NEAR EAST PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400110001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

- ~. ? ocr 1950
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Page
HIGHLIGHTS. ... ......................... 1
NEAR EAST PROBLEMS
Afghan "Invasion"~ of Pakistan ....... ... 2
Ethiopian Coup . ~........................ 2
Syrian Instability ....................... 3
The Palestine Issue :.................... 3
Iranian Economy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4
KOREAN SITUATION
Military Tactics,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,;;,,,,,, 5
Economic Recovery:,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, 5
Political Disputes , , , , , , , , , , , , , , g
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Indochinese Military Situation , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 7
French~Indochinese Political `im_ passer ......... 7
Ambon Rebellion in Indonesia ...... , ........ g
Indonesia andMDAP~,,,,,,,,,,,;,,,.,,,,, g
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS .?
Italian Politics . ............ _ ... .... 10
West German Cabinet Changes.... ........ 11
Auth: DD RtG. 77 1763
Date: ~ Sy: OZ3
Document No.
I40 CHANGE Sn Class. ~
DECLASSIFIED
ass. CHANGED T0: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
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In carrying out their intention to defy the UN peace
ultimatum and continue resistance throughout Korea as long
as possible, the Nortl- Korean forces can count on material
assistance from the USSR and Communist China. They will
be forced to rely largely on their own manpower resources,
however, except in the unlikely event of direct Chinese or
Soviet intervention. (see page 5). The North Koreans now have
at their disposal approximately 140,000 troops, of which only
40,000 have seen combat in the south. Although this force will
be.capabie of stiff defensive action at key points, .it probably
lacks both the strength. and experience necessary to continue
prolonged organized resistance.
French forces in Indochina. have suffered their most
disastrous defeat in the war with Viet Minh forces in an.
engagement in which four French battalions were virtually
annihilated (see page 7). Viet Minh capabilities for an eventual
decisive assault against the French. have been greatly increased
by this victory. Meanwhile, the political relationship between
the Bao Dai Government and the French has not improved. Fight-
ing elsewhere in. Southeast Asia, between the rebel Ambonese and
Indonesian Government troops, threatens to bring international
repercussions to the n.ew Republic of Indonesia (see page $). At
the same tfine, the recent decision of that government to refuse
further MDAP atd emphasi2es the strong Indonesian sentiment
for neutrality in the East-West conflict, '
Recent developments in the Near. East point up several
continuing problems which contribute to instability in. the area
(see page 2). In the Palestine region, little progress toward a
peace settlement between Israel and Jordan was made in a recent
meeting between Israeli officials and King Abdullah. In Pakistan,
the recent Afghan "invasi.on" is potentially serious in that it
could lead to sever. a Pakistani countermeasures. Meanwhile,
political unrest continues to brew in Ethiopia and Syria.
 Recent events point up continuing problems. in various
parts of the Near East. The major questions of Kashmir and
Palestine are still unx?esolved, relations between Afghanistan
and Pakistan are deteriorating, Syria is unsettled politically,
there is danger of revolution in Ethiopia, and Iran is still
beset with pressing economic and .political problems.
Afghan "Invasion'" No serious military complications are
expected as a result of the recent Afghan
"invasion" of Pakistan, but an increase in such incidents could
lead to Pakistani countermeasures which might, have serious
repercussions for Afghanistan; The Pakistanis are aroused be~
cause they.feel border incidents would be rare ff the Afghan
Government ceased its propaganda attacks against Pakistan
in its attempts to pr.~omote an autonomous Pathan state, and the
government has reiterated its firm intention not to yield "one
inch of Pakistan's soil," Hostile Afghan propaganda is likely
to continue, however, and Pakistan may decide to take forcible
countermeasures, the two major courses of action. open to it
being the cutting off of all Afghan trade through Pakistan and
the incitement of tribal revolt in Afghanistan. The first method
could force Afghanistan into economic vassalage to the USSR;
the second might invite Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and
stimulate similar disorders within Pakistan's own territory.
Ethiopian Coup Dissatisfaction with the central government
in Ethiopia, as evidenced earlier in 1950 by
serious disturbances in Gojjam Prodimce,'has~increased con-
siderably, .and a substantial opposition group is reportedly
preparing a revolution, possibly to take place as early as
November, The revolutionary opposition is said to include
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several high officers of trhe Tmpex~?al Guard, the most efficent
.Ethiopian military unit, t? which, case'the plot would have good
chances of success, The opposition group was formed largely
in protest against corruption on the part of such high officials
as Minister of Finance Hapte Woldg -accounts of the plot call
for the exiling of the Emperor, the execution of corrupt officials,
and the insiallati.on of the Crown Prince on the throned These
accounts are given some support by the fact that the Crown
Prince left; Ethiopia suddenly on 5 August, possibly in order to .
remain out of trouble until the coup is effected,
Syrian Instability Hopes for a stable regime in Syria following
the adoption of the new constitution have
been dimmed by the current controversy in Parliament ,over the
army's arrestr of several parliament deputies on charges of
treasonable relations with Jordan., The arrests haee provoked
stormy debates concerned more with the point of violation of
parliamentary immunity than with the substantive question of
the existence of a plot against the regime, The fact that Prime
Minister Qudsi, who in the past has voiced displeasure over
military interference in civil affairs, is supporting the army.
in the prese~atr instance may indicate that a serious piotr against
the government has in. fact been discovered, but no specific
evidence has been made public, and some local opinion believes
the charges were trumped up tro discredit the oppositions
Palestine Issue Littrle proga~ess froward an Israeli-Jordan .
peace settlement was achieved by the secret
2 October meeting between King Abdullah and Israeli officials
at Amman. The resignation of the Jordanian Prime Minister on
1 October furnished a chilly atmosphere for A3idullah's expression
of hope at this meeting chat some agreement might soon be reached
between Jordan and Israel, The smoulderf;ng opposition to any
settlement with Israel felt by so many Jordanians-~partricularly
 those from Palestine--came out into the open afier the
Israelis occupied the disputed Yarmuk territory a few
weeks ago. Abdullah, who was none too fond of the old
Cabinet, accordingly finds himself facing real difficulty
in obtaining a strong replacement which will support hi.s
general desire for an Israeli-Jordanian peace pact. Since
even the Israeli officials who conferred with Abdullah in
Amman were skeptical of Jordan's willingness and' ability
to undertake serious dtscussioiYS, an Israeli-Jordanian peace
settlement continues to remain. in the visionary stage.
Iranian Economy The Eximbank's decision to loan Iran
$25 million should serve immediately
to bolster waning US prestige in Iran and possibly to check
the growing popular receptivity to the USSR's friendly ap-
proaches toward Iran. The welcome for the loan may be-
come tempered, however, when the public realizes that the
Majlis must make official provision for the servicing and
repayment of the loan anal that Eximbank officials must
approve specific projects before the credits actuallg begin
to flow. Although the Iranian Government should be able to
provide for its financial obligations under the loan (by secur. -
ti~g British consent for conversion of sterling if other dollar
sources prove insufficient), the Majlis is not geared to en-
acting the necessary legislation promptly. Moreover, the
process of working out technical project details and getting
them approved is also an essentially time-consuming one.
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TOP SECRET
KOREAN SITUATION
Milita-*~y Tactics Despite 4he UN peace ultimatum, the.
North Koreans have reiterated their
determination to continue resistance throughout Korea for
a~ long as possible. Although the North Koreans will con-
tinue tm receive substantial material assistance from the
USSR and Communist China; they, will be forded to rely
largely on theix? own' manpower resources, except in the
unlikely event ~ dna?ect Chinese Communist or Soviet intern
vention. Some Korean units may stall be transferred from
.Chinese armies to North Korea and Peiping may send a
few Chinese troops across the Xalu River to protect its
bridges and the hydroelectric plant at Suiho. The principal
.Chinese Communist contribution, however; probably will
consist of military and other supplies, bases for'reorganiz-
ing and re-equipping North Korean troops, and sanctuary
for North Korean leaders chaa~ged with directing long-term
guerrilla. resistance, The North Koreans, meanwhile, prob-
ably now have at their dnsposal approximately 15 major units
of division size or less, comprising approximately 140,000
men: Only 40,000 of these have seen combat in the south,
the remainder being. hastily ta?ained conscripts with little
combat efficiency. The entice a force, while capable of stiff
.defensive actloa at key points, is estimated to lack the '
strength or experience to continue prolonged orgaa~ized
resistance.
Economic Recovery With the exception a~ff .the food supply
situation, the South Koreans face a
formidable task i1n ecorzomic recons9a?uction, The .speedy
recapture of southwestern Korea, coupled with an exceptionally
good rice crop, assures the country of ample supplies of rice
when the harvest begins to reach the ua?ban markets in early
December. The South Korea_u industaial. system, however, has
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TOP SECRET '
been brought to near ruin. The textile industry has been
reduced from more than 150,000 spindles to 4,000. The
machine tools and metals industry is believed to be either
almost totally destroyed or removed to North Korea. The
railroad and highway systems have suffered severely and
darsage to electric power installations will be a major
obstacle to economic recovery. Perhaps the most immediate
and pressing task facing the ROK Government will be that of
housing more than one million South Koreans who have lost
their homes in the fighting.
Political Disputes Serious and explosive issues are likely
to develop as the new seven-nation UN
Korean Commission undeirtakes the task of "holding elections
for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic
government in the sovereign state of Korea." The major con-
troversy will be over whether. to:~(1) make a fresh start by
holding elections throughout the country for an entirely new
government; or (2) merely hold, UN-supervised elections in
North Korea to fill the 100 seats "reserved" in the present
ROK Assembly for representatives from that area. President
Rhee and other ROK leaders feel strongly that the second alter-
native is all that is necessary, and will oppose strenuously any
UN effort to hold new nation-wide elections. Even in the event
that the UN Commission accepts Rhee's contention, additional
disputes will arise ff Rhee insists on enforcing ROK election
laws and security legislation in. North Korea, which would bar
Communists from voting.
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TOP SECRET
Indochina Military In the most disastrous defeat yet sus-
~ tained by the French is the Indochina war,
four French battalions have been virtually annihilated in the
China border area by an organized Viet Mfnh force of more than
16,000 men. Although heavy casualties sustained by the Viet Minh
will probably preve~ them from pressing their immediate advan-
tage, Viet Minh capabilities far an eventual decisive assault against
the French have been greatly enhanced. The- Viet Minh now control
a stretch of 300 miles along the Chinese-Vietnam frontier and
will probably soon capture the major remaining western French
outpost of Laokay, northwest of Hanoi at the juncture of the Red
River and the China border. This: latest Viet, Minh operation
provides no fresh evidence of Chinese Communist intervention, but
the size of the attack is praba~bly attributable to the training and
material aid received by the Viet Minh from China; elimination of
the French border posts will permit a substantial increase in the
flaw of material aid from China. The military situation in northern
Indochina. is now approaching on.e of positional warfare which will
.permit a Viet Minh build-up .of military formations of much more
formidable size and armament than those which have been used
against the French in the guerrilla warfare of the past several years.
Political Impasse Although recent deterioration i.n the French
military position is largely responsible for
the announced departure for Indochina of Minister for the Associ-
ated States of Indochina Letourneau, General juin, Commander of
French Forces in North Africa, and the reported intention of Bao
Dai to return shortly, there is still no indict3tfon that the French
have abandoned their belief in the primary necessity for a military
solution in Vietnam or are more willing than previously to make
political concessions to the Vietnamese. ~ Bao Dai's long-delayed
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return to Indochina will do little to compensate for the blow
to Vietnamese nationalist aspia?ations resulting from the '
failure of the Indochinese and French thus far to reach agree
ment at the' Pau?Conference; The inability of the conferees to
resolve their differences; after four months'of negotiations,
not only has had unfavorable repercussions on relations be-,
tween Franc? and Vietnam, but has seriously delayed imple-
mentation of the ECA program and establishment of adequate
administrative maohinery in the Associated States. The central
issue of the conference has been the long-standing dispute over
allocation of customs revenue, As long as the French refuse
to make concessions on this point, which the Vietnamese regard
as an essential first step to further independence, there is little
likelihood of early widespread Vietnamese support of the French
effort to eradicate the Viet Minh,
Ambon Rebellion The battle now in progress between Indo-
nesian Government troops and rebel Ambonese
on the island of Ambon, near New Guinea,may have unfavorable
domestic and international repercussions for the new Republic of
'Indonesia, The fighting resulted from the,:Ambonese attempt.to
establish an autonomous "Republic of the.Sduth`Moluccas," By
initiating hostilities, however, the Indonesian Government has
risked international censure for not having attempted a peaceful
solution using the good offices of the Ulv Commission stationed
there. Meanwhile, government forces are apparently. not having
much success in suppressing the rebellion, a prolonged military
campaign would be an additional blow to the new state's prestige.
The presence in Java of at least 20,000 Ambonese "troops who
formerly served with the Royal Netherlands Indies Army presents
another complication. The Indonesian Government cannot afford
to repatriate them under present circumstances and may face
serious difficulties in controlling them, Moreover, the Ambonese
issue may well prove an ob?tacle to success of the forthcoming
 ~~_~
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~~ TOP SECRET
Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on the disposition of New Guinea,
with: (1) the Indonesians accusing the Dutch of using New
Guinea.as a base for intrigue against the Indonesian Government;
and (2) the Dutch charging Indonesia with having violated The
Hague Round Table Agreement by refusing to grant the Ambonese
autonomy in a federated Indonesia.
Indonesia and MDAP The decision of the Indonesian Govern-
ment to reject further military aid
through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) empha-
sizes the strong .sentiment i.n Indonesia for a neutral policy in
the East-West conflict. 'The government feared that acceptance
of MDAP aid would lay it open to charges of having sided defi-'
nitely with the West. Moreover, at a time'when the Cabinet is
facing a critical vote of confiaerce, the government did not
wish to risk being overthrown by agreeing to MDAP terms, the
restrictions of which would be opposed by certain political in-
terests as an impingement on Indonesian sovereignty. The Indo-
nesian decision does not foreshadow abandonment of the past
friendly attitude the US.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
.Cabinet Changes The recent sharp increase in public
criticism of the financial policies of the .
Italian Government will. probably result in several shifts in
the De Gasperi Cabinet within the next few' months. -The
immediate occasion of the present controversy is'an unauthor-
ized statement of an ECA ouficial warning the Italian Govern-
ment of the consequences of its failure to encourage long-term
investment: The issue itself is not new. The government has
long been under pressure to accept the risks of inflation and
adopt a program of industrial investment designed to reduce
the chronic mass unemployment in Italy. The left wing within
the Christian Democratic Party has attacked the government's
conservative financial policy, has?been gaining influence within
the party as a result, and?will continue to exploit the issue.
The right-wing Socialists, who have criticized the government
on the same score, will continue to do so, emphasizing the
dangers of extensive unemployment. They may also seek to
use the issue as 'a basis for reuniting all anti-Communist
Socialists and may even th.~?eaten to withdraw support from
the De Gasperi Government. De Gasperi is not ]3kely to
make any immediate changes, for in so doing he would in
effect be acknowledging the justice of the criticism, but in
.due course he is likely to reshuffle his Cabinet partly in rep
spouse to the iaicseased political pressure generated by the
presentcontroversy.
 ~T A~~ .[LZ'Rr~
Cabinet Changes The resignation on 9 October of Federal
Minister of the Interior Gustzv Heinemann
removes from the Adenauer Cabinet the one settled opponent of
:Western German rearmament anal the principal representative of
German Protestantism. Dr. Robert Lehr, a Bundestag member
in Adenauer's Party, has been named as Heinemann's successor.
The occasion. for Heirnemazrn's resignation fs reported to have
been his refusal to disassociate himself from the views of Pastor
Martin Niemoeller, who recently accused Adenauer of provoking
war through his support of German participation in Western
.European defense. Heinemann., who has maintained extensive
personal contacts in East Germany, has long opposed .rearmament
in any form and has been reluctant to support any other steps that
might intensify East-West tension. Besides disagreeing with.
Adenauer on broad policy, he has contributed to Adenauer's dif-
ficulties by insisting that all police questions be placed under the
exclusive contr. of oi' his ministry, Heinemann's departure has
cleared the way for the creation of a Commissioner for External
Security with Cabinet rank, who will be responsible for the estab-
lishment of German military units and the direction of the federal
intelligence service, Theodor Blank, a Christian. trade union leade2?,
is reportedly slated for this post.
The ouster of Heinemann, one of the leading German Pro-
testant laymen, is likely to alienate Protestant electoral support
to a considerable degree, despite Lehr's religious affiliation, and
will induce a more hostile attitude toward the Feder. al Government
on the part of the Evangelical Church hierarchy thaiz it has pre-
viously displayed, The SPD has already indicated its support of
Heinemann in this situation, and may attempt to exploit Protestant
anger over the issue to br. ing about aProtestant-Socialist front of
opposition against any form of German rearmament, The likelihood
of such a development will be greatly increased ii final decision on`
German contribution to Western European defense is indefinitely
postponed.
 DECLASSIFIED
ss. CH1SvGED T0:
2,3,4,5:..... , Secretary of State Auth:
6,7,8:.... , .. Secretary of Defense Date:
9. , ......... Secretary of the Ar. my
10, . , ........ Secretary of the Navy
- - ---. ~~_ oo l
11. , . , ....... Secretary of the Air Force
12, , , , . , ..... Special Assistant to the President, W.A,Harrfman
13,14,15, , , , , . , Chairman, National Security Resources :Board
16,17, , ....... Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
18... , ......: Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
19. , , ...... , . Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
20, .......... Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22, > , ...... Chief of Staff, US Army
23,24,25, ...... Chief of Naval Operations
26,27,28. , , , , . , Chief of Staff, US Air Force
29, , , , , , , , , , , Assistant Chief of Staff, G~3, Ope.rations,US Army
30, , . , , , ..... Deputy Chief of Staff (Operati.ons), US Air Force
? 31, , . , , .... , : Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operati.ons)
32? , . , , ... Director of Plans and Operations, 'US Air Force
36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45, , . ,
46,47,48,49,50,51,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, US Army
52,53,54,55,56, :??'
57,58,59,60...
61,62,63,64,65,66,
67,68,69, , , , , ,
71..... .....
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85. , , .. .
86........,..
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition and Distribut$on Div,,:OCD, State
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
USAF Rep> on Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Director, Federal Bur. eau of Investigation
Admfxxistrator~, Economic Cooperation. Administration
Deputy Dir. ector. for Intelligence,T.he Joint Staff
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Ambassador At Large Philig C, ,Jessup
Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
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