THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
HIGHLIGHTS ....... .....
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
. .
Page
1
East-West Struggle. .... . . ..........
2
Korean Question? . . ..... . ?
? .
. . ? ?
3
? EAST-WEST RELATIONS
r '
West German Remilitarization .... ? . ?
4
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,
5
Iran-USSR..................?
. ....
..7
German Communists
SOVIET/COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
Communist China and Korea
9
Sovzone War Production . . . 0 . ? . . . ?
.....
10
? Japanese Communists . . ? ? ? ? .... .
......
11
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
Yugoslav Food Crisis. . . . . .......
12
Austrian Coalition Difficulties
13
Indonesian Cabinet... . . . . . .......
. .
. . .
13
South Korean Politics. . ..... . . ......
14
ARTICLE
North Korean Transportand Supply
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15
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HIGHLIGHTS
With the exception of the Western Foreign Ministers
meetings in New York, there were few developments during
the week having a major bearing on US security. The tense-
ness of East-West relations, however, is causing increased
speculation regarding the implications of possible future -
actions by the USSR and the Western Powers.
For example, it became clear that the forthcoming
General Assembly session will be long and bitter, with most
deliberations being overshadowed more than in any previous
session by the struggle between the US and the USSR, parti-
cularly over Asian matters (see page 2);
Soviet reaction to the remilitarization of West Ger-
many was also becoming of vital concern; present indications
point to no early substantial change in Soviet policy either
as a result of West German remilitarization or an increase
in Western occupation forces (see page 4).
In the Far East, UN amphibious landings in Korea
focussed attention on the possible commitment of Chinese
Communist forces to the fighting; continued Soviet reluctance
to expand the Korean conflict as well as various political
disadvantages appear to preclude such a development (see
page 9).
The serious agricultural shortages in Yugoslavia
may develop into the gravest threat to the Tito Government
since the Cominform break (see page 12). Because the
critical situation can only be alleviated by substantial dollar
?aid, the question of Yugoslav-Soviet relations was again
being examined; all available evidence points to the im-
probability of a rapprochement (see page 5).
CUCCE2111BEERMaill
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THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
East-West Struggle Delegates gathering for the Fifth
Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, which opens at Lake Success on 19 Sep-
tember, can expect a long and bitter meeting during which
the struggle between the US and the USSR will, more than in
any previous session, overshadow most deliberations. Al-
though the crucial issues of a new Western policy toward
Germany and Western European 'rearmament are not before
the UN, the Assembly will run head on into the East-West
struggle when it considers such key Asian issues as Chinese
representation and Korea: Debate on these issues will be
acrimonious and will be exploited as an integral part of the
Soviet propaganda campaign to picture the US as the aggres-
sor in Asia. In addition to theseiissues, the US and the USSR
will also clash in their attembts to maintain the initiative on
other fronts. The USSR will bitterly oppose US proposals to
strengthen the UN's ability to take united action against aggres-
sion. The US plan involves: (1) measures to facilitate GA action
when the Security Council is blocked by the veto; (2) creation of
a roving fact-finding and observation commission to act as a
deterrent to aggression in threatened areas; and (3) the estab-
lishment of national "UN" armed contingents to repel aggression.
The US will also attempt to place the USSR on the defensive by
raising the question of Soviet retention of German and Japanese
prisoners of war. Meanwhile, the Soviet propaganda campaign,
in addition to stressing the contrast of Soviet championship of
peace and self-determination with Western aggression in Asia,
will rely heavily on the Stockholm Appeal as proof of world
censure of US "warmongers" and possibly as a basis for again
raising the atomic energy question.
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Korean Question As the Security Council continues to
consider the military aspects of the
Korean question, the General Assembly's role will be to
work out a plan for Korea's future :rafter. the termination
of hostilities. Although hdeliberations-will not be subject to
the veto and Asian members will have a greater opportunity
to participate, the GA will face serious difficulties in reach-
ing any agreement as long as hostilities continue. The GA
has previously gone on record in favor of Korean unification;
re-examination of this issue in the light of the present con-
flict will require a decision on whether to work out a plan
for all Korea or for just that part south .of the 38th Parallel.
Regardless of the outcome of this question, the GA will prob-
ably discuss a rehabilitation program for Korea, an interim
authority to see the Koreans through the convalescence period
at the conclusion of the fighting, and plans to prepare for
Korean elections under UN auspices. The most likely GA
action would be to set up a stronger Korean commission with
greater Asiatic representation or, as an alternative, a single
UN commissioner. Trusteeship, completely distasteful to
the Koreans, will probably receive scant, if any, consideration.
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
German Militarization As the Western Powers discuss
the problem of rearming West
Germany and increasing their occupation forces, there are
no indications that these actions, by themselves, would cause
any early, substantial change in Soviet policy. In East Germany,
the development of the Alert Police into a fully equipped mili-
tary force would be pressed with even greater vigor than at
present. East German Communist propaganda has long accused
the Western occupation powers of re-arming West Germany;
actual remilitarization would intensify this clamor and produce
Soviet charges that the Yalta and Potsdam agreements had been
violated.
The Kremlin has probably realized for some time that
its global policy and the creation of the East German Alert
Police would lead to some form of West German remilitarization.
Basically, the Kremlin would regard this remilitarization as an
extension of current Western efforts to strengthen Europe's de-
fensive potential rather than as an immediate threat to its con-
trol of East Germany. The Kremlin would continue its present
policy of relying on non-military Communist techniques in the
hope that economic difficulties in West Germany will multiply
and eventually provide new opportunities for Communist ex-
pansion.
The USSR would not change its policy largely because
West German remilitarization would not eliminate the dis-
advantages to the USSR of adopting either of the two courses
of action open to A involving the use of military force. For
example, the East German Alert Police, apparently designed
as an instrument of military aggression against West Germany,
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will probably not be adequate for that purpose during 1951,
and West German remilitarization will act as a further
deterrent to a Soviet-inspired invasion of West Germany
by East German forces. Similarly, with respect to military
action by Soviet troops, the considerations which have thus
far deterred the USSR from taking this step will continue
to apply for some time, principally reluctance to initiate
global war until ultimate victory over the West is assured.
On the other hand, the possibility cannot be excluded that
the USSR may conclude that West German participation in
the Western European defense system would eventually
make Western Europe a threat to the Soviet orbit and practi-
cally invulnerable to further Communist expansion. Such a
conclusion could, of course, lead to a Soviet attack on Western
Europe, and would be reached, if at all, only as it became clear
that the Western European defense system was attaining sub-
stantial effectiveness.
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Despite occasional speculation
and rumors of dubious origin
regarding a possible rapprochement between Moscow and Bel-
grade, all available evidence indicates that the cleavage between
the USSR and the Tito Government has appreciably widened
since the original break on 28 June 1948. Moreover, it is
estimated that the extent of the cleavage as well as overriding
reasons of self-interest and prestige in the case of both Tito
and the Kremlin renders such a rapprochement improbable.
The ideological-political conflict between the Kremlin
and the Tito Government has sharpenened during the past year
and remains the prime deterrent to a Soviet-Yugoslav rapproche-
ment. The Titoist alternative to Kremlin-dominated Communism
constitutes a dangerous ideological threat to the Soviet monolithic
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structure; any concession to the Yugoslav thesis of equality
between national Communist parties or states would undermine
the whole edifice of Soviet power. For their part, the Yugoslav
leaders appear increasingly convinced:that the present Soviet
'leadership is irrevocably committed to a policy of militant
imperialism. The Communist leaders of Yugoslavia also prob-
ably realize that any acceptance of a "working arrangement"
with the present Soviet regime Would be at best a fragile oppor-
tunistic expedient, entailing ultimate submission to Moscow and
their personal liquidation,
. Since mid-1949 the economic break between the Soviet
orbit and Yugoslavia has been virtually complete, necessitating
a shift of the Yugoslav economy toward the West with the attendant
transitional difficulties. Having been forded at great cost to re-
adjust its entire economy as a result of the Soviet blockade, the
Tito Government is more likely to count upon Western assistance
and trade than to sacrifice this support in exchange for a renewal
of Soviet exploitation. ?
The Korean aggression has apparently caused the Tito
Government to revise its previous estimate that the USSR would
not "Seek its elimination through overt military action. In view
of the Soviet build-up of the Satellite armies and the accumulation
of military supplies in the Balkan area over recent months, the
Yugoslav Government, though apparently not regarding an attack
as imminent, probably views with growing concern the threat of.
Soviet/Satellite aggression. The Belgrade Government, therefore,
is proceeding with several long-range precautionary measures
designed to maintain the combat-readiness of its forces.
Meanwhile, the Tito Government is apparently convinced
that it should, for ideological and political reasons' limit itself
to denouncing all aggression but otherwise adhere to an
dependent position between the "East-West Power blocs." Although
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the Tito Government has avoided openly identifying itself
with the West, it appears hopeful that within the UN framework
the US will support Yugoslavia's independence. Yugoslavia's
attitude toward the US and its relations with the non-Communist
world have registered some improvement and this trend will
probably continue as the question of Yugoslav survival becomes
more critical and Western support becomes more tangible.
Iran-USSR The current Soviet conciliation campaign and
Iranian disappointment over the non-appearance
of Western economic help have produced a notable increase in
pro-Soviet and anti-US feeling among the Iranian press and
public. Despite the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's recent decision
to reverse its previous stand and grant Iran an eight-million
pound advance against royalties (a move which should ease Iran's
immediate financial situation), public support will probably con-
tinue to drift .away from the West until substantial US economic
assistance arrives. The Stiviet peace campaign, however, is
also a major cause for this trend of opinion. Although Premier
Razmara and other responsible officials continue to be wary of
falling into Soviet traps, the combination of bitterness toward
the West and wishful thinking about the possibility of friendly re-
lations with the USSR among the population at large paves the
way for further Soviet gains in Iran.
German Communists The Communist-inspired rally of "youth
for peace," scheduled to be held at
Dortmund in the British Zone on 30 September and 1 October, will
increase tension in West Germany and will test:. (1) the willingness
of West German Communists to implement at personal risk the
policy of "national resistance" directed by the East German
Socialist Unity. (Communist) Party; (2) the extent to which West
German authorities are prepared to go in resisting Communist
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subversion; and (3) the reliability and effectiveness of West
German police and Laender officials in coping with Com-
munist civil disobedience. The scheduled rally has been
banned by West German officials, but spokesmen of the
Communist Free German Youth have stated that the peace
demonstration will be held, and attempts Will probably also
be made to extend the demonstrations to several other Ruhr
cities. Although the police will probably be capable of pre-
venting extensive rioting, some violence will almost in-
evitably result, particularly in view of the increasing willing-
ness of West German Communists to provoke the police to
retaliatory action. The importance attached by the Communists
to increasing West German tension appears to outweigh the risk
that increased violence will result in the legal banning of the
Party and also demonstrate the need for an expanded West
German police force.
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SOVIET/ COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
Communist China and Korea
Military Assistance Numerous reports of Chinese Com-
munist troop movements in Manchuria,
coupled with Peiping's recent charges of US aggression and
violations of Chinese territory, have increased speculation
concerning both, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea'
and disagreement between the USSR and China on matters of
military policy. It is being argued that victory in Korea can
only be achieved by using Chinese Communist (or Soviet)
forces, that the USSR desires to weaken the US by involving
it in a protracted struggle with China, and that the Chinese
Communists are blaming the USSR for initiating the Korean
venture and thus postponing the invasion of Taiwan. Despite
the apparent logic of this reasoning, there is no evidence in-
dicating a Chinese-Soviet disagreement, and cogent political
and military considerations make it unlikely that Chinese Com-
munist forces will be directly and openly committed in Korea.
Global War The commitment of Chinese Communist forces in
Korea, by enlarging the scope of the conflict,
would substantially increase the risk of general war. Soviet
actions since the Korean fighting began indicate that the USSR
still not only wishes to avoid global war but believes it can
make substantial gains in Asia by continuing its strategy of
relying on indigenous "liberation" forces assisted, but not to
the point of overt intervention, by neighboring Communist regimes.
Political Difficulties Purely aside from these considerations,
and even if the USSR were willing to
assume a greater risk of general war, commitment of Chinese
Communist forces in Korea would entail serious political dif-
ficulties for both the USSR and the Peiping regime. It would tend
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to strain rather than solidify the Chinese-Soviet alliance,
partly because in the event of the conflict spreading to
China, the Peiping regime would expect substantial aid
beyond mere material assistance from the USSR, aid which
the USSR would be reluctant to grant for fear of itself be
involved in the conflict. The Soviet Union consequently
might face serious political problems in retaining control
over Peiping and Pyongyang, and prospects for Communist
China's admission to the UN would be virtually eliminated.
Indirect Aid The decision to provide indirect assistance,
such as the commitment of Manchurian
"volunteer" units, would present some difficulties. More-
over, victory, might not be assured by the maximum scale
of such indirect assistance. If large numbers. of non-Korean
manpower were necessary, they probably could not be supplied
without being recognizable as direct Chinese Communist inter-
vention, thus inviting retaliation against China by UN forces,
as would direct involvement.
Interim Considerations Although decisive Chinese Communist
intervention, either direct or indirect,
is thus unlikely, both the USSR and the Peiping regime will con-
tinue their attempts to exploit Western fears of this eventuality.
Charges of US border violations and aggression not only fit into
the "peace" propaganda campaign but are designed by increasing
Western fear of Chinese Communist military action to obtain
Western political concessions for the Peiping regime as well
as to create an atmosphere for obtaining a favorable settlement
in Korea.
Sovzone War Production The first Five Year Plan (1951-5)
of the Soviet Zone of Germany is
aimed primarily at augmenting economic war potential. If
successful, the plan will greatly enlarge armament production
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within the Soviet-orbit and place East Germany in a comt
mandirg industrial position among the Satellites. Greatest
Increases are planned in the production of steel, chemicals,
vehicles, precision instruments, and machinery. Fulfillment
of the plan will depend largely upon Soviet orbit collaboration
and will lessen East German dependence upon Western Europe.
The program for agricultural expansion is moderate, in
? comparison to the capital construction and production programs,
? although the socialization of agriculture will be accelerated and
will follow the pattern prevailing in the other Satellites.
Japanese Communists Various reports indicating a widening
division within the Japanese Communist
Party between the so-called "Centrist" and "Internationalist"
cliques suggest the possibility of a permanent rupture which
would considerably reduce the Party's potential for underground
activity. The cleavage is a direct outgrowth of the "Cominform
criticism" alined at the Party leadership in January 1950, the
"Internationalists" contending that "Centrist" policy has not?
changed radically enough since the criticism. The rift has
apparently reached such a critical stage that the "Centrists,"
who control 70-75 percent of the Party's membership, can
hardly hope to restore satisfactory Party unity, and the purges
instituted by both sides will probably continue. There is no
indication, to date, that Moscow has given its support to either
side.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
YUGOSLAVIA
Food Crisis An extensive drought has produced a crisis
in Yugoslav agriculture which may develop
into the gravest threat to the Tito Government since the
Cominform break. An estimated grain deficit of as much ?
as 800,000 tons will require imports of grains and other food
stuffs valued at more than $50 million in order to prevent
hardship and some degree of starvation before the next har-
vest. The Tito Government believes the public, already alarmed
by current scarcities of seasonable produce and rising food prices,
might be panicked if permitted to know the full extent of the pro-
spective food shortage. The over-all economic effects of the
crop shortages will be to: (1) adversely affect the Five Year
Plan; (2) reduce Yugoslav exports by 12-15 percent; (3) tighten
food rationing and further lower living standards; and (4) in-
crease discontent among workers, causing a further reduction
in efficiency and production. As industrial recovery under the
Five Year Plan is curtailed and food shortages increase in deficit
areas, popular disaffection with the Tito Government will mount,
and Cominform pressures against the regime are likely to intensify.
Efforts of the Yugoslav leaders to relax some of the more repres-
sive aspects of the Communist police state in order to win a larger
measure of internal support, which earlier in the year appeared to
be meeting with some degree of success, will be largely nullified.
Although the strength of Tito's internal security forces is con-
sidered adequate to maintain order in the country, the Tito regime
is facing a critical situation which can only be alleviated by sub-
stantial dollar aid.
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AUSTRIA
Coalition Difficulties The Austrian Government coalition
will probably survive the difficulties
it will face in coming weeks when the coalition parties must
compromise on Several controversial issues, but it may later
be more seriously threatened by a swing to the right in the
People's Party. Despite indications of a rebellious attitude
among the rank and file of the People's and Socialist Parties,
recognition among the leaders of the necessity of cooperating
while Austria's economy is weak and Soviet occupation forces
are present will probably 'result in agreement on such questions
as breadgrain subsidies, housing, revision of the exchange rate
system, and possibly a new. wage-price agreement. The growing
domination of the People's Party by its industrialist faction,
however, could swing the People's Party to a pronounced anti-
labor policy and antagonize the Socialists beyond the limits
of compromiss. This would be particularly the case if the
Industrialists oust Figl from party? leadership and from the
chancellorship, substituting a leader unacceptable to the
Socialist Party and labor.
INDONESIA
New Cabinet The first Cabinet of Indonesia's new unified
state appears to be a capable one, but its
members represent such diverse interests that they may
have difficulty in working as a group and in obtaining the
necessary parliamentary support. Several ministers are
believed to be under the strong influence of Sjahrir, leader
of the anti-Communist Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), who
will undoubtedly continue to exercise a moderating influence
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INDONESIA
and to work with the government in combatting the
growing influence of the Left. On the other hand, in-
clusion of several members of the former, aggressively
nationalistic Republic of Indonesia at Jogjakarta is bound
to give the new Cabinet a less moderate tone than that of
the preceding Hatta administration.
SOUTH KOREA
Political Maneuvers Efforts by the South Korean Assembly
to oust Acting Prime Minister Sin
Sungmo and Home Minister Chough Pyung Ok indicate that
Korean political opportunists are still willing to sacrifice
national unity for personal political advantage. Continuation
of this politics-as-usual will reduce the prestige of the South
Korean Government among UN member nations as well as
the Korean people.
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CanliglEIGRMEa
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NORTH .KOREAN TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY
The North Korean army, which was originally supplied
by the USSR with Soviet and captured Japanese equipment, is
now being re-supplied almost exclusively from Soviet sources,
particularly with respect to heavy equipment, ammunition, and
petroleum-products. A large part of this logistic support ap-
parently either originates from Soviet stockpiles in the Vladi-
vbetOk area or iS transthhiliped from fartifer. west ?th?SSR.
across northern Manchuria into northeast Korea.
Concentrations of rail and water traffic along the north-
east coast of Korea indicate that a substantial volume of heavy
equipment is waterborne from Vladivostok to North Korean
ports. The large numbers of railway tank cars observed on
the east coast line, for example, suggest that re-supply of the
North Korean army with petroleum products is being effected
in this manner. This line of supply is particularly advantageous
because the water haul from Vladivostok to the major Korean
ports north of the 41st Parallel is relativel5i short and not erect
to naval blockade, and in any case, the blockade has not yet pre-
vented all traffic in North Korean waters. On the other hand,
most of the limited waterborne tanker traffic thus far observed
has been along the west toast, possibly indicating that Dairen is
also a source of supply' for the Koreans, at least with respect_to
petroleum products.
The most significant aspect of the North Korean logistical
problem is the fact that North Korean divisions are expected to
operate with only a fraction of the supplies normally allocated to
US forces in combat. The over-all capacity of Korean transport
facilities is still sufficient to meet the enemy's military requirements
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algetis ?
on this limited basis. Nevertheless, despite the apparent
success of the USSR in transporting supplies to North Korea,
the extensive damage inflicted on the transport system with-
in Korea has caused certain serious weaknesses in the North
Korean military position. The inability of the North Koreans
to build up reserves of equipment and the serious difficulties
which they are encountering in moving heavy equipment and
petroleum in forward areas without through rail traffic have
reduced their capacity for exploiting temporary tactical ad-
vantages. In addition, the lack of mobility both in forward
? areas and behind the North Korean lines will make the enemy
particularly vulnerable to break-throughs by UN forces with
superior fire-power and mobility, or to amphibious operations
in areas removed from the immediate front.
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DISTRIBUTION
? N
IKCIASSIFID
1 -s. MGM TOt
1. . . . The President DDA Momo, 4 ADP 't
2,3,4,5 ? Secretary of State ?Auth. DD G.
6,7,8 . . . Secretary of Defense
9. . . . . . Secretary of the Army Date:
10 ? Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
12 Special Assistant to the President, W. A. Harriman
13;14,15 Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17. . . . . Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
? 18 .. .... . Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
19 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
? 20 Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22 Chief of Staff, US Army
. 23,24,25 ? Chief of Naval Operations
? 26,27,28. . . Chief of Staff, US Air Force
29 Assistant Chief of Staff, G73, Operations, US Army.
? 30. . Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
11 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
32. . . . . . . Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35... . . Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
. 36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51, ?
52,53,54,55,56,
57,58,5960. Director of Naval Intelligence
? 61,62,63,64,65,66,
? 67,68,69. . Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70 ? Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71 ..... . . Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85.. Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Div., OCD, State
86 ? Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
87 ..... . US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic Survey
Committee
88 Direetbr, -Federal Bureau 0 Investigation
39 Administrator, Ebonordic Cooperaticae Administration
90 - Deputt Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
91,92. .a, .. ? Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93,94,95. . . . . Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
*.g. (Q)W jij
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400070001-7