WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 130

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400170001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Numberi 3 n
24 NOV 1950
Document No. GIO )
NO CHANGE in Class. El
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DECLASSIFIED
lass. CHANGE) TO: TS S C &
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77......ii,McLi
Auth; DDA REG. 77/1763 ,,......?.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1 This, publication contains current intelligence exelusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, 'Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
?
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage. Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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0..ter" th at 'Drill
CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS 1
THE KOREAN SITUATION
Chinese Intentions 2
Military Tactics 2
Political Considerations 3
Economic Status 3
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Commonwealth Aid . . . . ........... 4
Indochina Military 4
Malayan Terrorists 5
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS
Rearmament Trend 6
French Attitude 6
German Elections 7
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
Nepalese Situation 8
VOA in Iran 8
Uraguayan Elections 9
ARTICLE
World Sulfur Crisis 10
TIGIUMENEterinfrab
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HIGHLIGHTS
Developments in Korea and Southeast Asia this
week continued to make the Far East the most immediately
critical area of the world, in terms of US. security.
In Korea, there is still inconclusive evidence regarding
the ultimate objectives of the Chinese Communists in inter-
vening militarily there. It seems fairly clear, however, that
the Chinese Communists will, for the present, maintain holding
operations in North Korea while seeking to obtain UN withdrawal
from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means (see page 2).
Elsewhere in the Far East, the rebel forces of Ho Chi
Minh are believed to be in a position to overrun northern Laos
almost at will, thus bringing Communist forces to the border
of Thailand (see page 4); and prospects for significantly re-
ducing terrorist activities in Malaya remain poor (see page 5).
Meanwhile, the problem of German rearmament re-
mained unsolved. Although the French are expected to modify
their attitude toward the arming of German units after the
Schuman Plan is signed, recent provincial elections in Germany
have enhanced the capability of the Social Democrats to obstruct
Chancellor Adenauer's efforts to reach agreement with the
Western Powers on the rearmament issue (see pages 6 and 7).
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THE KOREAN SITUATION
Chinese Intentions Current Chinese military, diplomatic
and propaganda tactics still provide
inconclusive evidence regarding the ultimate objective of
the Chinese Communists in intervening militarily in North
Korea.: It seems fairly clear, however, that the Chinese
Communists, for the present, will siniultaneously maintain
Chinese-North Korean holding?operations in North Korea,
maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria,
and seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation
and diplomatic means. In case of failure to obtain the primary
objective of UN withdrawal by these means, there may be
increasing, though unacknowledged, Chinese intervention in
Korea. Beyond that, however, neither Communist China nor
the USSR is as yet committed to any course of action, whether
it be a political solution, withdrawal, or a full-scale offensive
designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea.
It is, nevertheless, apparent that the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist rulers, fully aware of the risk that a general war will
develop, have allowed for its possibility and feel prepared to
cope with it.
Military Tactics Chinese Communist military tactics in
Korea, at present, suggest that the main
Coinmunist effort will continue to be directed at holding the
northwest front protecting the Sinho hydroelectric installa-
tions and the northeast triangle stretching to the Manchurian-
Soviet borders. The rapid northward advance of US units in
the central portion was made possible by the numerical
superiority of the UN forces, indicating that the Chinese Com-
munists did not consider it necessary at this time to protect
the entire Manchurian border, provided the vital areas in the
northwest and northeast were protected. Moreover, except in
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the northwest, Chinese Communist troops presently in
Korea are thinly deployed over a wide area and, therefore,
have only limited ability to launch large-scale counterattacks.
Political Considerations Korean reaction to the proposal
to establish a demilitarized buffer
zone along the Manchurian border has been one of violent and
strong opposition. Korean support for such a proposal might
be gained only if the demilitarized zone extended to both sides
of the border and UN supervision of the Korean part of the
zone were limited to non-Communist military observers. Under
any other conditions, it might be impossible to prevent South
Korean forces from entering the zone and clearing it of all
? Communist forces. It might also prove impossible to maintain
a strictly demilitarized zone in view of the near certainty that
Communist guerrilla forces would conduct operations in the
area and would attempt to use it as a base for expanding their
activities southward.
Economic Status The area of Korea still under Communist
control contains nearly 30 percent of the
nation' g electric power generating installations, more than half
of the standing Umber resources, important wood products,
chemical and metallurgical plants, and Korea's best coal and
iron mines. Denial of these resources to the Korean economy
would add considerably to the foreign economic aid required over
a period of years to rehabilitate the Korean economy. The prin-
cipal deficiencies would consist of iron ore and coking coal. Denial
of critically needed lumber, pulp and wood alcohol would also
complicate Korea's economic reconstruction.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Commonwealth Aid The publication on 21 November
of a report of the British Common-
wealth's Colombo Plan is a move in the UK effort, recently
begun, to induce the US to contribute heavily to the economic
development under UK leadership,ol South and Southeast Asia.
Throughout the recent Commonwealth consultations in London
? In connection with the plan,it was explicitly acknowledged that
the projected development, calling for more than $5 billion
:over six years, was far beyond the combined financial resources
of the Commonwealth and the UK. No direct approach to the US
for help has been made, nor is one likely to be made. The parti-
cipants hav.e.simply assumed, in drawing up the plan, that
the US-would finance nearly half of it--$2.5 billion out of $5.23
billion. South Asian representatives in the UK, and presumably
their home governments, have been encouraged to base their
expectations of aid on this assumption.
Indochina Military The evacuation of the French garrison
from Lao Kay in northwest Tonkin has
exposed northern Laos to Viet Minh incursions. As yet there
have been no significant military operations against any of
the several French outposts located north of Vientiane, but
Viet Minh troops in the locality, with even small reinforcements,
could probably overwhelm or isolate these positions. The gar-
rison withdrawn from Lao Kay, now stationed in mountain posi-
tions guarding the entrances to northern Laos, could-only delay
a serious Viet Minh drive. French authorities have become
increasingly concerned over the threat to Laos and some be-
lieve that it overshadows the threat to Tonkin. Implementation
of defense plans to meet this threat will require additional US
arms and, subsequently, at least nine weeks to recruit and train
native,troops for security duty. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh appears
to be capable of overrunning northern Laos almost at will,thus
bringing Communist forces to the border of Thailand.
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Malayan Terrorists The return to London of General Sir
? Harold Briggs.is a tacit admission of
disappointment over the results of his plan; launched in June,
for the systematic elimination of Communist terrorism from
-Malaya. Briggs is expected to request London to abandon the
projected transfer of Federation troops to duty in Europe and
to dispatch additional personnel and equipment to Malaya. He
Is expected also to propose drastic civil measures that would
in 'effectplace the government on a war footing, and to recom-
mend the postponement of political reforms (including elections),
?the institutiOn. of collective punishment for localities aiding.
terrorists, the resumption of deportation proceedings against
Chinese Communist sympathizers, and the imposition of strict
control over the entry of persons from Communist China. The
employment of more troops, stricter controls, and repressive
measures has not to date succeeded in significantly reducing
the activities of the terrorists, whose strength lies in the sup?
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port they obtain from the large Chinese minority in Malaya
(nearly 50 percent of the population), and is not likely to do so
In the future.
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? EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS
Rearmament Trends Under the leadership of the UK and
? France, the countries of Western
Europe are showing a greater tendency toward insisting that
the US join into more equal partnership with them and relax
itn special position derived from being the chief grantor nation
in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European
Recovery Program. Concerned lest they be forced into a
permanently subordinate position to the US, these nations
? desire not only to commit the US more fully to European affairs
? but to exert greater influence on US policy. In the -economic
? field, pressure is being exerted on the US to submit its own
policies to OEEC examination, just like any other member nation,
and to participate fully in measures to cope with raw materials
shortages. The European desire to minimize the US special posi-
tion is even more pronounced in the NATO. The NAT binds the
? US with the European nations in a treaty relationship which has
? the effect of making them feel under less obligation to the US
on military matters than on matters of economic aid. There
is thus a general desire to regard the US contribution to NAT
rearmament as merely the US share of a common defense pio-
grim and to bring the MDAP under NATO rather than unilateral
US control.
French Attitude With agreement on the Schuman Plan nearer,
French conditions for the aiming of German
units may soon be modified so as to permit an agreement on the
establishment of larger German units than they originally were
willing to accept. The key to France's attitude on Germany re-
mains its strong desire to promote the political, economic and
military unification of Europe. This has been evident in suc-
cessive French proposals for strengthening the Atlantic Pact
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.0 executive machinery, closer ties between. the ? US and the
?OEEC, the Schuman Plan, and the Pleven Plan.for a
0 European Army. ? The French have insisted on the inte-
gration of German units in a European army not only from .
fear of a resurgent Germany, but from the belief ?that Europe ?
0must be unified as a bloc if it is to be a-force in world politics.
?The successful establishment of a working authority and supra-
0 national assembly under the Schuman Plan would partially satisfy
the desires of the French, and would probably enable them to
accept German rearmanaentanuch.as proposed by. the US,while
0 continuing to press for an integrated European army.
.. . .
German Elections The results of recent provincial elections
0.in West Germany have been to throw the
Adenauer Government badly off balance and greatly to strengthen
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the Social Democratic potential for obstructing US interests in .
? Germany. The Social Democrats in these particular elections' .
(those held in Wuertemberg-Baden and Hesse on 19 November),
0 made effective use of German confusion over the controversial
rearmament issue and registered substantial gains over Adenauer's -
? Christian Democratic Party. (CDU). As a result of the elections,'
0 Adenauer's control over the Bundesrat (the upper house) is now in
balance and will probably be further -weakened after elections in .
U Bavaria on 26 November. Under these conditions, pressure for -
new elections to the Bundestag (lower house);will increase materially.
Adenauer will probably be able to avert these elections for the pre-
p sent;?but, if the Social Democrats, as a result of electorial successes
elsewhere, are able to advance the date of electionsin tower Saxony,
he might soon be forced to assent to new national .elections; Social
0 .Democratic popularity has increased largely because of popular
belief that German rearmament would provoke. the USSR and?con-
stitute an intolerable economic burden. Adenauer, in attempting
to recoup his lost prestige, will therefore rely on substantial Allied
.concessions to German equality.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Nepalese Situation The rapid collapse of the Congress
Party revolt in Nepal will at best
postpone rather than solve the question of India's relationship
with the small buffer state along its Tibetan border. Even if
India decides against openly intervening in Nepal at this time,
in view of the speed with .which the Maharaja has reasserted his
authority, the conditions which led India to look with favor on
the revolt--and which probably led to at least some semiofficial
connivance in its instigation?still exist. Even if the Rana regime
in Nepal institutes some reforms as a sop to Indian opinion and
the Nepalese dissidents, it will remain an essentially autocratic
government and will be even more suspicious than ever of the
Indian Government and of the ruling Indian Congress .Partit's con-
tinuing sympathy for its Nepalese offshoot. Although the Indian
Government has thus far hesitated to incur world censure by
forcibly intervening in Nepal, it is not likely to be reconciled to
the continued existence of a politically and ideologically hostile
state along its vital northern frontier. India will almost certainly
continue to give asylum to the deposed King of Nepal. If the Indian-
encouraged Nepalese Congress Party achieves enough strength for
a more successful revolt,or if the menace of Communist infiltration
from Tibet becomes more acute in Indian eyes, the Indian Govern-
ment may well decide to intervene, much as it did in the case of
Sikkim in 1949.
?VOA in Iran Iran's sudden curtailment of VOA and BBC re-
broadcast facilities probably stems primarily
from a desire to" smooth current Soviet-Iranian negotiations,
inasmuch as VOA, in particular, has recently been harshly
critical of the USSR. Nevertheless, the abruptness with which
the government acted also reflects a growing popular dissatisfaction
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with the US, particularly over the continued delay in formal
establishment of Iran's $25 million Eximbank loan, and
mighfi.hus.possibly portend a trend toward a more aloof
policy'Vis-a-vis the US/ Another case in point is the recent ?
curb placed on travel by-foreigners outside central Iran. Al?
though this .move may be partially ealained by the Iranian ?
Government's fears of. foreign meddling in tribal matters, it
also suggests a growing independence of spirit.
Uruguay Elections As in the past, the Uruguayan elections
on 26 November are expetted to be honest
and orderly, and the presidency is expected to go to one of the
candidates of the .Colorados, the largest political party. .Under ?
the unique Uruguayan electoral system, a patty may run several
candidates and receive credit.for their aggregate vote; the top
man in the winning party becomes president. The election of
any of the Colorado candidates (Cesar Mayo Gutierrez, Andres
?Martinez Trueba, or Dr. Blanco Acevedo, of whom the first two
are given slightly better chances)pwould leave unchanged the
democratic philosophy, basic policies, and prO-US orientation
of the Uruguayan Government. The.unique voting system does .
not apply to congressional elections, and they are likely to re-
sult less well for the 'US, with the election to congress of a large
bloc of the Herrerista Party,which is nationalistic, pro-PerOn,
and anti-US.
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WORLD SULFUR CRISIS
The reduction in US sulfur exports caused by
the need to preserve remaining US resources will
cause substantial sulfur shortages in the UK, France,
Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil,
and India. These countries are the major importers of
US native sulfur and their requirements are steadily
increasing. To the extent that they cannot find means to
their anticipated shortages, they will be forced to cut back
their production of such vital materials as sulfuric acid,
fertilizers, insecticides, explosives, pulp and paper, rayon,
and rubber goods.
Although the nations belonging to the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) have known
for the past two years that the US might reduce exports
of native sulfur, they have been reluctant to shift more
heavily to pyrites (formerly the principal source and still
an important source of their supply of sulfur),in view df
the additional capital equipment and the increase in cost
involved. The UK, the largest single importer of US native
sulfur, in particular, has shown marked hesitancy to increase
its dependence'on Spain,which is the world's greatest supplier ?
of pyrites and the most logical source of British sulfur.
By intensive use of existing pyrites roasting facilities,
the major Western European consumers should -be able to
make up some part of the deficit resulting from reduced im-
ports from the US. If this were done, it would absorb an esti-
mated half of the 500,000 tons of pyrites being exported annually
by Western suppliers(principally Spain, Norway, and Cyprus) to
the Soviet-Satellite economy. A diversion of this traffic to
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?41innaginiffrifte
Western Europe would help not only to ease the impending
shortage in Western Europe but also to intensify the exist-
ing shortage in Eastern Europe.
The Western European deficit could be further
decreased if the using countries increased their capacity
to process pyrites and if the producing countries re-
habilitated or expanded mining and transport facilities.
An expansion of processing capacity could be financed by
ECA funds formerly allocated to the purchase of US native
sulfur, but would be limited by competing requirements for
other types of plant expansion and increased munitions output.
Obstacles to large increases in the supply of pyrites
from traditional sources are nearly insurmountable. The
difficulties in Spain illustrate the type of problems being
faced elsewhere. They include: (1) governmental interference
with private enterprise, especially as affecting foreign capital
participation and management; (2) military vulnerability of
land transportation facilities; (3) deterioration of mining and
transport facilities during the past fifteen years; (4) shortage
of foreign exchange limiting the procurement of equipment to
modernize Spanish-owned facilities; and (6) shortage of electric-
power preventing full utilization of existing facilities.
Although British capital nominally owns 60 percent of
the Spanish pyrites productive capacitypit is probably because
of these difficulties that the British are now undertaking a sub-
stantial increase of production in Cyprus, a crown possession.
The positions of Norway and Sweden on the Baltic peri-
phery of the Soviet-Satellite orbit offer no inducement to foreign
assistance programs for expanding their sulfur and pyrites pro-
ducing capacity. Yet, their large current shipments to the
Satellite countries could well be absorbed in Western Europe.
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Any practical enhancement of the output of Italian
pyrites can be absorbed domestically. Improvement in the
supply and cost of Italian native sulfur, would reduce pro-
cessing 6-7 tons of rock under the best conditions, in order
to obtain one ton of raw fused sulfur. Modernization of
mining and processing techniques involves high capital costs
and the displacement of a large amount of labor. Without
such a program Italy can make no considerable contribution
toward the relief of the international sulfur situation.
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DISTRIBUTION
1
2,3,4,5
6,7,8
9
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13,14,15
16,17
18
19
20
21,22
23,24,25
26,27,28
29
30
31
32
33,34,35....
The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy ?
Secretary of the Air Force
Special Assistant to the President, W.A.Harriman
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G73, Operations, US Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, (Operations), Air Force
Deputy Chief. of Naval Operations, (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
36137,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45,100 Assistant Chief of Staff, Ge2, Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53,54,55,56,
57,58,59,60. Director of Naval Intelligence
61,62,63,64,65,66,
67,68,6g .Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70 Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71 Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85, . . Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Div., OCD, State
86 Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
87 USAF Rep, on joint Strategic Survey Committee
88 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
91 Deputy Director for Intelligence, The joint Staff
92 Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93 Deputy Director, joint Staff
94,95,96 Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
97 Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup
98 Secretary of the Air Force
99 Assistant Se cretary of the Treasury
?
caolawamagst
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P- DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date'
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--TostweeRET
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIC
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