WEEKLY REPORT #11

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002000110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No. 65
SUMMARY
Number 11
10 JUL 1948
Document No. GD/
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C O N T E N T S
Page
HIGHLIGHTS ...................... 1
WESTERN EUROPE ................3
EASTERN EUROPE ................8
NEAR EAST-AFRICA ...............11
FAR EAST ........................ 14
WESTERN HEMISPH ERE .........17
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H I G H L I G H T S
No developments of the first magnitude or significant
new trends came to light during the past week. Decisive
developments, particularly concerning the Berlin situation,
were in the making but had not yet taken form.
In western Europe, the Berlin crisis was accelerat-
ing preparations among the Brussels Pact countries for a
unified defense system (see page 4). An electric power
shortage in the Soviet sector of Berlin has occurred as a
consequence of the western powers' embargo on Ruhr coal
shipments in retaliation to the Soviet land and water blockade
on Berlin (see page 3). The new French Cabinet's chances
of survival until the October elections will depend upon its
ability to deal with the same serious economic and political
problems which led to the fall of the Schuman Government.
The disposition of the Italian colonies, upon which the US,
the UK, France,and the USSR disagree, will probably be
referred to the UN General Assembly in September (see
page ?).
In Poland, industrial sabotage is growing concurrent-
ly with corruption, bribery, and embezzlement in the state-
owned trading organizations. The Communist regime is
unable to remove the cause of these acts by improving
economic conditions and is turning to increased repression
(see page 8). A political crisis is expected to develop in
Greece soon after the end of the National Army's current
Grammos operation, whether the campaign ends in victory
or defeat (see page 9).
Fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine has
almost completely stopped. To all external appearances,
the situation is more conducive to a settlement than at any
time since the UK mandate was abandoned on 15 May. On
the other hand, there are indications that neither the
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Provisional Government of Israel nor several of the Arab
states may be in a position to follow the dictates of reason
and moderation. Chief among the basic considerations
which may lead to new difficulties are the pressures of
Jewish extremist groups and the acute Arab refugee problem
(see page 11).
The outlook for peace in India continues to be uncer-
tain. The monsoon has limited the fighting in Kashmir, and
India and Pakistan apparently are accepting in principle the
UN Commission's cease-fire order. At the same time, how-
ever, there are no strong indications that the Indians expect
a peaceful settlement and there is a possibility that India
may move its troops into Hyderabad to bring that state under
its control before military action is resumed in Kashmir
(see pages 12 and 13).
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WESTERN EUROPE
GERMANY
Recent Soviet "offers to feed Berlin" seem designed
further to embarrass the western powers in the hope of ulti-
mately forcing them either to quit Berlin or to negotiate on
the broad German issues. ` Feeding all Berlin would offer the
USSR several major advantages. It would enable the USSR to
gain an economic stranglehold on the entire city, to pose as
rescuers to the hungry Germans, to impress the Germans and
the world with Soviet power, to claim the western air lift is
no longer needed, and to speed Communist penetration of the
western sectors of the city. For the immediate future, how-
ever, the Soviet offer to feed Berlin will have no major effect
beyond propaganda value because it would be several weeks
before the system could be put into operation. The arrival
of winter and restricted flying weather for the air lift will
probably strengthen the hand of the Soviet officials who could
further bait the Germans with offers of coal for heating.
Thus, the Soviet offer to feed Berlin has the double advan-
tage to the USSR of embarrassing the western powers im-
mediately and of furthering the possibility of eventual Soviet
control of the city.
An electric poowershortage in the Soviet sector of
Berlin has resulted from the cutting off of Ruhr shipments
by the western powers in retaliation to the Soviet land and water
blockade of Berlin. Thus far the USSR has been unable to alle-
viate the Berlin coal shortage by coal from Poland, and unless
sufficient Polish coal is made available, Soviet officials in Ber-
lin may be faced with the necessity of offering to restore elec-
tric power to the western sectors in return for normal Ruhr
coal shipments. Negotiations for some such arrangement
took place between Berlin city officials and the Soviet Zone
German Economic Commission, with the apparent consent of
the Soviet Military Administration, but are without result as
yet. Either the USSR is feeling the economic pinch in Berlin
and is, therefore, willing to consider relaxing some of its
pressure there, or their negotiations represent an effort to
test allied reaction to Soviet overtures.
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GERMANY
Ian Iemen on of the western European union defense
system is being speeded by the Berlin crisis just as the original
signing of the Brussels Pact was expedited by the Czechoslovak
coup in March. The development of the Berlin blockade into
an international crisis made clear to the western union nations
the immediate need for a unified defense system, ready to
function at a moment's notice and assured of till US support.
Emphasis on military needs will continue to overshadow the
economic aspects of the Brussels Pact until some kind of work-
ing military arrangements have been made.
Recent Soviet propaganda on Germany indicates a desire
to have the western powers initiate negotiations on the entire
German problem, on the condition that the strength of Soviet
political control in Berlin remains unchanged. TASS dispatches
and the Soviet-licensed press in Berlin frequently discuss the
possibility of four power talks on the German problem. Although
Soviet editorial comment on Berlin continues to be sparse,
especially that for consumption within the Soviet Union, there
have recently for the first time been references to the gravity
of events in Berlin. The NEW TIMES notes the "incredible
clamor that has been raised around the situation in Berlin" and
charges that US and British leaders are encouraging "irresponsi-
ble politicians and pressmen to shout about the danger of war."
FRANCE
Premier Andre Marie's new French Government faces
the same serious political and economic problems tied to
the abandonment of the Schuman Government by the Socialists.
The differences between the Socialists and the Marie Govern-
ment are basic, inasmuch as the Socialists stand for controlled
economy and the other parties in the coalition favor varying
degrees of "free enterprise." Specific issues that will continue
to plague the French, regardless of the party or parties in power,
are the wage price balance, the military budget, authorization
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FRANCE
of the Finance Minister to issue decree-laws, the enactment
of a law to govern elections for the Council of the Republic,
the possible postponement of the cantonal elections scheduled
for October, approval of the Hate d'Along agreement for French
Indochina, and the relationship between the resistance press
and the prewar newspapers which have been cleared of charges
of collaboration.
The delay encountered by Premier Marie in forming,
his Cabinet was caused mainly by Socialist opposition to Reynaud
as finance minister. Only at the last minute did the Socialists
agree, in the face of serious opposition from left-wing members
of the party, to accept six posts in the Marie Cabinet and thereby
commit themselves to support the new government. Although
Socialist support of Marie s Government may not be wholehearted
at times, the new Cabinet has a reasonable chance to suriive until
the October elections. Despite the opportunities provided by the
needless overthrow of the Schuman Government and the difficulty
of establishing the Marie Cabinet, De Gaulle apparently still
intends to delay his bid for power until after the October elections.
Not only is it necessary for De Gaulle to time his bid carefully,
but he probably realizes that he would not now have the necessary
broad base of support in the National Assembly.
All or anization of exiled eastern Euro an lab
has been formed secretly in Paris to serve as an international
coordinating committee for free -trade unionists in exile. The
committee presently is composed of representatives of labor
organizations banned in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary;
it will also include Czechoslovaks and Spanish Socialist tirade union
representatives. The committee expects to publish an informational
bulletin on trade union conditions in Soviet-Satellite areas, main-
tain contact with US foreign language groups, and counteract Com-
munist labor propaganda. The American Federation of Labor's
sponsorship and strong support of this committee reflect AFL
impatience with the slow progress of the 15-nation Trade Union
Advisory Committee for the European recovery program and AFL
determination to organize non-Communist European labor against
the USSR.
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ICELAND
Russian fishing fleet activities in waters
have caused deep concern among high government officials
in Iceland. When a Soviet ship docked in Iceland recentl,,
extraordinary precautions were taken to screen the few
Icelanders allowed on board. Moreover, personnel aboard
the 14 vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet operating near Ice-
land appear to have established excellent liaison with Icelandic
Communists. Iceland has attempted for many months to nego-
tiate a trade agreement with the USSR, and the only excuse the
Icelandic Communists could offer to justify the presence of
the Soviet fleet would be the fallacious claim that Iceland's
anti-Communist government is unwilling to sell fish to the
USSR.
EIRE
Ire Js ab ndoned its wartime isolationism, al-
though in the event of war Its non-isolationist coalition govern-
ment would probably hesitate to. discard a traditional neutrality
policy if opposed by a large and determined sector of public
opinion. Minister for External Affairs Macbride's recent of -
ficial statement that Ireland's sympathies lie clearly with
western Europe and that "isolationism is no longer possible"
reflects a change in government policy brought on by shifting
public opinion. Moreover, the threat to Catholicism implicit
in a war between the USSR and the West could well cause an
overwhelming popular demand for Irish participation. Deter-
rents to all-out Irish military and economic cooperation with
the western powers still exist, however, in the lack of an im-
mediate threat to Irish security and in partition which, it is
claimed, prevents Ireland from taking its rightful place in
European and world affairs.
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ITALY
The disposition of the Italian colonies -- upon which
YCJIYI I.YIVYOYY~IiY~.YIYYOYI~Y ~IIYYi?.I~YYi~.7?Y Itli YYYb
the US, the UK, France, and the USSR disagree. -- will. probably
be referred to the UN General Assembly in September, even
though the USSR may request further discussions before then
as a preliminary to an overall European settlement. Because
the Soviet Union's attitude favoring the return of the colonies
to Italy was adopted in order to help the Italian Communists
in the April elections, the Kremlin may no longer feel it
necessary to maintain this stand. Soviet leaders may feel
that their objective of denying strategic areas to the US and
the UK can now be best served by favoring Libyan independence.
They may reason that an independent Libya, even under British
influence, would offer the USSR better possibilities for pene-
tration than a trusteeship held by the US, the UK, or Italy.
Moreover, by advocating Libyan independence the USSR could
derive immediate propaganda benefit by pointing to its support
of colonial freedom.
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EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
Recent rumors of dissension within the Politburo appear
exaggerated. Although differences of opinion regar Soviet
strategy undoubtedly exist among the members of the Soviet rul-
ing body, it is unlikely that these men, who owe their present
positions to Stalin, would find it possible to engage in serious
disputes so long as Stalin remains the arbiter of Soviet policy.
Whatever may be their personal differences and animosities,
it seems certain that the members of the Politburo continue
to work together as a team and confine their rivalry to jockey-
ing for Stalin's favor or to competing for control of the Party
machinery in order to hold the best possible position at Stalin's
death. Until recently Andrei Zhdanov, chief Soviet ideological
spokesman, seemed to have gained the upper hand over Malenkov
in a contest for control, of the Communist Party apparatus.
Latest indications are that Malenkov has regained his power-
ful post as a secretary of the Central Committee, which trans-
mits the decisions of the Politburo to lower Party organs.
Zhdanov may have to bear the responsibility for the inept
handling of the Cominform enunciation of Tito. Malenkov's
resurgence may be a rebuke to Zhdanov for his handling of the
Yugoslav situation and could foreshadow a lessening in his
influence and prestige.
POLAND'
An upsur of industrial sabotage simultaneous with
corruption, bribery, and embezzlement in the state-owned
trading organizations reflects both the basic dissatisfaction
of Polish managerial and working classes with their economic
conditions and political opposition to the Communist regime.
Because the regime finds itself unable to improve economic
conditions or to modify its totalitarian power, it is obliged
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POLAND
to resort increasingly to repression. Consequently, there
have been recent widespread arrests and other manifesta-
tions of a developing purge. Those arrested include many
well-known and respected Polish commercial leaders. Al-
though some of these arrests were political in motivation,
most of them are attributable to the fact that salaries are
so small and purchasing power so meager that executives are
driven to dishonest practices in order to eke out an existence.
strikes are forbidden; workers therefore can express their
discontent with low wages only by acts of sabotage.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
Anti-Go nm stactivities of Ukrainian erre ills
groups in Slovakia apparently continue to spread. Govern-
ment concern is indicated by a recent decree which estab-
lishes virtual martial law in the 19 eastern districts of
Slovakia. The area affected by the order is greater than
that in which the Ukrainian guerrillas were known to be
active in 1946-47--a probable indication of a new, heavy
infiltration of Ukrainian malcontents.
GREECE
Prime Minister Sophoulis' submission of his resigna-
tion to King Paul was the result of intra -party differences
rather than of Sophoulis' disillusionment over the record of
the US-supported Liberal-Populist coalition government. Un-
doubtedly, Sophoulis was confident that the King would not
accept his resignation and made the gesture as an object lesson
to his own party deputies. The immediate cause of the move
was the threat of nine Macedonian Liberals in Parliament to
withdraw their support from the government unless the recently-
abolished government wheat subsidy were restored. Sophoulis
was thus expressing annoyance over this particular rebellion
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GREECE
within his own party. Also, he was probably attempting to
discipline the more serious opposition led by Venizelos,
deputy head of the party.
Although these events do not constitute a government
crisis, it is evident that parliamentary discontent with the
government is growing and that a real crisis will probably
occur soon after the present Granmzos military operation
has ended, regardless of whether that operation succeeds
or falls. If the campaign is a success, opposition members
will feel that the threat to the country has been dissipated
and that they are therefore free to attack the government; If
it is a failure, they will feel justified in censuring the govern-
ment for mishandling the campaign. Meanwhile, public atten-
tion is focused on strictly military aspects of the battle in
the Grammos area, where in the sixth week of operations the
army is slowly compressing the guerrilla pocket with air and
artillery attacks.
Greek press itation for an increase in National Army
strength and for more air force bombers has recently become
insistent. This agitation, which is deliberate rather than
spontaneous and political rather than military, recalls similar
pressure last winter for increasing the size of the army and
for providing it with mountain artillery. The materiel requested
could not be used in the present phase of the guerrilla war; this
suggests that Greek political leaders wish to build up the armed
forces to a strength commensurate with the armies of other
Balkan countries. Further, they probably feel that US reaction
to their requests will reveal US long-range policy and the future
role contemplated for Greece in the Mediterranean and the
Balkans. Although Greek leaders may feel that they are justified
in looking beyond the present guerrilla war, the immediate effect
of this campaign for more materiel may be to discourage Greek
soldiers by convincing them that they are at present fighting with
inadequate equipment. It may also convince the uninformed
public that the US has failed to support an embattled ally.
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PALESTINE
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Fighting, between Arabs and Jews has almost completely
stopped with the arrival in Palestine ofthe first contingents of
the UN teams to observe the truce. To all outward appearances,
the situation is now more conducive to a settlement of the Pales-
tine issue than at any time since the UK mandate was abandoned
on 15 May 1948. The Jews are in a strong position militarily
and politically, but because the success of their cause is based
largely on UN support, they might presumably be expected under
UN pressure to make certain concessions to the Arabs in order
to consolidate what they have already gained. The Arabs, on
the other hand, are in a very weak position. In accepting the
truce extension, they admitted they were unable to defy the UN,
and some of their leaders intimated that the Arab states would
acquiesce in a solution of the Palestine issue imposed by the
UN. It might be expected, therefore, that both Israel and the
Arab states would be prepared tacitly to accept the status quo,
which can be preserved if the cease-fire is rigidly enforced.
In such an event, the Jews would consolidate their new state,
and the Arab governments would concentrate on strengthening
their authority over those extremist groups that wish to carry
on a suicidal war.
There are, however, indications already that neither the
Provisional Government of Israel nor several of the Arab gov-
ernments may be in a position to follow the dictates of reason
and moderation. Confident in the strength of its military and
international position and egged on by the Irgun Zvat Leumi and
the Stern Gang, Israel, by declaring Jerusalem an Israeli pro-
tectorate, has gone counter to the UN plan to demilitarize the
city. Israel also has taken over the Haifa refinery against the
objections of the UK and France as well as of the Arabs. The
Arab governments have so far been able to control popular
demonstrations against the truce. However, such provocative
actions by Israel, in addition to several flagrant truce violations
and the acute Arab refugee problem, will make it increasingly
difficult for such states as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to maintain
a moderate course.
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PALESTINE
Arab League solidarity is threatened by the Palestine
issue--the tie which, urat it now, has bound the members of the
League together. A rift has developed between Transjordan,
which advocates peace and moderation in Palestine, and those
states (notably Iraq, Syria, and Lebancn) which continue to
maintain an uncompromising attitude toward the Palestine
problem. Even before the League signified its official accept-
ance of the Security C ouncil's cease-fire order, Trans Jordan
(like Egypt) forwarded to the UN Mediator a separate acceptance.
Transjordan has also indicated that it is prepared to reach a
compromise w,th Israel on a realistic basis. The Iraqi Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, has asserted that it did not approve
and will not support the League's decision to accept: rho cease-
fire. Israel is in a position, by making concessions to the more
moderate Arab states such as Transjordan and Egypt, to exploit
this rift and possibly even to bring about the complete collapse
of the League. However, it appears that Israel is too conscious
of its strong military and international position to compromise
with the Arabs.
INDIA
Although the UN Kashmir Commission's cease-fire
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proposal is apparently acceptable in principle to India and
Pakistan, both dominions are unrealistic in the conditions
which they have laid down as prerequisite to forma acceptance
of the proposal. Pakistan has offered to withdraw its nationals
from the fighting fronts if India also will withdraw its troops.
India, in turn, demands the removal of Pakistan troops and in-
sists that Indian units be allowed to continue occupation of the
territory they now hold plus certain, additional strategic points.
The Commission expects to achieve a cease-fire.. but India's
recent successful negotiation for the loan of 10,000 ZE`epalese
troops does not suggest I than anticipation of a peaceful settle-
ment.
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Sgriflaas de eriQration is the H d,~ era d situation is
indicated by recent events. Nehru, the Indian. Prime Minister,
has reiterated publicly that unless Hyderabad accedes to India,
it may be necessary to initiate military operations against
the state. Moreover, the Government of India has reacted
sharply to a clash between Indian and Hyderabad forces in a
strip of the state across which Indian troops have free passage
as provided by agreement with Hyderabad. In. view of the lull
in the Kashmir operations (made necessary by the monsoon), it
is possible that Indian forces will be ordered into Hyderabad
with the expectation of bringing the state under Indian control
before military action is resumed in Kashmir. Meanwhile, the
Nizam of Hyderabad has indicated that he will refer the dispute
to the UN. Pakistan, Hyderabad's most likely supporter, may
not be willing to prejudice a favorable decision from the UN
Kashmir Commission by sponsoring a new case at this time.
However, another sympathetic Moslem country might take up
the issue.
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FAR EAST
tive on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea.
king and from the present influential role of China's representa-
Chinese influence on South Korean politics may continue
to be substantial despite Chinas generally weakened international
position. Chiang Kai-shek's influence with the present political
leaders in South Korea stems from his long association with
them through the exiled Korean Provisional Government in Chung-
CHINA
Violent public and official Chinese reaction can be ex-
pected to the proposed increase in Sino-Japanese trade despite
the benefits to China of such an increase. Under the terms of
the proposed trade pact, China would provide Japan with coking
coal and iron ore in exchange for finished products and fabricat-
ing materials needed by China for its economic rehabilitation.
In addition to contributing to the immediate economic rehabilita-
tion of Japan, increased Sino-Japanese trade would be beneficial
to the Far East. China also would profit in the long run by
receipt of products to be used in rehabilitation projects and in
building up its industrial plant. However, the immediate effect
of the trade, which would be to expand Japanese heavy industry,
will probably add to the already active Chinese resentment .
against the US. This resentment has been aroused by the China
aid program which many Chinese feel continues the civil war
and the present unpopular government in power.
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CHINA
The insolvency of the Chinese Nationalist Government
will become officially established with the arrival in Washington
in the near future of its financial statement to the Export-Import
Bank. Not only is China's foreign exchange exhausted, but there
are stacks of bills which cannot be paid. The Chinese Nationalist
Government, like any public bankrupt, will probably seek relief
by offering to creditors settlement at less than the full value due.
JAPAN
SCAP's no-strike order for Japanese Government
employees, issued in the face of inflationary and trade union
pressures, affects particularly the government-operated trans-
portation and communications Industries where trade union
leadership appears to be shifting toward the Communists. Most
labor leaders can be expected to object to the no-strike order
as a threat to newly won freedoms established by allied occupa-
tion authority. Moreover, certain members of the Far Eastern
Commission can be expected to charge SCAP with exceeding the
authority which they consider has been delegated by FEC directive.
MALAYA
,, la va's rubber and tin production may be curtailed in
the near future as a result of the continuing civil disturbances
there. Despite stringent precautionary measures by the British,
officials fear that the violence may soon spread to Singapore
and further disrupt the Malayan economy. The undiminished
seriousness of internal conditions Is indicated by the transfer
to Malaya of troops from Hong Kong, the outlawing of the Com-
munist Party, the registration required of all Malayans, and
the promise of the British Labor Government to take all measures
necessary to restore law and order.
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PHILIPPINES
The reluctance of Philippine dissidents to turn in
their arms to the Philippine Government may necessitate an
extension of the 31 July deadline and raises some doubts as
to the success of the Philippine Government's amnesty declara-
tion. The hesitancy of the rank-and-file Hukbalahap members
to give up their arms and accept amnesty is probably attribut-
able to Government inaction on measures to correct agrarian
abuses and to fear of retaliation by private land-owner arniles
and the constabulary. Unless the Government finds some
means of allaying these fears and dispelling Hukbalahap general
distrust, the amnesty declaration may fail in its objective of
furthering law and order in the Philippines.
-16-
SECRET
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02000110001-6
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The Dominican Republic's air supremacy over its
neighbors is now practically assured, and relationships in the
Caribbean and Central American area may as a result be
stabilized for a time. At present, Cuba's air superiority over
the Dominican Republic is very slight, and the arrival of air-
craft on order from the US and the UK will give the Dominicans
absolute air superiority over Cuba and the other Caribbean
and Central American republics. The superior air power of
the other dictator governments resulting from their balance-
of -power alignments with the Dominican Republic will probably
be used primarily as a means of protection against military ex-
peditions organized outside their territories and directed against
them.
Peru's announced intention of appointing an ambassador
to Spain reflects the effective use Spain has made both of cul-
tural and linguistic ties with Latin America and of support
from ultranationalist and conservative elements in obtaining
resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Western Hem-
isphere countries. Eight Latin American countries -- Argen-
tina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Paraguay -- have now arranged such represen-
tation. Even groups usually opposed to Franco's anti-democratic
domestic policies now maintain that Franco constitutes an anti-
Communist bulwark for the Western Hemisphere.
-17-
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02000110001-6
DISTRIBUTION
1......... The President
2......... Secretary of State
3......... Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
4......... Secretary of Defense
5......... Secretary of the Army
6......... Secretary of the Navy
7......... Secretary of the Air Force
8......... Chairman,National Security Resources Board
9......... Executive Secretary,National Security Council
10......... Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
11 ....Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
12,13,14..... Chief of Naval Operations
15,16,17..... Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18......... Director of Plans and Operations General Staff U.S.Army
19......... Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S. Air Force
20......... Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21......:.. Director of Plans and Operations, U.S.Air Force
22,23,24..... Special Assistant to Secretary of State, Research &
Intelligence
25,26,27,28,29. Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
30,31,32,33,34. Chief of Naval Intelligence
35,36,37,38,39. Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
40......... Director of Security and Intelligence,Atomic Energy Comm.
41......... Executive Secretary,Military Liaison Committee,Atomic
Energy Commission
42,43,44,45,46. Chief,Acquisition & Dts*ribution Division,OICD,Dept.State
47......... Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
48......... Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
49......... Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Dept. State
50......... Secretary of State (Attention: Mr. Barnes)
51......... Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
52753 ....... Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
54......... U.S. Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
55, 56....... Secretary,State -Army -Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
jL_Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02000110001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02000110001-6
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2631-S--1948
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02000110001-6