THE CARIBBEAN LEGION ORE 11-49 PUBLISHED 17 MARCH 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003400080004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 17, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CARIBBEAN LEGION
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WARNING
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of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
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CIA Reproduction
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ORE 11-49
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?
THE CARIBBEAN LEGION
SUMMARY
The Caribbean Legion, an irregular military group of several hundred exiles, well-
armed by Central American-Caribbean standards, has for some time exercised a con-
siderable influence on the international relationships of the area. It has played a part
in conspiracies against the Nicaraguan Government and was a deciding factor in the
1948 Costa Rican civil war. In relation to the countries within which it operates, the
Legion is a sufficient force to be a significant factor in the calculations of their govern-
ments relating to area foreign policy.
At present, this group is primarily motivated by a common desire for the overthrow
of the so-called "dictatorships"?especially Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. It
Is therefore aligned with and has become a clandestine instrument of public policy for
the "democracies," particularly Cuba, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The Legion as such
has, however, nothing like a clearly defined ideology, and might contribute to the estab-
lishment of governments as dictatorial as those which it now seeks to destroy.
Public pressure, such as that resulting from the advice of the Council of Organiza-
tion of American States (COAS) in December 1948 that Costa Rica remove from its
territory "groups of nationals of foreign military organizations," may force public
disavowal of the Legion upon the "democracies" which in turn may force the Legion
Into a temporarily passive role. Since, however, it has no real opposition among the
"democracies" in which it is based except from those who either resist change in exist-
ing political relations or object to the use of force as an instrument of public policy, it
is highly improbable that the group will be actually disbanded. At the present mo-
ment the Legion is quiescent and 'handicapped by disunity, but it may become more
active at some future and more propitious time as a vigorous and Significant force in
Central American-Caribbean intergovernmental relationships.
Note: This report has been concurred in by the intelligence organizations of the Departments
? of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; for a dissent of the Intelligence Organization
of the Department of State, see Enclosure A, p. 8. The report is based on information
available to CIA on 25 February 1949.
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THE CARIBBEAN LEGION
The presence in the Central American-Caribbean area of the self-styled "Caribbean
Legion" is a highly significant factor for change and consequent uncertainty in area
intergovernmental relationships. At the present time, the republics in the area tend to
group themselves into two rival and competing blocs of power (see accompanying
map) with Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica .(and now possibly El Salvador), the so-called
"democracies," in opposition to the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and, to a lesser
extent, Honduras, the so-called "dictatorships." Haiti's traditional rivalry with the
Dominican Republic makes its attempts to remain neutral difficult.
The aim of the Caribbean Legion coincides with that of the "democracies" in a
common hostility to the existing governments of the "dictatorships." As a result, an
informal but nonetheless intimate political and military relationship has developed
between the two, and the Legion has become a clandestine and important instrument
through which the "democracies" are pursuing their anti-"dictatorship" policy.
The planned invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947 by the organization which
later became known as the Legion was frustrated only when certain Cuban officials
temporarily confiscated its arms; its action was decisive in the 1948 Costa Rican civil
? war when it joined in the conflict in order to weaken the Somoza Government of
Nicaragua; it is in a position to influence the foreign policies of Guatemala, Costa Rica,
and Cuba; and it is still determined to destroy the present regimes in Nicaragua and the
Dominican Republic against which it has already engaged in several conspiracies.
Though it is at present somewhat divided and quiescent, it can and undoubtedly will
become more active at any opportune moment, ready to promote its designs against
the "dictators." In any case, an understanding of the organization and potentialities
of the Caribbean Legion is essential to a forecast of many developments in the Caribbean
area.
There is, at present, no evidence to demonstrate that the Caribbean Legion, its
leaders, or the governments which have harbored and supported it, have in any way
changed their hostile attitude toward the "dictatorships" as a result of COAS * inter-
vention in the recent Costa Rican-Nicaraguan disturbances. Although the govern-
ments of Cuba, Guatemala, and Costa Rica may from time to time and for various
reasons pursue a less cooperative attitude toward the Legion, coincidence of policy
should prevent a complete severance in the ties which at present bind them together.
Furthermore, so long as the Caribbean Legion or some of its more prominent in-
dividual members remain in physical possession of arms and materiel, the Legion, in
one form or another will not be dissolved. Physically it may move its base of opera-
tions from one to another of the Latin American countries, and its cadre may be
scattered among the several "democracies" of the area, but this development would
? Council of the Organization of American States, formerly known as the Governing Board of
the Pan American Union.
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SEA
not prevent its re-emergence at some future and more propitious time as a vigorous and
active force in Central American-Caribbean intergovernmental relationships.
The Caribbean Legion has no well-defined ideology, but is bound together by a
common opposition to the highly personalized and authoritarian governments of
Somoza and Trujillo. Given the power, however, there is no assurance in the case of
some Legion members that they would refrain from many of the "dictatorial" practices
they now oppose. Possibly the majority of members are inclined to believe in various
principles of government now practiced in the US, Britain, France, or Cuba; yet with-
in the group are also some Marxian socialists; conservative Catholics and active Masons;
ex-Spanish Republicans and ex-members of the Franco regime in Spain; millionaires
and paupers. The Figueres Government in Costa Rica which the Legion made possible
has sponsored no radical philosophies nor un-American ideologies. It is improbable
that a Legion-created government of Nicaragua would adopt such policies.
Admittedly the Legion fosters underlying concepts of change and is groping for
new norms of authority and administration, but these concepts are indistinct and un-
defined. Individual opportunism is the prime motivation of the Legionnaires. The
very lack of a definite program, however, probably accounts in large part for the ac-
ceptance of the Legion in an area where the only militant opposition is to be found
among those who either are against change in existing political arrangements or
generally object to the use of force as an instrument of international policy.
No matter what disturbances the Caribbean Legion may foment in the future,
they will not, of course, affect the basic concept of Hemisphere defense and hence will
have no direct bearing on US-Soviet rivalry. The Legion's power, however, to modify
and influence internal affairs and international relationships in the Caribbean cannot
be overlooked. (For details on the organization and development of the Caribbean
Legion see Appendix.)
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APPENDIX
SiZET
ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN LEGION
The Caribbean Legion was formed as such during March 1948. Its leaders, who
were dissidents and exiles from various of the Central American-Caribbean "dictator-
ships," joined with Jos?igueres (now Provisional President of Costa Rica) and assisted
him to such an extent that he was able to overthrow the pro-Somoza, Calderon-domi-
nated, government.
Many of the Legion's leaders, much of its materiel, and some of its men, however,
were part of the original attempted invasion of the Dominican Republic in 194'7?other-
wise known as the Cayo Confites expedition. This organized, well-equipped and inte-
grated revolutionary plot was originally conceived by political exiles from the Domin-
ican Republic, but was able to reach such proportions as a result of the informal
agreement between President Altaic; of Guatemala; ROmulo Betancourt (then Presi-
dent of Venezuela); the then Minister of Labor Ind now President Prfo, and former
Minister of Education Aleman of Cuba; and political exiles from the Dominican Re-
public, Nicaragua, and Honduras. The aim of the agreement was the "reinstatement
of popular sovereignty in the Caribbean area," and much was made of the "Bolivarian
mission" of the Legion. From the political standpoint, the goal of the "pact" was
simply the destruction of the existing governments of the Dominican Republic, Hon-
duras, and Nicaragua, and their replacement by friendly governments.
In preparation for invasion of the Dominican Republic, several landing craft, a
dozen or more aircraft, an estimated 1,200 men supplied with adequate small arms,
rifles, grenades, machine guns, and aerial bombs, were gathered on Cuban territory.
Immediately prior to the expedition's projected departure for the Dominican Republic,
however, the Cuban Government?prominent members of which had been openly aiding
and abetting the Legion's activities?suppressed it, their reasons being internal
political maneuvers and US pressure. The Legion's leaders subsequently substituted
Nicaragua in place of the Dominican Republic as the primary target. In order that it
might be nearer the target, the materiel was shipped and flown to Guatemala and then
transshipped to Costa Rica, where it was first used in the Figueres-led civil war.
The Legion considered its Costa Rican operations as part of its projected Nicaraguan
campaign and a preliminary to it. Two immediate objectives were thus attained: the
Somoza Government was weakened by the substitution of a hostile for a friendly neigh-
boring government on its southern border, and the amount of equipment available for
the ultimate Nicaraguan campaign was increased. In order to obtain the Legion's
support, present Provisional President Figueres had apparently agreed to give the Le-
gion, at the close of the civil disturbances, twice the amount of equipment it lent him
for arming his Costa Rican, as distinguished from his Caribbean Legion supporters.
At the close of the Costa Rican fighting the Legion was at its highest point of
power, prestige, and influence. Its successful attack on Puerto Limon confirmed its
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military prowess and enhanced throughout Central America its military reputation;
the rifles, submachine guns, and grenades it was able to deliver to Figueres during the
civil disturbances confirmed its ability to supply arms and to deliver them where and
when they were needed; its superiority in weapons and fighting men over that of the
new Figueres government assured it the ability to enforce its demands on the latter?
namely that it be repaid twice the amount of arms it had loaned Figueres and that its
personnel be housed and fed at Costa Rican Government expense until the debt had
been paid. The personal intimacy of its leaders with the Presidents of Guatemala,
Cuba, and Costa Rica gave it a voice in the area foreign policies of those countries; and
its refusal to concern itself with the domestic affairs of Costa Rica, despite the fact that
it was in a position to do so, reassured many who suspected the Legion's social-revolu-
tionary intents.
The burst of optimism in revolutionary? circles which followed the successful ter-
mination of the Costa Rican disturbances, was soon dissipated, however, by disagree-
ments among the legionnaires. Divisions developed over the formulation of plans for
the campaign against Nicaragua, especially within the so-called "Junta Revolucionaria
Uniflcada de Nicaragua", a subsidiary and largely theoretical organization of the Legion
striving for leadership of the projected attack. Rival factions of Nicaraguan exiles
whose divisions reflected traditional internal political distinctions each contended for
leadership of the Junta and for the support of Presidents Altalo and Figueres.
In Costa Rica the rivalries eventually narrowed down to two contending groups.
One led by Rosendo Argiiello, Jr., consisted of about 200 armed men who were under-
going daily training and comprised the liberal and more radical elements among the
Nicaraguan exiles. This group, variously called the "Chendos" or the "Puros", was
superior in training, discipline, and physical condition to the rival group of about 100
men led by Miguel Ramirez who were, for the most part, conservative Nicaraguan exiles.
Provisional President Figueres of Costa Rica supported the Argiiello group, and Presi-
dent Altalo of Guatemala supported the Ramirez group.
After much haggling, many conferences among the contenders, and high Costa
Rican, Cuban, and Guatemalan government officials, Rosendo Argiiello, Jr. was chosen
on 17 October 1948 to act as "Commander in Chief" of the Nicaraguan Army of Libera-
tion, with Miguel Ramirez as Chief of Staff "with all the functions and inherent at-
tributes of such a position." The general staff was composed of eleven officers, six of
whom (a majority) were Nicaraguan citizens, the others being Dominicans, Hondurans,
and Cubans. Essentially the united group consisted of an officer cadre; large numbers
of enlisted men were not trained.
The agreement also defined clearly and succinctly the relationship between the
"Nicaraguan Army of Liberation" (the united Arguello-Ramirez group in Costa Rica)
and Legionnaires in Guatemala, under the command of General Rodriguez, a Dominican
exile and original founder of the Legion.
The Dominicans under Rodriguez were permitted to organize their own separate
revolutionary force in Guatemala which, it was envisaged, would take full part in the
attack on Nicaragua and would then, when the "Nicaraguan Army of Liberation" be-
came the government of Nicaragua, become the Caribbean Legion for the eventual
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attack on the Dominican Republic. In exchange for this support, the Argfiello-
Ramirez group promised that if and when it obtained control of Nicaragua, it would
assist the Rodriguez group by supplying it with Nicaraguan air, sea, and land bases;
ammunition and weapons; air power, and money.
Immediately after the agreement was signed in October, preparations went ahead
for the attack on Nicaragua. Headquarters were established by the Rodriguez group
in a house near the Government Palace of Guatemala and located in such a position as
to be within rifle shot of a Guatemalan Army cuartel (for President Arevalo was deter-
mined that he should not, like Figueres, be subject to pressure from the armed body
which he had invited into his country). General Rodriguez was in frequent personal
contact with President Arevalo who, in all important decisions concerning the Legion,
Insisted that his Minister of War Arbenz and the Chief of the Armed Forces Arana be
associated with him. A general staff consisting of six Dominicans, two Hondurans, one
Nicaraguan and two Cubans was organized; and a skeleton organization of approxi-
mately 200 consolidated. Precise armed strength is undetermined, but is believed to
include two 2-inch cannon, 35 machine guns, 80 submachine guns, 800 grenades, and
780 rifles. Guatemalan Army, Cuban Army, and commercial ,(i.e., TACA) aircraft were
for all practical purposes made available to transport the men and materiel of the
Legion to any designated Central American or Caribbean point, and a particular airport
in Guatemala was designated for use by the Legion. President Prio of Cuba possibly
promised to give the Legion, once the Nicaraguan attack got under way, such materiel
as he still held from that confiscated during the Cay o Confites incident. This materiel
included 2,000 grenades, 200,000 cartridges, 600 rifles, 32 machine guns, aerial bombs,
boats, planes, and twelve bazookas. It was reported that officials of the Argentine
Government approached some of the Legion officials with a view to holding discussions
on the question of future Argentine support but that the Legion officials declined to
discuss the matter lest ties with Per6n arouse further anti-Legion feeling within the
US Government.
Meanwhile, and despite the October agreement, disunity within the Legion con-
tinued, especially within the Argiiello-Ftamirez unit based in Costa Rica. The Costa
Rican Government, by virtue of arms purchases in the US, was apparently able to pay
off the Legion's Costa Rican-based unit and return to it all borrowed arms. Further-
more, from mid-November Provisional President Figueres' official attitude toward the
Legion appears to have undergone a perceptible change, and the Costa Rican Govern-
ment was no longer as cooperative toward the Legion as it had been. Rivalry within
the Arguello-Ramirez group broke out afresh, and Rodriguez in Guatemala recalled
some Legion materiel and personnel from Costa Rica.
In addition, the Legion appears to have developed a greater respect for the loyalty
of the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional to its chief, Somoza.- The loyalty?or, more
properly, the lack of loyalty?of the Guardia has always been a crucial factor in the
Legion's anti-Somoza plans, for all responsible Legion members realize that, despite the
considerable materiel and personnel they have gathered, such a campaign as they
might be able to launch against Somoza could not succeed unless at least a part of the
Guardia Nacional, proved disloyal under pressure, and deserted. This is especially true
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in view of reported Legion strategy which calls for an initial air invasion of Nicaragua
with landings at the airfields of the Siuna and Bonanza mines where large numbers of
workers and Guardia garrisons are reported to be anti-Somoza.
This was the situation up to Friday, 10 December 1948, when an organized group of
Costa Rican exiles?numbers and armament undetermined?aided and abetted by
Somoza and the army which he commands, crossed the frontier from Nicaraguan ter-
ritory into Guanacaste province, Costa Rica. During the early hours of this invasion
(one of the causes of which was the presence of the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica
and Guatemala, and Somoza's fear of it) the Costa Rican Government made a formal
agreement with the Argilello-led Legion subsidiary. Although the precise terms of the
agreement are .unknown, there are strong indications that Provisional President
Figueres again promised future support for the Legion's aim of destroying the Somoza
regime in exchange for help in suppressing the Somoza-supported revolutionary incur-
sions against him. Specifically, individual Legion members were permitted to enlist
in the Costa Rican Army. The General Staff of the Legion, which was to remain in-
tact, was not to direct a counterattack in Nicaragua unless the invading forces had
enough support from Somoza to place the outcome in doubt. This backing did not
prove sufficiently strong and, as a consequence, the Legion as such did not engage in
anti-Somoza moves.?
The speed with which the Council of Organization of American States intervened in
the disturbances was possibly a factor in deterring the Legion and the Figueres Govern-
ment from precipitate action against Somoza. This and internal difficulties within
Guatemala checked the Altaic Government. On 24 December, the Council of Or-
? ganization of American States advised the Costa Rican Government to remove from its
territory "groups of nationals or foreign military organizations" (i.e. the Caribbean
Legion) conspiring against the security of Nicaragua and of other sister Republics.
At present, although the Legion has outwardly become less active, its operational
position remains comparable to what it has been for the past several months. Officers,
men, and materiel are located in both Guatemala and Costa Rica. It still constitutes
a sufficient force to be a significant factor in the calculations of the Caribbean govern-
ments relating to local foreign policy, especially in the matter of rivalry between the
"dictatorships" and the "democracies." Presidents Frio of Cuba, Arevalo of Guatemala,
and Figueres of Costa Rica remain favorably disposed toward it and willing to use it
as an instrument of public policy. There is evidence that Legion friends and sup-
porters In Cuba are about to launch an active propaganda campaign on behalf of its
aims and aspirations.
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ENCLOSURE A
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The intelligence organization of the Department of State does not concur in sub-
ject report in the following respects:
We believe that the report places too much emphasis upon the 15olitice.1 significance
of the Legion as an organization because (a) in recent weeks the strength of the Legion
appears to have materially declined and (b) the Legion is not put entirely in its proper
perspective with reference to the political conditions of the area. With reference to
the latter the intelligence organization of the Department believes' that the Legion in
itself is of less significance than the fact that it had its origin in the increased dissatis-
faction in the area with traditional methods of government and in the fairly widespread
desire for the development of political institutions along more progressive lines. Specifi-
cally, it is felt that insufficient emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the Legion
found it possible to organize partly because of intense feeling existing both in and out of
the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua against the repressive regimes of Trujillo and
Somoza. The conflict which has made the Legion possible is a more perSistent factor
in the political relationships of the area than the Legion itself which might at any
time fall apart as an organization, but which would in such case likely be succeeded in
time by some other and possibly similar instrument of agitation and force as long as
the self-seeking dictatorships remain. ? ,
We believe that El Salvador should be omitted from any mention in connection
with the tendency that has existed to form two rival and competing blocks of power in
the area.
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orgeeferrs
41.
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U. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
3519-STATE-1949
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