PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORTHCOMING WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS ORE 67-49 PUBLISHED 19 JULY 1949

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• Publication Date: July 19, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY No. 137
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE FORTHCOMING WEST
GERMAN ELECTIONS
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Published 19 July 1949
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Central Intolliganca Agency.
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Date J9-1:-.St419,1i
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CEN RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES. OF THE FORTHCOMING WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS *
SUMMARY
Election conditions preceding the 14 August
elections in Western Germany generally favor
the larger, established political parties, which
will profit from: (a) broader organization,
(b) superior capabilities for party propa-
ganda, (c) ability to present well-known can-
didates, (d) a substantial record of govern-
mental achievement, and (e) certain provi-
sions of the electoral law which handicap
smaller parties.
The latter, including the German Commu-
nist Party (KPD), are, however, unhampered
by the restrictions of responsibility, and can
make extravagant campaign promises to all
interests. They will attempt to exploit fully
the dissatisfaction voiced in many quarters
with the parties which are now in power.
They will also, except for the KPD, gain votes
as a result of the rightist political trend in
Western Germany today.
It is estimated that the German Social
Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic
Party (FDP) and the KPD will retain approxi-
mately their past electoral strengths. The
Christian Democratic Union and Christian
Social Union alliance (CDU/CSU) , however,
may lose the votes of the rightist elements
which supported it in earlier elections, in
which case the smaller, rightist parties will
be virtually the sole beneficiaries. The
CDU/CSU alliance and the SPD are expected-
to win together at least 60 percent of the
votes, and because of the provisions of the
electoral law, an even higher percentage of
the seats in the Federal Diet (Bundestag) !
In view of the probable election outcome, in
which no party will win a majority, one of two
possible coalition governments is expected to
result. The first would probably be composed
of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and possibly the FDP;
the second of the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the
Zentrum, and some of the smaller rightist
parties. Despite the differences between the
two major parties and the aversion of the
SPD leadership to assuming responsibility
without a majority of its own, a CDU/CSU-
SPD government is the more likely of the two.
The formation of such a coalition, however,
will depend upon the ability of the SPD to ob-
tain the cabinet posts necessary to ensure at
least a partial realization of its program, and
upon its willingness to subordinate partisan
political considerations to the creation of a
stable German government.
Of the two coalitions, a CDU/CSU-SPD co-
alition would be the more favorable to US in-
terests because of its control of the Federal
Diet, its greater stability, its more progressive
composition, and its firmness toward the Com-
munists. The alternative coalition would be
far less favorable to US interests because it:
(a) would be less stable, (b) would face far
more powerful parliamentary opposition, (c)
would be of a more rightist complexion?thus
evoking the opposition of organized labor?
and (d) would be more likely to seek the re-
unification of Germany with Soviet support.
'The lower house.
* It is assumed that there will be no fundamental changes in the present situation in Germany prior to
these elections. A Reference Outline of Political Parties in Western Germany is attached as Appendix.
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. It is based 'on information available to CIA as of
1 July 1949.
aaitelk-Wir
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?--Sprtrettrr
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORTHCOMING WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS
1. The Pre-Election Situation.
a. The Established Major Parties.
In the first federal elections under the Bonn
Constitution which are scheduled for 14 Au-
gust 1949, the established major parties, the
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union alliance (CDU/CSU) , the German So-
cial Democratic Party (SPD) , and the Free
Democratic Party (FDP) , have several distinct
advantages over the smaller independent par-
ties. These three major parties operate on a
trizonal basis and have fairly dependable
party presses. The SPD is the most highly
centralized, almost all authority being vested
in a central executive committee dominated
by Kurt Schumacher. The CDU/CSU and
the FDP have both formed working commit-
tees to coordinate the policies of their Land
organizations on a trizonal basis, but in both
parties final authority has been retained by
the Land party machine. The smaller inde-
pendent parties, with the exception of the
German Communist Party (KPD), have only
a rudimentary organization and press, and are
active in most instances only on a regional,,
or at most, a state (Land) level. None, ex-
cept for the KPD, is organized on a zonal or
trizonal basis. Some of the smaller parties,
such as the Bavarian Party and the South
Schleswig Association (SSV) are purely re-
gional, with programs comprising both right-
ist and separatist aims. Others, among
which are the German Bloc (DB) in Bavaria,
the National Democratic Party (NDP) in
Hesse, and the German Party (DP) in the
British Zone, are rightist and nationalist, but
have been unable to qualify for Military Gov-
ernment license in all states.
The major parties will also benefit from the
electoral law, which provides that any party
failing to win at least 5 percent of the state
vote, or else the majority of the votes in one
constituency, cannot be given seats in? the
Federal Diet (Bundestag). Most small par-
ties would be unlikely to win the majority
vote in any constituency. Their only hope
for representation, therefore, is to achieve the
necessary 5 percent of the state vote and thus
participate in the state party list system,
whereby the percentage of the total vote in a
state won by each party determines the num-
ber of Diet seats it receives. Of the seats in
the Diet, 60 percent are allotted to candidates
from the individual constituencies, so that
only 40 percent are available through the
state list system. The major parties have the
further advantage of well-known political
leaders, and, especially in the case of the
CDU/CSU, a fair record of achievement in
municipal, regional, state, and bizonal govern-
ment. Excepting a few of the major KPD
personalities, the smaller parties have rela-
tively unknown leadership. They have also
no recent experience in actual government.
b. The Independent Minority Parties.
During the coming federal election cam-
paign, however, some factors will favor the
independent over the established parties, par-
ticularly those of the latter that have held
office. Independent party leaders will be able
to exploit the considerable dissatisfaction felt
toward the established parties by many social
groups, most important of which are the eight
million expellees from the east. Because
these leaders are unlikely to assume actual re-
sponsibility, they will promise everything to
all interests. They will make increased use
of the label of "collaborators" with the Oc-
cupying Powers to embarrass the major
parties. Their rightist-nationalist attitude
should attract the votes of the many Germans
who have hitherto been apathetic to politics
and to the activities of the established parties.
2. Probable Results of the Elections.
a. Estimated Election Returns.
In the 1946 State Diet (Landtag) elections,
the approximate percentages of the total
votes in west Germany won by each party were
as follows: CDU/CSU-36.5 percent; SPD-
35.9 percent; FDP-10.3 percent; KPD-9.5
percent; and other parties-7.8 percent. The
1947-48 district (Kreis) and municipal (Ge-
2
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meincle) elections, however, saw changes in
the relative party strengths, generally at the
expense of the parties holding office. The
approximate relative party strengths in these
elections were CDU/CSU-34 percent; SPD-
34 percent; FDP-9.5 percent; KPD-9 per-
cent; and for small parties and independent
candidates-13.5 percent. In several special
district and municipal elections since 1947-48,
minor conservative party candidates and in-
dependents have gained an increasing pro-
portion of the votes. It cannot be assumed,
however, that they would do as well in na-
tional elections where their lack of party or-
ganization would be an important handicap.
STATE DIET (Landtag) ELECTION
RESULTS 1946-47
(Percentage of valid votes cast)
CDU/CSU 36.5%
SPD 35.9%
FDP 10.3%
KPD 9.5%
Zentrum
German Party (DP)
Economic Reconstruction 7.8%
Party (WAV)
Other Parties
Total 100.0%
ESTIMATED FEDERAL DIET (Bundestag)
ELECTION RESULTS, 1949
votes cast)
25-35%
34-35%
8-10%
5-8%
(Percentage of valid
CDU/CSU
SPD
FDP
KPD
Zentrum
German Party (DP)
Bavarian Party
South Schleswig Association
(SSV)
Economic Reconstruction
Party (WAV)
Independents and other parties
15-25%
Total 100.0%
On the basis of these trends, following the
State Diet elections of 1946 and the district
and municipal elections of 1947-48, the 1949
federal election results are estimated as fol-
lows. Of the 30 million Western Germans
3
eligible to vote, somewhat over 20 million will
cast ballots. No party will win a majority.
The SPD is expected to win between 34 and 35
percent of all votes, the FDP between 8 and 10
percent. The KPD is unlikely to win more
than 8 percent of the votes, and because anti-
Communist feeling in Western Germany has
grown as a result of Soviet tactics in Berlin, it
will probably win only 5 to 6 percent of the
votes. These parties, therefore, will approxi-
mately retain their past electoral strengths.
The election results are most uncertain in
the case of the CDU/CSU and the rightist
parties, primarily because the rightist groups
may win the votes of conservative elements
that have hitherto given their support to the
CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU should win at
least 25 percent of the vote, but may receive
as high as 35 percent. The minor rightist
and regional parties should win a minimum
of 15 percent. They may gain as much as 25
percent, however, mostly at the expense of the
CDU/CSU.
The proportion of west German voters ac-
tually opposed to the establishment of the
western German Federal Republic is believed
to be small and will be revealed primarily by
the number of invalid ballots cast and the
votes received by parties of the extreme left
and right. A high percentage of abstentions
would also indicate disapproval.
Because of the electoral law provisions pre-
viously noted, the percentage of votes esti-
mated for each party does not constitute an
estimate of that party's probable representa-
tion in the Federal Diet. Candidates elected
by majority vote in individual constituencies
will in most instances be those of the two
major parties. Some of the smaller parties
will not be able to gain either a single con-
stituency or 5 percent of the state vote, and
so will be barred entirely from representation
in the Federal Diet. As a consequence, the
strength of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP in
the Diet should actually be larger than their
share in the vote might indicate. For ex-
ample, it is entirely possible that the CDU/
CSU and SPD together, while receiving only
60 percent of the total popular vote, might re-
ceive 80 percent of the total Diet seats, de-
pending wholly on the distribution of the
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votes they receive. As a further example, the
KPD may suffer loss under the electoral law
in such states as Bavaria and Schleswig-Hol-
stein, where its electoral strength has rarely
exceeded 5 percent.
b. Estimated Composition of the Govern-
ment.
As a result of the probable outcome of the
elections, the government is expected to take
the form of a coalition because neither the
CDU/CSU nor the SPD is likely to assume ex-
clusive responsibility. This coalition will
probably take one of the following two forms:
(1) CDU/CSU Coalition with the SPD. In
view of the preponderant representation these
two parties will have in the Federal Diet, this
is the more likely coalition. Factors against
its formation, however, are the fundamental
differences in the economic and social pro-
grams of the two parties and the aversion of
SPD leaders to assumption of governmental
responsibility when the party does not have
its own working majority.
The final decision of the SPD is likely to be
based on two factors: first, its ability to obtain
enough cabinet posts to ensure at least a par-
tial realization of its program; and second, its
willingness to subordinate partisan politics to
the attainment of a stable government.
The stability of the coalition would be im-
proved by the participation of the FDP which
often takes a position midway between the
two larger parties. Although the attitude the
FDP would assume toward this coalition is
uncertain, it would probably participate if
given adequate compensation in the appoint-
ments to executive positions.
(2) CDU/CSU Coalition with the FDP, Zent-
rum, and possibly Certain Small Rightist
Groups. Although such a coalition is possible,
it would be faced with the unwillingness of
the more liberal elements to associate with
the representatives of the extreme right, the
regional and religious antagonisms between
its component groups, and the problem of
distributing executive positions to satisfy the
ambitions of all the partners.
4
3. The New Government in Relation to US
Interests.
a. CDU/CSU Coalition with the SPD.
A CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, with or without
FDP participation, would be broadly repre-
sentative, and would be favorable to US in-
terests. The two parties, through their con-
trol of the majority of the seats in the Federal
Diet, would be certain of passing all mutually
acceptable legislation, and to this extent could
provide effective government. Moreover, the
presence of the SPD would counteract the
rightist wing of the CDU/CSU, provide a pro-
gressive force within the coalition, assure the
support of most trade unions and the bulk of
the working class, and render remote the pos-
sibility of a west German "deal" with an east
German Communist state or directly with the
USSR.
b. CDU/CSU Coalition with the FDP, Zent-
rum, and possibly Certain Small Rightist
Groups.
Such, a government would present several
features at variance with US interests. Its
capability for effective and stable government
would be sharply reduced by the opposition
of the SPD, often coinciding with that of other
opposition parties and factions. Labor sup-
port, both union and otherwise, would be
largely lacking, and in many instances labor
would offer strong resistance to governmental
policies. Its stability might be further im-
paired by the undependability of the splinter
groups forming the right wing of the coali-
tion. In addition, the reactionary wing of
the CDU/CSU would gain in influence as a
result of the party's collaboration with these
conservative small parties and the govern-
ment would thus become increasingly rightist
and nationalistic in character. Certain ele-
ments in the CDU/CSU have already sought
to establish closer relations with politicians in
the Soviet Zone and would continue to ex-
plore the possibilities of reuniting their coun-
try, with Soviet support.
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-s--
APPENDIX
REFERENCE OUTLINE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN GERMANY
1. Rightist.'
German Party (DP). Active only in the
British Zone, with its main strength in lower
Saxony, where it received 17.9 percent of the
votes in the 1947-48 elections. The DP will
probably be supported by former members of
the nationalistic German Rightist Party
(DRP) . The latter party existed only in cer-
tain districts of the British Zone, where it en-
joyed considerable success until the recent
prohibition of its activities by the British Mili-
tary Government.
South Schleswig Association (SSV). Active
only in Schleswig-Holstein in the British Zone,
where it won 9.3 percent of the votes in the
1947-48 elections. The SSV is a separatist
and rightist party, given mild encouragement
by the Danish Government.
National Democratic Party (NDP). Active
only in certain electoral districts of Hesse, in
the US Zone. The NDP is a new organiza-
tion which has won surprising successes in by-
elections during 1948-49. Not yet licensed on
a state (Land) level, it is reported to have
concluded a working agreement with the
Hesse FDP, whereby some of its candidates
will stand on the FDP list.
Bavarian Party. Active only in Bavaria in
the US Zone, where it received 9.3 percent of
the votes in the 1947-48 elections. A right-
ist and separatist group, it is expected to win
25-30. percent of the votes in Bavaria, since its
popularity has been increasing steadily.
This does not purport to be a complete list of
the rightist parties, which are still in flux. The
parties listed are those which have been most active
recently. At present, the political activities of all
rightist parties are limited by military government
licensing. Their programs, therefore, are likely to
be implicit rather than announced, and their right-
ist character is presently indicated more by their
supporting elements than by their party platforms.
In general, however, they tend to be authoritarian
in principle and chauvinistic in attitude, either on
a regional or national basis.
Economic Reconstruction Party (WAV).
Although it gained only 2 percent of the votes
in the 1947-48 elections, the WAV, active only
in Bavaria, does have some representation in
the Bavarian Diet. Despite the crowds which
go to enjoy the speeches of its demagogic
leader, Alfred Loritz, the WAV will probably
win even fewer of the votes in the federal elec-
tions than it did in 1947-48.
2. Center.
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Chris-
tian Social Union (CSU).
Licensed in all states of all three zones, the
CDU/CSU is a loose amalgam of state organ-
izations coordinated through a working com-
mittee on the western German level. Its
membership is heterogeneous, ranging from
moderate liberal to extreme right, but in gen-
eral, the CDU/CSU can be characterized as a
middle class party subject to strong Catholic
clerical influence in the south and Lutheran
in the northwest. On the economic side, the
CDU/CSU stands as the chief protagonist of
free enterprise. The CDU/CSU represents
moderate federalism, as concerns the central
government.
Free Democratic Party (FDP). Licensed in
all states of all three zones, the FDP is a
working union of various state parties which
generally subscribe to a common program.
The FDP supports the free enterprise system
and parliamentary democracy, but is more
centralistic than the CDU/CSU and is not
subject to clerical influence.
Center Party (Zentrum). Active only in
the British Zone, where it registered gains in
the 1947-48 elections, the Center is a purely
Catholic party, in contrast to the CDU/CSU,
which enjoys some Protestant support. The
party endeavors to attract labor support by a
more progressive social program than that of
the CDU/CSU. The Center has been under
? continual pressure to join with the CDU/CSU,
-S-Freitt"r"? 5
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and such a union remains possible in the fu-
ture.
3. Leftist.
Social Democratic Party (SPD). Licensed
in all states and all zones of Western Ger-
many, the SPD is very tightly organized. It
is very similar in aims to the British Labor
Party, with which it has close relations. It
advocates parliamentary democracy, the so-
cialization of all basic industries, a strong
central government, and bitter resistance to
Communism. The SPD is supported by the
trade unions and the great majority of west
German labor.
6
German Communist Party (KPD). Li-
censed in all states and zones, the KPD pro-
gram is an amalgamation of the usual Com-
munist objectives and, for tactical reasons, a
strong nationalist stand against the western
occupation powers. The KPD is closely sup-
ported by the Communist Socialist Unity Party
(SED) in the Soviet Zone, though formally
separated from it. KPD strength, never more
than 10 percent of the votes cast in previous
elections, is believed to have been reduced ap-
preciably during the past year because of So-
viet tactics in Berlin and Eastern Germany.
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