WEEKLY SUMMARY #111

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

~. Y lY~C1a -.. ?~ 146ia: ~~ -.. ~.
AUMvL x
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300030001-2
 1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
 Page
HIGHLIGHTS ........................... 1
SOVIET PROPAGANDA THEMES
Korea, .......,0000 .............. 2
The Balkans ......................... 2
REACTION TO KOREAN SITUATION
Western Europe . .................... 4
Yugoslavia... ... . ................. . .. 4
Arab States ..... . . . .............. . .. 5
North and West Africa.... > ............. 6
India-Pakistan ................. . .... 6
Southeast Asia ............. . ...... 7
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ROLE
Korea ............................. 9
Taiwan ............................ 10
Indochina ........................... 11
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
African Defense Plans ......
African Transport Problems.
East German Police, .. , ....
SECRET
r,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 As the fighting in Korea continued to attract world
attention and showed no signs of coming to an early end, the
military capabilities of the Chinese Communists, as well
as Soviet intentions regarding the use of these capabilities,
were generally being regarded as the principal factors
affecting the outcome of the battle in Korea and determining
whether the fighting will spread to other areas of the Far
East. With regard to the critical areas of Korea, Taiwan,
and Indochina, the USSR must reckon with political and
strategic considerations of varying magnitude in deciding
whether or not to commit Chinese Communist forces. Indo-
china offers the Chinese Communists their greatest oppor-
tunity for expanding Communist influence in Asia with the
minimum military or political risks (see page 11). The
commitment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, however,
would complicate if not jeopardize Soviet control over both
the Korean and Chinese Communist regimes (see page 9), and
an invasion of Taiwan would be tremendously costly and the
immediate advantages would be balanced by the increased
risk of precipitating a global war (see page 10).
n
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 n
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
Line on Korea The voluminous Soviet-Communist propa-
ganda output on the fighting in Korea does
not yet offer any clue regarding Soviet intentions. Although
the US has become the principal target of the increasingly
belligerent Soviet propaganda attack, the general approach
being followed still provides the basis either for other mili-
tary maneuvers or for localizing the Korean conflict. The
major Soviet objective at the moment appears to be to fasten
on the US the stigma of planned aggression against the
Korean people and to develop the general thesis that this
aggression is but one phase of an over-all US plan of attack.
As part of this general war-scare theme, the USSR has been
laying new emphasis on alleged US intentions to employ
bacteriological weapons in its future aggressions. Mean-
while, the propaganda campaign among the Russian people
is marked by a note of urgency and by an "atrocity -monger-
ing" note somewhat out of harmony with internal propaganda
practices followed since the end of the war. Although the
technique of holding mass protest meetings is a common one,
the scale and intensity of the protest meetings appeared un-
usual. At the same time, atrocity stories similar to those
used about the Germans following the June 1941 attack on the
USSR are being circulated about the Americans.
Balkan War of Nerves Soviet-Satellite propp.r,anda directed
at Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey
has noticeably increased during the past few weeks and is
contributing materially to the development of a war psychosis
throughout the Balkan area. Propaganda directed against
Yugoslavia has concentrated on themes which could be utilized
to justify increased Soviet-Satellite pressure, including armed
aggression. The US has been charged with preparing Greece
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
F SECRET
for "immediate military action in the Balkans" and more
attention is being paid to Turkish "provocations." Although
there is no firm evidence pointing to imminent Soviet-
inspired military action in the Balkans, Soviet-Satellite mili-
tary strength in the area is being built up. The propaganda
campaign now being waged could at any time provide justifi-
cation for "defensive" moves by the Cominform countries
against Yugoslavia, Greece or Turkey,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 Western Europe The basic feeling of insecurity still pre-
vailing in Western Europe continues to
loom large in Western European reaction to the Korean situ-
ation. Despite continued evidence of progress toward economic
and military stability (as seen in. the foxmal agreement on the
EPU, progress on the Schuman Plan and the arrival of the
first shipments- of MDAP aid), Western. Europeans remain
acutely aware of their still precarious position vis-a-vis the
USSR. Under these circumstances, despite their initial
enthusiastic reaction to US intervention., the continental coun-
tries will understandably grow more jittery regarding the
possibility of global. war developing out of the Korean fighting
and will be particularly susceptible to the psychological im-
pact of US military reverses. They would view with serious
alarm any diversion of US military aid from Europe to Korea
and may even urge that heightened world tension calls for an
accelerated program of US aid to Western Europe itself. On
the other hand, the Korean situation will impress anew upon
Western Europe its almost complete defenselessness and may
provide the US with an. opportunity to press for a greater de-
fensive effort, including more effective mutual aid and more
balanced collective forces.
Yugoslav Attitude The Soviet-inspired attack on Korea has
confronted Yugoslavia with a particularly
difficult task in maintaining its Communist position while at
the same time defending itself. against possible Soviet aggression.
As advocates of pure Leninism, Yugoslavia has consistently
branded the South Korean. regime as reactionary and a product
of Western colonialism. On the other hand, the Soviet-inspired
attack has forced the Yugoslav Government to reappraise
Soviet intentions. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia is placing greater
reliance on the UN as a safeguard against aggression. Although
SECRET
S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300030001-2
 r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
Yugoslavia abstained in the first Security Council vote on
Korea and voted against the second US resolution, Yugoslav
officials have since then indicated that at the earliest
appropriate moment Yugoslavia would adhere to the Security
Council resolution, Meanwhile, as the gap between the USSR
and the West widens, Yugoslavia will find it more and more
difficult to maintain its independence in the cold war. In
the event of a Soviet withdrawal from the UN, Yugoslavia as
the only Communist nation remaining in the UN would be-
come increasingly identified with the Western struggle against
Soviet expansion. Even under these circumstances, however,
it could scarcely afford-to withdraw from the United Nations,
thereby probably sacrificing Western support in the event of
a Soviet attack.
Arab Reaction Although the earnest representations of the
US, the UK, and Pakistan have elicited from
Arab officials some private expressions of approval for the
use of sanctions in Korea, Jordan is still the only Arab state
openly to support the Security Council resolution calling for
aid to South Korea. Egypt, while it has felt compelled to re-
assert its opposition to Communist aggression, remains offi-
cially committed to abstaining from approving UN sanctions
against North Korea, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria have confined
themselves to equivocal statements which take "note" of the SC's
cease-fire resolution (which Egypt backed) but ignore the
later sanctions vote; in general terms, all deprecate any
action which might disturb the peace but at the same time
criticize the UN for alleged failure to prevent Israeli aggres -
sion, Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is reportedly attempting to
persuade Egypt to support US (as opposed to UN) action in
Korea, but there is little reason to believe that Egypt will
agree or even that Saudi Arabia will openly adopt such a policy
on its own. Any change in the attitude of the Arab governments
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300030001-2
r SECRET
iU
P
will depend largely on the nature of their respective rela-
tions with the US and the UK, as well as on developments
in Korea in the immediate future.
North and West Africa Arab nationalists throughout French
North Africa are not likely to react
favorably to the US and UN action in. Korea. Some spokesmen
have already expressed sympathy with the Egyptian attitude
and have indicated their belief that the US has fallen into the
same error in Korea as it did by supporting Chiang Kai-shek
and Bao Dai, The Nationalists generally show little concern
over the prospect of general war developing out of the Korean
fighting; in fact, many would welcome global conflict as an
opportunity to strike a blow at the French. No amelioration
of general nationalist hostility to the US position on Korea
can be expected unless the French can be persuaded to effect
drastic social and political reforms throughout the area.
This Nationalist opposition, however, will have little effect
on the loyalty of French-led native troops and will probably
not result in anything more than verbal protests at this time.
India-Pakistan One notable aspect of the Korean crisis is
the active roles which India and Pakistan
have assumed in it. Although neither country is at present
expected to provide material support for the UN forces in
the Korean dispute, both nations have made special diplo-
matic efforts to further a UN solution of the problem. As
the spokesman of a leading Moslem state, the Pakistan For-
eign Minister has been attempting (though without discernible
success) to persuade the Arab states to support.the Security
Council resolution calling for active measures to halt North
Korean aggression. The Government of India, meanwhile,
has been making earnest efforts to lessen the possibility of
a new world war. After first making a short-lived and un-
successful attempt to promote mediation of the dispute, India
f -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300030001-2
 Fl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
r
has since been trying to ease tension over Formosa, fearing
that the military forces of Communist China may become
involved with US forces, that the USSR may desire such a
development, and that if it occurs the USSR's position vis-a-
vis the US in Europe and elsewhere would be so greatly
strengthened as to encourage overt action by the USSR. It
is India's opinion that the present US position in regard to
Formosa constitutes a challenge to Communist China which
the latter may not ignore. India has accordingly urged
Chinese Communists to exercise restraint and has made
known to the US Government its ardent hope that the US
would find some means of alleviating the strain existing
between it and Communist China, perhaps by a public state-
ment indicating that its interest in Formosa is only tempo-
rary, Simultaneously India has espoused the Chinese Com-
munists' claim to China's seat on the Security Council,
maintaining that the USSR will return to the Council only if
accompanied by Communist China and that discussions lead-
ing to a cessation of hostilities might then take place.
Southeast Asia All five UN member nations in Southeast
Asia (Australia, Burma, The Philippines,
New Zealand and Thailand) have endorsed the vigorous UN
actions in the Korean war, and all but Burma have offered
material assistance. Nevertheless, considerable apprehen-
sion exists regarding developments in Korea and there is
some reluctance to take an irrevocable stand on the issue.
This tendency toward neutrality Is most clearly discernible
in. Burma and Indonesia, both of which suffered under pro-
longed Japanese occupation and experienced violent post-war
Communist uprisings. Burma has thus made it clear that
its support for the UN action in no way effects its existing
policy of maintaining friendly relations with all countries;
and Indonesia has officially announced a policy of neutrality
SECRET
 on the ground that it would be unwise to stir up leftist-
inspired trouble unnecessarily at a time when every effort
is being made to establish a stable, unitary state. The
Indonesian stand stems in. part from a reluctance to estab-
lish a precedent in the event of similar US action in the
event of a Chinese Communist military attack on Indochina.
Indonesia, as well as Burma, has recognized Communist
China and is well aware that UN intervention in support of
France and Bao Dai would receive little popular support
in Southeast Asia, In conclusion, the Southeast Asian nations
are now faced with the embarrassing dilemma of supporting
the UN and maintaining their moral self-respect while at the
same time avoiding entanglements which could jeopardize
their independence.
n
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 P
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
SECRET
As it becomes more apparent that the fighting in Korea
will be prolonged, the military capabilities of the Chinese Com-
munists, as well as Soviet intentions regarding the use of these
capabilities, provide the principal key to the outcome of the
fighting in Korea and to whether the fighting will spread to other
areas of the Far. East. Before the US action in. Korea, the Chinese
Communists were believed capable of launching, individually or
simultaneously, successful military action against Korea, Hong
Kong and Macao, or Indochina; a Chinese Communist invasion of
Taiwan, though costly, was also considered within Communist
capabilities. Events since then, however, have affected Chinese
Communist capabilities for action in the three key areas of Korea,
Taiwan, and Indochina? and have raised new political and strategic
problems regarding the use of Chinese Communist military forces
in these areas.
Aid to Korea The USSR will be confronted with a difficult problem
if forced to decide whether to permit a North Korean
defeat or to use Chinese Communist troops to win or prolong the
struggle Indefinitely. Although a North Korean defeat would have
obvious disadvantages, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces
would not necessarily prevent such a defeat and a defeat under these
circumstances would be far more disastrous, not only because it
would be a greater blow to Soviet prestige throughout the world, but
because it would seriously threaten Soviet control over the Chinese
Communist regime. Even. a victory in Korea through the use of
complicate if not jeopardize Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese
Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would be en-
a hanced; and Peiping might be tempted as a result of success in Korea
A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia. In addition to these
purely internal difficulties, the use of Chinese Communist
forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not
only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the
USSR itself would be under greater compulsion to assure a
victory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops.
C Taiwan Invasion The principal problems confronting the
Kremlin in deciding whether to permit
an invasion of Taiwan are the nature and extent of US re-
action and the risk of global war precipitated because of the
spread of Communist military aggression. Several factors
may lead to a decision to launch an assault on Taiwan before
the typhoon season in late August. Recent evidence indicates
that Chinese Communist forces are poised for the invasion
and available land, sea and air forces may now be capable of
launching a successful assault. If a sizeable beachhead is
established, the resultant panic in Nationalist ranks might
well induce desertions and snowballing defections sufficient
to cause a virtual collapse of organized Nationalist resistance.
C The Peiping regime is already publicly committed to the Taiwan
operation and the operation would not divert forces which might
be needed in Korea. In addition, the USSR may reason that US
support of Taiwan would gain less international support than the
I/ defense of South Korea and that the invasion should be under-
taken before the US can reinforce its "neutralization" forces
in the Formosa Strait. Despite these favorable considerations
the fact remains that kn invasion of Taiwan would be an immense -
C ly costly operation with the resulting political and strategic ad-
vantages balanced by the increased risk of precipitating a'global
war which it is believed the USSR does not presently desire.
p
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 Support for Indochina Indochina offers the Chinese Com-
munists their greatest opportunity
for expanding Communist influence in Asia with the minimum
military or political risks. From a military viewpoint, the
Indochina conflict has been a stalemate. Despite considerable
successes, the French have been unable fully to capitalize on
their superiority in equipment and manpower because of the
essentially guerrilla nature of the fighting and the terrain
which prevents large-scale operations. Given equipment and
supplies similar to that of the French, the forces of Ho Chi-
Minh could shift the course of the present inconclusive warfare
in their favor. The Chinese Communists have the capabilities
to supply the material needed by Ho Chi-Minh and may be ex-
pected to step up such assistance in the immediate future.
 GUINEA
SGURC.ES- AERK..1 .nt))'AOO Tr NM 1 Gq..onr $.c.b. N.nA1M, O C. 1911
CARTE OEN.SEMKE W GOWERNEMENT GENERAL OE L AERIOUE
OCCIOENTALE GRA JpISE .?aoogooo $...c. Gior.o.Nn.0 1'A O E. 1947)
rly .N.,n ooa.l bo..d.....n,.n C. do ..., do . n.c..../ily c.....,ond
+.R m... d.. bor.d..u....op...d by it.. U. S. G..Nn...L
 r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
r SECRET
African Defense The French General Staff is reportedly
considering the advisability, in the event
of war, and the overrunning of France, of basing French re-
sistance in West Africa as well as in North Africa, The French
apparently have doubts as to their ability to hold North Africa
and are anxious to establish another line of defense south of
the Sahara along the fourteenth parallel, skirting the first fully
habitable land south of the desert, The French maintain that
the desert areas of Libya and Niger can be crossed by a large
and properly organized expeditionary force, and that a Soviet
force, landing in politically unstable Libya, could advance virtu-
ally unopposed to the Gulf of Guinea, deny this strategically
important area to the US, jeopardize the export of uranium from
the Belgian Congo and permit the USSR to acquire Atlantic bases.
The French hope that the new defense line would help to prevent
the USSR from attempting to cut off the western bulge of Africa.
The present proposed pattern of defense installations includes
the establishment of an extensive air base at Bilma (Niger), to
be sustained in the west by the existing military installations at
Bamako (Sudan) and in the east by Fort Lamy (Chad), with in-
tervening strategically located points of support at Zinder (Niger)
and Gao (Sudan). The chief obstacle to French defense plans in
Africa is the inadequacy of funds and personnel because of prior
commitments elsewhere. Although some Communist acitivity
along the fourteenth parallel. has been reported by French authori-
ties, it is not likely that the Communists could effectively interfere
with French defense efforts in this backward and sparsely populated
area.
Central Africa An important step toward solution of the long-
standing problem of developing Central African
transportation facilities was taken when the UK and Portugal
recently concluded a twenty-year convention on transport relations
r, SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
between British territory in Central Africa and the Portuguese
colony of Mozambique. Negotiations are also continuing in
connection with an interim operating or phasing program for
Mozambique and surveys are being planned to investigate other
transport outlets for the land-locked British territories, Any
substantial improvement in the area', transport facilities re-
sulting from these measures would,serve US interests by: (1) ex-
pediting the flow of strategic materials being stockpiled by the
US; (2) aiding the economic recovery of European colonial powers;
and (3) contributing to the orderly economic and political develop-
ment of the African continent. Although the colonial powers will
remain reluctant to depart from their past practice of securing
the maximum economic benefits from their African colonies, the
constructive action now being taken to improve transportation
facilities may point the way to the broad opportunities available
to the West to develop this backward area, politically and economic-
ally, while Africa remains relatively stable and secure, unthreatened
by Communist subversion or pressure.
East German Police Although the situation in Korea has increased
West German fears of a similar Soviet-in-
spired military aggression, the state of training, armament and
indoctrination of the Soviet Zone paramilitary Alert Police makes it
highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to use this force for an
invasion of West Germany. The Alert Police could now be effective
only for security operations within the Soviet zone, and possibly, for..
petty harassing incidents against West Germany and West Berlin.
The Alert Police will, however, be expanded, and therefore constitute
an increasing threat to unarmed West Germany. Essentially a
training group organized in part along military lines, the Alert Police
can be developed into an effective, highly mobile internal security
force or into the cadre for an East German army. Training in the
Alert Police is primarily military, and under the close supervision
of Soviet Army officers, emphasis is placed on the creation of cadres
r SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
SECRET
C
for possible future development. The force now comprises
l approximately 53,000 officers and men (a considerable increase
during the past year) and T/O strength will probably not rise
above 55,000 during 1950. Completion of training for approxi-
mately 15,000 men in the alert schools will increase tactical
capabilities; coastal patrol units have recently been activated
and air units may be established.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 11,69......,
12,13,14.... .
15,16,17....
18.........
19.
. , . , .. .
20.....,..
21.........
22,23,24....
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34 ,
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44.
45,46,47,48,49,72,
73,74,75 , , .
52,53,54,55,56,79,
80,81,82,83,84,85,
The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OCD, State
Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Att: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
 Document So. ?o
NO'C': in
C . .
S
77
Date: o_ _ __
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300030001-2
 V S (:UVF:i