THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEST GERMAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004000040002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 11, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY N0, 220
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR RES1vARCH AND REPORTS
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEST GERMAN
MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO
WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE
GIA/RR 37-50
Published 11 December 1950
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Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
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THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEST GERMAN MILITARY
CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE
The members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) have agreed in prin-
ciple on the desirability of West German con-
tributions to European defense, although dif~
ferences in regard to the exact nature, extent,
and timing of such contributions still persist.
For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed
that: (1) Germany will contribute to West
European defense approximately ten ground
combat divisions, totaling about 170,000 offi-
cers and men; (2) these divisions will be
under the command of NATO, and not under
a German General Staff; (3) these divisions
will be dependent upon NATO for the procure-
ment of their arms and equipment; (4) Ger-
many will have no navy or strategic air force,
but will have such tactical air units for the
support of the combat divisions as the NATO
unified command deems necessary; (5) Ger-
man military production will be under NATO
control.
Although the West Germans have increas-
ingly shown concern for their own military
security and desire for strengthening Allied
forces in Germany, public opinion is still un-
formed concerning German participation in
Western defense. The Federal Government
favors such participation for its effects on
German military security, bargaining power
with the Allies, international prestige, and
internal economic expansion. The Socialists,
whose support would be essential to effective
remilitarization, will be particularly insistent
on prior attainment of German sovereignty
and equality and on major increases in Allied
military strength before consenting to Ger-
man remilitarization.
Remilitarization would extend federal con-
trol over the Laender and might eventually
require some form of military conscription.
It would also result in a general expansion of
industrial activity and absorption of a large
number of the unemployed, thus compensat-
ing for a possible consumer goods shortage.
Serious problems for future German political
development along democratic lines would
arise from the introduction into the present
West German scene of a German military or-
ganization. It is possible that the officers,
with their strongly authoritarian political
tendencies, might again become a powerful
factor in West Germany. A problem to West-
ern interests would be posed by the Eastern
orientation of some officers, who might at-
tempt to reach agreements with the USSR.
Although effective NATO controls would tend
to counter the adverse implications of West
German remilitarization, such controls are
likely to become increasingly difficult to main-
tain over an extended period of German eco-
nomic and military mobilization.
Although the NATO countries have accepted
the necessity of German military participa-
tion in a Western defense force, early imple-
mentation will encounter considerable ob-
struction, especially on the part of France.
The development of an effective Western de-
fense system with German participation will,
however, engender a feeling of security among
the peoples of Western and Northern Europe.
The Kremlin has probably realized for some
time that its global strategy and the creation
of the- East German Alert Police would eventu-
ally lead to some form of West German remili-
tarization. While the USSR will probably
rely on political and diplomatic means to pre-
vent the effective participation of West Ger-
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy,
~ and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to
CIA as of 10 November 1950.
SEC
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many in the Western defense system, the pos-
sibility- cannot be ruled out that the USSR
will resort to military action. Such action
would probably not be taken at least until the
USSR concludes that these means have failed
and that West German remilitarization will
make the NATO military establishment a
serious threat to the USSR. Even under these
conditions, a Soviet decision to use military
force, which would mean war with the West,
would involve larger considerations than West
German remilitarization.
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THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEST GERMAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS
TO WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE
Introduction.
The rapid growth of interest in West Ger-
man remilitarization, reflecting the increased
tension of the international situation and cul-
minating during September 1950 in the New
York Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Min-
isters of the US, UK, and France and of the
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the North
Atlantic Pact nations, has helped to crystal-
lize the probable form of future remilitariza-
tion. Clearly rejected in the majority of West
German comment, as well as by the Defense .
Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), is the recreation of an in-
dependent, national German army. The Tri-
partite Foreign Ministers and the NATO offi-
cially agreed in principle on the desirability
of West German contributions to European
defense. Differences among the various pow-
ers as to the exact nature, extent, and timing
of such contributions still prevent agreement
on the details.
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it
is assumed that : (1) Germany will contribute
to West European defense approximately ten
ground combat divisions, totalling about 170,-
000 officers and men; (2) these divisions will
be under the command of NATO, and not
under a German General Staff; (3) these di-
visions will be dependent upon NATO for the
procurement of their arms and equipment; "
(4) Germany will have no navy or strategic
air force, but will have such tactical air units
for support of the combat divisions as the
NATO unified command deems necessary; (5)
German military production will be under
NATO control. (The term "remilitarization"
is used in this paper to denote German rear-
mament in accordance with the foregoing as-
sumptions.)
Reaction and Implications in West Germany.
Since the outbreak of the Korean war, fear
of Soviet aggression has increased sharply
among West Germans and expressed itself in
demands for effective defense of Western Ger-
many's eastern frontier by strengthened Allied
armies. Despite this growing concern over
military security, West German public opinion
is still not crystallized concerning German
participation in Western defense. Sentiment
against rearmament is still strong, particu-
larly among the young Germans. The fears.
most frequently voiced in connection with ac-
tive German participation in a Western de-
fense effort are: the outbreak of a general war;
the likelihood of Soviet reprisals; the finality
of the division of Germany; an armaments
race between East and West Germany, with
the eventual prospect of a civil war on Ger-
man soil; and finally, the "sacrifice of German
blood for foreign interests." Furthermore, vir-
tually all Germans reject service in a Western,
force before Germany has been granted full
sovereignty and equal status among the free
nations.
In keeping with public opinion, the Federal
Government and the political parties have
shown increasing interest in German remili-
tarization. Chancellor Adenauer has re-
peatedly stated that the threat from the East
must be met by: (1) a rapid increase in US
forces in Germany to a total of at least ten
armored divisions; (2) the creation of an in-
tegrated Western defense force; and (3) an
early decision regarding German participa-
tion in this force. The Chancellor's desire for
West German contributions to Western de-
fense arises from a conviction that such con-
tributions would : (1) materially enhance the
military security of West Germany; (2) im-
prove the Federal Republic's bargaining po-
sition with the Allies on other issues; (3) en-
sure rapid attainment of German interna-
tional equality; and (4) serve to accelerate
German economic recovery and Western Eu-
ropean integration.
The chief opposition party, the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD), has stated that the only
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formula for remilitarization it would find ac-
ceptable would be German participation in a
"European defense force." The SPD, how-
ever, refuses to consider any remilitarization
plans until: (1) Allied forces in Germany are
made strong enough not merely to defend the
Elbe line successfully, but also to liberate East
Germany immediately and carry the war onto
enemy territory; (2) Germany is made fully
sovereign and equal to the other Western
European countries; and (3) anew Bundestag
has been elected: In addition, the SPD has
taken the position that remilitarization would
have to be preceded by amendment of the
Basic Law requiring atwo-thirds Bundestag
majority. The SPD might agree to support re-
militarization for something less than satis-
faction of its extreme demands, but it would
be even more insistent than the Federal Gov-
ernment on a major increase in the strength
of Allied forces in Germany. The very scope
of the SPD demands, if not modified, would
place the Adenauer administration in a diffi=
cult position. However, especially in view of
the existing opposition to rearmament, SPD
support would appear to be a necessary pre-
requisite for the implementation of the re-
militarization program.
For West Germany as a whole, remilitariza-
tion would bring about a greater measure of
sovereignty and international equality,
strengthen German prestige and bargaining
power, and increase the scope of federal au-
thority over the Laender. Remilitarization
would necessitate formation of a federal de-
fense ministry and might eventually require
some form of military conscription. It would
shift the burden of industrial production from
civilian use to military requirements. The
general expansion.of industrial activity would
absorb a large number of the unemployed and
increase the national product, thus compen-
sating for a possible consumer goods shortage.
An increase in taxation and allocation of ma-
terials in short supply would be inevitable.
The introduction of a German military or-
ganization into the present West German
scene will pose serious problems for future
German political development along demo-
cratic lines. Effective remilitarization of
West Germany will require some use of the
old officer corps and of manpower trained and
in service under the Nazi regime. Expedi-
ency, time, and available facilities would pre-
clude selection of an entirely new officer corps.
Even if the former officers were screened so
as to eliminate the most active Nazis, they
would still constitute a body with strongly
authoritarian political tendencies, which
might again become a powerful factor in Ger-
many. Under their leadership, the new Ger-
man military establishment might arouse ex-
treme nationalist and Irredentist sentiment
(especially among the more than 8 million
refugees and expellees) , provide a cover or or-
ganizational center for various extreme right-
ist groups, and influence the government by
the mere weight of its position in political and
economic life. Military influence over the
government might lead to the alienation of
the trade unions, the SPD, and even the left
wing of the CDU, and thereby weaken the co-
hesion of the present pro-Western front in
Germany. Moreover, the coordinated de-
velopment of German economic and military
strengths may well lead to their amalgama-
tion and eventual ascendancy over the Fed-
eral Government. The relative weakness of
this government, stemming from its lack of
firm popular support and the probable in-
ability or unwillingness of the present Ger-
man bureaucracy to combat the military,
could promote such a development.
Another problem for Western security is
posed by the doubtful position of some mili-
tary circles in the East-West struggle. An
anti-Communist attitude on the part of these
cliques would not by any means exclude at-
tempts to reach expedient agreements directly
with the USSR or through East Germany.
Such attempts would be in line with the
thought, historically strong in German mili-
tary sets, that Germany's destiny lies in the
East, and that Germany .has prospered most
when it has been on friendly terms with Rus-
sia. The revival of this tradition, which finds
support on both the extreme Right and Left,
might be given impetus by the belief that the
Western Powers will not be able to prevent a
Soviet advance in Western Europe and that
German unification can be achieved only with
the help of the USSR. Those who seek an
S*
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SEC- T
accommodation with the USSR do not fear
that an alliance between Germany and the
USSR would draw Germany completely into
the Soviet satellite system and have often ex-
pressed the belief that such a development
would be prevented by the political, strategic,
and technological weight ~ of a united and re-
militarized Germany.
The imposition of effective NATO controls
would tend to counteract the adverse implica-
tions of German remilitarization discussed in
the preceding paragraphs. The denial of an
independent economic basis and .the limita-
tion of the size and character of the forces
would diminish the political weight which the
German military establishment exerted under
earlier regimes. The traditional German
tendency toward militarism could probably be
contained within the framework of Allied con-
trols as long as these controls are effectively
maintained. Such controls, however, are
likely to become increasingly difficult as the
German economic and military potential is
mobilized for the Western defense effort. The
Allies are committed to a policy of gradually
transferring sovereignty and responsibility to
the German authorities. German demands,
however, will outpace Allied implementation
of this policy.
Reaction and Implications in Western and
Northern Europe.
The principle of eventual participation of
German armed units in a Western defense
force under the NATO was accepted by the
Western and Northern European countries.
Despite French acceptance of this concept re-
garding Germany, the deep-seated opposition
to German rearmament before Western armed
forces are built up or before the Schuman Plan
is effective will continue. The French will
insist on the priority of French rearmament
and will resist any steps toward the equip-
ment of German units which might divert
arms from other Western European alloca-
tions. As a result, implementation of any
program which includes the rapid creation of
a large German ground force will encounter
considerable French obstruction. Such ob-
struction might be viewed sympathetically by
the Benelux countries and, to a lesser degree,
by Norway and Denmark. To the extent that
West German military contributions result
in an effective Western European defense sys-
tem under NATO, however, a feeling of secu-
rity will be engendered among the peoples of
Western and Northern Europe.
Reaction and Implications in the Soviet Bloc.
The Kremlin has probably realized for some
time that its global strategy and the creation
of the East German Alert Police would eventu-
ally lead to some form of West German re-
militarization. In an attempt to prevent such
a development the USSR is now employing a
variety of diplomatic and political measures.
Within this framework, the USSR could cal-
culate that its only means to neutralize West
Germany militarily would be an effective
agreement among the Big Four, or more
states, for the_ permanent demilitarization of
all of Germany. Since such a demilitariza-
tion could be enforced only in a united Ger-
many, the principal prerequisite would be So-
viet acceptance of the Western position on
free elections throughout Germany. This
would greatly reduce the USSR's present con-
trol over East Germany. The USSR has given
no indication of willingness to sacrifice such
control.
Accordingly, the Soviet Union might calcu-
late that a better course of action -would be
to accommodate itself to the fact of West Ger-
man rearmament. The USSR might estimate
that the Western Powers would, in order to
ensure full West German participation iri
Western defense plans, have to remove all
effective controls over West Germany and that
this, in turn, would enable the West German
Government to pursue an independent for-
eign policy. The USSR might believe that
this situation could be exploited through ne-
gotiations with West Germany.
While the USSR will probably rely on po-
litical and diplomatic means to prevent the
effective participation of West Germany in
the Western defense system, the possibility
cannot be ruled out that the USSR will resort
to military action. Such action would prob-
ably not be taken at least until the USSR
concludes that these means have failed and
that West German remilitarization will make
the NATO military establishment a serious
threat to the USSR. Even under these con-
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ditions, a Soviet decision to use military force,
which would mean war with the West, would
involve larger considerations than West Ger-
man remilitarization.
West German remilitarization will be used
by the USSR as "justification" for retaining
and, perhaps, increasing its own forces in
East Germany and the other satellites. At
the same time, the remilitarization of East
Germany will be accelerated in order to in-
crease the over-all military strength of the
Soviet bloc. Also, the long-standing Soviet
propaganda effort against West German re-
militarization will be intensified. By seeking
to promote fear of German military resur-
gence, the USSR will attempt to divide the
West and strengthen the pro-Soviet alignment
of those of its satellites which have suffered
from German aggression. Within Germany,
the USSR will claim that the Western "im-
perialists" intend to use the Germans as dupes
in an "international plot" to cause another
war, which would completely devastate Ger-
many.
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~.
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