WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 31

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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I,Re'T Co py No. 80
1
1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
I.
Number 31
17 DEC 1948
VIY!
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. ri
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO,: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: A G. 77 1763
Date:
By: 0 it
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
'61:+1, role"
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
HIGHLIGHTS
WESTERN EUROPE.,
EASTERN EUROPE _
4 ? ?
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
FAR EAST
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ANNEX
# ?
, ? 1
4 4
4
4 4
4
4
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4
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4 4
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Page
1
2
5
10
13
Prospects for Palestine Conciliation Commission , 14
Mao Tse-Tung, Chinese Communist Leader, ? 17
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HIGHLIGHTS
Chinese Communist forces have, by successfully
containing all the effective Nationalist units south of
Ilsuchou, virtually finished the battle for Central China
While the Communist armies pause momentarily along
the north bank of the Yangtze River in order to regroup
and resupply, the Nationalist military offices in Nanking
are beset with despondency and confusion (see page 10).
Nationalist political leaders are similarly afflicted with
despair and uncertainty and apparently have not made any
systematic plans for the removal of the Government fol-
lowing the loss of Nanking.
The firm intention of the Netherlands Government
to proceed unilaterally in the establishment of an interim
government for all Indonesia has been deflected, at least
temporarily, by the conciliatory letter recently addressed
by Indonesian Premier Hatta to the UN Good Offices Com-
mittee (see page 11). Meanwhile, the Indonesian Republic
is continuing its efforts to win both domestic and foreign
support for an eventual showdown with the Dutch.
In Moscow, the Kremlin is currently holding dis-
cussions with Satellite economic delegates in what appears
to be an effort to bolster Satellite economies under increased
Soviet control (see page 5). The serious deterioration of the
vital Czechoslovak economy has largely prompted the hold-
ing of the conferences at this time.
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WESTERN EUROPE
GERMANY
Soviet Withdrawal Although the USSIVin the near future may
officially propose quadripartite withdrawal
from Germany, such a proposal would be primarily for propa-
ganda purposes in view of the still inadequate Communist control
over eastern Germany. Soviet propaganda has persistently ad-
vocated such a withdrawal since the Warsaw Conference in
May, and the Kremlin may now wish to strengthen this propa-
ganda campaign with an official proposal. Meanwhile, the USSR
has created the framework for an eastern German state and
has hinted that after its recognition the USSR would sign a sep-
arate peace treaty involving a partial withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Germany. Implementation of these plans, however,
would be preceded by a far more vigorous propaganda campaign
in the hope of convincing the German people that the USSR
stands ready to keep faith with Germany whereas the western
powers insist upon continued occupation. Regardless of what
propaganda proposals are made, the Kremlin cannot risk with-
drawal. of its forces from eastern Germany until the Communist
position there has been sufficiently consolidated, probably not
before the summer of 1949,
Inflationary Trends Inflationary symptoms now appearing
In western Germany may eventually
imperil its financial structure, the morale of the population,
and the industrial production upon which much of western
European recovery depends. The inflationary tendencies are
being strengthened by the easy credit policy of the banks and
by the Large operating deficits of most of the Laender govern-
ments and the Bizonal Economic Council. Despite widely-
proclaimed intentions by the German governments to economize,
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GERMANY
practically no attempt is being made to bring government ex-
penditures into line with revenues. Credit expansion and the
release of blocked accounts since the currency reform have
increased the money in circulation from 1.1 to 14 billion marks.
This increased money supply has raised prices, thereby en-
couraging the reappearance of hoarding, the black market,
and pressures for wage increases.
ITALY
Italian Colonies Although the UN has postponed until April
discussion of the controversial Italian
colonies question, the maneuvering which preceded this de-
cision underscored the difficulty of reaching a generally
acceptable solution and has already produced repercussions
In Italy and North Africa. In Italy, bitter reaction to the lack
of US and British support for the return of the colonies to
Italy will probably cause Premier De Gasperi to soft-pedal
temporarily his efforts to gain popular support for an Italian
bid to join the proposed Atlantic Pact. De Gasperi's pro-
west position is already opposed by neutrality-minded left-
wing members of his own Christian Democratic Party, as
well as by moderate Socialists, extreme leftists, and other
nationalist elements. In French North Africa, French support
of Italy's claim to a trusteeship over TripoMania has, by
revealing France's intention to maintain indefinitely the
colonial status quo, sharply increased Arab nationalist re-
sentment against France.
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FRANCE
Budget Deficit The budget deficit problem will require the
full attention of the Queuille Government
during the next few weeks if it is to survive politically and
at the same time further the progress of France along the
road to economic recovery. In its efforts to bring expendi-
tures into line with revenues, the Queuille Government will
be confronted with: (1) opposing pressures from powerful
political, economic, and labor groups for relief by govern-
ment action; and (2) conflicts between France's immediate
fiscal needs and US European recovery objectives. Any
sound solution to France's budgetary problem must now take
Into account US decisions involving such matters as the :size
of ECA dollar aid for 1949 and French investment program
commitments under the European recovery program. Mean-
while, the internal problems of the Queuille Government are
best demonstrated by the divergent official policies of two
of its political supporters, the Radical Socialists and the
Socialists. The Radical Socialists demand, among other
things, massive cuts in government expenditures, a lessen-
ing of governmental controls over business, and lowered
taxes to encourage production. The Socialists, in contrast,
oppose reduction of the civil service, seek stronger govern-
ment control over prices and production, and urge a re-dis-
tribution of the tax burden, which would mean higher taxes
for business. Confronted with the task of retaining the
support of both these opposing forces and at the same time
reducing the budget deficit, the Queuille Government must
either find a compromise course or face a vote of non-con-
fidence from its awn dissenters as well as from the Com-
munists and Gaullists.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Satellite Economy Strengthened Kremlin control over the
Satellite ecOnonaies will probably result
from current discussion; in Moscow between Soviet officials
and economic delegates from all the Satellites except Albania.
The presence of top political and economic leaders from
Czechoslovakia and rumors of an impending visit to Moscow
by a high-level Polish delegation reflect the importance the
Kremlin attaches to the development of the industrialized
economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland. In fact, the rapid
deterioration of the highly-important Czechoslovak economy
since the February coup may have prompted the Kremlin to
consider immediate drastic steps to alleviate the ailing eco-
nomic situation in the Satellite area. Realizing that two years
of ruthless Soviet exploitation of Satellite resources, coupled
with a curtailment in east-west trade, may finally be threaten-
ing economic dislocation in eastern Europe, the Kremlin may
have decided to exercise more direct control over the econo-
mies of the Satellite nations and to implement a more closely
Integrated plan for their economic development. The USSR
is probably also motivated by the necessity to improve the
economy of eastern Europe in order to counter the growing
economic recovery in western Europe.
SOVIET UNION
Israeli Policy Although the Kremlin is unlikely to alter its
basic policy toward Israel before the 25 Jan-
uary Israeli elections, the recent marked change in Czecho-
slovalda's earlier friendly attitude toward Israel may reflect
an impending change in Soviet tactics in the Near East. Czecho-
slovak authorities have cancelled the Israeli military training
program and the Government has allegedly forbidden unscheduled
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SOVIET UNION
air flights to Israel. This latter move, by curtailing clandes-
tine arms shipments, represents as obvious financial loss to
Czechoslovakia and was probably dictated by the Soviet
Union. The USSR may estimate that the establishment of
Israel as a disruptive force in the Arab world has now been
accomplished and that further military aid to a country of
basically pro-western sympathies would ultimately prove
prejudicial to Soviet interests to the Near East. Nevertheless,
the Soviet Union, In the faint hope that Israel's pro-western
itlignment may change after the 25 January Israeli electioas,
Ms not yet altered its basic policy of politically supporting
Israel.
GREECE
Guerrilla Activities Although neither the Greek A.r3ny nor
the guerrillas have undertaken large.
scale operations, they have continued their efforts to search
out the other's weaknesses and to maneuver for position.
Significantly, guerrilla logistics appear to be as satisfactory
as ever. Supplies are being trucked into the Vital triangle from
both Albania and Yugoslavia, and the Grammos area, laboriously
cleared by the Greek Army last summer, Is again serving as
a supply link between Albania and central Greece. Czechoslovak
mm.Skoda artillery pieces have been found among recently
captured guerrilla equipment.
The guerrillas have meanwhile continued their propa-
ganda efforts. In the battle zone, they have begun to use artil-
lery to fire their leaflets. Behind the front, Markos' radio
broadcasts to the Greek Army are emphasizing conciliation
and urging the formation of unit "reconciliation committees"
which would act to stop the war. Although the Greeks cannot
believe that Markos honestly wishes a reconciliation with the
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GREECE
Athens government, the successful guerrilla performance at
Grammos and Vitsi is causing many el them to wonder if they
were right a year ago in believing that Communist "peace"
efforts were prompted entirely by weakness.
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
MIA -PAKISTAN
Military Operations The impending departure on 15 January
of General Sir Roy Bucher, the British
officer now commanding the Indian Army, increases the possi-
bility of full-scale open warfare between bdia and Pakistan.
General Bucher has exerted a moderating Wham* on Indian
military policy and, in cooperation with his British opposite
number in Pakistan, has held to a minhnum direct encounters
between the Indian Army and Pakistan's regular troops in
Kashmir. His successor, Lieutenant General K. M. Cariappa,
Is reportedly vain, temperamentally unstable, and lacking in
sound military judgment. In attempting to give palatable mili-
tary advice to the Indian Government, he may fail to give due
consideration to all of the military and political factors in-
volved and may use his new position to seek the personal
glory that a speedy termination of the Kashmir campaign
would provide. The need for a prompt political solution of
the Kashmir problem is underscored not only by General
Cariappa's appointment but also by the prospect that weather
conditions will be more favorable for military operations
after 1 January 1949. Even if India does not start a clear-cut
offensive operation, Increased Indian pressure may cause an
already nervous Pakistan to launch a "preventive" offensive.
TURKEY
Arab Relations Turkey has demonstrated the seriousness
of its desire for an Arab-Zionist settle-
ment by its willingness to serve, at the risk of incurring
Arab displeasure, on the UN's three-power Palestine Con-
ciliation Commission. Already confronted with hostile powers
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TURRET
along a considerable portion of their frontier, the Turks have
necessarily placed great stress on maintaining good relations
with their Arab neighbors. Turkey voted against the partition
I Palestine in 194? and in its subsequent actions has been
careful to avoid any steps which might provoke Arab hostility.
At the same time, however, Turkey has been concerned over
the deleterious effect the Palestine dispute has had on Near
East stability and the resulting opportunities for Soviet agi-
tation. During the past year the Turkish Government has
sought on a friendly, informal basis to persuade the Arabs
that their interest would best be served by a Palestine settle-
ment. Now Turkey, along with the US and France, will have
to take the blame for any acts of the Commission to which
the Arabs object (see page 14).
SOUTH AFRICA
Government Rift A growing split between the Nationalist
and Afrikaner Parties has weakened
Prime Minister Malan's coalition government and raises
the possibility of new general elections. The rift has devel-
oped as a result of differences between the leaders of the
two parties over the allocation of seats for the March pro-
vincial elections and over constitutional questions connected
with the bill for depriving colored persons of representation
In the Assembly. Prime Minister Malan apparently has the
choice of risking a new election or of paying the price for
continued cooperation of the Afrikaner Party, led by N.C.
Revenge. In the case of new elections, Revenge might join
with Smuts' United Party, a development which has been
facilitated by the death of Smuts' successor-designate,
J. C. Hofmyer.
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FAR EAST
Economic Conference The recent, unharmonious meeting of
the UN Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East ( ECAFE) chiefly centered around:
(1) renewed efforts by Asiatic delegates to secure US backing
for a "Marshall Plan" for Asia; (2) continued discord between
colonial and anti-colonial powers; and (3) Soviet attempts to
exploit these differences. The US-Dutch attempt to bar the
Indonesian Republic from membership in ECAFE was soundly
defeated by an 8-2 vote. US refusal to sponsor a "Marshall
Plan" for Asia has created an anti-western sentiment which
the USSR is exploiting, along with the quarrel over seating
the Indonesian Renublic. as nroof that "imoerialist western
nations" seek to keep the Aa1at4c economy in a "semi-colonial"
state. On the other hand, the USSR itself suffered a propaganda
defeat when the Commission emphatically voted down a Soviet
amendment to an ECAFE resolution favoring import of foreign
capital.
CHINA
Military Debacle Despondency and confusion pervade Nanking
military offices as complete military
defeat comes nearer, and the Chinese public, long fed a diet
of "victories" and "strategic withdrawals,' must soon be
confronted with the stark fact that shattering reverses are
being suffered by the Nationalist forces south of Hsuchou.
The position of the encircled Nationalist forces southwest of
Hsuchou and west of Kuchen is virtually hopeless. Although the
Pangfou Nationalists will probably attempt to withdraw south of
the Yangtze river, it is doubtful that many of these forces can be
salvaged to bolster the weak Nanking defenses. The only chance
for a breathing spell for the Nationalists lies in the possibility
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CHINA
that the Communist armies will have to pause to re-group
and replace expended materiel. In North China, the
Nationalist position is also deteriorating rapidly. Fu
has withdrawn from most of his outlying positions to the
cities of Peiping and Tientsin, and Communist advance
guards have already reached the outskirts of these two
Nationalist bastions. Present indications are that a political,
rather than a military, decision will effect a transfer of
power in the area.
Manchurian Autonomy Hints in the Chinese -Communist
press of Dairen that Manchuria
will have a special status, under Communist control, are
substantiated by the Communist radio announcement of a
new, unified currency for all of "liberated" China except
Manchuria. Although such special status for Manchuria
may be motivated, in part, by a desire to keep the relatively
unstable north and central China economy from debilitating
that of the Manchurian area, the special status arrangement
may also be the first step in setting up a Manchurian People's
Republic similar to that of Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia.
The Dairen press release carried plims for setting up the
Judicial, administrative, and executive departments of a
"People's Republic," and commented that the Communist
Party must completely direct the affairs of the government.
INDONESIA
Dutch Plans Dutch plans to proceed without the Indonesian
Republic in the establishment of an interim
government for all Indonesia have been delayed at least
temporarily. The conciliatory letter addressed by Premier
Hatta of the Republic to the UN Good Offices Committee has,
by making the Dutch attitude appear stubborn and arbitrary
In contrast, given the Dutch Government pause. Public sea-
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INDONESIA
tinient in the Netherlands strongly favors a move by the
Government to push ahead with its Dutch-sponsored federal
movement in Indonesia. The Government will encounter
resistance from its constituents if, in response to the pres-
sure of the UN and world opinion, it delays this program
further or renews negotiations with the Republicans.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian Republic is attempting
to marshal both internal and foreign support for an eventual
showdown with the Dutch. The Republican Government claims
that, if forced to flee by Dutch police action, it will move to
southern Sumatra and, if necessary, will establish a govern-
ment-in-exile in India. Indian support in such an eventuality
may also include denial to the Dutch of air landing rights and
an embargo on all Dutch shipping. The Republican government
is also intensifying its efforts to win the support of non-Repub-
lican nationalists.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ARGENTINA
Economic Policy Argentina's failure to take effective
measures to relieve its unfavorable
economic position apparently is resulting from a conflict
between leading personalities of government and finance,
That Peron permits such behind-the-scenes maneuverings
to nullify government action on such a vital matter?adjust-
ing Argentina's foreign trade politicies to what is becoming
an international buyers' market--indicates that Peron does
not yet consider economic deterioration to be an immediate
threat to his internal position. (His party obtained a strong
majority in the 5 December elections.) As Argentina's
Internal economic crisis becomes more acute, however,
Peron may be forced to intervene in these backstage maneuvers
to the extent of initiating negotiations leading to a broad under-
standing with the US.
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ff?be?es?b Nr., I V Om. I VII NO-3, I= I N./ 1 I U% I
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15 December 1948
11 1 1 2
PALESTINE
\ Approximate area under Israeli
civil or military control,
15 December 1948
Partition Boundary Ws accepted by the United
Nations General Assembly. Nov, 19471
Inteniationel Boundary
Standard Gauge Railroad W1w1
? 34,11TON Gauge Reilmed131w1
First Clues Reed
Second Chem Road
011Mpe Line
0
Jewish Communal Ana
IQ 20 30 Mks
C1161=11=6111111111MIlaral"".."
MVO'
11112 Map Branch, CIA. 12-48
CONFIDENTIAL
CIA ROPIOCHICtI011
STAT
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PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION
Last-minute adoption by the General Assembly of an almost
completely emasculated resolution on Palestine reflects: (1) the
Assembly's unwillingness to define (as it did in the 1947 parti-
tion resolution) the terms of any solution which would require
forceful imposition; and (2) a consequent decision to permit
the situation to work itself out along the lines of the existing
Israeli fait accoropli. &Ur events had pretty well run their -
course In Palestine, the GA finally adopted a resolution winch
simply established a Conciliation Commission (to be composed
of representatives from the US, France, and Turkey) to assist the
Arabs and Jews to achieve a settlement. The GA did not recom-
mend a basis for settlement, and the Commission will be con-
fronted with almost all of the multiple difficulties faced in turn
by last winter's Palestine Commission, last summer's Truce ,
Commission, by Count Bernadotte, and by Dr. Bunche, the
present Acting Mediator.
Although the Provisional Government of Israel considers
the present as a propitious time to negotiate a favorable settle-
ment, most of the Arab governments concerned are unwilling
to enter into early negotiations. The Lebanese Government
refuses to talk while Israeli troops occupy areas of southern
Lebanon. The present political crisis in Syria was canoed in
part by the failure of the government's Palestine policy, and
it is extremely unlikely that any new government will either
desire or be permitted to negotiate with Israel. Iraq still
maintains about 15,000 troops in central Palestine, and the
Iraqi Government continues to advocate concerted opposition
to Zionism by the Arab states. The Iraqi Government does
not dare bring home an army that has failed to defeat the
Zionists; it is difficult, therefore, to imagine on what basis
Iraq could negotiate with Israel. Egypt refuses to negotiate
while Israeli troops continue to control the Negeb, occupy
Beersheba, and hold as virtual prisoners an Egyptian brigade
at Faluja.
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There is little doubt that Abdullah of Transjordan would
like to negotiate a broad settlement with Israel. A local armi-
stice in Jerusalem between Israeli and Arab Legion officers is
working smoothly, and Abdullah has been urged by the recent
conference of Palestinian Arab notables at Jericho to proclaim
himself joint ruler of Arab Palestine and Transjordan. On the
basis of these two developments, agreement between Israel and
Transjordan might appear to offer hope for a broad settlement
In Palestine.
Other members of the Arab League, however, strongly op-
pose the Jericho resolution. The Kings of Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen, Azzam Pasha (the Arab League secretary general),
the influential council of Ulernas of Al-Azhar University at Cairo,
and the governments of Syria and Lebanon have expressed their
disapproval. Unless this opposition is modified, it is doubtful
whether Abdullah will act, despite endorsement of the Jericho
resolution by the Transjordan Parliament. Even if he were to
assume the Palestine crown and attempt to negotiate with Israel
against the express wishes of other League members, he would
probably gain little territory initially. His Arab Legion occupies
the Old City of Jerusalem and a relatively small area bounded
by Ramallah on the north and by Hebron on the south,. Abdullah
Is therefore in no position to negotiate either the Negeb or the
Galilee issue. Moreover, he is not likely to receive encourage-
ment at this time from the UK, which is anxious to avoid responsi-
bility for any development opposed by most of the Arab League
and also realizes that Abdullah's authority in Palestine would
be greatly limited. Eventually, however, the other Arab states
may decide that it would be to their best interests to withdraw and
let Abdullah bear both the onus of treating with the Israelis and
the responsibility for subsequent developments in Palestine.
Thus the Conciliation Commission faces a difficult task
In trying to bring Arabs and Jews together in view of: (1) the
absence of any basis for reaching a settlement; and (2) the re-
fusal of most of the Arab states to negotiate with Israel, In
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effect, it will probably revert to a truce commission. It may be
able to extend the present Jerusalem armistice into a demilitari-
zation agreement for the area and establish an effective armi-
stice in the Negeb and on the Iraqi front in central Palestine.
However, it will probably have to ignore the question of boundaries
and the continued presence of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon
and Arab armies in Palestine.
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MAO TSE-TUNG, CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADER
Communist Leader Mao Tse-Tung, for 15 years the
foremost champion of Chinese peasantry, has become the
most powerful political leader in Asia. His stubborn, Intel-
ligent leadership is principally responsible for the steady
groWth of the Chinese Communist Party whose armies apparent-
ly are winning the final battle for control of the Chinese nation.
Mao's first ten years in the Chinese Communist Party,
which he helped to found in 1921, were marked by obstinate
Insistence that Communism in China could only be achieved
through an organized and armed peasantry, evolutionary
gradualism, and moderate bnd reform. With the expulsion
of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang, the "rightist"
opposition to Mao was deposed. Following the failure of
Li Li-san's "proletarian revolution" in 1931, Mao's advocacy
of a peasant base for Chinn* Commtmism became the Party's
official program. To adapt Marxist Communism to his con-
cept' of China's needs, Mao continued to build his party and
his army upon the base of a strong peasantry. His doctrine
continues to include a moderate land policy and, for the pre-
sent at least, cooperation with non-Communist elements and
a conciliatory attitude toward western nations.
Although Mao's flexible pragmatism in adapting Com-
munism to the Chinese situation has led many western ob-
servers to believe that his allegiance to Communism is only
tentative, his recent statements in the Corninform Journal
Indicate that Mao will probably remain faithful to the USSR
In all major issues. The possibility exists, however, that
Mao at some future date will resist Soviet efforts to annex
either Manchuria or the border provinces or to gain greater
direct control over the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover,
the return to Manchtria in 1945 of Li Li-san, an aggressive
supporter of Soviet interests, might suggest that the Kremlin
desires to strengthen Soviet control over the leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party.
- 17 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6
SECRET
D Lsrrn IBTTlCsN
1? The President
2. Secretary of State
3 Chief of :47,iff to Commander in Chief
4 Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the AT:my
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chtirman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10 Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
1,69 Chief' of 3taff, U Nrmv
12,13,14.. Chief of Naval Operations
15,16,1'7. .. Chief cif Staff, U.S. Air Force
18? ? . ? Director of Plans and Operations,General Staff,U S,Artny
19. . Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S. Mr Force
20, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21 . Director of Plans and Operations, U S Air Force
22,23,29. . Special Assistant to Secretary of State, Research &
Intelligence
25,26,2'7,28,29, Director of Intelligence, General Staff,U .5, Army
30,31,32,33,34
35,36,37,38,39, Chief of Naval Intelligence
40,41,42,43,44
45,46,47,48,49. Director of intelligence, U S kir Force
56 Director of Security and Intelligence,Atom Energy Comm
51 . Executive Secretary ,Military Liaison Corn:Tlittee,Atomic
Energy Commission
52,53,54,55,56. Chief ,Acquisition gz Distribution Division,01CD,Dept State
57. . , Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff,Dept,State
60 Secretary of State (Attention: Chief,Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
62,63. Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
64 . Director, joint Planning Group, joint Chiefs Staff
65 US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
66,67. . Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
68. . Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6 1
?Sietirr
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2631-8-1948
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP78-01617A002100100001-6-