COSTA RICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001700060001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.
FOR T}:E ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTI.,: TES
COSTA RICA
SR 53
Published 20 February 1950
`I L
oOl
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
r" :t :.iL!fir,`.: ..?irf`..
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for
the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
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2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Atomic Energy Commission
Research and Development Board
Document No. O 0 l
? ^
Ids Ca_ _a.' E in Class.
I EC-7.rySSIFILD
s. c ..._;:dC:D TO: TS S C
J:C-:S Memo, 4 Apr 77
Date.
:Cl. 7T'f7.763
By:
aMPArOPE T
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I-POLITICAL SITUATION
3. POLITICAL PARTIES .
a. National Union Party (PUN)
b. Social Democratic Party
c. National Republican Party
d. Communist Party .
e. Constitutional Party .
4. OTHER INFLUENTIAL GROUPS
a. Costa Rican Labor Federation (CCT)
b. Confederation of Workers of Costa Rica
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1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 9
2. THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION 9
a. Agriculture and Stock Raising 10
b. Fishing 12
c. Forest Products 12
d. Minerals, Petroleum, and Hydroelectric Power 13
e. Manufacturing 13
f. International Trade 13
g. International Finance 14
h. Money and Banking 14
i. Government Finance 14
CHAPTER III-FOREIGN POLICY
1. RELATIONS WITH THE US AND IN OAS .
2. THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY .
3. RELATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN .
4. PROBABLE FUTURE POLICIES .
17
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CHAPTER IV-MILITARY SITUATION 21
CHAPTER V-WARTIME SABOTAGE IN COSTA RICA . 23
CHAPTER VI-STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 25
CHAPTER VII-PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY 27
APPENDIX A-Transport and Communications Facilities 29
APPENDIX B-Topography and Climate 31
APPENDIX C-Biographical Data 33
APPENDIX D-Statistical Data 35
MAPS :
Costa Rica: Transportation
Costa Rica: Land Use
Central America-Caribbean Area
Is
40
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Because hostile forces established in Costa
Rica would be in a position to interfere with
the operation of the Panama Canal and the
Caribbean sea routes, denial of Costa Rica to
enemy clandestine or open operations is a
matter of importance to US security. In the
event of an East-West war, Costa Rica can be
expected to side with the US and against the
USSR and to fulfill its obligations for Hemi-
sphere defense under the Rio pact. Also, the
country would be willing to permit the US to
establish wartime bases on its territory for the
protection of the Panama Canal and Caribbean
shipping. In addition the country can be
counted upon to increase substantially its
production of abaca, ipecac root, balsa, and
mahogany-strategic materials-if such an in-
crease is regarded as desirable by the US.
The US and Costa Rica are today closely
allied by their economies. In 1948 over 75
percent of the country's foreign trade was with
the US, and one US corporation, the United
Fruit Company, spent in Costa Rica in 1947
over $14,000,000, the approximate equivalent
of total Costa Rican government expenditures
for the same year. Costa Rican economy is
based for the most part on agriculture, and
prosperity depends to a great extent on the
US demand for its four principal exports-
coffee, bananas, cacao, and abaca.
The Costa Rican Government is republican
in form. A new constitution became effective
on 8 November 1949 when Otilio Ulate was in-
augurated as President following eighteen
months of rule by a junta headed by Jose
Figueres after the 1948 civil war. In the mod-
ern era the primary rights of citizens have,
for the most part, been well respected except
during the last years of the Calderon-domi-
nated Picado regime (1944-48), and to some
extent after the civil war of 1948.
In its international relationships, Costa
Rica recognizes the US as the dominant power
in the Caribbean. The principal features of
the country's relations with foreign countries
and entities are: a desire for friendship with
the US; membership in the Council of Organ-
ization of American States; an effort to pro-
mote a satisfactory working relationship with
the United Fruit Company; and a conflict be-
tween a desire, on the one hand, to pursue an
isolationist attitude toward the other repub-
lics of Middle America and the Caribbean, and
on the other, to participate actively in regional
intergovernmental relationships.
The country is incapable of offering effective
military resistance to any but the smallest and
most ineffectual invading forces. There is a
strong anti-militarist tradition in the country
and, technically speaking, there is no Costa
Rican army. In its place there is a civil guard
which performs both military and police
functions. 'Costa Rica has no navy or air
force.
The Soviet or Soviet-inspired sabotage po-
tential in the country is limited. The former
Communist Party, known as the Vanguard'ia
Popular, was outlawed after the civil war and
activities were almost at a standstill. It has
now been renamed the National Democratic
Party and the Communists are slowly in-
creasing their activities. A substantial in-
crease in Communist strength is not foreseen.
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. The Intelligence Organization of the Depart-
ment of State concurs with the exception noted on page 17. The report is based on in-
formation available to CIA as of December 1949.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
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1. Genesis of the Present Political System.
Costa Rica declared its independence from
Spain and established a republican form of
government in 1821. Although the country
was among the first to foresee the disadvan-
tages of the Central American Union of which
it was a member, it was not until 1848 that
the Congress declared the nation sovereign
and independent of any other state. The
country had little preparation for self-govern-
ment, and, during the first fifty years after its
independence in 1821, there were sharp party
conflicts, coups d'etat, dictatorships, and a
military oligarchy. Governmental stability
was eventually achieved, however, somewhat
more quickly and with greater ease than by the
other Central American republics. The coun-
try had a sounder basis on which to establish
self-government. There were few Indians in
this part of Central America, and the colonial
government had not imported negroes. There-
fore, the small population was rather homo-
geneous with respect to race, language, and
religion. Also, there was less class stratifica-
tion because of equitable land distribution, the
comparative absence of Indian and slave labor,
and the agricultural subsistence economy that
prevailed before the introduction of coffee and
bananas.
Costa Rica's modern political history dates
roughly from 1889, when for the first time a
fairly large number of people actually partici-
pated in a presidential election. The govern-
mental system was, by Latin American stand-
ards, stable between 1889 and 1948 except for
a coup d'etat in 1917 and a counter-revolution
in 1919.
In 1948, Rafael Calderon Guardia, who had
dominated the political regime of President
Picado, sought election for the presidency. Al-
though his opponent, Otilio Ulate, was elected,
a majority of Calderon Guardia adherents was
returned to Congress. The new Congress,
dominated by Calderon, annulled Ulate's
election and civil war ensued. Jose Figueres,
a wealthy coffee planter, took up the cause of
Ulate, led the revolutionary forces to victory,
and proclaimed himself chief of a governing
junta. Ulate and Figueres agreed that the
junta would yield office to Ulate when order
was restored to the country and a new con-
stitution adopted. The transfer of power took
place on 8 November 1949.
2. Present Governmental Structure.
The form of government is republican, but
the political system is not wholly democratic.
An upper class tends to dominate the political
life of the country. Political parties frequently
disintegrate between elections, so that it is sel-
dom that the people can hold a party respon-
sible for the conduct of elected representatives;
the President and the Congress can sometimes
disregard public opinion without danger of
electoral reprisals. The primary rights of
citizens, such as free speech, freedom of the
press, of assembly and of religion, and the in-
violability of property ? rights have, for the
most part, been well respected in the modern
era. In the last years of the Calderon-domi-
nated Picado administration (1944-48), how-
ever, they were not universally respected and
have been disregarded during the past year
with respect to Communists and leaders of the
government who were ousted by the 1948 civil
war.
Although the 1871 constitution and the con-
stitution which became effective on 8 Novem-
ber 1949 have provided for a considerable
measure of local autonomy, the governmental
system is, in reality, highly centralized, em-
bracing many of the traditions inherited from
Spanish colonial times. As in the US, there
is a distribution of power among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. In practice,
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the executive branch enjoys a preponderance
of power and often dominates the legislative
and judicial branches as well as provincial and
municipal governments. The new constitu-
tion is a revision of the 1871 document, and is
modelled to a great extent on the US constitu-
tion.'
3. Political Parties.
Political parties of the type current in the
US and Great Britain do not exist in Costa
Rica. Many Costa Rican political parties are,
in reality, little more than aggregations of the
followers of ambitious politicians. They are
often temporary in character and relatively
unimportant.
a. National Union Party (PUN).
This is the personal political party of Presi-
dent Otilio Ulate. It polled 71.7 percent of the
total votes cast in the congressional election of
2 October 1949 and won 33 of the 45 seats in
the assembly. The party really has no specific
political or economic principles except, per-
haps, the belief in constitutional government.
It is neither outstandingly liberal nor conser-
vative, and has merely wished to seat Ulate in
the presidency and to win for itself control of
the government and the prerogatives thereof.
When Ulate ran for President in 1948 all
parties opposing the Calderonista administra-
tion united in nominating him for President.
Although the titular head of the National
Union Party, he consented to run on a "Demo-
cratic Union" ticket as a device for broadening
the base of his political appeal and securing
the support of the Social Democratic Party.
b. Social Democratic Party.
This small party, formed in 1943, represents
an aggregation of political amateurs, for the
most part young men, who oppose ? old-f ash-
ioned party politics and who claim to prefer
a carefully framed platform truly representa-
tive of the convictions of the party's mem
bers-one for which the party members in
Congress and the presidential candidate, if
elected, will work. The party also favors sound
government based on a permanent civil serv-
ice, monetary reforms, a balanced budget, and
1 An analysis of the new constitution will be issued
as an addendum to this document.
long-range planning for the improvement of
the economic and social conditions of the
country.
This party provided a majority of the troop
commanders in the civil war of 1948. As a
result, six members of the military junta which
governed the country until November 1949
were members. Nevertheless, it was soundly
beaten in the December 1948 election for the
constitutional assembly and in the 1949 con-
gressional elections, although it campaigned
aggressively. The defeats appeared to indicate
that the public preferred to see the country
revert to traditional political methods rather
than adopt the reforms and the concept of
political conduct that the Social Democrats
espoused. Another reason for its lack of
popular appeal was the military record of its
leaders. Many felt them to be inconsistent
with Costa Rica's pacific traditions.
c. National Republican Party.
This is the party of the Calderon Guardia
brothers, which (at least temporarily) has dis-
integrated since its party leaders were defeated
in the 1948 civil war and subsequently driven
into exile. The party was organized in 1931
and elected all four Presidents between 1932
and 1948. It retained power by means of its
particular appeal to the lower classes, by graft,
by patronage, and by manipulations of the
electoral laws. The party entered into a co-
alition with the local Communist Party (Van-
guardia Popular) in 1944, and, under pressure
from the Communists, passed most of Costa
Rica's modern social and labor legislation.
Although no longer really existent, it still en-
joys a certain amount of popularity among the
country's lower classes who have not yet trans-
ferred their allegiance to other political
groups.
d. Communist Party (Vanguardia Popular,
Now Renamed the National Democratic Party).
The Vanguardia Popular was outlawed by
the junta on 17 July 1948. Manuel Mora and
others of its leaders are now in exile. The
party's chief source of strength, the Commu-
nist-dominated Confederation of Workers of
Costa Rica (CTCR) with its subsidiary unions,
is disorganized. Communist elements are
working persistently in Costa Rica, but thus
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far have been unable to recapture their former
influence and power. In the fall of 1949 the
Vanguardia Popular was reorganized under
the name of the National Democratic Party.
The party was not allowed to present a slate
of candidates in the congressional election of
October 1949 and the party ordered its mem-
bers to support the Constitutional Party.
Until the overthrow of the Calderonistas in
1948, the Communists occupied a political po-
sition unwarranted on the basis of their nu-
merical strength. Mora's influence tended to
minimize the international revolutionary as-
pect of party action and center the party's ap-
peal to the voters on the need for social and
economic legislation designed to improve the
lot of the lower classes. By a series of astute
maneuvers, the party became an important
part of the Calderon Guardia political ma-
chine. In the 1944 presidential election, armed
bands of Communists were used by the Cal-
deronistas to perpetrate election frauds, and,
during the 1948 presidential campaign, groups
of armed ruffians were again used in an at-
tempt to terrorize the population into voting
for the Calderonista candidates. During the
1948 civil war, the Communists were encour-
aged by the government to perpetrate every
sort of crime from false arrest, looting, and
arson, to kidnapping and murder; they formu-
lated a specific plan for the capture of San
Jose in event of a government collapse, and
overran the city toward the close of the civil
war, in the interval between the collapse of the
government army and the entry into San Jose
of the victorious rebels. Communists were the
most astute labor organizers in the country.
Also, they operated a radio station, held con-
gressional seats (eight in 1948), and placed
many Communists at various levels and in
some key positions of the government. In the
spring of 1948, following the collapse of the
Calderon Guardia regime, the party bargained
unsuccessfully with the oppositionists in an
effort to change sides in the political struggle.
The Vanguardia Popular polled 16,000 votes
in 1942 and 12,000 out of 95,000 in 1948. Its
strength lay in its compactness, efficiency, and
discipline, and the intelligence and forceful-
ness of its leader, Manuel Mora. In 1948 its
membership was about 6,000 and the number
of militants probably stood at 2,000. It is un-
likely that the National Democratic Party
(the former Vanguardia) will reach a strong
political position in the foreseeable future.
ee. Constitutional Party.
This party was formed in the fall of 1948
to oppose the progressive tendencies of the
Figueres-dominated junta and to further the
political ambitions of several prominent at-
torneys. Its platform has never been care-
fully enunciated and it has contented itself
with emphasizing the need to curb the power
of thet`executive and to eliminate the special
courts established to try the leaders of the de-
feated Calderonista political machine. The
party's slate of candidates in the 1948 and 1949
elections included some of the soundest and
most respected men in Costa Rica and it polled
11,977 votes out of 75,831 in the 1949 congres-
sional election. Some of these votes came
from the Communists, who had been advised
by their leaders as a political maneuver to
vote for this party.
f. There are five minor political parties now
existent in Costa Rica. Of them only the Civic
Action Group, dominated by ultraconservative,
ultraclerical and middle- and upper-class indi-
viduals, is felt to have any potential future po-
litical significance. Its platform is nebulous
and non-committal in the extreme.
4. Other Influential Groups.
a. Costa Rican Labor Federation (CCT).
This Catholic anti-Communist labor federa-
tion, generally known as Rerum Novarum, was
established by Father Benjamin Nunez in 1943,
but, until the 1948 civil war, the effective force
in the labor movement was the Communist-
dominated Confederation of Workers of Costa
Rica, and the CCT existed largely on
paper. Since the civil war, however, the CTCR
has, for all practical purposes, been outlawed,
and the Rerum Novarum has thus emerged
as the only labor organization of influence and
importance in the country. It has tripled its
active membership to about 20,000. Although
it has some political influence, its efforts to
organize unions and increase their effective-
ness have been only moderately successful.
Handicapped by a shortage of experienced
labor organizers, by its failure to adopt a pro-
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gram of general interest to the workers, by
differences in ideology among top leaders of
the federation, and by its amateurish tactics
in handling union grievances, the Rerum No-
varum may never achieve the degree of pres-
tige, influence, and power that was formerly
enjoyed by the CTCR.
b. Confederation of Workers of Costa Rica
(CTCR).
Although this Communist-dominated labor
organization still has legal status, it is, for all
practical purposes, completely disorganized.
Its previous domination by Communists and
close association with the discredited Calderon
Guardia political machine brought about its
disintegration after the 1948 civil war and the
victory of the military junta, which openly
favored the Rerum Novarum as the country's
recognized labor organization. CTCR once
had approximately 15,000 active members and
was most strongly organized in the provinces
of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas. Its larg-
est and strongest unions were the United Fruit
Company workers and the railroad workers.
For some years, the CTCR and the Vanguard'ia
Popular were the only groups in the country
that were actively interested in the enactment
of progressive social and labor legislation and
in an improved level of living for the lower
classes. And, for this reason, it is not unlikely
that the CTCR or a successor of it may suc-
ceed at some future time in re-establishing it-
self as an important labor organization. The
poor record of the Rerum Novarum and the in-
ternational affiliations of the Costa Rican
Communists are also factors favoring the re-
establishment of a Communist-dominated
labor federation. It is not certain that the
country's conservative elements will succeed in
depriving the CTCR of its legal status.
5. Current Issues.
Current issues revolve around the revision
of governmental policies under the Ulate ad-
ministration, which is supported by conserva-
tive groups who have opposed the social and
economic reforms of Jose Figueres and his as-
sociates of the junta. The opposing points of
view of the junta and of Ulate supporters re-
flect basic economic and social problems of the
country. Class, racial, and nationality preju-
dice separate the whites of the Central Plateau
from the West Indian negroes and Nicaraguan
peons of the lowlands. Also, population pres-
sure in the highlands tends to increase class
rivalry. New philosophies have sharpened po-
litical debate on the function of the state.
The junta wanted a constitution that would
include advanced social and economic con-
cepts designed to commit the state to a planned
economy and to a more equitable distribution
of the national wealth. Also, it favored a gov-
ernment that would be freed of traditional po-
litical methods and would be an efficient ad-
ministrator of the country's affairs. The
junta had very little support for this program.
Some of its opponents have spoken of the junta
as being an idealistic group of political ama-
teurs whose impulses toward social and eco-
nomic experimentation might ruin the coun-
try. Others, while sympathetic to its aims
and aspirations, have distrusted the ambitions
of its leaders. They have looked upon Otilio
Ulate as the only practical solution for the
country's problems and seemed to believe sin-
cerely that he can restore the status quo
ante-before the civil war, before foreign po-
litical entanglements, before the groping be-
gan for new norms of authority and adminis-
tration. What is not said and is tacitly ad-
mitted only by a very few is that many of the
middle and upper classes have suspected or
instinctively feared that Figueres and his as-
sociates in the junta are as potentially danger-
ous to upper-class domination of the country
as was the former political alignment of the
Calderonistas and the Vanguardia Popular.
The Costa Rican lower class has, through
the years, been accustomed to paternalistic
government over which it exerts little influ-
ence. Until very recently it has not been con-
scious as a class of the need to improve its con-
dition. The lower class is composed of native
whites who live chiefly on the Meseta Central,
West Indian negroes who have been imported
to work on the Fruit Company plantations
and the railroad in the Caribbean lowland,
and illiterate Nicaraguan peons, mestizos, who
work on banana plantations and the railroad
in the Pacific Coast area. Costa Ricans of all
classes who live on the Meseta Central con-
sider themselves superior both to the Nica-
raguan peons and to negroes of the lowlands.
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During the Calderon and Picado administra-
tions (1940-48), class and racial prejudices
which had previously prevented the various
sectors of the lower class from cooperating
were, for a time, forgotten and the lower class
as a group tended to unite to support Rafael
Calderon Guardia. Meanwhile, the Commu-
nist-dominated CTCR organized large labor
groups and, principally because of the federa-
tion's labor strength, the Communist Party
was able to press the Calderonistas into pass-
ing liberal social and labor legislation. For
the first time the lower class of the Meseta
Central voted the same ticket as the negroes
and foreign peons of the lowlands who pre-
viously, for all practical purposes, had been
denied the franchise. This apparently hap-
pened to some extent even in the 1948 election
when the Calderonista-Communist combina-
tion received a majority in Congress even
though Calderon was defeated for the presi-
dency.
This lower-class alignment was a new po-
litical development for Costa Rica, and it
quickly dissolved in the face of the stresses
upon society brought about by the 1948 politi-
cal troubles. When Calderon, defeated for the
presidency in 1948, brought up from the tropic
lowlands negroes and peons and gave them
arms to assist him in staying in power, whites
of all classes of the Meseta Central hastened
to join the forces of the rebel leader, Figueres.
When fighting actually started, the lower-class
literate whites of the highlands refused to
make common cause with their illiterate
brethren from the lowlands and the Calderon
regime crumbled, despite the assistance it had
from neighboring Nicaragua.
The results of this chain of events are still
being felt. The CTCR and its subsidi-
aries have been thrown into disorder, the Com-
munist Party is outlawed, and the treatment
of Communists and the defeated Calderonistas
by the courts has been harsher than has ever
been meted out to defeated politicians in the
history of the country. Racial and national
prejudice will, it is believed, prevent for some
time to come another political coalition be-
tween the lower-class whites of the highlands
and the lowlands.
The Ulate administration, should be rela-
tively stable since many of the Communists
and the potentially vocal oppositionists have
either been disenfranchised, suppressed, or
exiled. In fact, such real opposition as Ulate
may be expected to encounter will probably
stem from former junta members, many of
whom have both an ideological drive and a
desire for power. It seems likely that Figueres
may find it difficult to resist the pleas of his
former associates to join with them in either
seeking power or forcing Ulate to accede to
certain of their reform measures. In such an
event, Communists and former Calderonistas
will no doubt seek to reassert themselves as a
political force by offering support to which-
ever of the two rival political factions they be-
lieve most promising from the standpoint of
their own personal preferment.
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CHAPTER II
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ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present. Economic System.
The Costa Rican economy is based for the
most part upon agriculture. This has been
true ever since colonial times. Geographical
conditions favor diversification of agricultural
productions, the soil is rich, and the land-de-
velopment potential substantial. Lack of
mineral resources and the absence of a large
indigenous servile native population made the
country unattractive for Spanish colonial de-
velopment and exploitation by mercantilist
methods applied to other parts of the empire.
Agricultural production by a literate, white,
land-owning peasantry became the chief eco-
nomic activity. Toward the end of the nine-
teenth century coffee and banana culture was
developed for the constantly increasing export
market, and today a large percentage of agri-
cultural effort is devoted to the production of
these two crops; in 1948, coffee and bananas
amounted to almost 40 percent of the total
value of agricultural production. This con-
centration has made the economy dependent
on conditions outside of Costa Rica, and espe-
cially on changes in price and demand in the
US. Currently, world markets for the main
export products are holding firm, so that the
immediate outlook is bright.
A distinguishing feature of the agricultural
economy is the United Fruit Company (see also
Chapter III, Foreign Policy, pp. 17-19). This
giant US corporation, with its vast complex of
locally owned or controlled activities that in-
clude ships, docks, railways, hospitals, planta-
tions, experimental farms, and rain-making
airplanes, produces almost 50 percent of the
country's total exports-primarily bananas,
but also cacao and abaca-and thus gives em-
ployment to thousands in the tropic lowlands.
Other activities are carried on for the most
part by independent producers on rather
widely distributed landholdings mostly in the
central mountainous region, where three-
fourths of the population live on less than one-
fifth of the total land area. This latter area,
which has an invigorating climate and some
of the richest land in the world, is so attractive
to Costa Ricans that they have been reluctant
to move to remote and less pleasant parts of
the country where West Indian Negro laborers
and Nicaraguan peons form a substantial part
of the agricultural working force.
The pattern of land ownership in the central
highlands has been changing. The number
of large landowners and landless peasants has
been increasing because (1) many coffee pro-
ducers-especially the smaller ones-operate
on so close a margin that they lose their prop-
erties in bad crop years; (2) large and
wealthy farmers can afford large capital out-
lays for land, equipment, etc.; and (3) there is
little good land left in the fertile central pla-
teau which offers economic opportunity and
is available to the younger sons of small farm-
ers. The increasing concentration of wealth
in the hands of fewer landowners at the ex-
pense of many peasants and the rapid increase
in population (Costa Rica has one of the
world's highest birth rates) have combined to
lower the standard of living of the masses.
Landholdings, however, still remain more
widely distributed in Costa Rica than in other
Central American countries, and the standard
of living is higher.
2. The Present Economic Situation.
Costa Rica was prosperous during the war,
its exports were at an all-time high in 1948,
the current demand for exports is good, and
coffee and bananas are bringing relatively
high prices on the world market. But despite
favorable international conditions, the coun-
try is confronted by economic problems in the
form of inflation, large internal debts, and a
dollar and revenue shortage. These problems
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result largely from governmental inefficiency,
from the political manipulation of domestic
economic problems, and from the fact that the
government is trying to operate and the up-
per classes to live at a level which is beyond
that which the country can afford at the pres-
ent time. The Calderon Guardia and Picado
political administrations greatly increased the
internal debt in order to pay governmental
expenses. The junta tried to increase gov-
ernmental revenues by decreeing a 10 percent
capital levy and by increasing excise and im-
port taxes; signed a new contract with the
United Fruit Company that will bring in an
increased revenue over the old contract; and
decreed nationalization of the private banks,
monetary reforms, and revisions in exchange
and import controls. The junta's efforts to
improve economic conditions were not notably
successful. Tax returns have been disappoint-
ing, the 1948 and 1949 expenditures have been
greater than previous governmental budgets,
and the 1948 national deficit attained an un-
precedented high.
a. Agriculture and Stock Raising.
About 15-20 percent of the total land area
of Costa Rica is at present used as crop and
cattle land; the remainder is in forests. The
total land area cleared for crops and cattle
could conceivably be increased to 35-40 per-
cent of the total, and wide diversification of
agriculture is possible in Costa Rica. By fur-
ther developing and expanding indigenous
food production the nutritional adequacy of
the diet could be materially increased. The
emphasis upon the production of export items,
however, tends to create a food deficiency for
the local market. Imports of food, tobacco,
and beverages amounted to 15 percent of the
1947 total, and increased production for do-
mestic use is becoming increasingly necessary
because of the rapid natural increase of the
population. Agriculturalization of the low-
lands and of Guanacaste Province is progress-
ing and could become sufficiently extensive to
solve the country's food supply problem if
transportation facilities between remote areas
and the centers of population were improved
and if agricultural labor were more willing to
move to the frontier areas rather than remain
on the central plateau-both doubtful possi-
bilities under existing conditions.
During an emergency Costa Rica could be-
come self-sufficient in most basic foods.
(1) Coffee.
Coffee is one of the two leading export crops
in dollar value. Costa Rican coffee is a high-
quality product which will remain in demand
even during a world depression. Coffee plan-
tations cover 32 percent of all cultivated land,
and about one-fourth of the total population
lives on coffee farms. Most of the coffee is
grown on the central plateau and is processed
for export by modern methods in some 200
processing plants usually located on the large
farms or in neighboring towns and cities. Ex-
periments indicate that high-grade coffee
probably can be grown with greater yields at
lower elevations such as Guanacaste and the
Talamanca Range. The 1948-49 crop totaled
302,107 bags of 60 kilos each (18,126 metric
tons), a small crop, and current estimates
place the 1949-50 crop at 475,000 bags. Costa
Rica exported 23,906 tons of coffee in the cal-
endar year 1948, which brought high premium
prices on the US market. Although this is
but a small percentage of total world coffee
exports-the country was fifteenth on the list
of world coffee exporters in 1948-1949-it is a
vital export item for Costa Rica and repre-
sented over one-third of total exports in value
in 1948.
(2) Bananas.
Banana exports were about equal in value
to those of coffee in 1948 (see subsection f.
International Trade, pp. 13-14) even though
only about 9 percent of the total crop area of
the country is planted in bananas. Costa
Rica ranks third among the banana produc-
ing countries of the world and exported 9.6
million stems in 1948, 89 percent of which
were grown by the United Fruit Company or
by independent producers who sold their prod-
uct to the Fruit Company. Thirteen percent
of the total volume of US imports of bananas
in 1948 came from Costa Rica. Production in
Costa Rica is now centered in the Puntarenas
and San Jose area of the Pacific Coast and will
most likely be moved to the Coto region if soil
exhaustion and the Panama disease force the
abandonment of the present plantations. If
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world market conditions permit, some of the
abandoned area will probably be planted in
cacao, abaca, or African oil palms.
The United Fruit Company has dominated
commercial banana production in Costa Rica
since 1900 and those who have sought to com-
pete with it have, for the most part, failed.
The company's control over banana produc-
tion has been more complete in Costa Rica
than in other Central American countries,
chiefly because of its control over wharves and
railroads and because the government and the
country are so small as to be particularly sus-
ceptible to concentrated economic power. The
company has operated under concessions from
the government, some of which have been
bitterly opposed by many Costa Ricans who
claim that the management is exploitative
and arrogant and would operate without gov-
ernment consent if it could and if it were con-
venient to do so. Even its enemies admit,
however, that it has contributed greatly to
Costa Rica financially, has developed harbor,
transport, health, and educational facilities in
its area of operations, and was the first
agency to develop the tropic lowlands on a
systematic basis-areas that had previously
been considered useless for economic develop-
ment. The most recent operational contract
between the Costa Rican Government and the
company was signed on 27 December 1948 to
terminate in 1988. Under this contract the
company obligates itself to pay greatly in-
creased taxes to the government and to ex-
pand the production of bananas, cacao, and
African oil palm. In exchange the govern-
ment grants the company liberal foreign ex-
change concessions.
Commercial banana production by inde-
pendents is conducted largely in the Atlantic
coastal area on lands abandoned by the Fruit
Company. In 1948, 1.1 million stems were
exported through several exporters. Yields
per acre on independent plantations are, for
the most part, smaller than on those of the
Fruit Company.
(3) Cacao.
Cacao is the third commercial crop. Pro-
duction totalled 4,432 metric tons in 1948, a
good crop year. Most of the crop-a flavor
variety-is grown by a United Fruit Company
subsidiary on 39,000 acres of abandoned ba-
nana land in Limon Province on the Atlantic
lowlands, 10.5 percent of the total crop land
of the country. Cacao planting has also been
started by the Fruit Company in its Quepos
Division on the Pacific coastal lowlands on re-
converted banana land, and plantings in this
area may be expanded to 15,000 acres by 1953.
Costa Ricans estimate that over 100,000 acres
of land in the Atlantic lowland are suitable to
cacao production. The Fruit Company plans
to expand acreages on the assumption that
the present world shortage of cacao will con-
tinue and that world market prices will even-
tually stabilize at a fairly high level compared
to those existing prior to World War II.
(4) Abaca.
Large-scale cultivation of abaca was under-
taken during the war in order to replace the
lost Philippine supply. Production is carried
on by the United Fruit Company under con-
tract with the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration, which buys all of the product and re-
pays the company for production deficits.
Plantations on 10,000 acres of former banana
lands yielded 13.8 million pounds of spinnable
fiber and 113,750 pounds of tow fiber-used
for paper manufacture-in 1948. Production
costs are high but are being reduced through
increased yields. The future feasibility of
abaca production on as large a scale as at
present appears to depend on (1) US govern-
ment subsidies; (2) the successful control of
the "tip-over" disease that is now seriously
damaging Panamanian abaca plants and is
spreading to Costa Rica; and (3) relative costs
of production in Costa Rica as compared with
the Philippines. Prewar Philippine costs were
lower, but this situation may change. The
Costa Rican yield per acre is said to be po-
tentially greater, aside from the threat of
"tip-over," and it is believed that methods of
control of this disease can be found.
(5) Other Crops.
The basic foods produced for domestic con-
sumption are beans, corn, rice, and potatoes.
Until recently, production fluctuated greatly
from year to year, and imports were often nec-
essary. The 1948 crop, however, exceeded con-
sumption requirements under present dietary
levels. The four basic food crops together oc-
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cupy 40 percent of the total crop area of the
country and represent about 13 percent of the
value of agricultural production. Much of the
corn and a substantial proportion of the beans
and rice are grown on small farms in the cen-
tral plateau where production techniques are
primitive and yields are low. The lowlands
produce larger crops at lower costs. Corn has
proved to be a good cash crop in the Atlantic
lowlands and production is increasing in that
area. Wheat is grown only for poultry feed,
oats for forage, and barley for beer.
The growing and local utilization of sugar is
an important industry in Costa Rica. The
cost of production is higher than in major
producing areas but the industry is protected
by tariff, and is helped considerably by the
government's distillery operations. In 1948
production was 39,364 metric tons, an excess
over domestic needs.
Vegetable oil seeds and oil-bearing palms
are produced in Costa Rica, but not in suffi-
cient quantity to meet domestic requirements.
The palm industry, however, is being further
developed and expanded.
Good quality vegetables and tropical fruits
of many varieties abound. Limited amounts,
especially of oranges, are customarily ex-
ported. During World War II supplies were
purchased for use by the US army in the
Panama Canal Zone. It is believed that Costa
Rica is in an excellent position to become an
exporter of fruits and vegetables, especially
tomatoes and pineapples, to the US, if appro-
priate transport and quick-freezing or can-
ning methods were developed.
(6) Livestock.
The dairy and livestock industry is fairly
modern and the country is largely self-suffi-
cient in livestock and livestock products.
Dairying methods on the larger farms com-
pare favorably both in terms of quality of
breeding stock and management to those of
the US and Europe, but costs are higher. The
dairy industry is located chiefly on the cen-
tral plateau and surrounding highlands and
the chief beef cattle area is in Guanacaste and
Puntarenas with a secondary area on the At-
lantic coastal lowlands. In the beef cattle
areas tropical conditions have been a deter-
rent to development.
b. Fishing.
Fishing is a minor industry in Costa Rica.
Practically all of the fishing off the Costa
Rican coast is done in US-owned boats. Tuna
is the chief type of fish available, and minor
fishery products are shark livers and turtles.
Exports of fresh and canned tuna were valued
at $818,000 (2.6 percent of total exports) and
amounted to 2,965 metric tons, not including
fish caught at sea and sent directly to the US.
There is a US-owned tuna processing plant at
Puntarenas.
c. Forest Products.
Costa Rica's forests cover about 80-85 per-
cent of the total area of the country. Over
one thousand species of wood are present, in-
cluding such strategic materials as balsa, ma-
hogany, ceiba (kapok), cinchona, ipecuanha
root (ipecac), and wild rubber. Little is
known about the available quantity or about
the properties and potential value of many of
the various species. The forests are in good
condition and have been little exploited ex-
cept for mahogany, the accessible stands of
which have been cut. Handicaps to the de-
velopment of lumbering are the extreme in-
accessibility of many of the forests, the diffi-
culty in logging in the mountain regions, and
the scarcity of foresters. More than 31 spe-
cies of wood are at present exported, although
forest products are a minor export item in
dollar value. In 1948, $562,000 worth of lum-
ber was exported.
Wild rubber trees of the Castilla variety are
found in small stands throughout Costa Rica,
especially on the Caribbean side of the coun-
try near Nicaragua. Production of rubber for
export increased during the war, and dropped
thereafter; in the peak year of 1943, 381 long
tons of wild rubber were exported, compared
with only two tons in 1948. There are some
limited possibilities for future development.
The Goodyear Rubber Company has a rubber
plantation on the Atlantic Coast, about 1,600
acres of which are just now coming into pro-
duction, and exports of plantation rubber may
soon be instituted. The US Department of
Agriculture operates a rubber experimental
station at Turrialba which does important ex-
perimental work on plantation rubber. Esti-
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mates indicate that about 1.2 million acres of
land in Costa Rica are suited to the produc-
tion of plantation rubber, and under optimum
conditions high-yield varieties of trees might
at maturity yield at least 1,000 pounds of
rubber to the acre as compared with about
400 pounds per acre from unselected trees in
the Far East. But such development of Costa
Rica's rubber production as has occurred was
primarily a wartime expedient, and, on a com-
parative cost basis, the country's potential as
a source of crude rubber is extremely limited.
Work toward the cultivation of cinchona for
commercial purposes was initiated during
World War II, and 1942 to 1948. cultivation on
a plantation at Isla Bonita was financed by
the RFC under a contract with the Costa
Rican Government. This contract was termi-
nated in 1948, and the cinchona plantation,
which is not yet in production, is now being
operated by the Costa Rican Government on
a reduced scale. The potential for cinchona
production in Costa Rica is undetermined be-
cause no method of control has been found for
a soil-born root disease that destroys the trees.
The Costa Rican Government is interested in
obtaining technical aid from the US and the
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural
Sciences at Turrialba (Costa Rica) in experi-
mental work on the control of this disease,
which is indigenous to Costa Rica. Both cli-
mate and soils at Isla Bonita seem ideal for
cinchona production except for this disease.
Ipecac root (from which emetine is derived)
is available in considerable quantities in Costa
Rica and is at present gathered (for export)
on the Atlantic slope of the country. In 1948
Costa Rica exported eight metric tons and
supplied the United States with about 3.8 per-
cent of its imports of ipecac.
d. Minerals, Petroleum, and Hydroelectric
Power.
Costa Rica's mineral resources are virtually
undeveloped, and there are few deposits be-
lieved to be of commercial grade and quan-
tity. At present.there are small amounts of
salt, diatomite, limestone, gold, and silver
mined. Manganese, sulphur, and marble
could also be extracted, but probably not on a
profitable basis.
There is no production of petroleum in
Costa Rica at the present time. The Hono-
lulu Oil Company, a US corporation, has pro-
posed a contract with the Costa Rican Govern-
ment to explore the country's petroleum re-
sources but thus far there has been no serious
exploration.
The potential hydroelectric resources are
enormous but, for the most part, undeveloped,
owing to lack of capital, technical skill, and
lack of a consumer demand that would be
great enough to warrant the large initial capi-
tal outlays.
e. Manufacturing.
Industrial development has proceeded
slowly in Costa Rica, and up to the present
has been limited to the processing of coffee,
cacao, lumber, and abaca for export, to the
processing of other agricultural and animal
products for local consumption, and to the
manufacture of light consumer goods. Manu-
facturing industries play a minor role in the
national economy, and possibilities for future
development are limited by the scarcity of do-
mestic raw material and the limited domestic
market. The government, by means of pro-
tective tariffs and other devices, has encour-
aged small-scale capital investment for the
manufacture of such products as alcohol, soft
drinks, cigarettes, leather goods, shoes, tex-
tiles, soap, matches, flour, and oil, and these
are the industries that comprise the bulk of
the country's industrial effort. Almost all
manufacturing takes place on the central
plateau in or within a few miles of San Jose.
f. International Trade.
Costa Rica had an unfavorable balance of
trade in 1948, as in other years. Export-im-
port statistics, however, do not accurately re-
flect the foreign trade situation because of an
underestimation of the value of banana ex-
ports, resulting from arbitrary evaluation.
Since the United Fruit Company has a mo-
nopoly on banana exports, there cannot be a
normal market price for export valuation pur-
poses; instead, an export price must be agreed
upon by the company and the Costa Rican
Government. The price in 1948 was set at
$0.80 per count bunch (the usual figure), al-
though the average 1948 wholesale price of
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bananas in the United States was equivalent
to $5.19 per count bunch. Part of the dollar
income from the spread between these prices
is returned to Costa Rica by the company for
ordinary business operations. Hence the dol-
lar value of banana exports from the country
is higher than the official export figures indi-
cate.
Coffee and bananas are always the two lead-
ing export commodities of Costa Rica, each
often accounting for one-third of the value of
all exports, and cacao is third. Other exports
are abaca, tuna, logs and lumber, gold, ipecac
root, and sometimes sugar, beans, hides, and
skins.
The United States is at present Costa Rica's
chief market and chief source of supply. In
1948 Costa Rican products valued at slightly
more than US $25 million (about 80 percent of
total exports) were purchased by the US. In
1948 the US bought 81.9 percent of the total
coffee exports, 92.6 percent of the bananas,
34.4 percent of the cacao, and 98.9 percent of
the abaca. Imports from the US amounted
to nearly $33 million in 1948, or about 77 per-
cent of the total imports. The principal types
of imports are food products, beverages and
tobacco, chemicals and related products, tex-
tiles, metals and their manufactures, machin-
ery, implements, and vehicles.
Before World War II, Britain and Germany
purchased about two-thirds of Costa Rica's to-
tal coffee exports and shipped the country
25-30 percent of its imports. It is not ex-
pected that either the British or the Germans
will regain their prewar position in the coun-
try's foreign trade.
g. International Finance.
The balance-of-payments statistics on both
current and capital account are not reliable
guides to the foreign exchange situation. In
1948 the virtual cessation of imports as a result
of the revolution effected a reduction in the
volume of imports and a decline in the adverse
balance of trade for previous years. The de-
cline in imports and increased dollar income
during 1948, resulting from favorable crops
and high market prices for exports, brought
about at least a temporary improvement in the
dollar exchange situation. Present-day high
coffee prices may slightly improve the dollar
exchange position.
The United Fruit Company is the largest
single foreign investor and spends large sums
of money in Costa Rica annually. Its 1947
total expenditures in Costa Rica amounted to
fourteen million dollars (US). Other US-
owned companies include the two principal
electric power companies, several telecommu-
nication and aviation companies, and com-
panies in several minor industries. British in-
vestors own one of the two railroads of the
country and hold government bonds.
h. Money and Banking.
The monetary unit is the colon. Its official
rate, as set by the Issue Council of the Na-
tional Bank in December 1946, is 5.60 to the
dollar (buying rate). There is also a legal
uncontrolled exchange market, the average
rate of which was 7.90 (for buying) in June
1948. The money supply increased from 51
million colones in 1937 to 223 million colones
in May 1949. Most of this increase origi-
nated from government deficit financing.
Private banks were nationalized as of 21
June 1948, and a national banking system is
in the process of being established. This
banking system at present consists of four
banks and three semi-autonomous govern-
ment agencies-the Office of Public Debt
Amortization, the National Insurance Insti-
tute, and the Social Security System. The
government, by nationalizing the banks, seeks
to implement its financial and credit policies
in the interest of effective economic develop-
ment. Considerable independence of admin-
istration will be left to members of the bank-
ing system.
i. Government Finance.
The junta operated on a different fiscal
and tax basis from previous administra-
tions and comparable statistics do not exist
for 1948 and other years. Government meth-
ods of imposing and collecting taxes are in-
efficient in Costa Rica, revenues are inade-
quate, and the government has operated at a
substantial financial deficit in recent years.
Plans of the junta to alleviate this situation
were not successful. The national revenue
for 1948 was 90.1 million colones ($16.1
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million) but expenditures, 114.8 million co-
lones or US $20.5 million, were the highest
in Costa Rican history and the financial
deficit for 1948 greatly exceeded that for
previous years. In order to finance this defi-
cit, treasury drafts, direct bank loans, and
bond issues were increased substantially, and
the government had difficulty in discharg-
ing its obligations. As of 31 December 1948
the total domestic government debt was 156.3
million colones ($27.9 million). The only new
foreign borrowing in 1948 was an advance of
$1,250,000 from the International Monetary
Fund against colones. Total government debt
was 325.4 million colones ($58' million) at the
end of 1948, of which 169.1 million colones was
foreign debt. This debt was more than three
times the total government revenue for 1948
and is high by Latin American standards.
The main sources of government income
are customs revenues, the National Liquor
Factory, income taxes, the capital tax levy,
and the cigarette excise tax. Revenues will
increase in the future because the United
Fruit Company will almost double its tax pay-
ments under a new contract that has been
ratified by the Costa Rican Congress. It is
estimated that the 1949 taxes received from
the Fruit Company may amount to 15-20 mil-
lion colones (US$2.7-3.6 million), or 8-10 mil-
0
lion colones (US $1.4-1.8 million) more than
was received under previous contracts. The
four leading types of government expendi-
ture, in order of importance, are education,
finance, public security, and internal debt.
3. Economic Stability.
During 1949 the dollar shortage may have
been accentuated because of a decrease in
cacao prices on the world market and because
of the small 1948-49 coffee crop. The sub-
stantial increase in coffee prices on the inter-
national market offsets this to some extent.
The domestic high-price situation will prob-
ably continue. The cost of living index for
June 1949 was 245.17 as compared to 227.01 in
June 1948 and a 1946 yearly average of 195.68.
There may be a small decline in economic ac-
tivity but crop prospects for 1949-50 are good
and any decline that may occur is not likely to
become a major threat to the political stability
of the country during the next year. The
country has a sound basis for a good economy
but its economic position has deteriorated in
recent years, despite the demand for and high
prices received for its high-grade coffee and
cacao in the United States and despite the
Fruit Company investments of large sums of
money in the country.
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN POLICY
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Costa Rica's policy in relation to foreign
countries and entities is essentially based on
four major considerations: (1) friendship and
amity with the US; (2) membership in the
Council of Organization of American States;
(3) the promotion of a satisfactory working
relationship of its citizens with the United
Fruit Company; and (4) a conflict between a
desire to pursue an isolationist attitude to-
ward the republics of Middle America and the
Caribbean and to participate actively in re-
gional intergovernmental relationships.
1. Relations with the US and in OAS.
Close ties of amity and friendship with the
US and general adherence to the Charter of
Organization of American States are the most
basic of these four considerations. These poli-
cies are accepted without question by most of
the Costa Rican people, and are unlikely to be
changed by any government that assumes
control of the nation's destinies in the fore-
seeable future. There is a surprising absence
of public discussion of the matter despite its
obvious fundamental importance. A reason
for this apparent indifference stems from the
fact that US-Costa Rican relations are not,
like those of near-by Panama and Cuba, sub-
ject to special treaties that lend themselves to
public discussion of the degree of national
subordination implicit in the terms of the
agreements. In addition, the higher stand-
ard of living and of education and the political
habits of the Costa Ricans tend to prevent the
formation of the type of inferiority complex
that is found in some other Latin American
countries. Only the small, suppressed, and
uninfluential Communist minority questions
the wisdom of such ties.
2. The United Fruit Company.*
Of lesser significance than Costa Rica's re-
lations with the US Government and member-
ship in the COAS, but of greater concern to
many Costa Rican people, is the relationship
of the country to the United Fruit Company.
Although no Costa Rican politicians would be
likely to admit this baldly (so that discussion
of the relationship proceeds largely by indirec-
tion), the United Fruit Company is a continu-
ous and very weighty factor in Costa Rican
politics. From some standpoints, this huge
US corporation is rather larger than the Costa
Rican Government itself. Its annual operat-
ing profit in Costa Rica equals or exceeds
Costa Rica's annual budget; the ships it con-
trols exceed in tonnage the total Costa Rican
merchant marine; and the salaries it pays its
executives exceed the annual incomes of prac-
tically all individual Costa Ricans. Although
few Costa Ricans would admit openly and pub-
licly what has been claimed by many neutral
observers, that the Fruit Company is, in ef-
fect, a "sixth political power among the five
Central American Republics," the fact is that
Costa Ricans do tend to regard the company
as a distinctive type of corporate structure
with certain attributes of sovereignty. Costa
Ricans believe that there have been occasions
when, in matters of policy, the US Depart-
ment of State has for one reason or another
been guided by decisions suggested to it by the
company's officials rather than by the US Am-
The Intelligence Organization of the Depart-
ment of State dissents from CIA "in its treatment
of the United Fruit Company under the heading of
Foreign Policy. Although it agrees that relations
between the Costa Rican government and the United
Fruit Company constitute an important factor af-
fecting Costa Rica's policy toward the United States,
it believes that the role that the United Fruit Com-
pany plays in the economic and political life of
Costa Rica is essentially an internal matter."
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bassador in San Jose. There is thus a tend-
ency in matters of foreign affairs for Costa
Ricans to analyze separately their effect on
(1) Costa Rica's relations with the US Gov-
ernment, and (2) Costa Rica's relations with
the United Fruit Company. Costa Rica is
more likely to consider the possibility of pur-
suing an independent course in matters of
conflict in which only the US Government in-
terests are involved than in those in which
both US Government and United Fruit Com-
pany interests are involved. Seldom, if ever,
however, does the situation crystallize into
open and frank discussion. More often it is
confused and lumped willy-nilly into a discus-
sion of national sovereignty, international
transportation costs, labor unions, social re-
form measures, etc. But, even if it is not dis-
cussed, the peculiar relationship between
Costa Rica and United Fruit is a reality and a
force to be reckoned with in many matters of
policy.
3. Relations in the Caribbean.
Many of the major considerations affecting
Costa Rica's foreign policy vis-a-vis Middle
America and the Caribbean arise out of the
conflict between the country's isolationist pa-
cific desires and what is regarded by many as
the necessity to participate actively in area
political alignments that cut across national
boundaries. This has been true ever since
colonial times and is especially true today.
Conflicting points of view are often adopted
by rival political parties. Sometimes the is-
sues are not stated candidly in terms of isola-
tion versus interventionism but are discussed
obliquely in terms of. other generalities-such
as isolationism versus Central American
Union, and non-recognition versus de facto
recognition.
The truth is that the country has never
really been isolated from its neighbors.
Subsequent to the collapse of the Spanish
American colonial empire, Costa Rica partici-
pated in the Central American federation of
the nineteenth century, in the 1902 Conven-
tion of Peace and Obligatory Arbitration be-
tween Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and
Costa Rica, and in the 1907, 1909, and 1914
Central American conferences that sought to
form a Central American Court of Justice and
to promote customs unions and other forms
of economic cooperation.
In Costa Rica, as in most of the other Ameri-
can republics, exiles and revolutionaries have
always been given asylum and have been able
to plot against their real or imagined oppres-
sors with relative impunity. This right of
asylum is deeply wrought into the fabric of
the state and is, in practice and despite the
reluctance of many Costa Ricans to admit it,
incompatible with the concept of isolationism.
As such it represents a powerful weapon in the
hands of those who prefer to see the country
pursue a policy of intervention and usually
leads to their triumph over the isolationists.
During the past two years, there has been a
move away from the country's isolationist po-
sition. In 1947 the Calderon-dominated Pi-
cado administration enjoyed close relations
with the Somoza regime of Nicaragua. Al-
though opposition elements deplored this vio-
lation of what they claimed was the country's
isolationist traditions, they did not hesitate tq
enter into clandestine contact with officials of
the government of Guatemala and anti-So-
moza elements in the Caribbean area. The
latter elements were organized into the Carib-
bean Legion. Eventually, the oppositionist
leader, Jose Figueres, obtained the assistance
from Guatemala and the Caribbean Legion
that permitted him to oust the Calderon
Guardia machine. The Calderon Guardia
machine in turn sought and received the as-
sistance of Somoza. As a result of the Fig-
ueres victory, the foreign alignments that
helped him to power were consolidated and
employed as an instrument of national policy.
Thus, Costa Rica, which formerly had been
pro-Somoza, became anti-Somoza and pro-
Guatemala and the Caribbean Legion.
These moves and countermoves in Costa
Rica's foreign relations have been made pos-
sible because there has existed in the Middle
American area a sort of balance-of-power sit-
uation during the past few years. Otilio Ulate
has been opposed to Figueres' interventionism
and prefers to see the country remain aloof
from Middle American politics and especially
from Caribbean Legion adventures. In such
an attitude, he has the support of the major-
41
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ity of Costa Ricans, but he may have difficulty
in pursuing such a policy, because the tradi-
tions of political asylum, the influence of par-
tisans of interventionism, and the balance-of-
power situation all tend to prevent a return to
a policy of isolationism.
4. Probable Future Policies.
Costa Rica's policy toward the US will re-
main friendly regardless of internal political
changes and variations in its relations with
the other Middle American republics. Al-
though a continuation of area rivalries could
conceivably impair the US security concept
of solidarity of all 21 American Republics, it is
believed that rivalries between Costa Rica and
its neighbors will, for the most part, be sub-
ordinated to cooperation with the US in the
event of an East-West war. And, in such an
event, Costa Rica can be expected to fulfill its
obligations under the Rio pact. Costa Rican
traditions are democratic and its sympathies
are most certainly on the side of the US.
Furthermore, Costa Rica recognizes and will-
ingly accepts the US as the dominant Carib-
bean power.
Costa Rica participates in the United Na-
tions and in other international organizations
and will in all probability continue to do so.
In all matters before the UN affecting US se-
curity interests it can be expected to side with
the US if the latter indicates in an appropri-
ate manner that such action is desirable.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
0
Costa Rica is incapable of offering effective
military resistance to any but the smallest
and most ineffectual of invading forces. Im-
mediate and substantial assistance would be
required to resist an invading enemy of size
and skill. Technically speaking there is no
Costa Rican army. A civil guard performs
internal security and police functions. This
body is entirely dependent upon foreign
sources for equipment.
The present size of the Civil Guard is about
1,000; there are also 100 traffic police, 60 de-
tectives, and 450 treasury or customs guards.
The Civil Guard maintains three sections of
200 men each in San Jose and a section of 50
to 80 men in each of the six provinces. Weap-
ons and equipment are not standardized.
Because of the many shipments of arms into
and out of the country in recent months, no
definite estimates of the amount of arms and
ammunition in the possession of the Civil
Guard are possible. It is believed, however,
that the Civil Guard has at least 30 cannon
and 6 mortars and approximately 160 machine
guns, 4,000 rifles, and 1,600 revolvers.
Costa Rica has no navy.
Costa Rica has no air force. Plans to or-
ganize an air force failed to materialize, al-
though four aircraft were actually purchased.
The government has disposed of two of the air-
craft and currently retains one Lockheed F-38
and one North American T-6. These aircraft
are maintained by TACA (civil airline). Sev-
eral Costa Rican citizens who are private pilots
are allowed to fly these aircraft. In event of
civil disturbances or revolutionary incursions
from without, the government-or the opposi-
tion-is expected to gain possession of all do-
mestic commercial aircraft in the country at
the time of the outbreak of hostilities and to
use them, as well as all the civil air facilities
of the country, for the duration. For the most
part these would consist of DC-3's.
There are about 138,000 men of military
age-16 to 39-about 100,000 of whom could
be considered physically fit for military duty.
It is presumed that up to 15,000 of these men
could be called up by the Republic in case of
war or an emergency but it is improbable that
many of them would be useful from a military
point of view.
The only contribution of which the Costa
Rican Civil Guard is capable in the event of a
struggle in which Costa Rica found itself allied
with the US against the USSR-and no other
alignment in the event of an East-West war is
anticipated at this time-would be the polic-
ing of the country. As an instrument to pre-
vent sabotage of airfields and to guard the
country's railway system-the only transcon-
tinental railroad between Panama and Gua-
temala-it would be of definite utility even
though it is not sufficiently organized or effi-
cient to frustrate a well-planned sabotage at-
tempt by experts trained in clandestine demo-
lition. It would, it is believed, be capable of
suppressing pro-Russian work-stoppages and
demonstrations provided the purpose of such
demonstrations was sufficiently clear to be
readily distinguishable from matters of domes-
tic politics.
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40
CHAPTER V
WARTIME SABOTAGE IN COSTA RICA
r
The USSR, whether alone or assisted by
satellite or conquered nations, is the only pres-
ent potential threat to the US. It is also the
chief threat to Costa Rica. Existing inter-
American machinery for the pacific settlement
of international disputes should afford the
country, as distinguished from a particular
government that may be in power, adequate
protection from incursions from Nicaragua.
Traditional ties to the US in addition to the
Rio pact make it almost certain that Costa
Rica will join with the US in any war in which
the latter may become involved with the USSR.
In such an event, Soviet activities in Costa
Rica will, it is expected, take the form of
sabotage.
Within the confines of Costa Rica, it is esti-
mated that the Soviet sabotage operations will
be divided into two distinct fields: (1) sabo-
tage activities arising out of influence over
labor which will, by seeking to promote strikes,
slow-downs, and sit-downs, endeavor to create
a general nuisance in order to impair directly
transportation, public utilities, and political
stability, for the purpose of interrupting the
flow of strategic and critical materials such
as abaca and hard woods to the US; and (2)
sabotage activities against such US naval, mili-
tary, and air establishments as this country
may construct in the republic in wartime (ex-
amples are radar listening posts that would
be designed to be part of the Panama Canal's
screen of defense).
It cannot be doubted that there are Com-
munists in Costa Rica who would, in the event
of an East-West war, endeavor to engage in
sabotage. However, the formerly influential
and powerful Communist apparatus in Costa
Rica known as the Vanguardia Popular (now
renamed the National Democratic Party) has
been declared illegal. This has cost it many
members, virtually all of its physical assets,
and has greatly diminished the sabotage capa-
bilities, especially on an integrated basis, of
the Communists in Costa Rica. Furthermore,
such strategic and critical materials as Costa
Rica produces do not lend themselves to sabo-
tage during the production process. Only dur-
ing transport from the producing area to the
sea are they susceptible and then only to a
limited extent. For these reasons it is believed
that, although sabotage activities would be
attempted by local Communists in the event of
a war between the USSR and the US in which
Costa Rica would be allied with the US, and
although this would probably create a nui-
sance, sabotage would not achieve a substan-
tial interruption of the flow of strategic and
critical materials to the US for an appreciable
length of time. It is also doubtful that sabo-
tage activities against the US military instal-
lations on Costa Rican territory would result
in substantial damage. The Costa Rican
armed forces and the US troops that would
most likely be assigned to these installations
should be able to give sufficient protection
against sabotage.
It is not believed that either US installations
in Costa Rica or the areas of production and
transport of locally produced strategic and
critical materials would offer the USSR a suffi-
ciently remunerative target to warrant the dis-
patch to the area of Soviet agents specially
trained in clandestine demolition operations.
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CHAPTER VI
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
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0
Costa Rica's positive strategic value to the
US is measurable in terms of its capacity to
produce abaca, ipecac root, and certain woods
such as balsa and mahogany. In 1948, 6,275
metric tons of abaca were exported and eight
metric tons of ipecac root. These amounts
were equivalent to approximately 10 percent
of US consumption requirements for abaca
and 3.8 percent of US imports of ipecac root.
The production of strategic materials could
be considerably increased if desired.
The presence on its territory of a transcon-
tinental railway that could conceivably be of
some use in the event of wartime damage to
the Panama Canal is another strategic con-
sideration, as is the willingness of the country
to permit the US to establish wartime naval
and air bases on its territory for the protec-
tion of the Panama Canal and Caribbean ship-
ping. Beyond this, the country offers no
positive strategic advantages to the US.
In a negative sense, however, Costa Rica's
proximity to the Panama Canal, the Venezue-
lan oil fields, and the sea routes over which
the majority of US strategic and critical im-
port tonnage passes, makes it imperative that
an enemy of the US be denied the use of Costa
Rican waters and territory for either clandes-
tine or open operations against the US. In
general, Costa Rica's constitutional system of
government, its Western cultural orientation,
and its well-defined political and economic ties
to the US render very unlikely any develop-
ments that would make such an eventuality
possible.
Specifically, however, there are elements in
the political life and governmental structure
of Costa Rica that could conceivably impair
the ability of the country to meet this strategic
requirement. Costa Rica can be expected. to
ally itself with the US in the event of a US-
USSR war and to fulfill its obligations under
the Rio pact. Its armed forces are not, how-
ever, sufficiently alert or organized to be able
to deny an enemy of the US portions of its
territory for operations against the US. Thus
patrol of Costa Rica's coastline by the US
would be necessary to prevent, for example, its
use as a refuge and base for enemy submers-
ible craft. Also, US installations on its ter-
ritory such as airfields and radar posts could
not depend entirely on Costa Rican armed
forces for protection from Soviet-inspired or
directed sabotage by members of Communist
cells known to exist in the country. (For ad-
ditional information on Communism and sabo-
tage, see Chapters V and VII.)
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CHAPTER VII
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
?
Costa Rica is friendly to the US and is likely
to remain so regardless of internal political
changes. Such governments as come to power
within the foreseeable future are to be ex-
pected to associate with them the majority of
the electorate in recognition of the US as the
dominant country of the Caribbean.
As noted in Chapter III, Foreign Policy,
Costa Rica can be expected to side with the US
in the event of war between the USSR and the
West and to fulfill its obligations for Hemi-
sphere defense under the Rio pact. In all mat-
ters before the UN-an affiliation which the
country can be expected to maintain-affect-
ing vital US security interests, Costa Rica will
side with the US if the latter indicates in an
appropriate manner that such a course is de-
sirable. Association with the US under simi-
lar circumstances is to be expected at other
types of international conferences. The econ-
omy of Costa Rica is so closely linked to that
of the US as to guarantee that Costa Rica will,
in the future as in the past, formulate its eco-
nomic policies with an eye to US reactions.
No significant changes in economic or man-
power potentials are likely to occur.
It is not expected that the presently out-
lawed Communist Vanguardia Popular will,
within the foreseeable future, substantially
increase the number of its adherents or
the influence it exercises over the domestic
affairs of the republic. Communist Party
members will, however, continue their efforts
to preserve the party apparatus, to propa-
gandize clandestinely or openly as the circum-
stances may warrant on behalf of themes
fashionable in Moscow, and to strive toward
dominant influence over organized and unor-
ganized labor unless and until they are in-
structed otherwise by Moscow.
Although unsettled relations with other
Central American republics, especially Nica-
ragua, may make more difficult the peacetime
implementation of the US concept of national
security based on Hemisphere solidarity, it is
believed that such rivalries as presently exist
would, for the most part, be subordinated in
the event of a US-USSR war.
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APPENDIX A
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
0
1. Railways.
Two 3'6" gauge single-track railway systems
totalling about 500 miles connect San Jose
with Limon, the Atlantic port, and San Jose
with Punta Arenas, the Pacific port. Together
these two railways form a transcontinental
system-the only one between Panama and
Guatemala. These railroads are vital to the
country's welfare since they are the only lines
of communication between the populous up-
land plateau and the ports capable of han-
dling the country's bulk imports and exports.
Services offered by the railways are, in gen-
eral, adequate for the country's needs, al-
though there has been a marked deterioration
in the equipment of the government-owned
electrified Pacific Railway since World War II.
Railway dock facilities at Limon, partially de-
stroyed by enemy action during World War II,
have not been repaired. The United Fruit
Company maintains several hundred miles of
3' gauge railway largely in the southeast part
of the country near Puerto Armuelles, Pan-
ama. The Company extends its rail network
from year to year as new banana lands are
developed.
2. Highways.
There are about 1,000 miles of highways, 921
miles of which are hard-surfaced, all-weather
roads. About 350 miles of the hard-surfaced
highways are, by Central American standards,
in an excellent state of repair. The road net-
work, for the most part, lies in the central
plateau. It is impossible to drive from San
Jose, the capital, to the Atlantic port of
Limon. The country's most important high-
way, usually referred to as the Pan American
Highway, which was planned to traverse Costa
Rica from the Nicaraguan border on the north-
west to the Panamanian border on the south,
has received only maintenance work' during
the past two years. The highway is open
throughout the year from San Isidro del Gen-
eral on the south to a point just north of the
Lagarte River on the northwest-a distance of
some 175 miles. Failure to extend the high-
way north into Guanacaste Province has re-
tarded the development of this potentially pro-
ductive pastoral area.
3. Telecommunications.
All methods of telecommunication are avail-
able and the various types of facilities are well
integrated. International facilities are be-
lieved adequate and services are efficient and
reliable. The principal cities have good local
telephone and telegraph services and are
linked by telecommunication facilities, but
there are only limited services to outlying dis-
tricts. Many parts of the country that are
remote from the Central Plateau have practi-
cally no means of communication with one
another or with San Jose. In providing new
long-distance services emphasis is now being
placed on radio telephone and radio telegraph,
which are at present the most rapid and re-
liable means of communication. Telecommu-
nications are a government monopoly but the
major telecommunication facilities are oper-
ated by private companies such as the Com-
pania Nacional Fuerza y Luz, a subsidiary of
the Electric Bond and Share Company, and
the Compania Radiografica Internacional de
Costa Rica, which is closely allied to the United
Fruit Company. All radio stations in Costa
Rica are privately owned. Licensing and con-
trol of radio broadcast stations and amateur
radio operators is lax.
Military communications are very limited.
There are no naval radio communications.
The US Air Force maintains one radio instal-
lation at Parrita, but release of this station
to the Costa Rican Government or a respon-
sible private agency has been considered. The
Department of Public Security and the De-
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partment of Internal Revenue have small in-
ter-connected radio networks. In event of
emergency the government would move to
take control of all civilian communications
facilities which were needed.
4. Air Transport.
Domestic air transport, which plays a highly
important role in the normal activities of the
.country, is in the hands of three companies:
LACSA (a Pan American subsidiary) ; TACA
de Costa Rica (a TACA subsidiary) ; and Aero-
vias Occidentales (owned principally by US
capital). TAN and TANSA, two other small
domestic airlines, were declared bankrupt in
1948 and have ceased operations. TACA de
Costa Rica, having backed the winning side in
the 1948 revolution, enjoys a favored position
and carried in 1948 over half the freight and
passenger traffic transported within the coun-
try. In 1948, 64,389 passengers were carried
by domestic airlines and 8,280,854 lbs. of ex-
press and freight.
Three international airlines operate to and
through San Jose: Pan American, TACA, and
KLM. In 1948, 32,879 international passen-
gers were carried to and from San Jose, and
1,595,376 lbs. of express.
All aircraft of both domestic and interna-
tional airlines presently over-flying Costa Rica
are of US manufacture.
There are 22 airfields in Costa Rica. Only
four, however, have runways over 3,000 feet.
Two of these have temporary runways and
two have natural surface runways. In no case
are Costa Rican airfields capable of handling
larger planes than DC-3's on a routine basis.
0
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APPENDIX B
TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
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1. Topography.
The larger portion of the territory of Costa
Rica is an elevated tableland of from 3,000 to
6,000 feet above the sea. The country is
traversed by the main cordillera of the Amer-
ican continent, with its two characteristic
ranges with the wide plateau between. The
chief mountains are mostly volcanic, rising
above the main ranges of the cordillera, the
highest peaks being Chirripo Grande, 11,485
feet, Irazu, 11,200 feet, Turrialba, 11,350 feet,
Buena Vista, 10,820 feet, Pico Blanco, 9,645
feet, and Pods, 8,895 feet.. The slopes to the
Caribbean and Pacific shores are sharp, and
the lowlands narrow on the Pacific and fairly
broad on the Caribbean littoral. Although the
Caribbean shore is broken by relatively few
inlets or rivers, and even the salt water lagoons
that skirt the other Central American coun-
tries and Panama are less in evidence, the
Pacific shore is broken by great bays and swift
rivers. These include three gulfs and bays of
prime importance, the Gulf of Nicoya, the
Golfo Dulce, and Coronada Bay. The Gulf of
Nicoya is a landlocked bay filled with tiny is-
lands and dominated by hills rising sharply
behind it on the mainland. The Golfo Dulce,
on the other hand, is sharply cut, averaging
100 fathoms in depth and entirely without
islands.
The chief river of Costa Rica is the San
Juan, which has its origin in Lake Nicaragua
and, flowing for most of its length through
Nicaragua, forms the international boundary
for a considerable distance. The Rio Colo-
rado, the most important of its many mouths,
lies wholly within Costa Rican territory. The
Reventazon, called the Parisimina through a
part of its course, is the chief river entirely
within Costa Rica. Rising in the foothills
around the volcano Irazu, it flows through the
central plateau and coastal lowlands to the
Caribbean. Its valley is the route of the old
Spanish highway from the coast, and now, of
the railway which connects the capital, San
Jose, with the country's chief port, Puerto
Limon. The Rio Frio flows northward into
Lake Nicaragua. On the Pacific slope, the
Tempisque runs in a southerly direction into
the Gulf of Nicoya. The Tarcoles, like the
Reventazon, rises on the slopes of Irazu, the
tip of the watershed between the Pacific and
the Caribbean, and flows westward into the
Pacific at the head of the Gulf of Nicoya. To-
ward the southeast, on the Pacific slope is
the Rio Naranjos, rising near the volcano
Chirripo Grande, and beyond it the Rio
Grande de Terraba empties into Coronada Bay.
The latter river has its headwaters in the
mountains near the border of Panama. None
of the rivers is long, nor is any one of them,
except the San Juan, navigable for boats of
any size.
Included under Costa Rican sovereignty is
Cocos Island, an uninhabited tropical island
lying in latitude 5?32'N., longitude 87?2W. in
the Pacific some 300 miles from the mainland.
2. Climate.
The climate of Costa Rica differs but little
from that of the other Middle American coun-
tries. There are sharp contrasts, however,
due to altitude, and the uncertainty of the
winds at this point on the earth's surface, and
variations in the currents along the Pacific
coast. The climate of the central plateau
makes the weather cool and refreshing. On
the plateau the altitude is from 3,000 to 5,000
feet and the mean temperature is 68?F. On
the coasts, the mean annual temperature is
around 82?F. In both the coastal regions and
the highlands the rainy season is generally
from April or May to December. The Carib-
bean coast often has rain during the dry sea-
son when the trade winds bring rain clouds
out of the Atlantic and precipitation on their
coming in contact with the cooler air currents
from the highlands of Costa Rica.
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APPENDIX C
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
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JOSE FIGUERES, born 30 September 1906
in San Roman, Costa Rica, is of Spanish
descent and is married to an American citizen.
A planter and farmer, he was a pioneer in
developing new coffee regions. The success
and extent of his operations were made pos-
sible by wealthy Germans. From 1942 to 1944
he was exiled by the Calderon Guardia gov-
ernment to which he was opposed and oper-
ated a mercantile establishment of indifferent
reputation in Mexico.
In 1948, subsequent to the Costa Rican
presidential and congressional elections, he
made a trip to Cuba in order to purchase arms.,
As a result of arrangements he made there
with government officials and the organiza-
tion that subsequently became known as the
Caribbean Legion, he secured the arms and
the collaboration of the professional revolu-
tionaries that made possible his spectacular
victory over the government forces during the
civil disturbances. During the fighting he
demonstrated definite tactical ability. As
Chief of the Revolutionary Junta he assumed
control of the pacified country in May 1948.
Jose Figueres has been described by his
enemies as fanatical, violent, erratic, and un-
hinged, with an all-consuming hatred for the
Calderon Guardia family. Whatever the
truth of these statements may be, there can
be no doubt that Don Pepe, as he is known
by his personal friends, among whom are a
number of the country's most substantial peo-
ple, is eccentric when viewed in the light of
the middle-class standards of Costa Rica. His
capacity both for affection and hatred is
highly developed. He tends to have the gentle-
man farmer's contempt for "people in trade."
Neither a practical politician nor desirous of
becoming one-an unusual attitude for a
Costa Rican-he likes to affect the role of Cin-
cinnatus and is fond of making "swords into
plowshares" gestures, and vice versa, if he be-
lieves the needs of the country demand it. His
politico-economic beliefs constitute a mixture'
of authoritarianism and strong government
that would concede improved conditions for
labor. To the problems of East-West rivalry
he appears in the main indifferent, but he has
left no doubt of his sympathy for the US as
against the USSR. He is fanatically anti-
Communist.
OTILIO ULATE BLANCO, President of
Costa Rica, was born on 25 August 1897 in
Alajuela, Costa.Rica. He owes his political
prominence to his position as owner and editor
of the Diario de Costa Rica, the country's
largest newspaper. Ulate served in the Costa
Rican Congress from 1930 to 1938. Later, he
founded the National Union Party, of which
he is the leader.
In 1948, after a bitter political campaign,
Ulate was declared the winner in the presi-
dential elections. Subsequently, a hostile
Congress voided his election. Civil disturb-
ances ensued during which he led a passive
role in the fighting and supported Jose
Figueres, the leader of the revolutionaries.
Subsequent to the pacification of the coun-
try, there were prolonged discussions between
Ulate and Figueres. It was finally agreed that
Ulate was to be recognized as President-elect
under a military government headed by.
Figueres-the arrangement to continue for 18
to 24 months.
As events progressed, it appeared, however,
that the two men held different views on how
the country should be run: Ulate upheld a
conservative point of view and preferred the
reinstatement of a nineteenth century con-
stitution; Figueres adhered to a more liberal
line and advocated a new constitution that
included many provisions designed to promote
social justice. After much wrangling, a sec-
ond agreement was made by the two men. It
was decided to terminate the junta's power
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on 8 November 1949, at which time Ulate was
to assume control of the government. Mean-
while, he was given full guarantees as to the
loyalty of the military to his person and office,
and in exchange he promised to persuade his
supporters in the Constituent Assembly to pur-
sue a more cooperative attitude toward the
junta.
Otilio Ulate is primarily a politician, al-
though at times he performs very well in the
role of statesman. In the past he often seemed
ready to compromise his own political beliefs
in favor of preferment for himself and his ad-
herents, and he seems primarily an individual
who prefers to reconcile and compromise op-
posing viewpoints than to force decisions in
favor of one side or the other. Thus, al-
though personally a liberal and an admirer of
the British Labor government, the rightist fac-
tions with which he has been associated in
recent years and which he has welded into the
National Union Party feel secure with him as
their leader. In matters of foreign policy,
Ulate is pro-British and pro-US. He believes
that Costa Rican trade with England should
be resumed so that the foreign commerce of
the country will not be entirely in US hands.
He is militantly anti-Communist. In Central
American affairs, as one devoted to pacific pro-
cedures, he opposes Costa Rican alignment on
the side of the "democracies" in open chal-
lenge to the "dictatorships" and would prefer
Costa Rica to pursue a more neutral and in-
dependent policy.
Ulate is flamboyant and susceptible to flat-
tery. He is an excellent editor and writer, an
amusing and charming and, if need be, force-
ful speaker. Except for heavy drinking, Ulate
leads an exemplary life in Costa Rica. As a
bachelor, he is fond of making trips abroad,
especially to Panama, where his heavy drink-
ing and "night-clubbing" are the source of
much amusement and gossip among upper-
class circles.
0
0
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SECRET.
r
APPENDIX D
STATISTICAL DATA
POPULATION
POPULATION : COSTA RICA AND EACH PROVINCE, 1927-19481
Costa Rica
825,378
687,354
539,654
471,524
San Jose
269,899
223,238
175,408
153,183
Alajuela
171,896
144,592
112,600
97,577
Cartago
120,947
103,448
81,067
70,198
Heredia
59,202
51,973
43,042
38,407
Guanacaste
100,500
81,958
60,550
51,142
Puntarenas
59,746
44,011
32,897
28,739
Limon
43,188
38,134
34,090
32,278
' Population estimates as of 31 December for each year except 1927, the
figures for which were collected in the population census of 11 May 1927.
S
ENUMERATED POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION BY RACE :
COSTA RICA AND EACH PROVINCE, 1927 1
ALL
MU-
YEL-
NOT
AREA
R
WHITE
MESTIZO
NEGRO
INDIAN
LATTO
LOW
SPECI-
ACES
PIED
Costa Rica
471,524
377,994
66,612
19,136
4,197
2,123
790
672
San Jose
153,183
133,089
17,807
431
1,334
408
45
69
Alajuela
97,577
90,820
6,519
24
126
41
26
21
Cartago
70,198
66,223
2,969
309
411
164
77
45
Heredia
38,407
36,828
1,546
1
...
24
4
4
Guanacaste
51,142
16,380
34,285
67
17
205
172
16
Puntarenas
28,739
23,594
2,413
301
1,244
862
220
105
Limon
32,278
11,060
1,073
18,003
1,065
419
246
412
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36 SECRET
PERCENT
OF
TOTAL
CENTRAL : Including from Turrialba
to Atenas
140,000
390,000
530,000
71
ATLANTIC: Limon, Linea, Vieja, San
Carlos, etc.
11,000
42,000
53,000
7
GUANACASTE
4,500
90,500
95,000
12
Puntarenas : Including the Banana
Zone and El General Valley
12,000
60,000
72,000
10
167,500
582,500
750,000
100
0
SECRET
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CENTRAL AMERICA- CARIBBEAN AREA
JAMAICA
(U.K.)
P A C I F I ga
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Capital of Guanacaster,
province ?W
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~T?GUCIGAL Aa k;-.
"DEMOCRACY" iii r,% '"DICTATORSHIP"
airfield or
S
PARTIAL PARTIAL "
"DEMOCRACY" 'DICTATORSHIP"
Pan Amerstation
Pan American Highway
All-weather road ------ Dry-weather road ......... Impassable route
-?-?- International boundary 0 Capital
Scale 1:11,CCQ,000
i 200 1W brie,
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Maracaibo
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/06: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01700060001-6
oil
CHANGE in Class.
jyj DEC'AASSIFIED
171
"--!CED TO: TS S C
rOA '.iecio, 4 Apr 77
Aut::: E.: FG. 77
Date:-- -_ By: V
9 1 q73
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/06: CIA-RDP78-01617AO01700060001-6
lfl
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