WEEKLY SUMMARY #10

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002000100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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WC WT
Copy No. 66
1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Number Document No. 60 1
NO CIANGE in Class. o
13 JUL 1948 DECLA.;SIFI%D
Class. CHANCED TO: TS S
DDA Memo
4 Apr 77
,
Auth: DDA RAG. 7 1763
Date: By; Q~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C 0 N T E N T S
I
HIGHLIGHTS ....
Page
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
WESTERN EUROPE 3
EASTERN EUROPE ............... 7
NEAR EAST - AFRICA .............. 11
PAR EAST ................. ..... 14
WESTERN HEMISPHERE........... 15
APPENDIX i
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R I G H L I G FI T S
As the fourth week of the present Berlin impasse
came to an end without relieving the tension between the
USSR and the western powers, the joint air lift continued
to meet the minimum food requirements of Berlin's western
sectors. French attention was deflected from the Berlin
crisis by concern over the unexpected and apparently r- -
necessary fall of the Schuman government. In Palestine,
the Security Council successfully re-established an Arab-
Jewish truce which offered no permanent settlement of
the Palestine problem but did offer the possibility that
a prolonged stalemate might ensue.
Despite the immediate success of the air lift in
enabling the western powers to hold fast in Berlin, the
general economic situation in the city's western sectors
was deteriorating (see page 3). The Berlin situation con-
tinued to receive minimum attention from propagandists
within the USSR, possibly indicating Soviet indecision con-
cerning the next move (see page 7).
In France, Radical Socialist Leader Andre Marie
was attempting to form a "transition cabinet" which would
hold power until the October elections for the upper house
and departmental assemblies (see page 3). De Gaulle has
indicated that he would be ready to take power after elec
tions had been held. Elsewhere in western Europe, it
appears that the Italian Government will soon be forced
by Soviet pressure to come to some decision concerning
Soviet shipbuilding contracts for Italian shipyards (see
page 4).
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In eastern Europe, a slackening of Bulgarian
support for the Greek guerrillas may be indicated by the
de-emphasis given the fighting in Greece by the Bulgarian
press (see page 9). In the Grammos Mountains, the Greek
Army has resumed the offensive. However,, operation
Crown is already behind schedule, and continued prolonga-
tion of the campaign will bring serious logistical and morale
problems (see page 10).
in Palestine, UN Mediator Bernadotte was confronted
with the task of enforcing the truce with the firmness neces-
sary to nn intain the status quo and to save face for Arab
leaders with their people who wish to continue the fight
(see page' 11). Meanwhile, Communist-controlled Czecho-
slovak air operations are being extended throughout the
Middle East in close cooperation with Jewish Interests in
Palestine (see page 12).
The long-continuing economic crisis in China has
reached such a stage that the people are repudiating the
national currency and have turned to barter as a means of
exchange. Meanwhile, the Soviet ambassador in China has
again urged National Government officials that the civil
war be ended (see page 14).
In Latin America, the recent reorganisation of the
Chilean Cabinet has revealed the political disunity of the
government and has emphasised the inherent instability
of the Gonzalez administration (see page 15). The political
impasse in Panama has not yet been resolved, but some
means may be found by the groups opposing president-elect
Arnulfo Arias to void his election before he takes office on
30 September (see page 15).
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WESTERN EUROPE
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GERMANY
Although the air lift t Berlin is meeting minimum food
requirements for the western sectors, the general economic
situation in these sectors continues to deteriorate for lack of
power and inability both to obtain raw materials and to deliver
finished goods. In the western zones of Germany, increased
production and general economic improvement have been slow
to follow the introduction of new currency. In June, ,nearly all
business came to a standstill in anticipation of the currency
reform, and at present the Germans are preoccupied with the
impasse in Berlin. In addition to this preoccupation with Ber-
lin and currency reform, bad weather has depressed the eco-
nomic outlook by threatening crop prospects throughout the
western zones.
FRANCE
The fall of the Schuman Government on 20 Mv,.although
erected and undesired by a majority of the French people
and their parliamentary representatives, occurred when the
Socialist deputies, preoccupied with partisan politics in antici-
pation of the fall elections, set in motion the disruptive forces
which were inherent in the coalition. The issue on which the
coalition split, a difference of some $ 10 million in a military
budget of $ 1 billign, was neither so great as the issues success-
fully met by Schuman in the past nor so important as others
likely to arise in the future. Schuman, who was aware of the
desire of the majority to avoid a crisis, threatened to resign if
the Government's budget were not passed. When a Socialist
amendment to reduce the Government's figure was passed by a
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FRANCE
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combined vote including Communists and Socialists, Schuman
fulfilled his promise.
General De Gaulle almost immediately indicated that
he was ready to assume power but only after elections which
would, in effect, give him a mandate from the people. Because
Schuman was not voted out of office, however, there is no con-
stitaational justification for national elections now. Actually,
De Gaulle probably does not wish to take power at this time.
Rather than associate his party with a coalition which must
now decide upon politically unpopular issues, he would prefer
to wait until a Gaullist Government can be formed.
After two days of continuous conference with party
leaders, President Auriol selected Andre Marie,, Radical Social-
ist Minister of justice, to form a government pending the October
elections for the upper house and departmental assemblies. If
this "transition cabinet" is formed, it will -probably not be much .
more than a caretaker government. However, because the
Gaullist deputies may hold the balance of power, the new Gov-
ernment could pave the way for a return of De Gaulle. If the
fall elections result in a victory for De Gaulle's Rally of the
French People, which is more likely now than heretofore, dis-
solution of the present Assembly and new national elections
would probably follow early in 1949.
ITALY
- The question of Soviet shipbuildin contracts will have
to be decided soon by Premier De Gasperi as a consequence
of continued Soviet pressure against the Italian Government.
Despite reports that the Italian Foreign Ministry planned to
request cabinet approval for about 15% of the contracts offered
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ITALY
by the USSR, nothing appears to have been done to date. The
Soviet Ambassador in Rome has again threatened to "expose"
the Italian Government's resistance to Soviet shipbuilding
orders which would substantially increase employment. If no
government action is taken, the Italian Communists can. be ex-
pected to make effective use of this inaction for propaganda
attacks against the De Gaspers Government.
The Italian government's stability and its continued,
effective cooperation with western powers may hinge upon the
assurance given Italians concerning participation in the admini-
stration of the prewar Italian colonies. Some measure of popu-
lar feeling on the colonial issue is indicated by the willingness
of the De Gasperi Government to agree to a joint Arab-Italian
administration of Libya instead of a straight Italian trusteeship
for the colony as previously suggested to the US and the UK.
This willingness to temporize may have resulted in part from
the realization that Libyans would resist outright control by
Italy. Moreover, for this reason Italians might even agree to
a condominium including one or two of the western powers.
The Mans are apparently prepared to accept any military
provisions necessary to protect US -British strategic interests
in the colonies, but Italian officials have expressed the hope
that these military requirements can be clarified before the
administration of the colonies is established. A trusteeship
limited to the US and UK, however, would lend substance to
anti-US-UK views held by both the extreme Right and the ex-
treme Left in Italy. Simultaneous attacks upon the De Gasperi
Government might undermine its position at a time when Italy's
collaboration with western powers an economic and military
matters is imperative.
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UNITED KINGDOM
The British position conce Antarctica has undergone
cons rable modification. The Foreign Office is presently
recommending that all British-claimed land in Antarctica below
600 -- except most of the South Shetland island group -- be placed
under the joint control of the eight powers who are claimants in
the area. Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands would be
unaffected, and Argentina would probably remain unsatisfied by
this move. British political relations with Chile, however, Wight
be much improved, and a potential source of friction with the US
would be eliminated. Such. a settlement would not impair British
commercial interests. Moreover, if the South Shetland Islands
were retained, the warm water port and potential air base of
strategic Deception island could be utilized to protect the sea
route around Cape Horn.
SCANDINAVIA
Through the al ent of Denmark and Norwa with
western European union, the UK hopes to prevent the formation
of a Scandinavian defense agreement dominated by Swedish poll-
cies of neutrality. The British Foreign Office considers the
development of a strongly US -supported western, union a pre -
requisite to Scandinavian adherence. Meanwhile, Foreign Min-
ister 'Lange of Norway has proposed to Denmark and Sweden
that a series of meetings be held which will omit discussion of
neutrality but will explore prospects for Scandinavian defense
collaboration. If the meetings fail, Lange Intends to recommend
to the Norwegian Government that a declaration be made of
Norway's affiliation with the western powers.
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EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
The can nuing lack of domestic Soviet propaganda an
Berlin may be explain d by the Kremlin's desire to keep its
Berlin tactics unencumbered by domestic propaganda commit-
ments, to avoid causing a war scare in the Soviet Union which
would lower morale and increase hoarding, and to eliminate
the possibility of showing up a Soviet weakness in case the USSR
does not succeed in evicting the western powers. During the
past week, Soviet propagandists have devoted mach time and
space to Togliatti's attempted assassination. Stalin's telngram
accusing Italian Communists of negligence was given widespread
publicity and probably resulted in the announcement by Italian
Communists that a purge of party ranks was imminent. Also,
during the past week IZVESTIA made its first mention of internal
developments in Yugoslavia since the Cominform-Tito clash in
an account praising the achievements of Yugoslav railway builders.
This demonstration of impartiality Indicates a desire by the Krem-
lin to keep the Tito rebellion an a Communist Party level and to
leave the way open for an eventual ace between the
two governments.
The USSR and Satellites are satisfactorily fulfilling, in
general, their commitments in trade agreements with the western
powers. Although there have been some complaints about the
quality of eastern European products, the willingness of western
countries to negotiate new trade agreements and to extend old ones
indicates general satisfaction with Soviet and Satellite deliveries.
In many instances, deliveries have actually preceded receipt of
shipments from the west. Such promptness springs in psdrt from
Soviet-Satellite eagerness to obtain vitally needed,equipment
from the west.
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SOVIET UNION
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The USSR will be able to a ort gain to western E
this year despite a decreases in amount of grain available for
export. and stockpiling, largely because of the increased harvests
expected in Satellite countries. By diverting to export channels
and stockpiles grain shipments which would have gone to, Satel-
lite areas, the USSR should be able to continue its favorable
grain export position into 1949.
Politburo doubt concerning the likelihood of an imminent
US depression may be indicated by continued failure to take
drastic action against E. S. Varga, leading Soviet economist.-
In the latter part of 1947, Varga publicly contradicted the basic
Marxist doctrine that a collapse of capitalistic economies is
inevitable.'. Varga contended that, through a continuance of -
moderate state planning set up during, wartime, Capitalism
might be able to delay its collapse, if not avert it entt'ely.
Varga has stubbornly refused to recant despite severe attacks
from Soviet economic journals.
TRIESTE
An eventual solution to may be facilitated as
a result of the Tito-Kremlin rift and the ensuing split within
the Communist Party of. Trieste. Because the pro-Tito faction
of the Party is in the minority, even in the Yugoslav Zone, the
Kremlin is no longer embarrassed by the necessity of cater-
ing to Yugoslav nationalist aspirations and can rely- upon the
pro-Cominform group to accept whatever decision the USSR
makes concerning Trieste. Moreover, the continued failure
of the Kremlin to reach agreement with Tito: (1) will weaken
Soviet determination to support Yugoslav demands on the area;
and (2) may increase Soviet desire for an agreement which
would effect the withdrawal of US -UK troops from Trieste,
I.
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TRIESTE
thus reducing the risk of an incident If more direct Soviet
interference tot Yugoslavia should become necessary. Mean-
while, the split in the Comnninlat Party of Trieste has elim-
inated Tito's major ins trument. for economic and political
penetration of the Free Territory. In addition, Tito will be % reluctant to risk farther opposition from the USSR by prearing
the Trieste issue at this time.
BULGARIA
aswelpm tr rt or the Greek 'll1
f
is indicated by Bulgarian press atment of the fighting in
Greece. Instead of front page reports of Markos successes,
the press has been carrying small back page paragraphs assert-
ing that Markus Is repulsing all attacks. This press treatment
lends credence to unconfirmed reports that Bulgaria ceased.
shipping arms to Markus shortly after the Cominform attack
on Tito. K this development can be interpreted as an indica-
tion that the USSR has temporarily "writtten off" the Greek
venture, such a Soviet decision would have been prompted by:
(1) a desire to conserve Bulgarian and Albanian military strength
In case of trouble with Yugoslavia; (2) Inability at this time to
reconcile conflicting nationalist interests between Greek, Bul-
garian, Yugoslav, and Albanian Communists concerning the
disposition of Greek Macedonia and Thrace; and (3) the diffi-
culty of achieving guerrilla success without direct intervention
which would increase the risk of open conflict with the US. ff,
however, the guerrillas are able -to prevent a decisive Greek
Army victory in the Grammoe area, the Kremlin may order its
Satellites to increase their rapport of the Markus regime.
.a -
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GREEK ARMY GRAMMOS OFFENSIVE -16 JULY 1948
Army Position 16 July 1948
Army Starting Line 20 June 1948
Principal Guerilla Raid (mostly artillery) 1.16 July
Qdo
DQ ~ Q~
d,
B U LGAR IA:
Route of Guerilla Reinforcements
Across- Border Communications
Main Road
MILES
50
STAT
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GREECE
The Greek Army.. after a brief bill, has resumed the
Grammos Mountains offensive against the guerrillas with
sharp attacks by artillery and air forces. At the conclusion
of the fourth week of action, the guerrillas had suffered heavy
casualties, but they had stubbornly refused to give ground a&
had been reinforced with about 1,000 troops from without the
battle area. Another 2,000 troops immediately threaten the
rear of the army cordon. Army casualties have not been
quite so heavy as those of the guerrillas. Operation Crown
is behind schedule; continued prolongation of the campaign
will result in serious logistical, reserve, and morale diffi-
culties and also will raise grave political problems in Athens.
Although the army may still be able to clear the Grammoos
area by the end of August, the guerrillas have won an impor-
tant tactical advantage. The unprecedented success of the
guerrilla static defense has forced the army to mane drastic
revisions in its original plan of action and also has fortified
guerrilla determination.
The Grammos drive has been highly publicized as
the operation designed to break the back of guerrilla resistance.
At the conclusion of the campaign, If it is not apparent to the
refugee peasants and the weary Greek soldier that guerrilla
activity has been effectively decreased, Greek morale will
plunge to a new low.
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.. .. (At beginning of second U. N. Truce) 11023
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PALESTINE "
APPROXIMATE LINES BETWEEN T
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
PALESTINE
1j g Palestine truce, which was re -established by the
Security Council following a week of violent Arab Jewish hos-
tilities, is not likely to result in a permanent settlement between
Jews and Arabs. The opposing armies will hold to their present
positions, extremist groups on both sides will become involved
in at least minor violations, and neither Israel nor the Arab
states are likely to modify their claims sufficiently to bring
about a general agreement. If UN Mediator Rernadottq can
effectively enforce the truce, If Israel can effectively restrain
the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang. and if the Arab gov-
ernments can control the extreme nationalism of their peoples,
the stalemate will continue and the whole issue will probably
come up again in the General Assembly in September.
The Jews agreed to renew the truce because its terms
favor Israel militarily and politically., The Arabs, on the other
hand, accepted the extension only because of military weakness
and fear of UN sanctions. Arab support of the truce will depend
largely on the reaction of the Arab people, who were confident
of victory and were assured by their leaders that the truce would
not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt Into violence
against their governments or the western powers, or both. If
their wrath is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab
governments In an attempt to survive will probably resume the
Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every
effort to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US,
and the UK.
The raeli forces ode substantial- gains during the
nine days of fighting between the expiration of the UN truce on
9 July and its renewal on 18 July. The Arab threat to Tel Aviv
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PALESTINE
was eliminated by the capture of Ran le, Lydda, and Ras ati Ein.
A Jewish thrust southeast of L dud effectively prevented the
Egyptian forces from joining the Arab Legion at Latrun. The
Jews are supplying Jerusalem through the widened strip of ter-
rttory between that city and Tel Aviv by skirting L.tran and
Bab el Wad, the only remaining Arab blocks along the main
road, and a Jewish offensive within Jerusalem succeeded td
breaching the walls of the Arab-held Old City. In the north,
Jewish forces took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Naz
areth. The only Arab advance of any consequence was made
by the Iraqi Army north of Jenin. The Transjordan Arab Legion
engaged in no offensive action during the period of fighting.
Commercial air operations outside Soviet-cont-roiled
territory have been established and are being expanded by
Communist Interests, despite US efforts to block such opera-
tions. Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA) has developed a profitable
business transporting passengers and cargo from Rome c'o ugh
Athens to Haifa and has ceatmlidated its position as a friendly
carrier for Jewish interests in Palestine. Active negotiations,
moreover, are now under way between CS.A and the Zionist-
controlled Pan African Air Charters (PAAC) for joint opera-
tion of a route from Europe through Rata to South Africa.
If a joint CSA-PAAC airlhie should be designated as the official
flag carrier of the State of Israel, CSA efforts to obtain modern
long-range aircraft (hitherto frustrated by the US and western
European powers) and to extend its air routes wed be furthered.
Furthermore, through affiliation with powerful Jewish interests,
CSA might participate in the greatly-expanded worldwift op-
erations envisaged for the State of Israel by Jewish commercial
enterprise.
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INDIA
The danger continues that the sporadic fighting in Kashmir
may develop into full-scale war unless the UN Commission acts
quickly to effect a cease-fire. Indian officials, in commenting
to the Commission on the undeclared war existing between India
and Pakistan, claim that a plebiscite cannot be held in the state
until Pakistani forces are withdrawn and threaten that India will
"end with force that which began with force." The Government
of Pakistan, which asserts that its troops (some 10,000 iren) are
in Kashmir for defense purposes only, has she n no disposition
to retreat from its position. Although neither dominion wants
war, both are committed to strong stands on the Kashmir issue.
The Commission Is accordingly faced with the ultimate problem
of finding a compromise that both dominions can accept without
loss of prestige.
A forced solution of the H derabad problem is threatened
by Indian officials. The Government of India has again asserted
that aircraft from Pakistan are illegally transporting arms and
ammunition to Hyderabad, although neutral observers are of the
opinion that the materiel does not come from Pakistan, where
an arms shortage exists. Continuation of the Indian economic
blockade of Hyderabad and predatory raids into Indian territory
by Hyderabad extremists presage increased violence.
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FAR EAST
CHINA
China's present inflationarv crisis may represent a
final stage in the disintegration of the National Government.
In a succession of fin=ancial crises, the Government has been
incapable of coping with the recurrent emergencies until, at
last, the printing press method of financing the civil war is
producing its logical and inevitable result: the repudiation of
the national currency. In many sections of China, barter,
the open use of silver dollars, and a general reluctance to
accept the Chinese National Dollar are becoming increasingly
apparent. It is extremely unlikely that US aid can effectively
check this trend. Repudiation of the currency Is expected
to produce chaos and civil disturbances in the urban areas.
In addition, it is problematical whether any kind of military
force can be maintained if the government s money Is not
acceptable. (For a detailed discussion of the Chinese crisis,
see ORE 45-48, "The Current Situation in China," which is
being disseminated on 23 July.)
may
be designed to promote the disunity of the government at
NanHng. If circumstances become favorable, the U?. may
offer its good offices to end the war, in which case a coalition
government might emerge which would facilitate rather than
deter Communist penetration and considerable propaganda
value would accrue to the USSR as mediators of the peace.
The USSR may believe, moreover, that a continuation of hos-
tilities would insure increased US aid to Nationalist China
with a concomitant increase in US influence.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
C LE
Haeorzation of the Chilean Cabinet has emphasized
President Gonmale inability to form a workable political
coalition. The inherent instability of the Gonzalez regime
stems from the fact that the cabinet is administrative and
not based on political agreement among its members. The
cabinet, for example, is right-of-center politically in an
administration which claims to be leftist and pro-labor.
T a division of the labor front at present also appears to
preclude strong support of the government. Opposition to
the administration is growing among parties formerly con.-
tent with a technical cabinet and government policy. Thus,
the reorganization of the ministries, together with the exten-
sion of the president's special powers for an additional 120
days, has only deferred the )roblem of finding a solid basis
of support for an administration which must consolidate a
substantial labor bloc in order to meet the growing threat
of the non-Communist opposition.
PANAMA
The Pah-namanianpolitical impasse continues. The
Supreme Court of Panama recently declared unconstitutional
a resolution of the National Assembly which called for the
resignation of President jimenez. Jimenez may therefore
complete his term in office which ends on 30 September. If
the groups" who oppose President-elect Arnulfo Arias remain
united, they can without violence deny him thy. presidency
in one of two ways: (1) void the election resuAs before the
expiration of JFmenez` term of office (which weld allow the
cabinet to choose a provisional president from among its
membership); or (2) declare a plurality for Domingo Diaz,
who received 37% of the votes as opposed to Arias" 38%.
ar.
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PANAMA
' Tnt support of pro-US Police Chief Remon, which the anti-
Arias factions now have, will probably produce a settlement
cif the presidential issue favorable to US security interests.
PARAGUAY
Military dice ar. Para.g y would follow the
in: ~ : ~ prat A s a of resider:.t~ l.ruct nzalex on 15 August. A
pa+?,aiox:toal a'terrnative is open to the Paraguayan people in
the illegal retention in office of Provisional President Frutos,
whose democratic government was Engineered by an extra-
constitutional coup, Frutos cou be expected to sponsor a
more democratic and I dependent, government than Gonzalez,
but it is unlikely that any new administration would deviate
radically from Paraguay's pr?o-US policy, which both factions
consider a bulwark against Argentine penetration.
ARGENTINA
N gotlation of a e eral ECA purchase agreement,
as recommended by US Ambassador Bruce, wou ` con-
siderable extent relieve the present tension of the Peron
regime by providing Argentina with the prospect of substan-
tial dollar receipts: Although Argentina is confronted with
the necessity of making fundamental changes in domestic and
foreign economic policy to adjust to present and prospective
economic conditions, the immediate crisis is essentially a
financial one and substantial dollar receipts would provide
a welcome breathing spell. Because Perot has made real
concessions on the terms on which ECA purchases would
be made, his administration may be expected to ! e,act more
favorably to a general purchasing agreement than to a pro-
cedure whereby the US would exercise a power of veto in
sales negotiations between Argentina and the sixteen members
of thf Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
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A P P E N D I X
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR BLOCKADING VIENNA
A Soviet blockade of Vienna would pose. far more serious
and immediate problems than does the present blockade of
Berlin. The transport of supplies through the Soviet zone for
the use of the 1-1 million Viennese living In the sectors occupied
by the western powers is governed by no written agreement be -
tween the western powers and the USSR. If the USSR should cut
off the land routes for supplies, both western power troops and
the Viennese in the western sectors would be faced with an
immediate and critical food shortage. At present, food require-
ments of the Viennese in the western sectors, the western troops,
and their dependents are met almost entirely from imports.
Supply of Vienna by air could be effected only on an
extremely limited scale by air drop. Both the US airfield and
the joint British-French airfield He within the Soviet zone, some
distance from the western sectors of occupation In Vienna.
Furthermore, the western sectors are almost wholly dependent
upon the Soviet sector for essential public utilities. All of the
hydroelectric power lines, most of the gas, and all of the water
supply for the western sectors could be cut off at a moment's
notice. Sewage disposal plants are also located in the Soviet
sector.
The US has, in concert with other western powers,
committed itself to the establishment of a free and independent
kustirian Republic within the 1937 boundaries. The US, as well
as the western powers and the USSR, has extended recognition
to the present Austrian government. Moreover, Austrian national
and foreign policies are based upon the assumption that the US,
together with France and the UK, will back the Austrian Govern-
ment. US prestige, therefore, would be seriously impaired by the
failure of the western powers to maintain their position in Vienna.
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SECRET
I
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I
3KRET
I1
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2631-S--1948
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