WEEKLY SUMMARY #110

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS
1
THE KOREAN SITUATION
Soviet Intentions and Capabilities
2
Far East
3
Germany
5
Yugoslavia
6
Iran
6
Non-Soviet Reaction
? 7
The United Nations
7
Arab States
8
South Asia
8
ARTICLES
The Schuman Plan
10
French Cabinet Prospects
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HIGHLIGHTS
Nearly two weeks after the attack on South Korea, world
attention is still being focussed almost exclusively on the out-
come of the fighting there and on its global implications. Al-
though the Soviet Union has not yet provided the Western world
with any firm clue as to its intentions beyond the immediate
objective of bringing the South Korean campaign to a speedy
and successful conclusion, anxiety has increased lest the USSR
seize the present opportunity to launch military moves in other
soft spots" on the Soviet periphery.
Despite this anxiety, there is no evidence to warrant
a change in the estimate that the USSR will make every effort
to avoid actions at this time which would, in the Kremlin's
estimation, lead to global war (see page 2). The principal
danger lies in a Soviet miscalculation of Western reaction
to steps the USSR may feel impelled to take in support of the
Korean venture. Thus, Soviet pressure in such sensitive
areas as Southeast Asia, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Iran,
while increasing, is not expected to result in overt military
action at this time (see pages 3,5, and 6).
Meanwhile, the reaction of the non-Soviet world to
the Korean affair remains one of unity and enthusiasm toward
the vigorous steps taken by the United Nations (see page 7),
although the Arab states still show more concern for their
own affairs than for stopping Soviet aggression in other areas.
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THE KOREAN SITUATION
Soviet Intentions and Capabilities
Two weeks after the beginning of hostilities in Korea,
the world was still waiting for some firm indication of Soviet
intentions regarding not only Korea but other countries on
the Soviet periphery. It became clear, however, that the North
Koreans were not to be intimidated by US involvement in the
fighting and that the all-out effort to overrun South Korea would
continue unabated. As long as the North Korean advance con-
tinues; the USSR can remain aloof; the crucial moment will
come when and if the battle turns in favor of US and South
Kerer.n fl'.:?:;:rer,. At L'ari tne, the USSR must decide whether
to permit a North Korean defeat or to take whatever steps are
necessary to prolong the action.
Soviet Intentions At the moment, the Soviet and Communist
propaganda line offers no clue regarding
Soviet intentions. Soviet propp;andists would have no difficulty
in using the present line as a basis either for withdrawal from
South Korea or for prolongation of hostilities, even including
armed action in other areas. The key to the fateful Soviet
decision will be the extent to which the USSR desires to risk
Instigating global war. All evidence available leads to the
conclusion that the USSR is not ready for war. Nevertheless,
the USSR has substantial capabilities, Without directly involving
Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting in Korea, as well as for
initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the USSR would
prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might
impel the USSR to take greater risks of starting a global war either
by committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea or
by sanctioning aggressive actions by Satellite forces in other areas
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of the world. The decisiveness of the US reaction to the Korean
invasion will thus cause the Kremlin to move cautiously, but
the danger still exists that the USSR, as it did two weeks ago,
will again miscalculate the Western reaction to any future moves
It may feel are necessary.
The Far East The Korean invasion has had its most immediate
and compelling impact on the Far East, parti-
cularly as it has affected international Communist intentions
to speed the expansion of Communism throughout the area through
the instrumentality of the Peiping regime. Pending clarification
of the Soviet position, the Peiping regime has not yet committed
Itself and, as far as Korea is concerned, will probably not take
any action at least as long as North Korean forces continue to
advance. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist troop strength and
dispositions would permit military aggression in a number of
places with little or no warning, and the Peiping regime can be
expected to give strong support to guerrilla activities and sub-
version throughout Southeast Asia.
Military Potential The Korean invasion has produced a deluge
of reports of Chinese Communist troop
movements indicating a Chinese intent to support the North
Korean invasion. Most of these reports, however, have emanated
from Chinese Nationalist sources and are merely propaganda for
US consumption,. Actually, the Communists are apparently still
strengthening their forces opposite Taiwan, and possibly Hong
Kong, and no significant changes have occurred in troop dis-
positions along Southeast Asian frontiers. Reported movements
of large troop formations from South and Central China toward
the Northeast are largely discounted. Communist troops already
in North China and Manchuria are sufficient to provide substantial
support to the North Koreans and of these approximately 40-50,000
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are of Korean nationality. Despite these reported troop
movements and Chinese Communist capability to launch
simultaneous and successful military actions in Korea,
Hong Kong, Macao, and Indochina, no immediate action is
expected. With regard to Taiwan, the US committment to
defend the island has almost certainly delayed the invasion
timetable if only because it will make occupation of the is
too costly an operation for the Peiping regime to under-
take without outside assistance.
Non-military Action Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist
regime will continue and probably
increase its efforts short of military aggression to further the
spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Political sup-
port and military supplies will be granted Ho Chi Minh's forces
in Indochina, efforts will be made to strengthen the insurgent
movement in Malaya, and the tempo of organizational activity
among labor and political groups will be stepped up. In this
campaign, efforts by the Peiping regime to use the nine million
Overseas Chinese will be impeded by its recent loss of popu-
larity at home and a growing anticipation in Overseas Chinese
communities that the spread of Communism may be reversed as
a result of US action in Korea. An intensification of Peiping's
efforts to gain control of the Overseas Chinese may well lead
to a split which, while reducing the exploitability of the Overseas
Chinese as instruments for extending Chinese Communist influence,
may also result in the adoption of more militant tactics by the pro-
Communist faction. An immediately explosive situation in South-
east Asia, however, derives from the presence in northern Burma of
approximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. The Peiping regime
has demanded their internment, the Burmese Government is ap-
parently incapable of doing so, and the Chinese Communists thus
have a legal "excuse" for carrying out local or major military
operations in Burma,
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German Policy The Korean invasion has emphasized to
West Germans the similarity of their
position to that of the South Koreans and their anxiety has
been increased by current Soviet tactics in Berlin. These
Soviet tactics, however, are not characterized by any un-
usual aggressiveness, and, in fact, appear to be little more
than part of the usual Soviet war-of-nerves against West
Berlin. For example, the refusal of East Berlin to renew
contracts to supply electric power and water to West Berlin
was apparently prompted by West Berlin rejection of a water
supply payment claim and by East Berlin desires to obtain
higher rates and to have the Berlin utilities question included
in the East-West trade agreement. Although the USSR seems
to be laying the groundwork for "justification" for interference
in the Berlin subway system, serious interference, such as a
power cut-off of long duration, appears unlikely as it would
harm East Berlin as much as West Berlin. The long and
vociferous propaganda campaign accusing the US of ruining
East German potato crops, climaxed by a formal Soviet note
to the US, was probably prompted by the need for an excuse
for the failure of the current crop and the opportunity offered
to vilify the US. Although the USSR can be expected to continue
and probably intensify these harassing tactics, a reinstitution
of the Berlin blockade in the near future is not likely. The USSR
probably estimates that the US, with British and French aid,
would: (1) immediately institute a partial airlift to augment West
Berlin's approximate five-month supply of coal and three-month
supply of food; and (2) take the necessary steps to increase US
air power sufficiently both to maintain the airlift and fulfill its
commitment in Korea. Moreover, the USSR cannot entirely dis-
count the possibility of the US forcing an immediate showdown by
use of an armed convoy.
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Pressure on Yugoslavia Although the Korean pattern of
a Soviet-inspired attack by non- ,
Soviet forces could be repeated against Yugoslavia, such an
attack is not likely at the present time. The flurry of recent
reports notwithstanding, Soviet-Satellite troop strength in the
area is not yet believed to be sufficient for a successful attack
on Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Korean venture has unquestionably
increased the Kremlin's fear that an attack on Yugoslavia would
provoke a vigorous Western reaction which might lead to war.
Nevertheless, with the US heavily committed in the Far East and
with Soviet prestige at stake, the USSR will probably step up its
efforts to overthrow the Tito Government by all means short of
war, principally through creating internal disorder and organizing
guerrilla incursions. Widespread peasant and labor disaffection
with the Communist regime in Yugoslavia would favor the Soviet
effort to create internal disorders, but strong Popular resentment
against the USSR would provoke equally strong reaction against
any guerrilla activity emanating from Yugoslavia's Satellite
neighbors. Moreover, Yugoslav security forces are believed
capable of quelling both Soviet-inspired internal disorders and
attempts at guerrilla activity.
Moves Toward Iran As in the case of Yugoslavia, the USSR is
apparently taking advantage of the Korean
fighting to step up its war of nerves against Iran. While there is no
specific evidence that the USSR will overtly attack Iran, recent re-
ports of increased border activity strengthen the possibility of
Soviet-instigated border incursions by non-Soviet guerrillas. It
seems more likely, however, that these activities and reports,
timed to coincide with the recent strong Soviet notes to Iran and
with the outbreak of open warfare in Korea, are more immediately
designed to intimidate Iran. The USSR has steadily increased its
propaganda outlets in Iran,and the clandestine Azerbaijan radio is
now openly advocating revolution.
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Non-Soviet Reaction
In general, the non-Soviet world continues to give
its enthusiastic support to the UN and US action in Korea,
and even sober second thoughts regarding the possibility of
further aggressive Soviet moves have not substantially dam-
pened the original enthusiasm. The events of the past two
weeks, while complicating the relationship between the USSR
and the UN, have increased the stature of the United Nations.
Moreover, the Soviet action in Korea has forced several
neutrality-minded countries, however reluctantly, to take a
more positive stand in the cold war.
The UN By sanctioning the use of military force to resist
aggression, the UN has demonstrated its ability
to respond to vigorous leadership under a flexible interpretation
of the Charter and in the absence of Soviet obstruction. The UN
action has thus changed what might have been considered unilateral
US armed intervention into a collective international effort for the
maintenance of peace. In an attempt to add further prestige to the
UN, some members are considering steps to formalize the UN's
role by authorizing forces aiding South Korea to display the UN
flag and by establishing a Security Council Coordination Committee
to screen offers of military aid and receive reports from the field
forces. Meanwhile, the Soviet UN walkout has been extended in-
definitely; the USSR has reiterated its determination to stay out
until the Chinese Communists are seated, and prospects that the
Peiping regime will be seated have diminished. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the USSR will permanently withdraw from the UN at this
time. The Krenilin would prefer to take such a step over an issue
likely to destroy the UN as an international force rather than over
one which has united the Western world in support of the UN. The
USSR meanwhile probably considers that it can be more effective
in obstructing the UN by continuing its boycott than by a formal
withdrawal.
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Arab States Egypt's refusal to support the UN resolution
calling for armed sanctions against North
Korea indicates the extent of Arab preoccupation with regional
problems. Although Saudi Arabia, because of its close ties with
? the US, may follow the lead of British-supported Jordan in adopt-
ing a more constructive attitude toward the Korean situation,
initial reaction from the other Arab states suggests that they
will probably follow Egypt's lead. The initial Arab reaction
indicates that: (1) the Arabs are not yet reconciled to the estab-
lishment of Israel; (2) they are dissatisfied with the Near Eastern
policies of the US and the UK; (3) they somehow believe they are
in a position to bring pressure on the US and UK to change their Near
? Eastern policies; and (4) the US-UK-French declaration did little to
improve relations between the Arabs and the Western powers. If
Soviet aggression were transferred from the Far East to the Near
7, East, for instance to Iran or Turkey, the views of the Arabs might
undergo a decisive change. It is also possible that the feeling that
they are out of step with the rest of the world may induce them to
modify their present attitude of aloofness. At present, however,
the Arabs are in general far more interested in humbling Israel
? and ridding themselves of all vestiges of US and UK political in-
fluence than in stopping Soviet aggression in other parts of the
world.
South Asia Although none of the South Asian countries has
opposed the UN action in Korea, there has been
a wide variation in the degree of support and approval expressed
by the several nations. Afghanistan, fearful because of its ex-
posed position, has refrained from openly proclaiming its private-
ly expressed support for the US position. Ceylon, not a UN member,
views itself as perforce a spectator whose expressed attitude should
follow the lead set by the Commonwealth generally; its approval of
the UN action is, however, certain.
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Pakistan wholeheartedly supports the UN action at
0 the government level, reflecting both an apparently firm con-
viction that further extension of Soviet influence is contrary
to Pakistan's interest and the Pakistani Moslems' basic belief
fl in the efficacy of force. Pakistan's support on this issue may
have an effect on the attitudes of the Arab states and the
Egyptian position.
Although India supported the resolution reluctantly, the
decision is nevertheless a firm one, and India's moral support
Of combined military efforts to repulse the North Koreans is
Li assured. Although no financial or military assistance is ex-
pected from India, the country's influence with many South
Asian countries renders its moral-support along invaluable.
India's decision in this instance, however, does not (necessarily.
mean support for actions which the US or the UN might take in
other Asian areas to forestall or counteract future Communist
moves. Moreover, US actions regarding Formosa and Indochink
may evoke Indian expressions of strong displeasure. By establish-
LI a precedent, however, for India's association with those elements
of the UN willing to use force against overt acts of Communist aggres-
0 sion, India's decision has implications which extend far beyond the
current situation.
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THE SCHUMAN PLAN
The French, acting vigorously and boldly, went
straight to the heart of the Schuman Plan in the opening
discussions when they presented the draft of a treaty which
provided the framework of the proposed supra-national
authority and related executive and operating bodies. The
drastic and forthright nature of the treaty alarmed the other
negotiators and required consideration of the project at gov-
ernmental level. The suggestion for inter-parliamentary
control, as well as the extensive powers to be conferred on
the high authority, is a radical departure from Europe's
traditional pattern of political behavior and will not meet
with ready acceptance. The treaty received strong backing
from the Germans, who have the most to gain from any
positive change in their international status, but it is stimu-
lating resistance elsewhere, and most of the nations involved
will, therefore, probably attempt to pare down the infringe-
ments on national sovereignty implicit in the French Plan.
Although the French have asked for the maximum, they are
probably ready to accept something less in order to reach
eventual agreement.
Of the six powers, Germany has the most to gain
in accepting the French terms. The Germans have no .
sovereignty to lose and under the Schuman plan the Federal
Republic stands to gain an increased degree of control over
its own affairs. Moreover, the importance of Germany's
material contributions to the plan will determine the influence
exerted by the German delegation on the control mechanism
and may, in time, give Germany a preponderant voice in the
new organization. The French as well as the Germans will
attach great importance to the financial independence con-
ferred upon the international authority, which, as proposed,
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may raise money and grant loans to facilitate the reconver-
sion of industries displaced by the creation of a single market
or doomed because of uneconomic production. For Western
Germany, crippled by lack of investment funds and conse-
quently facing possible future curtailment of industrial output,
the investment features of the plan will provide a badly needed
source of foreign funds. The public service objectives of
the French proposal are likely to mollify European Socialist
or labor elements suspicious of an ordinary cartel arrange-
ment which might reduce employment or wage levels.
The dynamic techniques adopted by Schuman in pre-
senting his ideas annoyed industrial circles in France and
governmental circles abroad, and there has been widespread
criticism in Western Germany of Chancellor Adenauer's
decision to keep the threads of the negotiations entirely in
his own hands and to make a political issue out of the situ-
ation. The Schuman Plan is the cornerstone upon which
French hopes of European leadership are based, and, given
reasonable political stability in France and Germany, some
compromise arrangement can probably be worked out to
the satisfaction of all participating nations.
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FRENCH CABINET CRISIS
As President Vincent Auriol continues his unsuccess-
ful efforts to form a French cabinet, the danger grows that
the political confusion created by the present crisis will be
prolonged and will weaken France's growing international
prestige and influence among Western European nations.
Nevertheless, the crisis has not yet hindered negotiations
on the Schuman Plan or prevented strong French support
for the UN stand on Korea.
President Atiiiol is making strenuous efforts to find
a Premier-designate who will be able to secure some sort
of working agreement between the squabbling Socialists and
Radical-Socialists, both of whom have been unable to recon-
cile their differences. Disagreement is intense concerning
domestic economic policies, principally over wage conces-
sions to labor. Developments in the?present crisis have
seriously increased Auriol's concern and he might well call
on the parties to bury their differences in order to participate
in a government of National Union. Such a government would
not, however, include the Communists and the GauMsts. If
the middle-of-the-road political parties are unable to agree
upon either a Centrist coalition or a government of National
Union, dissolution of the National Assembly and subsequent
national elections are possible. National elections are not
likely in the immediate future, however, because of both
the tense international situation and the fact that the problem
of reform of the electoral law has not yet been resolved.
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DISTRIBUTION
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25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34
35,36,37,38,39,
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61 ... ...
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66,76,77. . . . .
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The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff(Operations) US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Director of Navy Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div. OCD, State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Att: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
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