WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 30

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100090001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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ICopy No 8'
I WEEKLY SUMMARY
Number . 30
10? DEC1948
Document No.
.NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
tlass. CHANGED TO:
DDA Meto, 4 ApP 77
?Auth: Tr, G. 77/1763
-Date:
0
TS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
In accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNIN6
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the. United Stites within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS 1
WESTER N EUROPE
2
EASTERN EUROPE
5
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7
FAR EAST
9
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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HIGHLIGHTS
While UN negotiations on the Berlin dispute have con-
tinned to be stalemated, the division of Berlin itself has
become almost complete. The recent action of the USSR in
recognizing an east Berlin government has been followed by
a strong anti-Communist vote in the 5 December elections
for the western sectors of the city (see page 2). Although
these two developments accentuate the split in the city, the
western sector elections at least indicate continued German
support for the efforts of the western powers to defeat Soviet
attempts to gain complete control of Berlin.
The military situation of the Chinese National Gov-
ernment ccntinues to move irrevocably toward disaster.
Communist forces have succeeded in surrounding virtually
all Nationalist units in the Hsuchou-Pangfou area and are
rapidly destroying organized Nationalist resistance north
of the Yangtze River (see page 9 and map). Meanwhile, the
National Government is making haphazard plans to move
from Nanking to Canton and Chungking.
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1
WESTERN EUROPE
GERMANY
Berlin Elections Although the results of the recent elections
in the western sectors of Berlin will in fact
further accentuate the split in the city administration, they at
least assure continued German support for western measures
designed to counter Communist efforts to gain complete control
of Berlin. The new government in the western sectors will be
dominated by the Social Democrats, who have proposed that
their party leader, Dr. Ernst Reuter, be installed immediately
as mayor. Reuter has emphasized the need for close collaboration
with the western military governments. He has also indicated
that his government will: (1) undertake the reorganization of the
badly disorganized city administration; (2) ask the military govern-
ments to introduce the western mark as the sole legal currency in
order to simplify city administration problems and facilitate
reduction of the budget deficit; and (3) seek to streamline and
unify the three-sector government within the framework of the
111 Berlin constitution.
Bumper Harvest The improved food situation in the eastern
zone of Germany resulting from the bumper
1948 harvest has increased Soviet capabilities for carrying on the
present struggle over Berlin. The USSR will have at its disposal
approximately a half million tons of bread grains after meeting all
military and civilian ration requirements in the Soviet sector of
Berlin and eastern Germany. This excess can be used for in-
centive programs in factories, increased rations to consumers.
and disposal on the free market. Moreover, the USSR can be ex-
pected to rely upon this surplus to lend credence to an intensified
propaganda campaign to counteract the effects of the airlift. Previous
Soviet claims that the USSR could feed the entire city have already
been buttressed by an announcement by the new rump government
in the Soviet sector that it intends to carry out the "Democratic
bloc's" winter emergency program for supplying food and fuel to
all Berlin.
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uNnED KINGDOM
Commonwealth Status The future organization of the Common-
Wealth may be influenced by Ireland's
action in cuttinf its last legal tie to the British crown and the
Commonwealth $ unqualified acquiescence in this step. Ireland's
new republican status will change neither the existing recipro-
cal citizenship rights between Ireland and Commonwealth coun-
tries, nor "imperial preferences" in the field of trade. Although
the UK intends that Ireland be a special case, Ireland's unique
association with the Commonwealth will arouse keen interest at
least in India and South Africa. These Commonwealth nations
ardently aspire to become republics but have thus far been
deterred by the prospect of losing the benefits derived from
connection with the British crown. There are indications,
however, that?the older dominions of Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand would oppose any extension of the Irish precedent,
which might also be strongly opposed by non-Commonwealth
nations if these countries sever their ties with the Crown while
maintaining trade preferences.
SCANDINAVIA
Defense Prospects Prospects for a mutual Scandhavian
defense agreement still appear remote.
The difficulty attending the current defense talks is underscored
by the Norwegian Foreign Minister's prediction that Norway
will openly break with Sweden in January over Sweden's con-
tinued insistence on Scandinavian neutrality. Concrete steps
are being taken by the Scandinavian countries, however, to
Improve their Individual preparedness. The Swedish
meat is expected to approve a 50% increase in aircraft for
Sweden's day-fighter groups. Moreover, the Swedes are plan-
ning to increase the mechanization of the Swedish Army and
have reportedly been successful in developing a Jet fighter
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SCANDINAVIA
and anti-aircraft guns capable of combating jet planes. The
Norwegian Government, which obtained a 100 million kroner
($20 million) defense grant in March, is now asking for an
additional 112 million kroner for defense purposes. The
Danish Defense Minister has the support of the four major
political parties for a purchasing program to include jet
fighters, naval mines, and anti-aircraft equipment.
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EASTERN EUROPE
YUGOSLAVIA
Talks with West Behind-the-scenes economic and political
talks between the Yugoslav Government
and Italy, Greece, and Austria suggest that Tito's administra-
tion is seeking to strengthen its economic ties with its non-
Communist neighbors. Previous efforts to reach agreement
have been complicated by Yugoslav nationalism, but Tito's
Government has recently intimated that, in the future, it will
be more accommodating in its attitude toward the problems
of Trieste and Gorizia. Although the Carinthian frontier issue
has not been resolved, Austria and Yugoslavia have agreed
that the frontier controversy need not prevent cooperation in
the economic field. Despite Yugoslavia's acceptance of the
UN-sponsored plan for settling the Greek border dispute, which
may appear conciliatory to the western powers, the acceptance
was made contingent upon agreement to the plan by both Al-
bania and Bulgaria. Tito is thus apparently attempting to pur-
sue an unostentatious open-door policy which will not only allow
for Yugoslavia's economic accommodation with either the East
or the West, but will also prove useful as a means of bettering
Yugoslavia's bargaining position with the Soviet bloc.
ALBANIA
Cabinet Changes The USSR appears increasingly preoccupied
with Albania's future role in the Balkans.
Since the Tito-Cominform rift, a large Soviet military mission
has been sent to Albania and trusted Kremlin disciples have
been placed in Albanian army and security posts. The Soviet
bloc has sent Albania increased supplies of food, ammunition,
and industrial equipment, while the USSR has undertaken more
direct control over aid from Albania to Greece. In the past
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ALBANIA
two months there have been three shifts in the A:banian Cab-
inet. These shifts were apparently not specifically caused by
Ideological deviation from the orthodox Communist line. Rather,
Moscow -trained Communists now in Albania, recognizing the
weakness in Albania's present isotition from the other Comin-
form countries, rrobably initiated the changes in the Albanian
Cabinet because of their concern over: (1) the instability of
the Albanian regime; and (2) the inability of Premier floxha to
maintain control in view of the Albanian Government's former
close ties with Yugoslavia. Thus, it appears logical that )the
newly-arrived emissaries from the kremlin may have decided
to exert more direct control over Albania in the belief that Al-
bania Is strategically important to the USSR in its conflict with
Tito, in the Greek war, and in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian struggle
for Macedonia.
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
Moslem Unrest reased unrest alum the Moslems of north
Africa and the Near East will probably result
front the GA's decision to adjourn until next April without having
taken any definitive action on Palestine and the Italian colonies.
The Slav bloc's proposal to carry over all unfinished business
until the next regular session in September 1949 reflects Soviet
Interest in prolongbg confusion and tmcertainty in this area.
Any decision on Palestine reached by dm GA before adjourn-
ment will not go beyond a weak and incomplete resolution which
will not solve the basic, controversbl issues.
Popular Pressure Current mob demonstrations In Syria
and Egypt suggest that the Arab peoples
are Increasingly aware of their ability to influence govern-
ment policy by direct pressure. The tear of provoking new
manifestations by dissatisfied elements may explain the pres-
ent tendency of Arab political leaders to avoid any clear-cut
statements of official policy on such controversial znatters
as Palestine and Anglo-Arab relation& The effectiveness of
such popular pressure was demonstrated in Iraq in January,
when mob action forced the resignation of the jabr Govern-
ment, following the unpopular treaty negotiations with the UK.
The immediate pretext for these recent outbreaks is alleged
mismanagement in Palestine, but the bask cause is the eco-
nomic plight of the Arab people. Governmental inability to
cope with such internal problems as inflation, petroleum
shortages, and taxation Ins intensified popular resentment
over Israeli diplomatic and military successes. Because of
the volatile Arab temperament, it is always possible that a
manifestation originally planned as a mere formal protest
may get completely out of hand, as apparently happened in
Damascus and Cairo last week.
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PALESTINE
Jewish-Arab Negotiations The meeting of Palestine Arabs at
Jericho to proclaim Abdullah "King
Of All Palestine" and the cease-fire agreement between Israeli
and Arab Legion leaders for the Jerusalem area may form the
basis for a subsequent Israeli-Transjordan rapprochement So
far, there has been no violent Arab reaction to the cease-fire,
which has been surprisingly effective, and the accord reached
by Transjordan and Israel in military matters may offer a pre-
cedent for agreement in other spheres. Although the Jericho
meeting proclaimed Abdullah king of "all" Palestine (presum-
ably for propaganda purposes), Abdullah realizes that the exist-
ence of a Jewish state must be accepted and has long been eager
to annex merely the Arab portions of Palestine. Similarly,
Israeli officials are seeking a political agreement with Abdullah
In the hope that an arrangement with a strong Arab state might
break up the shaky structure of the Arab League and dissipate
the threat of concerted military action against Israel. No
agreement reached between Israel and Transjordan, however,
would automatically solve the Palestine problem. The future
of the Negeb is still in doubt, and periodic clashes between
Israeli and Egyptian forces in the area continue. About 8,000
Iraqi troops still occupy central Palestine north of Jerusalem;
the Iraqi Government would find it difficult to withdraw these
forces without stirring up dissatisfaction at home. Finally,
there is some reason to doubt whether Israel would long abide
by any territorial agreement with Transjordan, in view of
Israel's military strength and the pressure within Israel for
expansion to the Jordan.
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CIA Reproduction
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AR EAST
CHINA
Military Situation Following the strategic withdrawal of
Nationalist forces from Hsuchon, Com-
=WA forces have succeeded in surrounding and partially
annihilating two of the three remaining Nationalist pockets
of resistance in the central China sector. Late reports in-
dicate two of the three encircled army groups southwest of
lisuchou have been rendered ineffective as a consequence
of defections and casualties. Southwest of Sushien, the en-
circledTwelfthArmy Group has been written off by the
Nationalist High Command. US military field observers
consider the battle of central Chine to be nearing its end,
with the Nationalists apparently preparing to evacuate Pang.
fon, the last line of defense above Nanking. Meanwhile,
Communist units are continuing their drive on Chiang's
capitol and have reached the southern sector of the Hungtze
Lake region, east of Pangfou, approximately 60 miles north
of Nanking. Confusion appears to be the keynote a the
Nationalist High Coramand and the consensus of opinion
is that the loss of central China north of the Yangtze is
Imminent. In north China, Government troops under Vu
Tso-yi apparently have, thus far, been successful in with-
standing a Communist drive in the Kalgan sector aimed at
cutting off any possible avenue of escape for Fu's forces
west into Suiyuan.
INDONESIA
Police Action if the Netherlands Government undertakes
police action in Indonesia as a result of the
breakdown of Dutch-Republican negotiations, strong opposi-
tion is anticipated from Republican forces and from pro-
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INDONESIA
Republican elements in Dutch-occupied areas. Influential
Indonesian members of the Dutch-sponsored Bandoeng Con-
ference have stated that they would not permit any interim
government to be used as an excuse for ordering police
action. In addition, the Dutch-created states of Pasundun
and East Indonesia have informed Republic= Premier Hatta
that they would not enter a provisional government unless
the Netherlands promised not to use force against the Re-
public. Although Republican leaders are reportedly gloomy
concerning Indonesia's future, the Republic remains a symbol
of widespread nationalist aspirations and is expected to
receive resolute backing from its political groups which have
all gone on record as opposing any agreement with the Dutch
that would encroach upon the Republic's sovereignty.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Army Coups The recent army coups in Venezuela and Peru
may have set the precedent for Increased poli-
tical activity by military factions in other Latin American
countries. The threat to democratic government will continue
In many countries until a solution of social and economic prob-
lems permits the growth of a stable basis for civilian political
power. Moreover, the military groups can be expected to
resist bitterly any encroachments upon their long-established
positions of power and prestige. In Venezuela and Peru, for
example, army action was motivated not so much by a desire
to suppress a Communist threat as by a desire to restore the
waning political influence of the military in the newly-elected
popular governments. Army leaders in Guatemala and perhaps
Chile, which have recently established democratic governments,
may now be encouraged to tale steps necessary to safeguard
their privileged positions. Moreover, in countries with
little or no democratic experience such as Ecuador, Bolivia,
and Paraguay, military factions can hardly fail to note from
the Venezuelan example the advantages of unified action in
coercing civilian political elements. Although all these cotm-
fries will not necessarily experience army coups similar
to those in Peru and Venezuela, the armed forces throughout
most of Latin America will for some time be a serious threat
to the development of democratic government.
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DISTRD3UTION
1
2.
3 .
4.
5.
6.
7
8.
9.
11,69. 10. .
11,69. ?
12,13,14
15,16,17
18
19
20
21 . . . .
22,23,24. . . .
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,
45,46,47,48,49.
50. . .
51.
52,53,54,55,56.
57 .
58
59
60. ?
61.
62,63?
64.
65 65?
66,67,
68
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The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S, Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations,General Staff,U .3 Army
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S. Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
Special Assistant to Secretary of State, Research &
Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff,U,S, Army
34.
Chief of Naval Intelligence
44.
Director of Intelligence, U.S. kir Force
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm
Executive Secretary,Military Liaison Committee,Atornic
Energy Commission
Chief,Acquisition & Distribution Division,0ICD,Dept State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff,DeptState
Secretary of State (Attention: Chief,Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
Director, joint Planning Group, Joint Chiefs Staff
US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
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