UNITED NATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0 25 AUG 1950
Page
HIGHLIGHTS ......... * ................... 1
.UNITED NATIONS ........................ 2
WESTERN REARMAMENT .................. 3
TROUBLE SPOTS
Greece .................... ....... 5
Iran ... ..................... '....... 5
Bulgaria . 6
The Philippines ................... . 6
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
New Belgian Government ................. 8
Tunisian Nationalists ...................... 8
East. German. Rail-lines.. . . .. . . ......... 9
Soviet Transportation...................... 10
Japanese White Paper ..................... 10
Tension in.Panama .... ............... 11
Argentine "Third Position" ............... 11
ARTICLES
Korea Military Situation .. ..:......... 12
North Korean Occupation Policies ........... 13
Document V0-
`' CHANGE in Class. 0
No
p' DECLASSIFIED
lass. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
? DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Autn: L $3
Date.
15s
Any
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
0
The formal charge of US aggression against Taiwan
lodged by the Chinese Communists in. the Security Council
.opens the'second phase of the Soviet offensive against the
US in the UN. The US will probably find it extremely dif-
ficult to counter the Communist Chinese charge because:
(1) the US acted unilaterally in sealing off Taiwan; (2) the
Chinese Nationalist regime is largely discredited, espe
ci.ally in Asia; and (3) India has publicly disassociated. -itself
from US policy on Taiwan, the UK has avoided. the issue,
and France is extremely reluctant to antagonize the Chinese
.Communists. In having the Chinese Communist charge
placed before. the UN at this time, the Kremlin may hope
to obtain Western concessions on Taiwan as a condition to
agreeing to any settlement on Korea. (see page 2).
Sentiment f or .a ximore centralized European de-
fense organization:is continuing'to grow and offers-the?best
opportunity for utilizing German manpower in the European
defense effort. Most NAT members already favor the use
of German industry for European defense and many are
beginning to realize that German manpower as well must
be utilized in any greatly stepped-up European defense
program.(see pages 3 and 4).
? ~e>~53i~~ f
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0 J 35 0 '
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
The formal Chinese Communist charge in the SC
of US aggression against Taiwan opens the second stage
of the Soviet political campaign against the US in the UN.
This fiction offers: the best prospects=a6 the Soviet Union
for confusing the issue of Communist aggression in Korea,
splitting the non.-Communist front in the Security Council,
and driving a wedge between the US and Asiatic nations.
US ability to counter the Chinese Communist charge will
be extremely difficult because: (1) the US acted unilaterally
in ordering the protection of Taiwan; (2) the Chinese Nationa-
list regime is largely discredited, particularly in Asia; and
(3) India has publicly disassociated itself from US policy on
Taiwan,the UK has avoided the Issue, and France is extremely
'anxious not'to antagonize Communist China,.
Bringing the Taiwan issue, before the UN offers the USSR
several additional advantages. With Malik 's special oppor-
tunity for procedural obstructionism 'nearing an end (his
term *as SC President expires at the end of this month), the
USSR now has a fresh weapon for continuing its anti-US pro-
paganda offensive in the UN. Moreover, this new move may
offer an opportunity to bring the Chinese Communists before
a UN.body for the first time, thus further complicating the
issue of Chinese representation. By broadening the present
UN discussions to include Taiwan as well as Korea, the USSR
may hope to force Western concessions on Taiwan before
agreeing to any Korean settlement.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
The proposed increase in the rearmament effort of
the European NAT members over the next three years is well
below the capacity of these countries and wholly inadequate for
the minimum needs of Western European defense. Even in-
cluding, substantial US aid, the proposed increases in rearma-
ment funds fall far short of meeting West European defense
needs in ground forces alone, and are totally inadequate for
balanced ground, air, and naval forces. The presently con-
templated European rearmament programs indicate that the
NAT members (including the UK) have not'yet faced up to the
problem of providing their share for an adequate European
defense. These NAT members continue to be preoccupied
with their domestic economic and social problems, while ap-'
parently counting on even greater US aid to enable them to
meet defense expenses, . France and Belgium insist, moreover,
that they cannot undertake an all-out: defense effort until a strong
NAT program is developed under which each member nation will
bear a proportionate share of the over-all burden.
Judging from this initial reaction, West Europeans must
be convinced that the proposed strengthening of the NAT will
provide adequate European defense before they will make the
substantial sacrifices. necessary for their increased contribution
to a stronger NAT. The continuing European demands for a unified
NAT command (preferably under US leadership) and for greater
US and UK forces in Europe are a measure of the lack of confidence
Europeans have in present NAT plans. for West European defense.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
TOP SECRET
German Participation The growing European sentiment
for an integrated European defense.
system offers the best opportunity to utilize German man-
power in the West European defense effort. French officials
are convinced that German manpower can be utilized only by
establishing some kind of a centralized or unified defense
organization for all of Western Europe. These same French
officials are also convinced that the French people would be
.willing to make substantially increased sacrifices for defense
only if a stronger and more centralized organization were
established. .
Sentiment in West Germany at the moment is against
the creation of a German national army, but the West Germans
would be willing to participate in defense of Western Europe on
the basis of becoming members of an over-all defense organiza-
tion assigned the mission of defending all of Western Europe.
German participation in such a defense organization would prob-
ably be conditioned on the granting of greater powers to the
West German Government and the guarantee of protection against
Soviet aggression during the period when Germany was being
integrated in the West European defense organization. The
Belgians, Dutch, Luxembourgers, and Italians would welcome
any attempt to strengthen West European defenses and recognize
the necessity of using German manpower, The remaining West
European nations (and the UK) are also coming to recognize that
German manpower as well as industry would be needed in any
greatly stepped-up European defense program.
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
TOP SECRET
Shadow Cabinet Despite his grandiose talk of `national.cen-
tralization,' Prime Minister Venizelos gives
little promise of being able to provide a stable and effective
replacement for the shaky Piastiras coalition from which he
bolted last week. With the attitude of the other major centrist
leaders still doubtful and the rightist Tsaldaris Populists still
withholding firm support, Venizelos has thus far produced only
,a shadow Cabinet of six fellow Liberals. Moreover; even though
Venizelos may be able to line up enough backing to win an initial
vote of confidence for his government, existing Incompatibilities
among his potential supporters are such that, his appointment will
probably postpone only temporarily an eventual choice between
the installation as prime minister with extraordinary powers of
the Palace favorite, Marshal Papagos, or the holding of new
elections`(with Papagos perhaps heading an interim caretaker
government).
Financial Troubles Premier Razmara's plans for rehabilitating
the Iranian economy 'continue to be impeded
by financial and administrative difficulties, and there is danger that
Iranian morale may be seriously impaired and that the Razmara
Government may be forced to resign,unless some way can be found
to speed up projected US assistance. Iran has been able to main-
tain some sort of an interim unemployment relief program thus
far by dipping into the funds of the Seven Year Plan Organization,
but these funds are now reportedly at the vanishing. point. Mean-
while, the,Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's refusal to make.advance
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
TOP SECRET
payments on royalties has deprived the government of funds
which it had been counting on to meet expenses during the long
process-of working out projects required for Export-Import
and International Bank credits.
Note to Turkey The Bulgarian note to the Turkish Govern-
ment demanding repatriation within three
months of 250,000 Bulgarian nationals of Turkish origin is
designed to overburden the Turkish economy and embarrass
the government. The note climaxes an exchange of charges
and denials of maltreatment of the Turkish racial minority of
700,000 in Bulgaria, and, if complied.wi.th by the Turkish Govern-
ment, would raise the number of repatriates from the current
rate of 600 per week to 20,000. Although Turkey is anxious to
repatriate its racial minorities in Communist-dominated countries,
even the present rate of immigration. from Bulgaria is taxing
Turkish resettlement facilities, largely'liecause of.the Bulgarian
ptactice of confiscating all the property of repatriates. Resettle-
ment of property-less immigrants and,the necessity for time-
consuming individual screening for Communist infiltrators make
literal compliance with the Bulgarian demand physically impossible.
Government Turmoil Current opposition to President Quirino,
including attacks from important leaders
of his own Liberal Party, is rising because of mounting public
concern over the serious financial crisis now confronting the
Philippine Government. Quirino, who Is under vigorous attack for
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
TOP SECRET
THE PHILIPPINES
failing to rid his administration of corruption, has been unable
to appease his opposition, and the administration's legislative
program--including urgent tax and appropriation measures--
is being blocked in the Senate. Quirino is being blamed for
financial difficulties, and the Speaker of the House, who is also
boss of Quirino's Liberal Party, has reportedly become so dis-
gruntled with Qiuirin.o's leadership that he is considering various
actions short of iinpeachinent:for: eliiniiiating._Qniririo' from the
political scene. .
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
TOP SECRET
C
New Government The weakness of the new one-party Social
Christian (Catholic) Government, as evidenced
by both the inexperience of many of its members and the predomin-
ance of pro-Leopoldists and conservatives, will delay action on
vital legislation, especially defense measures. The composition of
the Cabinet was determined largely by the need to maintain Catholic
Party harmony rather than to promote inational unity. The dislike
of the Socialists for Foreign Minister van Zeeland may cause
friction and the inexperience of Minister of Defense de Greef may
be a serious drawback to solving the pressing defense problems
which will probably dominate Cabinet and parliamentary discussions
this fall. The volume of important legislation that must be dealt with
and the general weariness with political instability may prevent any
early changes in the present government, but a new and stronger
government may become necessary eventually. A Catholic-Liberal
coalition might emerge later this year, particularly if the Catholics
feel they need help in shaping defense policies. The Socialists,
however, would be unlikely to join any Catholic-dominated gov-
ernment which included van Zeeland, who will probably remain
in the government as long as the Catholic Party has a parliamentary
majority,
Tunisian Cabinet The unexpected acceptance of Cabinet posts
by leaders of the Tunisian nationalist Neo-
Destour Party, apparently reflecting a French -nationalist under-
standing based on mutual concessions, could be the first step toward
TOP S E C R E T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 TOP SECRET
smoother relations between Paris and French North Africa.
The acceptance of the Cabinet posts represents a modification
of extreme nationalist sentiment, and may have been brought
about. by private French assurances of reforms which go be-
yond anything publicly offered. The new Tunisian Prime
Minister, in his remarks during the investiture ceremony, re-
ferred to his Cabinet as a "ministry of transition," and declared
its purpose was to lead the Tunisian people toward the "restora-
tion of sovereignty with its rights and prerogatives." The French=
nationalist accord in Tunisia is all the more remarkable because
French policy toward the nationalists in Algeria and Morocco,
particularly the latter, is at present--more intransigent than it
has been for some time. The French may be intentionally creating
a situation which will make cooperation difficult among the various
North African nationalist parties. However, if the French have made
real concessions in Tunisia and if the experiment in cooperation
works out *ell, the chances for smoother relations in Algeria and
Morocco will be considerably increased.
Rail Restoration Soviet: occupation authorities in East Germany,
recently ordered the Reichsbahn to submit
an estimate of the time and material required to restore the
second tracks on five formerly double -tracked routes running
generally east-west across the Soviet Zone, but there is no in-
dication to date that the Soviet authorities have ordered the work
to begin. Restoration of the lines would require the dismantling
of-some secondary lines and the removal of rails from marshalling
yards. Handling present traffic through the marshalling yards with
reduced capacity would require increased traffic restrictions.
a
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
TOP SECRET
Transportation The USSR has for some time been rebuilding
and preparing direct transportation facilities
on the route from Moscow to the Smolensk-Minsk-Brest area.
New airfields have been constructed, and improvements in the
Moscow-Smolensk-Minsk highway, one of the few first-class
Soviet thoroughfares, are now being made west from Minsk.
Railroad service has also been improved, and the trans-loading
yard at Brest is one of the largest in the USSR. New station
facilities are being constructed along the line, notably at Smolensk,
and the roadbed is being improved, apparently so that it can support
heavy loads. .
White Paper The recently issued Japanese White Paper, by its
unqualified support of the UN action in Korea,
formally establishes Japan's pro-Western alignment and implicitly
favors the maintenance of Allied bases in Japan. Prior to the.
Korean conflict, lack of confidence in US intent and ability to
defend Japan and lack of the means of self-defense had led a large
segment of the Japanese people to support the opposition Socialist
position of non-involvement in the East-West struggle. The un-
provoked Communist aggression in Korea, however, has disillusioned
many who formerly supported a neutral course for Japan, and the
prompt US-UN action has reassured the Japanese. Because of
changing popular sentiment, the Socialist program for an over-all
peace and permanent neutrality for Japan may be modified, an action
which would pave the way for unanimous non-Communist support
for Japan's pro-Western alignment.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
C
Political Tension President Arnulfo Arias' regime is being
threatened by the recently intensified
struggle for power between the President and Police Chief
'Remon and by a rapprochement among factions opposing Arias.
Iininediate'causes for the current tension are the President's
effoits to avoid the reappointment as Comptroller General of
Itehio'n's brother-in-law and to strengthen his regime against
a possible opposition majority in the National Assembly scheduled.
ib 1riieet on 1 October. Underlying causes of the continuing poll- .
tical'tension are Police Chief Remon.'s key position in politics
and his Interest in supporting opposition to Arias in order to
further his own political position. The increasing rapprochement
among elements opposing Arias also increases the possibility of
an attempt to oust Arias.
``Third Position" Prospects for Argentine support of the
Western Powers in. the current East-West.
struggle have declined recently. Presideht'Peron hinted earlier'
tkat'Argentine.troops might be sent to Korea in support of the, UN,
but, he retreated quickly to his anti-capitalist, anti-commit hist
'..third. position" when confronted with strong popular sentiment
'against becoming involved in the East-West struggle. Although
Peron may favor closer alignment with the?West at this time, he
is apparently unwilling to make the effort needed to redirect,
popular opinion away from Argentina's third-force position.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
TOP SECRET
The rapid and successful shifting of UN forces to
eliminate successive North Korean threats is enabling the
UN defenders to bring about a further stabilization of the
military front. Although the invaders retain the initiative
and continue to probe for a weak defensive spot near Taegu
or Masan, the continuing loss of men and the UN bombing
of supply, lines and depots is beginning to affect North Korean
capabilities for mounting sustained and major offensives.
Along the south end of the defense line where Task Force
.Kean recently forced the NorthKorean 6th Division back
.to the outskirts of Chinju, reinforced enemy columns are
again attempting to launch a new drive to capture Pusan.
In -the central sector, UN defenders have so far contained
or destroyed repeated enemy attempts to take Taegu, vital
UN supply and defense point. To the northwest, enemy .
forces are being built up into what may soon become the
most dangerous enemy. concentration along the entire front
line. Only light and sporadic. action took place along the
northern sector.; on the east coast, the South Korean Capital
Division recaptured .the port of. Pohang and the town of
Kigye and drove the invading forces several . miles to the
north: Light enemy resistance on the east coast and the
northern, sector probably indicates that North Korean forces
in these, areas are being shifted to other points along the
.front.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002400040001-0
I
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
0
The speed and thoroughness of the North Koreans in
applying occupation policies in seized areas of South Korea
indicate they were fully prepared"to assimilate all of South
Korea after a quick military victory. Among the North Korean
occupation policies which will create the gravest problems for
the'returning South Korean Government: are military security
measures, land and general reforms, and the extension of North
Korean political control forms and laws to all occupied areas.
The North Koreans feel that there is little difference between the
Japanese occupation forces and the UN-backed Rhee Government,
and they are using the same techniques which they applied .in
setting up a Communist state in North Korea after the Japanese
withdrew their forces.
Primary responsibility for the maintenance of order and
security in occupied areas rests with the ".Ministry of Internal
Affairs" of the " Democratic People's Republic" in the North
Korean capital of Pyongyang. Several of the divisions of the
invading army formed shortly before the war-,-and forced into
action because of the unexpected UN resistance--had been in-
tended for garrison and security duty. Despite the commitment
of these intended security troops to combat, some reserve and
replacement units from the North are available for.garrison duty
in occupied cities and large towns.
At the same time, a considerable measure of responsi-
bility for local security has been given to local committees formed
from South Koreans. These town and village "People's Committees
staffed by reliable local Communists who reappeared from the under-
ground or were released from Republican jails, operate in close
IN EMEMMODW
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
C
cooperation with Northern security forces, manage local
affairs; and vouch for the people recruited into the local
"Civil Security " units. Such security units and."People's
Committees," under the direction of the North Korean govern-
ment, have responsibility for the defense of the local area
against enemy infiltrations, the suppression of popular up-
risings, and the arrest of ante-Communists and other unco-
operative persons.
To generate maximum popular support for the war effort
and the unification of Korea under the "Democratic People's
.Republic," the Communists have announced a series of "reforms"
similar to their earlier actions in the North. In the political field,
the Communists have made a considerable show of giving the
South Koreans "democratic" government and arranging for actual
participation In local government. The first step in this direction
was the "spontaneous" reestablishment of "interim People's
Committees" as organs of local self-government on all levels in
the occupied south. The elections of village, townshipnand county
were completed early in August in the occupied areas and elections
for Provincial Committees and a "unified" National Assembly are
probably planned for the future.
The land reform which is being instituted by North Koreans
may gain considerable popular support and thereby constitute a
...major problem for the returning government. The Northern in-
vaders' ordinance of 5 July 1950 contains provisions designed to
make the program both popular with tenant farmers and acceptable
to present small and medium landowners. The ordinance exempts
from confiscation land received under the Republican land reform
and abolishes former required annual payments on such land. Small
farmers who work their own land are permitted to retain up to 50
acres. ? Popular support for land reform Indicates that the South
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
 i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
Korean Government will be. forced to accept the new, land
distribution or face widespread adverse reaction.
Although the invaders' economic and political measures
may have gained an initially favorable reaction from South
Korean peasants and laborers, their increasing resort. to force,
both in.conscripting labor and troops and in requisitioning food
and materials, will cause growing antagdnisni. against the 'bccupa-
tion authorities.:.
C
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0
0
TOP S E C R EOent No.
DECLASSIFIED
?0)
lass. CHANGED TO:
DDA Memo. 4
1763
By:
5......... Secretary of the Army
6......... Secretary of the Navy
7:........ Secretary of the Air Force
8,70,113.... Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9171 ...... Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10....... .. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
11,69.:..... Chief of Staff, US Army
12,13,14..... Chief of Naval Operations
15,16,17..... Chief of Staff, US Air Force
18......... Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army
19......... Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) US Air Force
20......... Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21......... Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
22,23,24..... Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34.Assistant Chief of Staff, G.2, Intelligence, US Army
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44,
11'5,116,117,118,119.Director of Naval Intelligence
45,46,47,48,49,
72,73,74,75 Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
50:........ Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
51......... Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee
Atomic Energy Commission
52,53,54,55,56,79
80,81,82,83,84,85
86,87..... Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OCD, State
57......... Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
58,120...... Chairman and.Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
59......... Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
61....:.... Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint. Staff
62,63.. ...... Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
65......... US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
66,76,77..... Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
68......... Administrator, Economic Cooperation.-Administration
1......... The President
2,60,64,114:. Secretary of State
3,4,78:.... Secretary of Defense
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02400040001-0