CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002800090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 February 1947 COPY No. 22
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
THE GREEK SITUATION *
The strife in Greece today is the outgrowth of longstanding
political differences, accentuated by Soviet-inspired interference and
an internal economy severely disrupted during the war? So bitter have
these differences become that for months past antigovernment forces
under Communist leadership have been conducting intensive guerrilla
warfare. Furthermore, although the Populist Party group now in power
won an over-all majority in the general elections of 31 March 1946,
the governmentJlas been severely criticized, not only in the free
Greek press, but also by opposition groups, represented in Parliament.
The consistent failure of Tsaldaris to offer these Parliamentary groups
genuine and responsible participation in a united Greek government(ex-
cluding the extreme leftists, not represented in Parliament) has ob-
structed the recovery of economic and political stability in Greece.
Opposition leaders, too, have been unwillingto compromise their dif-
ferences with the Taaldaris government. ;Unless both sides prove more
amenable, there is danger that a large section of the Greek populace
composed of political moderates will succumb in disillusionment:to the
persistent tactics of Soviet propaganda and follow the lead oftheex-
treme leftists,
. Such a development would be in line with Soviet policy in
Greece and. would 'constitute an important steptowardsthe-attainment
of,the immediate Soviet objective of_anLindependentMaCedonia and of
the ultimate Soviet objective of the creation ,of,a,Comnunist:Greece.
With. the realization of this ultimate alm,_(1).,,the Soviets would gain
control of the Aegean and the approaches to the Dardanelles;. (2)their
dominance of the Balkans would be complete; and (3) they would achieve
a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking
Turkey, threatening the Suez Canal, and endangering the -polities, of .
.the Near East.-
? Although this report was prepared prior to the recent change in the
Greek government, CIG considers-that the conclusions,are still valid,
except as amended by the note on.page 3. The intelligence ,agencies ?
of the State and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces have con-
curred in this report. Comments by therqntelligence Division of the
War Department are contained in Enclosure "139 hereto. ,
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The Soviets will not openly pursue their objectives to the
point of precipitating an early major conflict. They will continue to
work through their satellites (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) to
intensify the dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece by providing clan-
destine aid to Greek leftists, disseminating propaganda against the
Rightist Greek government, opposing the retention of British troops in
Greece, and maintaining troops along the northern borders as a psycho-
logical threat.
If Greece is to be the free country which the majority of the
population and the Western Powers desire, the Greeks must counter these
tactics. Before, they can do this, however, they must achieve general
internal stability. In this matter they can do much themselves, but
they will also need outside aid. The British are re-arming, re-equip-
ping, enlarging, and reorganizing the Greek army to make it capable of
suppressing guerrilla activities and preserving order. Furthermore,
the presence of British troops in Greece, especially at strategic
Salonika, acts as a deterrent to more direct interference- by the sat-
ellites and also prevents the leftist guerrilla bands from controlling
the northern part of the country.
The US Economic Mission and 'the Security Council Investigat-
ing Commission are assembling in-Greece to make their studies. The
Economic Mission will submit a plan for the rehabilitation of the Greek
economy and may also indicate that further financial aid is needed- from
the-United States. Such assistance, however,-cannot be. efficiently, ap-
plied by the Greek government as now constituted, The Security ouncil
Commission is unlikely to find sufficient evidence to indict the satel-
lite states for interference in Greek affairs.- -During its investigation,
nevertheless, guerrilla operations (at least,in,the border areas) will.
probably decrease, and tne country should -experience a periodofcompar-
ative,calm. The Greeks will thus have an opportunity to make 4 start
along the, road to general-recovery by workinUontheiteconomic problems,
speeding up military reorganization, and composing-their
ferences.
The most-urgent reqUirement is the formation of .a broader gov-
ernment., No program of reconstruction can be effectively implemented by
a government subjected to constant Parliamentary attack as well as the
undermining tactics of: extreme leftist elements. Unless the Tsaldaris
Cabinet and opposition groups in Parliament make a sincere and whole-
hearted effort to form a workable coalition with other groups .(which
seems unlikely except under strong pressure from the Western Powers),
Greece will not be able to achieve the stability, necessary to thwart
the tactics and aims of the USSR.
A complete analysis of the situation in Greece is contained
in Enclosure "A" hereto.
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TOP SECRET
NOTE
After this study of the Greek situation had been completed,
Tsaldaris finally gave in to the strong demands that he relinquish the
Premiership, and on 24 January a new government was sworn in with all-
Parliamentary parties participating except the Liberal Party of Themis-
tocles Sophoulis. The new government is thus a coalition and -controls
86% of the votes in Parliament; without. Sophoulis, however, it remains
a government of rightist groups. Tsaldaris was replaced as Prime Min-
ister by Demetrios Maximos, a banker and former (1933-35) Foreign Min--
ister. Although associated with the right and. with the King, he is not
closely affiliated with any party. He was the only man available under
whom all party leaders except Sophoulis were willing to serve.
Barring a financial crisis (always possible in Greece's pres-
ent unstable economy), it seems probable that the Maximos government
will last at least long enough to present a united front during the Se-
curity Council Commission's investigation of alleged border violations,
and the Porter Mission's survey of the economic situation in Greece.
Cabinet leaders are aware, moreover, that any loan which the Porter
Mission might recommend would hardly be made by the United States to a
government lacking bona- fide representation-and unity. If Constantin
Rendis should take over the leadership of the Liberal Party from the
aged and ailing Sophoulis, the former might bring into the government
some less radical members of that Party. The addition of this liberal
element to the Cabinet, in which all the moderate rightist groups are
already represented, would broaden and strengthen the government.:
Newspapers of the left and center continue,to attack the new
government as a weak, ultra-conservative compromise, but Maximos is ap-
parently-sincere in his promises of pacification and political reform.
He has declared that he intends to release all women and children polit-
ical prisoners, grant amnesty to and even protection for guerrillas who
lay down their arms within a stated period, and disarm all illegal bands,
including rightists. Such a program, if carried out, should not only
prolong the life of the government, but should also bring about a greater
measure of unity in Greece than has existed since the liberation, thus
paving the way for general recovery.
- 3 - TOP SECRET
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ENCLOSURE "A"
THE GREEK SITUATION
INTRODUCTION
General. Today Greece is virtually in a state of civil war.
Left wing elements, opposed to the rightist government and to the mon-
archist regime, and receiving clandestine aid from the Soviet-satellite
states of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, are carrying out intensive
guerrilla operations, especially in the border areas.* The guerrilla
activities have reached such proportions that the Greek army finds it
difficult to suppress them. This situation marks the culmination of
long-standing differences between the various political factions of the
left and right which became violent during the period of Axis occupation
and have not been resolved since the liberation.
Early evidence of the international aspect of the Greek
troubles was supplied by local clashes along the Albanian border which
began in March 1945. In August 1946 the Ukrainian delegate protested
to the Security Council in behalf of Albania (not a member of the UN)
against alleged Greek violations of the border. The USSR, however,
vetoed the suggestion that a commission be sent to investigate border
difficulties.
Following the rightist victory in the Greek Parliamentary elec-
tions of 31 March 1946, in which the extreme leftist elements did not
vote, guerrilla activities in Northern Greece began to assume serious
proportions. They increased in violence after the plebiscite of 1 Sep-
tember 1946, which recalled King George II to Greece. Insisting that
the troubles were largely inspired from outside, Constantin Tsaldaris,
Premier. and Minister for Foreign Affairs, finally decided to go to New
York and complain to the Security Council of foreign interference in
Greek internal affairs.
Greece and the UW. On 3 December the Greek appeal was pre-
sented in a letter to the, Secretary General of the United Nations. The
letter was accompanied by a memorandum containing details of incidents
with supporting photographs. It requested the Security Council to in-
vestigate a situation "which is leading to friction between Greece and
her neighbors, by reason of the fact that the latter are lending their
support to the violent guerrilla warfare now being waged in northern
Greece against public order and the territorial integrity" of Greece.
* See map accompanying this report.
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The letter claims that aid from abroad is being given to guer-
illa bands in Western Macedonia and that the war is being supported by
OF (the Slav National Liberation Front), an organization which has for
ts aim the expansion of Yugoslav Macedonia to the Aegean Sea. It fur-
her claims that insurgents (Slav-speaking Greek nationals, fugitives
rom justice, and "anarchists") are trained at Buljkes in Yugoslavia and
hen, under the protection of frontier guards, are returned to Greece to
oin insurgents already there. The letter also contains allegations that
ertain-statements have been made which indicate that these activities
ave the official support of the Yugoslav government. Although the main
eight of the Greek appeal is thus directed against Yugoslavia, Albania
d Bulgaria are also held responsible for their allegecipart in the af-
air.
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The Security Council opened its examination of the Greek ap-
al on 10 December. During the sessions, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bul-
ria all made counter-charges, accusing Greece of violating their bor-
ers. They also denied any responsibility for the present unrest in
reece and claimed that the trouble lay in attempts by the Tsaldaris
overnment to coerce and terrorize the Greek people. The USSR member,
drei Gromyko, repeated these counter-charges and added that one main
ause ?tall the troubles was the presence of foreign (i.e., British)
roops in Greece.
On the 19th of December the Council unanimously decided to
Ispatch an investigating commission, not later than 15 January 1947,
to ascertain the facts relating to the alleged border violations ,
long the frontiers." The Commission has a mandate to visit any part
f Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and consists of one rep-
esentative of each member of the 1947 Security Council.; with technical
ssistants. It is empowered tequestion government officials and pri-
ate citizens. The Soviet and UK members of the Security Council; who
ere over-ruled, both indicated their preference'that the investigation
e confined to border areas. The Commission's task will probably be
e more difficult by the efforts of those to whom' guilt might be at-
ached to-cover up damaging evidence. There have been reports, for
xample, that the training camp at Buljkes,.in Yugoslavia, is being
roken up.
LITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Political. After seven months of 'resistance to 'Italian and
ater,to'German forces, organized Greek operations against the Axis
eased on 1 June 1941. ? On this date, King George II and? a makeshift
abinet headed by Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsoi,ideros; formed-in-April
n Athens; 'went 'into exile; The various puploet'Overnment'sik"up in
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Greece by the occupation forces had np influence on the people, who
soon formed underground resistance groups. The leftist ,EAM (National
Liberation Front), with its own army ELAS (National Popular Army of
Liberation), became the, largest of these groups by systematically
eliminating other groups until the only remaining one of .any conse-
quence was the Conservative EDES (National Democratic Greek Army).
EAM Was dominated by KKE (Greek Communist Party). By stressing patri-
otic motives and with the advantage of a well-integrated organization,
the Communists succeeded at first in enlisting the support of many lib-
erals and republicans and even some of the clergy and royalists who saw
in EAM the best means of resisting the common :enemy. .The main object-
ive of EDES was also expulsion of the enemy: it soon crystallized, how-
ever, into a wholly rightist, royalist organization which before. long
came into open conflict with the much larger anti-royalist ELAS forces.
? Although the resistance groups fought over their differences,
which'were accentuated by German propaganda, all except EDES and ,a- few
minor-groups had in common their dislike of the Tsouderos government and
the King. Most Greeks had not forgotten the King's violation of-the con-
stitution in condoning a dictatorship. Differences between the Govern-
ment-in-Exile and the underground forces-Of resistance grew steadily.
In the summer of 1943, representatives of EAM and other resistance
groups, including EDES, visited Cairo, where the government Was, then
established, in an unsuccessful effort to secure representation in the
government for the underground forces and to obtain from the King.a
promise not to return to Greece until the people had had an opportunity
to express their wishes on the matter by plebiscite.
Shortly thereafter, EAM formed in Greece a Political Committee
of National Liberation-(PEEA) to counteract- and, dispute the authority of
the:Government7in7Exile. The persistent refusal of the King and his
Cabinet to form a coalition government had led togeneraldissatisfac-
tion and eventuallyeven to serious mutinies in the Greek armed forces
in the Middle East. Finally the British, who had consistently supported
the King and the government, assisted in the suppression of the mutinies
and installed as Prime Minister the anti-EAM George" Papandreou. Papan-
dreou get out to form a coalition as agreed upon in May 1944 in Lebanon',
where representatives of all important resistance groups from inside
Greece had met with the Government-in-,Exile: Three membersotPEEA, and
two Communists joined theCabinet. In September, the new government.
moved from Cairo to Caserta, Italy, and there in a formal'agreement re-
ceived assurances of collaboration from EAM and EDES, who placed them-
selves under the orders of the Commander of the British forces. in Greece.
The government entered-Athens?on 19 October,1944- ?
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With the aid 'of the newly appointed-British:Commander,:the
government then tried to reorganize the Greek army, which would involve
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the demobilization of all guerrilla organizations in accordance with
the Caserta Agreement. EAM was strongly opposed to this move, being
reluctant to give up its power and feeling that the government was
trying to make the army a mere royalist tool by purging it of anti-
royalist elements. Disagreement became bitter, and early in December
the Communist and EAM ministers resigned from the Cabinet. A few days
later, fighting (for which ELAS had long been preparing) broke out in
the streets of Athens, and British troops gave armed support to the
established government. On Christmas Day, Prime Minister Churchill.,
went to Athens in an effort.to resolve the difficulties. After his,
return to England, he persuaded King George II to appoint Archbishop
Damaskinos as Regent, and the King himself promised not to return to .
Greece until a plebiscite on the constitution had been held.
General Plastiras, an anti-royalist, was selected as Premier
by the Regent. He formed a new government, which drew up an agreement
with EAM at Varkiza, near Athens, in February 1945. This agreement,
provided, among other things, for an end to martial law, an amnesty .
for political offenders, reorganization of the army, demobilization
of ELAS, and a plebiscite on the monarchy, to be held in 1945. Tle
plebiscite was to be followed as soon as possible by,Parliamentary,
elections, to which the "great Allied powers" would be requested to
send observers.
Although the disarming of ELAS began at once, many members
retained their best weapons, and large numbers of them fled to the
hills. A few members and many sympathizers, dissatisfied by.EAM's
refusal to abide by the letter and spirit of theyarkiza Agreement
and angered or disillusioned by ELAS excesses, went over to the roy-
alist camp. It had become apparent to many Greeks who had supported
EAM during the occupation as the best means of combatting the COMM0,1,1 ,
enemy, that the organization was now concerned solely 'with its own,.
narrow political interests and that its aim was with that,
of its dominant member group, KKE (the Greek Communist Party): namely,
to establish a Communist regime in Greece oriented towards,the Soviet .
Union. From there on, EAM began to lose many of its non-extremist
members.
Various cabinet permutations followed during the next few,
months. Contentions on the proposed Parliamentary elections-and the
plebiscite became so bitter that Regent Damaskinos, after visiting
the Greek King in England in the autumn of 1945, announced that the
elections would beheld before the plebiscite rather than after, as
had been stipulated in the Varkiza Agreement. There was also consid-
erable disagreement,on the general amnesty demandedfby,EAM to/include
the approximately 18,000 prisoners held in detention,campa.y,.,Under
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British guidance, the Regent experimented with several governments.
Bach, however, was short-lived during this transitional period before
the elections, partly because none was willing to modify its own nar-
row interests for the sake of effective coalition.
On 31 March 1946, the elections were held. EAM realized that
because of continued defections, it could not substantially influence
the vote, and consequently abstained. The royalist right wing, domi-
nated by the Populist Party, won an over-all majority of 234 seats out
of a total 354. The National Political Union (a coalition group right
of center.) won 69 seats; the Liberal Party (anti-royalist and center)
on 48; independents won the remaining 3. The Populist Party formed .a
royalist Cabinet under Constantin Tsaldaris.
Although the main political issue in Greece is the Communist-
extreme rightist conflict, it is apparent from these election results
that there are various shades of opinion within the limits of the chief
issue. Of .the numerous groups, parties, and associatidns inside and
outside Parliament, some can boast considerable .support; others are
merely "name parties" headed by ambitious politicians who have managed
to enlist a few followers. Among most of the parties there is general
agreement on such large objectives as the restoration Of the national
economy (which, they agree, can be achieved only with foreign financial
aid) and the fulfillment of territorial ambitions, which include North-
ern Epirus (now part. of Albania), a strategic strip on the Bulgarian
border, and the Dodecanese Islands. Such agreement, however, does not
extend to the ways and means of accomplishing them, and the many fac-
tions seem unwilling to compromise their differences and *OA tOgether
_ .
for the common good.
It is superfluous to list all the political parties, groupings,
arNi associations existing in Greece at any given moment. Many of them
grow like mushrooms and die as quickly. (A Washington report earlier
this year spoke of the number of Greek parties in existence "as of Mon-
day".) The parties or organizations, however, fall more or less into
five main groups:
1. The extreme right, consisting of conservative and
royalist parties. Their chief aim is to perserve the Greek
constitutional monarchy, patterned after the British, .but
there is also a strong tendency within this group to return
to a totalitarian, Metaxist regime. Prime Minister Tsal-
daris' Populist Party belongs to the extreme right.
? 2. The moderate right, consisting of conservative Oar=
ties with &republican outlook. Although their avowed pur-
pose is to re7establish 'the Republic, they acquieeded ih the
'people's verdict for a monarchy, as expressed in the plebi-
scite of 1 September 1946
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3. The center, composed of liberals and progressives.
They conceded the royalist victory detided by the plebiscite,
but will continue to work for re-establishment of the Repub-
lic.
4. The moderate left, which has seceded from EAM. This
group, which is small, cooperated with the extreme left in ab-
staining from the elections and refuses to recognize the re-
sults of the plebiscite.
5. The extreme left, coniisting of the several parties
which make up EAM and dominated by KKE (Greek Communist Party).
It aims to make Greece a Communist state oriented towards the
USSR.
'When the plebiscite was held on 1 September, there were no ab-
stentions for political reasons, and 68.3% of the voters favored the con-
tinuation of the monarchy. This large majority does not mean that the
Greeks had forgiven King George for past misdeeds; it was, rather, due
to the desPerate conviction that his return.to'the throne would provide
a core of resistance to the extreme leftists, whose purpose of achieving
full control of Greece had become more and more manifest ever since Var-
kiza. In 1936 the alleged menace of Communism had brought about a total-
itarian government in Greece. Now, ten years later almost to the day,
the people of Greece, most of whom assuredly did not want him, voted for
the return of their King,
Economic. Greece emerged from the war and occupation with her
national economy severely ditrupted.. CropAtOduCtion-?Upon which this
primarily agricultural country heavily depends, was far below minimum
needs. Industrial equipment had been ruined or lost, and-the continued
lack of such equipment is preventing a return to normal production.
Transportation was in &particularly bad state;,roads,were,. and con-
tinue to be, in an appalling State of disrepair; rail communications
and rolling stock were damaged and.dettroyed; most of the merchant fleet
had been sunk; and harbor facilities, espeaially at the chief ports of
Piraeus and Salonika, were largely destroyed..
To complicate the conditions cauged. by these difficulties, the
Greek government has been unable to prevent inflation and the flight of
capital abroad; nor it it in a position to recapture private investments
abroad.
?
The Greek people, furthermore, are suffering from malnutrition
and disease; almost half 'a million, according to some estimates, died of
starvation during the occupation. And worst of all, perhaps, political
factionalism of the most bitter kind was still rampant on the day of
liberation and grew worse.
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These difficulties have united to cause the virtual destruc-
tion of Greece's foreign trade. Nor can it revive without more stable
political conditions and greater financial aid from abroad to rebuild
the industrial machine, help feed and clothe the people, and re-estab-
lish confidence in Greek currency.
UNRRA has contributed heavily toward the general reconstruc-
tion of Greece. The greater Part of an allotment of $420,000,000,
chiefly of US origin, had already been applied by the end of 1946. The
US has extended a Surplus Property Credit of $45,000,000, together with
an Export-Import Bank loan:of $25,000,000,. and the Federal Reserve Bank
has extended short-term loans secured by Greece's gold holdings with the
Bank. The US Maritime Commission has granted a credit of $45,000,000
for the purchase of ships to replace Greece's lost tonnage. The British
have extended credits, and the Turks have .given and sold small shipments
of food. Collection of war reparations would also help to.eXpedite re-
construction. .
Additional measures which would contribute to the.economic re-
covery of Greece. include the following.:
1. Stimulation of export trade.
Increased domestic production of essential commodities.
3. Currency stabilization.
,
4. Foreign loans, carefully circumscribed by the lenders
in order to prevent uneconomic use by the Greeks, and invest-
ments of foreign capital.
5. Reduction of non-productive government expenditures,
which would make funds available for reconstruction.
6. Control and effective utilization of foreign exchange
acquired by the national economy.
,
7. Government reforms in administration and taxation.
8. Planned conservation of national resources.
9. Restoration of communications facilities, including
roads, rail lines, and harbors. ,Rolling stock and the,mer-
chant fleet must also be restored.
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1,(0.0wruKti
1
THE CURRENT SITUATION
Political confusion and strife (complicated by Soviet-inspired
interference) and a depleted economy are major factors making for insta-
bility in Greece today and are, therefore, largely responsible for the
intensive guerrilla activities especially prevalent in the northern parts
of the country. (See attached map.)
The guerrilla bands are of various types, the most numerous and
active being those of the. Communist extreme left. . Control and organiza-
tion of these extremist guerrilla bands is exercised principally by two
associations: _EAM (National Liberation Front), still dominated by its
most powerful member, KKE (Greek Communist Party)..; and NOF (the Slav Na-
tional Liberation Front). Other leftist bands, associated to some ex-
tent with EAM but non-Communist, operate more or less independently,
though aided by the organizations named because they, too, are fighting
against the rightist, monarchist government. There are also anarchists,
intimidated peasants, and fugitives from justice, whose purposes are not
political and who are raiding and looting siMply-as,a means of keeping
alive or because of dissatisfaction with conditions in general.: Member-
ship in any particular group, far from being confined to one type Of4n-
surgent, frequently includes men of varying_shades,of,political:ppinion
(or of none inparticular) who have been recruited by, or have.Voluritar-
ily decided to join, one leader or another. . ?
These various types of insurgents are very efficient for spor-
adic fighting; they descend from the mountains, from which it is diffi-
cult to evict them, to raid, pillage, and destroy, and return to their
hiding pliCes when the job is done. Their field,leaders,hold.the power
of life and death over them and demand complete obedience. There are
also rightist bands in existence, their chief activities consisting of
reprisals for murder, theft, and destruction wrought by the far more
numerous guerrilla bands of the opposite political wing. The government
has been bitterly assailed by leftists for not suppressing these right-
ist bands.
There is a considerable amount of evidence that many of the
insurgents have been trained, indoctrinated, armed, and equipped at
various camps beyond the Greek borders. Infiltration into Greece of
such insurgents is believed to have begun as far back as last march,
following a speech delivered at a camp at Buljkes (in Voyvodina, north-
west of Belgrade) by Nicholas Zachariades, the Greek Communist leader.
Camps are also alleged to have existed in Korca,(Koritsa) in Albania
and at Mandritsa and other points in Bulgaria.: The majority, if not
all, of the, insurgents trained at these camps,,how0er,,oiiginaliy
came fronvGreece-
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The insurgents have a variety of arms,- including Sten guns;
mortars, mines, machine guns, rifles, and grenades. Some of 'these
items have been stolen from Greek stores; other's are part of the stock
provided the Greeks by the British during the war. Italian, German,
and Soviet arms, probably left over from the war, have also been re-
ported. 'There is some evidence, too, that UNRRA supplies, including
food, clothing, and transport vehicles, have been used to assist the ?
insurgents while they are ?outside Greece.
Apparently the immediate objective of the rebels ii to cut
off Macedonia from the rest of Greece. To this end, they halie'seohceh-
trated on driving government forces (army and gendarmerie) and rightist
bands south of a. line from Mt. Grammoe On the Albanian border to Mt:
aympus near the Aegean Sea. (See map.) These' operationa have ?
achieved ?a Measure Of success, but most Of the key 'areas 'and' dOirmuhiCeiL-
tions facilities north of the line remain under government control,' riot-
ably the Salonika district, where. British troops are-atationed:''''"..=:
? A-recent recrudescence of guerrilla' Wartare in the felOpon;::'
nesus may have been staged by leftists to create the linPretifOn abroad
that the fighting in Greece is not confined 'to 'border areas and is' of
purely internal character rather than foreign-inspired. Meanwhile,
non-fighting political sympathizers are doing their utmost, through
propaganda in the press and elsewhere, to weakenthe government.1-''.
SOVIET POLICIES AND POSSIBLE GREEK COUNTERMEASURES ?
Under Soviet direction, Greece'd: nOrthern neighbora-Yugb
slavia, Bulgaria, and Albania-,-are conducting Af,driVeTwhich'prealimably
has for its .fitltimate objective the establiehrnent-Ol'a CoMmuniat'Greeca.
Slort of this 'supreme goal, there are leas 'th-astie objectIves WhiCh'ex.:e
Important :because they admit of 'more immediate achievement 'SO-
'lets appear-determined to prevent the expansion of GreeCe thraiigh-cterri-
torial revisions at the expense of Albania?and Bulgaria?''' SO tar' theY'-'
have been :sucCessful, since the Council 'of FOtergh:Miriietdre haa? hot
recognized Greek claims for boundary changes.' (2) 'In. 'the hope Of:bring-
ing about a -Greek government less unsympathetic to the liSSR,'?the'?SOViets
Will seek to Weaken and discredit the present .rightist/ rOYalist reiVerrk-
tent by pronfoting insurgent activities in Greecai Accomplishinent;:df-z
this end would constitute an important step towards the:lultiinate, goal.
(3) Present' guerrilla activities and propaganda indicate' that "the SO2z'. a
'lets hope to .create an independent Macedonia-whiCh' May eVezitilall.ir
become part-!'cit the' Yugoslav Federation, and liosisiblY ,to' add- Gre'ek
Thrace to- 'Bulgaria. If s suc des s fill; the' USSR. voiild? -bbtain!-'dOntror'ttit?
Aegean port 83: thus gaining a dominant ' pds t on 1113' the/taps:1'i -Sea:7161C tn. c>=''-'3
outflanking. the Dardanelles. ,! tc
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In line with their usual policy, the Soviets may also be ex-
pected to use Greek instability and the presence of Communist elements
in Greece as bargaining power to obtain desirable concessions elsewhere
in the world at future international conferences.
'Should Greece eventually become a Communist state: (1) the
Soviets would be able to consolidate and extend the gains in the Aegean
which control of Macedonia and Thrace would give them; (2) their domi-
nance of the Balkans would be complete; (3) they would achieve a stra-
tegic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking Turkey,
threatening the Suez Canal, and endangering the polities of the Near East.
The Soviets, however, will not in the immediate future pursue
these objectives to the point of precipitating a major conflict. They
will concentrate on intensifying the present dissatisfaction and unrest
in Greece. To accomplish this purpose, they will provide clandestine
aid to Greek leftists through their satellites, disseminate propaganda
to discredit the government, continue to oppose the retention of British
troops in Greece, and exert psychological pressure by retaining troops
along the northern borders. (Some of these tactic's may be.prejudiced
and temporarily abandoned during the Security Council's investigation
in the area.)
The extent to which the Greeks can counter these tactics:de-
pends on the degree of general internal stability they can achieve.
Although leftist elements, and through them the Soviets,. appear to be
responsible for much of the chaos prevalent today, great responsibility
also attaches to the refusal of Populist leaders to form a broader gov-
ernment,-honestlyrimplement an effective political amnesty, introduce
administrative reforms necessary for an efficient program of economic
recovery, and adopt a less intolerant attitudegenerally. The Govern-
ment was chosen by the Greek people (althoughjearand disillusionment
may have prompted many of them to vote as they.did):; the extreme:right
won a 'victory in the elections, and the plebiscite:committed the coun-
try to a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, legitimate Parliamen-
tary groups (whose leaders are also to be blamed for their unwilling-
ness to compromise their differences with the Tsaldaris government in
favor of unity during a critical period) are sufficiently strong to em-
barrass:the government seriously and even to jeopardize its efficiency
as a working organization. The uncompromising attitude of the Tsaldaris
Cabinet and the fact that 34% of the seats in Parliament are.not.held.by
the extreme right, serve to justify the demandsof-the opposition for a
broader government. Unless the government liberalizes its general poli-
cies and heeds these requests, some political moderates who composes.
large section of the population may become sodisillusionedas eventu-
ally to succumb to. the persistent Soviet propagandev*emanating from abroad
and given prominence in certain sections of the free Greek press, and to
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9711 01 11,9,4.,
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follow the lead of the extreme leftists. By instituting suitable re-
forms within its own ranks, however, the government could win substan-
tial support from these moderates and thus reduce the potentialities
of the extreme leftists and to a great extent nullify the effect of
Soviet propaganda.
The Soviets are constantly protesting against the presence
of British occupation forces in Greece. The present government, re-
membering how British troops in December 1944 prevented a leftist
minority from seizing the government by force, relies too heavily on
the continued presence of the British, feeling that in the event of
another such attack, British troops will come to its defense. It ac-
cordingly has not seen any urgent necessity for compromising with other
political groups and extending Cabinet positions to them.
Early evacuation of the British troops, however, would produce
intensified strife and instability in Greece. The mere presence 'Of the
troops, particularly 0 strategic Salonika, acts as a deterrent to more
direct interference by the satellites and also keeps the leftist guer-
rillas from gaining control of the northern part of the country. 'Fur-
thermore, a British Military Mission is supervising the reorganization
of the Greek army into small, self-contained commanao units designed to
quell guerrilla disorders within the country. As part of this program,
the Mission is continuing to supply modern arms and equipment; it i&
also increasing the size of the army from 84,000 to 99,000, and has
made plans for an even greater expansion.
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Two foreign missions are assembling in Greece to inveetigate
certain aspects of its difficulties. The US Economic Mission, headed
by Paul Porter (former chief of the Office of Price Administration),
will study Greek reconstruction needs with a view to determining the
extent to which they can be met by the Greeks themselves and the amount
of foreign economic aid necessary for rehabilitation. The Security
Council's Investigating Commission will examine the Greek government's
allegation that Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have interfered in
Greece's internal affairs.
Although Greece cannot achieve political or economic stabil-
ity without foreign aid, the success of any program of recovery depends
in large part upon the Greek government itself. The Porter Economic
Mission will submit a detailed plan for putting the country's economy
on a sounder basis, and it may also indicate that Greece needs further
financial help. Such assistance, however, cannot be efficiently applied
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4sernimmer rt
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TOP CRET
,ogards national recovery by a government which is under constant at-
not only by the extreme left but also by more moderate groups
44)e '!4.011stitutionally represented in Parliament.
La*
Investigation by the Security Council Commission, to commence
Jvcia4 Athens at the end of January, will be hampered by winter conditions
well as the difficulty of digging out evidence which will have been
:gdden before the Commission's arrival. It may turn up enough evidence
71C,011? 191-:windict such an agency as the Balkan organization NOF (Slav National
,Auberation Front),fOr having fomented internal Greek.strife. The possi-
Vntthilroity is remote, however, that the evidence will be sufficient to impli-
i eit143taie the Soviet satellite governments beyond charging:that they acquiesced
eriJortivt
?inborder violations and took no active steps to prevent them.
' ?
Regardless of the Commission's findings and recommendations,
'!f7 internecine .:'strife in the border areas should decrease and the country
illenej.m,404d be'cOitipatatively tranquil during the course of the investigation.
"t-;-ich a peridd'Of relative quiet would provide an opportunity for Greek
410,1iii ;Parliamentary groups to begin settling their political differences; a
ItImailifsprograth of economic recovery could then be developed, and military reor-
omm.,. ;pulization could be speeded up for.pacification of the country. It is
wnot.
10i9eJ 141- olikely, however, that the Tsaldaris Cabinet, except Under strong pres-
sure by the Western POwers, will take full advantage of the opportunity
iaelM erf4 md open its ranks to representatives of other groups, thus abandoning
its narrow, legalistic thesis that the Populist group alone has been
ncLq oals
ehmo_ Oven a mandate to govern. The formation of a government of national
1 unity (excluding the extreme left, which is not represented in Parlia-
tent) would be a great step toward stability. Complete,unity cannot be
adakEIOR4 expected, perhaps, but a government much broader than the present one
is attainable. .Unless such a step is taken, civil strife will probably
,
be intensified, and Greece will be unable to achieve the stability nee-
8 (as.119:2 nsary to thwart the tactics and aims of the USSR.
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Lionf
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ENCLOSURE "B"
COMMENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
, The Intelligence Division of theWar Department concurs.
in substantial measure with the subject report but notes a contin-'
uous emphasis which, it is believed, may be seriously misleading
The geneial,tone of the, paper, despite isolated statements in the
contrary sense, attributes to the Leftists., and particularly the
Leftistiaands, a strength and national character which they lack.
Concurreritly, the paper places in question the representative
character;and competence of the Rightist parties or leaders to
an extent1v#Iich does not correspond to known facts, particularly.
the resOlts of the recent elections.
r't
- 16 ?-;
'41;;Ait01.10.
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THE ENCLOSED MAP WAS PREPARED AS AN
ATTACHMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTEL?
LIGENCE RESEARCH REPORT, OCL-4197, SUBJECT:
"SURVEY OF REPORTED INCIDENTS IN THE NORTH?
ERN GREEK BORDER AREAS", DATED DECEMBER 16,
1946, DISTRIBUTED BY THE OFFICE OF INTELLI?
GENCE COORDINATION AND LIAISON, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
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