POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001700020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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WA IIIL1IIUiL IL
CANCELLED
crArraAT., EaTMLIG17,TICE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AHD REPORTS
SR-142
POLAND
This situation report has been
cancelled and is to be used for
internal reference in CIA. only?
9Pewent No.
po CaOC1 in 13
DSCLA.Z01131710
as5. C:1;6nD 1.01 ? 1S
Da% W?rao 4, mw, VV
41411:
Pato; i3y;
6 march 1951
42Atii
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FoOPer
CANCELLED
wars, ??????ampougen.........M.O.Infillias....nal%*
sa-42
POLAND
SITLIURY.
CHAPTER I- POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Political System. . . .
2. Governmental Structure. ....?....?..??.
a. Constitutional Basis ? 0 ****** 0 *** . * .
b. Executive. .0 ? ? . 0 .............?
c. Legislature. . . . ? . ****** ? *******
'I Judiciary. *** * 000????0000??00
c. Local Government . 0,00?0?00000 *
3. 'Political System . . . . 00 ******** ?
a, Political Parties... ***** ..? 0 ?
T4Elections. . . 0 . 0000006 0 0 0 0 ?
IT, Instruments of Comnunist Control . ? ? ? *
1 Civil liberties. 0 . 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 ?
4. 'internal Issues. ? . ? . ? . ? 0 ***********
a. Public Opinion . 0 0 . 0 0 . ? . 0 . 0 . 0 . ? ? 0
Collectivization of Agriculture.
c, Church-State Struggle. 6 . 00 * ? ** 0 4
1 Resistance Novement. . . . . . . . . *** 0
5. stability of the Present Administration
6 March 1951
O00.
? 0 0
0 ? 0 P. 0 0
0 ? 0 ?? 0 0
0 iff ?
CHAPTER II - ECOTICIEC SITUATION
1. Introduction . . .......?...?
2. Population and Manpower.
3. . Agriculture. ? ?0?00
4. Fishing and Fish Products. * . ? . ?
5. Forestry and Forest Products . 0 . ? .
6. anemia and Metals *** ...? ?
a. Iron, Steel, and Ferro-Alloys
13 Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-'1etallic Minerals
? S .0 1I1
? 0 0 0 0 ? OOOOOOO? ? -3
0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 010 0000? 0 ?011.41.
? 0 ..... 0 11-8
0000
7. "azmicis. ? ............ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
8. Production Equipment .. . . . . ? ? . ..... 0 ...
9u Fuel and Power 0 0 ? 0 0 0 .. 0 S . 90 o 0 ? 0 o 0 o
a. Coal . . 0 000 ?? 0 ? ? I?1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0.0 ? ? 0
s'& Petroleum.. 0 ? . . 0 . ? . ? ? .........
e., Electric Power . . . . . ........ 0 . ? 0 ?
106 Textiles 4 ? ? ? ? ? o 0 .... ? ........ ?
1.1. Transportation . . ? ? . ? ? ... ? .? ? . *** . . . . .
12. Trade and Finance. .....?00.0 OOO . WOO
a. Domestic Finance . . . . . 0 . ?.0 500 ?. ? a a ?
b. International Trade and Finance
. 0 . 11-9
o 6 6 1112
?O?
OO
O00
? 0.?
0 . . 11-20
0 . . 11-21
OOO 11-22
. 0 .
.. 11-25
0 . . 11-25
11-26
7e21-""'
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Fic1,12,1.
CHAPTER . FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Crigins of Polish Foreign Policy. * *
? . .171-1
-
2. Operation of Polandts Foreign Policy 1112
a. Relations with the Soviet Orbit.0 00?0..
17. Relations with the aest * ? IIT.2
111.5
17. Participation in International Organizations 111-6
3. TIrebable Trend of Polish Foreign Policy.* 0? . 111-7
CHAPTER IV . IIILITAay SITUATION
1. Genesis of Present Uilitary Policies IV-1
2. The Armed Forces. 004 ? ? * OOOOO ? OOOOO OOOO IV-2
a. Arqy IV-3
b. Navy* . ? ? . 0 ? ? 0 0 OOOO O ? IV".6
Go Air Force ..9
? ? . .. ? ... ?? . ? . IV
3. Uecurity Forces
4, Future Trends . 0 0 . ? 0 ....... ......... .1V-16
CHAPTER V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTIUG US pncunITY
1. General V-1
2. Political . 0 00000000000000900 .. ? o OIT1
3. Economic V-2
4. Unitary
OHAPTaR VI - PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELORENT.S AFFECTING US SECURITY
APPEIMIXES
Appwdix A . Terrain and Climate
Appqndix.B - Population of Poland According to Nationality
Appolldix C - Production Index for Selected Polish Industries, 1947.50
Ammdix D - Biographical Data
LIA.PS
Poland: Railroad and Industrial Centers (not completed;
to be disseminated later)
Poland: Terrains etc.
Poland: Post World aar II Boundary and 1937 International
Boundary
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?
SUMMAR!
Poland today is a police state controlled by Communists mho faithfully
implemgr:o coIonw directives? Its acts and commitments in the field of
foreigr policy may usually be understood as reflecting the elms of Soviet
foreigr policy. As a "sovoreAgn3 nation, Poland is a useful auxiliary for
issuinc Stalinist propaganda and a convenient intermediary for dealings in
each the 3oviet Union for tactical reasons prefers not to bo directly re.
preseni-cd.
Situated in one wide, accessible Tiuda between Western Europe and the
USSR, Tolarid for centuries has had to defend itself against Germanic and
Russiar, expansionism, Today, because the direct Soviet lines of communication
mith &stern Germany and Western Europe run across Poland, its control is
vital lc the Soviet Union. Ono of the principal factors determining Soviet
plane for expansion into Western Europe is the condition of the Polish rail;-
may 3yetem, the main transportation link between the USSR and Central &rope?
Other z.61itional factors such as Polandfs traditional role as an outpost of
Viestarn European culture, its strategic location along the USSR's vulnerable
? resterx, fronUer? its economic potential, and its economic value to the USSR
have a:zo r.lo'oivated Soviet domination of Poland.
Kotet-Y1-6:a Situation report has been cancelled and is to be used for internal
.reference in CIA only, It contains information available to CIA as of
15 Jaauary 1951 except miler? otherwise indicated,
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The Polish economy is an asset of great value to the Soviet Union. Al-
though Poland sustained the heaviest ear damages in Eastern Europe, it has
achieved greater postwar recovery than any other Satellite. Still hampered
by a shortage of technicians and by Soviet manipulation of its foreign trade,
Poland enjoys general economic stability, a groming manpower potential,
sizable industrial and agricultural production, and current and potential
surpluses, over domestic requirements, of such basic commodities as coal,
coke, zinc, steel, and foodstuffs?
During World War II, Poland experienced invasion by both Russian and German
forces, From the time of its occupation of eastern Poland, under the Nazi-
Soviet ?act of September 1939 until the German invasion of the USSR in June 19410
the ussa systematically exiled to the Soviet Union some of Polandes outstanding
rilitari, political, and professional leaders, as well as thousands of skilled
uorkmen0 On 22 July 19440 after the Soviet reoccupation of Poland, the Polish
Committee for National Liberation eas set up in Lublin. Within six months the
Lublin Committee proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland and mas
recognized on 5 January 1945 by the Soviet Union.
The pretensions of the Lublin Committee uas unacceptable to the Western
Allies, which supported the claims of the London Polish Government-in-exile,
The East-West impasse over the claims of the two "governments" vas resolved
in February 1945, at Yalta, viler? the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union agreed that: (1) the Polish Provisional Government in Wareaw should
be broadened to include representatives of the London Polish Government-in-exile
and of democratic elements uithin Poland; (2) the neu Government should hold
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free elections as soon as possible; and (3) "that the three heads of government
consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line
with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland."
In broadening the Provisional Government as directed by Yalta agreement
the Communiets managed to retain all key government posts. Overwhelmingly
confirmed in power by the rigged national elections of January 1947, the
Communists gradually consolidated their position in the government, and since
have ruthlessly eliminated organized opposition to tho sovietization of Poland.
In the early phase of their drive to control the government, the Polish
Communists were assisted by the physical presence of Soviet troops in Poland,
by the lack of cooperation between various non-Communist groups and political
parties, and the inability of the Western Powers to intervene effectively.
Since January 1949 the adminietrative structure of the government has under-
gone reorganizations uhich? in practical effect, have placed the reins of control
even more tightly in the hands of a feu key Communist administrators. Local
government has been organized along Soviet lines so that there are direct
administrative ties between the local government organs (Soviets) and the Council
of State. As in the national government, the Communists maintain effective
control of the local government organs through Party representatives.
Poland is committed to firm support of Soviet foreign policy through a series
of mutual assistance pacts with the USSR and the Satellites and through participa-
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tion in the Cominform and the Soviet-sponsored Council for Economic Uhtual
Assistance. It servos as an agent for the USSR in international trade by
endeavoring to obtain needed strategic naterials for the Soviet Orbit from the
West in exchange for coal. It is dedicated to the rapid reduction and eventual
elimination of Western influence in Poland, As indicated by the arrest and
trial of French officials in Poland in late 1949, the Polish aim is apparently
to reduee the operational efficiency of the Western Embassies to the lowest
possible point without precipitating an official break in relations*
While Polandvs armed forces cannot be considered politically reliable as
a whole, it is believed that political indoctrination has progressed sufficiently
to warrant integration of the armed forces into Soviet combat operation plan?
-
ing. Tle first indication was the appointment of Soviet Darshal,Rokossovsky as-
Polish flinister of National Defense in November 1949. Since then measures have
been talen to improve morale, develop political reliability, and equip the various
units with no_e modern arms. Those reform measures, considered with the intensi-
fication of military training, are causing a continual improvement in the combat
capabilities of the Polish Army.
Alttough the Communist regime is firmly in control of Poland it is unpopular
with the highly nationalistic and individualistic Poles, who continue to be
hostile to the USSR and to Commmnism. Popular resentment expresses itself only
in sporLdic outbreaks, but the latent hatred of the Polish people for the Soviet
Union and its Polish puppets remains an obstacle to the stabilization of the
Communiit regime. To overcome it is one of the most difficult problems faced in
the Orbit by the USSR.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Political System.
The Polish nation today, though nomina4y independent, has in effect no
more independence than it had in the long period of partition which began in
1772 and did not end until after World War I. Ever since the 16th century,
when Poland extended from the Baltic and Black Sea and had reached its political
and cultiral eminence, Poland has had to defend itself from Germanic and Russian
expansion, During this period the Poles have escaped national extinction through
a combination of patriotism, faith, capacity to resist oppression, and a fierce
and often impractical courage. It is these qualities which are-largely re?
sponsible for the fact that Poland resisted Sovietization for a longer time than
the other Satellites,
During the 125 years of partition, Russia occuped nearly three?fourths of
Polish territory, with Germany and Austria sharing the remainder. The intense
popular hostility to the USSR and Germany began during this period and still
exerts an important effect on the political life of the country. The controversy
over Ruseiar.rule was already apparent at the turn of this century in the
compositon of the two strongest political currents in Poland. The Polish
Socialist Party, founded in 1892, with which Jozef Pilsudski later became identip
fled was a bitter opponent of Russian occupation, while the Polish Lesgue? which
became in 1897 the National Democratic Party led by Roman Dmouski? believed until
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the Russian 'Revolution in cooperation uith Russia as the meet direct, path
toward P3lish unity and independence., These two groups figured prominently in
the post-World War I negotiations leading to the creation of a free and in-
dependent Poland in 19190
Both the "Little Constitution" of 20 February 1919, and the formal
Cor.stittrUon of 17 March 1921? provided for a preponderance of legislative
over executive power.. Party struggles in the reatiple-party system and the
constittaonal preeminence of the Sejm (legislature) provoked a constant series
ce crises until 12 May 1926, 'when Pilsudeki seized the government in, a military
coupu Pilsudskivs regime as legalized by the authoritarian Constitution of 23
April 1935, and continued in, effect until the fourth partition of Poland in 1939.
During world War II, Poland once more experienced invasion and occupation
by Russian and German forces. From the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland under
the Nazi-Soviet Pact of September 1939 until the Gorman invasion of the USSR in
June 1941, the USSR systematically wen ed to the Soviet Union some of Polendvs
outsta.ndfing military? political, and professional leaders, as well as thousands
of skilled workeen., After the reoccupation of Poland by Soviet forces? in the
summe.r e:-:* 19449 the Communist machine in Poland established the political pattern
which still exists?
lieamhile, the US and UK 'during World Vier II had encouraged and recognized
the Poliah Government-ineexile in London:. The So-riot Union, however, severed
relations with the London Poles as early as April 1943 and on 2.'4- duly 1944, the
Soviet sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation opened headquarters in
Lublkie Within six months the Lublin Committee had proclaimed itself' Provisional
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Government of roland and had been recognized as such (5 January 1945) by the
Soviet Union.
The resulting East-West impasse concerning the legitimate Polish Government
was resolved at Yalta in February 1945 by a tri-partite agreement that: (1)
the Sovietebacked Provisional Government in Warsaw should be broadened to in-
clude both representatives of the London Polish Government-in-exile and
democratic elements from vithin Poland; (2) the nevi Government was pledged to
hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible; and (3) "that the three
heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follov
the Curzon Line vith digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers
in favor of Poland." In June 1945 the US and British ambassadors reached final
agreenene uith Molotov concerning implementation of the Yalta agreement--after
substantial Western concessions concerning the composition of the Polish Govern-
ment,
When the Polish Government as broadened 28 June 1945, the Communists held
roughly ene-third of the Cabinet posts most of uhich were the key positions0
eikolajczyk? vho had been Premier in the London Government, as given one of
the tvo Vice-Premier posts after much Western pressure. The other non-Communists
included in the neuly organized PolishpreetdeeelGovernment of National Unity mere
of minor political stature, and were gradually eliminated. At Potsdam in August
1945 the. Warsau Government committed itself to hold elections as soon an possible
and the US, UK, and USSR reaffirmed their position that the final delimitation of
the western frontier of Poland should anait a German peace treaty.
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new
The Western Powers proved unable to stem the growing domination of
Polald by the Soviet Union through its Communist puppets in the Polish
Government. A crushing blow to the hopes of non-Communist Poles for a
democratic governnont came with the rigged elections of 19 January 1947,
which overwhelminaY confirmed the communists in powero
Because of the changes brought about by the war, Poland as a nation has
a new character. Its population is almost entirely homogenous, the maw
minorities having disappeared. It has an increased industrial base and
greater industrial potential than before the war. Because of the Changes in
its boundaries, Poland has boon moved bodily to the west. These and other
changes have resulted in the Polish Government facing many of the problems of
building a new country.
2. Governmental Structure.
a. Constitutional Basie,
The Polish political, structure is based on the.eo-called "Little
Conititution0" enacted on 19 February 19470 and ostensibly an interim instru-
men"; that is to be replaced by a full-length, permanent constitution supposedly
in process of being drafted by the Sejm. Although the "Little Constitution"
technically is partially hazed on the 1921 Constitution, which embodies such
western concepts of democracy as a freely elected legislature with broad
powers, an exaeutive branch with limited power, an independent judiciary, and
a Euarantee of civil liberties, these concepts are in practice ignored and the
operation of Polandle Government reflects the doctrine and political philosphy
of Comimnism es developed in the USSR. For example, the Constitution, while
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stipulatirc that the executive, legislative, and judicial organs are
suprenn each in its own sphere, provides for a governmental apparatus which
guarantees to the Communist leaders in the e7ecutive branch ample levers for
dominating the intricate machinery of government. Behind the facade of
democratic procedure, the Politburo of the United Polish Workers' (Communist)
Party fe the actual executive, legislature, and judiciary for the Polish
people. With the passage of time the Communists have increasingly ignored
even the appearance of democratic government.
b. Executive.
The President of the Polish Republic is elected by the Sejm (legis-
lature) for a seven-year term by an absolute majority of votes under a
quorum of at least tuo..thirds of the legal number of deputies. According to ,
the Constitution, the President appoints and recalls ministers, and exercises
his pores through ministers responsible to the Seim, He signs statutes
printed in the Journal of Laws of the Republic. He has the right to issue
executive orders and to enforce their execution. He is head of the armed
forces, except in time of war when he must appoint a Commander-in-Chief on
motion of the Council of Ministers. The President has the right to reprieve
condemned persons and mitigate punishment. He also receives and appoints
diplomatic representatives, He may make treaties, bringing them "to the
notice of the Sejme" However, in the case of commercial and customs treaties,
allianees and treaties which impose a permanent financial burden on the State
he must obtain the consent of the Sejm, He may declare war and conclude
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peace only with the consent of the Sejsu
Tile key executive organ of the Paish Government is the Council of
State, This body is a convenient instrument of the Party, and its alleged
origilal powers aro one of the many constitutional fictions of the regime,
It is composed of the President of the Republic, the Varshal and three Vice'..
Marshals of the Sejm, the Chairman of the Supreme Control Chamber and, in
time of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, All the important positions
in the Council of State are held by ranking members of the Partys Politburo
and Cmtral Committee. The Sejm may appoint up to four additional members
to the Council of State upon the unanimous motion of the latter, The Seim
may gmnt the Council of State authority to issue decrees when the Semj is
not in session, except on the following matters: the constitution, the
elceteral law, auditing of government accounts, responsibility of the President
of the Republic and of the ministers, the budget, the national economic plan,
alteration of the monetary system, conscription, local government structure,
and ratification of international agreements, Decrees issued by the Council
of State must be approved at the subsequent session of the Sejm or lose
their validity at the end of the seasion? At the instance of the Cabinet, the
Council. of State may declare a state of emergency or siege. In addition, the
Council is the final authority for local government divisisons known as
Peoplogs Councils, a function which enables the Communists to operate within
the gevernmental framework down to the lowest echelons throughout the country,
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azislature.
The Sejm is convoked and adjourned by the President of the Republic?
It is a sinje ehember of deputies popularly elected for a term of five
years,. The fall session, according to the Constitution, must extend for at
least tuo months, and the spring session, one month? Although certain
stipuLated matters must be legislated by the Sejm, in practice they are suba
mated by the Council of Ministers or the Council of State to the Sejm for
routine approval? If the Sejm should fail to adopt the budget or the national
plannjrig and conscription bills uithin three months from the tine the
Councils submit the drafts, the President of the Republic, uith the con?
currence of the Council of State, is empomered to promulgate the Government
draftt. The legislative function:, reduced to a rtininnzm as far as the Sejm
is corcerned; is performed by the Council of State during much of the year
uhen the Sejm is receesed? Decrees issued by the Council of State are, in
accorCance mith the Constitution:? subsequently submitted to the Sejm, where
they fleet mith little or no opposition?
do Judiclsg...
The judiciary has been rendered completely subservient to the
Commurist Party? No court is empouered to pass on the constitutionality of
lame? The regular Civil and Criminal Courts of preuar origin have been
deprived of many types of cases previously mithin their jurisdiction? Military
Triburale try a uide range of cases based on antielState activity including
economic sabotage? Special Commissions handle cases involving speculators,
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smugglers and black marketeers. Citizens Courts have jurisdiction over minor
penal eases such as disturbances of the peace.? assault and battery, petty theft,
desecraticn of the public domain, and violation of the liquor laws. Both the
Special Ccaniesions and Citizens Courts may impose a maximum sentence of two
years, ane frequently send individuals to forced labor campeo
Recently? there was established by the Sejm on 20 July 1950 a Prosecutor
Generalls Office, a highly centralized, extra?departmental organ beyond the control
of the executive branch (specifically the Ministry of Justice), but operating on
the same level as the executive. The office has broad supervisory power over
the execution of the laws by all ministries and institutions subordinate to them
and le, appointed by and responsible only to the Council of State.
Anyone uho is a Polish citizen of "unimpeachable reputation," at least
30 years of age, literate, and who has resided in the Courts district for a
minimum of one year, is eligible to be a judge in a Citizens Court. According to
decree, persons without legal training but who have "social, political and pro?
fessional standing permitting the proper fulfillment of their duties" nay be
appointed judges or prosecutors.
Loeal Government.
For adadnistrative purposes Poland is divided into nineteen provinces
(including the cities of Warsaw and Lodz) and further subdivided into county: urban:
and township divieions. The organs of local government for each of these levels,
as wel/ as their relationship to the central government: are alaost completely
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5E0Rai'
organized vlolg lines similar to those nom existing in the USSR. Each level of
the local government is administered by a People os Council (Soviet), uhich uas
appointed by the Communists as far back as 1944. These Councils have executive
and legislative powers and are responsible to the Council of State.
The Peopleos
Councils also control such functions as finance, education, labor, social vele
Lars, and economic planning, mhich formerly were handled by local representatives
of the national ministries in charge of these functions. Through this system of
Peopleos Councils, the Communist Party is able to maintain effective control of
the local governments, and the general government structure is better fitted for
incorporation of the nation into the USSR, should such an eventuality over COM
to pass,
3, Politieal Svsteme
Political Parties.
There are presently four political parties in Poland; the United Polish
Workers (Cemmnnist) Party, mhich controls the government, and the Damocratie?
Catholic Secial, and United Peasant Parties, mhich at this time have little
significanso: The United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) ortginated as the Polish
Workers Party in January 1942 and formed the backbone of the Soviet?sponsored Lublin
Government. Included in the Lublin Government, but serving only as front organiza?
tions for ';ommunist activity, mere the Polish Socialist, the Peasant, and the
Democratic Parties.
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In December 1948, the Polish Workers Party and the Polish Socialist
Parties rare merged into the United Polish Workers Party. Both organizations
underwent a purge for some reeks prior to the merger. The purge in the Polish
Workers Party was a token affiar. It was an all-out drive, however, in the
Polish Socialist Party. Any hope that the latter could maintain a semblance of
its identity or goals rithin the new party was effectively dispelled. Under the
merger, ths great majority of high-level pests rent to Communist adherents, rho
obtained nine out of eleven places in the United Polish norkers Party Politburo.
As long as the Polish Socialist Party maintained its identity., it con-
stituted al ideological threat to the Communists, because it remained conscious
of its preler heritage and attempted to maintain its links with the Socialist
part:tes of Western Europe. Right-ring elements are Wokseliminated and the United
Polish ;,orers Party is slowly becoming an organization of Communist reliables.
The recent absorption by the Comm/et-sponsored Peasant Party (SL) (a
spurious onganization lacking mass support when founded) of the Polish Peasant Panty
(PSL) almo3t completes the destruction of the PSL? which was formed as an opposition
party in. Jere 1945 by Vice-Premier Mikolajozyk and which had the mass support of
the peasants, Mikolajczyk was allowed to form his party in order to impress the
Vilest with a democratic facade. In addition, the government intended to use this
action later to discredit akolajczyk by naming him weaker of national unity.
Mikolajczykila organizational ability and the universal distaste of the peasants
for the Swriet occupation, together with their fear of collectivization, combined
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to favor n'-o growth of the PSL into a Cormidable opposition group. It become a
focus of Polish nationalist opposition and was joined by rightist elements who
could find nc other political haven0 flikolajezyk maintained that his party was
not essenetally an opposition group inaomuch as it supported the covernment's basic
precraranc: reform, the Soviet alliance and nationalization of industry--and
because in perticipated in the Cabinet. There is no doubt, however, that
flikolaje4rhor. party disagreed vith the authoritarian manner in which the govern?
ment was Lmplenerting its program? The struggle between the government and
Mikolajewk reached a climax during the January 1947 elections. Mikolejczyk, who
refused tn join the eovernment?sponnered electoral bloc, was decisively "defeated"
in the faLeified elections in 1947 and .fled the country in October of that year.
Remnante of his party have since been dominated by pre?government elements; the
merger in November 1949 of the PSL and the SL is a prior step to their probable
eventual ...ntqzration in the PZPRo
b. -Pleeicne
The last general elections, held on 19 January 1947, after months of
diplomatic pressure on the part of the US and the UK, were a cynical demonstration
of Communist police control. The Communist Government completely failed to live
up to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements,b3; which it was bound to hold "free and
unfetterei elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret baLlot?" The announced results gave an expected overwhelming majority ofl 1
the Sejmneats to the government bloc, uhich wne alleged to have polled 87 percent
of the voeesc
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c. .1nstruments of Communist Control.
Since the days of the Lublin Committee, the Communists have improved
their numerically dominant position in vital government organs. They now
control tmenty-one out of tmenty-nine ministries in the Government. They
control the entire political machine and, as an added source of strength, have
placed Communist Party members in all echelons of national and local government.
Com:mast policy is formulated, mith guidance from the Kremlin, by the Polish
Party Politburo. Throu,:h the Council of State, the Communfsts transform their
policy into lam and by means of the sane Council, they govern Poland by decree.
In addition to their advantageous position mithin the government, the Communists
have extensive means for controlling the people and "imbuing" them mith the
ilarxist-Leninist doctrine. These range from direct intimidation to more subtle
methods of persuasion and education. The presence of approximately 51,000
Soviet troops in Poland also renders incalculable moral as meil as physical
sup-ort to the Communists, mho enforce the Kremlines policies.
Intimidation is effected through the Security Police (UB) whose mission
is a covert, but complete, surveillance of the political, economic, cultural,
religious, and social life of the people. Notoriously ruthlesss the Security
Police enter homes without marrants? arrest and detain mithout formal orders,
and employ barbarous methods of extracting "confessions." The UB is directed by
the Minister of Public Security, Stanislav Radkiemiczs a Communist trained in
Moscow for his present duties. The organization comprises about 70,000 trusted
officers and mens as mell as some 1001000 part-time agents and informants. A
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number of its key positionsare held by Soviet citizens from the USSR Linistry
of State Security (LIGB). The UB operates on a regional basis paralleling the
governmental acIministrative s:ste.a as tell as on a functional basis in factories,
civil organizations, the army, and other organizations. Decrees of the Security
Police often conflict mith? and in most cases overrule, the polices of other
governmental agencies. The atmosphere of terror engendered by the Security
Police is intensified by the existence of three other subsidiary security
organizations operating on a country-wide basis: the Citizens Militia, Militia
Reserve, and the Internal Security Corps. In addition there are smaller special
security units such as the Internal Security Corps of the Army, Frontier Guards,
and Railway Police. The total strength of all these quasi-military security
agencies is estimated to be approximately 43C,000.
Through labor, cultural, professional, and youth groups: the Communists
persuade and indoctrinate various segments of the population. Prewar organize-
tions of this nature have either beon taken over by the Communists or liquidated,
in 1944, by the simple expedient of setting up a nem Trade Unions Central
?Comdttee? the Communists wrested control of the trade unions from the Soeialists.
Recently the Communists strengthened their control over the trade unions by a
thoroug% shake-up of the Central Trade Union Committee membership. All
cooperaUves are now under the jurisdiction of the Central Cooperative Union,
which is Communist-controlled. The Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, the Slay
Committee of Polmd, the Association of rarzist Historians, the Polish Democratic
Jurists Association, the International Press and Book Club, the Peasant Mane'
Aid Association, the League of -aomen, and the Union of Fighters for Independence
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and Democracy, ostensibly cultural or professional organizations, all serve the
political interest of the Communists.
The Communists have devoted their greatest attention to youth organiza?
tion. In July 19480 after a campaign of many months, the youth groups of the
four principal political parties uere merged into the Union of Polish Youth.
This monolithic or:anization0 aimed at indoctrinating large numbers of non?
Communist youth in Communist theory and practice, is a significant step in the
governments? effort to man the youth from the spiritual influence of the Church.
Earlier in 1948, uith the same objective, a youth labor organization, Service to
Poland, had been inaugurated on a military basis under the supervision of
political Education Headquarters of the Army. The plan involves the eventual
utilization of some several million boys and girls in an extensive program of
public vorks. It provided for the mobilization of the most promising youth for
organizational and training purposes, subsequently to serve as brigade and unit
leaders. During 1948 these units uere under the direction of commanders on de?
tached service from the Political Education Department of the Army. Later in
1948, the Ministry of Defense authorized the formation of a Union of Polish
Youth Uithin the Armed Forces, under the chief of the Political Education
Headqucrters of the Army. The activities of the military youth group are
coordinated uith the civilian Union of Polish Youth. The extension of the youth
organizations into the army is one more step tomard ideological regimentation of
all Polish youth.
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d. Civil Liberties.
There is no effective guarantee of civil rights and liberties to the
average citizen of Poland. On 22 February 19470 the Sejm approved a
Declaration of Rights and Liberties, statin-0 houever? that the abuse of civil
rights and liberties "for the purpose of overthrouing the democratic form of
government of the Republic of Poland" uould be prevented by las. As a r osult
most of the enumerated civil rights and liberties are denied to Polish citizens
through, government neasures enacted for the protection of the State. Any
individual uhose throughts or actions are suspect in the eyes of the government
may be arrested uithout cause and detained incommunicado for an indefinite
period, There is no freedom of speech or assembly. The right to vote uaa
"legally" denied to many thousands in the 1947 elections.. Private property
is confiscated. Homes are searched by Secret Police at any time of the day or
aighte Access to the courts is' not easy and verdicts are influenced by political
considerations, All publications are censored, as are radio broadcasts and
motion pictures. There is no social equality, because Communists have qp ecial
privileges. United Polish Workers Party members, for example, have priority in
obtaining employment and entering higher institUtions of learning, and enjoy a
generally higher standard of living.
A decree prom, gated in Movember 1949 by the Council of Ministers
extends the State e s control of the individual. The decree, designed to protect
the interests of the State, affects the revelation of almost any information
of a military, economic, or political nature. Punishment for violation of this
decro dap:lads on the presumed oonsequencles of the violation and on the social
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status of the offender. Tho decree is so inclusive in scope that any loop?
holes in previous legislation are covered; practically any act of a Polish
citizen can be construed as subject to its provisions.
4.. Internal Issues,.
The government is facing and will continue to face serious Popular opposition
to certain of its developing policies concerning the "socialization" of Poland
in the image of the USSR. Implementation of such policies as the collectiviza?
tion of agriculture and the subordination of the Roman Catholic Church will
cause basic changes in the economic and social structure of the country. The
government muct achieve extensive re-education and remolding of the Polish
people to make such policies palatable.
a, Public Opinion.
Polish opinion on most issues is primarily motivated by the factor
of nationalisms, whose historic and powerful influence even pervades the Polish
Communist Party. Resentment toward Russian domination of Poland has been too
deeply rooted in history for the Poles to accept the Soviets at this time.
The rovernmont is continually faced with widespread resentment at every in?
fringement upon Polish national sovereignty.
A second factor which conditions a large segment of Polish public
opinion is the heritage of individualism and personal independence handed down
for centuries to Polish peasants 'who nou number 16 million out of a population
of 24 million. The Polish peasant is closely tied to his land and is completely
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opposed to Buell policies as the collectivization of agriculture.'
Other forces affecting Polish public opinion include cultural ties
with the West and the widely held belief of non-Communists that Poland will
be freed from Its Soviet masters only through a war in which the Western nations
defeat the ussa.
b. Collectivization of Agriculture.
An issue which will assume greater importance in Poland is the pace at
which the Communists push the collectivization of agriculture. The government
will proceed with collectivization as quickly as possible. Present circumstances,
however, force the Comunists to hold down the pace and to use circumspection.
The Polish Government ostensibly began collectivization after the
Cominform denunciation of Tito in July 194C0 The program was inaugurated with
a full-scale propaganda attack on rich peasants and exhortations to the poorer
peasants to band together against the rich and to form production cooperatives,
Actual progress in the collectivization of agriculture has been small.
By the end of 1950 approximately 1.5 percent of all agricultural land had been
collectivized. The slowness of Polish collectivization is the result of practical,
rather than ideologicAl reasons, such as: (1) lack of farm machinery; (4 ex-
tremely strong peasant resistance to the concept of collectivization, which in
sem eases has culminated in the assassination of local Communist officials; and
(3) government preoccupation with the problem of increasing immediate agricultural
production to satisfy foreign trade commitments and internal requirements.
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c. Church-State Struggle.
- The Polish Government regards the Roman Catholic Church as a foreign-
dominated and Western-oriented institution which teaches an anti-Marxist
doctrine, all of these alleged characteristics being considered inimical to the
alms of the State. At the same time, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Poland
regards the government as its implacable foe?
The Polish Government moved directly against the Church last spring by
forcing a broad agreement with the Church. Previous State activity had been
limited to the imprisonment of priests, censorship of Catholic press and
publications, the transfer of Caritas, the Churches nationwide welfare organiza-
tion 0 to the State, and the nationalization of all Church properties larger
than 250 acres.
The Churches reaction to date has been essentially passive, with the
exception of a few strongly worded pastoral letters. With the signing of a
Church-State agreement on 14 April 19500 the neutralization, if not the sub-
ordination, of the Churches power will follow.
On the surface, the agreement
contains many clauaen favorable to the Church. Newever, in fact, the agreement
can be unilaterally interpreted by the Polish Government as it sees fit. In
this way various secular perogatives such ao Catholic education in schools will
be gradually Whittled away. Church reluctance to accept the State's inter-
pretation of the agreement will lead to accusations of Church violation of the
agreement and to prosecution. All that is left at present to the Church is
control of its religious activities.
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? Popular reaction to the government4 MVOS aginst the Church has
mant7ested itself by greatly increased religious forvor and exceptionally
large Church attendance. However, it is clear that in the Church?State
strec.:le? the State is presently in a strong position.
A. Resistance Uovement.
Polish nationalism, popular resentment over Soviet interference in
internal Polish affairs, Communist persecution of the Church, and peasant fear
? of collectivization combine to create widespread resistance to the present
Government in Poland, nanifestations of these feelings are evidenced by the
sporadic acts of violence and sabotage in industry and in rural areas, as well
as the sporadic murder of Communist officials.
Organized underground resistance groups in Poland have remained passive
since 1947. They have restricted their activities to maintaining their
organization, keeping open ties with Polish exiles in the West, and collecting
covert intelligence on Soviet and Polish Communist activities in Poland.
Though armed, these groups mill continue inoperative until substantial aid frau
the VIest is possible. Until then, there will be no organized uprising, for
there is no likelihood of successful revolt under current government controls.
5. Etabilit of the Present Administration.
? The Polish .Government at the present time is stable because of secure
Comarnist control of all branches of the government, the political parties, and
the people. The controls are strengthened by the open support of the Kremlin,
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and the physical presence of Soviet Amy and security units. Milo these
conditions last, opposition to the present regime will be disorganized and
Ineffectual.
Poland is a Satellite in good standing. Its OammunistAeaders can dis?
regard to somo extant the Polish hatred for their regime. They seem more pre?
occupied at presont with the problem of Sovietization of Poland than with that
of the country's interne]. stability. They have shown some regard for Polish
hostility-to the main targets of the Soviet program to transform Poland into
a facsimile of the Soviet Union: (1) the drive toward collectivization; (2)
the Runsification of Polish culture; and (3) the subordination of the Church.
Apparently they have convinced the Kremlin that the time is not yet ripe to press
toward these aims much more forcefully, for Poland has been allowed to lag behind
other Satellites in the approach toward theme
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CHAPTER II*
EC01;01.1IC SITUATION
10 Letroduction&
Although it sustained the heaviest war damages in Eastern Europe/ the
Polish economy has she= greater postwar gains that that of azw ether Satellitcp
Poland's General economic stability is contributing not only to the strength
of the gover=ent but also to the war potential of the Soviet Orbit& Poland
is growing into the wet powerful Se.tellite Ste.te? It has the largest popul-
ation; its industrial capacity is expanding; the- transportation system is
superior to that of the prewar period; there are large exportable surpluses of
coals mineralise telltales Oherd.calss textiles, and agricultural products? Its
foreign trades though shrinking with the liests is increasing with -the Orbit,
Poland'n ?commie situations herrevers ia not without some weaknesses?
Poland rust rely on extra-Orbit sources for essentials sueh as rubbers petro-
leums and tin, It must also imports from within or without the Orbits such
industrial raw raterials and equipneub as iron ores chemicals& textile material")
pulp and papers raohinery in generals and motor vehicles, In additions it
imports fruits & fates and Ubact000
Soviet control of Poland's economy is already widespread and will not be
rolaned. Polandls Growing econony is being increasingly integrated with the
Orbi?::; under the Soviet-dominated CEL IA (Council of EC072-02=1.0 Ilutual Aesistance)0
Poland's first venture into the Soviet type of economic; planning was in
1747 with the p.rez2ulgation of a Threee.Year Plan, Emphasis was directed toward
117lmmacr coniaias infermation available to CIA as of 20 October 19500
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such basic induatries as minings electric powers transportations steels and
chemicals? In general the goats of this plan wore achieveds and a foundation
was prepared for further and more complex industrial development under the
presort and recently revised Six-Yesr Plan (1950.55)s ribich calls for an over-
all industrial produotiot about four ie1.rms that of 1949. Overfulfillmerrb of
currert produotion schedules through rd.d.1950 and newly arranged trade pacts
in Julys 19500 prompted a sharp upward revision of production targets for 1955?
Agrieultural rroduction is to advance at a considerab3.y slower paces reaching
in 1955 160 percent of the prewar period?
Sinco Ciorld War II central e2 Polemics eoonomic organization and activity
hasirogreenively shifted to r013-00170 The USSR has continually strengthened its
influence in Poland a trend whish has recently been acoelerated? Under Soviet
tutelEge these have Docurred: (1) mirlisterial shifts, and more specificallYo.
?hatesin the powerful State planning Comassion and Llinistry of Foreign Trade;
(2) Soviet personnel have tale= key positions in Polish factories and within
the railwv administration; (3) Polish trade has been tied to the ,soViet .bloc
which in turns hass limited Polish trade with the Vest; and (4) pacts of
econordo collaboration with other Satellites have been sponsoreds the most
notable being the poet with Czeobeslovakia providing for the joint development
Of' the "little Rubr" it the Siiesiani.ibravian basin. Soviet control is further
evidenced, by the fact that Polandts new Six-Year Plan not only in closely
modelled atter that of the USSR but was actually drawn up under the guidance of
Soviet experts ? The Plan is to be carried out through an economic system
patterned along Soviet linea' with the usual provisions for cencontration of
aUthority and irispeotiono
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In line with Communist economic philosopkr, emphasis is boing placed on
the development of heavy industry, which forms an important segment in tile
Soviet bloc t a war potential? Thin omphasia will tend to loop living standards
below prewar levels
20 Saulabl.mi and
.Amang the me.jor postwar Polish problems arising out of World rTar II were
those associated with repatriation andresettlement of he population. As of
1 January 1948, war deaths dispersion of several million inhabitante, territorial
shifta, and deportations had eaused a net population loss of about 12 million
pereonre Of these, 7.5 million ethnic Germ= were expelled. At the be,..
ginning of 1950 there were en estimated 24.5 million persons in Poland as
presently constituted.
As of January 1950, the estimated agricultural labor forces was 7.2 million
end tho total non.agrioultaral labor force 4.6 million& In line with the
Goverment program for industrialization, the agricultural labor force is ex.
pected to decline still fin-there
Lerses arming from tiorld 17ar II and from peaty= Communist purges have
brought shortages in industrial ramla.gers? engineers, teohniciane, and skilled
laborers, The need for education c.nd job training to offset these losses is
intenaified by the; projected rate of industrialization. Extensive training
grognar. hIvo bean. initiated, and the reallocation of available personnel is
in promes, but the deficiency will continue to impede rapid industrial
progrers.
Tho t rade union organization, controlling over 4 million members, io
rospenrible for furthering govornmenb policies regarding Worldng conditions
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and labor productivity, Successive increases in work norms and deoroases in
wage rates directed toward oliciting hizher .productivity, have resulted in
dissatisfaction on the part of labor, Current living standards and vmrldng
conditions, below provar levels, and the, threat of punitive measures are also
sources of, irritation. The ausulative effect is apparent in increased
absenteoism and high labor turnover, particularly in mining, Currently, more
stringent noasures are being talon by the '30111)2711; Sunulteract absenteeism
and labor turnover*
50 ..isziaulturc,
Posimar recovery in agricuVare has 'Wen substantial* Crop production has
net yet attained prewar levelss in view of a reduced population, however,
production per oapita now exoeeda the annual avorage of the 1034.1938 period,
loss of .livestook during the wa was such that, notwithstanding considerable
postwar reeovery, the number e! hogs and cattle ix; the end of 1040 was only
60 percent of the 1933 level* The country is again an exporter of grain and
spiral 7oduets0 The outlool, is for a continued uptnird trend in agricultural
produotion., which could haviovorg, be reversed by peasant resistance against
government efforts to oolleadvize agriculture*
During the five end one-aalf years of war, one.sixth or 400,000 of Polandgs
farms rare desiroyef. or put, out of operation, In 1945 only 5107 percent of
the country', s arable land rtmained under cultivation, Substantial improvoment
has eocurred since that time? As a result of this improvement, as well as of'
the population decline ed of chart. gcs in territorial boundarios, land under
cultivation for each peron in the airioultural population increased from
0,95 hectare in 1J38 to 1.15 hootares in 1949 and to an estimated 1*5 hectares
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in 10490 Although tractors have been employed on large estateep horses TrOre
the primary source of draft power before World Uar II. As the ?umber of
horses declined during the German eccupationo several thousand tractors were
brought in? By the end of .the war there were en estimated 10500 usable tractors
remaining in the counia7,, Substantial postwar iraportas including 81,450 tractors
supplied by 17011/412 and domestic production of approximately 21,500 inereased
the number of usable tractors by the summer of 1949 to 14,500?
Polish soils have always required regular applications of fertilizer?
Animal manure TIUG the primary source of fertiliser prior to the war, lianure
shortages caused by wartime loeceo of livestock vrere heightened hy destruction
of fertilizer plants. Demand VOA accentuated by acquisition of 21017 territories -?
ir).the ie where the relatively -aigh crop yields depend upon heavy application
of artieicial fertilizers* While the SixaYear Plan provides for substantial
'fertilizer imports and increased domestic produetiono a shortage of fertilizer '
%rill continue to handicap crop production?
Normally a not exporter of aviculture' conteditiese the country has had :trt.'
rely up3n imports of food during the postwar period until the 1948 crop became
available* While production of potatoes in 1949 ma 30 percent beneath that
of the prewcu- ora o cereals were only 13 percent below:, and sugar had recovered
its proem* level?
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Production of Prinsi al Cro s
-Wzo=*--nsof?me c tons
1934.38 Avoraemasz
'Prewar
1948
1949
bony/411.1,es boundaries
17heat
2,064
1,065
1,500
1,630
R70
6 467
6,854
6,300
6,350
Barley
1,411
1,507
1,100
1,310
Oats
2,558
2,829
2,210
2,250
Potatoes
35,00?
38,014
26,756
29 500
Sugar (rax)
225
925
694
825
Althouch rzeduotion of breadgraine (wheat, rye) was slightly lower in 1949
than in prona.r years, in view of the decreased population, current production-
represents increased production per capita. Similarly, beoauso coarse grain
(barley, oats) consumption requirements declined as livestock numbers were
reduced, the supply position of these veins is also superior to that of the
precar?poriod, even though production has not attained preriar levels. Approxi.
rately tro.thirds of the arable land is planted with ryes wheat, barley, and
oats, t/ith rye accounting for about 50 percents These cereals, together with
potc:toes and. sugar, constitute approximately throo*.fourths of the total food
production Potato production, while considerably beneath prewar, is still
sufficient to meet the needs of a reduced populations A variety of pulse
(peas, beans, etc,), fruits, and vegetables arc also crawls, Rye and sugar
are major acportso
Animal husbandry in, the prewar period accounted for 62 percent of
agricsu:Vatral income? Consequently, wartime losses in livestock, relatively
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greater than elsewhere in Europe, preiented one of the moat serious problems
in agAoultural rehabilitation. 17hi1e livestock numbers are still well be-
neath those of prover, pork and poultry products are again being exported.
Livestock Numbers
1938
t u-T-S en?rrnrrale r
1949
1950
1955
frwear
boundaries
Postwar
boundaries 1948
Hermes
3 916
3.149
1,811
2,650
3,000
n.a.
? Cattle
10,554
9,926
3,910
5,800
6,000
6,500
lbws
.7.325
9,884
4.000
5, 310
6,500
9,200
Sheep
3,411
1,941
759
1,600
1,650
2,500
The present Six-Tear Plan visualises collectivization and wodernisation
of agriculture. Under the land reforms of 1944, 1946, and 1950, the Stets has
tab= cvor all holdinga larger than 50 hectares (exoept ibr Churoh properties).
There (Ire now 4,800 State Farms, largely in former German as well as
reimerckin other 3argo-,0co10 fox= oporatod by the Soviet Arm and by cooperatives.
Govarenant control of tractors farm nechinex7, and fertilisers will faoilitste
gradual. oolleativisation. Meanwhile. the Government is extolling oollectivi*
sation and is seeking to ?route friction between the poorer peasants and Um
richer farmers.
CoUectivization has prooeeded at a slower pane than originally planned
? bocauert of peasant resistance and shortage of agricultural mat:shimmy. Thus
far the goverment has chosen to avoid a 'showdown over the issue, Tot the
current Six-Tear PI= visualises an increase in farm production of 65 percent
grEIrr=-----nary estimate
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concurrent with a 'substantial Javanese in the member of oolleotive farms.
Excluding tho possibility of abnormal weattei peasant resistance will b. the
prime controlling factor in agricultural produetion during coming years. If
the rate of solleotiviso.tion la be great, or the particular form in whieh it
takes stave becomes too repugtent to the psasant, a deerease in firm production
is lily
4. Fisting and Fish Products*
l'olanes lengthened coastline mid the government's fisheries progrism ahould
elimixada, prewar reliance On izvorta>, rake posaible inoreesed per capita con-
sumpticn. end previde a substantial overtable surplus. In 3.950 the tetal
eatoh amounted to 25.000 torus. Vas imvernment program for modernising sad
expanding the fishing fleet should rains the catch to 900000 tows Polooideo
river ,clateh will probably remain qt the prewar level of 12.000 tons. Facili-
tie. axe adequate for smoking0 salting. canning and cold atorage of fisho
5.
?.sty and Produetec
Tizter *anti:saes as an invariant commodity in the oconeswo although +=porta
are bakor greyer levels. Forest reseturcsee suffered greatly from war destruction
and excasoatie espleitation by to Germans. As a eonsequanes,, a shortage of
timber produots hats hampered Vs housing development program even though over
outtinc has been cuctonsive.
Althsush the Six...Tear Pim pro/rides for intensive development of ibrestry
and related industries,9 it 13 unlikely that timber produetion or the value of
experts; will achieve wow. levels in the foreseeable future? The low rate
of tinter production sill 03ntinue to hinder housing development?
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de Lli: rale and Llets3.s.
se Iron* Steel Ind Ferro.Allsme
The roCenstruation and cc:pension programs; of the Six.Terr Plan rank
the ircen and etool industry ascend i importance only to the coal industry.
The iron and steci industry suffered considerable damage and dislocation
&wing Us war but has made a substantial recovery in the postwar poriode
1...opt in the raining of iron oroe production by the end of 1949 had.
otweeded -prover produotion and mat- the target.of the final year of the
Thme.Y.s= Plane
? Iron and Steel Production
~rrrzs----ara-zn--is
1938 Y 1946 1947
194,8
Lyon Cm
791
424
545
an
Pia; Iron
890
726
869
10100
Ear Sim/
10440
1 220
1b$0
186O
RoUod , ,
10051
800
1,155
1 340
Pr cductsdi
1/ 1949 V
no
10300
2 000
10460
The 1955 goal of the Sir..Yeer Plan hes fixed rear steel production at
40aU1ienin sninuelly or approximately three and ono.half times the
1936 cutputeT ssure fulfillment* the plena provider; for expansion of
equixont, modern production methods, sztencive reohanisation and improve.
resat of transportation. facilities. Attainment of 1955 coals, however,
dePluds largely upon imerte a industrial equipment, 15110h of which le
=twiny available only in. the ,lecte
FZMYEZMISTaVtr$6
I:irtttalit
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Bark* in the Three .Year Plan (1967.49)0 effearts were made.to inerease
stool capacity by procuring tse large stool minas which were to be looated
in the Industrial area of laser Silesia, The USSR* under the terms of the
Soviet.Polioh Cegtital Goods Agrooment of 26 January 19480 promised a steel
mill with an. annual capacity of 1.5000030 ions of raw et4:44. Conatruotion
of the ed.11 was begun in 1949 on the outskirts of Iralsewo but tho plant
will prObably mot be in operation before the termination of the Six-Year
Plan, The seCond mill MO to be procured from the US end the UX0bit
Ueetern export restrictions blocked the trencaotion, Prior to US export
otro1e 0 contract TIM sigrod with a US firm for a 07 million blooming
end: elabbing mill urgently needed to betimes; Polieh facilities Ibr
production of raw steel with that of rolled product:3 arid to curtail tho
untmesonsio importation of blows and slabs from Cseehoslovaldao US
refusal in June 1960 to i OSLO an =port li001200 for the !sill equipment
oeciously retarded implementation of Polish pleas Aor a well-integrated
stool induatry,_
Present iron end stool production meets the needs; of the domestio
eoonory mid providee a small turplaa of rem steel and eeni-fi3iishod pro.
duot.e for export, Poland's deficiency in iron oreo sorapp and ferro.Fa
alloyeo horsevere mekos it diepondent upon EaStern European oountries as
well tie on the 17est,
Cole, prod.:often is ample to meet domestic requirements (except for
15000(0 tons of high grade motallurgioal coke obtained from Csochoslovakia)
and provides en exportable surplus of ,approximately 19600,000 tons,
II 10
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Cokeries are 00710tUtrathod in tho diotricts of Tipper Silesia. end T;ale.
brayoh0 Lower Silesia0 and have a capacity of 507500000 tons a yeare
Of total cola production, approximately 43 percent in of retallurgioal
quality.
Your
Coke Production
Total Coke Production
Total llotallurgioal Coke ,
Production
IlliVaTri WO-MEM
1933
?Glandes
202910000
9850000
1943
303280000
104310000
194S7
400000000
107200000
1943
40680.000
108500000
1949
504000000
2a 320. 000
large resereo of ior...grade iron ore, with an iron content
'of about 30 percents, is difficult to eine. Ore 50262113 are thin and under-
,grould minas revive expensive timber reinforomments. To supplemant
dinnietie pr tin high gratle oro to Imported? principally firota Sweden
and :he USSR. Lteintenanoo of tho pr000nt rate of produotion.of Piz iron
and Nturo triennia= -in production depend directly upon oontinued and
orostied ivories of iron ore from &sedan and the USSR.
PoLich deposit? of ore? for producing forrogel.loya are limited. Suppliea.
of obromite and mraiganose murt be supplemented by largo inporto from the
ZESR., Norekve ead Rumcnino All other forro-alloya mast be incertedo
Tho procurement of iron and /steel persp was a major problem in 1949
and will continua to be difficult throughout the Silt-Year Plan. In 1949
requiromento amounted to 9000000 tone, the larger proporbion of whioh wan
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inportmis Small amounts of soraP have been contracted for in 1950 trade
agreements* but the total falls abort of the yearca requirements. If
planned targetu are to be achieved, the USSR nust arrange to supply the
large scrap deficit from the Soviet Unionandfor the Soviet Zone of
Germany.
b. genupPerrous Letals and Hon.Uotallie Minerals.
Polead ie deficient in non?ferrous metals with the exception of 113.3204,
lead, and cadmium, whieh are exported. The country is one of the worldee
important producers of eine end has ore reserves estimated at 11*0006000
tone. Zine and possibly lead exports move mostly to the USSR and the
Satellites. Produation of all three of these important metals is eatimated
to hale largely regained Ammar levels in 1969.
Prodtiotjon of Lead Zino, mod Cadmium
tmetrie tons)
use/
1947
1946
1949V
196e1
Lead (sme1ter) 200000
15,000
. 17*000
18,000
19,500
Z1110 (Sne1ter)108,000
72,000
870000
92,000
100,000
Cadatra 188
120
160
160
175
During 1949* Polaadoe chief nonferrous =talc deficiency eme in
oopper mad imports were obtained by various means. Chilean andrexioan
eopwr reached Poland via Belgium* Uolland* and Norway. The probleavras
aggravated by the loss ofTugeelat (topper following Tito's break with the
Soviet bloc.
There are na bauxite* antimmAy* tin* or magaesits deposits, and only
Ivrea e4jUatad to postmer boundmries
Estimate
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9
small arounts of gold and silver are produced. :Jnall but valuable deposits
of uranium ore arc found at :iouury in Riesengebirge nountaias of Lover
Silesia; the entire output of these sources is shil-ned to the
2oland is poorly supplied with non-metallic minerals uith the exception
of cement, salt, sulphur, and coal. Coal, as trill be noted in subsequent
sections, is of great importance0
production of cement has surpassed pre-
vas production, and exports in 1340 and 1949 uere principally to the USSR,
uith smaller quantities going to 2.rgentina, Lrazil, and the alay States.
1.1though production of salt has not regained 1957 levels, salt is exported,
uith the major quantity :oving to Czechoslovakia and lesser anaLmts going
to Sweden, Finland? end Denmark.
7. Chemicals.
4{.11?117?YM Z.V.E/14???? 1111.SNIVICO
The chemical industry in rapidly expanding and has already exceeded pre-
'
war tonnage figures, owing largely to the acquisition of 11017 productive fac-
ilities in.the territories talon over from Gonmlay? :,dvances over 1938 have
been registered in such basic chemicals as ammonia, caustic soda, sulphuric
acid, soda ash, and calcium oarbide. U0111.0 chericals are exported. Trade
agreements indicate an ability to produce lithopone, zinc -white, red load,
and DACDOSilln salts. Among the coal tar derivatives, bonzence toluene,
na)hthelene? and cresol are being exnorted. Wiipments of these chemicals to
the Soyzono have contributed significantly to the strategically important
chemical industry of Last Germany',
II 13
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Production and Capacity of Basic Chenicals
thousands of notric tons
Production
1948
1949
----------
19381/
Armenia (As' ll)
52
40
49
Caustic Soda
30
42
58
Sulphuric Acid
.196
195
239
Soda Ash
130
134
19C
Calciur Carbide
100
1C0
165
Phosphate Fertilizer
200
280
nea.
Revised Planned 2roduction Got is for 1955
7.1etric tons)
Sulphuric Acid (10) 540,000
Calcined Soda 309,000
Litrogen Fertilizer (Calculated in 230,800
pure nitrogen)
Kumphiebefertilizer (Calculated in .2if0000
pure P205)
letatsiumSalt (Calculated in H20) 10,00c
Carbon electrodes 31,000
Synthetic aubber 15,000
The chmical potential vas Greatly increased by the acouirdtbn of ibrraLr
German territories, there between GO and 70 veil-developed plmts ::ere lo-
cated* Llthough sore uere destroyed, others badly da:laged0 cnd &In dismantledp
many have been restored and are in --Jroductione. Jo cheracal installations of
27717aar 77SEFTs
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importmioe were located in the territory trcnoterrred to the USSR. In tho
transfer of territory, howevor? Poland loot sons rear materials, ths most
notable of ebiah wore taw large reserves of potash, which must now be procured
from the USSR end the Soviet Zero of Germany.
Poland is self "sufficient in many basic rate ntsteriale for a heavy chemical
industry? There is still a dependence on outaide sources, however, for pyrites
end ph)sphate rook. Small quantities of pyrites, important in the production
of sulphuric) sada are now produeed locally and satiety part of the requirements.
This mineral is still difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities but part of
the deficit is ma.de up by importa from Sweden snd Norway. Domestic deposits
of nine blonde and calcium sulphate, when developed, nay provide other rest
re.torials for the eulpleario acid industry. There is some production of low
grade phosphate rook but 'phosphate fertiliser produotion is sliest entirely
dependant on ivsports of rear notarial from the USSR end North Africa?
Abundant reservers of Balt, coking coal, and limeetone will be a valuable
asset in the further development of the heavy chemical industry. Coking meal,
Artioularly, Will be of inportenes in supplying the base for the expanded
production and export of ocal tar derivatives?
8, Preduetion Equireen.t.
Ths prock3.etion equirrent industry has been established only reeently?
During the 19209s and 193098 it was in a s?udimentary state; roqUirerments in
this fiold were lest largely through imports. After TIorldt7ar II }bland 80.1!
(Aired sons faeilities ibr the men.ufecture of production equipment in the
"reocreured territories," but thetotal equipment inventory Of these plants
was emx1.1 and skilled labor was lost through displacement of the forcer German
II 16
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populai4ext? Altbough the inductry has been unable to enquires sufficient now
production Istehinory? great propels has been Endo in the repair and wee of
oxiotilg equipment& materials for which could be obtaired from abroad. The
present equipment inrentorys beesevers hes deterioreted to the point where rek?
placements rather than further repairs is required? Replseement is being at,,
toired by domestic production end *porta? Bowsaw deliveries from mithin ths
Soviet blase are limited and orb= of low qualitgre receipts from the C(erk, or
the leak thereof& lave en important bowing on the rate of industrial progress
Be:rore the ware PoLaid had eompsertrUvely wall demand for assehins tools?
whioh mere ueed primarily in sme3.1 maintenance chops? Output ens insufficient
to tale) sere of even thew limited needs and approximately 75 percent of
nelehin, teals reqtdremonts had to be imported? principally from Gernany end
10 Liost entre of a basis type meth as lathes? drill presses? milling
maehiness end plencre? Dew of the sachinee being adtable for .production
During the air ? praeticelly all paceleino building octablishremete sere destroyed,
The repairing feeilities Isere? in mut easec'. dismantled and chipped to tees
Soviet Union co that after the ear imeediusee reetniption of 'production sem
impossible?
tiaohinse
1938 1946 1047 gem 194Q
Animal Production 6?536 10600 30495 40400 60700
Plasma-1 Pleduati011 WIMP la 764 40050 6,100 6?650
The abyro figures indicate a steady increaee in pectecer productiona but cash
year pm:Suet/on bee fallen coneiderably below planned output? Failure to meet
planned goals say be attributted to obsoloseense end dotariorettdou of equipment
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lack of oomponent partc. and a shortage of ekilled workers and technicians. as
mall so to an overly ambitious program*
Th e original Six-Year Plan calls for production of 376000 tons of maohino
tools in 19550 ocenpared to a production of 60605 tows planned for l9480 Largoly
became of a shortago of engineera ami techaioians, the plan probably will ac?t
be attained. The supply of equipeent and oomponents is no longer a retarding
elemort in maohine tool production, for require:ante are mat by imports?
Principal souroos have been Sweden, Seltzerland. the UK, USSR. Casoboalovakia
and. Until the export control program beaux, effective in the saiddle of 1968.
the US.?
Fazilitieo are limited for the production of all kinds .of machinery' in-
cludirg meth iteme as ,electrioal equipmentb precision inotruments, mining and
agrioultural meohinery. Production in all thee eatagories is insufficient
? to mset ravine:mato the bulk of shich Inuit be filled by imports?
In ,the olaertro-teehaioal industry thare ins little on *doh the nee Polish
State could Wild after the war? Garman and Soviet accpisitiono had roduoed
the number of instaLlations to insignificance Today, however. blatancy. 55 and
60 factories are either under construotion, or in produotion. Production hos
been impodad by the inability to inport sufficient quantities of eartain sed.
flashed materials web as coppor wire, by tap reduction in imports from the
Vegeta end by a dserth of oesverbently treined laoriaara?
The prevision ieetrument industry is limited primarily to the field of
optical lonsen ami instrumontee Outleat of indnotrial inotruisants is negligible?
The optical industry. 'expanded by the Gammons during wartimo, is still dependant
on outside sources, partioularly iset Germany. for a part of Ito requirements?
II 11
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Production of Mining machinery covers only a small portion of the country?
requirements end it has been limited 'primarily to such auxiliary items as pumps
and oloatsric rotors. The sohodulod 1948 output of 240330 metric tons of mining
equipment sand machimorys contracting sharply with a 1937 produotion a only 91
tons4, represents only a *mall part of the aountryos requirements. The 1949.50
trado agromanat beterean Poland end West Germany& providing for iroports of
08000000 worth of viirtietg reashincrys attesta to continued dependance on cut.
sift souroGe.
In order to expand and mailltain its economy& Poland will continue to depend
upon imEorto of production equipment. The Azisure rata of industrial expsu2sien
? willparobably rest upon the extant iiso which the Soviet Orbit in Willing to
oupp:Ly equipment& particularly in the fields of mining and agriGulturet.
9. fuel and Power.
it. Coal.
The seal iiduatry holds a seat imixxrtant pceition in Polendeo caonoove
otel proved and probable reserves are about 67 billion =trios to of
bituminous caosti and about 18 billion Immo of brawn cool. Furthermore&
geologlo conditions are more faverable for Goal stinking in Poland than in
arq other-nation in Europe. Coal in the Gauntness ssijor item of extx?rt
and the prime earmodity of foreign trades bother with Western and Eaotern
astrope. The Gauntry is um the largest coal =parting nation of Europe
and the eocand largest in the world. The rising European coal shortage&
ntlaulting from the roam/mat program and increasing industrialisation .noodn.
has strengthened Poland*o bargaining position against its Western European
ading partners.
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?
Throughout the vete Gory ?sated on desperate, intensive exploic.
tation & disregarding all Tatiana mining sad conservation policies for the
sake of forced production* Plresh veins were oorstently aubjected to
cabanas: excavation4 and plants and machinery were destroyed, Rehabilitation
of the Ettnes thus required heavy investment in zwehinery0 whiah has net
always been forthvoraing. Equipment shortages have been aorpensated in part
by longer working hours and increaced numbers of employees. Tho 1966 goal
is 100 million tone which is at moderate annual increase? that oan probably
be attained. In general& the industry tea beset by long.conge problems that
will be diffioult to eurmounte.
Coal Proshaetion
(thousands cat metric tons)
. 1936 194? 1948 1949 1950 (Estimate)
llrezaar . Yoratear ?"will' --""
Boundaries Boundaries
niZEILIMalla
380000
89000
599130
708260
740081
78a000
Lirtito
note
50022
40796
48621
48621
5000
Polish Goal gees to tiventy.one European and otbzrrcc untricee The USER
620. .Son aro the largest customers.
of Di Coal
1,
413_ 0 VI) IS 7213
Planned
1946
194?
1948
1949
1950
? Total experts
140030
179800
24'0700
260450
27.000
RArrts to USSR
n.11.
80556
7032C0
70000
110111.9
During 1949, the industry substantially increased exports to Italy m2d
Casolvalerakima vrith gumaler increases to the Netherlands nii Frame. Arbor
a tosivrary decline of exports, demand for coal revived end in September 19509
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the price for Polish ooal to T.Ostern Europe vas raised per ton. In
recant trade negotiations with Scandinavian oountries Poland indioe.tod
that it may attempt to allocate *Gal to its OEEC customers with the ob.
jootive of obtaining strategic materials. At the same time exports; to
the USSR and orbit countries, partioularly Czeohoslovalda, have risen.
Polandes potential for developing its coal industry with produotion
mate eomparing favorably vith that of ether peal areas in Europe, ro.
mains very great, but there aro seeorel obstacles to further increases in
?p:roduation and exports beyond the high level already attained. Leber
shartagee, absenteeism, and a look of toohniaal akills ciii oontinueto
be a deterrent to production. Further =pension will be impossible with.
set heavy invegtment in emehinery and other equipment. Equipront arriving
from the UK end Seitserland has been of czoellent caliber9 but insuffioicnt
quentityg equipment from the USSR has been lees useful. The equipment
bettlereek cane however, to eased whenever the Kremlin orders; increased
deliveries to Poland of Soviet and Cseeh mining equipment, tich is
eurrent going to eafia mines in the Soviet Union,.
10 Petroleum.
Production of crude oil in 1948 vma only about ono.fourth that of 1938o
Although this is partly thee:milt of depletion of the oil fields end general
'wartime disruption of the industry, the reduction is primarily attributeble
to boundary changes. Territorial adjustment* deprived Poland of from
thirds to three.fourthe of its petroleum resources end. forced the country
to besot= an inteertor of crude oil.
Refined
products suet deo be imported DOW as a result of the territorial
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lees. .Before the weir there VOS 0.21 exceas of refining capacity in relation
te crude oil production and output of refined products was suffiaient to
permit exports. Uith the transfer of the *astern sooter to the USSR, Poland
lest its three lergest and. moat nodern refineriem. Consequently, present
dementia processing capacity of 200.000 tons ofcrude annuallY is to longer
areffioiwnt to mmetestimates doMeetie requirement of 500,000 metric tons.
Imports are currently proeured fromRuenia and the USSR. A synthetic oil
plant is under conatruction at Dourya near Oswiecim. Although Polemi is
net known to be peoducing synthetic oil at present, its vast resources of
Gael mould nake such an industry very feasible in the future.
Extensive exploratory drilling bamboos,. undertaken by the gevernment
in ea effort to counteract the less of oil fields to the USSR. Although.
eil prospecting has checked the decline in old fields1 it has ant vitb
litiae (macaws and has been retarded by the leek of equipmeat.
e. Electric Power.
Aeeng the Setellitee. Poland shares with Csecheslame leadership in
production of eleotrio power. Together they account for over 60. percent
at total Satellite output. (Excluding the German Seveone)
Electric stations and tranemiesion,ncleorks suffered severely in the.
var. Repair parts and nee equipment which are vitally needed must largely
be imported. Became.iorte are delayed and in other says inadequate?
reverie capacity is at a mininneend existing equipment subject to heavy
use and overload. Hanes. the industry is faced with the problen of
teeelereted depreciation. lievertheless, electric output since 'blower
has 31.1mma steady emeeth. Official figured for kiloyatt hours produced
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?
show that output in 1947 ineroased 16 percent over 1946, and in 1948
inereaeed 15.5 peroent over 1947. Production in 1949 was estimated at
8.1 billion kilowatt houro? The revised Six-Year Plan provides for a
produotion of 1903 billion kileeett hours in 1955? but production will
probably fall .ahort of this goal by 15 to 20 peroent.
10. Textilee.
Textiles rank first among industries in the umber of porno= employed,.
engaging more than 300.000 workers. Current production has approached prewar
Altheugh it is still bolos oapaoity. owing to diffioulties inherent
in the maintenance of old equipment, exports are oubetan.tially above prewar
because of the reduced population. Textiles are an ir3portant export of. Polazul,
particularly to Eastern Europe. About 20 percent of all ootton textiles
produetion is shipped to the USSR as part payment for re= ratteriolso
Insufficient rot materials pose the at immediate difficulty for contirouss
opereltion. For example the ootton mills. entirely dependent upon importm.
were not Maintained at full prochntion .during 1949 because of inadequate supplies.
This ia attributable to the Eaetward orientation of trade and leek of dollars.
1Thoreas 75 percent of requirements ,or, formerly obtained from the US. the
Gotten goods industry nust now depend in largo part on irregular imports of
cotton from the USSR. The other major textiles industrislu.weei0 flex8 end
hemp.maro also dependent upon imports of rev materials. Only 205 paroent of
wool requirements are net by dor:motto production and imports are limited by
foreign 12250 hang* shortages. The UK is the primary source of supply for wool.
Prewar Polandl7a. sectond in world production of flaxe_ hit am a oonaequenee of
territorial losses to the USSR. 40 to 60 percent of its potential-production
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area me out off? In an attempt to overcome the general eupply problem synthetic
fibers are being developed. Prodiotion in 1040 ins double that of the prewar
arnual averaged ?and ittrther inerealses ore planned.
In the long run the ebief bottleneck will net be raw materials. Unless
investment td e are coneiderably inereased? output soy be expeeted to detaine
as the rosehinery ourrently in use? which has seen ton years of her operation
with little replacement? becomes unusable?
110 Transportation.
land$a present trensportation system hes capabilititio superior to those
of the prewar ey- eteek Traffic to heavier? noteerks are more ?oxtensive
venteries are at higher leveled, and equirment factories are more numerous and
mere produetive. These improvements are due largely' to postwar boundary atones*
by Which Poland acquired a donee road and rail netzerk in ex.8?enuost territories?
ten ma:)or Baltic; barboroz., end the Odra Rivor oyetem as well as several ship.
yards tiod.reikely eguipemet plants*
ne railways? 131110}1 ceorry 97 pareent of Polendas internal traffied ire
virtueLly paralysed by the ear? In the reconstruotion period ? railways were
given aret priority? and by 1967 the system wee moving ZOOM tonnage over :ore
miles of track with or loaamertives than ever betters* The rail retwerk totalled
270358 kilometers in 1948? compared with 210836 kilometers in 1938? end is
plea:ma te *snood 30?000 kilometers by 19510 Railway traftio in 1949 was 46
peroeni; above the 1938 levels 10?994?000 tons of .freight Imre moved for an
Amerman haul of 248 kilometero for a total of 20728 million ton.idlomsters of
freigle,T. traffic? Paseenger traffic oasts 181 percent above 1938 with 1?762
million peacenestaradletrzetera perform/4o By 19480 icoacestivo and rolling stook
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inventories wore 6,860 unite end 147,815 unite rospectivoIy0 18.3 'meant and
1.1 pwoont respectively above 1938 levels.
This restoration of rallwAy inventories vas duo in part to the large so-
quisltion of GOMM equip:matt and to the loss significant contributions of
UNRRA aquipmont. Another factor has teen ths.prodUctien of rolling stook in
domootic plants increased by the eaquisition of planate at Wroolow and Zialona
0ora0 Zormerly in GornmAr. Itch or the now production good baths USSR. By
the end of 1950 it la estimated that Poland will have delivered nee and used
equipmnnt to the USSR totalling 51,000 freight oars and 10080 locomotives.
Poland hoe no Soviet broad-gauge trook:saccopt bar the feu kilometers that
sopareJe the Teraspol and Zuresioa trancloading stations from the Soviet frau.
tier 'id the littlamwed 30.ci1e line from Elblag to the frontier at Bra:Limo?
Inland abippiimg also virtually paralysol by the wor:0 received low priority
Ar rostoratima. Tho islesd flint was restored by asaatruation, salwago0 and
parehaass0 to only 71 percent of prewar inventory by the end of 19460 Treat,
isincroaaing gradually and say reach promr levola by 19510 The nowly'soqUireed
Odra River system boo clic:pissed the Male as principal waters:we and completion
of the Cloploiartacezztil bee given an eastwnost waterway conneotion between the
USSR and reateirt Germany aorose'PoIand. ? In addition to the Polish inland fleet
of 481 vessels in 19480 the USSR oporatod 860 small vosaols on Polish inland
watormys and Czechoslovakia had 104 veinal* in service on the Odra.Rivor.
Ibtat transport is still limited largely to short hauls and urban drayage,
but le planned to handle 10 perces:ter' all internal freight by 195L, The
condthion of highwayd has bean greatly improved'aitoo the war and win irpose
no grant obstacle to the motor tranaport plan. Automotive manufacturs.
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however& is largely EValtrieted to the assembly of imported componsints? chiefly
of Soviet and CsechomUvalde origin* Civil aviation, although. 72Cnif double
is prnwar activity level, accotatto for only an insignificant fraction of
the total traffic,
The merohant marina is 45 percent greater then it was in 1939. In JUBA
l950, there ware 45 vacuole of 1000 grows tons and overt, ow:pared with 31 in
1039a ,zad 16,608 gross tons registered? oorapared 'with 114,000 tons registered
in 1930., rivet of the chips burn coal end about 30 perecnt are over 20,1e5rs of
age* The Six-Year Plan cells for the merchant marine to be me?re than doubled
by 1955? but 'this; plan will not oucceed without heavy purchasing abroad? despite
increfced shipbuilding ceptioityo- largely because the USSR has recently begun
aequiring >ships from the Polish merchant fleet,. Prewar shipbuilding was not
eztenvive? ,aud the lack of engineers and technicians es well as inadequate
supples of stetia Trill continue to limit production far yeerc,
Hone of the three major hi:whore& Ezozecin, Gdansk, end Gdynia, has fully
recovered front the Trar, but the eurrent progra,in of enlarging facilitie* will
conettcrably sugpent port cape.eitievi.* Improvement of 3zczecit i6 being advanced
by agreements with Csechosloveki and East Germany, iThereby thee* countriee are
devolving customs,...free porta an unimproved land south of the city.
:1'..,rade and anenee*
A. Domestic Fncet,
tY2
In the past twelve years the zioty* has depreciated in relation to the
dollar from Ent exchange rate of 5.28 to 406, But in the past two years the
inflationary trend has been *hooked by the application of effeetive
teehniques for monetary management& reorganisation of the banking structure,*
romp" istings *age and price controle*
11-""' ettEr was made prior to the revaluation of the Polish zloty on.
25 Octobcr I950*
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? The banking system has *banged drastically sine? 19450 Banking is
noel nationalisod fumetiou conductod.bya State bankb the Nerodowy Bank
Polskit and six epeeialised institutions. The Naredowy Bank Poleki handles
forsigatraneactione6ourroncy issneo and overoall erodit'polioies. The
etherso besides porforming normal fisoal and *mitt praatioes* oversee
investments andathrougheontrol over oreditee the dAy by day implementation
Qt the Six-Year Plaa.
Betomma 1948 and 1950 the Poliah federal budget has boon doubled from
.406 billion to 841billion sloty. The Three.Year Plan has becnthe principal
?ease of the increase. Alno importantees the initiation in 1949 of a
nyetasswhoreby induatrial profits eon no longer be retained but are in..
eorporstad into the budget to mauve proper use In facto .the largest
ingress* in the budget has been in inventrantoe whichwero alloted 374
billion aloty in 1950 compered to 40 billion two years ago* The ?Curt
majoroxissulitsre categories are national ecourity and defense and social,*
welfare, end-oultural services* The prinoipal 'Douro* of revenue-iothe
turnover tax (a law on all =lea* particularly consumer goods); other
import% such ac income taxes& samisen, and property levies are partly
designed to eomplete the elimination of propertied classes.
? b*- Xntornetienal Trade and Fine? ?
The objectives' and teebniques of Polendte foreign. temmeree have ahanged
.redlcally eilMoo TTorld War IX. Sovieto not Policha intoreits are worth*
detarmining teeter* A comparatively free rut of intornational inter-
ohaven carried on by experienoed private traders has given may to State
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trnd.ing within bilateral agreemente:. Trade is being reshaped along the
lima laid down for the Orbit by the Kremlin in the fall of 19490
Comsevoial'relatioms with eapitaligt countries are no longer developed
Cu a longeterts cooperative basis but aro *anti:nod an & necessary evils
justified by the need to import oertain easentiale that Communitat countries
*leek* Intra.-Orbit izede receives preferencte, and as a result now about
equals that with that-fest, Beth exports and import's after more then
&cabling between 1947 anti 1949 (from e. combined total of 666 millien of
)1.2 billion) are nor leveling off*, A 10 percent inerease over 1949
hie been pleumad for 1950 and will be attained,
Territorial adjustate. uta have?eaumed a. eoneiderable change in Poland's
'export; potential? Pootwar recouroec of ooa.10 leads sines and certain agri.i
oultural produats are greeter than pregars 'chile the ability to export
petroleums petiaehe and foreetry produets has either vanished or deolined,
Otis important devolopment of the last toe year* is the ohangeover of
Poland trom the stable of net importer to it exporter of agrioultural
peoductio Coal and *eke make up appraximetely 40 perosset of the total value
ourrent.ascportes followed by agricultural produpte (meats manes dairy
produotes vegetabloss and timber)s iron and semi.finished steel itemss
sine and leads railroad *area oements and textileaso Current imports area
primarily in raw materials and equirments Certain of those .
/ma ore, cheraleales general mohizza7e =cater vehieless textile materiali.
and paper and pulp - ? Poland oan obtain at lomat in part from trittain the
Orbits For others suoh essentials as rubbers peft'olcum products/1 end tfola
P9 lend, suet rely entirely on eouroes outside the Orbit, Poland also iriParta
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ilmno outaido the Orbit& aomo aomi-luxury agricultural preduoto0 suoh as
fouite& fate and tobacoo*
The USSR had replaeed Germaay as Polandie leading trading partner?
Tho Soviet oupply iron& chrome& and manna*** oree0 petroleum& ootton
(oftenpurchdoed Lutist') US for delivery to Poland) potash& alumitum0 motor
vothic1es0 and traoterei in return& the Poles ship chiefly ferrous produote0
textiloo& coal and coke& auger, railroad oquipment0 and cement, These ship-
mate aro governed by a five-year (1948.53) trade pact calling for an ex.
ohange of 500 million dollars worth of goods, each wear and a 450 million
dollar lang-tero Soviet loan& the largest ever granted by the USSR The
Soviet Union also aste as siddlamon in an 80 million ruble tri-latoral paet
mitliFtland and Finlandoeboreby Polish mei oompeneatea Finleald for a
variety of commoditied shipped to the USSR far which the latter me by
ezparting Ideate fat mo and oils to Poland, Furthermore, the Soviet Union
hos lam resolving largo /mum/ ohipments of Polish coal& and *Om (1-1.15
Pillion tone) as rush less then prevailing world pride These annual ?
shipmate& caromed by "roporotionor agreemetts are the to continuo till
the aigping of the pease treatioe concluding Vierld Uar IIa
Polioh trade with the Orbit& as with the USSR& is on the inure:toe*
Foliahoommermalrithintlo Orbit in 1950 will be approximately 15 to 20
poroont greater than the 340 million estimated for 1949, In general& Poland
hips coal& coke& and natal geode to other Orbit countries and reoolvea
prodiaionoquipment0 *hominald0 machinery& petroleum& and tobaeco, Finished
esparto& suchen mmohinery0 railway equipment& and textiles go predmainately
to the Balkane0 the rum materialo to the northern Satollitee,, Eastern
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Germeny la the met ieportant Satellite trading partnere &Aileen 1948
and 1949. **memo doubled* Recently oOnoluded pacts envisage a long term
melding of the economy of the tme countries following the pattern of the.
. Kremlin inspired Polish?Gseth trade agreement*
.Until the middle of 1948 ;Aoland's trade with Ileetern Europe Llamas:tingly
emphasised long.term &veal:ante far export by the former of hard fuels and
agrioultural products against extended deliveries by tts, latter ofirslustrial and
transport equipment* Thetis:tat also furnished maey essential 'r-as Mater:iala0.
slush as rUbber0 wooly iron ore0 and ohemioele. Doreover0 oonolusion of
eompensation agreement* for nationaIieed prepertiesi providing for payment*
thxdugh Polish expert surpluses* tended to establish a bee. for future
trade* Sino, the middle of 19400 the ehareoter of trade with Weetern Europe
boa been *hanging, and the total volume has been redueed, The shiftless
in part the result of decreasing demand in Western Europe for wale Poland's
principal crienedity fer.export in postwar eceseree* During the initial
years of reeorultruotiona coals.* eorely needed in Western Europe and could'
be exchanged there for both eesential materials and dollars*. This demand
fell off as Western countries expanded their own coal output end converted
to substitute fuels* But the trend, ems reverend late in 1950 and Western
demand for coal is inereasinge Poland is teking advantage of the rising
merld demand for opal and is bargaining with Western Europese countries
ter seonomio end political inter eet* Recently the Poles have reported4
reduced coal exporta to Densmrk because of the letter e? partioipatiOn in
VATO0
The leading trading partner in the West is the Unitied Kingdom* 'chi&
in Jamiacr 1949 concluded a.five.iyeer pact rith 'Poland involving Z2130
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million worth of goods the largest amount involved in any agreement's*
far signed batmen a CJIIiitlf0221 country and ?;:estera Europe. Trade with
Sweden. featuring Polish ooal for Vmedish iron ere and bearings, ia next
iccortent. The major shift in direotion during 1950 will be a sharp drop
in oommerce with Prune and a marked rine in trade with Waist Germany.
Non-European external commeree scoounte for approximately 10 percent of
foreign trade. Direct Polish.US trade is ecv&l1 au cleared imports are
largely blocked by export controls aril the US is a poor outlet for wet
Polish products. Expectatione in Latin Armories partiaularly under the
threemoyear 0150 million Polisbrargentine pact have not materialised.
Non4Wropeen trade ie therefore mainly with Egypt, Israel. Pakistan. and
/Watt, Even this trade fell eonsiderably short of the planned 19419 figure
of 475 million, primarily booause .of delayed Polish deliterieei; inexperienee
on both sides and currency devaluations. Prirsoipal cocaredities exchanged
way Polish itael, iron and steel, tostilee, and ohemical product& for cotton.
Nte. and foodstuffs such ao tee, citrus fruits, and nuts. Interehringeo
with Hear and Lida, East will expend in 1950. Indonesia may prove an
,
important supplier of strategic tin, rubber. and. eopra. Business with
Cb.f.na, homover, will probably be 'oral below olaims.
Polandos chief foreign trade problem is placing exports in mush a
manner that thwy will finanoo time acquisition of Western Eatterials required
under the Six.Year Plan. The objet obetaels hampering non-Orbit purchases
is us and parallel export control:3. Also, potential peasant resistance in
artr ecoeleration of collectivisation could jeopardise fttlfillment of
attesting substantial agricultural cemeitearnte to 77alitern Bumps.
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Poland 10 international financial status is unsatiofactoryo with foreign
exchange holdings estimated at loss than (AO million ao of June 1950. This
in partly caused by the servicing of short Western credits and nationalised
properties elaims. Si.124o cash acquisitions usually benefit the USSR as
? ouch as Po;elide the former will undoubtedly supply the exohance required
for their continuance. There in specifio evidence of the merging of
Po 'Ash finanoial opscrationa vith t: *so of the Soviet Union the publioa-
tion in rubles of figures for _Polish commeree in 1949, and Polio& withdrawals
from the Inteznational Bank and Llenetary Fund. Theo? develop:ante indioate
Volt Poi:Indus future external financial operations will Gone under increas-
,
inGly greater Soviet oontrol.
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CRAM III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. atiamait2stUelleediagaggx.
Poland is net a free agent in the conduct of Ats foreign relations.
Under the direction of the USSR, Poland pursues a foreign policy aiMed
at spreading Soviet influence and conversely at opeosing cal forces
blocking the achievement of Soviet goals.
Tho USSR. began taking steps to insure its contra _over Poland in
the closing days of World ,.lar II. On 5 January 1945 it recognized the so-
called Provisional Government of Poland at Lublin, Alla comprised
Polish Ccesmniists indoctrinated in the USFE and eezp1Ittily loyal to the
USSR. The USSR signed a TwentyTear Ehtval Assiatance Treaty 4th thin
Lublin Government on 21 April 1945, am before tht puppet regime had
been recognized by the UK and the US, end steadfeatle opposed the US
and the UK In insisting that the Lublia Government be the nucleus of
Poland2s postwar government.
Strategic as well as political faztors made it important for the
USSR to gain fine control over Polari and to bind Poland aosely to
its Wier Satellites. Poland is loeited in the broad, aoceasible
northern plan which connects Easter and Western Europe. ThAs plan
mould 73e vital to the USSR in the went that it should undertake of-
fensive action against Western Eurepe? or be forced to defend iia
western berdera.
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With current Soviet expansionist intentions in Europe primarily
focuyed on Germany as the key to control of Vestern Europe, Poland
offers the USSR the easiest and most direct avenue of approach toward
Germeny0 it the sane time, Poland's agricultural, mineral, manu-
facturing, and manpower resouroes are an important addition to the
Soviet economic potential.
2. StedmikeieeljeleallgeWsjem2aUsiz.
EldettateNalL"..gratte
Poland is tied to the Soviet orbit through its membership in the
Caminfarn and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance and its partici-
pation in an inter-orbit system of cultural, econaaic? and twentyeyear
mutuel assistance pacts binding Poland to the USSR and the other Satellites&
Poland is a member of the Soviet-dominated interlocking military
and potential bloc created by the series of Mutual Assistance Pacts
negotiated within the Soviet sphere during the postwar period. Following
the Soviet-ftlieh Twenty-Tear Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid signed
by the puppet Polish Provisional Government on 21 April 1945, Poland
negotiated similar bilateral agreements with Yugoslavia in 1946 (abrogated
by Poland after Tito 's defection), Czechoslovakia in 1947, Bulgaria and
Hungery in 1948, and Rumania in 1949. The specific treaty term are
"to prevent danger of aggression an the part of Germany, or mgr other
country which would unite with Germany directly or in some other form"
and to provide for mutual consultation on "all important international
problems which may concern the interests of both countries, or peace,
and international cooperation." The treaties are so inclusive that
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aluosi any pretext would be sufficient for MOicov to justify action
allepdly taken in acoordatme with their terms.
Poland is also geared into the Soviet orbit through its member?
/4ip in the Cominform. .Polaid has participated in all known conferences
of the Caminform since its fetedileg in September 1947. Although Poland
has lagged behind other Satellites? in adherence to the Cominform line
it is rapidly catching up with them. Polish Communiats have been Sharply
divided over the issue of natiotalism as evidenced by the weak Polish
criticism of Tito following his Oenunciation by the Ccainform, as well
is by the defame of Tito before Om Cominform by GomnikaD Polandoe
leading national Communiet. More ridentlyt-however, nationalist
?lemmata in the Polish Socialist out Communiat parties have been repeatedly
purged. GoMulka has been twice demItod, and the eociallat and Comnunist
partf;es united. Thete measures hwy.) effectively sanerged or eliminated
nationalist &daps in the Party and Government and broaaht Poland more
into line'vith Cominform policies. The marked deteriorsAon in Polleh.'
Yugoalav relationcilluetrates Polaults adherence to the Coale= line.
Poland not only abrogated the Po3.iaa4ugos1av twenty?year neaaaggression
pact and its trade pact with Ingoelavia but also followed the Ather
Satellitos in a concerted propaganda campaign against the Tito rime
and in casting most Of the Yugoslav diplomatic staff from the coun\ay.
Soviet control over Poland was further strengthened by the apivintw
ment 7.,i November 1949 of Soviet Marsha' Konstantin K. Rokossovaky as
Polish Minister of 'Rational Defenas and as a member of the Central Commi:ee
of titto United Polish Workers (lmumveist) Party. Before Rokossovskyos
III .a 3
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appointment, Communist control over Poland was sufficient to prevent
serious anti...Soviet outbreaks; his appointment to the Central Committee
and subsequently (Nay 1950) to the Politburo of the MR gives the USSR
very direct control over Poland and sets the stage for the development
of the Polish Army into a politically reliable and effective fighting
force along Soviet lines.
The major problem confronting both the Soviet Union and the
Polish Government in integrating Poland into the Satellite orbit is that
of overcoming traditional Polish fear of Germany in order to bring about
a Polish-East German rapprochement. Polish fear of such a rapprochement
stems from (1) experience with past ,German expansion eastward; (2) memory
of the brutal Nazi occupation; and (3) apprehension over possible return
to Germany of the "recovered territories."
All elements of the Polish population are united on the necessity
and justice of retaining the western territories elated to Poland for
admiristration under the Potsdam agreements. Poles regard this area as
partial compensation for the eastern Polish territories lost to the
USSR after World War II. Even the Communist Government repeatedly
eniphaaizes this theme in all propaganda media, betraying its concern lest
the USSR favor Germany at Polanda expense. Although the agreement signed
ty.the East German regime with Poland on 6 July 1950 recognized the
legality of the Oder-Neisse line and will help to alley Polish fears
regarding their new territory, popular amity toward Germany is still
strorg and has not been eradicated by such actions as: the signing in
1948 of a Polish-German trade treaty, exchange visits of journalists,
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propaganda campaigns, anda most, significantly, the recent :signing of
a SOTIGO of economic, political, and cultural pact!, in Warsaw.
addri9PM4b....
In accordance with the Ii!lta and Potsdam agmementa, the Polish
Govemment aGreed to tie holeing of free and unfetterNxeleetions
adtive basis of universal suffrage and secret ba1lot in iieh all demo..
cratio anh anti-gami partiom shall have the right to take part...." Yeti.
from trill recognition of the Poliah Government by the US ed the UK on
Aily 1945 until 1.he rigged elections of 19 january 19471ish relam.
'blow udth the Uttand UN revolved around Poland'a determined nowrimplemen-
tation of this JniAmTmaticalal commitment. The Polish Government used
organized secr3ion and intimidation against opposition political groups
and rejeets0 repeated US-UF protests as %name interference' in pUrely
internal affairs..
Another Unfavorable aspect of Palish-US relational:as concerned
PalardIs western boundary, At Potsdam the Big Three recognised Polish
adiairdutration of the former german lands east of qms Oder and Neisse
Rivers, but affirmed that the final delimitation a the western frontier
of Pcland abould await the peace settlement.? RestItement of this policy
by Seoretary of State ByrnElat Stuttgart, on 6 Sepiomber 1946 caused'
unfamorablo popular reaction in Poland and further wirained official
PoliSh4TS relations.
The Coamunist regime in Poland, following the atandard Soviet
pattern, has endeavored to .:mduce ties with the.Weat to a minimum? It
,has directed virulent?anti-jS propaganda in order to dissredit thin
? III - 5
ATIMI rote
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country with the Polish people. It has harassed Western missions in
Poland by attempt:, to isolate the Polish people from any contact
with them. Enforcement of the Decree on State Security, promulgated
in November 1949, has further reduced Polish contacts with Western
representatives, 4eeeeech as severe penalties ere provided for giving
at well as receiving any typo of information.
Poland, as a dutiful Satellite, rejected participation in the
Mere:hen Plan in :Ay 1947. Despite this action and despite its drive
to reduce Western influence, the Polish Government has consistently sought
Western eccaomic assistance, without strings attached, for the reconstruee
tion of certain vital industries. Eeamples are Poland's trade agreements
with the UK and the Scandinavian countries.
fo
brialabatissitalawatimaJzsallatima.
Poland's participation in the United Nation:: is guided by two
considerations: (1) politically, Poland follows instructions of the
Soviet Union, with little or no evidence of independence of action;
(2) wonamically, Poland has tried to follow a policy of expanding trade
relation's with the West, particularly through the Economic Commission for
Europe. Poland has acted in the General Assedbly? the Security Council,
and the UN's subsidiary organisations as an instrument of Soviet policy
and aa a mouthpiece for Soviet propaganda. Poland's thorough Soviet
orientation has also been evident in the ILO (International Labor
Organisation), ?EEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation),
and UNICEF Molted Nations International Children's Energeday Fund)
from all cd'etich Poland materially benefits, and in which the Soviet
in - 6
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Union does not participatee
30 ZuLtatisarandaasatiLEggaligiZaja,
Polandes foreign policy vill probably continue to be dictated by
the USSR and the Polish Government is not likely to take an independent
at on any important foreign policy imam, UNICEF operations have
been terminated by Poland, as have those of ID (The International Hank
for Reconstruction and Development), the iN? (International Monetary
Furd)? the FAO (The Food and Agrieulture OTganization)? and the WHO
(World Health Organization) during 19509
III
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Union does not participate.
3. ZrejagaglgoLgL2alakurazagi
Polandes foreign policy win probably continue to be dictated by
the USSR and the Polish Governnent is not likely to take an independent
stand on any important foreign policy issues. UNICEF operations have
been terminated by Poland*, as have those of IBRD (The International Bank
for Reconstruction end Development) the IN? (International Monetary
Pund), the FAO (The rood and Agrieulture Olganisation) and the WHO
(WIrrld Health Organisation) during 1950.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
10 ingSajarmengaatallikaaPairsams
the period between World War I and Tlorld War II, Polish military
policleaWere defensive in purpose save for the campaigns. to advance its
eastern frontier in 1919 and 1920; Rased on traditional French concepts
of fixed lines of defense and the counterattack, they aimed at the protec?
tion of national sovereignty. Under the current Communist regime,. however,
Polish military policies are no longer basically nationalistic; they are
part of the ever...all Soviet policy for the entire Soviet orbit. The
Soviet policy for Poland within this framework is based on the following.
considerations:
(a) Protection of the CoMmunist regime's internal security;
(b) 'Development of political reliability of armed forces
personnel toward the Communist regime;
(c) Development of a sizeable defense force adaptable for Soviet
employment, in the event of war, in line of communications and zone of the
interior midsionSp and for offensive or defensive purposes within the
limitation of the nation'e military manpower resources consistent with
economic requirements;
(d) Reorganization and training of the. armed forces under Soviet
suplrvioion to achieve conformity with Soviet organization and requirements;
(e) Modernization of the armed forces in direct proportion to the
Soviet Union's confidence in their loyalty.
17--teren out of nine top staff posts in the Paid: Army are held by Soviet
Arme personnel
IV ? 1
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The extent of Soviet Control of Minh military policy and the importance
which the Soviet Union attaches to thai control are attested by the appoint-
medit in Nefteber 1949 of Soviet Marshal K.L Rekossovsky as Polish Minister
of National Defense:. Rokossevskh who heads a unified military establith
ment directing land, sea, and air elegant!), reorganited his staff and made
immediate plans for extentive eattwr-and political training programs in
order to insure political reliribility and increase the rate of improvement
in combat effectivesess of thl Polict armed forces.
2. ZLILAIntIO rclreql.
In time of peet;e? the lEnister o National Defense it empowered by the.
President, as the Supreme Csnaander 6f the National Armed Forces, to control
all the armed farces, i.ec4Gronnd Fume, Navy, Air Force, Anti-Aircraft
Foice, and Security Forceat In his Awn, the Minister of National Defense
empowers the Ch:ef of Ste: to exerolse command %Led adminietrative control
through the respective ccupanders of the Ground &lime Navy, and Air Force.
In the event or war, the tincture is modified by th appointment of a
Commander in Chief, who appraises ths President's) aomavad function, but who
is eonstitutionany reslt.nsible to the Sejm (Legislature'. for all matters
pertaining tethe compd.
In aatua7 practice his command structure is believed to be a formality.
It is like17. that the Palish command follows the Soviet trysteo which tends:
to giant aufbority to-vaall committees rather than to individvb. Marshal
KOK. Rekrasevaky, the resent Minister of National Defense, haz fmovice_
minister' Who are chelsed with: (1) Political Education of the Aimy;
(2) Stet Affairs; (:).Military Instruction; and (4) Supply* Of those
four tice-ministers, who are ostensibly of equal rank, the Vice.Minister
IST -k 2
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for Staff Affairs, General Wladialaw Urger), formerly of the Soviet Are,
in believed to he the most powerful, since he is'also Chief of Staff of
the Polish Armed Forces.
The strength of the Polieh armed forces is distributed in the following
manners Army, a minimum of 180,000; Navy, 7,336; and the Air Force 8,200.
These forces aro supplemented by two organizations under the control of
the Ministry of Public Seeuritys the Internal Security Corps (NEW with
a strength of 50,000 men; and the Frontier Guard with a strength of 25,000.
Including all these elements, Poland has a mobilized force of approximately
255,000 men.
AENZQ
(1)glingalluarulaznzi
The present Polish Army originated in April 1943 when an
infantry division was organized under Major General Boning in the Soviet
Union on Soviet patterns. By March 1944 the original division had been
expanded to an army consisting of infantry, cavalry, and armored elements.
It emerged under the leadership of Marshal Rola.Zymierski after the Soviet
summer offensive of 1944.
(2) ?trsecti; and Oraaniaatclon.
The minimum strength of the Polish Army is approximately
180,000, consisting of 15 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, six
independent brigades, 45 independent regiments, and six independent tettalions?
representing all arms and services. (It is believed, however, that a re.
organisation is contemplated which will establish infantry and armored
corps, thereby absorbing many of the independent regiments and battalions.)
IV 3
Fimmtvr
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These unite are immediately subordinate to four military districts,
apparently for administrative purposes. It is a matter of conjecture
whether the Military districts have an operational rosponsibility.as well.
The number and type of subordinate tactical units in each district. suggest
that tactical &copings are poesible Within the present framework of the
district organisation. Since army units are deployed with relative.
uniformity throughout Poland, disposition has apparently been motivated
in the main by administrative considerations Web as existing barracks,
supply lines, and training requirements, rather than by tactical considera.-
time* The Antift.Aircraft Force is believed still in the planning stage.
Attached to the Polish Army are three AAA regiments, each located in a
different Military district and believed to be GHQ troops under the
command of the military district in which they are located*
(3) 93m1147 Qf PMP503221?
The discipline, morale, and efficiency of the Polish
Atter have not been high because Of repeated purges of offieer personnel,
dislike of the Soviet officers in command throughout the Army structure,
and the relative failure of the pelitical-education program to indoctrinate
personnel with loyalty toward the Communist regime.
(4) Inligns?
Training is primarily of the small unit variety.
Maneuvers on a divisional level, of an inconclusive nature, took place
for the first time during the summer of l9490 The Polieh Army healed
only limited combat experience, a weakness which has been increased by
the successive purges of those prewar officers Who had combat experience
with the Western allies during World War II. Although extensive basic
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training programs have been in effect, it is believed that the lack of
experienced instructors in both commissioned and enlisted ranks will cause
the, programs to fall short of objectives. The situation is likely to
continue since political reliability rather than military proficiency is
the criterion for advancement to positions of responsibility in the Polish
Antr.
(5) SUANSA.
The Polish Army, through Soviet influencevhas emphasized
artillery, with the result that there has been a substantial increase in
the artillery fire power of infantry elements. It is estimated that the
infantry divisions alone contain 960 artillery pieces, 76.2.-mm or larger, and
420 mortars, 82-mm or larger. In addition, independent artillery units
are believed to be receiving limited training with Soviet 152-em self-pro-
pelled gunhewitzers (JSU452). Polish artillery is largely Of Soviet
origin. The small area issue is believed to be the latest type. The
armored arm is estimated to possess over 200 tanks (T6.34's and JS-210 or
JS-31e). In addition, the Polish Army has approximately 150 SPts of
various caliber.
Polish anti-aircraft artillery material consists of equip
ment ftrnidhed by the Russians or left behind by the Germans. The Poles
are known to possess Soviet 37-mm? 76-eve and 85-em AA guns. Soviet fire
control equipment is standard in the Polish Army.
(6) Caeabilitim
Exclusive of the Internal Security Corps and the Frontier
Guerin, the Polish Army is a-force of questionable dependability at the '
$
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time of this report. It is contincmgy subject to political.pnrges*
It has leaked an adequate higher tartical command structure, trained.
officers Of ability, and modern saw and artillery. By itself it is
.incapable of sustained offensive or Safimaive action. Despite thole
limitations, the Polish Argy constitives LI addition to the Soviet dor-
fensive and offensive potential*
b. IOW
(1) ilISMIWASRI?
The Pelee have never 'men primariliA. seugaring people? and
during the perioe between World Wan I :Ind II, that* attempu to booms
save masters ea! the Baltic was ummuccessful. Durinit,World War :T Faith
vessels and Palidhaanned British weeds under the opvrational contri.
of the Britldh Navy foUght well fce. tba Allies on many evasions, but
most of tie Polish naval personnel wh6 fought with the Bri:ish and gained
valuabl,J experience in modern naval lit:ears did not return ?o Poland after
the Tlx. The relatively few naval prsonnel who returned now exert neg.
liriale influence in the Faith Nely and are'gredually being .lorced out
a the service because of alleged disloyalty toward the CommuniLt regime*
':he Polish Navy has been undergoin; organisational and personnel changes
to bring it into conformity with tus organisation and requiremento of the
Soviet fleet.,.
(2) &MAW
The mission of the PUwh Navy is to provide for Poltndes
defence in cooperation with the grand and air forces in tins of war, and
to protect the states maritime irbarests in time of peace. The couposii-
tion of the fleet and its small sire emphasize the defensive character of
? 6
0 21113VPIS
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the miseioni as does the limited capability of the Nacres amphibious forces.
Because Poland has no Coast Guard, the duties normally as..
signed to such an organization are performed by the Navy. These duties
Include west watching, anti...smuggling and anti-escape petrels', and, light.
house operations. Inadditdanothe coastal defense batteries are under the
central of the Navy.
Polish naval strategy and tactics are gravitating toward.
the basic Soviet concept that the navy is the maritime counterpart of
the army. This policy is borne out by the sizeable allocations of naval
personnel to the Marine Corps and coast defense organizations, far out of
proportion to those assigned to the seagoing unite.
(3) glkUNNgth*
The personnel strength of the Polish Navy is estimated to
be 7,336 divided as fellows: General Service, 2,586; Air, 975; Marinea,
750; and Coastal Defense, 3,025; plus a reserve of 3,360. In addition
it is estimated that there are 2,500 man in the reserve training program
and 2,000 in the State-owned Merchant Marine.
The Polish fleet consists of one destroyer, three sutnarines?
four auxiliary motor minesweepers (ANS), 13 coastal minemeepero?12 stall
adbmarine chasers, and other minor coastal craft. All naval units are
stationed in Polish home waters. All of these Ships are in poor to fair
condition. The three submarines are obsolescent and lack modern .equipment.
In the summer of 1949 the Pali& Navy received from the USSR 4 to 6 motor
boats, subMarine chasers (PTC)? and three modern auxiliary craft.
IV??
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(A) .9g4IISEJLEICEMOOle
Domination by the 'USSR and use of inferior equipment for
training have reduced the effiaency of the Polish. personnel considerably
below wartime standards. Soviet domination has resulted in discrimination
against qualified naval personnel Who are not politically aligned with the
Communists, and in selection of politically reliable personnel for respon-
sible positions without regard to their professional qualifications.
FertherMixre? attention is deveted to political indoctrination at the
expense of professional training.
(5)
psi
4.4 ,
The aephibious forces of Poland are designed for defensive
operations. It...gently there are three groups of 250 Marines eat*. Their
operations would be strictly limited because of their small nuierical
strength, lack of suitable landing craft, shortage of equipment, and
deficiency lb trained personnel.
The strong points of the naval-operated coastal defense system
are located at Swinoujscie (Swinemande) at the entrance to Szczecin Bey
and the Gdansk (Danzig) Bey area, with lighter fortifications along the
coast between these two areas. The Bel peninsula is being refortified
extensively and will constitute another strong position when completed.
The recent imposition of security regu1ati6ns prohibiting forayers from
these areas may indicate that more extensive fortifications are, planned.
The principal naval bases are located at Gdynia and Gdanak.
There are indications that Ustka (Stolpmunde) in being considered as a
possible location for a third naval base to be developed when the ow:now
17 - 8
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or the countrywillpermit. Polish naval shipbuilding and repair facilities
provide far little more than routine maintenance of available vessels.
This situation is likely to continue until Polish industry has ,sufficiently
recovered to satisfy priority demands of the USSR, the national *Amoy,
anithe Poll& Army.
(6) Canabigities,
The Polish Navy possesses only limited effectiveness for
contributing to the coastal defense of Poland, and is of little value to
the Soviet war potential. Its activities would be restricted to coastal
minelaying? minesweeping, inshore patrol, and burl defense at selected
Strong points, Its period of activity would be confined to the initial
phases of an assault against 'the Polish coast lines,
421.16051.
(1) 12=1
The nucleus of the Polish Air Force, is now Organised,
consists of those Polish air units will& were incorporated into the Soviet
Air Force after the partition of Poland in 1939. These units fought with
the USSR during the Worldlier II.1
Control of the Polish Air Force is and will continue to be in
Soviet hands. Many of the high-ranking positions in the Polish Air Force
are held by Soviet officers, Originally, mew positions even down to squadron
level ware hold by Soviet personnel. Some of the Soviet officers in the
1. Many Polish airmen escaped to %gland during the early months of the
war and fought with great distinction in the Royal Air Force; However,
of those few who elected to return to Poland for postwar service in the
Polish Air Forces only a handful have survived the maw purges. -
IV -.9
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tactical units are now being replaced with Polish personnel. These Polish
officers are apparent/7 limited to those Whom the Soviets regard as politi?
callyreltable. Many have served in the Soviet forces.. There has also been
continued integration of Soviet personnel, both enlisted men and pilots,
into the Polish Air Force, with the result that ?a large percentage of
enllsted men and pilots are former Soviet airmen.
Prior to the winter of 194761948, the Polish Air Force was.
not an independent organisation, btt vas an integral part of the Polish
Amy. During this period, however, the Polish armed forces were re.,
organised under a single Minister of National Defense, at whidh time the
Air Force was given independent states. tinmimily, at least, the Air Force
now ranks coequally with the ,Az and Navy, although the Amy actually
continues to be the predominant service.
(2) AIS2Bak.
Personnel of the Polish Air Force are estimated to nudber
8,200. Of these, 600 are believed to be pilots, 400 air crew personnel,
and the remainder ground personnel.
The Polish Air Force has soma 450 Obsolescent aircraft,
many of which are non-operational, owing to improper mainteniwice. Nearly
all tactical aircraft novrused by the Poles are. of Soviet manufacture. ?
Aircraft strength and types are as fellovs:
Light Bombers
41
Attack Bombers
135
Fighters
170
Transports
17
Trainers
.112
TOTAL
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(3) Ikalalato,
Training methods used in the Polish air schools are considered
roughly the same as those employed in the US, so far as purely flight train-
ing is concerned. Operational training is entirely different and in pro-
dominantly of a ground support nature in accordance with the Soviet doctrine
of concentration on tactical aupport training for the Air Force. Because
of purges of personnel the standard of skill is not up to US or USSR
staniards. It is believed, however, to be higher than that of any other
Satellite. Ground training is probably better than flight training, since
very little flying is being accomplished. It is believed that more pilote
are available than can be used with exiating equliment. Some Polish
personnel have been sent to the USSR for training. As in the case of
other branches of the armed aervivev, political indoctrination has a ?
prominent place on the curriculum or all lir Force trAiTon establish-
menta. It, has been estimated that probably as much time is devoted to
this as to all other subjects ceibined.
(4) Ground Facilities'.
Of the hundreds of airfields known to have been used in
Poland and the western territories acquit-ed during World War U, only
81 are believed currently available for tee, in addition to six sea-
.piano bases on the Baltic coast reportedlr in usable condition. Existing
airfields arviwell distributed with complmes around the larger eitiee
and have either bard-surface runways or usable natural surfaces with some,
facilities. Many of the so-called wartime airfields have reverted to their
farmr agricultural state, and there is a noticeable pattern that more
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airfields, even those with bard'-surfaced runways, are reverting to agri-
culture, probably because the combined military and civil requirements-do
not include their use.
Bard-surfaced runways are known to exist at 40 airfields,
most of Which were laid down hythoGermans and 10 of Which are in the
Polish western territories taken from Germany. Other than plans for
further development and modernization of the two large Warsaw airfields,
little is known of projected airfield development in %land. Information
indicates that these fields are being provided with concrete runways, or
In come cases, that existing runways are being extended. Airfield in-
stallations are being improved to sane extent, particularly radio and
lighting facilities. The airfields at Warsaq/Bornorowe and Warsaw/Okecie
are Imam to be suitable in weight bearing capacity and laagth of runway's
for medium bomber operations. These fields are also suitable for jet
operations. For jet operations the USSR is currently using other fields
whit% do not meet US standards. Current airfield construction and ieprove-
ment is apparently limited at the present time, although Polend possesses
over 400 sites apparently offering excellent locations for field improvement
when and if desired.
- Unless an extensive program of rehabilitation and construction
is launched, the capability of Polish airfields will retain for some time
restricted to light bomber (B47) type operations. However, B-oW type
operations weld probably be maintained for a brief period an a limited
scale fran such large airfields as Warsaw, Okecie, Biala Fodlieka, Gdynia,
Praust, and Brieg.
12
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(a) iiMatalialltettaill21.24221.
A. warning and, intercept system as such is not known to
exist in Poland. Some radar equipment was abandoned by the retreating
Germans during the later stages of World 'tar II, but most of this equip'
ment is estimated to be unoperational at the present time,i The Poles ?
are not capable industrially of equipping, operating, or maintaining an
?Motive radar defense system.
Poland in not known to be operating a sonic and visual
early warning system. Though the civil telephone network is extensive
and coed be used for early warning communieation, there is a marked
shortage of telephone, instruments and central equipment. The Over411
operational efficiency of the Polish telephone network is low
No Polish radar warning system is known to exist, although
it is possible that a few scattered and inefficient radar installations may
be in operation for training imposes along the Baltic coast. The USSR
has established overlapping radar coverage along the east Baltic Coaat,
In the Soviet Zone of Germannin Austria, and in Czeehoslovakta, whioh
presumably you'd give radar warning of any flights directed towards Polish
territeey from areas other than the USSR. This radar network is believed
to to capable of intensive tracking and to be in a constant state of alert.
Soviet force,' are also believed to maintain mobile radar equipment in Poland.
Poland is believed to have no Polish ground controlled
Interception radar, and no airborne radars with the possible exception of
token quantities of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Mark III,Whiet
IV ?13
SFORKT
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received vide distribution in Europe after 'World Vass 119 ?
(b) badriLIMELZMUINUatano
Extensive ground defense measures for the protection of
air equipment have not been apparent in Poland, although tatantheirmad
reports have indicated the availability of underground hangar and main.
Unarm) facilities9
Measures for defense of the civil population against.
air attack have not been.anthoritatively noted.
(6) gmabiligea,
At the present time the Polish Air Force baa only limited
capabilities, although it is considered to be the strongest of the Satellite
AirForcee, Its primary capability lies in the field of ground support,
Base. an Polish resources alone, it could maintain its present effective-
nen only for a very limited time, The capabilities of the Polish Air
Force should be judged not in the light of the limited resources vhieh_
Pawed nev possesses but as a Satellite force which the Soviet Union might
&wee to support and expand
gefillatiZ2SEM0
in additionto the Polish Army, the Internal Security Corps (EBW),
with a strength of 50,0000 and the Frontier Guard OP(P) ttmbering.25,900?
are a part of the effective fighting force of Poland. The personnel of
these organization? are better trained, better equipped, and have higher
political reliability than the personnel of the Polish Army. These
orgarizations'provide a trained mappower pool capable of performing
militarymissiona.to supplement the Polish awe Both organizations are
controlled by the Minintry of Public Security, but are under the operational
IV ? 14 .
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maned of the Ministry of National Defeasse.
Of the various aecurity agencies, the Internal Seniority Corps (OW)
has the greatest military importance. Charged' with the suppression of any
overt resistance to the government, the organisation is the Polish ?center-.
. part of the Soviet MVD. Its 50,000 personnel is divided into twenty regi-
ments *Joh are motorised, well.trained, equipped with small arms, artillery
and, in ease regiments, with eraser. Recruits are carefully selected Item
? screened Army personnel vho have high political reliability and military
ability. In general, KJ unite are bettor prepared for caabe.t than
comparable units in the Pali& army.
Another security force of importance is the Frontier Guard (W0P).
Although it appears that this organisation is trained and administered by
the Polish Army, it falls under the operational control of the Miniatry
of Pablio Security* Charged with the mission of guarding the Polish land
frontiers and Baltic) coast, 14'0F elements are stationed at all points of
entry, including airfields to prevent the illegal exit or entrance of
persons or goods. All personnel have been procured by voluntary enlist-
ments tram the Army. The organisation is well equipped with standard Soviet
small arms and miscellaneous vehicles, hit has no light artillery or armor.
Nevertheless, it is estimated to be a trained force capable of effectively
supplementing the Army.
Other security forces of military significance include the Citizen?
Militia. (24)), which has a strength of 107,000, and the Militia Reserve
(ORM)), which has an estimated strength of 70,000. Both organisations
are alaarged with part-time rural police and constabulary duties and
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are trained and equipped with small arms only. Their major value to the
national defense wad be in releasing other troops for oombat by amain
internal security duties.
bikESUESEdli.
The recent appointment (November 1949) of Soviet Marsha/ K.N. RekossovaW
as Polish Minister of National Defense indicates Soviet determination to
correct the legging progress of military and political training in the
Polleh armed forces. The Soviet Union appears prepared to make an all.
out effort to mold the Polish armed forces into a reliable fighting force
along Soviet lines, under Soviet commands and at Soviet disposition.
Rekousovakes background leaves little doubt that he can do the job. It
is estimated that once Nokossovsky has achieved reasonable success in his
missions the Soviet Union will eupply the Polish armai forces with additioe&
modern militagy equipment.
So far as the Polish Air Force is concerneds some modernization has
already ocaurred. A total of 20 YAK planes ware received from the Soviet
Zone of Germany early in 1930. One tgpe 16 jet fighter is believed to be
attached to the Polish Air Force. As the Soviets replace the pistonedriven
fighters and light bombers of the Soviet Air Force with jets, it is believed
that the Polish Air Force will receive the supplanted material, The speed
of the re-equipment of the Polish Air Force with new, modern equipments
including jets, appears to depend primarily on the availability of such
equipment in the USSR for delivery to the Satellitesc
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CHAIN OF COMMAS; POLISH ARMED FORCES
President
Supreme Commander of
Polish Armed Forces
Soleslaw Sierut
Minister of National Defense
Marshal KA-. Rokoesovsky*
Chief of Staff &Vice
Min, for Staff Affairs
Gen.Wiadielaw KOreaye
Minister of Public Security
Gen. Stanislaw Radkiewics*
1 Vice Minister for
Political Education
Brig.Gen. Nasakowski
Vice Minister for
Organ &Training
Gen. Poplawski*
Vice Minister for
Roar Services
?Gen, Komar*
Rear Admiral
Victor S, Caerokow
(alias Cherokov)
Strength-16336
Ground Force
Gen. Stanislaw
Poplawski*
Strength leo coo
Air Force
Gen, Romayke*
Stroith a20
Anti...Aircraft
Force
Security
Farce
Internal Brig.Gen. A:limn Hubner
Strength 700
Corps (IBW)
Frontier. Guard
WOP Commanding
Officer Unknown
_St 000
'Warsaw
Dydgosscs
Wroclaw
Krakow
Military District
Military District
Military District
Military District
Brig.Gen. Rotkiewice*
Maj. Gen,
Bronislaw Poltursyckie
Maj. Gen.
Karol Strasewski*
Col. Rmaian*
* Soviet Officers
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CHAPTER V
SIRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFEDTING US SECURITY
1. agora.
The domination of Poland by the Soviet Union affects US security
for the following reasons* (1) located on the Baltic coastal plain and
possessing a teuperate climate which enables year round military opera-
tion% Poland is a natural land corridor linfring Western EUrope with the
strategic Minsk-Smolensk and Lwow-Kiev corridors of the Soviet Union;
(2) the extensive indmatrial, agricultural, and =wearer resources of
Poland significantly augment the Soviet war potential; and (3) the
Polish Government is useful as an agent of Soviet policy and prcrpaganda.
2. roliticalo
11Tective use of Poland by the USSR in its strategic plans depends
upon the absolute subordination of Poland to the KremliWe will. The
present degree of control exercised by the USSR is satisfactory and insures
Poland la cooperation as an instamment of Soviet foreign policy. In the
event of an East-West wart the USSR could continue to control Poland
effectively by increasing Soviet occupation forces in the country. The
strong nationalism of the Polish people, however, as well as their intense
dislike of all things Russian, will continue as forces inimical to the
interests of the USSR,
.fin element of strategic Importance to the US is the now latent re-
sistance of the Polish population, even including considerable elements of
the Communist Party, to the ever-growing Soviet domination of Poland,
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The Polish Commit leaders have endeavored to eliminate this resistance
through, terror and propaganda;" They have made but little headway, however,
particularly against the Catholic Chureh and the peasants, who constitute
the two largest and most potent groups opposing the Communipts. If the
Krealin,s control apparatus over the Poles should be weakened, polish:
resistance would quickly become active and would, be a serious threat
to continual Commenist domination. Without external support from the
West, however, Polish resistance could successfully be contained by the
USSR.
:30Eisistaia.
The sizeable Polish industrial and agricultural production is a val.o
vale asset to the Soviet war potential. The current and potential surpluses
of Polish coal, coke, zinc, steel, foodatuffs? and other basic commodities
aid the economies of the other Satellites and thus add to the economic
potential of the entire Soviet orbit. Furthermore, Poland has a balanced
econonyend a.growing manpower potentials both of which enhance Polish
capabilities for continued economic aenension.
Poland is also of vital importance to the Soviet Union became) the
Polish railway system is the main link between the USSR and Central -
Europa. Locomotives now being built in Poland are designed either for
use on Soviet broad gauge or Polish standard gauge track. Moreover,
Peaish trackage and rolling stook have increased and immoral :as a result
of inereaeed efficiency in operation and greater government interest in
the transport field.
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Hieleliane
Polandos geographical position astride the Baltin coastal p:Lein, which
provMes the most direct land route between the USSR 1,nd Western korope
Oven Poland an important position in Soviet strategic planning6 In \IF
Soviet military ventures, the war potential representld by control of
%lanes industry and manpower will be an added streegic advantage for
the USSR. Poland also provides sites for air operations against Western
&trope and serves as a. strong defensive outpost for the Soviet Uniono
Although the present political reliability of the Polish Any would
circumscribe its usefulness to the USSR in any offenstve action, it would
probehly be capable of guarding supply lines and depote and of maintaining
Internal security under the scrutiny of the reliable Pelidh security forces?
Other manpower not used in the Polish armed forces or fa: essential produo-
tion would probably be organised into labor battalions fr use in Poland or
the USSR. If the Soviet Union should succeed in overcomiN; the way technical
deficiencies of the Polish Amp Polish troops might be used for local
offensive operations in such areas an German whore traditional hatreds?
would provide additional Incentives for action.
V-3
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CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPLUITS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Tho effeotiveness of Soviet *entre/ of Poland and& therewith& the
strategics unefUlness of Poland to the USSR will probably aontinue to inorease0
The Sottet.ortented Poliah Gwerrummt mill Gradually strengthen its hold over.
ths,eountryo Although sporadio reeistenee to the Communintsisill eentinUe
tektimw ineroase0 it sill not be sufficient sortensly to,thretten Communist
contra:Le
,Anthaugh nationalism is etreng in Poland and offeets even the leodership
of the Polish Conmunist ParblY0 the penetration of Party emd Covernmeet by
trusted Soviet agents& coven as the presence of the Soviet in the
oeuntrr& mili prevent any: Titoist defection In Poland? The potential throat
of netionalist deviation will& however& present a continuing problem for
the Comunist Government es it gradually sovietises Poland? despite the,
poriodf.e removals from Party and Government of individuals considered un.
tructeprtby0
O r paramount eignificanoe in any plane of the Gevernment to csocietizo
MAMA Win be Communietoueoess in overcoming the reeietanee'of the Church
and tho magnate? Thus far the Government Is named cautiously and gradually
agatner; theme tee groups and this tempo can bo expeoted to continue? It is
net boaecod that the Communiete eill euocoed for some years to come in making
the Church neutral and the peasants submisoire?
ilve Governnents which has alreedy nationalized the mans of production
and dtotribution& will acetate? over tighter control of the nation*e economy&
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and in mo doing will premed with the gradual elimination of to middle ?lame?
)barther plane? iamb as the collectivitsation of agriculture, will only be
pushed' ea the. Cossamist regime bowmen more confident of Ito ability to oarry
out its: programa without serioway interfering with the operation of the
natlents economy?
Soviet planning previdee for in.tegreting the Polish and Czechoslovak in.
dustries0 embracing the Silesian area, into an "Eastern Ruhr)." The epeoialised
production of this wee will be increasingly integrated with that of the USSR
and the eiher Satellites under an over-all plan. Although the plan hao been in
existeree for scveral poem its implementation will oontiene to wee at a slew
pada because of the shortage of neeeneary capital goods and the leek of se.
eperatlen between the two rations?
Beeense of certain defioieneices in the Polish eoonomy. suJoh as lack of
sktllo tudestrial labor and shortages of oleetrieel equipment and BODO of the
bast* enteritis; required for an iloduetrialized economy, Poland is vulnerable
to the curtailment of exports from the Tient. Although loss of trade with the
neat 'hes met MO yet damaged Pelee:dee economy. in the long run it will serve
to disrupt Soviet planaing?
Under the cozened of Soviet Marshal Rokoesovsky? Poland4e armed forces
are o/e?eoted to become an &swot of 1115ro military value to the Soviet Union?
Rokoasoysky, appointed Polish Master of National Defense in November 3.9490
has been. charged with developing -the Polish Army into a politically reliable
and toThnically trained military force available for Soviet use. The Soviet
Union :La already naterially aiding the Polish Government in the construction
of nee military setabliehmente and the improvement of those not: in emd.atenee?
VI 2
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Available evidence indicatea that the Soviet Union has long-range plans for
the Military development of Poland,
Gi OZIOUgh time* the USSR will be able to consolidate its politicali,
economiqs rad military position in Poland eztd wiile to an increasing degree&
derive the benefits that result from suoh control* The imposition of strioter
=port controls by the Trento. plus the growing shortage of capital goods might,"
however., cause a revision of the long...range Soviet plane for Es:plaiting Polira:.
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APPENDU A
TERRAIN AND CLIMATE
10 Unifia0
Poland, a "plaine?land" about the size of the state of New Mexico,
is tho major land route between Western and Eastern Europe. It is
situated between GermaAr on the west and the Soviet Union on the past;
across the Carpathian and Sudeten Mountains in the south lien Czechoslovakia;
on tha north is the Baltic Sea.
.Broad, a1iIi? level plains occupy nearly 90 percent of Poland., The
central Plain is a continuation of the North German Lowland, which
in Poland widens eastward, crosses the Pripet Marshes, and merges into
the lowlands of European Russia. At the German border the Plain is 80
miles wide; at the Soviet boundary it is more than 200 mien wide. North
of the Central Plain is the Baltic Lake District, a.sone 50 to 100 miles
wide consisting of lakes ancl sandy hillocks. The north..flowing Vistula
River divides the Lake District into two nearly equal parts. Although
the Lake District is the aecond largest of the physical regions of Poland,
it is the, least important econcedcally. South of the Central Plain are
the hilly plateau regions of Lublin and "Little Poland," which are
completely surrounded by upland plains, including the Sandoaderz Plain
between the two plateaus and the Silesian Plain in the west. Within
the hill lands and western upland plains are the most highly indturtrialized
areas of Poland. The only mountain areas in Poland ? the Carpathian and
&eaten mountains lie along the southern and southwestern fringes.
A ?1
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Sc iagage?ATIMAG
(1) 2/32.942112412eZda*
The Central Plain is the heartland of Poland. It ic. pre?
dominantly an agricultural region. , Despite the vagtneas of the Plains
there are no outstanding differences in landforms or type of land use
throughout its extent. The area is characterized by fields of grain and
fodder erops stretching for miles across the gently undulating aurface.
Despite its general uniTosimitys the Poll 4 Plain mgy be
diviend into three sections. (1) Ikest of Poznan the plain is rolling.
Hilltop elevations range between 200 and 350 feet. The broad and in.
tensively cultivated valleys are normally about 100 feet below the general
level. The less fertile hilltops are wooded. State forests cover lar
areas in the westernmost part of the area and between the Nate? and itarthe
rivers. (2) Between Poznan and.the Vistula Rivers the gently. undulating
plair is prairie.like in character. Eighty percent of it is under cultivaa
tione ryes potatoes s and hogs are the principal products. The sugar beet
industry is important on the rich clay?loan soils of the Poznan District.
(3) East of the Vistula Rivers marshes and maw areas become more
conspicueus features of the landscape. Loss than 50 percent of this area
is arable, and livestock raising is the major industry. Oats and potatoes
?emu a relatively high proportion of the cultivated land. In the extreme
sontkeasts near the Lublin Uplands is zone of rolling plain with fines
fertile soils. This is one of the most important Wheateproducing areas
of Poland.
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The Central Plain supports 45 percent of the population of
Polsnth The majority of the people live in small farm villages* Papule-
tion is densest in the west, thinning out to the east where the plain is
mare maralw and the climate more aware. The three largest cities of
,Polauff,..Warsaaa Lode, and Pesten are located on the Central Plain.
Warsaw, the national capital and a cultural and industrial center, is
situated on a terrace of the Vietula River* Lodz, at the southern edge
of the low plains, is especially noted for textile manufacture.
(2) DasjalastakastAtarlat.6
The Baltic* Lake District lies between the Central Plain and
the Baltic Sea and is divided by the Vistula River into the Pomeranian Lake
Distriet in the west end the East Prussian Lake District in the east.
The wide Vistula Valley free Torun to Danzig provides an
excellent route frima the Central Plain to the Baltic Sea. The artificially
drained Vistula trough and delta are fertile and intensively cultivated*
Wheat, sugar beets, and lush meadow lands occupy most of the area. ,The
flat delta, 25 miles wide, is crossed by a mase of drainage channels.
Danzig, the most important port oZPoland, is an the northwestern tip
of the data. Gdynia; the second port, is 15 miles north of Dansig* The
terrail of the lake District is characterised by an intermiature of lakes,
undulabing sandy hills, marsh and heath-filled depressions, and hummocky
ridges covered with pines patches of sands, clay, gr vel, and boulders
are also scattered irregularly throughout the area. The population
density in the Lake District is the lowest in Poland.
Mast of the Pomeranian Lake District lies between 300 and
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500 feet in elevation. The northern and southern parts of the area are
eloping plains of mixed gravels, sand, and clay? These eaains have been
deep ls cut by numerous small streams.
Forty to fifty percent of the Panamanian Lake District is
forested mostly with pines Infertile soils, numeroue lakes, and soggy
depressioes restrict crop cultivation to less than one4hird of the total
areae Grazing, however, is important?
The East Prussian Lake District rises gradually northward
from the Central Plaine The southern part of this District is a sandy
plain with many swamps and peat bogs. Bills and ridges are prominent only
in the central part of the District, and they are more subdued than the
MI] s of Pomerania, TO the east, the East Prussian Lake District beoemes
lower and flatter, and lakes and swamps are larger and more numerous.
Crop production is of little importance except north of
Olsztyn, Grazing of aheep? cattle, and swine is important out
the areae
(3) IttazaaraMaina.
.Poland? south of the Central Plain, is made up of two plateau
areas surrounded by upland plains. To the southwest is the Silesian Plain
and to the southeast the Sandomierz nails* Elevations in these higher
plains range from 450 to over 800 feet. ..The terrain is characteristically
roiling, but -same low bills rise above the general ievel, Streams flow
through narrow winding valleys. Although marshy areas Are numerous,
soils are generally coarser and better-drained than in the Central Plain,
Agriculture is most important on the fertile loessal soils
of thp treeless central part of the Silesian Plain, where over 80 percent
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of the land is under cultivation. Wheat is the chief crop, but sugar
beets are also important* Borth of the Oder River and in the extreme
northwest, livestock raising is .the chief occupation* Scattered areas
of higher lend, although sandy and infertile, rapport sane crops
renly potatoes, oats, and rye. Bear the base of the Sudeten Mountains,
mining, quarrying, and manufacturing are more Important than agriculture*
In the southern corner of the Silesian Plains a wide pass
known as the Moravian Gate separates the Sudeten and Carpatiiianmemotains
and provides a low-elevation route from Poland to Czechoslovakia*
The Sandomierz Plain is a triangular-shaped area bordered
by tha plateaus of Lublin and "Little Poland", and the Carpathian. Mountains*
West of Etakow? a corridor about 12 miles wide connects the Sandomierz and
Silesian Plains*
The northern part of the Plain is nearly level, and most of
it is in open pasture* Farther south, the land is gently rolling, more
fertile, and more widely cultivated* Several large sandy areas on the
plain have remain forested* The Vistula and lover part of the San River
meander across the Sandomierz Plain along wide, flat-bottomed valleys.
Most of the Plain is vellwdrained but the lover areas are subject to
spring flooding.
The San River is of great potential Importance as a route of
commanication4 since its headwaters rise within a few miles of the Dniester
River which flows into the Black Sem*
(4) Eta:testal Areas,
The two plateau areas of southern Poland differ markedly.
"Little Poland" consists of a broad upland plain bordered on the northeast
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and southwest by bills that rise to elevations of, 2,000 and 1,300 feet,
-respectively. Most of the.tuMin Plateau is rolling or billy, and the
general elevation is someWhat lower than that of "Little Poland."
"Little, Poland? consists of two groups of hills separated by
upland plains. The southwestern group of hills is composed of broed.
topped ridges of almost uniform elevation and steepwalled valleys 100 to
150 feat deep. at of the ridge tops are under cultivation; the steeper
elopes and rocky areas are grazed or wooded. Among the scattered outlying
hills to the southwest is the Silesian industrial area, the most important
mining and manufacturing center of Poland.
The upland plain of "Little Poland" lies at an elevation Of
abort 650 feet. In the north it is undulating; ftrther south the surface
has been. dissected into low hills. Most of the area is fertile and in-
tentively cultivated, eecept in some northern parts Where swamps and sandy
wooded areas are used for pasture.
In general, the soils of the northwestern part of "Little
Poland" are infertil and much of the area is covered by dense forest, or
dry meadow. Farther east, the surface is richly covered with loese and
? fareing is prosperous. The loess covered section ends north of Sandomiers
in u 230-4'oot escarpment.
especqn1Iy of iron, is important in the ridge and
valley area. Kieloe'and several nearby towns are manufacturing centers.
(2) 212.4jatellekus.
The Lublin Plateau lies southeast of the city of Zahn%
between the Bug and San tivere. The highest points on the Lublin Plateau
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are eaout 10300 feet. Only in the southwestern part of the Plateau is
the tarrain rugged enough to be an obstacle to transportation. Northward,
elevations gradually decrease and the Plateau merges into the Central 'Plain.
The Woad...topped spurs, which make up the northern portion of the Plateau,
are interrupted by occasional narrow, steep.sided valleys.
Nest of the soils of the Lublin Plateau are fertile and welI
drained and more than 70 percent of the area is under cultivatioa. The
rich -4heat1ands of the adjoining Central Plain extend southward onto the
Plateau. The populatiOn density of the Plateau, though lower than that of
Little Foland,a is over 200 persons per square mile inmost parts of the
Lublin Plateau.
aG Zafe.slaillataa-assiairsaasUala.
(1) IbLanallaimasaislaa.
The Carpathian Mountains are across 200 miles of the southern-
most part of Poland. This region consists mainly of mountains with rounded
ridges that are separated by wide flat-bottomed valleys. ElevationS in the
northern footmile average 1,5004,800 feet. The majority of the southern-
most create are between 20000 and 2,500 feet in elevation. Rugged mountaims
are found only in a few email, disconnected areas along the Czech border.
The moat prominent of these ranges, the High Tatry, has several peaks over
7,000 feet high, The mountains are not a barrier to transportation, since
numerous easily accessible passes lead southward to Czechoslovakia. A
major highway and railroad route between Poland and Czechoslovakia crosses
the Dekla Pass (elevation 1,650 feet).*
Agriculture is important in the low northern foothills, the
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broader valleys between ridges, and in the intermontane basins around
Kroszos Wowy Sacs, and Nowy Targ. Sheep are raised throughout the area.
The eteeper slopes and ridge tops are covered with dense deciduous forests:
and lumbering is ipportant. Other industries are unimportantexcept
in the western foot31411s Where the Katowice4rakew industrial region extends
into the Carpathian region at Cieagyn and Biala. Several oil fields are
located southeast of Erosno: but the total production is not great.
(2). IlLe Sudeten Mountains.
Between the Silesian Plain and the southwestern border of
Poland is a small but eopOlez section-of the Sudeten Mountains. These
mountains in general are more rugged than the Carpathians, although average
?elevetions of the tee regions are about the same.
The highest arid most rugged part of the Sudeten area is in
the northwest: where several peaks, incleding the Riesengobirge? rise to
over 5,000 feet. Elsewhere few peaks emceed 2:800 feet. Within the
mountains, Sharp-crested, ?achy ridges alternate with broad, rounded
domee. Traffieable routes across the region are numerous, but many of
them fellow narrow, winding valleys between the ridges and across gaps.. .
The main economic value of the Sudeten area is in its mineral
resorrees and forest removes. Coal, iron mines, and rock quarries
ere uumerous in the northern hills and around Liebau. Lumber camps and
smell factory towns are scattered throughout the area. Agriculture is
unimportant except in the hilly basin areas and in the northern foothills.
29 Wats.
The climate of Poland is transitional between the mild, humid west.-
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Darepeaa type and the severe, drier Russian type. Winters are long, cad,
and cloudy. Teuperatures for the three coldest months average between 264"
and 300 F. Belowfreesing temperatures prevail for about 3 months; and
rivets, lakes, and menthes are frozen Baldly almost that long. .In general,
the I/inters are longest and most Severe to the .at and in the higher
altitudes to the south. Posnan, in the western part of the Central Plain,
averages 4. degrees 'warmer in winter than Lublin, farther east; and Danzig,
on the coast, is 8 decrees warmer in winter than Zakepans In the southern
mountains. Protected lowland areas, such as the Sandomiers Plain and
southeasternrSilesia, are =really several degrees warmer than the
eurreuedinguplands.
In the Warsaw area, snow falls on about 60 days each year and the
ground in usually snov.covered for about 2 months. In the plateau regions,
the snow cover may last for 3 months. In the Carpathians, 30.40 inches of
snow ire not mammon. These deeper mountain snows normally remain an
the ground four or more months.
Summers throughout most of Poland are warm. July averages in the
plains, hills, and plateaas are between 630 and 66? F. Temperatures over
909 are almost unknown. The northern littoral, ebieh is warmest in winter,
is several degree's cooler than the plains in suanwas, and the eastern Labile
Plateau, ehieh is very cad in einter? is the hottest part of Poland in
the summer. In the far south, the mountain =mere are mild or cool
temperatures are sometimes more than 20 degrees below thos on the plains.
The growing season is about 170 days long, but it varies according to
altitude, exposure, and soil Oonditions. The richest agricultural areas,
A
SMIRIer
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on the southern upland plains, have 174.180 consecutive frost-free dam.
the :central plain to the north of it has /55470; and the Baltic coast has
180 or more.
Iestern Poland and the Central Plain normally receive 1921r inches
of rainfall annually. The amount increases slightly to the eastward and
.averages'23 inches near the Russian border. To the south the increase is
more pronounced. The plateaus receive 25-32 indhes, Whereas the higher
Carpathians receive 44 inches or more.
Summer rains account for almost two-thirds of the total annual precipi-
tation, most of which falls in the form of thunder Showers. July is the
rainiest month. Rainfall is normally- adequate for grain crops, and
droujhts are rare..
Spring and autumn are Short, stori y. intervals between winter and
summor. The heavy spring rains, together with molting mow, are often
the cense of severe flooding in the piedmont and plains areas.
1-10
SMUT
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81ERET
APPENDIX 3*
POPULATION OF POLAND ACCORDING TO NATIONALITT1
491611FE?ga=? 1222 M
(Pt) (Paercent)
Poll&
69
85e?
Ukrainian
14
JowiaL
8
?White Russian
4,
German
4
9a)
Other
_NI
..462
100
100.0
/The figures for 1946 were incomplete and subject to alteration as
the result of further movements of population. The population of
Poland is estimated to be 97 percent Polish as of 1950.
POPULATION OF POLAND ACCORDING TO AGE
hga-Caraza
2222
(Percent)
Under 29
4446
2059
48.0
60 ane ever
.14
100.0
WM .
(Percent)
43
49
....1
100
POPULATION OF POLAND ACCatDING TO RELIGION
falialsmAtfilliansm
2232
(Percent) ?
32221
(Percent)
Roman Catholic'
64.0
96
Greek Catholia
10.9
.
Greek Orthodox
12.4
..
Protestant
2.7
.
Hebrew
9.7
..
Other
.11
....ti
10040
100
* This Appendix contains information available to CIA as of 26 October 1950.
B-1
Mani WM
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APPENDIX C*
PRODUCTION INDEX..FOR SELECTED POLISH INDUSTRIES, 1947-501/
(1938 100; old boundaries)
1262
litualanauLltialas
Iron, Steal, and Ferro Alloys
Iron Ore 69
Pig Iron 98
Raw Steel 110
Rolled Steel
NonFerroas Metals
Lowl 65
Zinc 67
Cadmias - 66
Cement 111
232611
SO
124
128
345
93
83
93
Z24.2a2
3.46
3.39
440
100
101
133.
116
Este
101
169
157
469
100
102
131
116
LB&
Coal
86
102
106
312
Grade Oil
25
28
30
. 30
Electric Power
aumdmla
169
192
208
230
Calcium Carbide
70
160
165
165
Caustic Saba
/01
14/
195
201
Soda Ash
108
142
146
154
Ammonia (as N)
78
95
97
Phosphate Fertiliser
140
150
Sulphuric Acid
79
99
117
128
:Ismdillma
Cotton Cloth
68
90
98
101
Woolen Cloth
73.
92
115
110
'item
42
49
49
54
y The wide ramgse shown by the indices in some categoric? may be partly
attributed to postwar boundary changes.
* This Appendix contains information available to CIA as of 26 October 1953.
04111
SMRET
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ma Mg 1912 1212 Est.
tiaa.ZMARIdialS2
Freight Traffic
(tic teas kilometer )
95
126
147
156
Freight Traffic
(thonsana tons)
117
152
172
169
Passenger Traffic
(passenger kilometers)
240
262
251
250
Passenger Traffic
(passengers)
247
172
175
170
G (io 2
SEDREr
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WORN
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION INDEX, 1947650
(1935-39 average - 100)
19.2 12-4/192222
fasalitima
Wheat
57
76
83
87
Tkre
61
92
93
98
Barley
77
74
87
93
Oats
62
76
so
81
Sugar
77
89
89
Patateee
knaillgagilLbarta
70
78
89
Cattle
48
53
58
60
liege
46
52
60
67
Sheep end Goats
50
72
82
85
!braes
64
73
84
95
UGRIC
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STAT
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R
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The northern part of East Prussia and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are administered by the U.S.S.R.; the Government of the United States
has not recognized the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union.
The international boundaries shown on this map do not correspond in Cl! cases to the boundaries recognized by the U. S. Government.
10626 January 1947 Department of State. MI
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