THE RYUKUYU ISLANDS ANDTHEIR SIGNIFICANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003200010001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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L?W.0.01'
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
40731
THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND
THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
ORE 24-48
*Le41MIDEANtMabeat. Published August 6, 1948
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CENTRAL INTELLIG NCE AGENCY
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ORE 24-48IgT
THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
SUMMARY
1. Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands may become one of the most controversial
issues in any settlement of Far Eastern problems. Possession or control of these
Islands, particularly Okinawa, will give the occupying country: (a) an advantage in
either defensive or offensive operations in Asia; (b) a watch post to guard the sea
approaches to Central and North China and Korea; and (c) a base for air surveillance
over a wide area, taking Okinawa as the center.
2. US control of the Ryukyu Islands would: (a) give the US a position from which
to operate in defense of an unarmed post-treaty Japan and US bases in the Philippines
and other Pacific Islands; (b) obviate the possibility of the Ryukyus falling under the
control of a potential enemy; (c) neutralize, to some extent, Soviet positions in the
Kurils, Korea, and Manchuria; and (d) give the US a position from which to discourage
any revival of military aggression on the part of the Japanese.
3. Both China and Japan will advance territorial claims to the Islands; the UK
and Dominions may support, while the USSR will vigorously protest, US control.
Note: The information in this report is as of 5 August 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
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THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
. IMPORTANCE OF THE RYUKYUS.
The Nanshei Shoto, thirty in number, curve in a 775 mile-long chain from the
southern tip of the Kyushu to Formosa. In this archipelago the term Ryukyu applies
to the islands comprising the Okinawa-gunto and the Amami-gunto, or those islands
which lie between the latitudes roughly of 24:45 N and 28:30 N. The Ryukyu Islands
are important solely because of their strategic military position in the Far, East.
Economically the Islands are of no value to anyone except the inhabitants, and the
internal political picture is a relatively quiet one.
The value of Okinawa, centrally located in the Ryukyu chain, was demonstrated
in World War II. In the Island group there are a total of twenty-two airfields and
seaplane bases, eleven of which were constructed on Okinawa during the war (six could
accommodate B-29's). There are adjacent islands which, if developed in conjunction
with Okinawa, would present an excellent base from which heavy bombers could bring
within range the interior of China, any part of Japan and Korea, portions of eastern
Siberia including Vladivostok, the whole of the Philippine Islands, Guam and the Mari-
anas, and portions of Southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies.
Although they are not ideal, there are several bays and inlets (Naha Ko, Buckner
Bay, and Kerama Retto) in the Ryukyus which*provide natural harbors. Use of these
sites for extended naval supply and tactical operations is limited, however, since from
three to six typhoons can be expected annually to cross directly over the Islands and
cause severe damage.
Withdrawal of US forces from the Ryukyus following the eventual withdrawal from
Japan and Korea would move the US line of defense in the Pacific back to the Marianas.
Should an Asiatic conflict develop under these circumstances, the Ryukyus might
become subject to control of powers whose interests are antagonistic to those of the US.
Any power occupying the Ryukyus and possessing an adequate air potential could
control an unarmed Japan. Furthermore, control of the Ryukyus by powers unfriendly
to the US would obviously constitute a threat to US Pacific bases as well as tend to
circumscribe any future action of US forces operating in the western Pacific.
2. CURRENT STATUS.
The Islands, as a part of the former Japanese Empire, have been under US occupa-
tion control since the spring of 1945. Neither the Cairo nor the Potsdam Declarations
specifically defined the future status of the Ryukyus Islands. Therefore, the way is
clear to return the Islands to Japan, transfer them to some other power, or place them
under trusteeship. There are indications that the Ryukyuans would prefer to remain
under US protection. Nevertheless, in anticipation of a future settlement in the Far
East, China has already advanced territorial claims, and Japan has voiced pious hopes;
but the major conflict over the disposition of the Islands will involve the US and
the USSR.
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3. BASIS OF JAPANESE AND CHINESE CLAIMS.
ET
Although China made the first contact with the Ryukyus and the latter sent
"tribute" to China and received "presents" in return, the procedure had the typically
commercial aspect of the traditional "suzera,nty" relationship obtaining between the
"Middle Kingdom" and the outlying "tributary" states. By the 17th Century the
Ryukyus were paying tribute to both China and Japan. In 1874 the Chinese signed an
agreement with Japan in which the Ryukyuans were referred to as "subjects of Japan."
By 1879 Japan had assumed full governmental responsibility for the Islands, and it con-
tinued to administer them as an integral part of Japan Proper until 1945.
4. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS AND POSITIONS OF INTERESTED POWERS.
Recognition of China's claims would involve a tremendous risk. Chinese control
might easily deny use of the bases to the US, and, in the event of final subjugation of
the Nationalist forces by the Communists, might give the Soviets easy access to the
Islands. Such a development would not only pose for Japan a serious threat of Soviet
incursions but would, in effect, compromise the strategic position of the US in the
Pacific Area. The failure of the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa since the end of the
war indicates the impracticability of awarding the Ryukyus to the Nationalists with
agreement that the US maintain a base on Okinawa. Under such an agreement, the
resentment of the Ryukyuans toWard the Chinese, coupled with the confusion of the
Chinese Government, might seriously impede US efforts to maintain stability in the
area. It may be, moreover, that China is advancing claim to the Islands more as an
argument useful for improving its own bargaining position when a Far Eastern settle-
ment is made, rather than with any real hope of seeing the claim satisfied. Even in
this case, the pressure of Chinese public opinion may force China to press its claims to
a point highly embarrassing to the US.
Even though the political, historical, and ethnical claims of the Japanese to the
Islands are substantial, Japan, under its present circumstances, can advance no claim
other than one sponsored by one of the Allied Powers. Nevertheless, it is to be expected
that the Japanese will attempt to exploit the US-Soviet rivalry in order to regain con-
trol of the Islands and thus further Japanese ambitions in the Far East. The US,
however, is caught in a contradiction if it supports return of the Islands to Japan.
Control of the Islands by a militarily weak Japan would contribute to the over-all
instability of the Far East, whereas US commitments as well as US determination to
prevent a recrudescence of Japanese aggressive power rules out giving the Islands to
a Japan capable of maintaining Ryukyus' security. China, the USSR, the UK, and the
Dominions would strongly oppose retrocession to Japan because of fear that such acton
would foster the extension of Japanese power.
The USSR has indicated a stern adherence to the policy that Japan be "limited to
the four main islands." Since the USSR will unquestionably oppose US control, the
? alternatives acceptable to the Soviets are independence for the Ryukyus or transfer to
a China rapidly succumbing to Communist domination. The USSR will presumably
prefer the latter.
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At Canberra, in August 1947, the UK favored a US trusteeship over the Islands.
Also, the UK has leaned toward turning over to the US the task of molding the security
pattern in the Pacific, and therefore will probably lend support to a plan which will
allow the Islands to remain under US control.
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65 01 60 Silti E061
03A13038
IT. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2820-8-1948
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