CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AZERBAIJAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002900010003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 4, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
AZERBAIJAN SITUATION
rzl.41 92
92-4
ORE 19
4 June 1947
Copy No. 35
FT-
84132
,Otilr'.%
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"This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning of
the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its
transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
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ORE 19 S T
4 June 1947 COPY NO.
rhis document has been
approved for release through
DEVELOPMENTS IN tip. HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
AZERBAIJAN SITUAItliet Central Intelligence Agency.
Date.1 10-
SUMMARY
Bap
Although the collapse of the pro-Soviet "Azerbaijan National
Government " in mid-December of last year relieved much of the interna-
tional tension centering in this strategically situated province in
northwestern Iran, Azerbaijan's present unstable internal condition
and persistent Soviet activities and ambitions in this region continue
to make it a potential source of international friction.
While progress has been made in the re-establishment of order
since the restoration of central authority over the province, the situ-
ation continues to be unstable owing to the opposition of heavily armed
tribes to the army's program of forceful disarmament and because of dis-
satisfaction caused by excessive corruption practiced by both the army
and civil administrations. The Prime Minister, despite strong army op-
position, has been making efforts to secure a peaceful settlement with
the tribes, and Azerbaijan's Governor General has given evidence of a
desire to improve the local government. Serious fighting between the
tribes and the army may be expected if the army attempts to carry out
its disarmament policy, and discontent among the vocal sections of the
non-tribal population may be expected to grow if excessive corruption
and malpractices continue unabated.
Although tribal unrest and maladministration have long ex-
isted in Iran, they enhance the chances for successful Soviet subver-
sion, which has recently taken the form of encouragement to dissident
tribes to resist the army and of propaganda broadcasts designed to
undermine the government. Moreover, the similarity in race and lang-
uage among the populations on both sides of the Soviet-Azerbaijan bor-
der makes the infiltration of Soviet agents into Iran an easy matter.
Azerbaijan's position on the eastern:flank of Turkey and Iraq,
its nearness to the Caucasus oil fields, and its usefulness as a gateway
to the whole of Iran give impetus to the Soviet will to control this
province which contains oAe-fifth of Iran's population and produces
nearly one-quarter of its wheat. Because of its strategic geographic
position, its manpower, and its agricultural productivity, the loss of
Azerbaijan would threaten Iran's independence.
Having incurred the strong censure of world opinion as repre-
sented in the United Nations for encouraging an autonomous regime in
Azerbaijan, and having failed to arouse sympathetic response to commun-
istic doctrine among the local populace, the Soviets may be expected to
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limit their efforts in Azerbaijan for the time being to economic pene-
tration and subversive activities. The USSR, however, will not abandon
its ultimate objective of controlling Azerbaijan, and eventually all of
Iran. To this end, the Soviets will doubtless bring much pressure upon
Iran for oil concessions and air rights. The Iranians, encouraged by
their success in regaining control of Azerbaijan and relying upon UN
and US support, will resist Soviet domination and will probably reject
the present Soviet demands for concessions. If these concessions are
not granted, the USSR will probably intensify its efforts to create ser-
ious disorders in Azerbaijan, possibly as a pretext for subsequent uni-
lateral Soviet intervention, maintaining in the United Nations that So-
viet security was in jeopardy. It is yet doubtful whether the Iralian
Government can take effective steps to counter such Soviet subversive
activities. Azerbaijan, therefore, will probably continue to be a
trouble spot in world politics.
Further discussion of the Azerbaijan situation is contained
in the Enclosure hereto.
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ENCLOSilRE
STRATEGIC POSITION
Control of Azerbaijan by a foreign power would place that -
power in a position to dominate Iran because two lofty mountain ranges
fan out from the province, forming a "V" which opens the rest of Iran
to easy conquest. Azerbaijan is especially well placed geographically
for penetration and military operations from the USSR. Tabriz, its
capital, is but 62 miles from the Soviet border, which is 480 miled
long and impossible for the Iranians to defend. Conversely, the So-
viets would regard control of Azerbaijan by an unfriendly government
as a serious threat to their rich Caucasus oil fields, which produce
approximately three-fourths of the Soviet petroleum supply.. Baku, key
city of the Caucasus oil area, is but 125 miles distant from the Azer-
baijan border. The possession of Azerbaijan by a power friendly to
Iraq and Turkey is important to those countries as protection of their
eastern flanks. Azerbaijan borders 202 miles on Turkey and 70 miles on
Iraq, whose valuable Mosul-Kirkuk oil fields are 125 miles from this
frontier. Although the rugged mountains between Turkey and Azerbaijan
discourage extensive military actionin that quarter, the border farther
south presents a better military route into northern Iraq, which in turn
offers access to southern Turkey.
A description of the geography and economy of Azerbaijan is
contained in Appendix "A" hereto, while its ethnic composition is des-
cribed in Appendix "B".
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to World War .I
During the past 120 years, the history of Azerbaijan has been
intimately bound to that of an expanding Russia. The present border be-
tween the province and the USSR Was established in 1828 when, after two
disastrous wars, Iran was forced to cede areas which are now a part of
the Soviet Socialist Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
Not only did this forced cession deprive Iranian Azerbaijan of terri-
tory which had for centuries been an integral part of the province, but
it also divided the ethnic-language group composing much of the popula-
tion. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which provided for zones of
Russian and British influence in Iran, was used by Russia as justifica-
tion for intervening in Azerbaijan's affairs in 1908. Russian.troops
were sent to keep order in Tabriz (the capital) during upheavals accom-
panying the Persian Revolution, were subsequently maintained in the
province, and were used to quiet further internal disturbances in 1910.
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World War I to World War II
Azerbaijan was a battleground for Russian, Turkish, and Brit-
ish armies during World War I, and during the subsequent two years suf-
fered from famine?and_insecurity. With the advent of Riza Khan as army
chief of staff in_19312strong efforts to re-establish Iran's authority
over the area were encouraged by the favorable terms of the 1921 Soviet-
Iranian Treaty of Friendship. Under the terms of this agreement the
young Bolshevik Government renounced extraterritorial rights and all
? concessions and holdings gained in Iran during the Czarist regime (in-
cluding the Julfa-Tabriz Railway) with the exception of Soviet interests
in the Caspian Sea fisheries. The USSR did, however, reserve "the right
to advance her troops into (Iran) for the purpose of carrying out mili-
tary operations necessary for its defense" should a third party threaten
the frontiers of Russia through this area and should Iran be unable to
meet such a threat after having been once called upon to do so by Russia.
Riza Khan took advantage of Soviet preoccupation with internal
matters to reduce Iran's economic dependence on the USSR and to extend
his firm control over dissident elements in Azerbaijan. The Kurdish re-
bellion of 1922, part of a larger movement for Kurdish autonomy origin-
ating among Turkish and Iraqi Kurds, was decisively crushed. During his
reign as Shah (1925-1941), Riza Khan endeavored to strengthen Iranian
solidarity by requiring the exclusive use of the Persian language in
schools and in official correspondence, by choosing administrators large-
ly from Tehran, and by fostering an economic development program in which
many neutral experts, particularly German nationals, were employed.
During World War II
Following the opening of German-Soviet hostilities, both Great
Britain and the USSR demanded that German agents throughout Iran, includ-
ing many in Tabriz, be expelled. As a result of the Shah's failure to
orient Iran toward the Allied cause, it became strategically expedient
for the Allies to occupy the country. Soviet columns crossed into Azer-
baijan in late August 1941 at the same time that the British attacked
Iran in the south. Every important city in Azerbaijan was occupied
within four days, andibease fire" orders were immediately forthcoming
from Tehran. Riza Shah, the keystone of strong central authority, was
replaced by his young and politically weak son, Muhammed Riza Pahlavi,
and Azerbaijan entered a period of complete foreign occupation. The
Tripartite Treaty of January 1942, in which the USSR and Great Britain
guaranteed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity and agreed to
the withdrawal of all foreign troops within six months after the end of
the war, did little to restrict Soviet activities in Iran to matters of
military necessity.
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The familiar pattern of Soviet political penetration became
quickly evident in Azerbaijan as imported agents began agitation through
the pro-Soviet Iranian Tudeh Party. Disregarding treaty obligations,
the USSR prevented the moving of additional Iranian security forces into
Azerbaijan in 1943 and blocked the supply and movement of troops already
there. Aided by Soviet intimidation of the opposition, the Tudeh Party
was able to elect two deputies from Azerbaijan to the Najlis (Parliament)
in the spring elections of 1944. In October of that year, oil conces-
sions covering 216,000 square miles in northern Iran, including most of
Azerbaijan, were demanded by the USSR of Prime Minister Salid's govern-
ment. The decision not to grant any concessions so long as foreign
troops occupied Iranian soil led to Soviet-inspired anti-government
demonstrations and to the fall of Salid's cabinet in November 1944. The
five succeeding cabinets have found Azerbaijan and Iranian-Soviet rela-
tions their most difficult problem.
The Autonomous Movement
Following the war, the USSR, instead of preparing to withdraw
the garrison of approximately 60,000 Soviet troops in Iran, increased
it by 15,000 soldiers with the heaviest addition assigned to Azerbaijan..
The motive for this action became quickly apparent. In September 1945,
a new "Democratic Party", an outgrowth of the Tudeh Party, began to
clamor in Tabriz for autonomy, and a similar movement with Soviet back-
ing was initiated among the Kurdish tribes in southwestern Azerbaijan.
Democratic partisans took over the Azerbaijan government the following
December, called a "National Congress", and installed the Soviet-
trained Iranian, Jaafar Pishevari, as president. Meanwhile, a Kurdish
Republic was set up at Mahabad under Qazi Muhammed, a Kurdish leader
who had received direct encouragement from Soviet diplomatic agents
in Azerbaijan.
Central Government garrisons disintegrated, and for a year
the autonomous regime held sway. Because of the similarity in race
and language between the inhabitants of Iranian and Soviet Azerbaijan,
it was a simple task for the USSR to export Soviet nationals and for-
mer Iranian subjects to stiffen the Azerbaijan People's Army or to act
as secret police and political leaders in the movement. Under mount-
ing pressure from world opinion shaped by Iran's appeal to the United
Nations, the Soviet garrison in Azerbaijan was finally withdrawn in
May 1946, two months after the deadline set by the Tripartite Treaty
of 1942. Agents of the USSR remained, however, and were reported to
number at least 5,000 during the greater part of the "Democratic" re-
gime.
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Meanwhile, Ahmad Qavam, astute elder statesman, had been ap-
pointed Prime Linister of Iran in January 1946.* In June he succeeded
in reaching a basic agreement with the Tabriz Government whereby Azer-
baijan would enjoy limited autonomy and could anticipate increased rep-
resentation'in the National Government. Disagreement over details,
however, delayed implementation of the agreement, and in October, nego-
tiations were broken off by the Azerbaijan Government in protest over
Qavam's dismissal of Leftists from the Tehran Government. The,Shah
then demanded that Qavam allow the use of troops to take possession
of the area; and finally in December 1946, despite Soviet intimidation,
the Government ordered direct military action. The failure of the USSR
to give active support-to the "Democrats" and the weakness of the Azer-
baijan army enabled.the Iranian forces to occupy the province within a
matter of days. The disintegration of the Soviet-inspired regime was
swift and complete. Qavam, the army, and above all the Shah, were
widely acclaimed as liberators, and all three enjoyed unprecedented
popularity.
CURRENT SITUATION
Corrupt and Oppressive Rule
Five months have elapsed since the Central Government's troops
marched into the province to depose the "Democrats", many of whom poured
into the USSR along the 480-mile Azerbaijan-Soviet border. Within this
time the enthusiasm with which the population welcomed the return of
Iranian authority changed to widespread dissatisfaction over government
maladministration and army corruption. Since the fall of Azerbaijan,
the army has conducted a virtual military occupation of the province,
which is still under Martial Law. It filled the jails not only with
political prisoners but also with persons who resist its venal prac-
tices. The execution of collaborationists unable to buy their freedom,
although temporarily suspended during the recent Majlis elections, has
now been renewed.
rUblic declarations by Qavam and the appointment of Ali
Mansur, a former prime minister ,.of wide experience in government ser-
vice, as the province's new governor general encouraged the hope that
a more enlightened, progressive administration would be provided for
Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, wealthy landlords were permitted to abuse
? Shortly after his appointment, Qavam went to Moscow in an attempt
to ease Iran's strained.relations with the USSR. The trip proved
fruitless. In April, however, he and the Soviet Ambassador in
Tehran reached an accord providing that (1) the Central Government
would seek a peaceful settlement of its differences with Azerbaijan;
(2) an agreement covering the formation of a mixed Soviet-Iranian
company to exploit Iran's northern oil resources-would be presented
,to the Majlis for consideration; and (3) Red Army troops would be
withdrawn from northern Iran, including Azerbaijan.
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the peasants in extorting crop shares for the past year, the collection
of which had been specifically prohibited by Prime Minister,Qavam at the
time central authority was restored. Subordinate officials of dishonest
reputation re-entered the local government; now, however, the government
is screening Azerbaijan's civil and gendarmerie officials in an effort
to improve the provincial administration.
Disturbances in Western Azerbaijan,
The western part of the province, predominantly a Kurdish area
containing many well-armed tribesmen, has been particularly unsettled.
The number of rifles and machine guns in Kurdish hands is variously es-
timated to be between 25,000 and 100,000; and although the tribes gener-
ally have expressed a desire to cooperate with the Central Government,
continued mutual distrust, engendered by long years of oppressive meas-
ures by the army and excesses on the part of both the tribes and the
government, makes them obviously a potential source of trouble. The
Iranian Army has thus far been unable to carry out the administration's
program for disarmament, and while leaders of the principal Kurdish
tribe e manifest some acquiescence in partial disarmament provided pro-
tection and fair treatment are promised them, little more than a token
surrender of arms is anticipated.
The western area has also suffered from extensive looting aid
pillaging, which followed the fall of the autonomous regime in the prov-
ince. Furthermore, the Iranian Army' has had great difficulty in subdu- ?
ing certain tribesmen who had collaborated with the "Kurdish Peoples Re-
public" (established under Soviet aegis in February 1946 and terminated
along with the autonomous government). These tribesmen include renegade
elements indigenous to the area and ,the Barzani Kurds, who fled from
Iraq to Iran in 1945 after the Iraqi Government had condemned their
leaders for rebellious activities. To !!J he Barzanis from Iran, .10'
Central Government military leaders found it necessary to augment their
force of 10,000 troops in southwestern Azerbaijan with heavily-armed
loyal tribesmen--a clear indication that the army alone is unable 'to
effect tribal disarmament.
Soviet Complicity
The broader implications of the deteriorating situation become
evident in the light of the USSR's proximity to Azerbeijan and in view
of the common Soviet practice of capitalizing on local difficulties.
When the autonomous regime collapsed, livestock, goods, and arms were
transported into Azerbaijan SSR by the discredited "Democrats" who are
still being harbored in adjacent Soviet territory, ready tools for fu-
ture Penetration of the unsettled province. Broadcasts from Soviet
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stations and underground radios are directed toward increasing the dis-
content among the population. Moreover, Soviet diplomatic representa-
tives are reported to have encouraged leaders of the Barzanis and-other
dissident elements in their resistance to the Iranian Army. Economic
pressures are constantly applied to Azerbaijan; the Soviets continue to
operate an illegal airline between Tabriz and Tehran, and they have
maintained demands upon the Central Government for exclusive air rights
covering Azerbaijan as well as other northern Iranian provinces. More-
over, they are applying increased pressure to secure Parliamentary ap-
proval for the formation of a mixed company to exploit the oil resources
in five northern provinces including most of Azerbaijan, tentatively
agreed to by Prime Minister Qavam in April 1946.
Internal instability facilitates Soviet intervention in Azer-
baijan's affairs as a first step toward including Iran in the fringe of
satellite governments it considers essential to Soviet security. The
loss of Azerbaijan, which would deprive Iran of one-fifth of its popu-
lation and cut off the source of almost one-quarter of its wheat, would
threaten Iran's independence. All these circumstances focus attention
on an area which possesses many elements of international dissension
and which has long been subject to Russian interference. '
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Azerbaijan's future will be greatly influenced by the atti-
tude of the Tehran Government toward the province's semi-nomadic tribes
and sedentary agrarian population, but it will be largely determined by
the relationship of Iran with the USSR.
The Direction of Soviet Activities.
From a military point of view, the USSR will continue to be
able to reoccupy Azerbaijan at will. The weakness of the Iranian Army,
attributable as much to low morale as to inadequate equipment, indicates
that, important as Azerbaijan is to Iran't independence, the government
cannot organize the province's defenses to offer even a delaying action
against direct Soviet attack. In the face of strong US foreign policy,
however, there is little likelihood that the USSR would risk the possi-
bility of disrupting the United Nations by taking unilateral military
action against Azerbaijan at present. Braving encountered the strong cen-
sure of world opinion when they delayed. withdrawalof Red Army troops and
having failed to rally popular support to their puppet regime, the So-
viets will, for the time being, probably restrict their activities in
Azerbaijan to economic pressure and political subversion. If the Soviet
oil agreement, as proposed, is approved by the Majlis, almost all of the
province will be open to exploration and development by Soviet petroleum
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technicians, and the USSR will undoubtedly use these privileges to fur-
ther its efforts to gain hegemony over Iran. -Similarly, if the persis-
tent Soviet demands for air rights in northern Iran are granted, Azer-
baijan will receive an additional influx of Communist agents in comer-
cial.guise. If these concessions are not granted or are ineffectual in
gaining Soviet aims, the USSR will probably intensify its efforts to
create friction or even warfare between tribes and army, or similar
serious disturbances which might, at an appropriate future time,
provide the Soviets with an excuse to intervene unilaterally, thus
presenting the United Nations with a fait accompli ,based on a claim
that Soviet security was in jeopardy.
The Iranian Course of Action
The prevailing sentiment among deputies-elect to the Majlis
is to refuse the USSR any and all concessions. The unpopularity of the
recent autonomous regime with an estimated 90% of the popula:tion does
not preclude the possibility of another Soviet-inspired, regime's gain-
ing power in an Azerbaijan subjected to intense subversive activities
among its dissatisfied tribal and non-tribal elements. Iran's best
defense against such activities would be to provide a better adminis-
tration, stimulate employment, and pursue a rational tribal policy.
While it is doubtful that sufficient action will be taken to improve
the government of the province, Tehran will undoubtedly attempt to im-
plement its economic development program, which contemplates extensive
public works improvements. Prime Minister Qavam and influential tribal
leaders will continue to work for the adoption of a moderate tribal pol-
icy, but will meet strong opposition from military leaders, who favor
disarmament of tribes by force and who have great influence with the
Shah. Unless the Shah can be induced to support peaceful settlement
of the tribal problem, the army's "blood and iron" policy is likely to
prevail. In such event, the relationship between tribes and government
will further deteriorate, probably developing into serious conflicts
abetted and encouraged by the Soviets. Although the tribes may re-
linquish a portion of their less serviceable weapons to the army at
this time, they will be in a position to oppose the government with
strong force as soon as the present heavy military concentration in
the area is reduced for the purpose of disarming the Qashgais 8,13A
'other southern tribes. It is more than likely that serious fighting'
will then, if not before, break out in the Kurdish area, where the
tribes"will undoubtedly be supported covertly and possibly openly by
the Soviets.
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APPENDIX "A"
GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMY
Topography
Azerbaijan's 32,500 square miles (comparable to the size of
Maine) are 'generally mountainous, with many wide valleys between the'
extended ranges. The principal topographic features are (1) the Aras
(Araxes) River valley and the Moghan Steppes, both in northern Azer-
baijan along the Soviet border; (2) the Zagros Mountains in western
Azerbaijan and the gara Dagh Mountains in the north; and (3) the basin
in western Azerbaijan formed by Lake Urmia, Iran's largest inland body
of water. The lofty mountain ranges which intersect the province's
high tablelands are the only strategic obstacles of consequence. Mod-
erately developed road and rail communications, together with well-
known mountain paths, make the whole of Azerbaijan comparatively ac-
cessible, except along the western frontier.
Communications
Road connections With the USSR consist of Azerbaijanis prin-
cipal highway, which extends south from Julfa through Tabriz and the
heart of the province; a second road from Julfa traversing western
Azerbaijan from north to south; a road south from Ararlan into north-
western Azerbaijan; and roads from Astara through Ardebil to Tabriz
and from Astara along the Caspian Sea to Pahlavi. The Russian-built
'5-foot gauge railway extending north from Tabriz is linked with the
Soviet rail network at Julfa, and southeastern Azerbaijan is served
by the standard-gauge Trans-Iranian Railway which runs north from
Tehran to Mianeh. The Central Government has projected completion of
this railway, which is to connect Mianah and Tabriz. Azerbaijan is
linked with Turkey by a road through Maku (in the northwestern corner
of the province), and with Iraq by a road which crosses the border
.southwest of Lake Urmia.
Agriculture'.
Azerbaijan has an essentially agricultural economy, and the
land provides 957 of the province's wealth. Azerbaijan contributes
more than its proportionate share of Iran's total agricultural produc-
tion. Although the province comprises but one-twentieth of Iran's to-
tal area, it produces nearly one-quarter of its wheat, together with
other important grain and fruit crops. The importance of Azerbaijan's
wheat may be judged by the events of 1942-43 when the USSR took all of
the normal surplus; bread riots broke out in Tehran, which theretofore
had received one-third of its annual wheat requirements from Azerbai-
jan, and importation of large grain supplies from Allied countries
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. was required to avert famine in parts of southern Iran. The USSR_fur-
nishes the largest and most profitable market for Azerbaijanis extens-
ive grape and apricot crops,. which could not be advantageously disposed
of elsewhere. .
Industry and Natural Resources
py Western standards the industrial output in Azerbaijan is
negligible since the greatest portion of manufactured goods is the
product of "home" economy. Tabriz factories, however, do produce half
of Iran's tanned leather and almost half ?of its matches. Development
of the provin6e's industry is hampered by clack of power sources; Diesel
motors furnish most of the industrial energy, and the USSR is a more
economical source of fuel for these motors than is southern Iran and
the Anglo-Iranian refineries.
Although there is some geological evidence to indicate the
possibility of oil deposits in this region, up to the present time
there has been no evidence proving the existence of oil in commercial
quantities. Similarly, other mineral resources have not been extens-
ively explored or developed. Deposits of molybdenum, copper, lead,
and zinc are known to exist along with arsenic, potash, salt, and
scattered deposits of coal, but at present only arsenic is being mined.
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APPENDIX "B"
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
Turki Elements
Of Azerbaijan's estimated population of 2,750,000 (which ap-
proximates that of Minnesota), the large majority speak Turki. Tartar
and Turk elements settled in Azerbaijan in the Middle Ages, introduced
the Turkish language, and stamped the population with many of its pres-
ent characteristics. ? Few Turki peoples have maintained tribal Organi-
zations; of these the Shahsevans,? who number approximately- 100,000 and
inhabit the northeastern section of the province, are the most import-
ant. .Unlike many of the Kurdish tribes, they are not expected to be-
come a source of serious trouble because of their traditional loyalty
to the Shah which was recently manifested by their aiding the Iranian
Army in its recent campaign against the autonomous regime. .
Kurdish Elements
Azerbaijan's Kurds number some 300,000 and represent half of
the Kurdish peoples in all Iran. From time to time there has been some
agitation for the formation of a Kurdish National State among Iranian
Kurds and the approximately 2,500,000 Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria,
but tribal fragmentation has operated against the success of such move-
ments, which have been rigorously suppressed by the respective govern-
ments. Kurds in Azerbaijan, who speak a language related to the Persian-
Indo-Germanic group, are divided into numerous tribes and sub-tribes
which undergo a constant process of disintegration and reformation. They
have been brought under government control only by pressure of arms,
electing rather to follow the leadership of their preferred chieftains.
Qazi Muhammad, president of the Soviet-inspired "Kurdish Peoples Repub-
lic", was unable to effect a unin,of the tribes ard found himself con-
strained to a small area around Mehabad. After failing to get continued
support from the USSR or encouragement from other Kurdish peoples, he was
quickly divested of his following when the Iranian Army moved into Azer-
baijan'at the close of 1946. Me permitted himself to be used as a Soviet
"stooge" in his desire to further the Kurdish case as he conceived it,
but before the collapse of Azerbaijan he had promised allegiance to and
support of the Central Government. Nevertheless, he and a number of his
supporters were executed by the army, although the government has not
taken similar action against Djavid, Shabostari, and other non-tribal
key figures in the Azerbaijan movement. Ammar Khan, chief of the pow-
erful ShikkakT,urds, is perhaps the most influential tribal leader in
Azerbaijan today. Ie and Rashid Beg, paramount Harki Bard chieftain,
have assisted the Iranian Army in subduing rebellious tribal elements
and, at the same time, have conducted negotiations with the government
regarding tribal disarmament. As long as the tribes keep their extens-
ive arms, they will be a potential source of trouble; and they will cer-
tainly not submit themselves peacefully to disarmament until the govern-
ment gives convincing evidence of pursuing a more liberal tribal policy.
- 12 - SET
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4C430?
Christian Minorities
Assyrians and Armenians in Azerbaijan create a minority prob-
lem because of their religion and the recent cooperation of some of
their number with the autonomous regime. Persecutions flaring up in
February of this year were reported to be of political rather than re-
ligious inspiration. The Assyrians number between 10,000 and 15,000,
while the Armenians are twice as numerous.: The latter have never been
well integrated with the rest of the population, and many have suc-
cumbed to recent Soviet inducements to migrate to Armenian SSR. In
1946 an estimated 5,000 Armenians moved to the Soviet Union, and re-
Sports indicate in some instances that all expenses for the journey
were borne by the Soviets.
The Central Government's past performances in dealing with
tribal and minority problems do not suggest that an early solution to
the present difficulties will be reached. Tribal administration .has
traditionally been a function of the army, which has employed tempor-
izing military action rather than a constructive, far-sighted policy
in dealing with unrest among the tribal peoples. Soviet agents turned
this situation:to their advantage during the autonomous movements, and
will dpubtless continue to encourage the discontent of Azerbaijan's
tribes.
C ?
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44 46 4 50
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. 44 .. 46
.... ????:.:1 .... ''''''''
.........
... .....
50
40
38
36
34
Primary Roads
Railroads
Tribal Areas
46
48
50 ma ? 650
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CIS