WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 127

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400140001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
Number127
Document No.
NO CHANCE in Class. 0
3 NOV 1950 DECLASSIFIED
lass. CIANOLD TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
DDA P.71. 77 1763
Auth:
BY;
o 0
6
Date:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETURN TO ARCHIVES Et RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
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I. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has ?not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as Amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
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HIGHLIGHTS
1
SOVIET MANEUVERS AND PLANS ?
Over-all Policy
2
Japanese Treaty
2
? Austrian Policy. ..... ? ...... . .
. .
3
Bulgarian Purges
4
? Hungarian Economy
4
?'Rumanian Unrest ... . . ? . ? . ? .... ? ?
?
5
CHINESE COMMUNIST PLANS
Korean Intervention
6
Tibet Invasion
6
? Taiwan Plans ? ........ ..... . .
7
Overseas Chinese
7
LOCAL DE VE LOPME NTS
Huk Raids in the Philippines
9
Bell Report on the Philippines
9
Korean Unification Delays
10
French Proposals for Western Defense ?
11
French Labor Unity
11
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HIGHLIGHTS
Of the week's developments, The sudden stiffening
of North Korean resistance, with increasing Chinese Com-
munist support, posed the gravest threat to US security.
Although the possibility cannot be excluded-that the Chinese
Communists, under Soviet direction, are gradually committing
themselves to full-scale intervention,their main objective appears
to be to establish a buffer area south of the Yalu River in order
to guarantee the security of the Manchurian border and insure
the continued flow of electric power to Manchuria from the vital
Suiho hydroelectric system (see page 6).
Other Far Eastern developments also affected US security
interests. The announced Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet,
although not believed to have penetrated the US-recognized Tibetan
border, has prompted a strong Indian protest and indicates that
Peiping will not brook long delays in the "liberation" of that
country (see page 6). In the Philippines, there remained the
possibility of widespread Huk attacks on 7 November which
could inflict severe damage throughout Luzon but would not re-
sult in the overthrow of the government (see page 9).
In Western Europe, interest was centered on the effect
of the Pleven proposal on Western rearmament and on Soviet
pressure in Austria. The Pleven proposal will further delay
a decision on Wesi Germany's contribution to the defense of
Europe and as a consequence of this delay opposition in Germany
to remilitarization will increase (see page 11). In Austria, there
was some slight indication that the USSR might back down from its
Intransigent 'stand on the dispute with the Austrian Government over
the issue of police control (see page 3).
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SOVIET MANEUVERS AND PLANS
During recent weeks, Soviet propaganda has continued
to pursue the dual policies of advertising the USSR's peaceful
Intentions and viewing with alarm the aggressive preparations
of the West. Although the "peace" campaign has recently re-
ceived slight additional emphasis, there has been no material
relaxation in Soviet charges of Western warmongering.
One of the highlights of the current phase of the "peace"
offensive has been the Prague Declaration, which appears designed
to undermine US policy with respect to Germany, and especially
with regard to West German remilitarization. At the same time,
Moscow radio took full advantage of United Nations Day to proclaim
the USSR's interest in the success of that organization. Also in'
line with the "peace" theme, Soviet propaganda has revived the
sporadically recurrent line that war is not inevitable and that,
given a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the West, peace-
ful coexistence between East and West is still possible. In contrast
to these apparent attempts to quiet Western war fears, the USSR
has,characteristically, by no means abandoned its propaganda attacks
against the West, and particularly the US. Moreover, much of the
effectiveness of the Soviet "peace campaign" has been destroyed by
such recent Soviet activities as the denunciation of Trygve Lie, pres-
sure on the Austrian Government, Chinese Communist support for
the North Koreans and the Viet Minh, and the announced Chinese
Communist invasion of Tibet.
Japanese Treaty In expressing a willingness to discuss informally
US proposals for a Japanese Peace Treaty and
in returning to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), 'the USSR probably
reasons that continued intransigence regarding the Japanese Peace
Treaty would not prevent the Western Powers from drafting a
separate treaty. By entering into treaty discussions and returning
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to the FEC,the USSR not only strengthens its propaganda
peace campaign but increases its capabilities -for-obstruct-
ing and delaying treaty negotiations. Participation in informal
talks, however,-will not commit the USSR to participating in
formal treaty negotiations, and in view of the USSR's over-all
policy in the Far East, it appears most unlikely that the USSR
would agree to any treaty acceptable to the Western Powers.
Austrian Policy The present dispute between the Austrian
Government and Soviet occupation authorities
over control of the Austrian police force demonstrates continuing
Soviet determination to exploit local situations. Soviet authorities
in Austria have stated that the Austrian Government will not be
permitted to dismiss, transfer, or take disciplinary action against
Austrian police officials in the Soviet sector accused of disloyalty
to the Austrian Government during the recent Communist-inspired
strikes. In view of this krave threat to Austrian independence; ,
the Austrian Government is proceeding with its investigation and
plans to carry out the verdict of the disciplinary court. There is
no firm evidence to indicate whether the USSR will maintain its in-
transigent attitude On this issue in the face of official Austrian and
Western protests. In the past, Soviet authorities have often backed
down on timilar isdues when Confronted with vigorous Austrian
resistance, and a recent conversation between the Soviet High
Commissioner and Austrian Chancellor Figl suggests that the .
USSR may be seeking a way out of the impasse without too great
a loss of prestige.
r
Meanwhile, evidence is accumulating that the 'process? of
sovietizing the Satellites' is not proceeding smoothly. The principal
Problems appear to be creating reliable Communist parties loyal to
the USSR, overcoming economic difficUlties, and eliminating peasant
oppos Men.
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Bulgarian Purges Current reports indicate that the ?
sweeping purg'es in the ? Bulgarian
Communist Party, begun in January 1949 with the Kostov
deviation affair, will continue during the next few months.
More than 100,000 Party members have been expelled since
June 1950 and more purges are expetted to result from Party
organizational meetings which will be held between now and
May 1951. It is not entirely clear why the USSR has felt it
necessary to purge the Bulgarian Communist Party more ?
drastically than the parties in the other Satellites. It is
apparent, however, that the inability of Bulgarian Communists
to carry out Soviet demands for the wholesale exploitation and
rapid communization of Bulgaria provides ready justification for
the removal of any Bulgarian Communist who has outlived his.
usefulness. The extent of the Bulgarian purges may also be .
attributed to the greater need for a strong, Pro-Soviet Communist .
Party in view of the absence of Soviet occupation troops. It is
believed that purges of Bulgarian Communist leaders will con-
tinue until enough younger Communists have been sufficiently
indoctrinated by the USSR to assume the responsibility of carrying
out Soviet orders faithfully and without regard for Bulgarian nation-
alist aspirations.
Hungarian Economy Hungary's continuing difficulty in meeting
its export commitments to Western Europe
is indicative of the problem facing the USSR in its attempts to
develop inter-orbit trade while simultaneously increasing the
pace of Satellite industrialization. Hungarian imports from West-
ern Europe are currently running 10 percent more than in 1949
and far in excess of exports, which are 35 percent less than in
1949. If this trend continues, Hungary will build up a 1950 deficit
of approximately $30 million. Western European trade is impor-
tant to Hungary as a source of industrial equipment unavailable in
the orbit. It appears, hoiever, that internal difficulties and the
great expansion. of Hungarian trade with the East are proving
greater obstacles than Western export controls to Hungary's
ability to obtain equipment needed for its industrial expansion
program.
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Rumanian Unrest Apparently made desperate by the pro-
longed drought, the government's forced
grain collection program, and the certainty of an enforced
collectivization program; the Rumanian peasants are resist-
ing the Communist regime with considerably more violence
this fall than in previous years. Resistance has apparently
been especially strong in Transylvania and Moldavia, the
Dobruja area and around Bucharest. Peasants have occasionally
burned crops to prevent them from falling into the hands of
authorities, driven out militia men sent to collect the grain, and
even seized control of some isolated localities. Attempts to
murder local Communist officials have increased. Thus far,
however, no effective, centrally-directed resistance has been
organized and peasant opposition is not likely to be a serious
threat to the regime. The effect of peasant opposition, how-
?
ever, will.be to delay the Communist collectivization program
or, if the regime attempts to push through collectivization
despite opposition, will probably cause a serious reduction in
Rumanian agricultural production with consequent adverse .
repercussions on the entire Rumanian economy.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST PLANS
Korean Intervention Fresh, newly-equipped North Korean
troops have appeared in the Korean
fighting, and it has been clearly established that Chinese Coin-
munist troop unita.are also oppo?ing.UN forces. ,Presentlield.
estimates are that between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese Commu-
nist troops organized in task force units are operating in North
Korea while the parent units remain in Manchuria. ? Finally,
current reports of Soviet-type jet. aircraft in the Antung-Sintiju
area indicate that the USSR may be providing at least logistic
air support for the defense of the Manchurian border.
These indications of increased Chinese Communist
support and assistance to North Korean forces point to a deci-
sion to establish a "cordon sanitaire" south of the Yalu River.
Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese
Communists, under Soviet direction; are committing themselves
to a full-scale intervention in Korea, their main objectives
.appear to be to guarantee the security of the .Manchurian border
and insure the continued flow of electric power from the vital
Suiho hydroelectric system to the industries of Manchuria. The
Suiho hydroelectric system is of vital importance to Manchuria,
and Peiping's apprehension may have been increased by the recent
statement of a South Korean general that allocation of power to
Manchuria would be cut off. The reported eva.cuation of industrial
machinery and civilian personnel from MuIthen, and intensification
of air-raid precautions in that city, appear to indicate that Peiping
anticipates possible UN retaliatory action against Communist
China for Peiping's activities in Korea.
Tibet Invasion Although Chinese Communist forces have probably
advanced toward Tibet, as reported in frequent
though unconfirmed press dispatches, it is not likely that any size-
able force has covered the 200 miles claimed in these reports or
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that Chinese Communist forces have in fact crossed the
Tibetan border as recognized by the US and the.Chinese.
The reported advance fits the pattern of Chinese Commu-
nist policy toward Tibet indicated by the publication on
24 October of a "political mobilization directive's to troop
units "which have been ordered to advance on Tibet," and
the transfer of Sino-Tibetan conversations from New Delhi
0 to Peiping. Apparently the Chinese Communists are increas-
ing their pressure on Tibet as rapidly as possible, short of
a sharppublic break with India. Meanwhile, regardless of
.whether the military occupation of Tibet has yet begun in
earnest, the Chinese Communists,by so firmly committing
themselves to liberating Tibet, have shown that they will
not permit prolonged dickering over the status of Tibet, and
Intend to proceed.with the "liberation" of that country soon.
0.
Taiwan Plans Meanwhile, the "liberation" of Taiwan un-
questionably remains a Chinese Communist
objective and invasion preparations are continuing, but an
invasion of Taiwan during 1950 does not appear likely.
O.
Peiping seems to have decided to exploit the possibilities of
controversy in the UN over US Far Eastern. policy. While
Insisting that the "question of Formosa:" does not exist, and
fl demanding that the question be dropped from the agenda of
the General Assembly, the Chinese Communists have accepted
the invitational the Security Councato discussions of US
0 'aggression" against China. They stand temporarily to lose
face at home, having promised the Seliberation" of Taiwan for
the last two years, but this is believed to be less serious in
their eyes at present than the risks of an operation in the face
of the US commitment to "neutralize" the island.
Overseas Chinese The recent celebrations in Southeast Asia
0 National Day on 1 October
rival Chinese holidays (Peiping's
and the Nationalist Double-Ten on
10 October) indicate increased dislike of the Peiping Communist
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regime among the Overseas Chinese throughout the region.
Overseas Chinese in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaya,
apparently reacting against vigorous Chinese Communist
efforts to control and exploit them gave surprisingly strong
and enthusiastic support to the Dol;ble-Ten celebration. It
would appear that the setback to Communism in Korea is the
factor primarily responsible and that the demonstrations
were more anti-Communist than pro-Kuomintang. The Kuomin-
tang is almost as discredited among Overseas Chinese as among
mainland Chinese and still offers little promise as a focus for
the active patriotism of the majority of Overseas Chinese.
Although the majority of Overseas Chinese appear to welcome
the containment of Communism in the Far East, they would
adjust themselves, prudently, if somewhat less readily, to new
Communist successes, such as a Communist victory in Indo-
china, that would seem to bode ultimate Communist domination
of Southeast Asia. In the present unsettled state of affairs, an
increasing number of Overseas Chinese will probably attempt
to remain aloof from both Peiping and Taipei.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
THE PHILIPPINES-
Huk Raids The Philippine Aimed Forces have been
? alerted against the possibility of stepped-up
Huk activity during the next several weeks as a result of the
capture on 17-18 October of Huk plans for widespread, co-
ordinated offensive operations. on 7 November. The Huks '
have thus been deprived of the element of surprise which in .
the past has been so largely responsible for the success of
their attacks. Despite this loss, there is no evidence to indi-
cate that the attacks have been called off. If undertaken, Huk
raids could cause extensive disturbance and destruction through-
out the Luzon countryside. The Philippine army and security
forces are believed capable of preventing the violent overthrow
of the Philippine Government by the Huks and defending the city
of Manila against attack. The Huks will, however, be able to
perform acts of terrorism in the Manila area, conduct raids'
at will throughout Luzon, and avoid destruction at the hands
of the Philippine Armed Forces. In fact, the activity of the
Huks has increased during recent weeks despite widespread
operations against them, thus indicating that government meas-
tri-es--against the Huks continue to be ineffective hi preventing -
a steady increase in Huk capabilities.
Bell Report Preliminary official reaction to the report sub-
mitted by the US economic survey mission headed
by Daniel Bell indicates that the Quirino adminis' tration, while
eagerly accepting ?US?grants and loans, will reSiSt the granting
of supervisory powers to a US technical mission and will only
reluctantly carry out the reform measures upon which US aid is
to be contingent.. The administration has apparently been so
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THE PHILIPPINES
confident of receiving substantial US aid that it has thus far
taken very few steps to remedy the deteriorating Philippine
economic situation.
KOREA
Unification Delays The stiffening of North Korean resistance
with Chinese Communist reinforcements,
in the mountains of North Korea, and the extent of guerrilla
activity to be eliminated elsewhere in Korea make probable a
considerable period of military and police action before elections
can be held to unify Korea. The present probability of a con-
siderable delay in the unification of Korea points up the many
problems involved in the interim administration of North Korea
under UN responsibility. One of the most pressing problems is
the establishment of interim administrative organizations capable
of contending with varied problems of security, relief, public health,
and the restoration and operation of public utilities. UN forces
have found that without exception all North Korean Communist
officials have fled their posts. There are no citizens with pre-
Communist government experience capable of managing municipal
affairs. US civil affairs officers lack knowledge of the Korean
language and are assigned to specific areas only temporarily,
molting forward with combat units. ROK national police, previously
taken northward with combat units, are now being sent back to the
south, and UN resolutions and directives to the UN Command gen.-
erally discourage the use of South Koreans in the establishment of
interim regimes in the north. Thus an administrative vacuum has
developed in North Korea, and if the existing confusion is prolonged,
the present favorable attitude of the North Korean populace toward
UN forces in likely to be dissipated.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Pleven Proposals The Pleven counterproposals for solving
the issue of eventual German rearmament,
though primarily intended to link the rearmament of Europe
with its long-term political integration, have in effect postponed
a decision by the other NAT powers on Germany's contribution to
the defense of Europe. Initial West German reaction to the move
? indicates that Adenauer will be faced with a severe test in the
forthcoming foreign policy debate set for 15 November in the
Bundestag, when the opposition is likely to make political capital
of Adenauer's stand on remilitarization.
Official West German comments on the Pleven proposals,
while generally moderate, have indicated strong objection to
the French proposals: (1) to make German remilitarization con-
ditional on successful conclusion of Schuman Plan negotiations;
and (2) to assign an inferior role to the German forces in European
defense. Bundestag leaders have already attack-ed- as ."political
blackmail" the linking of the Schuman Plan to remilitarization.
? Schumacher, the SPD leader, is in favor of rejecting remilitaiiiation
unless conditions of German equality and security are met, and
may insist on a plebiscite or a new election before dealing with
the issue. In general, Protestant and Socialist opinion, already
critical of the security measures proposed by Adenauer, is likely
to become still more unfavorable to Adenauer in the face of the
continued French reluctance to rely on German cooperation in
defense of Western Europe.
FRANCE
Labor. Unity The recent national congress of the Socialist-
oriented Force Ouvriere (FO) clearly indicated
that the TO has made no great progress toward supplanting the
Communist-led General Confederation of Labor (CGT) as the
latUnglMano,
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dominant labor confederation of France. The FO's oppor-
tunity to increase its influence at the expense of the CGT
has been steadily improving for two years. The CGT was
badly discredited by the failures of its previous strike
campaigns, the Communist Party has lost prestige as a
result of events in Korea, and-management has lately been
negotiating wage agreements only with the non-Communist
unions. But the leaders of the FO remain badly divided over
the question of unification of non-Communist labor. This
division and the consequent weakness of FO can be expected
to work to the advantage of the Communists -- who are in-
creasing efforts to exploit the workers' legitimate economic
grievances -- as the rise in living costs continues and it
becomes more evident that management is firmly opposed to
an increase in real wages until there is measurable improve-
ment in productivity.
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DISTRIBUTION
1 The President
2,3,4,5 Secretary of State
6,7,8 Secretary of Defense
9 Secretary of the Army
10 Secretary of the Navy
11,.,... . . Secretary of the Air Force
12 Spetial Assistant to the President, W.A.Harriman
130.4,15 Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17 Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
18 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
19 ..... . . . Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
20 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22 Chief of Staff, US Army
23,24,25 Chief of Naval Operations
26,27,28 Chief' of Staff, US Air Force
29 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army
30 Deputy Chief of Staff, (OperationS), Air Force
31 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
32 Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35. . . . .Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45,100 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53154155,56,
57,58,59,60. Director of Naval Intelligence
61,62,63,64,65,66,
67,68,69. . Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70 Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71 Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
- Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85; . . Chief Acquisition and Distribution Div. OCD State
86 Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
87 USAF Rep. on Joint Strategic Survey Committee
88 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
89,90 Administrator, Economic Cooperations Administration
91 Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
92 Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93 Deputy Director, Joint Staff
94,95,96 Director Armed Forces Security Agency
97 Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup
98 Secretary of the Air Force
99 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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