CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CURRENT SITUATION IN FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003000240001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN FRANCE
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"This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning of
the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its
transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
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THE CUS ZikON IN FRANCE
I. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE.
France is of greater strategic importance than any other continental European
country except the USSR. It is important because of its geographic location, its mili-
tary potential, its cultural and intellectual leadership of Western Europe, its key posi-
tion in the European Economic Recovery Program, and its control of French North
Africa and other outlying areas which, in the hands of a hostile power, would provide.
bases for military action against the US.
Access to France's airfields, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Channel ports, and
transportation net are essential to the successful prosecution of a war in Western
Europe. Their control by a power hostile to the US would provide that power with
bases for mounting amphibious attacks against the US or US-held bases in the Atlantic,
would permit naval and aircraft to operate against US shipping in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, and would make US counteraction extremely difficult. The cost in
manpower and materiel of forcing such a hostile power out of France was demonstrated
In World War II.
In addition to an army which could be raised to 1,000,000 men, if the necessary addi-
tional materiel is acquired from abroad, France's military potential includes a good
navy and a fair air force. Given external logistical support, the three services would
be of assistance in defeating a hostile European power in any attempt to attack the US.
French influence in international politics remains strong in Western Europe;
hence the reorientation of France from the West to the East, whether achieved through
political means or force of arms, would be almost inevitably followed by similar action
in the Low Countries and Italy, and probably in Germany and Spain. If France is lost,
Europe is lost.
Recent violent efforts of the Communists to disrupt French economy in order to
prevent or retard the European recovery program reflect the importance with which the
USSR regards the French position in that program. French economic participation
is essential to European economic recovery.
An unfriendly government in France would, at the outset of war at least, control
French North Africa with obvious implications for US security (see ORE 63: The Cur-
rent Situation in French North Africa). Other French possessions of varying degrees
of importance to US security are located in other parts of Africa, the West Indies, the
Far East, and the Indian Ocean. The most vital of these could be neutralized or occu-
pied rapidly by the US but would, if controlled even temporarily by any ememy, cause
diversion of force and effort.
2. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS.
Continued Communist attempts to sabotage economic recovery in France can be
expected. While Communist extremist action will be likely to reduce the size of the
Note: This report has the concurrence of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A statement of dissent by the Department of State is set
forth as Enclosure "A".
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Communists' electoral following, stiffen the purpose of non-Communist elements in the
French labor movement, and lessen the possibility of the Communists' eventual return
to the Government by legal means, the Communists are now openly committed to an
antinational stand. Their actions will continue to be guided by Moscow as an integral
part of the current Soviet offensive against the European recovery program.
As French opposition to the Communists intensifies, the Communists may be
expected to draw their forces together in a niore closely knit unit, to intensify the
training of Communist para-military formations, and L?ake a greater effort to
conceal their activities short of going underground. Growing resistance to Commu-
nist control of labor has already resulted in the secession from the CGT of non-Commu-
nist leaders and the establishment of a new national labor organization, the Force
Ouvriere. The trend of labor is away from the Communists, so that in the next few
months, the number of workers represented by the Force Ouvriere, autonomous unions,
and the CFTC (French Confederation of Christian Workers) may equal that of the
CGT. The Communists, therefore, will probably not attempt within the foreseeable
future to seize control of France by force. They will probably conserve their strength
until the return of De Gaulle appears imminent when they can be expected to make
an all-out effort to create disorder in an attempt to prevent his accession to power.
The Schuman Cabinet, a centrist coalition government, by its success in breaking
a wave of strikes that seriously threatened the nation's economy, has strengthened the
Government's position and has indicated a capacity to cope successfully with Commu-
nist attacks. For the time being at least, the Government appears to be secure against
Communist attempts to bring about its downfall.
In order further to promote French recovery and insure the continuance of his
Government, Schuman, having initiated an economic program designed to balance
the budget and control inflation, expects to devalue the franc in an effort to provide a
realistic rate of exchange with foreign currencies which the Government hopes will be
a stimulus to the volume of French exports.
If the Government should fail to meet the exigencies of the current situation, how-
ever, the return of De Gaulle would be practically assured, although he prefers not to
take power until the present critical winter is over. A government headed by De Gaulle
would be the last line of defense against Communist accession to power. Should
De Gaulle fail to bring order and recovery, the pendulum might swing back sharply to
the extreme left, thus bringing the Communists to power.
3. POLITICAL SITUATION.
Domestic French politics are dominated by two factors: the existence of a multi-
plicity of political parties, and the physical and psychological damage caused by war
and German occupation.
Because of the widely differing shades of political thought represented by the
numerous and diverse political parties (at the present time, for example, the French
Assembly is made up of representatives of 12 different parties), no one of them receives
an absolute majority in elections. France, therefore, has usually been governed by
coalitions. This has rendered very difficult the type of political compromise charac-
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teristic of the US and the UK political systems and makes it very hard for a French
government to cope with a political or an economic crisis.
The physical and psychological damage caused by the war in France is much
greater than was at first realized. Political differences existing before the war were
intensified and einbittered during the occupation, and a general decline in public
morality caused by the conflict is now reflected in a continuing decline in political
morality.
The French Communist Party has the largest representation in the National
Assembly?roughly 27%, exclusive of the minor parties which follow the Communist
line. The political power the Party held during the past two years has recently been
threatened as a result of the October municipal elections, largely fought on national
Issues.
As a consequence of the elections, General De Gaulle and his group, the Rally of
the French People (RPF), emerged as a new and potent force in French politics. Pri-
marily because of its anti-Communist stand the RPF polled nearly 40 percent of the
vote, but its strength has come largely from defections from the Popular Republican
Movement (MRP), a center party, and not from the Left. It should be particularly
noted that a substantial portion of this vote was cast in protest and does not represent
a cohesive political force. In the municipal elections the Communists obtained about
30% of the vote. The Socialists, the third largest party, made slight gains. The effect
of this election may be further to divide the French Assembly and people into Left and
Right groups of more or less equal strength. In any event, the municipal elections have
not lessened the importance of effective action in the economic sphere which might
lessen the severity of the political crisis.
Whether General De Gaulle can achieve power and, if he does, will adopt the neces-
sary measures of stabilization and reform that the present Center coalition government
has planned, remains uncertain. He lacks experience in the field of economics. His
characteristic inflexibility and his sense of a "mission," furthermore suggest that he
might take an authoritarian rather than a democratic approach. The positive action of
the Schuman Government in dealing with the present strikes may have reduced the ap-
peal of De Gaulle as the only strong leader who could bring France out of economic and
political chaos.
4. ECONOMIC SITUATION.
The recent strikes and work stoppages have posed immediate problems which
overshadow by their urgency the fundamental problem of long-term economic rehabili-
tation. The realization of the Monnet Plan has been pushed even further into the
future. The question now is whether the French politico-economic mechanism can be
repaired and made to operate until the European recovery program has had time to
take effect. In a moment of great crisis French political parties have temporarily set
aside their differences to combat Communism and to prevent national collapse. The
future of France depends on the ability of the non-Communists to continue cooperating
long enough to consolidate in the field of economics the victory they won in the field of
politics. The loss of production in November and December has accelerated inflation
and increased the public sense of insecurity about the whole future of the nation. The
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tottering French economy, highly vulnerable to Communist-inspired strikes, has already
received such a setback as a result of the strikes* that French leaders may be unable
to succeed without substantially increased interim aid. Such aid, of course, is not of ?
itself a guarantee that French economy will survive.
In April 1947, French economy appeared to be on the way to substantial post-war
recovery. The subsequent decline has reflected multiple basic deficiencies in a French
economy acutely affected by the world-wide economic distortions growing out of World
War II. The nation's gold reserves are dangerously low. Exports. have not provided
the projected returns in foreign exchange, particularly hard currencies, to pay for
needed imports. The upper and middle classes, the farmers, and labor have gone their
separate ways in pursuit of self-interest, resisting investment and tax collection, hoard-
ing farm produce, and demanding higher wages, all of which have contributed to the
inflationary spiral.
Essential to economic recovery are fiscal and currency stabilization plus foreign
aid. The aid is required over the next three or four years to assist in obtaining imports
of consumer's goods, raw materials, and equipment now in acute short supply. Given
these requisites, and a reasonable degree of political stability, France is capable of main-
taining without foreign aid, a relatively stable economy oriented to the West. For the
present, however, the situation remains critical.
5. THE MILITARY SITUATION.
The armed forces of France, although unable to resist aggression by any major
power, are capable of maintaining order at home. Insurgence and disturbances in the
French Empire have necessitated maintenance of relatively large military establish-
ments overseas, resulting in an added drain on the nation's economy.
The French military potential, including a trained reserve, is estimated at 1,000,000
men, but in the foreseeable future the nation lacks the financial and industrial capacity
to sustain with modern equipment such a force or any substantial portion thereof.
The present strength of the French Army is estimated at 500,000 men plus 61,000
members of the Gendarmerie Nationale, which, though a part of the army, is not nor-
mally under its operational control. In metropolitan France, General Revers, Chief of
Staff of the French Army, has at his disposition approximately 220,000 men, of whom
180,000 are ground force troops and 40,000 gendarmes. In addition, Revers, as the
leader of the only important anti-Communist, clandestine military force, is reputed
to have a personal following of between 30,000 to 50,000 men who would reapond to his
call in the event of a Communist attempt to take power by force. The army is believed
to be loyal to the legally constituted government although a small percentage of its
personnel is either Communist or sympathetic to Communism. At one time it was
considered that the Communists might effectively infiltrate the Army. Since General
Revers became Chief of Staff, however, such infiltration is negligible.
Of the total French Army of half a million, 110,000 are actively engaged in opera-
tions in Indo-China and another 15,000 in Madagascar. There are an estimated 112,000
in North Africa and 45,000 in the Occupation Zones. A rough estimate of the total
? Estimated to have cost at least $300,000,000, over two million tons of coal, and a general
decline of 40% in over-all production in November as compared with October.
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operational troops in Europe and North Africa organized into tactical groups is prob-
ably around 100,000, but all units suffer from inadequacies of equipment. Currently
stationed in France are mobile groups equivalent to at least one armored and two
infantry divisions plus some thirty-odd territorial battalions fairly evenly distributed
throughout the country.
The Navy, including the Naval Air Force, composed of about 57,000 men scattered
throughout the French Union and metropolitan France, is almost totally void of Com-
munists or their sympathizers. Its loyalty to the present Government is unquestioned.
The Air Force currently has a strength of approximately 63,000 men. Because of
Communist direction of the Air Ministry immediately following the Liberation, this
branch of the armed forces, particularly the_goirCEBCn crews, has the highest incidence
of Communism. Current reports indicate that approximately 65% of the Air Force
officers are strongly anti-Communist, 30% politically "neutral," and 5% fanatical
Communists. Although the prestige of Communists is not high, such individuals stra-
tegically placed might very well render the Air Force ineffective in the initial phases of
an operation.
For the most part, top Air Force leadership is composed of opportunists who would
have little hesitancy in supporting a Communist-dominated French government.
General Piollet, the Chief of Staff, is consistently rumored to be pro-Communist. If
France were 'attacked by the USSR, however, the top leadership would be likely to
remain loyal to France.
The morale of the Army and Navy is good. The morale of the Air Force is poor
because it lacks modern equipment with no prospect of obtaining any domestically for
? at least 3 years, and because the Air Force lacks real leadership at the top.
The armed forces would be reduced should French politics become more stabilized.
Every finance minister since the liberation has attempted reduction but all have been
frustrated by overseas military commitments (the cost, for example, of the French
effort in Indo-China alone is estimated at $900,000 a day).
6. FOREIGN POLICY.
The foreign policy of France is directed at two primary objectives: (1) security
against possible future German aggression, and (2) restoration of French prestige in
the role of a major power.
Security from German aggression has been and continues to be a cardinal point of
French policy. Three times in seventy-five years, France has been invaded and ravaged
by Germans. The French are determined that: Germany be kept permanently weak;
some form of international control be established over the Ruhr and the Rhineland or
their industries; and the Saar be incorporated economically with France. Virtually
all French moves in European politics are influenced to some degree by France's fear
of a resurgent Germany.
With regard to national security in general, France has always supported the prin-
ciple of collective security and will continue to seek freedom from aggression through
international agreements and the UN.
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To this end the French have supported and will continue to support in the UN any-
measures or guarantees which will further world peace in general and collective security
in particular.
Toward the US, France maintains a policy of friendship and cooperation in the
hope that the US would again come to her assistance in the event of another world
war. The French, however, entertain serious doubts of the ability of the US to do so in
time to save them from another and possibly fatal invasion. Iii addition, they know
that their hope of restoring stability to their economy depends on the US. French
policy will reflect that knowledge so long as the Communists do not take power. '
A similar policy will be followed toward the UK. The French realize that their
hopes of achieving their colonial objectives, and the restoration of their prestige, as well
as of carrying out their intentions regarding Germany, rest largely on the support of
the US and of the UK. ?
Toward the USSR, its satellites, and Spain, French policy will follow that of the ?
US and the UK as far as possible.
Toward Italy, French policy will be dictated by a desire to remain at peace but will
be tempered by the recollection of Mussolini's "stab in the back," the traditional
instability of Italy's foreign policy, and the type of government which happens to rule
the country.
France has attempted and will continue to attempt, through the UN and by other
means, to rebuild its prestige on the European continent. Emerging from World War
II as a second-rate power, France sought to do two things: prevent becoming once more
a battleground, and enhance ith own international position. Therefore, and in view of
the widening rift between the US and UK on the one hand and the USSR on the other,
it attempted to act as arbitrator of the political conflicts between the USSR and the
Anglo-Saxon powers. This attempt failed, and the French felt compelled to choose
between the East and the West. Following tradition and apparent self-interest, they
chose the latter and will attempt to continue in that way so long as the French Govern-
ment continues non-Communist.
France views its colonies as indispensable to its prestige. The French are attempt-
ing through a program of colonial reforms to retain their present overseas possessions
within a proposed French Union which will admit of some degree of local autonomy.
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ENCLOSURE "A"
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Section 1, Strategic Importance of France.
The section presents an unbalanced view of France's strategic importance to the
United States. It begins by adopting a broad interpretation of the word "strategic,"
as evidenced by mention of France's cultural and intellectual leadership and her key
position in the European Recovery Program. From that point, however, it confines
itself almost exclusively to France's role in a future war, thus slurring over the vital
'and dynamic contribution which French political leadership and economic potential
are expected to make to US strategic aims for peace.
Additionally, the section presents an overly pessimistic view of the probable
consequences of Communist domination of France..
Section 2, Probable Developments.
The phrase "all-out effort to create disorder" appears to mean the utilization of
Communist para-military forces for the initiation of civil strife. We cannot agree with
such a view of Communist tactics to prevent General De Gaulle's return to power:
Section 3, Political Situation.
General De Gaulle "would" rather than "might" take an authoritarian approach.
.The evidence for this is not merely the General's "characteristic inflexibility and his
sense of a 'mission'" but also the content of his speeches since the adoption of the
present Constitution.
Section 4, Economic Situation.
The section (1) overplays the effects of the November - December strikes and work
stoppages; (2) fails to mention the economic difficulty with greatest immediate political
implications, namely the acute shortages of bread, meat, and fats resulting from the
freeze of last winter and last summer's drought; (3) gives an erroneous picture of the
causes of France's deficit in its balance of payments on current account; and (4) neither
explains the Monnet Plan nor gives France the merited credit for positive accomplish-
ments under that Plan.
Section 6, Foreign Policy.
The section fails to discuss the prime interest of France in rebuilding and knitting
together Western Europe ? as a bulwark for peace if possible, in war if necsssary ? and
In becoming the leader of such a grouping.
Also the Westward shift in France's international actions can be understood only
if attention is called to the recent isolation of the French Communist Party on the
domestic scene.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2040-S-1948
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