WEEKLY SUMMARY #107

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300070001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
107
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16 JUN 1950
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS 1
THE SCHUMAN PLAN 2
WESTERN EUROPE 4
EASTERN EUROPE 8
FAR EAST. 10
WESTERN HEMISPHERE ....... 12
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HIGHLIGHTS
The trend toward the division of Europe between East
and West continued this week as West Germany accepted asso-
ciate membership in the Council of Europe and East Germany
assumed more of the trappings of a full-fledged Satellite.
The extensive political and economic agreements between
Poland and the German Democratic Republic, particularly
the formalization of the Oder-Neisse line, point to the Soviet
intention to integrate the Eastern Zone into the Satellite bloc
and create a base for subsequent expansion in Germany (see
fl page 4). In addition to obtaining parliamentary support for
German membership in the Council of Europe, the Adenauer
Government will probably succeed in persuading Parliament
fl to ratify the Schuman plan for pooling steel and coal resources
L, when it reaches the legislative stage (see page 3). Full Brit-
ish participation in the proposed organization remains doubt-
ful, however, in view of the divergence between the proposal
as presently conceived and the conditions the British Govern-
ment is likely to insist on (see page 2).
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SCTWIVIAN PLAN
UK Attitude Although the British Government will continue
to express sympathy with the Schuman proposal,
it will avoid any definitive commitment during the formative
stage. When the details have been worked out by the six parti-
cipating nations, the Labor Government will carefully weigh
the economic and political advantages and disadvantages before
deciding whether to participate fully or to accept some limited
form of association. Full participation, however, appears doubt-
ful at this time in view of the divergence between the Schuman
proposal as presently conceived and the conditions the British
Government is likely to insist on. Moreover, the Conservatives
have not come out in favor of Britain's participation.
Initial British reserve toward the proposal stemmed
primarily from the government's uncertainty over the effect
of a bold action on Britain's delicate internal political balance;
the desire to study closely the implications of the proposal for
both the affected British industries and Commonwealth and
sterling area relations; and the usual caution in connection with
subjects involving the principle of European economic and poli-
tical integration. The cautious approach was not caused solely
by the government's desire to manage its own economy in iso-
lation or its reluctance to tie itself to "free" economies. Simi-
larly, the British rejection of European federation or other supra-
national authorities does not necessarily prejudice eventual
participation, in some form, in the Schuman organization. The
former would have imposed the broadest sort of integration "from
the top," conceived in constitutional abstractions, while the French
idea coincides not only with the British preference for a functional
approach toward European unity but with the British desire for
Franco-German rapprochement and the merging of Germany with
the West.
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Nevertheless, the Labor Government will probably insist
that the plan provide for maintaining full employment, retaining
ultimate national control over industries, insuring high labor
welfare and pay standards, and preventing the evils of cartels
and other restrictive influences. Moreover, the British do not
want to be levelled down economically or to transfer control of
their industries to an authority in which they can be out-voted.
German Attitude Although much will depend upon the final form
of the organi2ation and the speed with which
agreement is reached, West Germany is likely to ratify the
Schuman plan when it reaches the legislative stage. The ease
with which the plan will gain parliamentary approval will depend
largely on the success of German efforts to gain approval at the
six-power conference for proposals which would satisfy national
aspirations. The Federal Republic will thus attempt to obtain an
organization which will revise the present ceiling on annual
German steel production, transfer power from the present Ruhr
Authority to the proposed International Authority, and relax
limitations on German shipbuilding. The principal obstacle to
the plan will be Socialist insistence that the plan permit labor
participation in industrial management and at least partial sociali-
zation of basic industry. The Socialists will probably also join
with representatives of the German coal industry in seeking the
inclusion of the electric power industry under the proposed
authority.
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WESTERN EUROPE
GERMANY
? Split Widened The transformation of East Germany into
a full-fledged member of the Satellite com-
munity was appreciably nearer this week following the con-
clusion of a series of agreements between Poland and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). Similar agreements
will probably soon be signed by the GDR first with Czecho-
slovakia and then with the other Satellites. As a necessary
prerequisite to the extensive economic and cultural accords,
Poland and the GDR agreed to a formal delineation of their
"established and existing international frontier" on the
? Oder-Neisse Rivers. The sweeping economic pacts call
not only for an increase in trade between East Germany and
Poland but for greater coordination in planning within the
ful framework of each country's long-range economic programs.
A basis for agreement was also reached on frontier traffic,
as a result of which Poland may soon grant the GDR free
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port and transit rights in Stettin.
These agreements, by widening the breach between
East and West Germany and strongly antagonizing West
German opinion, will increase West German opposition to
Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in West Germany. They
are another indication, however, that the USSR intends to
Integrate the GDR into the orbit and, by establishing the
GDR as an "independent" Satellite, create a base for subse-
- quent expansion in Germany. Moreover, the formal con-
firmation of the present Polish-German boundary is certain
to appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments and should tend to
allay Satellite fears of a Soviet sell-out to Germany at the
expense of the orbit.
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GERMANY
Political Trends Chancellor Adenauer's efforts to gain
complete control over his party, the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) are likely to meet defeat
on 18 June in the important Land election in North Rhine-
Westphalia. Left-wing elements of the CDT), along with the
Socialists, are expected to emerge with sufficient strength
to permit a continuation of the present CDU-Socialist Land
Government. The CDU left wing, led by Land Premier
Karl Arnold, has stubbornly maintained a CDU-Socialist
coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia and is influential at
Bonn in exerting strong pressure on Adenauer to proceed
with such economic legislation as worker participation in
industrial management and partial nationalization of industry.
Despite the gradual swing to the right expected in subsequent
Land elections, an Arnold victory on 18 June would force
Adenauer to continue his precarious policy of compromise
between the right and left elements of his coalition and to
make some concessions to demands for passage of eco-
nomic and social legislation.
ITALY
Peace Campaign In their current peace campaign, the
Italian Communists are gaining the
support of a number of influential non-Communists and
have thereby increased their potential for gaining public
adherence to the neutrality concept and for weakening the
Italian will to resist. Growth of this sentiment could in
time seriously weaken effective Italian participation in the
MDAP. The recent rally of the Italian Partisans of Peace
provided evidence of the success of the Communist cam-
paign. The rally was attended by ex-Premiers Orlando
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ITALY
and Nitti, as well as by non-Communist members of Parlia-
ment, Many of these are advocates of Italian neutrality in
the East-West conflict and supported a resolution similar
to the Communist-sponsored Stockholm convention outlawing
the atom bomb. Moreover, there was practically no protest
in the non-Communist press over the presence of prominent
Italian statesmen at a Communist-staged meeting.
BELGIUM
Royal Question The newly formed one-party Social
Christian (Catholic) Government probably
will receive parliamentary approval by a small majority
when the new Belgian Parliament convenes on 20 June, and
is likely to obtain repeal of the law of 1945 which makes
King Leopold ineligible to reign. Although the slender
majority of the Catholic Party makes it theoretically possi-
ble for the Catholics to return Leopold to the throne un-
conditionally, it is not likely that they will do so. Numerous
responsible Catholics fear that such a course would impair
national unity and economic stability and pose a serious
threat not only to the monarchical institution but to the
Catholic Party itself. It is probable, therefore, that the
Catholic Party will make strenuous efforts to reach a solu-
tion, with the tacit approval of the Liberal and Socialist
Parties, which would provide for Leopold's return but
which would also assure his eventual abdication in favor of
his eldest son, Prince Baudoin.
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FRANCE
Political Rumblings The weakness of the Bidault coalition
government is once again being em-
phasized by current Socialist efforts to secure passage of a
bill to raise Civil Service salaries. The Socialist stand heralds
a revival of dissension among the political parties supporting
the present coalition and points to the deep-seated differences
which become apparent whenever controversial social and
economic problems are raised. Bidault has been authorized
by the Cabinet to call for a vote of confidence on the wage
issue, but the Socialists will probably agree to a compromise
rather than cause a political crisis during the crucial negotia-
tions on the Schuman proposal.
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EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
Party Purge Evidence during the past few months of a
large-scale purge involving important Party
and government officials of the Estonian Republic further re-
flects the periodic difficulties encountered by the Kremlin in
its effort to complete the sovietization of the Baltic states.
The scope of the dismissals indicated the existence of more
basic troubles than nepotism and peculation normally pre-
valent in Soviet bureaucracy. The charges included such
serious accusations as "bourgeois nationalism," the harboring
of "Kulak elements," and "poor selection and training of Party
personnel." Although these elements have been eliminated and
Moscow's control tightened, the extent of the purge is another
manifestation of the Kremlin's difficulty in using members- of a
national minority to govern for the benefit of Moscow.
HUNGARY
Military Purge The current shake-up of the Hungarian
Ministry of National Defense, following
similar personnel changes in the military forces of Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, is part of
the Soviet program to strengthen the links between the Soviet
Union's military system and those of the Satellites. Those
Hungarian officers, even Communists, who were trained in
the military schools of the pre-Communist era and who thus
have non-Soviet ideas of military orkanization and training,
are being removed, as well as those tainted by a relationship
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HUNGARY
with General Palffy, executed last fall along with Laszlo Ftajk
for nationalist deviation. The removal of top-level officers
in Hungary may even, as in Bulgaria, be a preliminary to the
ouster of the Minister of National Defense, Mihaly Farkas, who
although a Soviet-trained Communist, has been reported in dis-
favor with Moscow for his failure to organize, train, and in-
doctrinate the Hungarian Army satisfactorily.
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FAR EAST
BURMA
Government Change Deputy Prime Minister Bo Ne Win's
probable accession to the Prime
Ministry, in the event of Thakin Nu's retirement next month,
would not impede and knight well accelerate the Burmese
Government's present trend toward stability and Western
orientation. Although Ne Win may prefer someone else to
hold office, the successor will,in all likelihood, be amenable
to Ne Win's direction and control. Ne Win's strength stems
from a personal following within the influential Socialist Party,
his control of Burma's armed forces, and ability to take ad-
vantage of party factionalism over whether Burma should accept
Western aid or seek closer alignment with the Communist world.
Although a government under Ne Win's control can be expected
to reflect some of the opportunistic and dictatorial aspects of
Ne Win's own character, the bitterly anti-British Deputy Prime
Minister is presently friendly to the US because of his nation's
need for economic and military assistance. Moreover, Ne Win
is apparently aware of the threat to Burma's independence posed
by the Communist success in neighboring China, and he will
probably do what he can to thwart the extension of Communist
influence in Burma. Ne Win's accession to power will come at
a time when Burma and China have agreed on an exchange of
ambassadors and when Peiping is showing increased interest
in Burmese affairs. Little will now prevent the Chinese Com-
munists from gaining control over the relatively small Overseas
Chinese community in Burma, an action which would provide
Peiping with a useful instrument for applying pressure to the
Burmese Government. Ne Win's anticipated firm attitude in
favor of the West, however, will probably serve as a temporary
counterbalance to the increase in Communist potential for in-
fluencing the Burmese Government.
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KOREA
Unity Move The latest north Korean campaign for the
"peaceful" unification of Korea is not
likely to meet with success in south Korea either in
gaining substantial public support or in causing disunity
and indecision. The Communist "appeal" specifically ex-
cluded Republic of Korea leaders and the UN Commission
on Korea (UNC OK) from participation in the unification
attempt. South Koreans, however, have learned from past
experience the futility of bargaining with northern leaders
and now for the most part support the Republican govern-
ment. The Republican government, in turn, has agreed with
UNCOK that unification can be approached only on the basis
of UNCOK-observed democratic elections throughout the
country.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BRAZIL
Mineral Bill Election year political pressures may force
through a bill in the Brazilian legislature
which could seriously curtail US imports of several important
critical and strategic minerals. The bill, reportedly already
approved by the Constitution Committee of the Chamber of
Deputies, would: (1) prohibit the export of fissionable elements
as well as thorium and uranium ore; (2) enable the Brazilian
National Security Council to control exports of rare metals
and those ores which contain them, as well as essential min-
erals with known reserves insufficient for Brazilian require-
ments; and (3) give to the same agency general policy control
over the mining and processing of minerals containing rare
or fissionable elements. Although the bill is aimed particularly
at monazite, other minerals, such as beryl, zirconiurni tantalith,
columbite, lithium ores, tungsten ores, and even manganese
could be included. Pressure for this bill is coming principally
from those seeking to make political capital prior to the October
election, in which it appears that nationalism will be an important
issue. The proponents of the bill, however, may also be attempt-
ing to force foreign firms now exporting these raw materials to
establish plants in Brazil to process the ores, thus providing
further employment to Brazilians and increasing the inflow of
foreign capital.
PERU
Revolt Quelled The 13-14 June revolt in Arequipa, which
began with student rioting, was a direct
result of the disqualification of General Odria's only op-
position candidate for the 2 July presidential elections. The
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PERU
revolt failed when army support did not materialize; the
Arequipa garrison remained in barracks, emerging after
two days to suppress the revolt and arrest the leaders.
Although the situation now seems under control, consider-
able tension is expected to continue until the election issue
is decided.
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DISTRIBUTION
1 The President
2,64 Secretary of State
3,4,78, Secretary of Defense
5 ...... . Secretary of the Army
6 Secretary of the Navy
7 Secretary of the Air Force
8,70 Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9,71 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
11,69 Chief of Staff, US Army
12,13,14 Chief of Naval Operations
15,16,17 Chief of Staff, US Air Force
18 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,0perations
19 Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
20 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21 Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
22,23,24. . . ? Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44 Director of Navy Intelligence
45,46,47,48,49,72,
73,74,75. . _Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
. . . . . . Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
51 Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
52,53,54,55,56. Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div.,0CD,State
57 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
58 Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
59 Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
60 Secretary of State (AU: Policy Reports Staff)
61. . . Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
62,63, Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
65 ...... ? US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
66,76,77 Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
68. . . Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2631-S-1948
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