THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR ORE 17-49 PUBLISHED 4 MAY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003400130008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 4, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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1%7101Mi iucri I IML N. COPY NO-23 7
itea?eeeRtwr- FOR THE CHIEF.
INSPECTION AND SECURITY
iiuz2336
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE
FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR
This document has been
appreved for release throw
the HISTORICAILMIEW PKOGr of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Date ALCruA qz
lote 9a.
ORE 17-49
Published 4 May 1949
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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!WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of, the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage -Act, 50 US.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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se0;cis Nrirertri
4
NOTICE TO HOLDERS OF CIA ESTIrATE Ofit17.-e
h022505
Holders of ORE 17-49 (The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the
US and the USSR) are requested to insert the text beim; in the report. This
text, submitted by the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State
on 27 May, amends the coordination footnote on Page 3 of the report' and ?
therefore supersedes the memorandum of concurrence submitted by the Depart-
ment of State on 29 April. It does not modify the CIA estimate itself nor
the stated positions of the other agencies.
"The concurrence of the intelligence organization of
the Department of State in ORE 17-49 (p0) should be considered
is limited to the section entitled 'Political Estimate for
1952' (pp.74).
"The intelligence organization of the Department of State
dissents from the conclusion on the ultimate strategic
importance of the Far East, as contained in paragraph (b) on
page '18, and mentioned frequently throughout the paper.
"This dissent is based on the belief that the paper exag-
geratea. the importance of the Far East, especially in
considering it-as potentially 'decisive.' Problems of USSR
mobilization of the Far East for yar are under-estimated,
especially the dependence on and difficulties in maintaining
.the necessary sea transportation. .
"US potential for interference (a) in a USSR-occupied
Japan, (b) on the sea lanes; and (c) elsenhere, Nith USSR
efforts to mobilize the Far East, appears to be under-estimated.
The general conclusion of the paper that, under certain
Assumptions, the yar potential of the US might be destroyed,
is not considered proven. Nor is the derivative conclusion
for US policy believed proven, namely, that to deny to the
Soviets the consolidated control of the Far East it is necessary'
to maintain 'integrated US control of the, offshore island
chain extending from the Philippines to Japan.'"
CENTRAL, NTFILIGENCE AGENCY
1 June 1949
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TOP CRET
?
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
? designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
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dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official. duties may be authorized by the following:
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the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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DISTRIBUTION:
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ORE 17-49
1114Werffn11 AL ig?FamWeThET
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PROBLEM, SCOPE, AND ASSUMPTIONS 3
SUMMARY 5
DISCUSSION 7
Political Estimate for 1952 7
Economic Estimate 9
Strategic Estimate 13
1. Strategic Importance to the US 13
2. Strategic Importance to the USSR 17
GRAPHICS
Strategic Location of Far Eastern Areas.
Political Orientation-31 December 1945.
Anticipated Political Orientation-31 December 1952.
Political Estimate--31 December 1952 (Table).
Military and Industrial Manpower Potential.
Industrialization Potential.
Areas of Food Deficit and Surplus.
Air Distances from Selected Far Eastern Points (8 Figures).
Major Airfields in the Far East and Adjacent Areas.
Shipping Tracks and Ports.
NOTE: The graphic material appearing herein can be used validly only in conjunction
with this study.
A correct interpretation of the political aspects of all graphics herein requires
that the reader bear in mind the basic assumption that present trends in the Far
East will continue up to an outbreak of hostilities by the end of 1952.
The graphic presentation of quantitative data is based on information available
in late 1948. This material is designed to show broad comparisons of basic economic
factors, rather than to serve as a statistical source. Thus, these charts show that
Japan, with the greatest industrial capacity and reservoir of industrial manpower
in the Far East, has the greatest food problem in the region. Note that military man-
power data are based on estimates of World War II strength and do not reflect quali-
tative differences.
? 1
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?04914Ffifffriarm .
THE PROBLEM
To assess the strategic importance of the Far East to the US and the USSR in
the event of hostilities between those powers by 31 December 1952.
SCOPE
For purposes of this study, the Far East is defined as Korea, China (including all
border areas and Taiwan), Japan and the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Ceylon.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. A war between the US and the USSR will break out some time between the
present and 31 December 1952.
2. General trends now perceived in the Far East will continue.
3. Neither the US nor the USSR will basically alter its present policy towards the
various areas of the Far East.
Note: ORE 17-49 has been prepared through the collaborative efforts of the intelligence organiza-
tions of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Central Intelligence
Agency. These agencies provided the basic data pertinent to the following aspects of the
problem: political (State), military (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and economic (Central
Intelligence Agency). Coordination with Departmental Specialists was subsequently under-
taken on the intermediate phases of analysis and synthesis of the basic data. As pub-
lished, the paper represents over-all conclusions drawn by the Central Intelligence Agency
from analysis of the basic papers.
This estimate has been concurred in by the Intelligence Organization of the Depart-
ment of State, the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, and the Directorate of
of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents for the following reasons:
"a. Although the factual matter is in general accurate, its presentation contains
obscurities, apparent contradictions and unwarranted presumptions regarding
II. S. plans and policies, which are beyond the intelligence field_ As a result,
the reader is required to evolve his own analysis of the situation in order to reach
a sound appraisal of the strategic importance of the Far East.
This inchoate development is apparent in the SUMMARY, which furthermore
does not include all the salient points of the detailed discussion. Therefore, it
does not present a comprehensive abridgement."
Textual material is based on information available to CIA on 18 April 1949.
The supporting data for ORE 17-49 consist of basic material provided by the various
IAC agencies, as indicated above, an area by area compilation of the factors of importance
within the Far Eastern region, and a detailed regional examination of these factors. This
Is essentially study material of continuing value to national intelligence production on the
Far East and is available in the Central Intelligence Agency for reference.
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In ithe event of war between the US and the USSR; the major objective of each
power will be destruction of .the other's war-making potential., ?The Far East, lying
at great distantes from the heart of bothpowers' war-making centers, while not seem-
ingly of Vital importance to either tinder continued circumstances of peace, will develop
increasing strategic .tignifIcance to both in the eveht of war. Upon the outbreak of
hostilities prior to 1953, the region's signiflcancacannot be of initial decisive importance:
first,tecause of the distance consideration; second; because the Far East's considerable
resources will not have been fully exploited, developed and integrated with the home-
land war complex-of either the US or the USSR; and third, because of prior stockpiling
of essential raw ? materials ? primarily available in the Far East.. However, should all
the major components of the Far East's own self-contained war potential become con-
trolled and exploited by either power, the region's strategic importance would become
great. , Indeed, under the-conditions of a prolonged war, a USSR-controlled .Far?East
might even prove decisive..
: The USSR, in its drive foi world. dornination, can be expected to continue .ita
present attenaPts at expansion and censolidation in Eurasia by all means short of `direct
involvement of SoViet arnied forces in in attempt to attain -eventual decisive :militant
superiority. over the US in: intercontinental warfare:. Continued SoViet aggrandite
inent niight precipitate open hOstilities with the US before the USSR. has aelheited
as decisive superiority, as. would be the case .if war.oecurred prior to '1953. There
la grave danger that the USSR', with its vast -territory 'and. preponderant ;Militant
manpower for employment in Eurasia; inightivell surrviviand successfully absorb an
initial major .US offensive against European USSR and thus _achieve at least an in:
termediate italemate. Under such conditions, and if the Soviet Union had established
effeCtiie control over the Far East by occupation olkey areas either in peacetimeor in
the. war's eru:ly phases, the USSR wohld.be in. a poSition to exploit a- self:sufficierit Far
Eastern War-making complex in additiOntO its- own European, industrial and militant
establishment. This combination could provide the USSR with the capability:for-de-
cisive action in global war against the US.
In the event of war prior to 1953, it is probable that Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Ceylon, Japan and southern Korea would favor the US, although southern
Korea's active contribution in the war would be restricted to guerrilla operations.
Although Siam, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan would desire neutrality, they would
choose, with varying degrees of hesitancy, to support the US in preference to the USSR.
The position of China and its border areas (except Tibet, a few limited areas of the
southwest and possibly Taiwan) will be pro-Soviet; northern Korea, as well, will support
the USSR. Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia will remain areas of mixed orientation
in which the conflict between European colonial control and Far Eastern nationalism
might prevent their effective exploitation regardless of local preferences for either the
5
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"41111111111.111110
US or the USSR. Burma, too, will be an area of deep-seated unrest and doubtful ex-
plo it ability.
Japan, because of its industrial potential, its large resources of trained military
and industrial manpower and its strategic location, is the key to the development of
a self-sufficient war-making complex in the Far East. This fact was amply demon-
strated in World War II. Control of Japan's industrial machine would be more 'valu-
able to the USSR than to the US, however, not only because .the USSR has more im-
mediate need of the products of Japan's industry but also because the USSR will be
in effective control of the area (chiefly northern China, Manchuria and Korea) whose
natural resources Japanese industry can utilize most efficiently. For this reason, long-
range US security interests dictate the denial of Japan's capacity, both economic and
military, to USSR exploitation.
?The present aggressive Soviet attitude in the Far East indicates that the USSR
already appreciates that realization of the long-term decisive potential of the region
*ill be enhanced by early elimination of the US from the region, especially if accom-
plished without resort to war. Maintenance of the present US position in the Far East
denies Soviet hegemony over key areas of the region, particularly Japan. Loss of that
position, for any reason, will greatly facilitate Soviet exploitation of a potentially de-
cisive war factor and will correspondingly reduce the means for subsequent US counter-
action. US ability to derive full strategic advantage from the region and to deny its
ultimate exploitation by the USSR largely depends on measures to be taken in the
period extending from the present. Expansion of Soviet influence in the Far East
greatly beyond present limits at the expense of the US Far Eastern position in the
prewar period politically, economically and militarily, would tend to render the re-
maining US position militarily untenable from the outset of hostilities. Once having
lost its present minimum position in the region, the US might well lack the resources
needed simultaneously to maintain a major war effort against the Soviet European
war-making centers and to deny Soviet realization of the war potential of the Far East.
US strategic interests in the Far East, therefore, are immediate and continuing,
even if limited tq denying consolidated Soviet control of the region. Key to this denial
is integrated US control of the offshore island chain extending from the Philippines
to Japan.
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FAR EAST: POLITICAL ORIENTATION -31 DECEMBER 9215
U. S. S. R.
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SOVIET INFLUENCE
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MILITARY SITUATION. In North China and
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FAR EAST: ANTICIPATED POLITICAL ORIENTATION - 31' "DECEMBER 052
U. S. S. R.
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(31 December 1952)
SOVIET INFLUENCE
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NOTE, Infleendal trends towards nationolist.
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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ,OF THE TAR? EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR
nit ? ") n" t La? ''1 L ? ''
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POLITICALESTIMATE FOR 1952, "
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v ,tn . ?Vik,u4 farS, 1"_ bag Pa--(1.wlinT ? er-esh ? f 1
The following iestimate of ' the Far Eastern politieal situation in .?1952 is made
primarily toirpermit 'asseWment Of: c(a) liirgbobie orient?ttioIn of specific areas towards
either the US or the USSR, or towards neutrality; (b) potential. availability to the US
or the USSR of raw materials, industrial faahities, and manpower resulting from these
political orientations; and (c) extent of probable effective exploitation by the UR or
, ?
? . ? ,
the USSR of potentially available iesources as limited by local political conditions.
In general it appears probable that 'pp to 31 December. 1952 or at the prior outbreak
of hostilities:
. - - ! 'Jr. . f ? It` F
Areaa oriented towards- the US'will be : n:J:1 brunw -
? tt.;n-jrTr.i-ATI ? -- -
(a) Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Ceylon e ., Japan and
Korea. The governments in these areas and the general populace in
most of them would favor siding with the US in war. (In the case of
southern Korea, however, pro-US efforts after the outbreak of hostilities
probably would be limited to underground and guerrilla operations.)
(b) Siam, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In these areas, desire for neu-
trality may restrain the otherwise predominant choice of the US in pref-
erence to the USSR, with a resulting tendency towards indecisiveness and
less efficiency in the event of their participation.
(2) Areas oriented towards the USSR will be northern Korea and China (except
Tibet, limited areas of the southwest and possibly Taiwan).
Areas of mixed orientation will be Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaya.
(The latter three are colonial areas at present. Although the governments of
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, superimposed upon Far
Eastern colonial areas and endeavoring to control them, may be expected to
be oriented towards the US, the native populations of Indochina, Indonesia
and Malaya will be nationalistic, will prefer neutrality, and will determine
their orientation according to national self-interest. Inability of these colo-
nial populations to achieve their aspirations for national identity through
relations with the. respective governments of France, the Netherlands, and the
UK can result in their inclining to USSR-orientation. The political conflict
between the European governments and their colonial areas could produce
sufficient instability either to deny any appreciable advantage to the US result-
ing from the pro-US orientation of the European government or to permit
access to the resources of these colonial areas only at an infeasible cost.)
(3)
?sir
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Of areas expected to be available immediately to the US in the event of hostilities,
political conditions probably will permit effective access by the US to the natural
resources, industrial facilities and manpower of Japan, the Philippines, Ceylon, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. The same will hold true, in varying degrees, for Siam, India,
Pakistan, and possibly Taiwan. Although the Republic of Korea probably will be
US-oriented, it is not expected that Korea can make any appreciable contribution to
the US, except possible military action by prewar trained guerrilla units.
The resources of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya, however, may not be effectively
available to the US unless political stability within these areas is obtained and can be
maintained.
Of areas immediately available to the USSR, initial effective participation probably
will be confined primarily to northern Korea and China. Continued instability in the
colonial areas of Southeast Asia probably would not result in any positive contribution
to the USSR despite the possible anti-US or pro-USSR inclination of certain' native
populations, induced by Soviet vocal championship of nationalism. Negatively, how-
ever, such unrest would be of very great value to the USSR, since local instibilitY result-
ing from political conflicts would minimize the advantages to the US of access to the
resources of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya.
8
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POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE FAR EAST
Up to 31 December 1952 or at prior outbreak of hostilities.
Basic assumptions:
(a) presently foreseeable trends will continue.
(b) prior to outbreak of hostilities, the nature and intensity of forces now
employed by the US and the USSR will not alter fundamentally, nor
will either nation basically alter presently known policy towards areas
of the Far East.
JAPAN
SOUTHERN KOREA
NORTHERN KOREA I
CHINA
PHILIPPINES
INDO-CHINA
SIAM
1
MALAYA ? INDONESIA BURMA INDIA
1
PAKISTAN I AFGHANISTAN
PROBABLE
Government con-
Republic of Korea,
Communist domi-
Communist or Com-
Present or similar
French control lim-
Phibul or similar
. British . controlled
United States of
Unpredictable. One
Present Indian Na-
Present Mo s 1 e m
Present go v e r n-
REGIME
trolled by conservative
pseudo-socialistic;
nated.
munist dominated co-
regime with possibly
ited ? de facto con-
regime still in power.
federation.
Indonesia with de-
or several ineffective
tional Congress Party
League leadership.
ment.
political parties under
moderately conserve-
alition over all of
stronger nationalistic
trol largely in hands
creasing Dutch con-
leftist regimes result-
with partial program
continued supervision
of SCAP and US oc-
cupation support.
tive; oligarchic.
China (possibly except
Taiwan and areas of
southwestern China).
characteristics,
\
of local nationalists.
trol.
Ing from partial or
complete citsintegra-
tion of the Union of
of state socialism.
Burma.
STABILITY
Fundamentally stable
Failure to improve
Unstable
Stability dependent
Reasonably stable
Communist leader-
Moderately stable
Probably capable of
Satisfactory
Declining financial
Poor,
Conflict of French
Satisfactory
Impaired by con-
Moderately stable .
British control firm
Unstable
Conflict be t wee n
Poor
Political and ethnic
Moderately stable
Subject to:
Increasing stability
Subject to:
Moderately stable
Stability u n i m -
economic conditions,
however, would make
on but not guaranteed
by continued US aid
ship well established -
effective, organized
more stability than
any predecessor gov-
support from US and
increasing agrarian
efforts to maintain
control, and local ef-
stant political crises..-
but but challenged by in-
creasing demands of
Dutch efforts to main-
tam n a maximum of
factionalism will re-
main disturbing fac-
(1) Threat of serious
sabotage from Com-
(1) Serious impair-
ment in event of out-
paired if present pub-
lic works program
continued stability de-
because of:
opposition unlikely.
ernment during the
unrest may result in
forts to achieve hide-
Malay, Chinese and
economic and political
tor.
munists in event of
right war with India.
proves effective and
pendent on extensive
(1) Threat of invaston
.
Republic. Faced with
economic difficulties.
pendence prevent sta-
Indian political and
control and local ef-
major national emer-
(2) Serious impair-
unless rivalry be-
external assistance,
from northern Korea.
(2) Communist un-
derground in southern
Korea.
(3) Inefficiency in ad-
ministration.
major political and
economic problems,
bility.
labor organizations for
self-government and
by Communist ac-
tivity.
forts to achieve real
independence jeop-
ardize stability,
gency;
(2) Popular unrest in
case of famine or con-
tinued inflationary
pressure.
ment in event of fur-
ther mass migrations
of Moslems from
India.
(3) Continued food
sufficiency.
tween governmental
factions develops.
POLITICAL AND
Good
Poor
Moderately effective
Moderately effective
Fair
Poor
Moderately effective
Moderately effective
Weak
Very Weak
Improving efficiency
Good
Limited effectiveness
ADMINISTRATIVE
Capable of imposing
Inefficient due to:
Limited by inade-
communists can be
Administra-
Conflict of author!-
Able to maintain
British generally
Conflict of interests,
Inexperience and in-
Increased experience
Handicapped by in-
Handicapped by in-
EFFECTIVENESS
and operating neces-
(1) Inexperience
quacy of experienced
expected to achieve
tive weakness due to
ty will minimize ef-
present moderate de-
able to maintain in-
and native inexpert-
ternal dissension will
and maturity of lead-
experienced person-
experience and by
sary wartime controls.
(2) Corruption
technical and admin-
an important degree
inexperience and cor-
fectiveness.
gree of administrative
temal order. Admin-
ence, will minimize
limit effectiveness.
ers, stop-gap economic
nel, instability of pro-
tribal irresponsibility.
Istrative personnel
and mediocre produc-
tion ability of Ko-
reans.
of administrative ef-
fectiveness.
ruption. Social unrest
will continue to be
present.
efficiency. .
istrative effectiveness
however, will be de-
creased by refractory
elements.
effectiveness,
reforms, and consoli-
dation of central au-
thority will produce
improved efficiency.
Andel governments,
and separation of two
areas of Pakistan.
ATTITUDE
TOWARDS US
Oriented toward US
to point of offering
Friendly to US out
of fear of USSR ?
Anti-US
Anti-US
Primarily national-
Oriented towards
US but with diminish-
French colonial ele-
ments and many local
Desire neutrality,
but probably will
British elements
Pro-US, but local pop-
Dutch-US-oriented:
Indonesians ? prefer
Suspicious of US.
D e s 1 r e neutrality.
Favorably disposed
towards the US de-
Disillusionment to-
wards the West re-
Favoring neutrality.
bases and manpower
accompanied by gen-
1st, with anti-US pro-
Ing support for corn-
groups would prob-
maintain US proclivi-
ulation would favor
neutrality but US-
Choose side with up-
spite pressure from
suiting from what it
for US military opera-
lions.
eral anti-foreign sen-
timent.
clivity.
plete subordination to
US.
ably favor US.
ty. Slam's ability to
offer positive contri-
button to any US war
effort probably limited
to surplus rice needed
in other areas.
neutrality and some
will be anti-US.
oriented to degree of
US support for na-
tionallst aspirations,
per hand,
elements anxious to
maintain a position of
neutrality and from
elements hostile to
the West.
believes to be pre-
ferred treatment to
India. Pakistan will
be less disposed than
India to favor the US
position by a positive
stand prior to the
outbreak of hostilities.
ATTITUDE
Anti-Soviet and an-
Fearful of USSR
Completely subordi-
Pro-USSR
Anti-Soviet
Local population
G en era 11 y anti-
Generally anti-Soviet
Generally anti-So-
Susceptible to Soviet
Desires amicable re-
Anti-Soviet
Anti-Soviet
TOWARDS
USSR
ti-Communist
nate to USSR.
Primarily national-
1st with pro-USSR
proclivity.
would desire neutron-
ty. Some important
local leaders would
be sympathetic to-
wards USSR.
Soviet.
Except for small
active Communist mi-
nority.
viet with a few local
leaders announcing
sympathy for the
USSR. Trend toward
USSR-orientation as
nationalist's aspire,-
tions are frustrated.
propaganda. USSR's
claim to be a cham-
pion of colonial peo-
pies has wide accept-
ance.
lotions with Soviets,
but Is worried about
Communist gains in
eastern Asia. No eco-
nomic or security in-
terest inclines India
toward USSR.
?
11111Mkr
For an with 0 flE 17-49 only
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FAR EAST: MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL MANPOWERWOTENTIAL
U. S. S. R.
?-? ? 1
MONGOLIA
t
""t?-?"91117
JAAN
-Skilled 'Labor Military
SEA oe
9 000.000. 6.000.000
(MIA JAPAN
"Skotlect Labor Military
5.000.000 5.000.000
AFGHANISTAN .9
Ina data/ or//
ef///%7
PAKISTAN
43,024ncIud.s eaarem
...stmedVtior PakistanlV
500.000
CHI
463,000,000
ss ?To&
?CA,
IN0ScHINA CHINA
?S!';41kIl Lac
140003 '
mAINAN
350.
? OREA
? 10.000,000
0
?
334000;000
CEYLON
BAY
OF
BENGAL
ANTICIPATED POLITICAL ORIENTATION
(31 December 1952)
SOVIET INFLUENCE
U.S.S.R. Territory CI
U.S.S.R.-Dominated MKi
U.S.S.R.-Oriented IED
U. 5.-ORIENTED
NEUTRAL-NATIONALIST
II
ORIENTATION UNCERTAIN
(Mixed influence)
NOTE, Wanda trends tawords nationalist,
artrolity or of orientation towards the U. 5.
or U.S.S.R. are shown by appropriate dinarsl
tan ban or groan or red lines.
11.000.000
0
SEA
.siierdineo.Lata ; BRITISH,
BORNEO
ofr
OniMALAYA
114.10200);
0 ' 0
400.052/0
e-
-
Skeet' Labor
295,000
sratlrel
-Skated' Labial
300.000
I 9.000000
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
Piot aa wulz ode. a 49 ody
ESTIMATED MANPOWER POTENTIAL-I943
I. The ratio of esuiatetankilatican lea end
trained alba anima 60 the total papirlacie of
each cowry shown 4 indicated by ...Oa on the
Omar graphs.
2. The Cant under It.. graphs are amain al
the krial Pastan
3. WI'IT* fans ore loan either the ennead
nimbi? negligiblo or data ruffian. In. estimating
Cr. not available
NOTE Estimate. el "sidled" kat soy Incas large
lapodicies of sernincrila end whirled natistrot worlier?
NEW ZEALAND
US. oriental
-Slotted tabor Military
117,000 200.000
7.000,000
INDONESIA
es?'
fit a?
p,, ed---a 0 0
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1:127 Map Brach.
AUSTRALIA
-skimed- Labor Modify
745400 700,000
CIA Reproduction
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003400130008-2
FAR EAST: INDUSTRIALIZATION POTENTIAL
As indicated by installed electric-power generating capacity-1948
U . . S. R
MONGOLIA
Sz22wS' .1
skci Tu.;
CHINA
(Includes Taiwan and Manchuria)
1,332,000 KW
) HAINAN
CHINA
BAY
OF
BENGAL
SEA
:TAIWAN
'5S1
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
1108,000 KW
?
I cc: tj? o
JAPAN
10,200,000 KW
NEW ZEALAND
(U.S.wiwu.d)
?
570,000 KW.
CEYLON
21;000 KW
r ?
KW
MALAYA
BRITISH <
BORNEO
NE-0
r.
ANTICIPATED POLITICAL ORIENTATION
(31 December 1952)
NEUTRAL?NATIONALIST
ORIENTATION UNCERTAIN
(Mixed influence)
NOTE, influential trends towards nationalise
neutrality or of orientation toward' Or U. S.
or U.S.S.R. ore shown byappropriatediagonal
ton ban or green or rod Nees.
SOVIET INFLUENCE
USSR. Territory
U.S.S.R.?Dominoted
U.S.S.R.?Oriented
U. S.?ORIENTED
2:20;
2,184,000 KW
11126 Map Bra
540,000 KW
4
INDONESIA
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CIA Reproduction
1'
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FAR EAST: AREAS OF FOOD DEFICITS AND SURPLUSES
(Measured by average pre-World War II net imports or exports of rice and wheat)
U. S. S. R.
MONGOLIA
SEA OF
JAPAN
L7,-;;;S 4,21,.-
1111.11110 ?
JAPAN
EA
AFGHANISTAN
(non?)
t.
CHINA
NEPAL%--??
1vcriur;47#:'
9.50
(Excludes Taiwan
and Manchuria)
1000
TAIWAN
\ ?
600
HONG KONG
200
BAY
OF
BENGAL
tStOck; ,
/ ?
CHINA
SEA
Net exports
Net :mport5
Figarei ind.Cate appropmAte net exports or irrtoorts
at rite ar.d wheat in 1000s metnc tons
Q PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
? 450
1500.
CEYLON
BRITISH
. BORNEO
MALAYA; (snal
ANTICIPATED POLITICAL ORIENTATION
(31 December 1952)
NEUTRAL?NATIONALIST
ORIENTATION UNCERTAIN
(Mixed influence)
SOVIET INFLUENCE
U.S.S.R. Territory CI
U.S.S.R.?Dominated EigiN
U.S.S.R.?Oriented
U. 5.?ORIENTED
11128 Map Esninc
If I
PION
&SO.
NOTE: Influential trend, towards notionolid.
mutuality or of oriontatioe towards the U. S.
or U.S.S.R. aro shown by appopriai? diagonal
ton ban or green or red lines.
INDONESIA
,a/
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, ?AUSTRALIA
2.2.1
.?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003400130008-2 .
ale
?ECONOMIC EatIIVIATE
Denial of Far Eastern resources to. the US pr the USSR.would not seriously jeopard-
iZe either power's war-making _capacity in the early. stages of the conflict. Both the
BS and the USSR are, in fact,"now less dependent on the .strategic materials of the
Far East for the operation of their civilian and military economies than they. were
before World War II. During and following that war, alternative and less distant
sources of some materials .have been .developed, and substitutes or synthetics have
been devised. Stockpiling programs have been instituted for those materials not readily
available elsewhere and for which no satisfactory or practicable substitutes exist. .
There are, however, some economic objectives in the Far East which, as the war
was prolonged, would assume increasing imPortance to the US and the USSR and
which would, influence strategic planning for the region. These objectives .could be
threefold: first, to build a potent self-sufficient war-making complex in the Far East;
failing that, to assure access to those strategic materials necessary for full-scale func-
tibning of the domestic war economy; and in any event to deny both the components
of a self-sufficient war economy and key strategic materials to the enemy.,
self-Sufficient Far Eastern War Economy.
( That the Far East possesses the potential for a self-sufficient war economy was
amply illustrated by the Japanese in World War II. If either .the US or the USSR
consolidated its control over those areas needed to make up such an economy, realiza-
tion of the region's potential could be decisive in a prolonged war. At the outbreak of
hostilities, the US, through its control of Japan, would hold the key area in any such
regional economic system.. The USSR, with Korea and China added to its own Far
Eastern holdings, would possess much of the most important remaining .area. It is
pertinent to note, however, that while the US could establish a Minted, albeit costly,
Asiatic war economy without access to Korea and China, the USSR would be unable
to establish any large-scale war' economy in. the Far East without access to Japan.
Japan now is and will probably long continue to be the most important industrial
country in the Far East. Despite war damage, postwar deterioration and uncertainty
'with respect to Allied reparations policy, Japan possesses a greater industrial capacity,
in terms of existing plant and reservoir of trained industrial manpower, than all other
countries in the region combined.
The value of Japan as the industrial 'center of a potent war economy,' however,
would depend largely on the extent to which other areas in. the region could furnish
those raw Materials. needed by Japan's .industry. Without an adequate and assured
supply of food, coking coal, iron bre, steel alloying minerals, tin, natural rubber, and
petroleum, Japan would be an economic liability rather than an asset to any controlling
power.
If the US were to exploit the ,Illapanese war potential fully, it would be necessary to
'simply Japan, oVerlont Mies of communications, with -many materials which the US
'itself 'must obtain from-the Fat East?tin, steel-alloying minerals, ,rubber, fibres, and
'9 :1111.10111.!
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003400130008-2
?-?
vegetable oils. In addition, the US would need to supply Japan with petroleum, as
well as iron ore and coking coal. Sufficient petroleum could be obtained from Indonesia
to meet Japan's probable industrial requirements. Similarly, enough iron ore is avail-
able in India, Malaya and the Philippines. However, the problem of supplying Japan's
coking coal requirements without access to North China would be extremely serious;
India's coking coal supply is limited and probably would be completely absorbed by a
wartime expansion of Indian industry.. The modest quantities of anthracite avail-
able in Indochina could not be depended on in the event of hostilities..
The difficulties and cost of making Japan the center of a Far Eastern war-making
complex, and the fact that Japan's industry?measured in terms of realizable steel
production?is only 5 percent of US, probably would make denial of the Japan com-
plex to the USSR, rather than full exploitation of Japanese industry as an auxiliary
to US war production, the dominant US strategic consideration: ,
Japan's industrial plant would be of much greater positive' value to the USSR
than to the US; it would, in fact, be for the Soviet Union the richest economic prize
in the Far East: In the first place, Japan's factories could make a relatively greater
contribution to the industrial output of the USSR than they could to the US, Japanese
steel capacity being approximately 20 percent of USSR and the satellite countries
combined. Second, the USSR would have access to China and northern Korea; an
area that could furnish Japan with iron ore, coking coal, tungsten, manganese, 'agri-
cultural products?'virtually everything needed for large-scale industrial development
except petroleum, tin, and rubber. Thus not only could the USSR more easily provide
the necessary raw materials to Japanese industry than could the US, but control over
Japan's industries would also increase the economic value of the rest of Northeast Asia
to the ussit. Control of Japanese industry, therefore', would provide the USSR with
the most important segment of a self-sufficient Far Eastern war economy.
Access to Strategic Materials.
The earlier war breaks out, the less time will have been available for stockpiling
and technological development and therefore the greater the dependence of both the
US and the USSR on the Far East. In any event, however, neither the US nor the
USSR would be dependent on the Far East for strategic materials during at least the
first year of war. A prolongation of hostilities, however, would dissipate the stockpiles
of each and thus increase the need for key Far Eastern materials. The availability of
tin, manganese, and possibly natural rubber would be of prime importance to the US,
tin being the most important. Access to tin, tungsten, and natural rubber would be
prime Soviet considerations. In addition, each power would rely on Far Eastern
sources of petroleum, not for direct .contributions to its own war economy, but as a
means of reducing the necessity of supplying Far Eastern military or industrial opera-
tions over long lines of communication. A brief discussion of each of the key materials
and its relation to the US and USSR follows.
Tin.
The bulk of the world's 'Supply of tin is produced in' the Far East, principally
in Malaya and Indonesia, but also in China, Siam, and Burma. Since tin is essential
TettaRET 10
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111001.1111.114'
.for .both-naval ?and land warfare; substitution for, it is. difficult, and conservation is of
limited scope, access to sources of supply is extrethely important to both the US and the
USSR.
Should. all Far Eastern sources of .tin be cut off, peak US war requirements
?, ?
could be met- only in part through stockpiles, ,secondary domestic sources and imports
from Bolivia, Nigeria and the Belgian Conga. Denial of access, to major Far Eastern
.sources of tin would have, serious implications for. the US war economy when accumu-
lated stockpiles were dissipated.
The USSR depends heavily on Far Eastern tin, since domestic production and
alternative sources are seriously below Soviet requirements. The problem' of meeting
heavy requirements would directly affect Soviet economic warfare in the Far East and
Might even influence USSR military decisions With respect to South China and South-
east Asia.
. Ferro-Alloys.
South China is the world's most important single source of tungsten. Burma,
Korea, and Siam produce modest quantities.. ,
? . Tungsten deposits :discovered in the US during the last war, exploitation of
deposits In-Mexico and South America, and stockpiles built up since V.1-day have de-
creased US dependence on Far Eastern sources. In addition, molybdenum, an accept-
able substitute for tungsten in some steel alloying processes, is both domestically avail-
able to the US in sufficient quantities and can be obtained in adequate amounts from
such dependable foreign sources aa Canada.
? ? ??
The USSR depends considerably:on, the tungsten of China and Korea. Pro-
duction in the u8prt is insignificant, and all Other sources of tungsten 'night be denied
to the USSR in the event Of war.. Moreover, the USSR is critically short of molybdenum,
and can rely on only the.inedest .outp' ut of Finland and China. The production of
some steel alleys in the USSR .ip dependent, therefore, on access to Chinese and Korean
tungsten. .
.
The USSR, with the world's largest re.Acrves of manganese, and India normally
'represent the major sources of UQ ,manganese Although production in Latin
America and Atrica is increaSing, for the nekt several years at least, US access to Indian
manganese will continue to be an important security consideration.
-.Rubber: , c. e .e. ? ? ? y
? Malaya- and?Indonesia.produce almost three-fourths of the world's supply of
-natural rubber. 'Some rubber 'is also 'produced in .Ceylon, Siam, Indochina, Burma,
.and India. - ?
? Both the .US And 'the USSR have del/eloped synthetic rubber industries and
processes for reclaiming rubber. In addition, both powers are systentiatically 'stock-
piling natural rubber. In the -early. stages of a war, the US would -require access to
sources of natural rubber .until its' synthetic, rubber production capacity was adequate
to?meet peak wartime requirentents. - Altbough a longer war would permit the de-
velopment of additional synthetic capacity, stockpiles would be depleted ? and some
new supplies of natural rubber would be required for special military purposes. If war
LI
iTassuir
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003400130008-2
111191.1811111.5116660
should break out before late 1952, the date at which maximum US stockpile objectives
are to be achieved, the dependence of the US on Far Eastern sources of ,supply would
be increased.
Soviet dependence on natural rubber probably would be greater than that of
the US in the case of either a short or a prolonged war because: (1) initial stockpiles
would be smaller; and (2) existing synthetic capacity would not only be less, but the
USSR would need more time to build additional capacity and to perfect stnthetic prde-
esses.
Petroleum.
Indonesia, including all of Borneo, is the principal petroleum producer in
the Far East. Its 1948 production?approximately 49 million barrels?was about 1
percent of world production. While neither the US nor the USSR relies on therpetro-
leum of the Far East for domestic requirements, oil is one of the most important
strategic materials in the region because of the long lines of communication from
other petroleum producing areas to the Far East. Access to Indonesian oil would be a
major factor in both powers' strategic planning, particularly that of the USSR, since
large-scale, sustained military operations in the Far East by either the US or the USSR,
could be more economically conducted if oil requirements could be obtained close at
hand.
Food.
The Far East is a net food deficit region. Local food surpluses of the Far East,
except for those of Australia, New Zealand, and Manchuria, largely remain in the
region. Thus, regional food production would appear to be of limited direct significance
to the US, but of considerable significance to the USSR. Manchuria at present. fur-
nishes soybeans and some grain to the Soviet Far East and this supply may become
an important factor in USSR Far East strategy particularly if food from Western
Siberia or the European USSR were cut off. Moreover, the availability of istrategic ma-
terials from Malaya, Indonesia, India, and South China, as well as the explciitation of
Japanese industry, would depend to a great extent on control over the disposition of the
rice surpluses of Burma and Siam, the two leading producers for export purposes.
Denial of Far Eastern Resources to Enemy.
Since tin, rubber, and petroleum are of direct importance to the war economies of
both the US and the USSR, it would be an important strategic objective for each major
belligerent to deny these materials to the other. In addition, the US, whose needs for
tungsten are much less acute than those of the USSR, would attempt to ideny sources
of tungsten to the Soviet Union. The USSR, in turn, would attempt to deny manga-
nese to the'US.
US denial of Japan's industrial plant to the USSR would be a most important
strategic factor in the event of Far Eastern hostilities, but it could of dours6 be ex-
pected that the USSR would apply the strongest pressures to deny Chinese coking
coal to US-controlled Japanese industry.
Analikagir 12
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a
fq; ago with on 1749 011/7
11137
FAR EAST AND ADJACENT AREAS: AIRFIELDS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING
B-29 OPERATIONS
(Active, inactive or caretaker status)
NOBLER Name of airfield with runways 7,000 feet or more and currently capab;e NAMIO
of sustained operations Sr aircraft weighing 120.000 pounds or more.
Name of airfield from which B-29's have operated or airfields that are known
to be capable of supporting aircraft with gross weight of 120,000 pounds or
more but due to length, designed bearing capacity, and/or present conditions do
not meet standards prescribed for the other classification
ECM LYMAN.- a'
s
NOORt AGO
- A Vitt AM
Or MORRO,
'THOR CH
AWE Ail
16-8E 0C1 Ate
't
;
DANS Atli 4--
MY* Artl
'CENTRAL
.WADI SEIDNA
40BLER
?
WEST TINIAN Ar8
NORTH TINIAN al3
VORTNVRESI MAY A
OATH GUAM ?
ON
FLORIDA8LANCA
CLARK CF
NNAGARLI
OUONRUND
RALMKUNDA
KNARACPUR
CUrtwITOLA
Prepared for use ...nth ORE 17-49
Data furnished by
Directorate of Intelligence,
United States Air Force
Information as of 20 Feb. 1949
? - -
- 11137 Mali Branch. CIA. 3-49
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CIA Reproduction
N'N'si5 "'redid 17tor use with ORE 17-49 VA
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? 11138
PORTS OF THE FAR EAST
AND SHIPPING TRACKS
(Comparison of sea lane distances from
selected Far East ports to supporting area&
over various routes)
0
1\
YOKOHAMA TO
Saattle 4276
San Francisco
direct 4536
via Honolulu 5485
Sydney 4328
Auckland
ellington
??hristchurch
unedin
gungnam
Kunsan
Inchon
Chinnamoo
okohama
Yokosuka
Hulutao
ChinwangtacPort Arthur / Dairen
Chetoo
ilsingtoo .4Fraig
Chinhae
Shanghai
Ninglork
Wenchowe?
Foochow to,-
Swatow
Amoy ?
Eniwetok
MANILA TO
San Francisco
direct
via Honolulu
via South Pacific
Sydney
?Truk /01,/
6221
6858
9395
3975
0
Karachi HPackihownoi
Bombay Hon
Hm phoGangy
Yita82:17:Its. :ChlwjAkrgb Moulmein
cli,ra Rano:Mace
? I rim:0mb? ieeKo Si Ing/Sattt
% Si ?
pukel?
BOMBAY TO SAN FRANCISCO
via Yokohama 9894
BOMBAY TO NEW YORK
via Cape of Good Hope 11356
via Suez 8176
Matins ^ .--.Eta4zotita,
Si.. gas A
Paolo
Palernbgrig
Batara
\\I
/NOTE:
All distances in nautical miles. ?
Information based on ONI data,including adap-
tation of HO i262, 26th Edition; April 1940
11138 MapMap Branch CIA, Declassified and Approved
SINGAPORE TO SAN FRANCISCO
via Yokohama 7430
via Manila end Honolulu 8188
via South Pacific 9923
Canton de
Ekon
SYDNEY TO
San Francisco 6576
Townsville Sydn
, Melbourne
---
LVISSISfikkiil A L
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arbaya
Scm.heribon
Bilatjap
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ellatinaist
? STRATEGIC ESTIMATE
?
In the event of war between the US and the USSR the decisive strategic objective
of each power will be the destruction of the other's means to wage war. At the outset
,of hostilities prior to 1953, and indeed from the present, the decisive strategic importance
of the Far East to either the US or the USSR derives from long term considerations of
strategic potential in the region rather than from factors of direct 'military advantage
or limitation in the first year or two of war. Although the potential strategic signifi-
cance is of immediate and continuing concern, the readily apparent strategic signifi-
cance of the region will emerge and grow only as hostilities are prolonged.
? Despite general similarities in the significance of the Far East to the US and the
USSR, the strategic interests of the two powers are neither identical nor directly. con-
verse. Accordingly, the following discussions treat separately the strategic importance
of the Far East to the US and to the USSR.
1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE US.
a. Considerations in the Initial Military Phase.
(1) Limitations.
(a) Offensive.
The Far East will not be a decisive region in terms of US ndlitary
operations against vital Soviet war centers at the outset of hostilities because such
decisive objectives will be located deep in the USSR and can be reached from existing
Far Eastern bases of the US only by long range air action. Such action would be in-
decisive in weight because of the distances involved. Moreover, under the basic as-
sumption that present trends will continue, no indigenous Far Eastern forces ,in being
at the outset of hostilities can contribute to the US strategic offensive. Finally, denial
of Far Eastern raw materials to the USSR will not have a decisive effect in the first
year or two of hostilities because of prior Soviet stockpiling.
(b) Defensive.
The US strategic defensive, which in the last analysis is concerned
with the protection of the basic US war-making capacity, will have no direct, immediate
-concern-In.the Far East at the outbreak of hostilities. By 1953, US stockpiling of
strategic materials should result in independence of Far Eastern sources for one or two
years. In this period, moreover, the basic US war potential, located in the continental
US, will be protected from attack mounted in the Far East by extensive land and ocean
expanses. It is estimated moreover that the USSR will continue to lack the means
for conducting decisive intercontinental military operations for some time after 1953.
(2) Advantages.
(a) Offensive. ? , ?
While indecisive in the early phases of hostilities, the areas of the
Far East not initially under Soviet control can contribute, nonetheless, to US offensive
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.11111.0111101P
capabilities in the early phase of hostilities. Existing US bases in Japan and the
Ryulcyus, as well as potential bases in western Pakistan and India, are within air range
of important objectives in the USSR?the Karachi area being particularly significant
from the standpoint of target proximity. There exist additional potential air-base
areas as well as bases for other operations of limited objective in support of the main
US strategic effort. The Far East also provides important ocean communication linlcs
which facilitate free global movement around the Soviet perimeter, a requisite to 'US
strategic flexibility.
(b) Defensive.
Those areas of the Far East estimated to be available to the US 'at the
outset of hostilities (see Political Estimate, p. 7) provide positions astride or flanking
probable routes of USSR advance or expansion?the most important area in this regard
being Japan. The Far East, moreover, would be a region for the containment of
significant Soviet forces remote from the main objectives of the initial. US .strategic of-
fensive against European USSR. Finally, the manpower of the region would con-
stitute a potential source of large forces.
(3) Difficulties of Exploitation.
The varied difficulties facing US exploitation of the strategically favor-
able factors initially available in the Far East cannot be overlooked.
(a) Aid Requirements.
Economically and militarily, the areas of the Far East available to the
'US are dependent on outside assistance. The Far East is a net food deficit region, a
factor which is aggravated in particular areas of normal food shortages, such as Japan,
by the present dislocation of normal trade patterns. Maintenance of a political atmos-
phere favorable to the US in areas of strategic importance is dependent on substantial
economic assistance. Moreover, these areas lack adequate means of defense against
invasion by a major power. Militarily, the Far Eastern areas initially available to
the US would depend on the US for varying degrees of assistance in materiel, train-
ing, and even constituted forces for protection against Soviet aggression.
(b) Communications Requirements.
The US position in the Far East is dependent on long ocean lines of
communication. Not only is this a disadvantage in itself, but it also imposes an
added requirement for security. Unless consolidated control over the offshore idland
:chain extending from Japan through the Philippines is secured and maintainek'the
US will be severely limited in its means for effectively combatting the considerable Soviet
capability for anti-shipping operations in the Pacific. Thus; the components of the
island chain are mutually dependent for the security of their supporting lines of 'com-
munication from the US as well as for defense against direct attack.
(c) Manpower and Base Requirements.
Protection of the US position in the Far East e.xcluaively with US
forces would probably exceed the capacity of US manpower resources. The alternative
is development of indigenous forces. In general, however, the effective military develop-
ment of Far Eastern manpower tequires a greater expenditure of time and resources
Sismair
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4111rtar
than does Western manpower. Even potentially, the-principal initial contribution to
US strategy to be made by Asiatic forces would be in terms of ground forces for the
defense of their respective areas:
The most effective potential forces are those of the Western-populated
Commonwealth areas, Australia and New Zealand; but both these countries have
definite manpower limitations. Among the Asiatic nations, the armed force potential
of Japan is the most significant but utilization of this potential is presently confronted
by political objections. While the manpower potential of India and Pakistan is nu-
merically adequate to prevent Soviet invasion of the Indian subcontinent, the neutral
inclinations of these two nations and the limited availability of trained leaders and
materiel renders uncertain the timely provision of defensive forces adequate to insure
security of the subcontinent. Political factors also render uncertain the availability
of potential Fax Eastern base areas for prewar. development by the US. Development
of forces and bases under war conditions would constitute an added burden and might
well be ineffective.
(d) The Factor of Initiative.
The final difficulty to be encountered in the exploitation of the Far
East by the US is closely related to the problem of timely provision of potential forces
and bases. Possessing the initiative in opening hostilities, the USSR may be able to
mount surprise attacks in such force as to overcome limitations on its offensive capa-
bilities and thus overrun areas for which the defenses otherwise might be adequate.
This consideration applies particularly to Japan, Taiwan, and northwestern Pakistan.
Effective US counteraction following such a development would :require a major war
effort. Despite the factors of disadvantage presented above, failure to solve these
difficulties and to accept: the consequent political, economic, and military costs will
deprive the US of the increasing strategic advantage to be derived in the Far East and
may subject the US to an ultimately decisive threat from the USSR.
b. Developing Significance.
As war may be prolonged beyond the first year or two of hostilities and initial
strategic stockpiles of one or both major belligerents :may become depleted, the Far
East will become a region of increasing significance to US strategy. The factors of
importance in the initial military phase discussed under paragraph la (2) above will
continue to be of supplemental significance to the main theater of war, and, as the
center of Soviet war production is moved farther eastward, may acquire growing direct
significance. However, in this intermediate phase of hostilities, the principal develop-
ing importance of .military factors in the Far East will derive from their bearing, in
conjunction with the political factors, on continued US access to the essential raw
materials of Southeast Asia and India and on the denial of those materials to the
USSR. A consolidated and strengthened US position in the Asiatic offshore island
chain extending from Japan to the Philippines would be a material factor in securing
the most favorable US ocean routes to Southeast Asia and to India also, since avail-
ability of the Suez route would appear doubtful. In addition, US development and
exploitation in that island chain would serve to deny Soviet access to the southern
t15
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regions of eattern 'Asia. ' Conversely, US loss of control in that island chain would
facilitate Soviet southward expansion.
As previously noted, US loss of its position in the offshore island chain is not
simply a matter of yielding or foregoing one independent base at a time. Loss of
position at the northern end of the arc would threaten the communication lines sup-
porting positions farther to the south, even though those positions might be held in
? considerable strength. It would therefore be important to peak operation of the US
war economy after the? first year or two of war and to reduction of Soviet ,war output
in this intermediate period that the US possess a consolidated position in the Far
East's offshore island chain.
c. Ultimate Strategic Importance.
Of greatest US strategic concern in the Far East is the realization by the USSR
of that region's potential for development into a self-sufficient war-making complex.
In the event of a prolonged and indecisive US offensive against the Soviet European
war center, the Far East under consolidated Soviet control might well develop ulti-
mately as a decisive factor of war. Not only does the region contain all essential
elements of a self-sufficient war economy, but its tremendous ?manpower resources
include a pool of some 6,000,000 militarily trained, albeit demobilized, Japanese. The
Japhhese prisorfers of war now being retained by the USSR include large numbers of
? former Japanese? officers and technicians. In the event of Soviet control-of Japan,
.stch key perSonnel could contribute to rapid Soviet exploitation of Japah's military
.and 'eceinomic potential.-
Further, the geographic location of Japan suits it for ultimate Soviet- exploita-
lion in a?major offensive effort against the continental US. -Soviet possession Of two
'Major independent war bases, one in Europe and one in'the Far East; coupled With
probable Soviet achrances in materiel and technology that can be anticipated over a
period of years, could pose a critical threat to the continental US war potential and
hence to US survival as a world power.
d. Conclusion.
While the full strategic significance of the Far East to the US is deferred and
will materialize only in a protracted war, US ability to derive full strategic advantage
from the region and to deny its ultimate exploitation by the USSR depends at a? mini-
mum on maintenance of the present US strategic position in the region. Expansion
of Soviet influence in the Far East greatly beyond present limits:into areas of present
US control would tend to render the remaining US position militarily untenable. 'Once
having lost its present minimum position in the regibn, the US might well lack the
resources needed simultaneously to maintain a major war , effort against- the Soviet
European war-making centers and to deny Soviet development of the war potential
of the Far East.
ii 9$'- 16
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2. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR.
a. ? Considerations in the Initial and Intermediate Military Phases.
(1) Limitations.
(a) Offensive.
At the outset of hostilities, the Far East could not contribute signifi-
cantly to Soviet efforts to destroy the basic US war potential because
(i) the US would be temporarily independent of Far Eastern re-
sources; ?
(ii) the US war. potential would be located primarily in the con-
tinental US;
(iii) the USSR at this stage would lack the military resources needed
to conduct a decisive intercontinental war;? and
(iv) so long as Soviet forces in the Far East were dependent oh a
combination of stockpiling and Access to the Soviet European war production complex
over the Trans-Siberian railroad, grave risks would be involved in mounting an inter-
continental offensive from Soviet Far Eastern bases.
(b) Defensive.
The Far East's contribution to Soviet defensive strategy in this period
would be for the most part passive. No indigenous Far Eastern forces would be capable
of threatening the USSR with offensive action at the outset of hostilities, and, in any
case, the basic Soviet war potential, located in central and western areas of the USSR,
would be protected from Far East-based attack by extensive expanses of formidable
terrain which could not be feasibly surmounted except by US air action at long range.
For these reasons, the Far East at the outset of hostilities would not be an immediately
decisive strategic region from either the offensive or defensive point of view.
' (2) Factors of Immediate and Developing Importance.
(a) Offensive.
Both in the prewar period and in the early stages of hostilities, the
USSR nevertheless woud have important strategic objectives in the Far East. Offen-
sively, Soviet expansion in the Far *East could provide;
(i) Security of established USSR Far Eastern bases;
(ii) Access to important sources of strategic materials and their de-
nial to the US;
(iii) The potential for a self-sufficient Far Eastern war economy;
(iv) Additional sources of military manpower, including the trained
manpower of Japan which could be exploited effectively by use of former Japanese
officers and technicians presently held in the USSR; and
(v) Bases and routes of access to the continental US notably in
ilortheastern Atli and the Mirth Pacific.
Taken in total and with requisite exploitation, the attainment of these
objectives ultimately would make a decisive contribution to the Soviet strategic
offensive.
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diaarlidef
(b) Defensive.
Defensive intermediate objectives in the Far Easi could be -attained
by confinement of US Far Eastern positions to the peripheral areas initially available
and by preventing, through political or military action, successful US exploitation of
those peripheral areas. By these measures, the USSR can:
(i) Maintain or expand its defensive buffer on the south and east;
(ii) Limit the fiodbility of the US strategic air offensive;
(iii) Tie down substantial US military resources in the Far East
and, as the result of harassing attacks against the North American continent, contain
additional significant US military resources in the continental US; and
(iv) Provide increased potential forces for the defense of the .USSR..
(3) Ease of Exploitation.
The USSR's intermediate strategic objectives in the Far East may be at-
tained at moderate cost because of the fundamental nature of the Soviet national
objective and Soviet singleness of purpose and lack of scruple in pursuing that objec-
tive. Added to these Soviet policy considerations, which reduce the cost of attaining
strategic objectives, are factors of military advantage. The USSR already possesses
predominant forces for offensive action within the Eurasian land mass. Moreover,
initial military dispositions can be made under optimum conditions, and transport
limitations are being overcome through prior stockpiling, industrial development, and
relocation. Finally, the very nature of the Soviet national objective provides the USSR
with the advantage of surprise in initiating hostilities. All these considerations tend
to limit the military costs involved in Soviet attainment and exploitation of its inter-
mediate strategic objectives in the Far East, thus enhancing the attractiveness of that
region to the USSR.
b. Ultimate Strategic Importance.
Having attained its short-term objectives in the Far East, the USSR would have
under its control all elements of a powerful war-making complex. Development of that
complex could proceed unmolested, except by US counteraction which would have to
be carried on over long distances and at great military cost. Rather than draining the
Soviet war potential, the Far East would add progressively to the total Soviet means
for resisting the US main effort. In this light, the Far East, even in the-early stages
of conflict, could be an important factor in the USSR's ability to absorb and survive
a US offensive against the existing Soviet European war potential. Were that offensive
successfully absorbed, the Far East subsequently could provide a self-sufficient war
base from which a sustained Soviet attack might be mounted, in conjunction with an
offensive based in Europe, for the destruction of the continental US war potential and
the consequent elimination of the US as a world power.
c. Conclusion.
Current Soviet expansionist activity in the Far East viewed in conjunction with
the factors of strategic significance presented herein indicates that the USSR already
recognizes the long term decisive importance of the region to the Soviet national ob-
jective of world domination.
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0
Documuzent No
tiO CHAIIGF in Class: 0
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clay camic:v) TO.
Auth: DDA "CE... 77 1763
?ate
DDA Memo, 4 Apr: 77
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? t;02.2)38.
HAY 5 8 57 AH 149
110100401140PAL
+434 hositerrr
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
369I-STATE--1949
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