WEEKLY SUMMARY #109

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300050001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 WEEKLY I SUMMARY
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- Number 109
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Date; 31-1-10
CENTRAL "INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS 1
THE KOREAN SITUATION 2
fl WESTERN EUROPE
LJ
EASTERN EUROPE 9
NEAR EAST - AFRICA 11
ARTICLE
Events in Korea 12
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HIGHLIGHTS
The Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea and the
prompt and vigorous US reaction have overnight changed the
complexion of East-West relations and will lead to the rapid
development of new and critical problems for the US in
nearly every area of the world. The most immediate effect
of the Korean invasion is the emergence of the US as the
primary enforcement agency of the United Nations, a develop-
ment strengthening the UN but at the same time adding to the
difficulty of getting the USSR to return to the world organization.
As a result of the US action in Korea, which establishes the
absolute minimum of assistance that can be extended to any
other nation in a similar situation in the future without disastrous
repercussions on Western morale, the US is now committed
to a fixed position in the East-West struggle for world leader-
ship. In Western Europe where the peoples are closely watching
the development of a painfully familiar pattern of invasion and
then liberation, there are critical implications for the US effort
to contain Soviet Communism. The Western Europeans are al-
most certain to develop grave doubts about the effectiveness of
US aid for them in any conflict with the USSR if they now see a
protracted and costly war fought in Korea.
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THE KOREAN SITUATION
The Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea and the
prompt and vigorous US reaction have overnight changed the
complexion of the cold war and will lead to the development
of new and critical problems for the US in nearly every quar-
ter of the globe. It is not believed that the USSR desires a
global war at this time. It is probable, however, that a con-
certed attempt will be made to make the US effort in Korea
as difficult and costly as possible. (The USSR has sizeable
forces of Chinese Communist troops at its disposal for this
purpose.) The implications to the US of defeat in Korea would
be far-reaching. It would become nearly impossible to develop
effective anti-Communist resistance in Southeast Asia, and pro-
gress toward building a strong Atlantic community would be
seriously threatened. A US victory in Korea would also pose se-
rious problems for the US.
Increased Demands The adoption of a vigorous stand by the
US against Communist expansion has,
in general, been favorably received throughout the non-Soviet
world. The adoption of this stand, however, implies that any
failure by the US to take similarly prompt and effective action
to stop any further aggressive moves may have even more
serious repercussions to US and Western prestige than would
have resulted from failure to come to the aid of South Korea.
The Korean invasion has increased fears that the USSR will
take aggressive action in other "soft spots" on the Soviet peri-
phery, thus tending to create in these areas greater demands
for US military and economic aid. The areas most immediately
affected are Southeast Asia (particularly Indochina), Iran, Yugo-
slavia, Greece, and Germany.
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The UN The Korean invasion will have its most immediate
effects on the United Nations insofar as US security
interests are involved. In effect, the US has become the enforce-
ment agency of the UN, a development which has increased the
E ability of the UN to act forcibly and promptly, but which also
reduces the potential of the UN as a moderator between East
and West. Although there is as yet no indication that the USSR
is preparing to withdraw from the UN, the Korean incident has
created conditions which will make a Soviet return to the UN
much more difficult. The UN, therefore, without continued US
support of the kind offered to Korea, will be able to bring far
less pressure on the Kremlin than it did for instance, in the case
of Iran in 1946.
.Western Europe It is in Western Europe that the Korean in-
vasion may have the most critical implications
for the US in its efforts to contain Soviet expansion. The European
fl peoples are watching the development of a situation that patently
involves a painfully familiar pattern of invasion and liberation.
They have aligned themselves with the US in the hope that the US
would offer protection, not eventual and disastrous liberation. The
possibility of a protracted war fought viciously the length of Korea,
not once but twice, cannot but engender doubts in European minds
as to the efficacy of US protection. The US is at judgment and,
while as yet the reactions remain latent, the European nations,
according to their several inclinations, are capable of preparing
to hedge against eventualities. There is now no evidence of an
inclination to disregard commitments to common defense, but
there is sufficient anxiety to fortify the neutrality sentiment in
Europe to a point where the common defense efforts could be
disrupted by fear and by a desire, bred of desperation, to
strengthen their national military defenses at the expense of
a collective effort.
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The Far East The generally favorable reaction of the non-
Soviet nations in the Far East to the US action
in Korea has been tempered somewhat by fears that it will lead
to global war. Despite this fear, however, the effect of this in-
vasion will be to widen the gap between Communist and non-Com-
munist and to force many neutrality-minded elements to take a
more positive stand in the East-West conflict. The US adoption
of a more vigorous anti-Communist policy in the Far East, however,
will not in itself solve the basic causes of unrest and instability in
the Far East. For instance, strong nationalist, anti-colonial
sentiment will persist and may even be accentuated in some areas
both by resentment caused by the spectacle of US troops in combat
with native populations and by the fear that increased US aid will
strengthen the position of the colonial powers. In addition, prospects'
for the development of a strong regional anti-Communist associa-
tion of Far Eastern nations have not materially improved as a
result of events in Korea.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Communist Plans The recent meeting of representatives
of the French and East German Com-
munist trade unions to combat the Schuman proposal and
Western defensive measures illustrates the progress being
made toward joint French-German Communist action but
will not materially increase Communist capabilities to dis-
rupt Western efforts in either France or West Germany. A
joint declaration sponsored by representatives of the French
General Confederation of Labor and the Soviet Zone Federation
of Free German Trade Unions advocated common action to
liquidate the SchUraan Plan and establish peaceful Franco-
German relations. Aimed specifically at Western defensive
measures, the declaration also called for an intensified struggle
against MDAP shipments by the dock workers in both countries.
In addition, agreement was reached to establish direct con-
tacts between Franch and German labor organizations and to
work for trade union unity on both a national and international
basis in the WFTU.
FRANCE
Cabinet Crisis Despite the basic disagreements which
caused the downfall of the Bidault Govern-
ment and which under ordinary circumstances might cause a
prolonged political crisis, the critical Korean situation and
general desire to retain recently reasserted French leader-
ship in European affairs will probably lead to the establishment
of another middle-of-the-road coalition government in the near
future. One of the most urgent requirements for establishing
a stable government is a working agreement among the Popular
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FRANCE
Republicans, the Sotialists, and the Radical Socialists, be-
cause even though they may not all participate in the next
coalition, their support is essential to the stability of any
L. coalition government in France. The split between these ?
parties on domestic issues, especially the question of
increased wages to workers, is the principal obstacle to
the establishment of a new government. The political situa-
? tion is further complicated by the fact that a second defeat
on a vote of confidence will require dissolution of the Assembly
and new elections. Following the fall of the Bidault Government,
Pe the Gaullists immediately took up the cry for elections in the
near future. The first issue on which the three parties must
? agree prior to formation of a new government is where to find
revenues to cover a raise in Civil Service salaries, the issue
which led to the collapse of the Bidault coalition.
WEST GERMANY
Adenauer's Retirement In view of the extremely tight per-
" sonal control exercised by Chancellor
Adenauer over all branches of the Federal Government, his
retirement from active political life as a result of his recent
illness and advanced age would weaken the government and delay
solution of numerous pressing foreign and domestic problems.
The Chancellor's retirement would be followed by a period of
confusion and inaction while factions within the coalition maneuver
for position in selecting a successor or determining the com-
a position of the next government. It is not likely, however, that
any of Adenauer's potential successors, even if acceptable to the
major factions in Parliament, would be able to exert immediately
the thorough control over the government that Adenauer has thus
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WEST GERMANY
far maintained. Because of this lack of decisive leader-
ship, consideration of such crucial foreign issues as the
Schuman Plan would be delayed and a forthright solution
of pressing economic and social problems of western
Germany would be more difficult.
EAST GERMANY
Communist Youth The growing success of the USSR in
the political indoctrination of German
youth will increase East German popular support for the
Communist regime, will decrease the likelihood of a peace-
ful solution to the German problem, and may eventually weaken
the presently favorable balance of pro-Western sentiment in all
of Germany. At present the population of both the eastern and
western zones is predominantly anti-Communist, but in the
Soviet zone, few projects are receiving more attention and
financial support than the molding of German youth into the Com-
munist pattern. As East German boys and girls respond to the
Vigorous program of ideological training to which they are sub-
jected, Soviet capabilities will increase. The success of this
indoctrination, already impressively demonstrated by the strength
and discipline shown by the Free German Youth (FDJ) at the
Berlin rally, is likely to be accelerated. Strenuous efforts are
being made to obliterate the conservative influence of family
and church authority, and, as rapidly as possible, Communist-
trained FDJ leaders are being fed back into the educational
system as teachers. The FDJ now claims a strength of nearly
2 million, with over a million children, aged 6 to 14, in the
auxiliary "Young Pioneers" group.
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EAST GERMANY
In contrast to this emphasis on youth in East Germany,
the weight of democratic leadership in West Germany falls upon
such elderly political leaders as Adenauer, Schumacher, and Reuss,
who represent what will soon be an extinct generation. Although
youth organizations are many, they are generally under-financed
and can do little to fill the needs of the younger population. East
Zone Communists, moreover, are persistently attempting to
attract the youth of Western Germany. The Communist propaganda
attack is directed particularly at the large proportion of West
German youth who are unemployed, or will have extreme difficulty
in obtaining employment when their education is completed.
Satellite Relations The economic and cultural pacts recently
negotiated between the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia and Hungary are additional
steps in the Soviet program leading to the formal integration of
the GDR into the Satellite orbit. The pacts follow the general
pattern of the recent GDR-Polish agreements and are undoubtedly
forerunners of similar agreements to be negotiated soon between
the GDR and other Satellite nations. As a necessary prerequisite
to the accords with Czechoslovakia, the GDR renouric-ed by formal
agreement all claims for the two million Germans expelled from the
Sudetenland to return to Czechoslovakia. The official acceptance
by the GDR of the Sudetenland expulsion and the Oder-Neisse
frontier (GDR-Polish accords) shows clearly that the Kremlin con-
siders the formal liquidation of outstanding irritants between East
Germany and the Satellites a necessary preparation for full and
equal membership of the GDR in the Satellite community.
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EASTERN EUROPE
YUGOSLAVIA
Greek Relations Yugoslavia's present attitude regarding
the small Slav minority in Greek Mace-
donia has led to an impasse in negotiations for Greek-Yugoslav
rapprochement and could develop into a Serious barrier .
to eventual normalization of their relations. Yugoslavia has
apparently taken the extreme position that rapprochement must
be linked to settlement of the question of the 'Macedonian minority"
.in Greece, and Greek public opinion has been aroused to such
an extent that the Greek Government feels unable to continue
negotiations and has postponed the already agreed-upon ex-
change of ministers. There are indications, however, that in
the interest of obtaining the concrete benefits which would
result from closer ties with Greece, Yugoslavia may take steps
to relieve present strained relations.
BULGARIA
Communist Problems The failure of the Bulgarian Communist
Party to complete the development of
Bulgaria into a Communist state firmly bound to the Soviet Union,
as confidently planned by the Party Congress of December 1948,
is illustrated.by the tone of the speeches at the recent Party con-
ference. These speeches indicated that the relatively easy problem
of controlling non-Communist opposition has been completely over-
shadowed by the more difficult task of controlling Communist op-
position to Soviet subjugation and exploitation. Almost every branch
of the government, the entire Party organization, and numerous
Party officials were criticized, and, in contrast to the 1948 meeting,
emphasis was placed on the importance of the role of front organiza-
tions in working with the Party.
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SOVIET UNION
Balkan Acitivity Recent reports indicating an accelera-
tion of Soviet military actitity, in the
fl Balkans should be regarded for the time being as part of a
Soviet war of nerves designed, at least partially, to diS-
tract world attention from Korea. The number of Soviet
troops in the Balkans has remained largely unchanged during
the past six months, and present Soviet/Satellite troops in
the Balkans are inadequate to mount an armed offensive against
Yugoslavia, which would be the most likely target of Soviet action.
On the other hand, a sizeable flow of Soviet war materiel into the
Balkan area has been taking place during the past several months,
probably sufficient to supply a force greater than the USSR now
has available in the area. It is known that at least some of
the Soviet military equipment sent into the Balkans is being
used by Satellite military forces. Thus, the USSR has been
building up its military potential in the Balkans over a period
L of months, with little indication of any intention to take aggressive
action in the immediate future. The Yugoslav :Government is in-
n dined to discount the recent flurry of rumors regarding the possi-
bility of a Soviet attack, and it is likely that the firm US stand against
Soviet-directed aggression in Korea will deter the USSR from overt
aggression in the Balkans.
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
MAN
New Premier The Shah's drastic action in appointing a
military man, Chief of Staff Razmara, as
premier may lead to a much needed improvement in Iran's
political and economic situation. Unlike the old-line poli-
ticians, General. Razmara is a vigorous leader with strong
ideas about the necessity for internal reform, and he has
worked out a tentative program which appears generally
sound and workable. His appointment by the Shah, which
was demanded in many quarters, should contribute toward
restoring much-needed popular confidence in Iran's ability
to extricate itself from its present difficulties. Razmara
may encounter difficulties, however, unless he continues to
receive vigorous support from the Shah. The vocal National
Front group in the Wallis has already attacked the Premier
and the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party is violently opposed to him.
Razmara's attempt to undertake his reform program can be
expected to draw the opposition of the powerful land-owning
group as well, while his notable lack of political experience
may be thrown into sharp relief if he tried to push the pending
AIOC agreement, on which government fiscal stability and the
financing of the Seven Year Plan are dependent, through the
traditionally irresponsible Majlis.
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EVENTS IN KOREA
At 0400 Sunday 25 June (Korean time), Northern Korean
forces launched a full-scale invasion south of the 38th Parallel.
Although the opposing forces were nearly equal in. numbers,
the "People's Army" of the north had a marked superiority over
Republican troops in artillery and an absolute advantage in armor
and aircraft. The main northern drive was aimed at Seoul, capital of
the Republic, while diversionary attacks were made elsewhere across
the Parallel and amphibious landings were made on the east coaSt
The northern attack slowed on the second day, but, on the third thy,
Republican forces retreated in confusion south of the Han River and
Seoul fell shortly thereafter.
The temporary Republican line along the Han River has
now been penetrated and the Southern Korean position is critical.
The four Republican Divisions formerly north of the Han have
lost almost all their equipment, southern supply channels have
broken down completely, the number of Republican effectives
has been reduced to less than half, and the will to fight is
diminishing rapidly. It is estimated that, even if the deterior-
ating situation permits, several weeks would be required to
regroup and re-equip the broken Republican forces and permit
them to take any significant offensive action.
The initial reaction to the invasion by Southern Korean
leaders was one of calm, with the exception of President Rhee
who was badly shaken. By the end of the second day, in the
face of overwhelming enemy superiority, both military and
political leaders began to show serious signs of despair and
it appeared that the fall of Seoul would mean an end to organized
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resistance. The early promise of US aid, however, braced
the Republicans sufficiently to allow a reasonably orderly
withdrawal of the government from Seoul to Taejon. Republi-
can Army headquarters were withdrawn to Suwon, twenty
miles south of the fallen capital, and the US Military Advisory
Group accompanied the Korean command. Subsequent adverse
developments, however, have worsened the morale of Republican
leaders and, at present, the situation borders on panic.
The chief of the US Mission in Korea, Ambassador
Muccio, who moved to Taejon with the Republican Government,
has concentrated his efforts on holding the government together
and attempting to sustain its will to resist. In this task, he has
been assisted by the Washington announcement of 27 June that
the US would give air and sea cover and support to Republican
forces. CINCFE's operational authority was extended to
Korea following this declaration and an advance CINCFE
headquarters (ADCOM) has been established at Suwon and has
assumed command of the US Military Advisory Group which con-
tinues to work with Republican Army headquarters and units in
the field. US air and naval support had an immediate effect on
Korean leaders and Army officers and is believed responsible
for present continued resistance. It is not likely, however,
that the Republicans will be able to stabilize the situation without
extensive support from US ground forces.
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DISTRIBUTION
1
2,64
3,4,78.
5
6
7 ......
8,70. .
9,71
10 ......
11,69
12,13,14
15,16,17
18
19
20
21
22,23,24
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44
45,46,47,48,49,72,
73,74,75 ? . . Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
50 Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
51 Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
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The President
Secretary of State '
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Director of Navy Intelligence
52,53,54,55,56,79,
80,81,82,83,84,85,
86,87
57
58
59
60
61
62,63
65
66,76,77
68
Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OCD, State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Att: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
9631-S -1948
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