CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002800030009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 6, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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ORE 1/1
.6. January 1947
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP-
REVISED SOVIET TACTICS
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
TOP
COPY NO. 31
Indications of a Change in Soviet Tactics
1. The USSR has apparently decided that for the time being. more
subtle tactics should be:employed in implementing its basic foreign'
andedlitary policy (see ORE.1, dated 23 July 1946). Recent develop-
ments indicating this decision include: \
Soviet concessions-onthe Trieste issue.
b. Soviet acceptance of the principle of free 'navigation on
the Danube.
? Soviet agreement in principle to international inspection'
of armaments and' to eliminate the veto in the work of the contem-
plated atomic and disarmament commissions. ?
?
d. Indications of substantial reductions in Soviet occupa-
,
tion forces.
e:. Failure of the -USSR to. render effective 'support toAzer-
-baijan.
f. Agreement of the Security Council tb investigate respons-
, .for disorders on the Greek frontier. ?
.5.
k; Relaxation 'from former extreme poeition-of interpreting
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-abstention as a veto to. meaning -not an expression of.a.veto.,:-::
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h. -, Agreement' to have Foreign MiniSters'. DePutiesmeetin. '
*London before the forthcoming Moscow Conference,to-drAW Up .446.ft-
tredty'for Austria and GarmanY
,
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ConeAde rat i ons' Conducive 'Toward: a Change Te`b s ;
1142. There are a number of cOisiderations, both'international,and
ta.t
doMOtic, which appear to' have convinced the Kremlin of the 'desfrabil--7
-itYlitf a temporary change of course: ? -
:
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3. International considerations in estimated order of importance
include:
a. The firm policy of the Western Powers, especially the US;
the realization that a further expansion Of Soviet control in Eu-
rope cannot be accomplished by force without risk of war; and the
desire to placate the US and the UK in'order to encourage a relax-
ation of Western vigilance, to strengthen the hand of Western ad-
vocates of a conciliatory policy toward the USSR; and to obtain
economic aid from the West for, sorely needed rehabilitation.
b. The benefits to the USSR from a reduction in its occupa-
tion forces. With effective control over Soviet-dominated areas
in Europe established to the maximum extent possible at present,
the USSR can afford to reduce its present excessive occupation
forces, especially in view of the increased mechanization of the
remaining troops. A reduction in occupation forces would have
the following benefits:
(1) Release of'additional manpower sorely needed, for the
Soviet internal economy.
(2) Reduction of antagonism throughout the world.
(3) Alleviation of a major cause of popular hostility
toward the Communist Parties in occupied areas where local
elements have been disillusioned and alienated by ruthless
Soviet reparations policies, the conduct of Soviet troops
and the burden of subsisting these troops.
4) A basis for attempting to induce further reductions
of occupation forces by the Western Powers. TheUSSR will
undoubtedly use any drastic reduction in its occupation forces
to support a-campaign of diplomacy and propaganda to secure
further reductions in the occupation forces of the Western
Powers. Proportionate reductions by all of the Allied Powers
would have the net effect of strengthening the Soviet Union's
relative position on the Continent. Once 'the oCCupation
fOrces of the ps and.the UK havebeen reduced., there is small
chance that they Could be readily increased again. The USSR,
on the other hand, is in a:position to move troops into and
of the areas under its control with relative:ease:and
secrecy. It is likewise in a position to concealthe pres-
ence of its troops abroad by infilti-ating t4em.into:sate17
lite armies and polite forces, and by settling theuias
l"civilians" in occupied areas, ready-forhObiliZatiOn'on
short notice.
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c. The USSR's need of support at international gatherings ?
from the smaller nations outside the Soviet bloc Which have.re-
cently been aligning themselves with Anglo-American. positions in
opposition to arbitrary Soviet tactics.
d. Net advantages to the USSR of general disarmament among
the major powers.. The realization of a general disarmament Pro-
gram would result in a decided relative advantage to the Soviet
Union. Whereas the Western Powers derive their military strength
from extensive navies, strategic air forces and intricate. modern
weapons, that of the USSR is still essentially based on mass land
armies. Once reduced, therefore, the war potential Of tpe West' ?
would require. years to restore, while that of the 'USSR would be
substantially restored merely by the remobilizing of manpower.
4. Domestic factors which would have equal weight in producing
a temporary change in Soviet tactics Are:
-
a. Internal economic conditions.. The condition' of Soviet.,
agriculture is undoubtedly:berious, withcritical shortages in:.
some vital foods, while certain basic industries.are failing to
meet the quotas prescribed by,theFourth:FiVe-YearJlap.T.As'a:
result, the Kremlin may have been forced to reVisedts-eStimate
.of the proportions of the 'national economy which:could be di-
verted to military, purpOses, because the immediate needs of the
USSR, particularly the devastated areas, have exCeededwhat it.
was reasonable to plan :for industry.t6produce.._,
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b. Civilian morale. There are indreaaing signs'obf'apathy,
and even unrest, among the Soviet populace. Shortages in food,
housing, and consumer goods have created.widesprea?issatisfac-,
tion. The vigorous campaign of nideologicalcleansineindiCates
.the concern with which the Kremlinviews,the,situatid6:, -
_
..,, . .
c. Morale among former occupation troops.'' The Oecupation
has furnished a large number of Soviet citizen's with their first
.opportunity to view the outside world. .:The 'bourgeois fleshpots"
.-
of Germany, Austria, and the Balkans have peodUced:disillusion7
Tent, a reluctance to return to the USSR, andva substantial num-
ber of desertions.* Demobilized occupation troopdare spreading. .
the infection throughout the USSR, Whichjs:probably an portant ' ?
.element in current domestic dissatidfaction. Thelarge-scale.
-.
..7,,46, ? ,-, X.,,
The Department of State considers thisae4enCepo qt0pOiecip,,yee: .
,it implies that these conditions are tathet*Valent. O4..d:and..
-i. ?
'the War and Navy Depattments,?,.....hol4eVer446,14etthat. these ccondi-,
,. . -,, _. , ,...-ky.-1,i? ? ;-
4ons are inde-ed .prevalent.
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occupation has thus constituted a breach in the barriers which
guard the Soviet people from foreign ideology and information,
and which are so essential to the maintenance of the Kremlin's
control.
Probable Future Tactics
5. In view of the foregoing considerations, Soviet leaders must
have decided upon a temporary breathing space for the purpose of _eco-
nomic and ideological rehabilitation at home and the consolidation of
positions abroad. We believe, however, that the Kremlin has not aban-
doned any of its long-range objectives descrilied in ORE 1, but that
these objectives will now be pursued where expedient by methods more
subtle than those of recent months. Such methods will include:
a. Continued efforts to gain political and economic control
of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Korea, by.cer-
tain characteristically Soviet techniques, which would not neces-
sitate-the presence of large Soviet military forces-- Such tech-
niques consist of the "popular front", or coalition, political
strategy, under which relatively weak Communist parties merge
with and gain control of leftist and liberal organizationa;in-
filtration, byldloscow agents or local Communists, into key gov-
ernment positions, especially police, judicial, military, prop-
aganda, and educational agencies; the "liquidation" by local
Communist parties of all native elements which' might be expected
to oppose the Soviet program; and the stripping)or.expropriation
of key industrial plants and the establishment of elaborate car-
tel systems, giving the USSR control of/vital industry..
b. Intensification of militant Communist activity in Euro-
pean areas outside.of the present Soviet sphere, aimed at produc-
ing Communist or Communist-controlled governments by legal or
revolutionary means in such countries as France, Italy, Spain,
and Greece.
c. Political and economic penetration in the Middle East,
Far East, and Latin America.
d. Elaborate campaigns of propaganda and diplomacy designed
to convince the world of the USSR's peaceful intentions, and to
promote disarmament and pacifism abroad.
? e. An intensive long-range program to develop the war poten-
tial of the USSR, concentrating especially on the expansion of
-.basic industries, on the secret development of ?newweapons, on
the acquisition of information on secret military developments
40 other countries, and on reducing the vulnerability of Soviet -
industry to attack by atom bombs, rockets, etc.
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I. Promotion of discord and unrest in the capitalist coun-
tries', especially by seizing any opportunities offered by per-
iodic economic crises and unemployment, which: theSoviets con-
fidently predict for the near future.
Conclusions
6. Recent developments have confirmed previous estimates that
.the USSR did not intend and was not in a position toengage in imme-
diate military conquests. Its ultimate,action*Il;depend- upon future'
developments in the Soviet Union and inthe outsicleworld.-. Meanwhile,
the USSR is seeking to consolidate its positions- abroad and to improve
its economic and psychological position at home, while encouraging dis-
armament and, pacifism in the rest of the World:. .
?
7. Soviet tactics, however, will remain flexible and opportunis-
tic. The Kremlih has nevee.relied exclusively. on any single, linerof.
action. .Rather,' its tactics are based on the inter-play of two appar-
etly-conflicting-couraea, internationalcollabOration:and Unilateral .
aggression, and 441 its 'abilitysuddenlYoto shift from one to the other.:
Thistechnique.seeks to achieve maximum surprise:,foreach netiMove:, ?
?and,t0A)romote such Confusion and uncertainty:aMOngthe.tptiosition.6,6 ?
ito?PteyentAhe.development of any long-range CoOhter4trategY.. Thus
in view of the'considerationsdescribed in the-preceding.pages,.new:
tactics of compromise and conciliation have been adopted merely as a_
matterof expediency 'They will be employed,only:in4hOsesituationa.
wha:re.?theyare deemed to further Soviet foreigni4fidlitary4olicy.
as
AegiCribeVin ORE 1.
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