CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003300150004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 8, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.91
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CIA
Jo
41.S 5
CONTINUING SATELLITE AID
TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS
ORE 67-48
Document
Published 8 October 1948E0 CHANGE ?
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Datew-V-ZILI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Str9tRVI
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RFGEIVEr;
1948 OCT II 12 2 1
CIO/ RE
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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JOT
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ORE 67-48
S,ET
CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS
50X1
SUMMARY
it appears that the Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece
under Communist domination still obtains. For the following reasons the Kremlin
may be expected to continue to supply and use the guerrillas as one instrument of policy
in pursuit of this objective:
a. The guerrillas are more immediately available than any political weapon of
comparable effectiveness in Greece.
b. The guerrillas are militarily effective.
c. The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US.
d. Guerrilla operations are cheap, requiring neither a large number of men nor
large expenditures in heavy equipment.
Despite continued Soviet-satellite aid, the guerrillas cannot now effect a military
domination of Greece. Hit-and-run tactics, however, will still be feasible so long as
supplies reach the guerrillas. Such activity, even on a progressively reduced scale,
will continue seriously to hamper Greek rehabilitation and economic recovery. More-
over, any relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Greeks and their Western supporters
would provide the satellites with an opportunity for re-equipping and reinforcing the
guerrillas to such an extent as to render them capable of seizing the initiative
once again.
* In this paper, the term satellite refers only to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.
Note: The information is as of 15 September 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
1
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50X1
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CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS
The failure of the Greek guerrillas to launch expected large-scale attacks in the
spring of 1948 gave rise to a belief that the Soviet bloc was severely curtailing its aid
to Markos. It was believed that the Kremlin (hence also Albania, Yugoslavia, and
Bulgaria) was unwilling to risk further world censure by furnishing aid to the guer-
rillas in the amount necessary to enable them to disrupt the Greek nation sufficiently
to bring about an early overthrow of the regime, and that Markos would accordingly
be allowed "to wither on the vine." This belief was strengthened by the failure of a
single Communist-dominated country officially to recognize the Markos government,
the failure of rumored international brigades to participate in the fighting, and the
recurrence of peace feelers from the Markos camp, especially during the Grammos 50)(1 ,
campaign.
it appears that 50X1
the Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece under Communist domination still
obtains. The questions consequently become: (1) Will the Kremlin, in the face of such
factors as US-UK support of the Athens government, UN censure of satellite aid to the
guerrillas, and the slow defeat of the Markos forces, continue to use the guerrillas as
one instrument of policy in pursuit of this objective? (2) If so, what will be the effect
of continuing guerrilla activity in Greece?
1. With respect to the first question, it appears for the following reasons that the
Kremlin will continue to supply and use the guerrillas:
a. The guerrillas are more immediately available than any political weapon of
comparable effectiveness in Greece. The Communist Party members in the towns
have been a disappointment to the military leaders; their morale is reported as lower
than that of the guerrillas, and their organization has been severely disrupted by gov-
ernment measures. The Communist Party is outlawed in Greece. Even were it to be
legalized upon termination of the guerrilla war, popular anti-Communist sentiment
would continue so strong as to make overt Communist participation in Greece politics
almost impossible, although eventually the guerrillas themselves (adequately rein-
forced) might prove to be an effective bargaining weapon in forcing the Greek gov-
ernment to accede to Communist participation in politics. Meanwhile, the guerrilla
war continues to provide an excuse for violent Soviet political attacks on the Athens
government.
b. The guerrillas are militarily effective. For the better part of three years they
have seriously disrupted the economic, political, and social life of the country. The
cost of guerrilla operations to the Greek Government has been staggering not only in
terms of military expenditures but also in the non-productivity of 600,000 refugees, the
destruction of lines of communication and transport equipment, and the burning of
villages. Although the continued success of the Greek Army will enable the government
slowly to reduce the size of the army, return the refugees to their homes, and supply
2 ST
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greater security to the population, the guerrillas must be all but completely eliminated
before their cost to the government will become negligible.
c. The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US.
Their activity can assure the Kremlin of a continued drain of US dollars for unproduc-
tive military expenditures, as well as for rehabilitation.
d. Guerrilla operations are cheap, requiring neither a large number of men nor
large expenditures in heavy equipment. So far the guerrillas have subsisted largely on
food collected on forage raids and have been armed, to a considerable extent through
satellite effort, with British equipment obtained during World War II or with captured
German and Italian equipment; there is no reason to believe that the guerrillas cannot
continue to be supplied and armed in much the same manner.
There is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of the strong US interest
in Greece and current US assistance to the Greeks in the form of money, materiel, and
advisers, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had waned.
It is probable, moreover, that any such consideration would be outweighed by the real-
ization that a prolonged period of inactivity could well destroy guerrilla enthusiasm
for the struggle and irreparably damage the present guerrilla organization. It also
seems unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred from supporting the guerrillas by
any fear of UN action to seal Greece's northern borders. The USSR has been able to
block any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that, as in the case of Pales-
tine, no UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece.
It is true that Tito's defection raises practical difficulties in the matter of aiding
the guerrillas. Of the three northern neighbors, Yugoslavia had been the principal
source of supply and probably of military advice for the guerrillas. Currently, Yugo-
slav border guards are still passively cooperating with the rebels, and the "free" Greek
radio continues to operate from Yugoslav soil. It is possible, however, that Yugoslavia
will cease giving active aid to Markos because: (1) the Tito-Cominform split is keep-
ing Yugoslavia preoccupied with its own affairs and probably has not encouraged any
desire to assist the Kremlin in its foreign-policy aims; and (2) it might be convenient
eventually to effect a reconciliation with the Athens government, thereby eliminating
an enemy on the south and keeping the door to the western world open. Tito still
has an active interest in Greek Macedonia, and a number of guerrillas are probably
ready to serve those interests, but they will undoubtedly be restrained until a more
propitious time. Nevertheless, even with the defection of Yugoslavia, the Kremlin
can still supply the guerrillas through Albania and Bulgaria at only slightly increased
effort and expense.
2. With respect to the second question, it is apparent that the guerrillas, despite con-
tinued Soviet-satellite aid, cannot now effect a military domination of Greece. Guer-
rillas capabilities are slowly being reduced under steady pressure from the army; guer-
rilla movements are being somewhat restricted, their supply problems (especially in
areas distant from the Albanian and Bulgarian borders) are increasing, and the local
defenses of the government-held villages are improving. Hit-and-run tactics, how-
ever, will still be feasible so long as supplies reach the guerrillas. Such activity, even on
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a progressively reduced scale, will continue seriously to hamper Greek rehabilitation
and economic recovery. Moreover, any relaxation of vigilance on the part of the
Greeks and their Western supporters would provide the satellites with an opportunity
for re-equipping and reinforcing the guerrillas to such an extent as to render them
capable of seizing the initiative once again.
4
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
3051-S-1948
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