THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003100160001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF;THE WORLD
FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS
IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICT
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CONS' N T I A L
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE
UNIONS IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICT
The World Federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1945 almost simultaneously
with the United Nations and inspired by the ephemeral unity prevailing in the final
months of World War II, was intended to serve as a world force promoting unity and
understanding between national labor organizations and furthering international
peace and cooperation. Within its first year, however, the governing bodies and Secre-
tariat of WFTU were for the most part taken over by the USSR and the federation
was largely reduced to a sounding board for propaganda in support of Soviet foreign
policy objectives. The Soviet elements have concentrated on the use of WFTU as
a propaganda instrument and have played down the non-political trade union objectives
which the Western affiliates sought to stress.
The USSR's ability to utilize the WFTU as an effective propaganda instrument
derives from the preponderant voting power enjoyed by the pro-Soviet elements in
the WFTU and the intrenchment of key Communists in the Secretariat. Its prepon-
derant voice in WFTU governing bodies has been the result of the working alliance
between the Soviet and satellite trade unions and the Communist-dominated unions in
France, Italy, and other countries and of the enrollment of virtually the entire indus-
trial populations of the Soviet-oriented nations as union members.
While the USSR has utilized the WFTU to great advantage as a propaganda plat-
form, it has so far been unable to use the WFTU effectively as a means of promoting
international labor disorder and is not permitted to do so under the present WFTU
constitutional structure. The autonomy of national labor organizations, insisted upon
by the non-totalitarian unions and written into the WFTU Constitution, protects the
national organizations from being compelled to follow federation policies.
The almost free rein given the USSR for propaganda has been checked to some
extent recently by the growing opposition of the Western trade unions to what they
now recognize as a perversion of the original purposes of the federation. Their efforts
to make their own views penetrate to the unions behind the Iron Curtain, however,
have rarely succeeded.
The underlying East-West division in the WFTU came to the surface when the
Western trade unions sought to discuss participation in ERP and the Eastern trade
unions refused. Subsequently fifteen Western trade unions set up a provisional or-
ganization in London to assist ERP and thus provided the nucleus for a possible new
labor federation. The impasse on ERP within the federation was temporarily resolved
Note: The information in this report is as of 27 May 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and of the Navy have concurred
in this report; the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army and of the Air
Force had no comment.
CON/ TIAL
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by Soviet acquiescence in February 1948 in the right of each national affiliate to de-
termine its own attitude toward ERP and by the subsequent Soviet agreement, at the
May WFTU meeting in Rome, to curtailment of the General Secretary's powers and
elimination of his use of WFTU machinery to oppose ERP. These concessions reflect
the importance which the USSR attaches to the WFTU and its desire to hold the federa-
tion together, even at the cost of at least temporarily reducing its usefulness as a So-
viet propaganda instrument.
Although these concessions to the views of Western labor appear for the time
being to have averted a split, they have failed to satisfy all of the demands of the
Western organizations for basic reforms. Additional Soviet concessions would prob-
ably be the price for maintaining WFTU unity beyond the 1948 meetings. The USSR
may be expected to continue its efforts to save the WFTU from permanent schism
threatened by the increased opposition of the Western trade unions. Whether such
efforts will be sufficient to achieve their purpose is still problematical.
While the ultimate fate of the WFTU is difficult to foresee, the present alternatives
are that the federation will either break up following a Soviet failure to carry out the
basic reforms demanded by the Western trade unions; or the USSR will make con-
cessions sufficient to keep them within the organization, though at the cost of ma-
terially reducing its propaganda value for Soviet objectives. The Western trade unions,
in any case, are unlikely to be satisfied with anything less than modification of the
present fundamentally pro-Soviet orientation of the WFTU.
CONFI NTIAL 2
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The World Federation of Trade Unions was born in the final months of World
War II and its early activities reflected the unprobed and ambiguous unity of the
Allied war effort. Soviet, British and American trade union leaders, meeting in London,
initiated the steps which led to the establishment of the federation. The collapse of
the common enemy, however, removed the galvanizing force which had held together
the federation's heterogeneous parts. Subsequently, in the face of increasing East-
West tensions, the national affiliates moved steadily apart. . Moreover, within its
first year, the USSR obtained control of most of the WFTU governing bodies and of
the Secretariat and succeeded in transforming the federation into a virtual sounding
board for propaganda supporting Soviet foreign policy objectives.
In terms of sheer numbers of labor organizations and of workers included, the World
Federation of Trade Unions is the largest and most comprehensive trade union in-
ternational in history. It is composed of 67 national trade union centers with an
estimated membership of 71,500,000 in 58 countries.* It dwarfs the now defunct In-
ternational Federation of 'Trade Unions (IFTU) which never claimed more than
22,000,000 members. It has contrived to hold under one banner the cautious British
Trades Union Congress (TUC), the crusading CIO, and the totalitarian Soviet All-
Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) with 27,000,000 regimented work-
ers. It has, in its three years of existence, succeeded in enrolling every important na-
tional trade union center with the exception of the American Federation of Labor and
the Argentine Confederation of Labor.
The largest bloc in the membership is Communist-controlled, a consequence of
the fact that in the USSR and its satellites the entire industrial population of the nation
is regimented into state-controlled trade unions. This mass induction of workers has
inevitably swelled the membership of the Communist trade union centers. While
the graded voting required by the WFTU Constitution prevents complete reflection in
WFTU governing bodies of this preponderance of Communist unions, the USSR, with
the support of the Communist unions in the West, commands a decisive majority of
*The WFTU, unlike the International Labor Organization (ILO), is exclusively a workers
organization. The ILO is a Specialized Agency of the UN made up of representatives of govern-
ments, employers, and workers. Although the two organizations occasionally deal with the same
issues (e.g;, freedom of association, trade union bargaining rights, etc.), their interests are distinct
and contact between them has been informal and usually has been effected through key labor
leaders who happen to be members of both. The USSR is not a member of the ILO and opposes
participation on the ground that the inclusion of government and management prevents the
organization from properly representing labor interests.
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CONF$ENTIAL
votes in the WFTU Congress and is generally able to muster a majority in the General
Council and the Executive Committee.*
Nevertheless, the WFTU is by no means the effective instrument of Soviet policy
that is sometimes represented to be. Its efforts to enforce uniform world labor policies
have been consistently handicapped by the large degree of autonomy accorded to the
national trade union centers, by the lack of effective enforcement machinery, and
by the divergent orientation of the national centers.
The more conservative Western unions would never have affiliated with the WFTU
had not the all-important "autonomy clause" been written into its constitution.
This guarantees the autonomy of the national trade union centers while pro-
viding no effective machinery for compelling them to execute decisions of the
governing bodies. A national affiliate which chooses to reject such a decision
must transmit to the Secretariat within 90 days a report setting forth its reasons for
so doing, but the provisions for subsequent disciplinary action are vague and cumber-
some. An affiliate may be expelled only for: (1) "serious and persistent violations"
of the Constitution or of rules and decisions of the Congress or General Council; (2)
persistent non-payment of dues. Expulsion requires a two-thirds majority of the Con-
gress, which neither the Communist nor the Western unions could separately attain
in the present composition of the Congress.
The divergent orientation of the national trade union organizations, implicit at
the outset, was brought into the open by the Marshall Plan, the Soviet consolidation
of Eastern Europe, and the formation of the Cominform. Each of these develop-
ments imposed mounting strains on WFTU's shaky constitutional unity. These divisive
forces have been intensified by the federation's preoccupation with propaganda and
political activity. The IFTU, to which the Soviet unions never belonged, enjoyed the
support of the powerful international craft unions known as the international trade
secretariats.** Although the WFTU originally hoped to absorb these secretariats, it has
been unsuccessful in reaching agreement with them on terms of their incorporation,
and, from the Western point of view, the federation has to that extent lacked the mortar
and cement of trade union activity for strictly economic ends.
SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THE WFTU.
It is often assumed that the Communist power in the WFTU is a source of Soviet
strength and support in Communist-influenced unions outside the USSR. The actual
basis for Soviet strength in these unions is that, independently of the WFTU, the USSR
directly controls and influences powerful national labor organizations such as the
Italian CGIL and the French CGT. The Kremlin exercises domination not through
the WFTU but through direct control both of Communist "cadres" within these unions
and of key labor leaders like Louis Saillant (France), Benoit Frachon (France), and.
*See Appendix I: Organization Chart of the WFTU; and Appendix II: Basis of Representation
in the WFTU Congress. The Executive Bureau is an exception. Its "window dressing" composi-
tion-the President (British), 7 Vice Presidents selected on a national basis, and the General
Secretary-has made it less subject to Communist control. It has frequently been manned by a
non-Communist majority.
* * The International Transport Workers, the International Metal Workers, and the Inter-
national Miners are craft internationals of this type.
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CONFYSENTIAL
Giuseppe Di Vittorio (Italy). Were the WFTU to be dissolved tomorrow, the Soviet
power to dictate to these unions would be unchanged.
The influence of Soviet Russia in the WFTU, as distinct from its direct control of
Communist trade unions within the national organizations, has been covertly exercised
through the WFTU General Secretary, Louis Saillant. From his headquarters
in Paris, Saillant, who is also a secretary of the French General Confederation
of Labor (CGT), has disseminated WFTU resolutions, sent out WFTU investigating com-
missions, and headed WFTU delegations attending international conferences (includ-
ing UN meetings). While Saillant constitutionally possessed these broad powers, he
consistently abused them by exercising his authority in a manner calculated to pro-
mote Soviet objectives. Moreover, in several matters of vital importance to the West-
ern national affiliates, he took unilateral action without consultation. Under his
direction the Secretariat has consistently given greater emphasis to WFTU political
and propagandist activity than to measures aiming at the economic and social im-
provement of union members.
The WFTU, in fact, serves the USSR principally as a sounding board for its propa-
ganda. Through this medium the USSR can project its political and social aims west
of the Iron Curtain and agitate issues embarrassing to the Western powers. The
WFTU in the eyes of the working class symbolizes the striving of the workers towards
"solidarity" and thus provides an unexcelled means for the dissemination of Com-
munist ideology. In the propaganda struggle between the Western-oriented and Com-
munist elements in the WFTU, the Communists have shown themselves more effective
and adroit. They packed the permanent WFTU Secretariat at the outset with followers
of Saillant. They selected for agitation political issues which had a surface appeal
to a wide non-Communist group. WFTU resolutions, especially those drafted in the
earlier period, included repeated professions of faith in "democracy" and protests
against the "remnants of Fascism," and this ambiguous vocabulary often proved decep-
tive to the Western trade unionists who were frequently unaware of the pro-Soviet
orientation of resolutions which they endorsed.
During the first two years of the WFTU's existence the USSR exercised its working
control in the federation with moderation in an evident desire to avoid alienating the
TUC and the CIO. None of the federation's political resolutions, however, were per-
mitted to reflect unfavorably on the USSR. In contrast, many resolutions were
sharply critical of US and British actions, particularly those dealing with colonies,
racial discrimination in the Canal Zone and South Africa, and labor conditions in
Puerto Rico.
The WFTU has been an extremely effective agency, from the Soviet standpoint, in
carrying propaganda to the populations of colonial and dependent areas. The colonial
peoples have furnished a fertile field for Communist labor organizers because of the
prevalent illiteracy and the widespread exploitation of native labor. As a consequence
of these factors, the WFTU Secretariat has influenced colonial peoples with its propa-
ganda to a far greater degree than it has the more literate workers in industrially de-
veloped areas. It is also becoming evident that WFTU investigating commissions, in
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CONFFENTIAL
i
the colonial areas and in politically unstable areas like Indonesia and Iran, repre-
sent a potential instrument for political penetration.
Saillant's early attempts to use the Secretariat to promote Soviet aims were
largely held in check so long as Lord Citrine (UK), first president of WFTU, and Sidney
Hillman (US), his close friend and collaborator, were active in the organization. After
Citrine's resignation and Hillman's death in the summer of 1946; the assertion of the
Communist propaganda line through the Secretariat became bolder, and the Com-
munists consistently took the offensive.
WFTU activity in Germany in 1946 and 1947 furnishes an outstanding ex-
ample of the use of the federation for Soviet propaganda. Then, as at present, the
USSR envisaged a unified Germany labor movement under Communist leadership as
a most important means of securing economic control of Western Germany. The
WFTU Secretariat actively promoted the efforts of German Communists, supported
by the USSR, to set up a central German trade union organization which could be
recognized as a WFTU affiliate. Trade Union representatives from each of the four
zones were invited to attend the meeting of the WFTU General Council in Prague in
June 1947. The Council at that time passed resolutions calling for establishment of
a WFTU liaison bureau in Germany and accepting affiliation of the German trade
unions on condition that the zonal labor groups should be united in a central organ-
ization. The WFTU Secretary General subsequently exerted every effort to implement
these resolutions, and set up a liaison bureau in Berlin with the open support of the
Soviet authorities. This bureau was prohibited from functioning in the US Zone.
However, Saillant's efforts to call an all-German trade union congress with the aim
of establishing a Communist-dominated central labor organization have so far been
blocked by continued disagreement between Soviet and Western members of the
Allied Control Council regarding the conditions under which German labor should be
unified. Plans for a central organization of the type desired by Saillant were set aside
by the German unionists themselves when, at an interzonal meeting in Dresden in
February 1948, they substituted a "Central Council" in which.the delegates from the
US and British zones would hold a majority.
The aggressively pro-Soviet orientation of the Secretariat under Saillant was even
more unmistakably shown during the visit of a WFTU Commission to Korea in April
1947. After touring both Northern and Southern zones, Saillant, as chairman of the
Commission, concluded that "greater freedom of organization" existed in the Soviet-
controlled zone. This time, however, his criticisms of US military administration drew
a sharp dissent from the CIO and TUC members of the group, who denied that a labor
movement could be free in the presence of armed Soviet troops.
The propaganda offensive of Saillant against US and UK policies encountered more
serious resistance at the November. 1947 meeting of the WFTU Executive Bureau in
Paris. The CIO requested that the WFTU place the European Recovery Program on
the agenda of the Executive Bureau meeting scheduled for February 1948. In the face
of the bitter opposition of Saillant and the Italian CGIL, acting as spokesmen for the
Soviet bloc, the Bureau voted to discuss ERP. But as February approached, it became
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clear that the Communist coalition was determined to postpone the scheduled meeting
and block consideration of ERP. Early in February the British TUC transmitted an
ultimatum to Saillant demanding that the meeting be held. It was rejected
by Saillant without even the formality of a vote of the nine members of the Bureau.
Only the vigorous protests of the CIO and the TUC leaders to V. V. Kuznetsov, Chair-
man of the Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions, effected a reversal of this action
and secured agreement to proceed with the discussion at the Executive Committee
meeting subsequently held in Rome during May 1948.
THE US AND THE WFTU.
It was the aim of Sidney Hillman (US) to use the WFTU as an educational medium
to promote unity and understanding between the respective national labor organizations
and, through labor, to influence nations toward peace and international cooperation.
The CIO has contended that through its WFTU connections it can carry US views to
the working classes of all nations more effectively than embassies and diplomatic mis-
sions whose contacts are largely restricted to influential persons at the top of the social
scale.
The record of the past three years, however, indicates that US labor, as represented
by the CIO, has on the whole been unable to hold its own in the WFTU. The relatively
ineffective role which it played during the greater part of this period was a consequence
of:
(a) The schism in the US labor movement and the abstention of the AFL from
WFTU which reduced the weight of US influence in international labor councils.
(b) The indecision and defensiveness of the CIO, until recently, in expounding the
US position. This attitude was induced by the presence in CIO executive councils
of representatives of unions under Communist influence (constituting about one-
fourth of all CIO unions and including the United Electrical Workers, the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Union, the Furriers Union, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,
and the Farm Equipment Workers).*
(c) The lack of preliminary coordination between the views of US unions and
those of the government. This failure to coordinate weakened the presentation of
US views at international labor conferences and correspondingly increased the ad-
vantages enjoyed by the totalitarian countries. The USSR already enjoyed a marked
advantage at these conferences because of the fact that the Soviet AUCCTU and
the other Eastern European trade unions are virtually governmental departments.
There can be no serious conflict between these unions and their governments and no
possibility of a union's endorsing a resolution criticizing its own government. * * By
contrast, the trade unions of the Western nations habitually and freely share in general
criticism of conditions prevalent in their own countries.
*At its October 1947 Congress in Boston the CIO leadership adopted a more militant line in
support of ERP and in opposition to Communism. The housecleaning of Communist unions within
CIO, begun at that time, is still under way.
* *The "self-criticism" of Soviet industrial officialdom, including the trade unionists, is limited
to suggestions for improving techniques of production.
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(d) The inability of CIO to carry its point of view to the working masses behind
the Iron Curtain because of the censorship exercised in Communist countries.
(e) The lack of effective US labor representation in the WFTU Secretariat.
In the perspective of these developments, an estimate can be made of the relative
value of the WFTU to the US and the USSR in the present power conflict.
The USSR has derived substantially greater advantages from the WFTU as a
world forum for its propaganda than have the US and the UK, and it has been par-
ticularly successful in exploiting the issues of colonialism, racial and religious discrim-
ination, cartels, and suppression of trade unionism. While the Western unions have
exercised a restraining hand in the drafting of resolutions on these issues, too often the
restraints have been more editorial than substantive. Until ERP became an issue,
the TUC and the CIO showed little initiative in propagating their own views through
the WFTU. Although the USSR itself, for tactical reasons, has often taken a concili-
atory position in WFTU councils, it has consistently encouraged the Communist trade
unions outside the USSR to adopt aggressive and belligerent attitudes toward the
Western powers.
On the other hand, the autonomy guaranteed to its national affiliates prohibits
the WFTU, as now constituted, from being effectively used as an instrument of direct
action for the execution of Soviet foreign policy. The WFTU would be powerless to
carry out a general strike, sabotage, or boycott in countries where the national organ-
izations resisted. Where the Communists have already gained control, the USSR can
issue its orders directly to its Communist agents within the unions without using the
WFTU as an intermediary.
EAST-WEST DIVISIONS IN THE WFTU.
The growing tension between the East and West has seriously undermined the
unity of the WFTU. The exaggerated political and propagandist role which the Com-
munists have imposed on it despite repeated warnings from the Western unions has
made WFTU extremely vulnerable to disruptive international issues. In November,
1947, the Marshall Plan became the immediate issue which threatened to split the
organization. The resistance offered by the Communist-dominated Secretariat to CIO's
effort to obtain WFTU endorsement of the ERP precipitated the convening of an in-
dependent trade union conference at London in March 1948. At this conference labor
groups from fifteen western nations set up a Trade Union Advisory Committee to im-
plement ERP and serve as a possible nucleus for a new federation. While the London
Conference did not bring about the withdrawal of the CIO and the TUC, it indicated
that the federation had reached a turning point and would soon have to make critical
decisions which it had long sought to evade. A Soviet concession in February 1948
acknowledging the right of each national affiliate to determine its own attitude toward
ERP somewhat reduced the tension between the two groups. A split was averted for
the time being at the May 1948 meeting of the WFTU in Rome when the Soviet trade
union leaders yielded to the Western demand for curtailment of the powers of the
General Secretary and for restriction of his right to participate in activities outside the
federation. By these concessions the USSR showed unmistakably its desire to maintain
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an undivided WFTU and to preserve its contacts with the non-Communist labor
groups of the West.
PROSPECTS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE WFTU.
The existence of the fifteen-nation Trade Union Advisory Committee confronts
the WFTU with a continuing threat of secession by the Western trade unions under
the leadership of the CIO and the TUC. This threat may be made good at the Paris
meeting of the Executive Committee in August 1948 or at the Brussels WFTU Congress
in December if the critical issues dividing the Eastern and Western blocs are not re-
solved. The Soviet concessions to the views of Western labor, while substantial, still
fall short of satisfying all the demands of the Western organizations for basic reforms
and have merely brought about an uneasy truce and agreement to resume discussion
of remaining East-West differences at the subsequent WFTU meetings this year. In
order to retain WFTU unity after these meetings, the USSR would probably have to
pay the further price of: (1) faithful adherence to the Rome agreement to curtail
Saillant's activities; (2) admission of the anti-Communist Force Ouvriere to member-
ship; (3) cooperation in negotiations to bring the international trade secretariats into
WFTU on terms satisfactory to their desire to retain a large measure of
autonomy; (4) acceptance of the Western concept of an impartial WFTU dedicated
to the international interests of labor as opposed to the national political interests of
its participating organizations.
Although ERP has so far been the most controversial issue dividing the national
trade union movements in the WFTU, it may not precipitate a final break. Those
British and US labor leaders who have taken the initiative in pressing toward a show-
down with the USSR on ERP are reluctant to make this issue the occasion for a break-
up. Should they elect to split, they would prefer to base their action upon a non-
political trade union issue such as the failure of the WFTU General Secretary to bring
the international trade secretariats into the organization.
The effect of an East-West division in the WFTU would be not only sharply to
separate the national labor organizations East and West of the Iron Curtain but also
to widen and perpetuate the internal splits between Communist and non-Communist
elements of labor movements in presently contested areas. An Eastern-oriented WFTU
could be expected to retain, in addition to the hard core of the USSR and its satellites,
the French CGT, the Netherlands EVC, the Communist and left-wing Socialist ele-
ments in the Italian CGIL, the Latin American labor groups still affiliated with the
dwindling CTAL, and a miscellany of rapidly growing native labor organizations in
the colonial and dependent areas. The British and US labor bloc would probably
carry with them into a new Western trade union international the WFTU affiliates
of the Benelux countries (with the exception of the minority Communist EVC in the
Netherlands), secessionist non-Communist organizations in France and Italy, and the
national affiliates of Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand. The trade unions of
the Near and Middle East, India, and China would probably split into Right and
Left labor organizations. In Latin America, where a three-way division is appearing
in labor ranks, trade unions opposing the CTAL and cooperating with the US (like
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CONFI/NTIAL
the Mexican CTM) could be expected to join the Western bloc while a third group
might attach itself to a new continental federation sponsored by Argentina.
Prediction as to the ultimate fate of the WFTU is difficult at this time. How-
ever, the alternatives implicit in the current situation are: (1) the federation may
break up as a consequence either of Soviet failure to meet the principal remaining
Western demands for WFTU reforms or of Soviet failure to carry out promised reforms;
or (2) the USSR may continue to make whatever concessions may be required to
retain the Western trade unions and keep the federation intact. In the latter event,
the USSR will be confronted with a WFTU which, from its point of view, will possess
a greatly reduced propaganda potential. While continued Soviet efforts to prevent
a break-up may be expected, the Western trade unions are not likely to be satisfied
ultimately with anything less. than modification of the present fundamentally pro-
Soviet orientation of WFTU.
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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Meets at Least Twice a Year)
Chairman:
M
b
Saillant (Fr)
em
ers:
USSR 3
India & Ceylon 1
US & Canada 3
Africa
1
UK
2
West Europe
1
France
2
South Europe
1
LA
2
Central Europe 1
Middle East
1
SE Europe
1
China
1
Scandinavia
1
Australasia
1
Trade Depts
3
(M
EX
eets
ECUTIVE BUREAU
About Every 3 Months
)
Presid
ent:
Deakin (U
K)
Kuznetsov (U
SSR)
Jouhaux (F
r)
Di Vittorio (It
Chu (C
Toledano (M
Kupers (N
Saillant
aly)
hina)
ex)
eth)
WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS (WTUC)
(67 Natl TU Centers)
(58 Countries)
(71,500,000 Members)
(Meets Once Every Two Years)
USSR
Soviet Satellites
US & Canada
UK
Italy
France
Far East (& India)
Latin America (CTAL)
Scandinavia
Western Europe
Australasia
Africa (PATUC)
Middle East
GENERAL COUNCIL (71)
(Meets Once a Year)
Smaller replica of WTUC.
Each delegation has same
voting power as in WTUC.
Chairman: Executive Com-
mittee Chairman
205
153
116
116
102
101
59
57
40
28
16
20
11
USSR 1
UK 1
Sweden 1
SECRETARIAT
Gen Sectry: Saillant
Asst for Press: Faline (USSR)
Asst for Colonies Cope (US)
and Mandates:
Asst for Trade Depts : Schevenels
- (IFTU)
The WFTU constitution provides for three interim governing bodies. The General
Council governs between sessions of the World Trade Union Congress. The Executive
Committee directs WFTU activities and carries out Congress and Council decisions
between sessions of the Council. The Executive Bureau governs between sessions of the
Committee.
CONFIIAL
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BASIS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS
"Affiliated trade union organizations
following basis:
Up to 250,000 members:
For members in excess of 250,000 and
up to 5,000,000:
For members in excess of 5,000,000 and
up to 10,000,000:
For members in excess of 10,000,000
and up to 15,000,000:
For members in excess of 15,000,000:
shall be represented at the Congress on the
1 delegate
1 delegate for every 250,000 members or
majority fraction thereof
1 delegate for every 500,000 members or
majority fraction thereof
1 delegate for every 1,000,000 members or
majority fraction thereof
1 delegate for every 2,000,000 members or
majority fraction thereof
In addition, each affiliated trade union organization shall be entitled to appoint
an additional representative for every 250,000 members or majority fraction thereof
up to 1,000,000 members. Such additional representatives shall be entitled to speak
in the Congress but shall have no vote."
(Article 4: III, WFTU Constitution)
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,A
APPENDIX III
NATIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE WFTU, REPORTED MEMBERSHIP
AND PRESENT EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
(In order of size of membership reported to First
World Trade Union Congress, Paris, October 1945)
USSR
Central Council of Trade Unions
(AUCCTU)
27,124,000
UK
Trades Union Congress (TUC)
6,600,000
Arthur Deakin
USA
Congress of Industrial Organiz-
ations (CIO)
6,000,000
Philip Murray
Italy
General Confederation of Labor
(CGIL)
5,200,000
Giuseppe di Vittorio
France
General Confederation of Labor
(CGT)
5,100,000
Leon Jouhaux (CGT/
FO) Benoit Frachon
Christian Confederation of Work-
ers (CFTC)
750,000
Gaston Tessier
Czechos-
Central Council of Trade Unions
1,500,000
Antonin Zapotocky
lovakia
(ROH)
Evzen Erban
Rumania
General Confederation of Labor
1,267,000
Gheorghe Apostol
Sweden
Trade Union Confederation
1,087,000
Axel Strand
Poland
Central Committee of Trade Unions'
1,011,000'
Casimir Rusinek
Mexico
Confederation of Workers (CTM)
1,000,000
V. Lombardo Toledano
(suspended)
Fernando Amilpa
Hungary
Trade Union Council
888,000
Staphane Kossa
China
Association of Labor (CAL)
800,000
H. F. Chu
Australia
Council of Trade Unions
625,000
A. E. Monk
Yugoslavia
United Syndicate of Workers &
Employees
622,000
Djuro Salaj
Cuba
Confederation of Workers (CTC)
558,000
Lazaro Pena
Belgium
Federation of Labor (FGTB)
500,000
Louis Major
Paul Finet
Denmark
General Confederation of Labor
500,000
Eiler Jensen
Nigeria
Trade Union Congress
500,000
Nat. A. Cole
India
Trade Union Congress
456,000
S. A. Dange
Federation of Labor
408,000
Maniben Kara
' The Central Committee of Polish Trade Unions (KC-22) now claims a combined membership
of 2,556,395.
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CON ENTIAL
Norway
Federation of Trade Unions
400,000
Konrad Nordahl
Bulgaria
General Workers Trade Union
385,000
Rajko Damianov
Austria
Trade Union Federation
350,000
Johann Boehm
Canada
Congress of Labor (CCL).
300,000
Pat' Conroy
Finland
Trade Union Federation (SAK)
260,000
Emil Huunonen
Switzerland
Federation of Trade Unions (USS)
250,000
Robert Bratschi
Association of Protestant Trade
10,000
Unions
Colombia
Confederation of Workers (CTC)
200,000
Victor J. Silva
Netherlands
Federation of Trade Unions (NVV)1
170,0001 E. Kupers
Unity Trade Union Council (EVC)
170,000
Berend Blokzijl
New Zealand
Federation of Labor
168,000
A. W. Croskery
Brazil
United Workers Movement
150,000
Roberto Moreno
Palestine
Federation of Jewish Labor
150,000
S. Z. Rubashev
(Histadruth)
Palestine Labor League
5,000
Federation of Arab Trade Unions
3,000
Salim Quasim Haj
Ireland
Trade Union Congress
145,000
Gilbert Lynch
Ecuador
Confederation of Workers (CTE)
100,000
G. Maldonado Jarrin
Spain
Basque Workers Solidarity Union
100,000
Manuel Robles Aranquiz
General Union of Workers (UGT)
31,000
Trifon Gomez
Luis Delage
Egypt
Trade Union Congress
78,000
Mohammed Y. A.
El Modarrek
Congress of Industrial & Com-
60,000
Ahmed El Masri
mercial Unions
Union S..
Trades and Labor Council
70,000
Jerry Calder
Africa
Guatemala
Confederation of Workers (CTG)
50,000
Victor M. Gutierrez
Uruguay
General Union of Workers (UGT)
40,000
Enrique Rodriguez
Puerto Rico
General Confederation of Workers
30,000
Colon Giordiano
Barreto Perez
25,600
Mustafa El-Ariss
Panama
Trade Union Federation (FSTP)
25,000
Luis Avila
Luxemburg
General Confederation of Labor
22,500
Antoine Krier
Free Trade Union Federation
10,000
Joseph Frapport
Iceland
Federation of Trade Unions
22,000
Herman Gudmundsson
1 The Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV) has made substantial gains since 1945
at the expense of the Communist-controlled EVC and other unions, and it now claims 330,000
members.
CONFI TIAL
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CONF 00TIAL
Ceylon Trade Union Federation
20,200
S. A. Wickremasinghe
Albania Federated Syndicates
20,000
Tuk Jakova
Syria Workers Congress
17,600
Subhi Al-Khatib
Cyprus Trade Union Committee
13,200
A. Ziartides
Jamaica Trade Union Congress
10,000
Ken Hill
Sierra Leone Trade Union Congress
10,000
Isaac T. A.
Wallace-Johnson
10,000
British
Guiana
6,200
Gambia Gambia Labor Union
5,000
E. F. Small
Gold Coast Railway African Employees
3,000
No. Rhodesia Mine Workers Union
3,000
Brian Goodwin
NATIONAL AFFILIATES PROVISIONALLY ADMITTED BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL
AT PRAHA, JUNE 1947
Iran
Central Trade Union Committee
Reza Rousta
Greece
General Confederation of Labor
Demetreos Paparigas
Tunisia
Workers Union of Tunis
Hassem Saadaoui
Georges Poropane
Belgian Congo
Confederation of Trade Unions
Andre Wynant
Trieste
Central Trade Union Committee
Renato Rizzoti
Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) V. Lombardo Toledano
International Federation of Trade Unions z (IFTU) Walter Schevenels
International Confederation of Christian Workers (ICTU) Gaston Tessier
P. J. S. Serrarens
I The General Council itself did not reach final agreement on the admission of this pro-Markos
faction of the Greek Labor Confederation (GSEE) but the WFTU Secretariat and the Soviet-
oriented trade unions within WFTU have extended de facto recognition to it.
2 Although the IFTU formally ceased to exist 15 December 1945 when its General Council voted
for dissolution, an IFTU liquidating committee still functions. Schevenels, former IFTU General
Secretary, is a WFTU Special Assistant in charge of relations with the International Trade
Secretariats.
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The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of State
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C-ONftDEf tAkL
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2596-5-1948
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