THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLONIAL EMPIRES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003200020001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 3, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.86
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND, ESTIMATES
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THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLONIAL
EMPIRES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR US SECURITY
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CO DENTIAL
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ORE 25-48 CONF NTIAL
THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLONIAL EMPIRES AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY '
SUMMARY
The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded in
breaking up a large part of the European colonial systems and in creating a series
of new, nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for
US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with the USSR.' This
shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens
the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access
to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in event Of war. Should the recently
liberated and currently emergent states become oriented toward the USSR, US military
and economic security would be seriously threatened.
World War II gave a tremendous impetus to the colonial independence move-
ment. The UK withdrew from India-Pakistan and Burma, while the Dutch and
French, exhausted by war, appear unable to suppress the Indonesian and Indochinese
nationalists by force, or, despite any temporary compromise solutions, to be able to
arrest their eventual achievement of genuine independence. Growing nationalism
in French North Africa threatens French hegemony. While the colonial issue in most
remaining dependencies is not yet acute, native nationalism in many of these areas
too will exert increasing pressure for autonomy or independence.
This marked postwar development of the colonial independence movement has
resulted from: (1) the release of bottled-up nationalist activities in the Far East
as a result of Japan's defeat of the colonial powers in World War II and its encourage-
ment of local nationalism in occupied areas; (2) the postwar military and economic
weakness of the colonial powers, which has made them less able to resist nationalist
demands and led them to grant concessions or even independence to their dependencies;
(3) the increasing tendency of liberal-socialist elements in the colonial powers to favor
voluntary liquidation of restive colonial possessions; (4) widespread support of colonial
independence movements by a large group of recently liberated and other sympathetic
states, particularly the USSR; and (5) creation of the United Nations, which has
provided a forum for agitating the colonial issue and a mechanism for its liquidation.
Because of these factors, further disintegration of the remaining colonial empires
appears inevitable. Belated concessions by the colonial powers, at least on the limited
Note: The information in this report is as of 9 August 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, and the Navy have con-
curred in this report; the Air Intelligence Division, Air Intelligence Directorate, Department
of the Air Force, had no comment.
1 In this paper the term "colonial" is used in a broad sense to denote the relationships be-
tween the metropolitan powers and their dependent and semi-dependent areas, whether these be
colonies, mandates, protectorates, or treaty relationships. Similarly the phrase "colonial issue" is
meant to encompass all differences between the colonial powers and their dependent areas arising
from the development of local nationalism.
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scale presently contemplated, do not meet the basic nationalist demand for independ-
ence and are unlikely to be more than temporarily effective, except in more backward
areas. The colonial powers appear unwilling for the most part to recognize fully
the force of nationalism in their remaining dependencies and to take the leadership
in guiding these toward genuine independence or self-government.
As a result of the rapid breaking-up of the colonial systems, a new power situation
is developing in the former colonial world. No longer can the Western Powers rely
on large areas of Asia and Africa as assured sources of raw materials, markets, and
military bases. In contrast to the ever closer integration of the Satellites into the
Soviet system, there is an increasing fragmentation of the non-Soviet world. This
process is already largely completed, with many of the most important colonial and
semi-colonial areas, like India, Burma, the Arab states, and the Philippines already
independent, and Indonesia ,and Indochina well on the road. These new states will
be free to choose their future alignments, which will be largely conditioned by the at-
titudes of the Soviet and Western Power blocs toward the colonial issue and their
economic demands.
The colonial independence movement, therefore, is no longer purely a domestic
issue between the European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has been
injected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element in the
broader problems of relations between Orient and Occident, between industrialized
and "underdeveloped" nations, and between the Western Powers and the USSR
The newly independent and older nations of the Near and Far East strongly sympathize
with the aspirations of still dependent areas, to which they are bound by racial and
religious ties. These nations are further bound together in varying degree by two other
issues which tend to set them off against the colonial powers and the US: namely,
the growing economic nationalism of the "underdeveloped" areas and the underlying
racial antagonism between white and native peoples. All intensely nationalistic,
the Near and Far Eastern nations tend to unite in opposition to the Western European
powers on the colonial issue and to US economic dominance. As a result there has
been a tendency toward the formation in the UN and affiliated bodies of a so-called
"colonial bloc," whose members have already brought colonial disputes into the UN
and will likely take the lead in attempting in this manner to hasten the liberation
of further colonial areas. The colonial issue and economic nationalism, therefore, will
continue to be a source of friction between the colonial powers and the US on the one
hand, and the states of the Near and Far East on the other. The gravest danger
to the US is that friction engendered by theseS issues may drive the so-called colonial
bloc into alignment with the USSR.
The USSR is effectively exploiting the colonial issue and the economic nationalism
of the underdeveloped areas as a means of dividing the non-Soviet world, weakening the
Western Powers, and gaining the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Ever
since World War I the USSR has sought to infiltrate the nationalist parties in de-
pendent areas and, more recently, to play up the colonial issue and the so-called eco-
nomic imperialism of the Western Powers in the UN. The poverty and underprivileged
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position of the population in these areas, their latent hostility toward the occupying
powers?past or present?and the existence of leftist elements within them, make them
peculiarly susceptible to Soviet penetration.
Consequently, the good will of the recently liberated and emergent independent
nations becomes a vital factor in the future strategic position of the US in the Near
and Far East. In addition, the restoration of the economic contribution of their
colonies is important to the economic stability of the Western European powers, which
the US is endeavoring to create. Short-sighted colonial policies, however, will in the
long run cause the colonial powers to lose the very economic and strategic advantages
in their dependencies which they are anxious to retain. Unless, therefore, the Euro-
pean colonial powers can be induced to recognize the necessity for satisfying the as-
pirations of their dependent areas and can devise formulae that will retain their good
will as emergent or independent states, both these powers and the US will be placed
at a serious disadvantage in the new power situation in the Near and the Far East.
Moreover, unless the US itself adopts a more positive and sympathetic attitude toward
the national aspirations of these areas and at least partially meets their demands for
economic assistance, it will risk their becoming actively antagonistic toward the US.
3
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44
THE BREAK-UP OF THE-COLONIAL EMPIRES AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.
A major trend in the twentieth century world power situation is the development
of a strong colonial independence movement which is in process of breaking up the
colonial systems and creating a series of new, nationalistic states. The primary cause
of the break-up of the European colonial empires is the growth of native nationalism
in these areas, simultaneously with the decline in power and prestige of the colonial
powers. This striking growth of local nationalism is primarily the result of: (a) the
rising level of political, economic, and social development in dependent areas, with
resultant growing sensitivity to inequality of treatment; (b) the short-sighted policies
of the colonial powers, whose discriminatory treatment of subject populations and ex-
ploitation of colonial resources without attendant benefits to these populations have
aroused strong resentment; (c) a deep-seated racial hostility of native populations
toward their white overlords, due largely to these policies, which has taken the form of a
reaction against "white superiority"; (d) the exposure of colonial areas to Western ideas
of nationalism and the right to self-determination, which has made them increasingly
conscious of their dependent status; and (e) the meteoric rise of Japan, whose defeats
of the European powers in the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II
punctured the myth of white superiority. The colonial powers, while exposing their
dependencies to the technological advances and democratic ideals of the West, failed
to reckon with their aspirations to achieve the same type of national self-expression
which the West exemplified.
While nationalism in dependent and quasi-dependent areas first reached signifi-
cant proportions in the early twentieth century, it was given its greatest impetus by
World Wars I and II. These conflicts, particularly the last, greatly weakened the
colonial powers, thereby reducing their ability to control their colonial holding by force.
At the same time, reliance of these powers on colonial resources and manpower forced
them to grant concessions which greatly advanced the nationalist cause. In World
War I Great Britain also fanned Arab national aspirations in order to. hasten the
downfall of the Turks. President Wilson's insistence upon the self-determination of
peoples and the creation of the League of Nations gave a powerful stimulus to colonial
aspirations for independence.
The period between wars saw further development of nationalism in dependent
areas, particularly in the Near East and India. The repercussions of the world de-
pression of the 1930's, which forced the colonial powers to retrench in colonial develop-
ment, and shattered the world raw material price structure, increased colonial resent-
ment and led to pressure for self-government and a larger share of the proceeds of
economic exploitation. Indigenous nationalists, resentful of political, economic, and
social discrimination against them, tended to attribute the depressed state of colonial
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eco ies to the ineptitude of the great powers. States like Iraq and Egypt, which
had been under British tutelage, tended to assume a more independent course in their
affairs. The US groomed the Philippines for independence, while Britain was forced
to make some concessions to the growing pressure of Indian nationalism. The ag-
gressive policies of Japan, whose propaganda stressed the racist doctrine of "Asia
for the Asiatics," greatly.stimulated the racial hostility of East toward West.
World War II delivered another blow to the declining colonial empires. When
the colonial powers proved unable to defend their Southeast Asian possessions against
the Japanese onslaught, Japan, capitalizing on local feelings, set itself up as liberator
of the Asiatic peoples from white oppression. Although the Japanese actually kept a
tight rein on Southeast Asia, they granted a shadowy "independence" to Burma, the
Philippines, Indochina, and Indonesia which further stimulated their national am-
bitions. At the end of the war most Allied Far Eastern dependencies were wholly
unwilling to revert to their former status, and the exhausted Allies have been unable
to re-establish the status quo ante. The UK labor government, no longer willing or
able to hold off the violent demands of the Indian nationalists, granted independence to
India, Pakistan, and Burma and dominion status to Ceylon. A weakened France
was forced to recognize the independence of its Levant mandates, Syria and Lebanon.
The US fulfilled its promise of freedom to the Philippines. Korea was freed from
Japanese bondage. France and the Netherlands, unwilling to relinquish their rich
Southeast Asian possessions to the native nationalists, became embroiled in an uneasy
struggle with indigenous regimes established in these areas.
2. CURRENT STATUS OF THE COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.
As a result of the stimulation of native nationalism in the chaotic war and postwar
periods, the remaining colonial world is in a ferment of nationalist activity. This
movement is in varying stages of growth in different areas, depending largely upon
the level of local political, economic, and social development, but in most of them the
eventual goal is independence. In the more backward areas of Asia and Africa, which
are at a relatively early stage of political and economic growth, nationalism is still
inchoate. On the other hand, in relatively highly developed areas like Indonesia,
Indochina, and French North Africa, it has reached an advanced stage.
The two most critical colonial issues are in Indonesia and Indochina, where the
Dutch and French, exhausted by war, have been unable to suppress the local national-
ists by force and, despite temporary compromises which may be worked out, are un-
likely to be able to arrest the eventual achievement of native independence. The
Dutch and the Indonesian Republic are attempting to negotiate a settlement designed
to bring the Republic within a Netherlands-dominated United States of Indonesia
while allowing it a large degree of autonomy in all but foreign affairs and defense.
In Indochina the French have been unable either to suppress the nationalist Viet-
Minh Party or to reach mutually acceptable agreement with it. In view of the pro-
tracted strain of pacification expenditures on the unstable French economy, it is
likely that France eventually will have to make sweeping concessions to the National-
sts. These will constitute but another step along the road to independence.
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.? While nationalism in French North Africa has not yet reached the fighting stage,
the development of militant native independence movements in Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia is a growing threat to French hegemony. In Tunisia and Morocco, both
protectorates, the nationalists have concentrated on restoration of national sovereignty
under the existing dynasties. A bureau has been established at Cairo where exiled
North African leaders like Abd-el-Krim coordinate the nationalist program. French
North African nationalism is stimulated by common Moslem ties with the chauvinistic
Arab League, which, while as yet giving little overt support to North African nationalism,
may be expected to step up its activity as soon as the more pressing Palestine problem
is settled. Mounting nationalism in Libya, particularly among the Cyrenaican Senus-
si tribes, is complicating the disposal of this former Italian colony.
Although nationalism in other dependent areas has not yet attained critical
proportions, there exist well defined movements in several regions which foreshadow
similar problems. In most of these areas the demand- at present is not so much for
immediate independence as for a greater measure of self-government. In Malaya the
heterogeneity of the population and the relatively enlightened British colonial admin-
istration so far have retarded rapid growth of nationalism, but the success of neighbor-
ing areas in achieving self-determination cannot help but stimulate it to some extent.
France's suppression of the 1947 rebellion in Madagascar has set back the Malagasy
nationalist movement several years, but tension will recur. In the relatively back-
ward Central African colonies the low stage of development has limited the growth
of nationalism, and will do so for a long period. The Zik movement in Nigeria and
the United Gold Coast Convention, though neither very strong, are examples of rising
nationalist movements in this area.
3. THE COLONIAL ISSUE IN WORLD POLITICS.
The colonial independence movement is no longer purely a domestic issue be-
tween the individual European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has been
injected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element in the
broader problems of the relations between the Orient and Occident, between in-
dustrialized and "underdeveloped" nations, and between the Western Powers and the
USSR.
a. External Support of Colonial Independence Movements.
The newly liberated and older nations of the Near and Far East strongly
sympathize with the aspirations of still dependent areas, to which they are bound
by racial and religious ties. All intensely nationalistic, these countries resent the po-
litical and economic domination of adjacent areas by European powers. States like
India and Egypt have already brought colonial issues into the UN and may be expected
increasingly to take the leadership in attempting to hasten in this and other ways the
liberation of remaining colonial areas. Moreover, many of these states are exploiting
the colonial issue in their own self-interest, with a view to supplanting the Western
Powers in certain areas. India and China both have ambitions to dominate South-
east Asia, and the latter also aspires to replace Japan as the major power in the Far
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East. Some of the Eastern states covet portions of the moribund colonial empires:
Egypt?the Sudan and Cyrenaica; Ethiopia?the adjacent former Italian colonies; and
China?Hong Kong.
The colonial issue, therefore, will be a major source of friction between the
Western European powers and the rising nations of the Near and Far East. To the
extent that the US supports the European powers on this issue, it too will incur the
of these new, nationalistic states.
b. Economic Nationalism and the Colonial Issue.
The nations supporting the colonial independence movement are bound to-
gether by another major issue, closely related to the struggle for political independence,
which also tends to build up antagonism toward the Western European powers and
the US. This is the development, more pronounced since World War II, of economic
nationalism in the "underdeveloped" countries. These countries, most of them with a
colonial background, find that though they have achieved political independence, their
undeveloped economies, producing mostly raw materials and agricultural products, are
still tied to those of the industrialized Western nations which provide markets for
their goods. They are in essence still semi-colonial areas, for their economic depend-
ence upon the metropolitan economies tends to vitiate their political independence.
Therefore native nationalists have not been wholly satisfied by the achievement of po-
litical independence; they demand economic independence as well.
The aim of this economic nationalism is to attain greater economic self-suffi-
ciency through development of a diversified economy, usually by industrialization. It
has led the underdeveloped countries to favor tariffs, import restrictions, and other trade
barriers to protect their infant industries. This attitude has characterized not only
the recently liberated countries but many long since independent, like the Latin
American nations, which still have semi-colonial economies. It was most clearly
displayed at the recent Havana Trade Conference, where the underdeveloped coun-
tries strongly opposed multilateral free trade and charged that the US and other in-
dustrialized nations were stunting their economic development in order to keep them
permanently dependent.
With the largest segments of the colonial systems either already liberated
or in the last stages of liberation, this aspect of the colonial problem becomes increas-
ingly important. The economic nationalism of the underdeveloped nations conflicts
sharply with US trade objectives and these countries tend to resent US economic domi-
nance. On the other hand, they urgently need external assistance in their economic
development, and the US is at present the only nation able to supply it. The desire
for US loans and private investment will have some effect in tempering the antagonism
of these states toward US policies. However, the underdeveloped countries display an
increasing tendency to demand US aid as a natural right, irrespective of any conces-
sions on their part, and to feel that the US will be forced to invest abroad because of
insufficient internal demand for its existing capital resources.
c. The Colonial Issue in the UN.
Colonial problems have been brought increasingly into the UN, which native
nationalists and their supporters have found an ideal forum for agitating the colonial
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issue. There is a pronounced tendency toward the formation in the UN of a colonial
"bloc" consisting of formerly dependent states like India and the Arab nations, others
like China and Iran With strong racial and religious sympathies toward colonial
peoples (also characteristic of the first group), and yet a third group like many
Latin American republics and Australia, which sympathize on liberal, humanitarian,
and economic grounds. The colonial bloc has consistently sought to broaden the UN
trusteeship system. China, India, the USSR, the Philippines, and the Arab states
contend that Article 73 of the UN charter, which binds members to promote the pro-
gressive development of self-government in their dependencies, implies that the UN
should have broad supervisory powers over these dependencies. Critical colonial
situations like the Indonesian question and Egypt's demand that Great Britain with-
draw her troops have been brought before the Security Council as potential threats to
world peace. The underdeveloped countries have insisted on emphasizing their own
economic problems in UN economic bodies. Thus, through the UN, the colonial issue
has been placed squarely on the world stage and local colonial problems have become
matters of global concern. The colonial "bloc" and the USSR may be expected to
bring more and more of such problems before the UN and to attempt to use it as a
mechanism for liquidating the colonial empires.
d. Soviet Exploitation of the Colonial Issue.
The USSR is effectively exploiting the colonial issue and the allied issues of
economic nationalism and racial antagonism in an effort to divide the non-Soviet
world, weaken the European allies of the US, and gain the good will of the colonial
"bloc." In pursuit of these objectives, the USSR is: (1) giving active support through
agitators, propaganda, and local Communist parties to the nationalist movements
throughout the colonial world; and (2) consistently injecting colonial and Allied prob-
lems into UN and affiliated activities.
The Soviet regime has always looked upon the so-called "depressed areas" as a
fertile field for penetration, and since 1918 the Comintern has stressed the importance
of stirring up discontent in these areas. As a non-colonial power, the USSR is in the
fortunate position of being able to champion the colonial cause unreservedly and there-
by bid for the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Its condemnation of
racial discrimination pleases native nationalists and tends to exclude the USSR from
the racial animosity of East toward West. The Communists have sought to infiltrate
the nationalist parties in dependent and formerly dependent areas and have been, as
in Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina, among the most vocal agitators for independence.
The Soviet Union has found the World Federation of Trade Unions an effective weapon
for penetrating the growing labor movements in Asia and Africa and for turning them
against the colonial powers.
At the San Francisco Conference in which the UN Charter was framed the
USSR fought for a provision categorically demanding eventual independence for all
colonies. Since that time, it has frequently injected the colonial issue into UN dis-
cussions and has strenuously supported the colonial "bloc" on all colonial and allied
questions brought into the UN. Persistent Soviet support of the colonial "bloc" on
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purely colonial issues may win adherents from the colonial "bloc" for the USSR
on other major issues between the USSR and the Western Powers in the UN. Thus the
Soviet Union clearly recognizes the potential of the colonial issue for weakening its op-
ponents and has made of it an important element in the power struggle between the
Western Powers and the USSR.
4. INEVITABILITY OF FURTHER COLONIAL DISINTEGRATION.
Under these circumstances, some further disintegration of the remaining colonial
empires appears inevitable. Native nationalism in these dependencies will increase as
the inhabitants, spurred on by the example of the already liberated nations, seek to
emulate them. Indonesia and Indochina are apparently already in the final stage
before full independence, and crises will arise in other colonial areas as local nationalists
clamor increasingly for self-government. The USSR and the colonial "bloc" will lend
external support to these groups and utilize the UN as a means of assisting them.
The weakened colonial powers, stricken by war and economic crisis, will find it difficult
to cope with these insistent nationalist pressures.
The colonial powers, belatedly aware of the threat to their empires, have shown
some willingness to liquidate the most troublesome of their possessions and to make
concessions in others. The Western European socialist parties, now a major influence
in many governments, appear more willing than their conservative predecessors to
adopt colonial reforms although their colonial policies to date have shown little change.
Some of the colonial powers have adopted more progressive colonial policies, offering
/concessions to their dependencies in an effort to stave off the demand for independence.
The UK in particular, after recognizing that independence for India and Burma was
inevitable, is cautiously promoting greater self-government in its remaining colonies
and has earmarked large sums for their economic development (although Britain's
I present . economic weakness has prevented full development of these schemes). The
Netherlands has granted substantial concessions in Indonesia, although clearly de-
termined to make every effort to keep this rich area under her control. France, too,
while making minimal reforms in critical areas, seeks to draw her dependencies closer
to the mother country in a French Union.
These concessions, however, at least on the limited scale presently contemplated,
appear unlikely to do more than temporarily placate local nationalism and at most
delay the demand for liberation. Differences in race, language, and religion, intensi-
fied by a strong East-West antagonism, make Dutch and French plans for integration
of their colonies into French and Netherlands Unions unlikely to succeed in areas like
Indochina, Indonesia, and French North Africa where native nationalism is already
well advanced. Moreover, stimulation of colonial economic and social development
and granting of greater political autonomy may well promote local nationalism rather
than weaken it. As the colonies become more _ highly developed, they will become
more conscious of their dependent status and more insistent upon independence. They
also will be better able to create viable economies and to function as independent
states. Under these circumstances limited concessions are likely to be effective, in
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the long run, only in relatively small or backward areas which would in any case be
likely to remain under a protecting power.
5. EMERGENCE OF A NEW POWER SITUATION IN THE FORMER COLONIAL WORLD.
As the result of the gradual disintegration of the colonial systems and the emer-
gence of young, nationalistic states, a new power situation is in the making in the former
colonial world. No longer will the western colonial powers control large areas of Asia
and North Africa which are sources of manpower and raw materials and provide as-
sured military bases. The economic and political policies formerly imposed by the
colonial powers on their colonies will give way to a welter of conflicting national policies.
This process is already largely completed, with many of the most important dependent
and semi-dependent areas, such as India, Burma, the Arab states, and the Philippines
already independent, and Indonesia and Indochina well on the road. These new and
emergent states will be free to determine their own economic policies and future align-
ments.
For a long period, however, these new states will find it difficult to stand alone.
Though actively, promoting their own political and economic development, they will
remain for some time semi-dependent areas, forced to rely on the great powers for
protection and assistance. Their relatively backward stage of political, economic, and
social evolution, their lack of developed resources, and the absence of technical skills
and education among the mass of their peoples make them dependent upon outside
help in their development. Militarily, they will be unable to withstand any major
power. Economically, they will still be undeveloped countries, tied to the larger metro-
politan economies. The effect, therefore, of the disintegration of the colonial systems
and the withdrawal of the colonial powers is the creation of a power vacuum in the
Near and Far East.
There is danger that unless the Western European nations, and with them the US,
can secure the good will of these newly liberated and as yet dependent areas, they may
become aligned with the USSR. Several factors: friction over the colonial issue, eco-
nomic nationalism, and the racial antagonism between East and West, may tend to
orient these areas away from the US and the Western Powers. The newly liberated
states will entertain some hostility toward the former colonial powers, and as these
powers belong to the Western bloc supported by the US, this hostility will extend
in some degree toward the US also. US support of the colonial powers in the UN also
has tended to make the dependent peoples and their supporters suspicious of US
motives. In the economic sphere, the new and undeveloped countries tend to resent
US economic dominance and to fear that the US and other industrialized nations
intend to keep them economically dependent. The USSR, pursuing an assimilative
racial policy and able to represent itself to colonial peoples as largely Asiatic, escapes
much of the resentment of colored toward white peoples; while US treatment of its
Negroes, powerfully played up by Soviet propaganda, embarrasses the US on this
issue. Racial restrictions in areas like South Africa and Australia also arouse colonial
resentment. Moreover, the poverty and backwardness of the colonial and former
colonial world, combined with the restrictive policies of the colonial powers, has en-
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v.,
hanced the appeal of radical political philosophies and tended to place leadership- of
indigenous nationalist groups in the hands of extremists. This tendency is evident
in the existence of active pro-Communist parties in such areas as China, Indochina,
Burma, and Indonesia. Thus the basic backwardness of these areas, their resentment
toward the past or present dominating powers, and the existence of strong leftist
elements within them, make them peculiarly susceptible to Soviet penetration. Should
the USSR in turn, however, become in the eyes of these areas a threat to their inde-
pendence, they would actively oppose Soviet domination too.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY.
The break-up of the colonial systems and the creation of a series of new national-
istic states may adversely affect the present power balance of the US and Western
Europe versus the USSR, particularly if these new states become friendly toward the
USSR and hostile toward the US and its allies.
a. The loss of their dependencies weakens the colonial powers, which are the
chief prospective US allies. These nations rely upon their colonies as sources of raw
materials, military manpower, and revenue, and as strategic military bases. France,
for example, draws heavily upon its North and West African empire in most of the
above respects; and the breaking away of these areas, especially North Africa, would
seriously weaken its strategic position. UK withdrawal from India and Burma already
has substantially affected its strategic capabilities in the Middle and Far East. The
Netherlands would be weakened economically by the defection of its rich Indonesian
possessions.
b. The drift of the dependent areas away from the orbit of the colonial powers
deprives the US itself of an assured access to bases and raw materials in many of these
areas, an increasingly serious loss in view of global US strategic needs and growing de-
pendence on foreign mineral resources. Bases in French North Africa and the Middle
East, for example, would be strategically vital in event of conflict. The growing US
list of strategic and critical materials?many of which like tin and rubber are available
largely in colonial and former colonial areas?illustrates the dependence of the US
upon these areas. The US has heretofore been able to count upon the availability of
such bases and materials in the colonial dependencies of friendly powers; but the new
nations arising in these areas, jealous of their sovereignty, may well be reluctant to
lend such assistance to the US.
c. Possible Soviet domination of certain former dependent areas or their orienta-
tion toward the USSR would create a major threat to US security. Such a possibility
is strongest in Asiatic peripheral areas around the USSR, where the danger of Soviet
penetration is acute. Soviet control of areas like Iran, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia,
or Korea, whether through occupation, alliance or friendly neutrality, would help com-
plete Soviet control of the Asiatic continent, make the USSR more invulnerable to
external attack, assure its access to vital materials like oil, tin, and rubber, and place
it astride strategic sea lanes.
d. Colonial antagonism toward the US would hamper the US in its relations with
colonial areas should their metropolitan powers fall within the Soviet orbit in event of
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war. While governments-in-exile probably would be .formed, they might prove unable
to control their dependencies, which might seize this opportunity to further their own
nationalist aims by revolt. Were the US forced to occupy these territories for strategic
reasons, its task would be much more difficult if they were hostile.
e. The colonial issue also tends to create recurring crises which promote world
unrest. Increasing resort to the UN to deal with the swelling chorus of colonial griev-
ances and the pressure in behalf of dependent peoples by a large bloc of sympathetic
states tends to magnify these grievances out of all proportion to their local significance.
The USSR, seeking to promote any unrest in colonial areas, will quickly exploit its
disruptive possibilities.
Consequently, the good will of the recently liberated and emergent independent
states becomes a vital factor in the future position of the US in the Near and Far East.
The breaking up of the colonial systems and the gradual withdrawing of the colonial
powers from these areas has faced the US itself with the problem of filling the gap
left by their withdrawal. The US stand on the colonial issue and economic nationalism
will have a major effect on the attitudes of these colonial and former colonial areas.
Yet the US is currently in an unfortunate position vis-?is the USSR with respect to
such issues. On the one hand, the US has historically sympathized with the aspirations
of dependent peoples for self-government and has pledged itself to this end in the
Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations. As a result, the dependent and semi-de-
pendent areas have come to expect and demand US backing in their struggle for in-
dependence. To the extent that the US acquiesces in or supports restrictive colonial
policies on the part of the Western European nations, it will jeopardize its position in
these areas. Such a policy will lay the US open to charges of inconsistency and im-
perialism and may lead to loss of the voting support of the colonial bloc in the UN.
It will allow the USSR, in particular, to pose as champion of the colonial cause and thus
gain the good will of the dependent and former dependent areas.
On the other hand, the European colonial powers are the chief prospective US
allies in its power struggle with the USSR and it is difficult for the US to oppose these
powers on colonial issues. These nations are anxious to retain as much of a hold as
possible on their dependencies, partly for economic and strategic reasons, but also for
prestige. Should these countries lose the benefits of their colonial empires, it would
hamper their economic recovery and possibly threaten the stability of governments
friendly to the US.
If, however, the colonial powers do not basically modify their present colonial
policies, they will in the long run lose the very strategic and economic advantages in
their dependencies and former dependencies that they are seeking to retain. Such re-
strictive policies will not arrest the development of local nationalism but may in fact so
aggravate it as to alienate the local populations and minimize the possibility of re-
taining any benefits whatsoever. Moreover, attempts at forcible retention of critical
colonial areas in the face of growing nationalist pressure may actually weaken rather
than strengthen the colonial powers. French and Dutch efforts to suppress local
nationalism by force in Indonesia and Indochina, for example, are a drain on funds
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urgently needed for reconstruction and may create such antagonism that no profitable
tI
economic development will be feasible for an extended period.
The colonial powers must fully recognize the irresistible force of nationalism in
their dependencies and take leadership in guiding these dependencies gradually toward
eventual self-government or independence, if they are to retain their favored position
in these areas. A policy of far-reaching colonial reforms, designed to foster colonial
political, economic, and social development, would do much to neutralize the more
violent aspects of native nationalism and to substitute orderly evolution toward the
inevitable goal of independence for the violent upheavals characteristic of the present
situation. Only through such a new cooperative relationship can the colonial powers
in the long run hope to retain their close ties with these areas and the maximum of
political and economic advantage. Unless the colonial powers can be induced to
recognize this necessity for satisfying the aspirations of their dependencies and can
devise formulae which will retain their good will as emergent independent states,
both these powers and the US will be placed at a serious disadvantage in the new power
situation in the Near and Far East.
In the economic sphere, since the US plays a dominant role in world trade and
is the nation currently most capable of supplying the capital needs of the "under-
developed" countries, the attitude of the US itself toward the efforts of these areas to
achieve greater economic self-sufficiency will have a great effect on their goodwill. US
failure to adopt a more sympathetic attitude toward the economic nationalism of the
underdeveloped countries or at least partially to meet their demands for capital as-
sistance will stimulate the charges, already heard, of US economic imperialism and
seriously affect US relations with these areas.
The US, therefore, is faced with a serious dilemma. On the one hand US en-
couragement of colonial self-determination and economic development may itself
incur the charge of US imperialism and run the risk of alienating the colonial powers.
On the other hand, the US may be unable to afford to let its policy on colonial issues
be swayed by the colonial powers if such support of its allies tends to alienate the de-
pendent peoples and other non-European countries, lay the groundwork for future
disruption, and in the long run weaken the power balance of both the US and the
Western European nations vis-a-vis the USSR.
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