SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003500200006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 26, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM
IN GERMANY
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ORE 51-49
Published 26 May 1949
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET7.042?
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ORE 51-49 TpliwiAgaiiET
SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY
SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the mechanism of Soviet control in
Germany, and secondly, to estimate the effectiveness of this mechanism.
Since the collapse of the Third Reich, the USSR has attempted to create in Ger-
many?particularly in the eastern zone?a political and economic system through
which it could exercise an indirect but complete control, even under conditions of
nominal German independence. The components of this system are closely integrated,
and function under the supervision of the Soviet authorities in East Germany. For
convenience of discussion, however, the political and economic control organizations
in eastern Germany, and the Communist organization in Western Germany are here
considered separately.
The Soviet organization for political control of East Germany follows a pattern
similar to that employed for that purpose by the Nazi regime, a combination of police
forces and a dominant political party. It is estimated that the USSR would need a
loyal security police force and party apparatus?as well as a number of Soviet personnel
in plain clothes?in order to exert certain control of East Germany in the event of
Soviet troop withdrawal. The training and organization of such a mechanism may be
impossible to achieve in the immediate future. This does not mean, however, that
the USSR would not withdraw troops from Eastern Germany because its control mech-
anism was not adequate, if other factors made such a withdrawal expedient. Even
thereafter, the USSR would probably have to maintain under various guises close
supervision of the mechanism to insure its reliability.
For economic control of the Soviet Zone, the Soviet Military Administration
employs the German Economic Commission, a highly centralized authority. In the
economic administrations of the various states in the Zone, each department is subordi-
nated to its corresponding branch in the Commission, which is thereby enabled to exert
a vertical and generally close control over each element of economic activity in the
area. The Commission's five main branches, being thus organized, could be adapted
with a minimum of delay as economic ministries of an East German state. Although
key positions in the German Economic Commission are held by Germans considered
comparatively reliable by the Soviet administration, their actual loyalty to Soviet inter-
ests is questionable.
In Western Germany, Soviet controls can be exerted only within the relatively
weak German Communist Party. This organization, however, is highly centralized
and functions under the direction of the Soviet Military Administration and in close
liaison with the Socialist Unity Party in the Soviet Zone. At present, the Communist
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report. The information herein is as of 5 May 1949.
1 weik.sacalwiT
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Party in West Germany functions principally as a propaganda medium but possesses a
strength disproportionate to its membership because most Germans are apprehensive
of a future Soviet occupation of West Germany and the authority the German Com-
munists would probably exercise thereafter. The Communist Party is closely inte-
grated into the control organization which the USSR has established for the Soviet
Zone and hopes to extend to all Germany.
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ORGANIZATION FOR SOVIET CONTROL OF GERMANY
SOVIET MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
GERMAN
ADMIN. OF
THE INTERIOR
MINISTRIES OF
THE INTERIOR
PROVINCIAL
POLICE
PERSONNEL
& BUDGET
BORDER AND
PARAMILITARY
POLICE
LIAISON
- - -
POLITBURO AND
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (BED)
4
ts.V
0:e. te4i;
0.1400141.'- -4. 0
GERMAN
ECONOMIC
COMMISSION (DWK)
LAND BRANCHES
OF THE
DWK
TRIZONAL HQ.,
WESTERN KPD
(DZV)
\ AID AND
SED.
LAND
ORGANIZATION
ASSISTANCE
COMMUNIST
PARTY,
WESTERN GERMANY
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SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY
1. ORGANIZATION FOR POLITICAL CONTROL-SOVIET ZONE.
Because the organization for political control now being activated by the USSR
follows a pattern similar to that formerly used by the Nazi Party and the Third Reich
for control of the approximate area of what is now the Soviet Zone, a comparison of
the two systems in that area provides an approximate estimate of the present stage of
development of the Soviet organization. Such a comparative estimate is, however, con-
ditioned by the fact that the Nazi organization in 1939 applied to an area not yet
suffering the effects of World War II and enjoyed popular support in sharp contrast to
the general dislike Germans still feel toward Communism and the USSR. Because of
this dislike, the USSR is faced with special difficulties in its imposition of a puppet
regime for control of Germany and can rely upon such control only so long as this
regime is sustained by the presence of large numbers of Soviet personnel.
?a. Devices for Political Control under Nazi Regime.
Under Hitler, the control organization for the area approximating the present
Soviet Zone had two parallel and coordinated systems: the military and police organs,
acting as the executive arm of the Third Reich, and the structure of the Nazi Party
(NSDAP) and its affiliated organizations.
Military and state police control of this area in 1939 was exerted through
garrisons of troops, SS formations, and the regular police (including the Gestapo). The
total strength of these police organs was approximately 180,000. In relation to the
population, the ratio was about 1:83.
In addition to these governmental controls, the German population was
supervised by the Nazi Party. All phases of German life were also organized by the
various affiliates of this party, and no sizable element of the population could avoid
regimentation in one or more of such organizations as the Hitler Youth and the
Labor Front.
Spread throughout the Nazi Party and its affiliates were representatives of the
party police (SD) . These maintained close liaison with the Gestapo, to which they
reported all subversion within the party for action by the official German police.
This joint control organization functioned with, a high degree of efficiency
from 1939 until the latter part of the war, organizing and guiding the German popu-
lation to exploit its productive capacities to the utmost.
COMPARATIVE NAZI AND SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS FOR POLITICAL CONTROL
OF SOVIET ZONE AREA -
Nazi Organization
(1) Policing Organs
(a) Army garrisons of approximate
total strength of 102,000 troops.
Soviet Organization
(1) Policing Organs
(a) The Soviet Army of Occupation
with -a total strength of 345,700
as of 28 Feb. 1949.
a? TePitffleffLPT
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TIVANCRET
Nazi Organization
(b) Eight Allgemeine SS Abschnitte
(zones) each controlling about
three SS standarte of 1,600-2,000
men.
(c) About 30,000 members of the
official police (Ordnungspolizei).
(Total strength of the policing or-
gans was approximately 180,000. In
relation to the population the ratio
was about 1:83.)
(2) Party Organs
(a) The Nazi Party, a highly central-
ized political structure based on
the Zell, whose strength was
40-60.
(b) The party affiliates such as Ger-
man Labor Front (DAF) , which
successfully regimented the ac-
tivities of all sizable elements
of the population in the interests
of the state.
(c) The party police (SD) , whose
representatives were spread
throughout the party and its af-
filiates for the purpose of report-
ing subversion to the state police
organs, chiefly the Gestapo.
Note: Estimates of police strength in the So-
viet Zone are from the I. D., Depart-
ment of the Army.
'Ped"?SEGIBEIT
4
Soviet Organization
(b) The German paramilitary police,
operating under the Ministry of
the Interior and including about
15,000 Bereitschaftpolizei and
about 12,000 Border Police.
(c) Criminal police and their sub-
section, the political police, also
under the Ministry of the Interior.
(Total actual German police
strength, including the para-
military police, is estimated as of
March 1949 at about 102,000. In
relation to the population the
ratio of German police is about
1:196. The ratio of German po-
lice plus Soviet Occupation per-
sonnel to the population is about
1:40.)
(2) Party Organs
(a) The Socialist Unity Party, a theo-
retically centralized political
structure, with a basic unit
slightly larger than the Nazi Zell,
but with little popular support.
(b) The mass organizations, con-
trolled by members of the SED,
such as the Free German Trade
Union League (FDGB) , have wide
membership but slight actual
support.
(c) For party police the USSR relies
on various types of control com-
missions, which are set up on all
but the most subordinate party
level. In addition, other less
conspicuous groups may also be
used for surveillance. These con-
trol commissions probably have
some connection with the Crimi-
nal Police Department of the Ger-
man Ministry of the Interior.
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b. Agencies of Soviet Political Control.
The organization for political control now being prepared by the USSR is in
general similar to that employed by the Third Reich, as can be observed from the
introductory chart. Two parallel and theoretically coordinated systems are being set
up: (1) the German Administration of the Interior (GAI), which not only exerts quasi-
governmental police controls but also controls the Central Administration for Justice,
and (2) the Communist-controlled Socialist Unity Party (SED) and its affiliates.
In addition to its own army of occupation, with units stationed at all key
points and Soviet personnel for surveillance of all German organizations (total
strength 345,700 as of 28 February 1949) the USSR employs the following as executive
organs of the German Ministry of the Interior.
(1) The para-military German police, composed of the Border Police and the
internal security components (Bereitschaftpolizei) . As of March 1949, total Bereit-
schaftpolizei strength was estimated at 15,000 as a maximum. Total strength of the
Border Police is believed to be about 12,000.
(2) The regular police (Ordnungspolizei) . The present ratio of the Ordnungs-
polizei to the population is not known. Total actual German police strength, however,
including the para-military police, is estimated at about 102,000. In relation to the
German population, therefore, the ratio of security control is about 1:196, as compared
to the ratio of 1:83 under the Nazi regime. The ratio of German police plus Soviet
occupation personnel to the population is about 1:40.
In addition to powers exercised by the Soviet Army and the Interior Minis-
try, the USSR is attempting, in order to supplement its control of the Soviet Zone, to
make the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and its affiliates into a reliable Communist-
controlled party structure similar to the Nazi Party. Theoretically the party struc-
ture is built on a basic unit slightly larger than the Nazi Party cell of 40-60 members.
The SED has a wide membership but has failed to attract real popular support, and its
rank and file are either apathetic or hostile to the party and its programs. Implemen-
tation of party policies is in the hands of a minority of Communists and pro-Soviet
opportunists. Supplementary to the SED, the USSR is endeavoring to create mass
organizations controlled by Communist or pro-Soviet elements, which would regiment
the German population in support of Soviet-Communist policies, or at least reduce oppo-
sition to the present regime. Various front organizations, ostensibly non-political,
have been employed, such as the Free German Trade Union Federation and the Free
German Youth. In addition, the USSR has used the surviving remnants of non-Com-
munist political parties and various Soviet-created political groups. Staffed by pro-
Soviet elements, these organizations have a wide membership but have almost no actual
support from the population.
4 (3) For close supervision of the SED and its affiliates, the USSR relies on
various types of control commissions, having surveillance functions and set up on all
except the most subordinate party level. Functioning as a cell within their respective
party headquarters, these probably have direct or indirect connection with the Criminal
Police Department of the Interior Ministry. Though the efficiency of this system of
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TOV-BE t E
control commissions has been gradually improving, it does not appear to be very
great.
c. Relative Difficulty of Soviet Political Control.
The present control organization for the Soviet Zone, although designed to
promote a concerted effort of the population, has been obliged to function for the repres-
sion of anti-Soviet elements. Lacking the loyalty and support of the German people, it
has not yet even remotely approached the high degree of efficiency of the Nazi control
organization.
Because of German hostility, it is estimated that the USSR would need a
loyal security police force and party apparatus?as well as a number of Soviet person-
nel in plain clothes?in order to exert certain control of East Germany in the event
of Soviet troop withdrawal. The training and organization of such a mechanism may
be impossible to achieve in the immediate future, at least during 1949. (This does not
mean, however, that the USSR would not withdraw troops from Eastern Germany
because its control mechanism was not adequate, if other factors made such a with-
drawal expedient.) The "reliability" of para-military police forces, even if they were
increased to more than double the present figure, would be doubtful in the event of a
complete Soviet troop withdrawal. Because of nationalistic and anti-Soviet tendencies,
already evident in the present control organization, it is doubtful that the USSR can,
within the next few years, find sufficient "loyal" Germans to staff its control mecha-
nism adequately or effectively. The Soviet control will, therefore, be ineffective unless
the USSR maintains in Germany for an indefinite period the Soviet personnel pres-
ently believed to be infiltrated within the control mechanism at all levels.
At present the USSR keeps its control organizations almost entirely separated,
except for high-level coordination and policy directives of the political bureau of the
SED. By continuing this policy the USSR can forestall the integration of the adminis-
trative agencies in a future East German state which otherwise might be more likely
to develop strong nationalistic tendencies.
2. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CONTROL-SOVIET ZONE.
In order to raise the level of industrial production in the Soviet Zone and thereby
increase the volume of commodities which can be drained from the Zone for Soviet use,
the USSR has imposed a master plan, known as the Two-Year Plan, whose production
schedules are similar to those employed in the USSR itself. This plan was introduced
through the SED, which, as has previously been pointed out, serves as a major vehicle
for Soviet political control within the Zone. Execution of this plan, to which the
entire economy of the Soviet Zone is subordinated, has been entrusted to the German
Economic Commission (DWK).
The DWK, like the SED, is little more than a German appendage of the Soviet
Military Administration. A highly centralized administrative agency, it controls
almost all production and distribution of goods in the Soviet Zone. (The major excep-
tion is the SAG, or Soviet Corporation, which controls about twenty percent of the
major Soviet Zone industries.)
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The DWK is divided into five main branches, which are in turn subdivided into
numerous departments covering all aspects of economic activity within the Zone.
Within each state of the Zone, the economic departments of the state government have
been subordinated directly to their corresponding functional branches in the Commis-
sion. By reason of this direct subordination, the branches of the DWK are able to
exercise a vertical control over all economic enterprises in the Zone.
Within the DWK, authority appears to be vested in two experienced Communists:
the chairman, Heinrich Rau, and the deputy chairman, Fritz Selbmann, whose deci-
sions and acts, however, are subject to the approval of the Soviet Military Adminis-
tration. Actually, internal policy is probably made in a Secretariat composed of the
chiefs of the five main branches of the DWK, together with representatives from the
various front and party organizations. The German Administration of the Interior
(GAI) has some measure of control over the DWK through the Central Control Com-
mission of nine members appointed jointly by the chairman of the DWK and the presi-
dent of the GAI. This commission has wide powers of investigation and dismissal,
ostensibly to eliminate bureaucracy and to counter economic sabotage. The commis-
sion probably functions as a surveillance agency within the DWK and appears to have
close liaison with the Criminal Police Division of the Interior Ministry. In each Land,
there is a similar Control Committee, subordinate to the Central Control Commission.
Key positions in the DWK bureaucracy are held by "reliable" Germans, most of
whom belong to the SED. Continuing purges have greatly reduced the number of
DWK personnel who were not also members of that party. Such purging, however, will
probably not increase the loyalty of the DWK, either to the SED or to the USSR. Sev-
eral cases of misappropriation of goods on a large scale by responsible DWK officials
have occurred in consumer goods industries; production quotas have not been satisfac-
torily fulfilled; and raw material allocations have been diverted to non-scheduled con-
sumers. Although available information on the efficiency of the DIRK organization is
limited, it is believed that because of the bureaucratic nature of the agency, and because
of the opportunistic attitude of many of its officials, its over-all efficiency is not
very great.
The primary significance of the DWK at present lies in its immediate availability
as a government for the Soviet Zone. Because its five main branches are organized
vertically, they could, without delay, become the economic ministries of an East Ger-
man state. Together with the Interior Ministry and its satellite Central Administra-
tion for Justice, as well as the Central Administration for Education, the DWK already
functions as a de facto government under Soviet supervision. Imposition of a pseudo-
democratic legislative body at the top of the control organization and official recog-
nition by the Eastern bloc are the only two factors not yet supplied by the USSR for
the creation of an East German government.
3. THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN WESTERN GERMANY.
The Communist Party (KPD) of Western Germany is closely integrated into the
system which the USSR has set up for control of the Soviet Zone and hopes to extend
over all Germany. The Dreizonenvorstand (DZV) , the headquarters of the western
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TOP4MCBST
Communist Party, has been given wide latitude in the field of policy-making during the
past year. Previously, the DZV was definitely subordinated to the Central Secretariat
of the SED in Berlin, which may still retain some final authority on fundamental
issues. The DZV maintains rigid party discipline and enforces compliance with its
instructions on all subordinate party levels. Its members are called to Berlin to confer
on broad policy with the SED Politburo, and both presumably take their directives from
the Soviet Military Administration. Communications between Berlin and the DZV are
handled by a branch of the organization section of the SED Central Secretariat under
the direction of an old-time Communist, Richard Stahlmann.
The KPD is a highly centralized organization of approximately 350,000 mem-
bers. Since 1945 it has consistently sought to wrest from the Socialists the con-
trol of German labor in the hope of creating a revolutionary situation and obstructing
German economic recovery, and has tried vigorously to win the support of the West
German public by Communist propaganda. In neither effort have the Communists
achieved marked success. German labor has remained predominantly Socialist, and,
to a large extent, has withdrawn its support from the KPD. The numerous Communist
propaganda campaigns have proved generally ineffective. The KPD has been the
palpable tool of the USSR for too long to win over any sizable segment of the German
public. Paradoxically, however, fear of the USSR is the principal source of KPD
strength. Although they are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, most Germans, always
apprehensive of a future Soviet occupation of Western Germany and consequent
reprisals by the Communists, will go to considerable lengths to avoid antagonizing
the KPD.
In an attempt to reduce distrust of the KPD and allow it to pursue policies diver-
gent from those of the SED, the headquarters of both parties have published com-
muniqu?announcing the formal dissolution of the KPD/SED working alliance. Each
party is ostensibly to operate independently in the future. The top levels of the IUD
now receive policy directives from the SMA in Berlin, although the lower echelons will
probably continue to cooperate with their counterparts in the Soviet Zone.
The post-1945 KPD is much weaker than the pre-1933 party in membership, finan-
cial resources, and capability for illegal activities. Its pre-1933 clandestine organi-
zation, the Illegal or Kippenberger Apparat, was liquidated by the Gestapo, and few
survivors have returned to Germany. As a result, the personnel needed to rebuild
an efficient illegal organization would have to be trained and organized on a long-term
basis. At present, some covert activity is conducted by the Organization and Per-
sonnel sections of the KPD at various party levels, but no organization similar to the
old Apparat has appeared. The various measures now being taken by the Party to
tighten control over the rank and file may be designed to form an organization which
would be similar to the Apparat and capable of going underground.
Since the currency reform in June 1948, the KPD has had considerable difficulty in
meeting Party expenses, previously covered by funds from the Soviet Zone. The Party's
regular and dependable income results from the sale of its propaganda publications
and from collection of party membership dues, on which great emphasis is now placed.
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Other sources of KPD income are the sale of various commodities smuggled from the
Soviet Zone, and donations from individuals desiring to insure themselves against the
dangers inherent in a possible future Soviet occupation of the Western Zones. By the
use of pamphlets and newspapers shipped or smuggled from the Soviet Zone, the KPD
has been able to exceed any other political party in the volume of propaganda produced.
In addition, the recent importation of a considerable quantity of printing equipment
from the Soviet Zone is expected to increase materially the propaganda capabilities
of the KPD.
The consolidation of the Communist Parties outside the USSR has been reflected
in KPD programs to increase centralization of the party structure and weed out unre-
liable elements. New party membership cards, reorganization of the basic party units,
and checks on the personnel are all directed toward this goal. Although the mem-
bership of the party is decreased by such measures, they tend to develop a disciplined
and fairly reliable organization.
During coming months, KPD propaganda will be directed chiefly at the "inter-
ference" by the Western Powers in German affairs, as evidenced by the Ruhr Authority,
the Occupation Statute, and the terms of trizonal fusion. All incidents of friction
between the Occupation Powers and the Germans will be aggressively attacked. Pre-
sumably the KPD will have two objectives: exploitation of the general German resent-
ment against occupation controls, and preparation for an eventual East German state
claiming national sovereignty. Although KPD tactics may somewhat heighten Ger-
man resentment against occupation controls, the KPD is not expected, under present
conditions, to improve either its capabilities or its party strength.
.9
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3754-8TATZ-1949
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