PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION ORE 50-50 PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
SEC ET
ORE 50-50 PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST A CHINESE
COMMUNIST INVASION 1
ORE 50-50 PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA
Supplement DURING 1950 9
Sty4K T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 ? CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A004100020003-1
PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST
A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION
(ORE 50-50)
The Problem
To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities
for an invasion of Indochina, the attitudes of
the Vietnamese that would affect their will to
resist such an invasion, and pertinent aspects
of a program of foreign aid that would be re-
quired to stimulate the will of the Vietnamese
to resist an invasion.
SUMMARY
In the event of a Chinese Communist in-
vasion of Indochina under present circum-
stances, it is almost certain that the defend-
ing forces under the French would soon lose
all of Vietnam except Cochinchina. So long
as present political and military conditions
continue unaltered, US material aid alone can-
not decisively improve this prospect.
Some 100,000 Chinese Communist troops
are presently deployed near enough to the In-
dochina border to make possible a Chinese at-
tack without appreciable forewarning. Ap-
proximately 150,000 additional Chinese Com-
munist troops could arrive at the border in
support of an invasion within ten days. Some
reinforcements might be moved by sea to rebel-
held sections of the Indochina coast. It is also
within Chinese Communist capabilities to fur-
nish air support for an invasion.
The 92,500 Viet Minh regulars and the 130,-
000 irregulars that make up the rebel forces
of Ho Chi Minh possess significant capabilities
for expanding their guerrilla operations and
thereby increasing the present cost in troops
and equipment borne by the opposing French.
Aid now being provided from Communist
China, moreover, is giving Ho's army an in-
creasing capability for an early large-scale of-
fensive against the French and a developing
potential for conventional warfare.
The operations of the French Army (some
150,500 regulars) reveal a lack of aggressive-
ness and are in part handicapped by a scar-
city of adequate material. The most that
French ground forces, who receive some sup-
port from weak indigenous forces totalling
66,700 men, can presently accomplish is the
destruction of enemy supplies and the conse-
quent temporary postponement of a Viet Minh
offensive. The French Air Force in Indochina
is weak and its limited capabilities are severely
strained by action against the Viet Minh. The
French Navy possesses forces adequate for sup-
port of the army in limited amphibious opera-
tions but is incapable of maintaining a com-
plete blockade against the smuggling of arms.
In balancing the capabilities of these oppos-
ing forces, it becomes apparent that, under
present circumstances, a Chinese Communist
invasion, which in all probability would be
supported by the Viet Minh, could easily pene-
trate French border defenses in Tonkin and
Note: This estimate concerning Chinese Communist capabilities is made in the light of CIA's
previous estimates that an early Chinese Communist invasion is possible but not prob-
able. The scope of the paper is in accord with the request of the Office of Intelligence
Research, Department of State.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of 5
September 1950.
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1
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2 - 0
compel withdrawal of defending forces to t e
south. The strategic Tonkin plain would
probably be overrun within six weeks and the
retention of a French foothold in the Saigon
area would depend upon the provision of rein-
forcements from abroad. If Chinese Commu-
nist assistance to the Viet Minh were increased,
while foreign aid for the French remained only
at the level presently programmed, and the
French were unable to develop the support of
the Vietnamese people, Ho could eventually
drive the French out of Indochina without the
direct support of invading Chinese Communist
forces.
In analyzing the probable Vietnam reaction
to a Chinese Communist invasion, considera-
tion must be given to the fact that the Viet-
namese are in general apathetic toward Com-
munism and antipathetic toward the French.
Forced to choose between present tangible
French control and the contingency of domi-
nation by international Communism, even
some of those Vietnamese who have some ap-
preciation of the nature of Communism prob-
ably would risk the change in the interest of
early achievement of national identity. Al-
though the Vietnamese dislike the Chinese, re-
gardless of their ideology, a rapid Chinese
Communist occupation of Vietnam would not
arouse active popular resistance or widespread
rallying to the French or Bao Dai. It might
well be met with resignation or opportunistic
cooperation.
The overriding preoccupation of Vietnamese
intellectuals and common people alike is the
issue of independence. The effect of foreign
aid on Vietnam will to resist Chinese Com-
munist encroachments must therefore be
viewed against this background of intense na-
tionalistic aspirations. If the French should
make satisfactory concessions to the spirit of
Vietnamese nationalism, a program of eco-
nomic assistance in Vietnam offering visible
improvement in the lot of the common people,
combined with military aid sufficient not only
to maintain French forces but also to develop
an effective national army, could be expected
to stimulate the Vietnamese will to resist.
The channeling of such aid through the Viet-
namese themselves, subject to a certain neces-
sary degree of French influence, would com-
plicate the problems of supply but would have
the advantage of encouraging Vietnamese de-
sire to defend the country. The announce-
ment of such an aid program would be more
effective if it preceded a Chinese Communist
invasion. In any event, the effectiveness of
the announcement would be seriously lessened
if it were not preceded by a declaration of un-
equivocal French concessions and followed by
the prompt and substantial delivery of such
aid.
SprE T
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rustic
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s the
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rit of
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SE
PROSPECTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA AGAINST
A CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION
Conclusions.
Under present political and military condi-
tions in Indochina, a Chinese Communist in-
vasion in force would quickly overrun Tonkin
and severely threaten the maintenance of even
a French foothold in the south. US material
aid alone cannot decisively change this situa-
tion.
In the event of an invasion, effective mili-
tary opposition will depend at least as much
on substantial modification of the present
anti-French attitude of the Vietnamese people,
as on the French Army or foreign assistance.
French guarantees of independence, if imme-
diately followed by the expansion and equip-
ping of an indigenous army, would stimulate
some Vietnamese will to resist. Even assum-
ing appropriate French concessions to Vietna-
mese nationalism, however, successful Viet-
namese opposition to the Chinese Communists
would depend on the amount of time available
to develop a popularly supported indigenous
regime and on the speed with which effective
Vietnamese forces could be created.
Chinese Communist Military Capabilities.
Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese
Communists would probably be undertaken in
cooperation with the forces of Ho Chi Minh.
Sizable Chinese Communist military forces
are in position to intervene in Indochina. De-
spite reports of actual and scheduled north-
ward movements of certain Chinese Commu-
nist field forces, approximately 100,000 troops
remain deployed along the Indochinese border.
These units could launch an invasion of Indo-
china without appreciable forewarning. Al-
though reliable reports do not indicate the
presence of armored units on the Indochina
border, a division of armored cars, plus a bat-
talion of tanks attached to the Fourth Field
Army, are stationed in South China within 700
miles of the frontier. Moreover, approxi-
mately 150,000 additional Chinese Communist
troops could arrive at the Indochina border
within ten days to bolster initial invading
forces. Even in the event of a simultaneous
assault on Taiwan, these reinforcements would
be available and would bring the potential in-
vading force to a total of at least 250,000
troops. In view of the Chinese Communists'
improving capability for waterlift, it is pos-
sible that some invasion forces might be moved
by sea to Viet Minh-held sections of the Indo-
china coast. There is no evidence, however,
of Chinese Communist preparations for such
a move.
Although there have been no indications of
any significant build-up of Chinese Commu-
nist Air Force strength in Southwest China
and although this air force has not yet ap-
peared in combat, the estimated 200 to 250
operational combat types (including fighters
and light bombers) in the Chinese Communist
Air Force could furnish effective air support
to operations in Indochina. There are six air-
fields in China within 170 miles of the Tonkin
border. In addition, construction of new air-
fields and the restoration of others in South-
west China are reportedly in progress in the
Tonkin-Kwangsi border area and on Hainan
Island.
Viet Minh Military Capabilities.
The forces of Ho Chi Minh, which have been
engaged in resistance activities against the
French since September 1945, are capable of
expanding their operations. Ho's organiza-
tion, commonly known as the "Viet Minh,"
possesses approximately 92,500 regular troops
and an estimated 130,000 irregulars. The
Viet Minh forces include 2,000 Khmer Issaraks
in Cambodia and 500 Issaraks in Laos.
The Viet Minh forces are geared primarily
for guerrilla warfare. The demonstrated ef-
fectiveness of a few task forces, each totaling
as many as three to five thousand men and
equipped with adequate infantry weapons and
some artillery, points to a developing capabil-
S Eyic
3
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4 SW/MET
ity for more conventional warfare. Under
present circumstances, the Viet Minh should
have little difficulty in maintaining relative
freedom of action throughout most of Indo-
china while simultaneously supporting pock-
ets of resistance within French-occupied terri-
tory and continuing to harass French lines of
communication. In addition, the Viet Minh
is capable of seizing one or more French border
outposts and holding them for a short time at
least.
Following the de jure recognition of the
"Democratic Republic of Vietnam" by Com-
munist China and the USSR, a general plan for
closer collaboration between the Chinese Com-
munists and the Viet Minh probably was
formulated. As many as 10 to 20 thousand
Viet Minh troops are being trained in Com-
munist China.. There is evidence that the
Chinese Communists have supplied the Viet
Minh with significant quantities of materiel,
probably confined to small arms, ammunition,
mortars, and light artillery. Access to train-
ing facilities in Communist China, the expan-
sion of routes and facilities for supply, and
the possibility of accelerating recruitment
give the Viet Minh the potential capabilities
for initiating a large-scale offensive against
the French at an early date.
Capabilities of French-Controlled Forces.
French ground, naval and air forces in In-
dochina are under the operational control of
GHQ, Armed Forces in the Far East (FAEO)
As of 1 July 1950, French regular ground forces
totalled approximately 150,500 men. An esti-
mated 66,700 troops in the armies of the Asso-
ciated States, although subject to the nominal
political control of these states, are under
FAEO operational control. In addition there
are 122,500 quasi-military and miscellaneous
indigenous troops under over-all FAEO con-
trol. Of these local forces, only the Vietna-
mese army, at present weak and ineffective,
has the potential for developing into a sig-
nificant force. French ground forces are capa-
ble of penetrating the Viet Minh-held areas of
Indochina but at the expense of garrison
strength engaged in pacification duties else-
where. The French have demonstrated a lack
of aggressiveness. The French-controlled
ground forces have a dual problem?the elimi-
nation of the Viet Mirth forces and the de-
fense of the China border. Indications are
that current emphasis is on the former. Un-
der these circumstances, the most they can
hope to achieve in the immediate future is the
destruction of enemy supply caches and the
consequent postponement of a large-scale
Viet Minh offensive.'
The strength of the French Air Force in
Indochina, which is severely strained by its
actions against Viet Minh forces, presently
totals 84 fighters and fighter-reconnaissance
aircraft, 68 transports and 50 liaison planes.
The level of serviceability of fighter aircraft,
now about 55 percent, will probably continue
to drop as maintenance shortages become more
acute. Many of the French air installations?
few in number and generally in poor condi-
tion?are vulnerable to sabotage and some
even to direct Viet Mirth attack.
French naval forces are adequate for sup-
porting the army in small-scale amphibious
operations and for conducting raids against
the rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast.
Their inability to maintain a complete block-
ade of the coast is demonstrated by the extent
of over-water arms smuggling now in progress.
French Naval Forces, Far East, stationed in
Indochina, consist of 166 small craft and ships.
and 21 aircraft manned by 8,750 personnel.
Vessels in the most important categories cur-
rently stationed in Indochina waters include
one old cruiser, 11 fleet minesweepers, two
LST's, nine submarine chasers of various types
and a number of supporting service and re-
pair craft. Naval aircraft include nine patrol
bombers and 12 reconnaissance aircraft.
Comparison of Opposing Forces.
A Chinese Communist invasion could with-
out difficulty penetrate the extended French
perimeter in Tonkin and rapidly overcome the
defending forces. Although the French Air
Force would be capable of limited defensive
action in the event of an invasion, there is a
grave risk of its being overwhelmed if the
Chinese Communists committed their air force
in support of the attack. On the ground, only
in the coastal border area of the strategic
Tonkin plain, where the French are organized
S4?WKT
ii
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?
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rT
he de-
ns are
Un-
3y can
3 is the
nd the
e-scale
wee in
by its
.3sently
.ssance
planes.
ircraft,
ntinue
e more
Ions?
condi-
some
)r sup-
iibious
tgainst
? coast.
block-
extent
ogress.
ned in
ships.
sonnel.
es cur-
nclude
s, two
s types
.nd re-
patrol
t.
I with-
French
me the
ch Air
fensive
re is a
if the
ir force
d, only
rategic
;anized
in some depth, could effective resistance
against a Chinese assault be expected and
even in this. area inferior front line strength
and the lack of reserves would inevitably com-
pel a withdrawal. It is estimated that a Chi-
nese Communist force of 100 to 150 thousand
could overrun the whole Tonkin plain within
six weeks, but that the French could hold a
temporary beachhead in the vicinity of Hai-
phong. A successful second-phase Chinese
Communist drive further to the south would
take longer and require additional troops. In
this circumstance, French maintenance of a
firm foothold around Saigon would depend
upon the provision of military reinforcements
from abroad.
Although French forces in Indochina are at
present stalemated, a French offensive in Ton-
kin, with considerable outside aid, probably
could carry through to the border and might
even effectively isolate the Viet Minh from
overland Chinese Communist aid. However,
such an offensive probably would not result
in the destruction of the Viet Minh forces. If
Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh con-
tinues to increase?as seems probable?and if
the French receive no more foreign assistance
than is now programmed and are unable to
develop the support of the Vietnamese people,
the Viet Minh could eventually defeat the
French in Indochina without the help of an
overt Chinese invasion.
Key Vietnamese Attitudes.
Key Vietnamese attitudes which would
largely determine their conduct in the event
of a Chinese Communist invasion are their
views concerning: international Communism,
the local Chinese, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet
Minh, and the French.
The Vietnamese people, as a whole, know
little about international Communism. The
opposite poles of political attraction in Viet-
nam are represented by the Viet Minh and the
French-Vietnamese regime. The fact that the
Viet Minh is an instrument of international
Communism causes the average Vietnamese
little or no concern. Although most educated
Vietnamese are aware that the espousal of
Communism entails the risk of Soviet control,
it is probable that?forced to choose between
actual French control and hypothetical Soviet
5
control?most Vietnamese intellectuals would
be willing to grant Communism a trial.
Among all classes of the Vietnamese popu-
lation, the local Chinese, who compose the
majority of the small merchant group, are
generally disliked. The memory of previous
Vietnamese wars of liberation against Chinese
overlords and the Chinese occupation of Ton-
kin during 1945-46 is painful. To the Viet-
namese, the Chinese are unpopular, regardless
of their ideology.
Ho Chi Mirth's Viet Minh is widely regarded
by all classes of the Vietnamese population
as the potential liberator of Vietnam from the
French yoke. Most Vietnamese intellectuals,
even some of those who are in the Bao Dal
Government, regard armed opposition to the
French as justifiable and, to this extent, ap-
prove of the Viet Minh's activities. Although
in some areas of Tonkin where the Viet Minh
has used scorched-earth tactics, the peasantry
has reportedly become bitter, such hostility (if
measured in terms of popularity of the Bao
Dai Government) has failed to produce signifi-
cant results.
The French are the targets of historical
Vietnamese antipathy, rooted in decades of
colonial rule. Postwar French policy has done
little to diminish this antipathy and the desire
for independence has grown progressively
stronger. The French today are regarded by
almost all Vietnamese as the prime obstacle
to the attainment of these intense nationalistic
aspirations.
Probable Conduct in the Event of Invasion.
In all probability, a Chinese Communist seiz-
ure of Tonkin would be rapidly accomplished.
As a result, the Tonkinese intelligentsia, most
of whom would be basically opposed to the
entry of Chinese troops, would have little op-
portunity to manifest opposition in an organ-
ized and effective manner. Those now in Ho's
camp probably would continue loyal to him;
the rest could be expected to make themselves
as inconspicuous as possible while awaiting
developments.
Elsewhere in Vietnam, the attitude of Viet-
namese intellectuals would be largely affected
by the determined nature of the French de-
fense and by the prospects for US intervention,
either locally or as part of general US-Coln-
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6
;?9110 .CA
munist China hostilities. Absence of strong
defensive action by the French or lack of US
interest in the conflict would probably force
those Vietnamese, who?although fearful of
Communism?would see the futility of solitary
resistance, to accept Communist rule.
In contrast to the intelligentsia, the mass
of the Vietnamese people?in the absence of
effective and popular anti-Communist leader-
ship?probably would accept the burden of
Chinese occupation much as they have ac-
cepted it in the past. A pact with Communist
China which offered Ho ostensible control of
a post invasion Vietnamese government, would
probably be welcomed, at least at the outset,
by the vast majority of Vietnamese. Even
evidences of Chinese imperialism subsequent
to the invasion probably would be rationalized
by the majority so long as the Ho government
did not actively oppose such actions.
Foreign Aid and the Vietnamese Will to Resist
Invasion.
All problems connected with the strengthen-
ing of the indigenous will to resist a Chinese
Communist invasion of Indochina by means of
foreign aid inevitably are related to the issue
of nationalism. As a whole, both Vietnamese
intelligentsia and the mass of the people are
preoccupied with the problem of their inde-
pendence.
The character of whatever aid is granted in
the immediate future will have little effect on
the Vietnamese because of the present atmos-
phere of mutual Franco-Vietnamese distrust.
So long as French monopolization of the key
elements of administrative and military power
continues, the Vietnamese are likely to view
foreign military aid as a device actually in-
tended to strengthen French hegemony and
would probably either be apathetic to a Chi-
nese Communist invasion or would welcome
the invading forces. Economic aid?for
health, agriculture, transportation, and re-
construction?would engender some gratitude
but, if the allocation of such aid were subject
to French control, its effect on the Vietnamese
will to resist a Chinese Communist invasion
would be minimized.
If, instead, it were assumed that a reso-
lution of the difficulties arising from mu-
tual Franco-Vietnamese distrust had been
achieved, the character of foreign aid required
to stimulate the will of the Vietnamese people
to resist a Chinese Communist invasion could
be estimated as follows: (1) a program of eco-
nomic assistance which, in the manner of the
Griffin Mission proposals, would offer visible
improvement in the lot of the common people;
and (2) military aid beyond that necessary to
maintain French forces in the area and suffi-
cient to permit the development of a sizable
and adequately equipped national army. It
is recognized that the development of an effec-
tive Vietnam army is a long-range task made
difficult by a shortage of trained personnel
and by the fears of the French authorities
that they may not be able to control a strong
native army. Nevertheless, the announce-
ment and the rapid implementation of plans
to create such a force would at once stimulate
the spirit of Vietnamese resistance to aggres-
sion and lessen antipathy toward the French.
The utilization of French managerial knowl-
edge is essential to efficient administration of
foreign aid in Vietnam. However, as earlier
discussion has shown, Vietnamese suspicions
are such that unless the indigenous Vietna-
mese government is clearly recognized as the
authority through which aid is dispensed, the
local reaction will be unfavorable. In this
connection, it is probable that if the French
were willing to make full concessions in mat-
ters of form, the Vietnamese would be willing
to concede much in matters of substance. Un-
der these circumstances, French participation
(possibly with third-party or UN supervision) ,
as paid advisors and technicians exercising a
substantial managerial function within the
framework of the Vietnamese government,
might well prove to be a satisfactory com-
promise formula. The device of channeling
aid through the Vietnamese, subject to such
a degree of French influence, would do much
to develop respect for the Bao Dai regime and
concomitantly to encourage a Vietnamese de-
sire to aid in defense of their country.
A final factor in stimulating the will of the
Vietnamese to resist invasion is that of timing,
which although subsidiary in importance to
the French attitude toward granting inde-
pendence, is nevertheless significant. If what-
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?
I been
:quired
people
could
of eco-
of the
visible
teople;
;ary to
I suffi-
sizable
It
t effec-
: made
sonnel
.orities
strong
ounce-
plans
nulate
ggres-
rench.
knowl-
Lion of
earlier
Acions
rietna-
as the
xi, the
n this
.Prench
-I mat-
willing
. Un-
pation
ision),
sing a
in the
anent,
corn-
neling
3 such
much
le and
3se de-
of the
lining,
nce to
inde-
what-
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ever aid that may be offered is announced
subsequent to, rather than prior to, an inva-
sion by the Chinese Communists, the effect
on the Vietnamese will to resist will be minor
regardless of other factors which may charac-
terize the timing of the announcement. Fur-
E T 7
thermore, unless the announcement of aid is
timed in the light of practicable delivery dates,
even a promise of assistance made against the
background of French guarantees of inde-
pendence will be followed by disillusionment
and disappointment.
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doprt..e, ?
PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE COMMUNIST
ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950
(ORE 50-50 Supplement)
1. Introduction and Conclusions.
Communist China at present possesses the
capability for a successful invasion of Indo-
china. If Communist China, as a participant
in the world Communist movement, were
called upon to invade Indochina, it could prob-
ably be persuaded to initiate such an opera-
tion. Chinese Communist military commit-
ments elsewhere would not necessarily mili-
tate against an invasion of Indochina because
the Chinese Communists possess the forces
necessary for military action?separately or
simultaneously?against Indochina, Korea,
Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao.
Despite this general capability and despite
the existence of Chinese Communist military
concentrations along the Indochina border,
adequate for the task, it is estimated that an
open Chinese Communist invasion?while pos-
sible and capable of being launched with little
or no preliminary warning?is improbable in
1950 because considerations (from the stand-
point of Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese Commu-
nists, and international Communism) favoring
such action appear to be outweighed by con-
siderations opposing it. It is highly probable,
however, that the Chinese Communists will
continue to expand military assistance to the
Viet Minh forces (by measures short of open
invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide those
forces with the capability of achieving signifi-
cant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and,
assuming that the French receive no more aid
than is presently programmed, of eventually
expelling the French without the aid of a Chi-
nese Communist invasion.
2. Types of Chinese Communist Action.
The two major courses of action open to the
Chinese Communists in support of the Viet
Minh are: (a) overt intervention in the form
of an invasion; or (b) assistance short of open
invasion.
a. Overt Intervention.
(1) Indicators:
Recent Chinese Communist activity in the
two border provinces of Kwangsi and Yun-
nan?the construction and improvement of
roads, railroads, and air facilities?might be
construed as positive indicators of an impend-
ing invasion. It is equally valid, however, to
interpret these activities as indicators of an
increase in the flow of Chinese Communist
aid to the Viet Minh and its subsidiary move-
ment in Laos and Cambodia.
The presence of some 100,000 Chinese Com-
munist troops in the Indochina border re-
gion?whence they could launch an invasion
without appreciable warning?might also be
construed as a positive indicator. The pres-
ence of these troops, however, can be explained
in part by the need for "pacification" forces
in Southwest China, where thousands of anti-
Communist guerrillas have been operating.
It is also noteworthy that the present strength
of Chinese Communist troops in the Indochina
border area is only one-third of that reported
in May of this year.
(2) Factors Favoring Intervention:
The following factors favor a Chinese Com-
munist invasion of Indochina in 1950:
(a) A Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-
china would be the most rapid means of build-
Note: This estimate was prepared under urgent procedures upon the request of the Intelligence
Organization of the Department of State, dated 1 September 1950. Because of the
limited time available it was not feasible to integrate it with ORE 50-50 which was
already in process of coordination.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report; for the dissent of the Intelligence Organization of the
Department of the Army, see Enclosure A.
Declassified
11111lar
. i
. ,
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9
7e sig-
neu-
mem-
rgani-
oppor-
tic re-
e cur-
or ap-
Indo-
ted by
.tnam,
he Ho
: men-
vasion
ie risk
)en to
Io Chi
stance
t Corn-
tonths
to the
mical-
They
1g this
lowing
s, not
hinese
_ons in
being
have
nalist-
Both
move-
e Viet
nnent,
the
lerable
7411 be
tists in
1 prob-
easing
ochina
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? SET
and by enlarging the already substantial
training program for Indochinese within
China.
(3) As to personnel, "volunteer" soldiers are
believed to have already inconspicuously
joined the Viet Minh forces in small numbers.
Although individual "volunteers" probably will
be further encouraged, such reinforcement is
not likely to attain extensive proportions since
the language problem, among others, will con-
stitute a limiting factor. Problems entailed
in utilizing "volunteers" can and probably will
be partly overcome by integrating small units
of Chinese Communists into the Viet Minh
forces, operating under Viet Minh command.
Those elements most acceptable to the Viet
Minh probably would be of a specialized na-
ture, such as artillery, tank, mortar, engineer,
signal, and medical units, capable of providing
support and services now limited or unavail-
able to the Viet Minh. It is improbable that
units larger than battalions would be inte-
grated, for fear of exposing direct Chinese
Communist involvement and because of the
increased applicability of those considerations
which reduce the prospects of open Chinese
Communist invasion (see 2 a. (3) above).
3. Prospects for Success of Chinese
Communist Courses of Action.
If the Chinese Communists openly invade
Indochina under present circumstances, it is
almost certain that defending forces under the
French would soon lose all of Vietnam except
Cochinchina. A Chinese Communist force of
100,000 to 150,000 could probably overrun the
Tonkin plain during the first six weeks of
operation, reducing the French position in the
north to a temporary beachhead in the vicinity
of Haiphong. Although a second-phase Chi-
nese Communist drive further to the south
would take longer and require additional
troops, Peiping is capable of providing the
forces required from areas south of the
Yangtze River without immediate jeopardy to
other possible operations.
Available information does not permit firm
quantitative estimates of either materiel pres-
ently in the hands of the Viet Minh forces or
of present or future rates of flow from China.
Supply from China is presently confined to
transport over secondary overland routes and
by coastal smuggling, with French forces hold-
ing positions on the main overland supply
routes. In addition, Viet Minh forces up to
now have shown no indication of a capability
for orthodox warfare on a scale approaching
that essential if French forces are to be elimi-
nated from Tonkin. Although these consider-
ations do not rule out the possibility that
the Viet Minh may already be equipped and
trained in the use of heavy arms on a substan-
tial scale, with its presently estimated capabili-
ties the Viet Minh probably could not mount a
sustained offensive capable of driving the
French from Indochina in 1950.
Nevertheless, it is estimated that during the
autumn of 1950 the Viet Minh will be capable
of launching the initial phase of such an of-
fensive which could result in the seizure or
destruction of several key French border posts.
Neutralizing these French strongholds, in ad-
dition to further reducing French strength
through attritional warfare, would permit the
flow of heavy equipment from China to the
Viet Minh in greatly increased quantity. Ac-
quisition of this equipment, assuming that
the French receive no more aid than is pres-
ently programmed, would enable the Viet Minh
to develop a preponderance of force over the
French in a matter of months. Meanwhile,
the earliest reliable test of the actual military
strength of the Viet Minh forces will be their
showing in the campaigns of limited objectives
which it is anticipated they will undertake in
the coming weeks.
SireE T
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10
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ing up the military strength of the anti-
French forces.
(b) Moreover, it is doubtful that the French
will be able to provide large-scale reinforce-
ments to their forces in Indochina in sufficient
time to oppose such an invasion.
(c) Further, decisive Communist action in
Indochina in 1950 would expel the French and
bring that area under Communist control be-
fore any appreciable build-up in the military
strength of the western bloc could be achieved.
(d) In addition, the fall of Vietnam to the
Communists would hasten the accommodation
of Burma and Thailand to Communist power.
(e) On the other hand, should a Chinese
Communist invasion of Indochina in 1950 not
be immediately decisive, and should US or
other western forces subsequently intervene,
the invasion would serve to contain substan-
tial military strength of the western bloc in
inconclusive peripheral warfare in the Far
East.
(3) Factors Opposing Intervention:
The following factors appear to reduce the
prospects for an invasion under present cir-
cumstances:
(a) Without major external assistance to
the French and their supporters, Communist
"liberation" of Indochina would be accom-
plished ultimately without resort to overt Chi-
nese Communist intervention.1 In order to
achieve his objective of expelling the French,
Ho Chi Minh?who at present is estimated to
have 92,500 regular troops, 130,000 irregulars,
and extensive manpower reserves?needs and
probably prefers materiel and technical-
advisory assistance rather than direct Chinese
Communist intervention.
(b) The presence of Chinese Communist
troops in Indochina?in addition to weakening
the nationalistic appeal to the Viet Minh move-
ment?would arouse local anti-Chinese senti-
ment and be a serious source of command
conflict between Peiping and the Viet Minh
leadership.
(c) World Communism thus far has sought
to present Communist aggression under the
guise of indigenous "civil wars."
'See conclusion of ORE 50-50.
(d) A Communist invasion would have sig-
nificant negative effects on the presently neu-
tral states of Asia, particularly India.
(e) Communist China's prospects for mem-
bership in the UN and UN-sponsored organi-
zations would be eliminated and the oppor-
tunity for the establishment of diplomatic re-
lations with non-orbit powers would be cur-
tailed.
(f) The USSR may hesitate to urge or ap-
prove a Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-
china, because to do so would risk the possible
substitution of Peiping's influence, backed by
Communist forces in "occupation" of Vietnam,
for its own present remote control over the Ho
Chi Minh regime.
(g) In addition to the specific factors men-
tioned above, an open Communist invasion
of Indochina would greatly increase the risk
of global war.
b. Assistance Short of Open Invasion.
A second general course of action open to
the Chinese Communists in support of Ho Chi
Minh is the expansion of military assistance
short of open intervention. The Chinese Com-
munists during the past six to eight months
have provided substantial assistance to the
Viet Minh in the form of materiel, technical-
advisory aid, training, and personnel. They
have the capability of greatly increasing this
assistance.
(1) Materiel is now reported to be flowing
into Indochina in increasing amounts, not
only across the border but also from Chinese
coastal ports via Hainan. Communications in
Southwest China and in Tonkin are being
improved and the Chinese Communists have
secured control of many former Nationalist-
held islands off the south China coast. Both
these developments greatly facilitate the move-
ments of materiel into Indochina. The Viet
Mirth has been short of heavy equipment,
particularly artillery, and although the
present volume is unknown, considerable
quantities of such materiel probably will be
forthcoming from the Chinese Communists in
the future.
(2) Technical-advisory aid could and prob-
ably will be greatly expanded by increasing
the number of persons detailed to Indochina
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ENCLOSURE A
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, dissents for the following reason:
Page 9, section 2.a. (1), second paragraph,
last sentence. G-2 has never carried a troop
strength figure higher than 180,000 for the
area of South and Southwest China (Yunnan
and west Kwangsi). This area includes more
territory than the border region defined in
page 9, section 2.a. (1), second paragraph, first
sentence, as now containing 100,000 Chinese
Communist troops. The 180,000 figure for
the larger area was carried by G-2 in May
1950, but troop strength in the border region
as defined above was approximately the same
in May 1950 as it is now, that is, 100,000.
NOTE
CIA fully accepts the accuracy of these G-2
troop strength figures. The discrepancy in
CIA and G-2 views arises from a difference in
the definition of "border area." The "border
area" referred to in this paper on page 9, sec-
tion 2.a. (1), second paragraph, last sentence,
comprises a strip of land approximately 90
miles in uniform depth along the Indochina
border from Mengtzu to the Gulf of Tonkin
(see enclosed map). The G-2 "border area,"
however, appears on the one hand to exclude
the Kwangtung coastal strip adjacent to Indo-
china and on the other to include the Kunming
area over 150 miles from the border. The
conclusions of the paper are not affected by
this difference in definition.
13
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-.7
I 11.?13.1
?,YA-110.1
Hdikou
'p
CHINESE FORCES
FRENCH PERIMETER
VIET MINH CONTROLLED AREA
le AIRFIELD ? SEAPLANE BASE
A FRENCH OUTPOST
ROUTES OF PENETRATION
+do Terrain favorable
Terrain not so favorable
-4-- MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE
FRENCH UNION FORCES
French Indigenous Troops Total
VIETNAM Regulars Auxiliaries
North 58,500 6,500 7,700 72,700
Central 23,500 10,200 3,500 37,2C0
South 56,000 11,500 17,800 85,300
Total 138,000 28,200 29,000 195,200
LAOS 7.000 2,600 9,600
CAMBODIA 5,500 6,900 12,400
Totals 150,500 37,700 29,000 217,200
VIET MINH REGULAR FORCES
TONKIN 90,000
ANNAM 22,000
COCHIN CHINA 21,000
LAOS 5,000
CAMBODIA 4,500
Total 92,500
IRREGULARS 130,000
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tr c non.