WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 128

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400150001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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48003
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Numbe~~L Document Ido.
1 0 rvov 195th; CI'A:';:~ i, class. ^
i DECI,P.SSIP'IED
Vxi`1ss. C9ANGsD T0: TS S '.~C
DDA ISemo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA I2%G. 77/1763
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively.
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force. +
- 2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable secul?ity regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
- WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C? 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or. the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by ]aw.
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'With the fighting in Korea at a temporary lull following
the commitment of Chinese Communist troops,' speculation
this week centered on. how the United Nations would deal with
the new turn of events. Tt appeared likely that initially the UN
would adopt a"cautious approach'in the hope of avoiding becom=
ing involved in a full-scale war with China (see page 3). Mean-
while, the limited nature of their participation in the fighting
may indicate that the Chinese Communists merely iuterid?.to-
hait.the advance of UN forces fn Korea and to keep a Com-
munist regime on Korean soil, and hope to achieve some kind :of
political solution (see page 2).
The European NAT countries are .making a slow start
in getting their arms production programs under way (see
page 5), partly because they still do not view the need for
rearmament with'the same sense of urgency as the USA In-
dications are growing, however, that the Pleven Plan will
not prevent an early solution of the current deadlock between
.France and the other NATO powers on the use "of German
manpower (see page 14).
In other cx?i.ti.cal areas of the world, indications of
developments affecting US security include: (1) the possibility
of local Viet Minh attacks against the newly established French
defense lines (see page 10); (2) probable moves by India to
wrest the initiative from the UN on the Kashmir issue (see
page 11); and (3) the growing probability that the "liberation"
~ "
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 Chinese Intentions Although the Chinese Communists,
in intervening in Korea, have accepted
a grave risk of US-UN retaliation and general war, the
limited extent of their intervention to date may indicate
that their objective is merely to halt the advance of UN
forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being
on Korean soil. In so doing, the Chinese Communists would:
(I) avert the psychological and political consequences of a
disastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (2). keep UN forces
away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (3) re-
tain an-area in Korea as a base of Communist military and
guerrilla operations; (4) prolong indefinitely the containment
' of UN, especially US, forces in Korea; (5) control the dis-
tribution of hydroelectric power generated, in North Korea
and retain other economic benefits; and (6) create the pos-
,..
sibility of a .favorable political solution in Korea,
The Chinese Communists, however, still retain full
freedom of action. If successful in desf;roying the effective
strength. of UN forces'in North Korea, they would pursue their
advantage as far- as possible. In any case, they would probably
ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal, and, if Chinese
territory were to be attackedD they would probably enter Korea
in full force. With forces available in Manchuria, the Chinese
Communists are capable of committing more troops in an
attempt.to prevent a UN victory in northern Korea. A possible
development of the present situation, therefor. e, is that the
opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive
increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magni-
tude are involved. At any point in this development, the danger
is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to
a general war.
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 UN Action Chinese Communist intervention in Korea
could confront the UN with a critical test
of i$s effectiveness as an instrument for resis$ing aggress
Sion which would have long-range implications for the future
power and prestige of 'the UN.' 'It is still too early to predict
the final ou$come of the UN's handling of the issue. In the
initial stages,'as long as'Chinese Communist activity is
apparently restric*_ed to holding a defensive line along the
Manchurian border, the UN is likely to proceed with utmost
caution, largely through fear of provoking the Chinese Com-
munists to further aggression. Every effort will be made to
localize Chinese military action by such conciliatory gestures
as assurances that the UN has no intention of crossing the
Manchurian border and that Chinese interests in the Yalu
hydroelectric plar~trs will be protected. It is also likely that
a political solution will be sought. The real test will come
if such a solution fails and if Chinese Communist military
actions indicate an intent to drive UN forces out of northern
Korea.. The UN would then have to face squarely the question
of whether to risk involving itself in a full-scale war with China
by sanctioning UN military action against bases and supply faci-
. lines in China, At present, it appears that there would be strong
deterrents against prompt and vigorous UN military action against
'Communist China. They include: (1) the fear that such action
would precipitate general war; and (2) the concern ref the NATO
powers tha$ European defenses would be left daatgerously weak if
the US and i$s allies were drawn into an exhaustive campaign. in
Asia,
Political Bickering Since the return of the Republican Govern-
ment to Seoul, the long-?standing conflict
between the National Assembly and President Rhee has been
renewed and there is little prospect of an early resolution of
the struggle for power between the legislative and executive
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branches of 'the ROK Government. The struggle came to
ahead last week when the Assembly refused to approve the
nomination of George Paek to the long-vacant post of Prime
Minister. It also appeared likely at that time that the Assembly
would demand the resignation of'the entire Rhee Cabinet; under
the impetus of the reversal in the military situation, however,
the Assembly has apparently decided to postpone such a step.
Nevertheless, the presence in. the Assembly of large numbers of
"independents," even though they are not yet fully coalesced into
organized factions, makes it certain that President Rhee will be
faced with strong Assembly criticism it he exercises broad ex-
ecutive powers without regard for AsseYrnbly wishes.
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 TOP SECRET
WESTERN DEFENSE
Rearmament Delays Aside from the. yet unresolved key
question of German participation ?
in the Western defense effort, numerous other factors are
responsible for the'slow start being made by the European
NAT countries in getting their arms production programs
under way: On.e delaying factor is the continued' failure of
the NATO'to reach. firm decisions on the forces to be con-
iributed by the member nations, the types of weapons needed,
the degree of standaR~dization to be achieved, and the allocation
of the financial burderos. Mor'e' basically, however; most
European-countries do not view the need for rearmament with
the same sense of urgency as the US and are still more pre=
occup~.ed with recovery problems. Thep have thus been dilatory
in getting arms production started and in submitting specific
requests for US ai.d and have shown a reluctance to push forward
with rearmament until they know how much US' aid they wili're- .~
ceive: A fumther obstacle to a rapid increase in aa?ms production
is? the continuing tendency'of most nations to produce only for
their. own needs and to show little interest (except for Italy) fn
producing for transfer under the concept of mutual aid.
British Position The difficulties already being faced by the
British illustrate the economic repercussions
of the proposed European rearmament production programs.
Growing domestic needs foz~ steel, partly arising from actual
artd prospective rearmament orders; have already forced cuts
in exports of some steel products and caused some interruptions
in industrial productfon. US orders have had to be turned down
and the danger exists that the UK may have to cutback pro-
duction in the automobile industry, one of the UK's major ex=
porters. Current shortages in other raw materials will complicate
the problem of dividing indust~?i.al production among export, home
needs, and rearmament as the tempo of armament production
increases.
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UK European Policy With the questions of European inter-
gration and rearmament currently
closely associated, it appears that the British Government
will adopt a more flexible attitude toward European unity.
Although the British will rema~ua basically opposed to closer
polikical and economic union with the European nations,.they
are not likely to oppose the efforts of the continental countries
to achieve greater unity among themselves on a purely con- .
tinental basis.
CFM on Germany Meanwhile, the Soviet proposal for a
Foreign Ministers' Conference to dis-?
cuss the Gea?man problem, while reflecting serious Soviet
apprehension over the rearmament of Western Germany, is,
not likely to have any significant effect at this time on Western
.European progress toward rearmament: The proposal is ap-
parently merely another step in the Kremlin's diplomatic and
propaganda effort to obstruct a West German military con-
. tribution to Western defense and does not indicate Soviet will=
ingness to meet even minimum Western conditions for German
unity. The proposal has had little effect in raisfrng German hopes
of obtaining unity by peaceful means, of in strengthening French
or West German fear of provoking Soviet military action by
proceeding with plans to rearm West Germany.
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As the Western Powers continue to discuss the
problem of formulating effective controls on the export
of strategic commodities'to the Sovfet~drbit, it remains
apparent that trade between the East and West is still
considerable and that the Soviet orbit is- still interested
in' obtaining st~rateg4.c materials from the West. There are
indications, however, that the UK and Sweden, which are
the USSR's largest Western trading partners, are taking
steps toward curia.ilment of the flow of strategic commodi-
ties to the East.
British-Soviet Trade During the first seven months of
1950, Eastern European imports
from the UK declined isn comparison with 1949 while Soviet
exports to the UK rose sharply. Principal Soviet exports
were grain and timber vitally needed by the UK. British
exports consisted mainly of machinery of all types, and
machine tools, mostly in fulfillment of orders.placed from
one to three years ago. The export balance of trade in favor.
of Eastern Europe continues to provide the Orbit with an
important source of sterling for the purchase of strategic
raw materials elsewhere in the sterling area. Although the
UK is planning a further tightening of controls on the export .
of special indust^ial equipment and machine tools, its demand
for non-dollar timber and grain will probably continue to pro-
vide the USSR with substantial sterling exchange.
Swedish Position The proportion of strategic commodities
in Sweden's exports to Eastern Europe
remains high; nevea?theless, the Swedish Government is
showing some ~incl.inati.on toward imposing tighter controls
t"
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 over these exports: The Swedes have given oral but fixm
assurance that no I-A or ImB items imported by Sweden
from the US will be rPa~expostsd'to Eastern~Europe (this
assurance does not extend tore-exports from other countries).
They have also expressed a willingness to cooperate informally
with the'Consultative Group in Paris on the control of strategic
exports'to the USSR, although Sweden's present interpretation
of neutrality does not pex.?mit formal participation in the group's
work.' These actions indicate Swedish desire not`o;~ly to main-
tain and extend participation in the cooperative economic
activities of Western Europe despite military and political "
neutrality but to avoid endangering their relations with the' US
and UK and thus possibly lessening their chances of obtaining
.critically short materia.l.s.
.Soviet-Iranian Trade The Soviet Union's recently demon-
strated willingness to sig:rc a trade .
pact with Lran which. apparently contained no significant Iranian
concessions may in part ~?eflect a need for the wool, cotton,
leather, and other producta^ Iran is to provide. The USSR's
action, however, undoubtedly also represents a belief that its
policy of conciliation toward Iran (of which the trade pact is?
the most notable achievement) will cause considerably more
Iranians to favor a more :friendly attitude toward the USSR
and that the pant specifically will tend to counterbalance the
r. ecently announced Expart Import Bank and Poirnt'IV pr. ograms.
From the Iranian point of view, the agreement (involving about
$20 million worth of goods each way) should not only provide
the economy of the nortriern provinces with considerable benefits
but also confer increased strength and prestige on the Ra2mara
Government,
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Geneva Grain Conference Judging from the Soviet posi-
tion during the recei-tly con-
cluded British~oviet trade negotiations, there is little
likelihood of East-West agreement at the forthcoming grain
trade conference at Geneva. At this conference, the USSR
will probably make the same demands it made of 'the British,
namely higher prices for Soviet wheat than currentlq set by
the International.Wheat Agreement and guarantees that
proceeds from the sale of Soviet grain can. be used'for the
purchase of specific commodities such as rubber, wool, and
other strategic items. The USSR will attempt to embarrass
the Western Powers by pointing out that their refusal to grant
these demands is incompatible with their former statements
regarding the need for greater reciprocal trade.
Argentine Exports Meanwhile, Argentine exports of in-
soluble quebracho extract (a tanning
agent) to Eastern Europe are steadily increasing. During
the past few months, orders from Flong gong reportedly
totalled 2b,500 metric tons, as compared with average annual
shipments informer years of less than 1,500 metric tons.
Moreover, Argentine exports of this strategic commodity
to Eastern Europe during the first six months of 1950 have
increased 85 percent over the first half of 1949.
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TOP SECRET
Indochina Military Tn the near future the French face
probable Viet Minh moves against
their newly established defense lines covering Hanoi and
its communications with the sea: The French estimate that
the' most likely opening of the next phase of the campaign will
be an attack on Viet Trig 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, the
point of convergence between the line covering Hanoi from the.
north and that covering Hanoi from the west and southwest. It
is believed that Vfet Minh forces have by now had time to re-
place recent losses and regroup and, while far from ready to
mount a major offensive, are able to renew local attacks.
Meanwhile, General Juizi, who has returned from hfs
? mission to Indochina, has recommended that the French
attempt to hold existing positions, strengthen th.e morale of
French troops, and prepare for a counteroffensive in the
spring aimed at retaking the frontier post's recently abandoned
to the Viet Minh. He estimates that an additional 50,000 troops
and considerable new equipment, especially aircraft and artillery,
would be needed. In order to carry out these immediate objectives
and to strengthen the long-term French position in Indochina, Juin
further recommends that French forces in Indochina. be concen-
trated for defense of the frontier and that a Vietnamese national
army of 150,000 be built up as rapidly as possible to take over
the internal security of Vietnam. This army would presumably
incorporate most of the Vietnamese now serving with the French,
who number'somewhat over 150,000. Such a division of functions
between French and Vietnamese forces would represent an im-
portant concession to Vietnamese nationalism, a fresh approach
to the unsolved problem of eliminating guerrilla activity behind.
the French lines, and a partial solution to the acute shortage of
French troops.
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Tibet Invasion Persistent reports of confusion and in=
decision in Lhasa, which apparently have
handicapped Tibetan defense efforts against the advance of
Chinese Communist forces toward Lhasa, indicate that Tibet
will probably soon capitulate to Chinese Communist demands,
acknowledging the sovereignty of Peiping on terms'laid down
by Peiping: The strength and position of Chinese Communist
forces marching on Tibet are still uncertain, but Pefping's
position is perfectly clear:- it has categorically rejected Indian
ihte7rvention on grounds that the means used and the results.
a$tafiied i`n Fc~e`aling' with 'Ti"be't~? a~'e a purely rdo4iiesti~c ncotLCern '
of the Chinese Communist Government. In the face of continued
military pressure and Peiping's flat rejection of diplomatic in-
tervention, the situation in Lhasa is likely to be resolved shortly
by the flight of the Dalai Lama together with those followers that
are unwilling to accede to Communist demands. It is anticipated
that the "liberation" of Tibet will be effected during 1950.
Kashmir Problem ~ India is apparently preparing to take the
initiative in UN discussions regarding
Kashmir by introducing a Security Council resolution calling
for informal discussions of the Kashmir issue by India, Pakistan, ??
and other interested parties. Meanwhile, India has strongly en-
dorsed a resolution of Sheikh Abdulla's Kashmir National Con- ? .
ference condemning the UN's failure to settle the Kashmir problem
and calling for the election of a sovereign constituent assembly to
settle the future of Kashmir. India apparently hopes that these
maneuvers will forestall the creation. of new UN machinery (such
~as the proposed "small power" committee) that might make
embarrassingly specific formal proposals regarding the UN
plebiscite India has been seeking to avoid. India may also hope
to put the US and UK on the defensive; if the U3 and UK should
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object flatly to the proposed Kashmir elections, Indian
(and Soviet) propagandists would very likely accuse them
of opposing self-determination, while failure to oppose the
elections would draw fire from Pakistan. Present indications
are that the UK, which has assumed the leadership in the
Kashmir case, 'may react firmly to these Indian maneuvers
by suggesting that the SC oppose unilateral Indian action and'.
insist on an~overmall plebiscite, or some alternative, whether
or not acceptable to India.
BulgarianTTurkish Tension Tension between Turkey and
Bulgaria has increased with the
arrival of the 10 November deadline set by Bulgaria for accept-
ance by Turkey of 250,000 immigrants of Turkish origin. Turkey
again suspects that Bulgaria will attempt a mass eviction of the
remaining immigrants. Turkey, which is consider. i.ng bringing
the mati:er before the UN, is likely to do so immed'iatel'y if
Bulgaria. attempts to expel the refugees by force and will prob-
ably do so in any case if the Bulgarian Government maintains
its intransigent attitude. Tf this case should be presented to the
UN General Assembly, that body, after investigating the situation,
is likely to condemn Bulgaria for violation of human rights. Such?
condemnation would not be likely to cause Bulgaria to desist,
but it would help i;o mobilize international opinion and would
doubtless be accompanied by a GA recommendation that modest
but essential economic and technical aid be sent to help Turkey
deal with the influx,
Greek Instability The incomplete new Venizelos-Papandreou
coalition Cabinet, sworn in on 3 November,
promises to be even less stable than its ,predecessors and to
-present the King with the dilemma of calling a new election or
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installing a. gc~verr~ment with extra-parliamentary power.
Unless tl~e ~ccreasingly popular Plastiras Tsouderos group
QEPFI~~ cai,n be d~~?aw~, back into a coalition with Venizelos and
Papand.reou~ no effective government is in sight on the basis
of khe preser~.t divaded Parliament. Although the new Cabinet
as yet cax~,trols fewer than 100 of the 250 seats in Parliaments
it may receive ea~ough temporary support from elements
anxious to a.vo~d ar postpone elections in order to win an initial
vote of coa~idenc~; on about 16 November. In that case, how-
ever, the crisis wa.11 only have been postponed.
North. Ai'rnca~m?, Natz.sa~ua.lYSm In North Africa, where the basic
political patte~~ are similar to
those cif 1:~~,dochina, the issue of nationalism is becoming more
acuteo NatAa~a.l~.st participation in the 66transition~y Cabinet
of ~'un~sia~ organized a.n August, has not induced the French
to make a.nv subst~.ntial concessions or even to indicate that
they might do soo Participation was from the first strongly
disa.pprcR~r~;d by mast nationalists in Algeria and Morocco;
dissatisia.ction. with it appears to be spreading among the
Tu~.isian x~atianal~.sts; and the party which agreied to the ex-
per:i~mer~t Qthe unrecogr~i.zed Neo-Destour Party) may soon have
to choose between withdrawing its representative or becoming
discredi.~eda
Na.t;~ve ~~~estiveress may also increase in the wake of
Fr~er~cY, defea~;s i.ri I~adochina which are being in$erp~?eted by
the r~at.~o~~alist~ as the handwriting on the wall for French
color~ialismo Native hostility is aggravated by the fact that
a la~?ge proportion of French troop losses in Indochina has
been from native North African contingents. North. African
Communists are gaining a tactical advantage because their
reactions and interests c~aincide in this case with those of the
nationalists, who view the Indochinese issue entirely as one
of indeper~.d.~nce from France, and not as one of containing
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Communism. The possibility of public disorders as a
result of native discontent is the more serious since the
need for reinforcements in Indochina may reduce troop
strength in North Africa below the minimum necessary
for internal security.
German Rearmament Indications are growing that
French Defense Minister Moch's
intransigent stand oh the Pleven Plan'will not prevent an
early solution of the current deadlock between France and
the other NATO members on the use of German manpower
in the proposed European army. For one.t5ing,: the French
are not likely to back up MOch's unrealistic insistence on
the proposal that German units be smaller than divisions.
Moreover, a draft agreement of the Schuman Plan, the
basic prerequisite for French consent to the use of German
manpower, is likely to be'signed in the next few weeks.
Agreement on this issue might permit the French to approve
the use of German manpower (although subject to specific
guarantees against the creation of instruments which could
lead to a revival of German militarism) without having to
air the matter In the Assembly once again. The French
Government, however, wouuld continue to insist that other
provisions of the Pleven Plan be studied by the NATO powers
and aye not likely to make major early concessions on these
points, because the Assembly itself would be umvilling' at this'.
to redefine the French position.
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1.. .... The President
2,3,4,5:.... Secretary of?State
6,7,8...... Secretary of Defense
9......... Secretary of the Army
Y0......... Secretary of the Navy
11......... Secretary of the Air Force
12......... Special Assistant to the President, W.A.Harriman
13;14,15.... > Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17....... Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
18......... Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
19......... Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
20......... Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22....... Chief of Staff, US Army
23,24,25..... Chief of Naval Operations
26,27,28..... Chief of Staff, US Air Force
29:........ Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army
30....:.... Deputy Chief of Staff, (Operations), Air Force
31.... ?..... Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
32......... Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35...... Special Assistant, intelligence, Department of State
36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45,100 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, .Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48, 49, 50, 51,
52,53,54,55,56,
57,58,59,60. Director of Naval Intelligence
61,62,63,64,65,66,
67,68,69... Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70......... Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71......... Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77, ?
?8,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85.... Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Div., OCD, State
86......... Chief. Policy Planning Staff, department of State
87......... USAF Rep. on Joint Strategic Survey Committee
88......... Director, Feder. al Bureau of Investigation
89,90....... Administrator., Economic Cooperations Administration
91......... Deputy Director for Intelligence, Th.e joint Staff
92, ......... Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93......... Deputy Director, Joint Staff
94,95,96..... Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
97......... Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup
98......... Secretary of the Air Force
99......... Assistant. Secretary of the Treasury
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 U. S. GOVh:RNMF.NT PRINTING OFFICE
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