WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004400030005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 29, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/25: CIA-RDP78-01617A004400030005-5
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SUMMARTES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
USSR
29 August 1950
1, Communist China's note to the UN Se2milz
Council char ing the US with aggression a ainst Formosa
represents the latest Soviet maneuver to weaken the non-
Communist front in the UN and to obstruct SC action on
Korea?, The Chinese Communist charge is a logical develop-
ment of Soviet propagandistic efforts, within and outside of
the SC, to label the US, particularly for Asiatic eyes, as
an aggressor.
(Page 4)
2. There has been no important incream_mgoily
in Communist activiILIn West Germany_ampt_j_n the field of
praagania, Soviet agenT7-77--oximately 15067 in West
Germany probably have agitation and espionage, rather than
sabotage, missions.
- (Page 5 )
3. . One shipment of American molvbdenyalajmain
to have reached the USSR thru ajfleal transshi tent,.
A second, shipment of American molybdenum plus a shipment of
French cobalt may. also reach the USSR by similar channels.,
.(Page 6)
4. The USSR and Burma have agreed to exchan e
ambassadors, according to a Foreign Office announcement in
Rangoon on 22 August. The two countries extended mutual '
recognition on 18 February 1948 and Burma initiated negotia-
tions for the exchange of representatives at least as early
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st,?/
as December 1949. Both the USSR and Communist China apparent-
ly withheld closer relations with the Burmese Government until
it became evident that the Burmese Communists were not powerful
enough to establish a government which might be safely recog-
nized. A Soviet mission in Rangoon can be expected to encourage
and exploit Burma's policy of "neutrality," its suspicion of
the West, and the leftist tendencies of influential non-Communist
Burmese leaders, both within and outside of the present Govern-
ment.
EASTERN EUROPE
GENERAL
5.
alignments of
the emergence
in weapons.
ALhytEkeslaet of World War,II and the present
Western Europe with the United States has been
of the Communist countries as the chief traffickers
(Page 7 )
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
6. Sweden has sus ended shi ments of vital ferro-
alloy to Czechoslovakia to force Czech adherence to terms of
1950 trade agreement.
(Page 7 )
FINLAND
7. A new Social Democrat-sponsored Finnish wage
offensive led off this week with a strike in the Metal Workers!
Union, Strikes by other unions, including the vital Lumber
Workers 2 Union, are scheduled to follow on 2 September. The
ovirsgfr-P
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SECRET
Social Democrats probably saw in the Government's institution
of price controls on 1 August an opportunity for the Communists
to claim that the Government, by delaying increases in the cost
of living index, wad attempting to prevent wage increases. The
Social Democrats have thus moved first to keep the initiative
in wage demands out of the hands of the Communists.
Very probable additional Social Democratic
motives were to make the Kekkonen Government appear incompetent
,and to raise their own stock among the workers in preparation
for the communal elections of 1-2 October. During the period
of pre-strike negotiations between government and labor,
Kekkonen informed the Diet and the Government would reimpose
wage control at the level created by the Fagerholm agreement,
if a peaceful settlement to the wage disputes could not be
refIchod. The bourgeois majority in the Diet gave the Cabinet
a vote of confidence on this statement with the Social
Democrats and Communists voting solidly in opposition.
YUGOSIAVIA
8.. Proamplil_of a Yugoslav-GreolLrammgmlat
;are little improved .but there has been a definite ameliora-
tion of Yugoslav relations with both Italy_anl_Austria.
?(Page 8 )
INTMNATIONAL COMMUNISM-
PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS
9. - The World Student 2=222 of the International
Union of Students_dyst concluded in Prague virtually ignored
functional issues of rimary interest to students and, instead,
confined itself to an endorsement of,the "peace" campaign,
condemnation of US aggression in Korea, and a demand that the
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/25: CIA-RDP78-01617A004400030005-5
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1_1 ?
(
SECRET
UN Security Council immediately undertake a peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean question..
(Page 10)
10. The Presidiut of the World Cottittee .of Peace.
Partisans announced at the conclusion of_itEitagq22112aaw.
that the Second World Peace Partisans would meet
in Britain from November 13 to lq. The Congress, originally
, planned for Italy, had already, been shifted oncel.to Warsaw,*
where it was scheduled to teat from October 16 to 21.
(Page 11)
EASTERN EUROPE
USSR
Chinese Communist cllar4es of US aggression
Laign2Lto confuse Korean issue
Communist China's note to the UN Security
Council, charging the ps with aggression against Formosa,
represents the latest ?evict nanouver to weaken the non-
Communist front in the UN and to obstruct Security Council
action on Korea. The Chinese Communist charge is a logical
development of Soviet propagandistic efforts, within and
outside of the Security Council, to label the US, particular-
ly for Asiatic eyes, as an aggressor. The latest Peiping
protest that US and British planes have bombed Chinese
territory is apparently intended further to substantiate
Soviet allegations of US aggression.
The USSR probably hopes by bringing the issue
of Formosa before the Security Council at this time to: (1)
confuse the issue of Communist aggression in Korea; (2) drive
a wedge between the US and Asiatic powers by attempting to
? 4 -
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t,)
SECRET
fan the flames of Asian suspicions and resentment of Western
imperialism and colonialism; (3) weaken the unanimity between
the US on the one hand, and the UK and France who have not
favored the US stand on Formosa; (4) Focus upon the US the
blame for possible Chinese frustration arising from the
obstruction of their plans to invade Formosa.
The introduction of the Chinese issue at this
time is a further indication that USSR has no intention of
resuming its boycott at the end of the month. Since its
presidency expires then, the USSR probably intends to anploy
the Chinese demand as a new pretext to obstruct Security
Council action on Korea. If it can sueceed in broadening
the UN discussions to include Formosa as well as Korea, the
USSR may hope to effect a compromise settlement of the Korean
problem on the basis of Western concessions regarding Formosa.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
No important Soviet?GDR action has accmpalled
increased propaganda hostilit to West Ger-12a
Although references to West Germany in the
recent speeches of East German officials retain the high
degree of hostility introduced at the Socialist Unity Party
Congress, there has been no important increase in Communist
activity in West Germany except in the field of propaganda.
Communist reaction to increased Allied and West German restric.
tions (suppression of Communist newspapers, more numerous
arrests, and 'banning of demonstrations) has been limited to
propaganda and unsuccessful attempts to organize local strikes.
A few West German policemen, however, have been injured in
clashes with "peace demonstrators," and the Communists continue
to insist that they will hold a Free German Youth rally of
100,000 in Dortmund in late September. (The rally has been
banned by the local authorities). The Communists, who are
reportedly transferring newspaper files and printing machine
ownership titles to party members in order to evade possible
seizure, are apparently preparing for illegal publishing
activitiesS
ltB11
SECRET
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A
F--
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SECRET
There has been a recent increase in the number of
Soviet and East German agents entering West Germany. It is
estimated that there are now approximately 1500 agents operating
in the German Federal Republic. They are believed to have agita-
tion and espionage, rather than sabotage, missions. Reportedly,
they are to place special emphasis on increasing fear in West
Germany and on the collection of economic intelligence. While
these agents increase the Communist capability for sabotage,
the Communists are unlikely to embark on a widespread sabotage
campaign in the near future. They are undoubtedly aware that
widespread sabotage could be undertaken only once and at the
cost of the destruction or serious crippling of their entire
subversive machine by Allied and West German retaliatory
action. (SECRET)
Thru ill2gLLIEplisshianents,
cobalt and mollyzio2anLraw reach USSR
The French have issued an export license for an
order of 5,080 kgs. of cobalt metal by a British firm and
intended to be shipped to Eastern Europe. This same firm
succeeded in transshipping 144 barrels of American molybdenum
to the USSR in May 1950. It has also been reliably reported
that a Brussels it is trying to arrange a second transship-
ment of 200 tons of American molybdenum through Switzerland
to the Soviets.
Molybdenum and cobalt are two of the USSRls most
scarce industrial raw materials. The transshipment of the
molybdenum in May is moSt serious; the acquisition of these
metals represents a significant addition to the Soviet potens-
tial for war. (SECRET)
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SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/25: CIA-RDP78-01617A004400030005-5