THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003700210002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 23, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO. 13 7
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
4b( .,.
THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S
ABANDONMENT F OVERSEAS O O MILITARY COMMITMENTS
ORE 93-49 Auth
DOCUMENT NO.1
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DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HP. 70-2
ublished 23 December 19?
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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS
MILITARY COMMITMENTS
1. The Commitments.
Britain's overseas military commitments in-
clude: (1) the defense of its dependent ter-
ritories from external aggression and internal
disorder; (2) obligations set forth in treaties
and agreements; (3) obligations implicit in
Britain's Commonwealth and general defense
policies; and (4) occupational responsibilities.
The nature and scope of these world-wide
commitments are examined in Section 1:
Britain's Current Overseas Military Com-
mitments.
2. The Likelihood of Liquidation for Economic
Reasons..
In present circumstances and those likely
to obtain at least well into 1950 the British
Government has no intention of giving up any
of its overseas military commitments. The
British economy has indeed reached a stage
where some reduction in defense spending has
become necessary. A token reduction has re-
cently been made, and the defense budget for
the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1950 will show
a saving over that,for the present year. But
there is as yet no serious demand for other
than moderate savings, which can be accom-
plished within the framework''of existing over-
seas military policy.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the
British financial position will not deteriorate
so far as to make essential a really deep reduc-
tion in defense expenditure in order to pre-
serve the national economy. The critical
point could be reached as early as mid-1950.
Large savings could be achieved only by the
abolition (or a very substantial curtailment)
of conscription and a deep cut in the service
manpower ceilings, combined with a decrease
in overseas commitments and a reduction in
the industrial demands of the services. It
may be assumed that the British will make
every effort to avoid these drastic measures.
3. The Method and Order of Retrenchment
and Withdrawal.
If economic deterioration ultimately should
force the UK to make large reductions in de-
fense expenditures, beyond the amounts pos-
sible through administrative and minor man-
power economies, the, government would
undertake a series of coordinated retrench-
ment measures, including a sharp reduction in
the manpower strength of the services; a fur-
ther sharing or, in some cases, a transferring
of some - overseas commitments to other
friendly and reliable powers; a reduction of
strength at remaining overseas locations; and
a cut-back in the military production and
works programs. In their withdrawals the
British would aim, so far as possible, to avoid
adversely altering the East-West power situ-
ation and creating power vacuums. Their
order of approach would be determined by the
international situation prevailing at the time,
the willingness of the US and the Dominions
to take added responsibilities in various areas,
and considerations of prestige. Assuming the
situation were about as at present, the UK
would initially reduce its forces in Austria and
Trieste to token size and make a substantial
cut in its forces in Germany; whittle down its
forces at other stations, though probably not
in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong; and econo-
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of
29 November 1949.
SE9ET
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mize on the maintenance or development of monwealth countries, and possibly other allies
installations and bases. Concurrent with, or looking toward their sharing in or assuming
following on, this series of steps the UK would some of the British overseas military under-
open conversations with the US, the Com- takings.
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SECRET
THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS
MILITARY COMMITMENTS
1. Britain's Current Overseas Military Com-
mitments.
The overseas military commitments of the
UK, some burdensome and some only potenti-
ally costly, are of several types :
(a) Those natural to a modern colonial
power, the defense of its dependent territories
from external aggression and internal dis-
order;
(b) Those set forth explicitly in treaties or
agreements, involving defense guarantees, the
supply of arms and/or training missions;
(c) Those implicit in Britain's Common-
wealth and general defense policies; and
(d) Occupational responsibilities.
Within these general types there is over-
lapping. For example, by treaty the UK is
bound to defend Egypt and enjoys the right
to maintain troops and bases there; but a
commitment to defend the Middle East from
external aggression, to maintain a condition
of stability there, and to control the Mediter-
ranean-Suez Canal-Red Sea "life-line" is im-
plicit in Britain's Commonwealth and gen-
eral defense policies. Similar considerations
apply to Iraq. As another example, Gibraltar
would be defended as a dependent territory,
but it would also be defended for reasons im-
plicit in the Commonwealth and defense poli-
cies. It is apparent, therefore, that although
for convenience and organization British, com-
mitments are broken down into categories,
many of them fit more than one.
A commitment, it should be made clear, is a
fixed military policy or principle embedded in
the national strategy, involving an intention
to carry out a given mission; it need not in-
clude a precisely specified number of troops,
ships, or aircraft. A commitment remains
operative regardless of fluctuations in the
? strength of the forces on the spot, so long as
policy is unchanged. Until policy is altered,
therefore, any such fluctuations affect only
the adequacy of the forces to fulfill the mission
and, in the case of a defense obligation, meas-
ure only the size of the risk accepted.
To service the present commitments of the
UK, British forces (including colonial troops)
are disposed across the world * according to
British "Estimates. of the Situation" and the
availability of bases.
a. The Dependent Territories.
Britain's defense commitments include all
the parts of the widespread dependent Empire.
The majority of these parts, however, require
no positive defense efforts or only token forces
(for example, the colonies in the Western Hem-
isphere, the Pacific Islands, Aden).
Some British dependencies, though inter-
nally stable and not in immediate jeopardy
from aggression, are strategically situated;
they must be kept prepared for defense and
maintained as air, naval, and/or army bases.
In some cases their local economies must be
supported by annual grants-in-aid (subsidies) .
Their installations must be serviced, developed,
and manned. Included in this group are Gi-
braltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Singapore; and
Kenya as the site of a large. supply depot. The
British military investment in each is heavy.
They are all important militarily, though for
some the degree may fluctuate in relation-
ship to the availability to British forces of
Egypt and Cyienaica (see below).
Two dependencies at present require rela-
tively large commitments. Some 35,000 army
troops (including colonial troops) are disposed
in Malaya on active operations, together with
supporting air and naval forces, to put down
insurrection. Some 25,000 troops, including
supporting air and naval elements, are dis-
posed at Hong Kong to cope with the Chinese
Communist threat to that colony.
* See Appendix for the present disposition of UK
forces.
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SEET
b. Treaties and Agreements.
Britain's treaty obligations (and advan-
tages) are numerous. Some are costly; some
only potentially so. Some are overlapping.
(1) The North Atlantic Treaty (1949).
By the terms of this pact the UK is com-
mitted militarily according to the following
terms :
Article V The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be con-
sidered an attack against them all and con-
sequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of
the right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the party or parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with
the other parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area. Any such armed at-
tack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to
the Security Council. Such measures shall
be terminated when the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to restore
and maintain international peace and secu-
rity.
The explication of Britain's obligations
under the NAT is in its initial stages. It may
be notable, however, that of the five regional
planning groups set up, the UK is a full and
permanent member of four-more than any
other state. (The US is a permanent member
of only two of them at present, though it is
associated with each of the other three in a
non-member role.)
In this connection, though antedating the
NAT organization, the UK has maintained two
large military staffs in the US apart from the
service attaches. One is known as the Joint
Services Mission, reporting to the Ministry of
Supply, and the other has been supporting
the British element of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.
(2) Five-Power Treaty of Western Union
(Brussels Treaty) (1948).
Britain is committed militarily according
to the following terms:
Article IV If any of the high contracting
parties should be the object of an armed
attack in Europe, the other high contract-
ing parties will, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the party so attacked
all the military and other aid and assist-
ance in their power.
Under the terms of the Treaty the UK has
committed itself to a centralized supreme
command, to an integrated staff organization,
to the defense of a line east of France and the
Benelux countries, to increased production of
military equipment, and to other cooperative
measures involving equipment, training, and
the assumption of the major share of adminis-
trative costs of the organization in London and
Fontainebleau.
(3) The United Nations Charter (1945).
According to the charter the UK is com-
mitted militarily under the following articles
of Chapter VII:
Article 43 1. All members of the United Na-
tions, in order to contribute to the main-
tenance of international peace and security,
undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with
a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces assistance, and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and se-
curity.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall
govern the numbers and types of forces,
their degree of readiness and general loca-
tion, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be
negotiated as soon as possible on the initia-
tive of the Security Council. They shall be
concluded between the Security Council and
member states or between the Security
Council and groups of member states and
shall be subject to ratification by the signa-
tory states in accordance with their consti-
tutional processes.
Article 45 In order to enable the United Na-
tions to take urgent military measures,
members shall hold immediately available
national air force contingents for combined
international enforcement action. The
strength and degree of readiness of these
contingents and plans for their combined
action shall be determined, within the
limits laid down in the special agreement
or agreements referred to in Article 43, by
the Security Council with the assistance of
the Military Staff Committee.
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No explication of these articles has yet been
agreed on among the concerned powers,
though the UK continues to maintain its ele-
ment of the Military Staff Committee and
may be presumed to be prepared to accept a
suitable obligation according to the stated
terms, if general agreement can be achieved.
(4) The Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk
(1947).
This pact commits the UK and France to
take such action as necessary to put an end
to any threat to the security of either of them
"arising from the adoption by Germany of a
policy of aggression or from action by Ger-
many to facilitate such a policy."
(5) Anglo-Portuguese Treaties.
There are eight treaties and a Secret Dec-
laration covering a period from 1373 to 1899,
the most important being :
(a) The Treaty of 1661, which binds His
Majesty to "take the interest of Portugal and
all its dominions to heart, defending the same
with his utmost power by sea and land, even
as England itself," and further to send troops
for the purpose and ships also.
Though an annexed Secret Article binds His
Majesty to "defend and protect all conquests
or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal
against all his enemies, as well future as
present," it is expected that the UK will re-
fuse to defend Portuguese Macao in the event
of attack on the latter by the Chinese Com-
munists. A threat to the African or Atlantic
Ocean colonies of Portugal would be another
matter, however.
(b) The Secret Declaration of 1899 in which
both parties confirm the Secret Article of 1661.
(6) The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance
(1942).
Britain's military obligations under this
treaty are as follows:
Article IV Should either of the high con-
tracting parties during the post-war period
become involved in hostilities with Germany
(or any of the states associated with her
in acts of aggression in Europe), in con-
sequence of the attack of that state against
that party, the other high contracting party
will at once give to the contracting party
so involved in Hostilities all military and
other support and assistance in his power.
This treaty binds both parties neither to
conclude any alliance nor take part in any co-
alition directed against the other (Article VII),
nor to seek territorial aggrandizement or in-
terfere in the internal affairs of other states
(Article V). Thus, either the UK or the USSR
could at any time make a case for breach of
treaty against the other; and the UK Govern-
ment as recently as July 1948 declared its view
that the treaty is "still technically operative."
As a practical matter, however, neither this
treaty nor the one with Poland (see below)
figures in Britain's strategic planning.
(7) The Anglo-Polish Treaty (1939).
The UK is committed militarily in the
following terms:
Article I Should one of the Contracting
Parties become engaged in hostilities with a
European Power in consequences of aggres-
sion by the latter against that Contracting
Party, the other Contracting Party will at
once give the Contracting Party engaged in
hostilities all the support and assistance in
its power.
Article II (1) The provisions of Article I will
also apply in the event of any action by a
European Power which clearly threatened,
directly or indirectly, the independence of
one of the Contracting Parties, and was of
such a nature that the Party in question
considered it vital to resist it with its armed
forces.
(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties
become engaged in hostilities with a Euro-
pean Power in consequence of action by
that Power which threatened the independ-
ence or neutrality of another European
state in such a way as to constitute a clear
menace to the security of that Contracting
Party, the provisions of Article I will apply,
without prejudice, however, to the rights of
the other European State concerned.
(8) The Anglo-Joi'dan Treaty (1948).
In substance this treaty commits the two
parties to the following:
(a) Should either party become engaged
in war, the other party will immediately come
to its aid. In the event of imminent menace
of hostilities, the parties will immediately con-
cert together the necessary measures of de-
fense.
(b) In event of either party being engaged
in war or menaced by hostilities, each will in-
vite the other to bring to his territory, or ter-
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ritory controlled by him, the necessary forces
of all arms.
(c) The King . of Jordan will safeguard,
maintain, and develop. as necessary the air-
fields, ports, roads, and lines of communica-
tion, in and across Jordan as may be required
for the purposes of this treaty and will call
upon the British for any necessary assistance
.to this ,end.
. (d) The King of Jordan invites the British
to maintain units of the Royal Air Force at
Amman and Mafrak airfields, and he will pro-
vide all necessary facilities. The UK, however,
will reimburse the King of Jordan for all ex-
penditures incurred in (c) and (d).
(e) The King of Jordan will afford, on re-
quest, all necessary facilities for the movement
of UK armed force units across Jordan on the
same financial terms applied to his own forces;
the King of Jordan will also permit British
Navy ships to visit Jordan ports at any time
upon notification.
(f) An Anglo-Jordanian Joint Defense
Board is set up to formulate agreed strategic
plans, to coordinate measures for the imple-
mentation of (c) above, to consult on train-
ing and equipment, and to consider, if neces-
sary, the location of UK forces at places other
than (d) above.
(g) In view of the desirability of identity in
training and methods of the Jordan and Brit-
ish forces, the UK:
i. offers appropriate facilities in Britain or
its territories for training the armed forces of
Jordan;
ii. makes available operational units of its
armed forces for joint training;
iii. provides on request any British service
personnel required to ensure the efficiency of
Jordanian . forces;
iv. affords military instruction in British
schools for Jordanian officers; provides arms,
ammunition, equipment, aircraft, and other
war material..
(h) As long as the treaty is in force Britain
will, in accordance with arrangements to be
agreed upon annually, afford financial assist-
ance to Jordan to enable it to carry out obliga-
tions undertaken.
For the British fiscal year ending on 31
March 1950, this financial assistance amounts
to ?3.5 million. The ruler of Jordan is a vir-
tual puppet of the British and, in a practical
sense, the UK has unlimited military rights
there. In conjunction with the Egyptian and
Iraqi Treaties (see below) and an anticipated
agreement with Cyrenaica, this treaty enables
Britain to plan a defense-in-depth of the Suez
Canal Zone and to count on uninterrupted
land communications from North Africa to
at least the border of Iran in case of war.
(9) The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936).
In substance this treaty commits the two
parties to the following: .
(a) Should either party become engaged in
war, the other will immediately come to his
aid in the capacity of an ally.
(b) The aid of the King of Egypt, in event
of imminent menace of war or apprehended
international emergency, will consist in fur-
nishing the UK on Egyptian territory all fa-
cilities and assistance in his power, including
use of ports, aerodromes, and means of com-
munication.
(c) Until such time as the parties agree
that the Egyptian Army is in. position to pro-
tect the Suez Canal, the King of Egypt au-
thorizes the UK to station forces in specified
zones around the Canal.
(d) Without prejudice to (a) above, UK
troops in the Canal Zone may not exceed 10,000
land forces and 400 pilots together with neces-
sary ancillary personnel for administrative
and technical duties. These numbers do not
include civilian personnel.
(e) The Egyptians will provide, when neces-
sary, reasonable means of communication and
access to and from localities where British
forces are situated and will also accord fa-
cilities at Port Said and Suez for landing and
storage of materials and supplies for British
forces, including maintenance of a small de-
tachment of British forces in those ports to
handle and guard this material and these
supplies in transit.
Though Egypt has denounced this treaty,
the UK considers it still in effect and remains
hopeful that a new treaty containing terms
reasonably satisfactory to British require-
ments will eventually be concluded when
Egypt's postwar xenophobia has died down.
It is notable in this connection that Egypt is
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no longer pressing the UK to remove or reduce
its forces in Egypt even though their present
strength there is about three times that
specified in the old treaty as the upper limit.
An RAF training mission continues to be ac-
tive with the Royal Egyptian Air Force.
(10) The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930, effective
1932).
In substance the provisions of this treaty are
as follows :
(a) Should either party become engaged in
war, the other party will immediately come to
its aid in the capacity of an ally, and in the
event of an imminent menace of war the
parties will immediately concert together the
necessary measures of defense. The aid of the
King of Iraq will consist in furnishing to the
UK on Iraq territory all facilities and assist-
ance in his power including the use of rail-
ways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means of
communication.
(b) The King of Iraq will grant the UK
sites for air bases at or in the vicinity of Basra
(Shaiba) and for an air base to the west of
the Euphrates (Habbaniya), and further au-
thorizes the UK to maintain forces on Iraq
territory at the above localities. The strength
of these forces shall be determined by the UK
from time to time after consultation with the
King of Iraq.
(c) The UK undertakes to grant, when-
ever may be required by the King of Iraq, all
possible facilities in the following matters, cost
of which will be met by the King of Iraq:
i. naval, military and aeronautical instruc-
tion to Iraqi officers in the UK;
ii. provision of arms, ammunitions, equip-
ment, ships and aeroplanes of latest available
pattern for forces of Iraq;
iii. provision of British naval, military and
air force officers to serve in advisory capacity
to the forces of Iraq.
(d) In view of the desirability of identity
in training and methods between the Iraq and
British armies, the King of Iraq undertakes
that:
i. if necessary to have recourse to foreign
military instructors, these shall be chosen from
amongst British subjects;
ii. any personnel of his forces sent abroad
for military training will be sent to the ter-
ritories of the UK, and only to another country
when British facilities are not available;
iii. the armament and essential equipment
of his forces shall not differ in type from those
of the UK forces.
(11) The Treaty of Mutual Assistance be-
tween Britain, France and Turkey (1939).
In substance the provisions of this treaty are
as follows :
(a) In the event of Turkey being involved
in hostilities with a European power because
of aggression of that power against Turkey,
Britain and France will cooperate effectively
with Turkey and will lend it all aid and assist-
ance in their power.
(b) In the event of an act of aggression by
a European power leading to war in the Medi-
terranean area in which France and the UK
are involved, Turkey will cooperate effectively
with France and the UK and will lend them
all aid and assistance in her power. In the
event of an act of aggression irt the Mediter-
ranean in which Turkey is involved, France
and the UK will collaborate effectively with
Turkey.
(c) In the event of France and the UK being
involved in hostilities with a European power
in consequence of aggression committed by
that power against those powers in an area
other than the Mediterranean, the parties will
immediately consult together. Nevertheless,
it is agreed that in such eventuality Turkey
will observe at least a benevolent neutrality
toward France and the UK.
(d) In the event of: i) aggression by a Eu-
ropean power against another European state
whose government one of the parties had, with
the approval of that state, undertaken to as-
sist in maintaining independence or neutrality
against such aggression; or ii) aggression by
a European power which, while directed
against another European state, constituted
in the opinion of one of the governments of the
parties a menace to its own security, the
parties will immediately consult together with
a view to such common action as might be
considered effective.
(12) The Anglo-Greek Agreement (1944).
The presence of British troops in Greece was
first formalized by the above agreement. An
invitation to the British forces to continue in
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Greece has been reaffirmed by succeeding
Greek governments. The UK has maintained
a brigade of about 3,000 troops in Greece,
though these will have been withdrawn by
March 1950. In addition, the British have
three service missions, military, air, and naval,
engaged in training and re-equipping the
Greek armed forces. (The British also main-
tain a Police and Prisons Mission for train-
ing purposes.) Since the American Military
Aid to Greece mission began to operate in 1947,
the US and UK missions have worked jointly
and closely.
(13) The Treaty of the Trucial Chiefs of
Oman (1353).
This treaty, mediated by the British, estab-
lished that the UK would watch over and in-
sure the peace agreed to among themselves
by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, and that,
in case of aggression by one of the parties on
another, the UK would obtain reparations for
the injured party.
(14) The Anglo-Bahrein Convention (1861).
By the terms of this agreement between the
Sheikh of Bahrein and the British Government
the UK agreed to maintain the security of the
former's possessions against war, piracy, and
slavery on the part of "the Chiefs and tribes
of this (the Persian) Gulf;" and to obtain repa-
rations for the Sheikh for any such acts.
Usage and precedent, however, have estab-
lished that Britain has expanded its obliga-
tions to include the protection of Bahrein from
aggressive acts regardless of their source.
(15) The Anglo-Kuwait Understanding
(1914).
In this understanding, documented by offi-
cial letter, the British Government recognized
the Sheikdom of Kuwait as "an independent
Government under British protection."
(16) The Anglo-Qatar Treaty (1916).
This treaty provides in substance for the
British defense of Qatar against all aggressive
actions and the exaction of reparations, unless
Qatar itself provoked the aggressive actions.
(17) The Anglo-Burmese Defense Agree-
ment (1947).
This agreement provides for:
(a) the evacuation of all British troops
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from Burma immediately after Burma be-
comes independent (January 1948) ;
(b) the transfer to Burma of airfields, naval
vessels, fixed Army and RAF establishments
and initial equipment for the Burmese Army;
(c) the establishment of a Naval, Military,
and Air Force Mission for instructional and
advisory purposes with the condition that the
government of Burma will not accept such a
mission from any government outside of the
British Commonwealth;
(d) a British contribution of financial and
technical assistance in maintaining specified
airfields;
(e) the extending of all reasonable British
facilities for purchase by the government of
Burma of war material;
(f) ships of either navy to have the right
of entry into ports of the other party upon
direct notification between their respective
naval authorities on the spot;
(g) military aircraft of either party to have
the right, upon customary peacetime direct
notification between the respective air au-
thorities, to fly over the territories of the other,
and to enjoy staging facilities at airfields
agreed upon;
(h) the government of Burma to afford all
reasonable assistance including facilities of
access and entry into Burma by air, land, and
sea, to British forces bringing help and sup-
port to Burma by agreement with the govern-
ment of Burma or to any part of the Com-
monwealth by agreement with the govern-
ment of Burma and with the government of
that part of the Commonwealth;
(i) the opening of fresh negotiations by
either party with the other on any matter
within the defense sphere, such negotiations,
except by agreement, not to affect obligations
under this agreement.
(18) The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement
(1944).
This was to be a temporary agreement for
the regulation of mutual relations during the
remainder of the war, but its replacement by
a permanent treaty has been delayed pending
the disposition of the Italian colonies. Article
VI provides that the UK will make available
to Ethiopia a British Military Mission whose
head shall be responsible to the Ethiopian
S E A E T
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Minister of War for the organization, training,
and administration of the Ethiopian Army.
The mission may be withdrawn upon three
months' notice by either party.
(19) Anglo-Siamese Military Relations.
There is no formal military agreement be-
tween Siam and the UK. Britain enjoys, how-
ever, especially close relations with Siam and
provides special facilities to the Siamese such
as the training of Siamese officers in the UK-
and Malaya, and the provision of arms and
supplies. The British Military Attache in
Bangkok serves as military adviser to the
Siamese Army. Local agreements have been
concluded between Siamese and Malayan au-
thorities permitting the passage of border
patrols over the national boundary and pro-
viding for exchange of information in efforts
to deal with disorders in the Malaya-Siam
border area.
(20) Anglo-Saudi Arabian Military Re-
lations.
The UK maintains a Military Training Mis-
sion in Saudi Arabia. In addition it provides
a Civil Air Training Mission, and the RAF has
shown interest in surveying the area for air-
field sites.
c. Commonwealth and General Defense
Policies.
(1) Commonwealth Policies.
Britain's Commonwealth and general de-
fense policies contain implied military commit-
ments not expressed in contractual or treaty
relations (except in the case of Ceylon *).
* The Anglo-Ceylonese Defense Agreement (1947)
provides that (1) the two governments will give
each other such military assistance for the security
of their territories, for defense against external ag-
gression, and for the protection of essential com-
munications as it may be in their mutual interest
to provide; (2) the UK may base such naval and air
forces, and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as
may be required for these purposes and as may be
mutually agreed; (3) the Government of Ceylon will
grant the UK all the necessary facilities. . . . These
will include the use of naval and air bases and
ports and military establishments and the use of
telecommunications facilities; (4) the UK will aid
in training and development of Ceylonese armed
forces; (5) joint administrative machinery will be
established to implement this cooperation and to
coordinate the defense requirements.
So far as the Commonwealth is concerned,
it may be assumed that the UK would"partici-
pate in the defense of any of the Dominions
made the object of aggression by a non-Com-
monwealth power. Though varying in de-
gree, Dominion by Dominion, the UK's mili-
tary and strategic relations with the other
Commonwealth nations are close. There is
interchange of certain intelligence, and in
some cases a division of intelligence work.
The UK is the source of much of the others'
equipment and doctrine, and provides tech-
nical and general training facilities and ad-
visory services. Two of Britain's major naval
bases, Trincomalee (Ceylon) and Simonstown
(South Africa) are leased from the Dominions
and maintained by the Royal Navy. Tech-
nical control of the Ceylonese forces is prac-
tically in British hands; British officers serve
in and advise the Indian and the Pakistan
forces on contract; New Zealand looks to the
UK for technical military guidance. Canada
and Australia are on the most intimate mili-
tary terms with the British forces, and the
UK is carrying out joint research and develop-
ment projects with each. For political reasons,
military relations with South Africa are cur-
rently less cordial.
Since the war, the UK has encouraged the
Dominions to enlarge their armed services and
assume greater defense responsibilities, to re-
duce the size of the burden on itself of the
imperial defenses. Britain has to that end
freely provided all the indoctrination, advice,
and training desired. It has provided all
manner of military equipment, often at nomi-
nal prices and sometimes without charge. In
recent weeks, for example, the UK made a
gift of a naval vessel to Ceylon after training
an all-Ceylonese crew to man it; British sub-
marines were moved to Sydney, Australia, in
order to cooperate with the New Zealand
Navy's program to expand its antisubmarine
training; an RAF heavy bomber squadron was
assigned to participate in the Quetta (Pakis-
tan) Staff College's combined operations ex-
ercise.
(2) General Defense Policies.
Britain's over-all defense policies also con-
tain implied military commitments, based on
the mission of the armed forces, i.e., to insure
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the security of the UK, the dependent empire,
and British interests overseas; and to take the
leading part in insuring the security of im-
perial communications. The Middle East, in
British thinking, falls within these terms. As
the locus of gigantic British investments the
Middle East is the source of essential oil sup-
plies, a center of imperial communications,
and the sole Eurasian-African land bridge;
the British are determined to defend it against
aggression by an external power. (The Brit-
ish have encouraged US participation in Mid-
dle East defense planning.) Britain's strate-
gic planners subordinate the area only to the
home defense zone; they view a Soviet menace
to the Middle East as a threat to Britain's na-
tional security as dangerous as any similar
threat to Western Europe; they consider that
the loss of the Middle East would endanger
the independence of Pakistan, India, Ceylon,
and Southeast Asia and would probably per-
manently affect the world balance of power
between the USSR and the West. The British
would, therefore, react vigorously to any
threat to this area, regardless of whether a
treaty relationship existed requiring action.
Also embedded in Britain's defense policies
is the giving of military aid and advice to na-
tions expected to be allies in event of war. It
follows from this that the UK has special rela-
tions, not always reflected in explicit treaties
or general agreements, with the numerous
countries which use British Tables of Organi-
zation, equipment, and . doctrine. Special
technical missions to these countries have
been fairly frequent, and their specialists at-
tend military schools in the UK. Apart from
the Commonwealth, several countries of West-
ern Europe and Scandinavia were the benefi-
ciaries after the war of surplus British equip-
ment, including ships, aircraft, and army sup-
plies. All the countries of the Middle East
periodically seek military favors from the UK
and minor potentates have for long received
politico-military subventions. Siam and
Burma are likewise applicants for military fa-
vors. Argentina's purchase of British aircraft
led to- the establishment in Argentina of a
technical advisory mission, reportedly on a
two-year contract. More countries of the
RET
world are dependent for equipment and spare
parts on the UK than on any other power.
d. Occupational Responsibilities.
British forces have occupational missions in
Germany, Austria, Trieste, and the Italian
colonies. More than 20 percent of the British
Army forces are so committed.
(1) Germany.
The UK occupies and administers an area
of 33,700 square miles in northwest Germany
in accordance with the agreement reached by
the European Advisory Commission (a body
set up at the Moscow Conference of 1943 and
originally including representatives of the US,
the USSR, and the UK) and approved by the
governments in 1945. No limit was set on the
numbers of troops, and though the later Pots-
dam agreement set out the main purposes of
the occupation of Germany, it made no provi-
sion for its termination.
(2) Austria.
The UK occupies and administers the South-
ern zone of Austria in accordance with the
agreement reached by the European Advisory
Commission, which in 1945 included France,
and approved by the four governments in 1945.
No limit was set on the numbers of troops.
The termination of the occupation depends
on the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty.
Though the treaty is still under negotiation,
one agreed article specifies the withdrawal of
troops within 90 days after ratification by the
occupation governments.
(3) Trieste.
The Italian Peace Treaty called for a short-
term military occupation of the Free Territory
of Trieste until the appointment of a governor
under the UN Security Council. The treaty
provides that troops in the FTT shall not ex-
ceed 5,000 each for the UK, US, and Yugo-
slavia. When a governor is appointed, these
troops shall be at his disposal for a period of
90 days after his assumption of office, after
which they will cease to be at his disposal and
will be withdrawn within a further period of
45 days, unless the Governor advises the Se-
curity Council that some or all of the troops
should not be withdrawn, in which case the
troops required may remain until not later
than 45 days after the Governor has advised
SE RET
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the Security Council that the troops are no
longer needed for internal security.
(4) The ex-ttalian Colonies.
The UK occupies and administers the ex-
Italian colonies-Libya (excepting the prov-
ince of Fezzan), Eritrea, and Italian Somali-
land-by the terms of the Italian Peace
Treaty, pending their final disposal according
to UN General Assembly decisions. The Brit-
ish will retain their responsibilities in Libya
until it becomes an independent power on 1
January 1952; in Italian Somaliland until it
reverts to Italy as a trust territory in 1950; and
in Eritrea (the disposal of which was post-
poned by the General Assembly until its 1950
session) at least through next year.
The civil administration of these areas has
been a financial burden to the British. They
have wished for some time to relinquish their
responsibilities in Somaliland, Eritrea, and
the Libyan province of Tripolitania. The
province of Cyrenaica plays a part in the pat-
tern of Britain's strategic planning for Middle
East defense, although it is secondary in im-
portance to the role of Egypt. The British ex-
pect to have concluded a satisfactory defense
treaty with its ruler when Libya becomes in-
dependent, enabling the permanent retention
of bases in Cyrenaica. Meanwhile, they have
an understanding with the Emir, and already
have begun substantial constructional work.
2. The Likelihood of Liquidation as an Answer
to Economic Difficulties.
Though the British economy has reached
the stage where some reduction in defense
spending has become necessary-for political
as well as economic reasons-it has not
reached a level so critical that early abandon-
ment of overseas military obligations * need
be expected. In present circumstances and
those likely to obtain at least well into 1950
the UK has no intention of giving up any of
its commitments, and there is no serious de-
mand for other than moderate savings which
can be accomplished within the structure of
existing overseas military policy.
The Labor Party's present attitude toward
defense problems has evolved rapidly during
the past few years, leaving far behind pacifism
and notions of an effective foreign policy not
backed by power. Though small minorities
remain to advocate pacifism and withdrawal
as a matter of principle, they carry no weight;
the early enthusiasm for the reduction of mili-
tary commitments has largely been replaced
by demands for economies through efficiency.
The advent of a Conservative Government fol-
lowing the national election next year would
signify no important changes in the pattern of
Britain's overseas commitments, since there
is practically no difference between Laborite
and Conservative views on overseas strategy.
The Conservative Party, not so subject to divi-
sion within its ranks, might hold out longer
,against retrenchment.
Discussions regarding military policies and
expenditure are quite general, extending
across all political faiths, especially during
this present time of increased economic pres-
sure; but they center on better value for fewer
pounds, rather than giving up commitments.
There appears to be a widespread feeling that
the money's worth in terms of operational
forces is not being received; criticism is di-
rected against extravagance and ineptitude,
or on the weaknesses inherent in the con-
scription policy. At present, then, the ques-
tions raised turn not on withdrawals of forces
from overseas (and the reneging on obliga-
tions to allies, dependents, and friends) but on
scrutinizing more carefully the results ob-
tained for the expenditure of nearly 8 percent
of the national income * and 25 percent of the
1949-50 national budget and on cutting down
the outlays that yield least.
* That in Greece is an exception. The British
brigade and large elements of the military training
missions there will probably be withdrawn shortly,
not primarily for economic reasons but because of
the reduction of the Communist threat to Greece's
integrity and the assumption of most residual re-
sponsibility by the US. Moreover, these troops ap-
pear to be destined for another overseas post.
* Comparable figures are:
For the US ...... 6.7% for fiscal year 1949
For Australia ....5.4% for FY 1948; slightly lower
for FY 1949
For Canada ..... 2.12% for FY 1949; substantially
higher for FY 1950, possibly over
3%
SE/6 T
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The British Government is at present pro-
posing, as part of its new economic program,
to economize on defense expenditures to the
extent of some ?12,500,000 by 31 March 1959-
as against total defense spending likely to be
in the neighborhood of ?800,000,000 in the
current fiscal year-and is holding out the
hope that further savings may be possible in
the following year. But these savings are ex-
pected to accrue from administrative and staff
economies. Partly as a result of Conservative
criticism of the forces' efficiency the govern-
ment some months ago initiated a re-examina-
tion of the whole military establishment. The
economies expected to result in 1950 from this
review, however, will flow from alterations in
the structure of the services rather than over-
seas commitments.
Intensified efforts by the armed services to
abolish waste, to eliminate duplication and
achieve further standardization, to improve
administrative efficiency, to cut out or modify
unnecessary or marginal activities, and in con-
sequence to effect a slight reduction in man-
power requirements and lessen consumption
of expendable supplies will enable limited sav-
ings. Minor economies in construction and
maintenance programs will do likewise. Some
steps along these lines are already under way.
As a whole, such efforts will suffice to meet the
present requirement to economize. The Brit-
ish could conceivably, if need be, retrench even
further without actually giving up any com-
mitments; they could selectively reduce their
armed strength at home and overseas, cut
back works and military production programs
somewhat, and retain all their obligations on a
less secure basis. The net effect of this action
would be to increase the risks inherent in the
strategic situation. They could also impose
less liberal terms for equipment provided to
allies. Moves in these directions would ex-
pose the UK to charges of disregarding obli-
gations, and in any case they are not to be ex-
pected before April at the earliest.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the
British financial position will not eventually
deteriorate so far as to make essential a really
deep reduction in defense expenditure in or-
der to preserve the national economy. The
critical point could possibly be reached as
early as mid-1950. Large savings could be
achieved only by the abolition (or a very sub-
tantial curtailment) of conscription and a
deep cut in the service manpower ceilings,
combined with a decrease in overseas commit-
ments and a reduction in the industrial de-
mands of the services.
The abolition or extensive curtailment of the
unpopular conscription plan would have much
to commend it. Though there is no effective
political opposition to conscription, since the
Conservatives favor it, numerous responsible
critics believe it costly and inefficient. More-
over, the very considerable numbers of regular
army troops now engaged in training the
draftees could largely be reorganized into op-
erational field forces. Two important objec-
tions exist, however, apart from the question
of the government's prestige and the attitude
of the Conservative Party, which will stop of-
ficial consideration of abolition until extreme
economic urgency requires it: the strong
doubt that the manpower needs of the army
and air force could be satisfied without con-
scription, and the consequential major change
in Britain's foreign and strategic policies, in-
cluding the abrogation of certain treaty com-
mitments, particularly those under the Brus-
sels Pact. Direct withdrawal from some of
the more expensive overseas commitments, en-
abling savings in both maintenance and man-
power costs, would also involve radical changes
in Britain's foreign and strategic policies and
a great loss of prestige. It may be assumed
that the UK will make every effort to avoid
these measures which, besides affecting treaty
obligations and undermining present British
foreign policy, would reduce (the British be-
lieve) the deterrents to Soviet. aggressive ac-
tion and invite the ill will of the US. While it
is conceivable that the UK may at some future
date be forced to lighten by these means its
heavy military burdens-since power, in any
case, rests ultimately on an economic founda-
tion-it is likely that the UK would in advance
of action consult with the US and other allies.
3. The Method and the Order of Retrench-
ment and Withdrawal.
It is believed that if economic deterioration
ultimately requires the British to make large
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S/RRET
reductions in defense expenditures, beyond the
amounts possible through administrative and
minor manpower economies, they would un-
dertake to set in train a series of coordinated
retrenchment measures. These would in-
clude :
(a) A sharp reduction in the manpower
strength of the services. The intake of con-
scripts would be decelerated and demobiliza-
tion speeded up; the conscription plan would
be drastically modified.
(b) Further sharing of overseas commit-
ments or, in some cases, transferring them to
other friendly and reliable powers in order
to reduce the British burden and enable forces
to be withdrawn; this would intensify the
process apparent since the war, which brought
the US into Greece, Turkey, and the eastern
Mediterranean in general, and gave to Aus-
tralia Empire responsibilities in Japan.
(c) Reductions of strength in remaining
overseas locations.
(d) A cut-back in the military production
and works programs to the extent made pos-
sible by the smaller British forces, the post-
ponement of re-equipment programs, and the
curtailment of maintenance and development
projects at various installations.
The British would aim in their withdrawals,
so far as possible, to avoid adversely altering
the East-West power situation and creating
power vacuums. For reasons of prestige they
would in most cases prefer to share rather
than transfer commitments. Their order of
approach to these withdrawals would be condi-
tioned by the international situation prevail-
ing at the time, the calculated receptivity of
the US and the Dominions to taking added re-
sponsibilities in various areas, and considera-
tions of British prestige. Assuming, how-
ever, that the situation was about as at pres-
ent, the UK would initially:
(a) Reduce its forces in Trieste and Austria
to token size, and make a substantial cut in
its forces in Germany. Of the four major
overseas theaters containing concentrated
British armed strength-Europe, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Hong Kong-that
in which the function is simply occupational
and performed jointly with the US could be
cut with least damage to international stabil-
ity. The presence of US troops would remain
a deterrent to the Soviets, though British
prestige would suffer considerably.
(b) Whittle down slightly its forces at other
stations, though probably not in Southeast
Asia and Hong Kong. Small reductions would
be accomplished in Egypt, Cyrenaica, East
Africa, and in other less important stations.
The effect of these actions would be, not to
give up standing defense commitments, but to
lengthen the calculated risks now present in
British strategy.
(c) Economize on the maintenance or de-
velopment of installations and bases, both at
home and overseas. The construction plans
for Kenya and Cyrenaica would be modified;
economies- would be required in maintenance
expenditures at numerous other bases and
stations.
Following on, or concurrent with, this series
of steps the UK would open conversations with
the US, the Commonwealth countries, and pos-
sibly other allies looking toward their sharing
or assuming certain defense burdens. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand would be pressed to
share in the Malayan and Hong Kong under-
takings. The Asian dominions would be en-
couraged to play an even larger defense role
in the Indian Ocean area, and the US might be
urged to take up a commitment there, com-
parable to that on the other side of Suez, in-
cluding part of the cost of the bases. Some
form of subsidy from the US, additional to that
in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, might
be sought in support of the maintenance of
home and colonial strategic facilities, of mili-
tary production, and of certain fields of mili-
tary research and development.
SET
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APPENDIX
BRITISH ARMY ? AND BRITISH COLO-
NIALS: ESTIMATED DISPOSITION AS OF
1 NOVEMBER
Area
UK Troops
Colonials
United Kingdom
224,000
....
Germany
57,000
....
Austria
6,300
....
Trieste
4,300
....
Gibraltar
3,100
....
Malta
1,300
1,500
Greece
4,500
....
Cyprus
1,700
270
Libya
13,000
2,700
Egypt
25,000
9,000
Sudan and Eritrea
2,000
....
East Africa
7,300
25,000
West Africa
1,600
13,600
Aden
100
Jordan
1,000
Malaya
16,500
18,800
Ceylon
450
....
Hong Kong
14,500
2,100
Caribbean
800
700
India
260
330
Pakistan
470
....
Miscellaneous
3,820
....
Total
389,000 *
74,000
IF4ET ,
THE ROYAL NAVY: DISPOSITION AS RE-
PORTED ON 1 SEPTEMBER
The British fleet is currently composed of 5
battleships, 6 aircraft-carriers, 6 light aircraft-
carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 24 light cruisers, 115
destroyers, 63 submarines, and 172 escorts.
Although some of these are maintained at re-
duced operational status, the following are
ready to fight:
Home Waters
3
battleships
2
aircraft-carriers
2
light aircraft-carriers
3
light cruisers
31
destroyers
22
submarines
18
escorts
Mediterranean
4
light cruisers
15
destroyers
7
submarines
8
escorts
South Atlantic
1 light cruiser
2 escorts
North Atlantic
1
light cruiser
and West Indies
1
submarine
2
escorts
East Indies 2
light cruisers
escorts
light aircraft-carriers
heavy cruiser
light cruisers
escorts
destroyers
A few destroyers and escorts are held in re-
serve on overseas stations; otherwise the bulk
of the non-operational ships are based on UK
ports.
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THE ROYAL AIR FORCE: DISPOSITION AS REPORTED ON 1 NOVEMBER
Germany
Medium Bomber Squadrons
Light Bomber Squadrons
Day Fighter Squadrons
Night Fighter Squadrons
General Reconnaissance Squadrons
Photo Reconnaissance Squadrons
Transport Squadrons
Meteorological Squadrons
Fighter Squadrons
Fighter/Photo Recce Squadrons
Light Bomber Squadrons *
Fighter Squadrons *
Fighter Squadrons
Fighter Squadrons
Light Bomber Squadrons *
Light Bomber Squadrons *
General Recce Squadrons
Photo Recce Squadrons
Transport Squadrons *
Fighter Squadrons
Fighter Squadrons
Light Bomber Squadrons
General Recce Squadrons *
General Recce Squadrons *
Photo Recce Squadron *
Transport Squadrons *
* Half strength (all home based units are maintained at half strength).
* * One squadron is half strength.
Medium Light Recon-
Bomber Bomber Fighter naissance
22 2 24 11
18
6
5
4
15
(1 Northern Ireland
1 Gibraltar
3
1
4
5 Egypt
1 Cyprus
1 Malta
1 Aden
1 Iraq
2 Malta
1 Egypt
5 Egypt
2 Hong Kong
2 Malaya
1 Malaya
1 Hong Kong
2 Malaya
1 Malaya
3 Malaya
Trans-
port Liaison Total
15 2 Flts 74+2 Flts
120 10 582
Tactical units
Aircraft in tactical units
Medium Light Recon-
Bomber Bomber Fighter naissance
7 141/2 71/2+1 Flt
46 218 60
Trans-
port Liaison Total
8 8 Flts 37+9 Flts
64 41 429
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000
ti
Home Based
Fighter Squadrons
4
Attack Squadrons
4
Mediterranean
Fighter Squadrons
1 Malta
Attack Squadrons
1 Malta
Pacific
Fighter Squadrons
1 Hong Kong
Attack Squadrons
1 Hong Kong
Recon- Train-
Attack Fighter naissance Liaison ing Misc. Total
Number in tactical units 72 74 146
Total number of aircraft 838 788 81 24 519 65 2,315
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