possibly also on the Iraqi economy. (SECRET)
*, The recent increase in Kurdish propaganda received by the
US from the USSR reflects the initiatiOn of regular US
monitoring service rather than an increase in actual
volume of propaganda.
EASTERN EUROPE
GENERAL
Cominform maniallates commercial and financial
mEition of Rumania andl'plaria
Cominform absorption of Rumanian and Bulgarian
goods has resulted in: (1) the almost complete lack of formal
commercial and financial agreements between these two countries
and those outside the Soviet Orbit; and (2) the use of spot
purchases in the West, many of which are made in avoidance of
Western export controls. Even if formal trade and payments
agreements were signed with the West, it is doubtful that Rumania
SECRET
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and Bulgaria could fulfill their connitments or obtain strategic
items. During 1950 both countries have apparently virtually
abandoned signing formal trade and payment agreements, and have
failed to implement valid past commitments with non-Cominform
countries.
The use of the spot purchase technique instead of
formal commercial agreements has been quite successful in avoid-
ing export controls. Rumania has boon obtaining many types of
equipment used in the petroleum industry, as well as bearings,
vehicles, and other controlled goods, Similarly goods required
by Bulgaria to meet planned industrialization, especially trans-
port equipment, are on the Western banned export list, but are
still being obtained? from the West. Moreover, both of these
Coninforn nations have made direct and clandestine purchases of
military goods from the Western sources.
Tho comparative rapidity of concluding spot
purchases and the low volume of such trade with the West permits
these transactions to go unnoticed by Western officials. Pre-
sumably the Soviet Orbit will make available those products
most, needed to help fulfill economic plans for industrialization
and the Soviet Union will supply sone hard currencies for spot
purchases when the Coninform Orbit is unable to supply require-
ments of these Satellites. (SECRET)
FINLAND
Social Democrats warfe of
Kekkonon Government
"4"
A political tug of war between the Social
Democrats and the Agrarian-led Government is now in progress
in Finland. The Social Denocrats' wage offensive, which is
also a product of Finland's chronic price-wage spiral, has
completely halted production in the important reparations
producing metals industry. Work stoppages are also expected in
the wood industry, which furnishes reparations material, as well
SECRET'
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as the exports which make up 90 percent of Finland's vital
foreign trade. At the moment, however, Finland is Lead on its
reparations deliveries of machine products. The glass and
porcelain workers and the food industry workers (Communist)
have been authorized by SAK to issue strike warnings for 14
September if negotiations break down. The Communist-controlled
leather, shoe, and rubber workers union has applied for, but
has not yet received, similar permission. If the pension demands
of the civil servants, including those of the State Railroad
locomotive engineers (which have been hanging fire for four ?
years) are not met, they, too, can be expected to strike. The
agricultural workers also have unsettled wage grievances.
Thus far the metal workers strike, involving
some 60,000 workers, has been unusually orderly, but Kekkonen
may soon be faced with a situation completely beyond the control
of his centrist Government. It appears that it is just such a
situation the Social Democrats are preparing in order to demon-
strate their indispensability to any Finnish government.
Fagerholm clearly intends the price of labor peace in Finland
to be Social Democratic participation in the Government, pre-
sumably on his terns, which would exclude the participation
of the Communists. While the Agrarian Party has also been
opposed to admitting the Communists, Kekkonen awes what prestige
he has at the moment to Moscow's willingness to conclude a trade
agreement with his Government. In addition, his record of small
gestures of appeasement to retain Moscow's favor makes it likely
that he will insist on including the Communist-led Democratic
Union in some posts in a new coalition Cabinet.
If the wage disputes cannot be settled, and the
threatened strikes materialize, the fall pf the present Cabinet
seems inevitable. There will then follow that long period of
negotiation among the parties which has come to characterize
the formation of post-war Finnish Governments, The Soviet propa-
ganda campaign against the Social Democrats, which has recently '
been reinvigorated, will have little effect on the Social
Democrats, but the Agrarians may be influenced by Soviet adjura-
tions. The USSR has made it qUite clear that it would not be
pleased to see the Social Democrats back in the Cabinet.
SECRET
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Another political battle between Kekkonon and
Fagorholm, involving rural and urban interests, appears in-
evitable. Whether the Social Democrats and the Agrarians can
reconcile their differences in the interests of strengthening
Finland's internal stability is an open question, but it is
certain that only the Communists will profit fran their failure
to do so. (SECRET)
New issue in Polish Church-State
stElagl foreshadowed
An area of Church authority thus far untouched
by the Polish Government has been its exclusive jurisdiction
over appointments of bishops and clergy, A recent incident
involving the Vatican's appointnent of the Superior General of
the Pallotine Order, resident in Rohe, to the post of Coadjutor
Bishop of Czestochowa, has now indirectly raised the issue of
ultimate authority in this field. The Superior General, appoint-
ed to his new post while on an inspection tour of his order's
religious houses in Poland, was not permitted to remain in the
country to assume his duties as bishop, on the ground that his
temporary visa had been issued for another purpose.
The Government nay present its action as a
purely legal one, or may attempt to justify it on the basis of
the appointee's eleven years' residence outside Poland. It is
probable, however, that the Communists reasonably interpreted
the appointment as a Vatican effort to strengthen the Church's
forces by the addition of a relatively young and spiritually
confident bishop. ?They were quick, therefore, to forestall it.
The appointment of a Suffragan Bishop of Plock, which wont un-
opposed by the State in early July, was also apparently intended
to infuse new blood into a hierarchy whose resistance has been
slowly sapped by the war and by the present Government's erosive
tactics.
. If the Vatican presses this recent appointment, it -
seems likely that the State will bring matters to a head, since
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..weiter"
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? control over Church appeintments is essential to the Govern
merit's program for bringing the Church under its suzerainty.
(CONFIDENTI&L)
? 11? ?
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